What is the face of the Kursk arc. Northern front. Justice has been restored. New explanatory and word-formative dictionary of the Russian language, T. F. Efremova

The Kursk Bulge (Battle of Kursk) is a strategic salient in the area of ​​the city of Kursk. From July 5 to August 23, 1943, one of the most significant battles of the Great Patriotic War took place here (06/22/1941 – 05/09/1945). After the defeat at Stalingrad, the German army wanted to take revenge and regain the offensive initiative. The General Staff of the Wehrmacht (German armed forces) developed Operation Citadel. Its goal was to encircle a huge group of Red Army troops in the area of ​​​​the city of Kursk. To do this, it was planned to strike from the north (Army Group "Center" from Orel) and the south (Army Group "South" from Belgorod) towards each other. Having united, the Germans formed a cauldron for two fronts of the Red Army at once (Central and Voronezh). After this, the troops of the German army had to send their forces to Moscow.

Army Group Center was led by Field Marshal Hans Günther Adolf Ferdinand von Kluge (1882 - 1944), and Army Group South was led by Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (1887 - 1973). To implement Operation Citadel, the Germans concentrated enormous forces. In the north, the organizational strike force was led by the commander of the 9th Army, Colonel General Otto Moritz Walter Model (1891 - 1945); in the south, the coordination and leadership of the tank units was carried out by Colonel General Hermann Hoth (1885 - 1971).

Scheme of the Battle of Kursk

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (the body of highest military command that exercised strategic leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945) decided to first conduct a defensive battle in the Battle of Kursk. Next, having withstood the enemy’s blows and exhausted his forces, at a critical moment launch crushing counterattacks against the enemy. Everyone understood that the most difficult thing in this operation would be to withstand the enemy's onslaught. The Kursk Bulge was divided into two parts - the northern and southern faces. In addition, understanding the scale and significance of the upcoming operation, the reserve Steppe Front was located behind the ledge under the command of Colonel General Ivan Stepanovich Konev (1897 - 1973).

Northern face of the Kursk Bulge

The northern face is also called the Oryol-Kursk Bulge. The length of the defense line was 308 km. The Central Front was located here under the command of Army General Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky (1896 - 1968). The front included five combined arms armies (60, 65, 70, 13 and 48). The front reserve was mobile. It included the 2nd Tank Army, as well as the 9th and 19th Tank Corps. The headquarters of the front commander was located in the village of Svoboda near Kursk. Currently there is a museum dedicated to the Battle of Kursk on this site. Here they recreated the dugout of K.K. Rokossovsky, from where the commander led the battles. The interior is very modest, just the bare necessities. In the corner on the bedside table there is an HF communication device, through which you can contact the General Staff and Headquarters at any time. Adjacent to the main room is a rest room, where the commander could restore his strength by resting his head on a camp metal bed. Naturally, there was no electric lighting; simple kerosene lamps burned. At the entrance to the dugout there was a small room for the duty officer. This is how a man lived in combat conditions, under whose command were hundreds of thousands of people and a huge amount of various equipment.

Dugout of Rokossovsky K.K.

Based on intelligence data and his combat experience, Rokossovsky K.K. determined with a high degree of certainty the direction of the main German attack on the Olkhovatka-Ponyri section. The 13th Army occupied positions in this place. Its front segment was reduced to 32 kilometers and reinforced with additional forces. To the left of it, covering the Fatezh-Kursk direction, was the 70th Army. Positions on the right flank of the 13th Army, in the Maloarkhangelsk region, were occupied by the 48th Army.

The artillery preparation carried out by the Red Army troops against Wehrmacht positions on the morning of July 5, 1943 played a certain role in the beginning of the battle. The Germans were simply dumbfounded by surprise. In the evening, Hitler's farewell address was read to them. Full of determination, early in the morning they prepared to go on the attack and defeat the enemy to smithereens. And so, at the most inopportune moment, thousands of Russian shells fell on the Germans. Having suffered losses and lost offensive fervor, the Wehrmacht began its attack only 2 hours after the scheduled time. Despite the artillery bombardment, the power of the Germans was very strong. The main blow was delivered to Olkhovatka and Ponyri by three infantry and four tank divisions. Four more infantry divisions went on the offensive at the junction between the 13th and 48th armies, to the left of Maloarkhangelsk. Three infantry divisions attacked the right flank of the 70th Army, in the direction of the Teplovsky Heights. Near the village of Soborovka there is a large field along which German tanks walked and walked towards Olkhovatka. Artillerymen played a major role in the battle. At the cost of incredible efforts, they resisted the advancing enemy. To strengthen the defense, the command of the Central Front ordered some of our tanks to be dug into the ground, thus increasing their invulnerability. To protect the Ponyri station, the surrounding area was covered with numerous minefields. In the midst of the battle this provided great assistance to our troops.

In addition to the already known tanks, the Germans used their new self-propelled guns (self-propelled artillery units) Ferdinand here. They were specifically designed to destroy enemy tanks and fortifications. Ferdinand weighed 65 tons and had frontal armor twice that of the Tiger heavy tank. Our guns could not hit self-propelled guns only if they were the most powerful and at very close range. Ferdinand’s gun penetrated armor over 100 mm. at a distance of 2 km. (armor of the Tiger heavy tank). The self-propelled gun had an electric transmission. Two engines drove two generators. From them, the electric current was transmitted to two electric motors, each rotating its own wheel. At that time this was a very interesting decision. Self-propelled guns Ferdinand, made with the latest technology, were used only on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge (they were not on the southern front). The Germans formed two heavy anti-tank battalions (653 and 654) with 45 vehicles each. Seeing this colossus crawling towards you through the sights of a cannon, but nothing can be done, is not a sight for the faint of heart.

The fighting was very fierce. The Wehrmacht was rushing forward. It seemed that this German power could not be stopped. Only thanks to the talent of K.K. Rokossovsky, who created a deeply layered defense in the direction of the main attack and concentrated more than half of the front’s personnel and artillery in this sector, was it possible to withstand the enemy’s onslaught. In seven days, the Germans brought almost all their reserves into the battle and advanced only 10-12 km. They never managed to break through the tactical defense zone. Soldiers and officers fought heroically for their land. The poet Evgeny Dolmatovsky wrote the poem “Ponyri” about the defenders of the Oryol-Kursk Bulge. It contains these lines:

There were no mountains or rocks here,

There were no ditches or rivers here.

Here a Russian man stood,

Soviet man.

By July 12, the Germans were exhausted and they stopped the offensive. Rokossovsky K.K. tried to take care of the soldiers. Of course, war is war and losses are inevitable. It’s just that Konstantin Konstantinovich always had many fewer of these losses. He spared neither mines nor shells. More ammunition can be made, but it takes a lot of time to raise a person and make him a good soldier. People felt this and always treated him with respect. Rokossovsky K.K. and previously had great fame among the troops, but after the Battle of Kursk his fame soared very high. They started talking about him as an outstanding commander. It was not for nothing that he commanded the Victory Parade on June 24, 1945, which was hosted by G.K. Zhukov. The country's leadership also valued him. Even Stalin himself I.V. after the Great Patriotic War, he apologized to him for his arrest in 1937. He invited the marshal to his dacha in Kuntsevo. Walking past the flowerbed with him, Joseph Vissarionovich broke a bouquet of white roses with his bare hands. Handing them to K.K. Rokossovsky, he said: “Before the war, we greatly offended you. Please forgive us..." Konstantin Konstantinovich noticed that the thorns of the roses injured the hands of Stalin I.V., leaving small drops of blood.

On November 26, 1943, near the village of Tyoploye, the first monument to military glory during the Great Patriotic War was unveiled. This modest obelisk glorifies the feat of the artillerymen. Then many more monuments will be erected along the defense line of the Central Front. Museums and memorials will be opened, but for veterans of the Battle of Kursk this simple monument to artillerymen will be the most expensive, because it is the first.

Monument to artillerymen near the village. Warm

Southern face of the Kursk Bulge

On the southern front, the defense was held by the Voronezh Front under the command of Army General Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin (1901 - 1944). The length of the defense line was 244 km. The front included five combined arms armies (38, 40, 6th Guards and 7th Guards - stood in the first echelon of defense, 69th Army and 35th Guards Rifle Corps - in the second echelon of defense). The front reserve was mobile. It included the 1st Tank Army, as well as the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps. Before the Germans began their offensive, artillery preparation was carried out, which slightly weakened their first onslaught. Unfortunately, it was extremely difficult to determine exactly the direction of the main attack on the Voronezh front. It was carried out by the Wehrmacht in the Oboyan area, against the positions of the 6th Guards Army. The Germans tried to build on their success by advancing along the Belgorod-Kursk highway, but they failed. Units of the 1st Tank Army were sent to help the 6th Army. The Wehrmacht sent a diversionary attack on the 7th Guards Army in the Korocha area. Taking into account the current situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered Colonel General Konev to transfer two armies from the Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front - the 5th combined arms and the 5th tank. Having not advanced sufficiently near Oboyan, the German command decided to transfer the main attack to the Prokhorovka area. This direction was covered by the 69th Army. In addition to the Tigers, the Wehrmacht used its new Pz tanks on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. V "Panther" in the amount of 200 pcs.

Tank battle near Prokhorovka

On July 12, southwest of Prokhorovka, the Germans launched an offensive. The command of the Voronezh Front sent here the 5th Guards Tank Army with two attached tank corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps a little earlier. One of the largest tank battles in the entire history of World War II took place here (09/01/1939 – 09/02/1945). To stop the advance of the 2nd SS Tank Corps (400 tanks), the corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army (800 tanks) were thrown into a frontal attack. Despite the seemingly large advantage in the number of tanks, the 5th Guards Tank Army was inferior in their “quality.” It consisted of: 501 T-34 tanks, 264 light T-70 tanks and 35 heavy Churchill III tanks with low speed and insufficient maneuverability. Our tanks could not compare with the enemy in striking range. To knock out the German Pz. VI "Tiger" our T-34 tank needed to approach at a distance of 500 meters. The Tiger itself with 88 mm. with a cannon he effectively fought a duel at a distance of up to 2000 meters.

It was possible to fight in such conditions only in close combat. But it was necessary to shorten the distance in some incomprehensible way. Despite everything, our ordinary Soviet tank crews survived and stopped the Germans. Honor and praise to them for this. The price of such a feat was very high. Losses in the tank corps of the 5th Guards Army reached 70 percent. Currently, Prokhorovskoe Field has the status of a museum of federal significance. All these tanks and guns are installed here in memory of the Soviet people who, at the cost of their lives, turned the tide of the war.

Part of the exposition of the Prokhorovskoe Field memorial

Completion of the Battle of Kursk

Having withstood the onslaught of the Germans on the Northern front of the Kursk Bulge, on July 12, the troops of the Bryansk Front and the left wing of the Western Front launched an offensive in the Oryol direction. A little later, on July 15, the troops of the Central Front struck in the direction of the village of Kromy. Thanks to the efforts of the attackers, on August 5, 1943, the city of Orel was liberated. On July 16, the troops of the Voronezh Front and then on July 19, the troops of the Steppe Front also went on the offensive. Developing a counterattack, on August 5, 1943, they liberated the city of Belgorod. In the evening of the same day, fireworks were given for the first time in Moscow in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod. Without losing the initiative, the troops of the Steppe Front (with the support of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts) liberated the city of Kharkov on August 23, 1943.

The Battle of Kursk (Kursk Bulge) is one of the largest battles of the Second World War. Over 4 million people from both sides took part in it. A huge number of tanks, planes, guns and other equipment were involved. Here the initiative finally passed to the Red Army and the whole world realized that Germany had lost the war.

Battle of Kursk on the map

12.04.2018

A small German heavy self-propelled gun Panzerjäger Tiger (P), better known asFerdinand, left a noticeable mark in historical memory and in Soviet tank building. The word “Ferdinand” itself became a household word: the Red Army soldiers “noticed” these self-propelled guns in various sectors of the Soviet-German front, right up to the end of the war. In practice, only 91 such machines were built, but truly massivelyFerdinand They were used only in the summer of 1943 during Operation Citadel on the Kursk Bulge. In this battle, the Germans lost more than a third of all vehicles of this type.

Despite the fact that self-propelled gunsFerdinand (later known asElefant) were used rather limitedly, they proved to be a very effective anti-tank weapon. The command of the Red Army to the brainchildPorsche K. G. AndAlkett took it very seriously. AppearanceFerdinand at the front directly affected the development of Soviet tanks, tank guns and anti-tank artillery.

Impact force on the northern face

The Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GBTU KA) had no idea that German industry had created such an impressive combat vehicle until its appearance at the front. The allies in the anti-Hitler coalition did not know about it either. This is explained simply: the fact is that the Panzerjäger Tiger (P) was built in the spring of 1943, and went into battle in early July. In the short time that preparations for Operation Citadel were underway, information about “Ferdinand” did not have time to leak through the front line. At the same time, even about the “Panther”, for which the battle on the Kursk Bulge also became a combat debut, the allies received at least some information, albeit inaccurate.

The study of the German novelty began on July 15, that is, during the Battle of Kursk. A group of NIBT Polygon officers arrived at the Central Front, consisting of engineer-colonel Kalidov, senior technician-lieutenant Kzhak and technician-lieutenant Serov. By that time, the fighting in the area of ​​the Ponyri station and the state farm on May 1 had died down. In addition to the direct inspection of German vehicles, specialists interrogated German prisoners of war. Soviet soldiers and officers who took part in battles against German combat vehicles also shared information. Finally, German instructions for Ferdinand fell into the hands of the Soviet military.

A survey of prisoners allowed us to obtain a large amount of information, including on the organization of anti-tank divisions, which were armed with Ferdinand self-propelled guns. Additionally, NIBT Polygon specialists received information on other units that participated in battles together with the 653rd and 654th divisions, which were armed with heavy tank destroyers.

Ferdinand with tail number 501, which was delivered to the NIBT Test Site in September 1943

The information obtained made it possible to reconstruct the picture of the combat use of the divisions with the Ferdinands and their neighbors, who used the StuH 42 and Sturmpanzer IV self-propelled guns. The Ferdinands, which had thick armor, acted as a ram, moving at the head of the battle formations of the strike group. According to the information collected, the cars were walking in a line. Thanks to powerful weapons capable of hitting Soviet tanks at long distances, Ferdinand crews could open fire at a distance of up to 3 kilometers. If necessary, German vehicles retreated backing away, leaving thick frontal armor under enemy fire. So they could, while retreating, continue to fire at Soviet tanks. The shooting was carried out from short stops.

The shell mark on the left side is clearly visible. The same mark is also on the side of the car in the Patriot park.

Against well-protected German self-propelled guns, Soviet tank guns turned out to be almost useless. Of the 21 vehicles examined by GBTU KA specialists, only one, with onboard 602, had a hole in the left side. The hit was in the area of ​​the gas tank, a fire broke out, and the self-propelled gun burned out. The tactics of the German self-propelled gunners could well have worked, if not for one “but”: they had to attack a layered line of defense, in which there were far more than just tanks. The most terrible enemy of “Ferdinand” was the Soviet sappers. 10 vehicles were blown up by laid mines and land mines, including a self-propelled gun with tail number 501. This self-propelled gun with serial number 150072 turned out to be the vehicle of Oberleutnant Hans-Joachim Wilde, commander of the 1st battery (5./654) of the 654th heavy division tank destroyers.

5 Ferdinands were hit by shells in the chassis and were disabled. Another 2 vehicles were hit in both the chassis and guns. The vehicle with tail number 701 became a victim of Soviet artillery. The shell, which hit the roof of the cabin along an overhead trajectory, pierced the hatch and exploded inside the fighting compartment. Another car was hit by an aerial bomb, which completely destroyed the wheelhouse. Finally, a vehicle with tail number II-01 from the headquarters of the 654th division was destroyed by Soviet infantry. A well-aimed hit from a Molotov cocktail caused a fire and the crew burned inside.

The letter N indicates that it was a vehicle from the 654th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion, commanded by Major Karl-Hans Noack

In fact, the losses of the divisions that were armed with Ferdinands were even higher. In total, during Operation Citadel, 39 self-propelled guns of this type were irretrievably lost. The results of the battle of Ponyri clearly showed that the Red Army had learned to fight with significantly superior enemy forces, because the German tank forces had an undeniable advantage in this battle. The Soviet tank industry was able to give a full response to the new generation of German tanks and self-propelled guns only in the spring of 1944, when the T-34-85 and IS-2 entered service with the troops. However, the Germans lost the Battle of Kursk. As the battles near Ponyri showed, the advantage in tanks was not always the most important factor. The Ferdinands were unable to break through the northern front of the Kursk Bulge.

To Kubinka for experiments

The first group of specialists from the NIBT Test Site left the combat area on August 4. On August 24, the second group arrived here, consisting of engineer-major Khinsky, senior technician-lieutenant Ilyin and lieutenant Burlakov. The task of the group, which operated on the Central Front until September 8, was to select the most intact captured German vehicles and deliver them to the NIBT Test Site. Two cars were selected. In addition to the already mentioned self-propelled gun with tail number 501, it was also a self-propelled gun with serial number 15090. It also hit a mine. One vehicle was used for direct study and fire tests, the second was fired from domestic and foreign guns.

The damage on the right side was minimal.

The study of captured vehicles began even before they ended up at the NIBT Test Site. The first shelling tests of the damaged Ferdinand were carried out on July 20-21, 1943. It turned out that the side of the German vehicle was penetrated by a sub-caliber projectile from a 45-mm anti-tank gun at a distance of 200 meters. The 76-mm ZIS-3 cannon also penetrated German armor at a distance of 400 meters with a sub-caliber projectile. For the 85-mm 52-K cannon and the 122-mm A-19 hull cannon, the side armor of the German self-propelled gun was also not a serious problem. It is worth noting that the armor of the Ferdinands, especially those with serial numbers up to 150060, was worse than that of the Pz.Kpfw.Tiger Ausf.E. For this reason, subsequent shelling tests of the vehicle with serial number 150090 had slightly different results.

"Ferdinand" with tail number 501 turned out to be a victim of Soviet sappers

Captured documents were also studied. Already by July 21, the Red Army had at its disposal accurate data on the performance characteristics of the German self-propelled gun. Moreover, it was known exactly how many Ferdinands were built. The data was drawn from the summary instructions for arming the German army, captured among other documents:

“In terms of its armor and weapons, it is an exceptionally strong weapon for fighting tanks and for supporting an offensive in the face of strong enemy resistance. Large weight, low speed on the battlefield, and low maneuverability limit the possibilities of combat use and require particularly careful reconnaissance before being introduced into battle.

90 units were produced, formed into a heavy anti-tank regiment consisting of two divisions of 45 guns each.”

Self-propelled guns selected by a group of specialists from the NIBT Polygon arrived in Kubinka in September 1943. Immediately after arrival, the study of the sample with tail number 501 began. There was no talk of sea trials at that time, there was not enough time. Instead, the testers compiled a brief description of a German self-propelled gun, which they called “Ferdinand (Tiger P).” Thanks to existing materials, it was possible to accurately indicate the characteristics of the machine.

This self-propelled gun had its evacuation hatch removed. On the museum car it was welded to the roof so it wouldn’t get lost

The assessment of the German new product turned out to be, to put it mildly, ambiguous. The obvious advantages of the vehicle were armor protection, as well as powerful weapons. At the same time, even the tank’s armament raised questions. A study of the 88 mm Pak 43 gun showed that the aiming speed using its rotating mechanism is low. Conducting aimed fire was only possible from a standstill or from short stops. Soviet experts considered the vehicle's visibility to be poor. These conclusions were indirectly confirmed by German designers. During the modernization of the Ferdinand, which began in the fall of 1943 (around the same time, the vehicle changed its designation to Elefant), the vehicles received a commander's cupola. True, this did not improve the situation much.

Another significant drawback of the German self-propelled gun was its small ammunition load, consisting of only 38 rounds. The crews corrected the situation on their own: in self-propelled guns they found wooden stowages that had been improvised in the field.

A dismantled installation during shelling. NIBT Test Site, December 1943

Compiling a description, however, was not the most important task for the NIBT Polygon specialists. It was much more important to determine where and with what the German novelty could be hit. After the battle of Ponyri, the threat posed by the Ferdinand was taken very seriously. The vehicle made an indelible impression on the Soviet infantry and tank crews. A steel colossus, which is almost impossible to penetrate into the frontal projection, appeared in different parts of the front. For this reason, it was necessary to know exactly which systems and at what distance were capable of hitting a heavy German tank destroyer.

For a sub-caliber projectile from a 45-mm anti-tank gun, the sides of the German self-propelled gun turned out to be quite penetrable

The shelling test program for the Ferdinand hull was signed on September 29, 1943. But the tests themselves were only able to begin on December 1. During this time, the range of weapons with which it was planned to fire at the trophy was expanded. In addition to domestic, German artillery systems and Allied guns, the NII-6 anti-tank grenade was also used, later adopted for service as the RPG-6. As tests have shown, the cumulative grenade confidently pierced the side of the self-propelled gun, after which the jet pierced the shield made of inch boards installed inside the hull.

Next on the list was the 45 mm gun installed in the T-70 tank. Its armor-piercing shell did not penetrate the German vehicle at a distance of 100 meters, which turned out to be quite expected. But the sub-caliber projectile hit both the side of the hull and the side of the wheelhouse at the same distance. At a distance of 200 meters, a sub-caliber projectile managed to penetrate the side, and the deckhouse turned out to be stronger.

Results of shelling a vehicle from a 6-pounder tank gun

The 57-mm tank gun installed in the Churchill tank was also capable of penetrating the side of the German self-propelled gun. From a distance of 500 meters, armor 80 (85) mm thick penetrated confidently. The fire came from the 43-caliber version of the gun; the Valentine XI/X and Churchill III/IV delivered in 1943 had longer guns.

For tank guns of 75 and 76 mm caliber, the side of the German vehicle turned out to be a difficult obstacle

Things were worse with the shelling of a German self-propelled gun from a 75-mm M3 cannon installed in an American M4A2 medium tank. The M61 armor-piercing shell was unable to penetrate the side of the wheelhouse even from a distance of 100 meters. True, two hits on the weld connecting the front and left side sheets of the cabin led to its cracking. However, the same shell pierced the side of the Ferdinand hull already at a distance of 500 meters. The armor-piercing shell of the Soviet 76-mm F-34 tank gun behaved even worse, which, however, was not news.

The D-5S board of the Ferdinand struck at a distance of almost a kilometer

The results of firing at the side of a German self-propelled gun from the D-5S cannon installed in the SU-85 were not surprising either. At a distance of 900 meters, it confidently penetrated both the side of the hull and the side of the wheelhouse. When a shell hit the inside of the sheet, the armor was spalled; the fragments left the crew of the fighting compartment no chance of survival. However, by the time the SU-85, and then other Soviet combat vehicles equipped with 85-mm cannons, appeared at the front, the chances of meeting the Ferdinand on the battlefield had noticeably decreased.

This penetration from the D-25T was not counted. But if it happened in a real situation, the crew of “Ferdinand” would not care

All of the systems listed above were not used to fire at a self-propelled gun from the front, which is understandable: it would hardly be possible to penetrate 200 mm of armor with their help. The first gun used to fire at the front hull plate was the 122-mm D-25 cannon installed in a prototype of the IS-2 tank. The first shell, fired from a distance of 1400 meters at the frontal plate of the hull, pierced the screen and ricocheted. The second shell, fired at the same distance into the wheelhouse, left a dent 100 mm deep and 210x200 mm in size. The third shell got stuck in the armor, but still partially entered it. The penetration was not counted, but in practice such a defeat would have put the gun crew out of action. This time shooting was not carried out at shorter distances, but, as subsequent events showed, hits at distances of 1200 meters or less ended in penetration. The testers considered the maximum distance for penetration to be 1000 meters.

The Panther's cannon pierced a self-propelled gun in the forehead of the hull from 100 meters

This was followed by shelling from a 75-mm KwK 42 L/71 cannon mounted on a German Pz.Kpfw.Panther Ausf.D tank. At a distance of 100 meters, the forehead of the hull was penetrated. But it was not possible to break through the wheelhouse from 200 meters.

These results were influenced by damage from previous hits. But the meeting with the ML-20 did not bode well for Ferdinand

The most terrible test was shelling from the 152-mm ML-20 howitzer gun installed in the ISU-152 prototype. A second hit to the frontal part of the hull resulted in both the screen and the sheet being broken in half. Last but not least, this result was obtained due to the unwelded embrasure of the front-facing machine gun, which was again installed on the Elefant.

A clear demonstration of why another car was sent to the trophy exhibition in Moscow

At this point, it was decided to stop the shelling tests. ML-20 turned the Ferdinand into a pile of rubble. It was supposed to send the shot car to a trophy exhibition in Moscow, but later the decision was changed. For the demonstration, another vehicle was taken, which was also fired at (it was quite likely that it was the Ferdinand, which was fired at in the summer of 1943). Together with her, a whole self-propelled gun went to the exhibition. The vehicle with tail number 501 remained at the NIBT Test Site.

Catalyst for the arms race

The appearance of a new German self-propelled gun on the Kursk Bulge was taken very seriously by the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GBTU KA). The start of new developments was partly provoked by the combat debut of the Panthers. Of course, what happened cannot be compared with the activity that began after the appearance of the Tiger. However, already at the beginning of September 1943, a letter was sent to Stalin signed by the head of the GBTU KA, Lieutenant General Fedorenko. In connection with the emergence of new models of German armored vehicles, he proposed to begin the development of promising tanks and self-propelled guns.

A direct consequence of the appearance of the Ferdinand was the beginning of the development of the heavy tank Object 701, the future IS-4. In addition, work on the 122-mm D-25T cannon, which began in May 1943, was accelerated. Moreover, it was planned to replace it with an even more powerful weapon with an initial projectile speed of up to 1000 m/s. Work began on creating more powerful guns of 85 and 152 mm caliber. Finally, the issue of developing a 100-mm gun with the ballistics of a naval gun was again on the agenda. Thus began the history of the D-10S, the main armament of the SU-100 self-propelled gun.

Cooling system diagram prepared by NIBT Polygon

All this is just a part of the activities that were launched or restarted in connection with the appearance of Ferdinand. Thanks to the German heavy self-propelled guns, the Soviet program to create an electric transmission was also “resurrected”. They have been working on it in the USSR since the early 30s; such a transmission was supposed to be used on the KV-3. The serial German heavy vehicle with electric transmission forced Soviet specialists to return to this work again. However, our engineers did not copy German developments. The program, to which the famous science fiction writer Kazantsev (and part-time military engineer of the 3rd rank and chief engineer of plant No. 627) was involved, developed independently.

Specification of armor plates for the Ferdinand chassis, prepared by NII-48 in 1944

The design of the German car aroused great interest in the USSR. The hull and deckhouse were studied at NII-48, a leading enterprise dealing with armor issues. Based on the results of the study, several reports were prepared. NII-48 engineers created armor and a hull of optimal shape - with good protection and relatively low weight. The result of this work was a more rational form of hulls and turrets, which began to be introduced in the second half of 1944, first on heavy and later on medium tanks.

These developments were also influenced by the study of the gun mounted on the Ferdinand. In 1944, the creation of armor protection capable of withstanding this gun became a priority for Soviet designers. And they coped with it much better than their German colleagues. By the end of 1944, the first experimental tanks appeared, the protection of which made it possible to confidently resist German guns. The IS-3 and T-54 tanks “grew” from just such developments.

Other elements of the Ferdinand were also studied, for example the suspension. This development was not used in Soviet industry, but it aroused some interest. The report on the study of the Porsche suspension was compiled at the request of the British.

Scheme of the Ferdinand suspension from the album of torsion bar suspensions prepared by the NIBT Polygon in 1945

The most important result of studying the German machine was the emergence of means to effectively combat it. The IS-2 heavy tank and the ISU-122 self-propelled gun were adopted by the Red Army. There are at least two known cases of collision between the IS-2 and the Elefant in the summer of 1944. In both cases, the IS-2 crew under the command of Lieutenant B.N. Slyunyaeva emerged victorious. The most notable battle was on July 22, 1944: a column of the 71st Guards Heavy Tank Regiment was heading towards Magerov when fire was opened on the heavy tanks from an ambush. Slyunyaev's tank, under the cover of a second vehicle, advanced to the crossroads. After observing the ambush for 10-15 minutes, the IS-2 approached it at a distance of 1000 meters and returned fire. As a result, the Elefant, 2 anti-tank guns and an armored personnel carrier were destroyed.

Three weeks later, the same regiment was the first to fight the newest German Pz.Kpfw heavy tanks. Tiger Ausf.B. It was then that it turned out that the measures taken by Soviet designers turned out to be very useful. The "Royal Tiger" had more resistant frontal armor than the "Ferdinand", which did not prevent Soviet tankers from winning a dry duel with the latest German tanks. While preparing to fight the Ferdinands, the Soviet tank industry also prepared for the emergence of a new generation of German heavy tanks. As a result, such a powerful qualitative superiority in tanks, which the Wehrmacht received on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, did not happen in the summer of 1944. And the German tank industry had no time left for other serious attempts to change the existing balance of power.

4 July 1943, at 16:00, after air and artillery strikes on military outpost positions of the Voronezh Front, German troops with up to an infantry division, supported by up to 100 tanks, conducted reconnaissance in force from the Tomarovka area to the north. The battle between the combat guards of the Voronezh Front and the reconnaissance units of Army Group South lasted until late at night. Under cover of the battle, German troops took up their starting position for the attack. According to the testimony of German prisoners captured in this battle, as well as defectors who surrendered on July 3-4, it became known that the general offensive of German troops on this section of the front was scheduled for 2 hours 30 minutes on July 5.

To facilitate the position of the combat guard and inflict losses on German troops in their initial positions, at 22:30 on July 4, the artillery of the Voronezh Front conducted a 5-minute artillery attack on the identified German artillery positions. At 3 a.m. on July 5, counterpreparations were carried out in full.

Defensive battles on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge were distinguished by great ferocity and heavy losses on our side. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, the nature of the terrain was more favorable for the use of tanks than on the northern front. Secondly, the representative of the Headquarters, A. Vasilevsky, who was overseeing the preparation of the defense, forbade the commander of the Voronezh Front, N. Vatutin, to unite anti-tank strong points into areas and assign them to infantry regiments, believing that such a decision would complicate control. And thirdly, German air supremacy here lasted almost two days longer than on the Central Front.

The main blow was delivered by German troops in the defense zone of the 6th Guards Army, along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, simultaneously in two areas. Up to 400 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated in the first section, and up to 300 in the second.

The first attack on the positions of the 6th Guards. The army in the direction of Cherkassk began at 6 o'clock on July 5 with a powerful raid of dive bombers. Under cover of the raid, a motorized infantry regiment went on the attack with the support of 70 tanks. However, he was stopped in the minefields and was additionally fired upon by heavy artillery. An hour and a half later the attack was repeated. Now the attacking forces were doubled. In the forefront were German sappers, trying to make passages in the minefields. But this attack was repelled by infantry and artillery fire from the 67th Infantry Division. Under the influence of heavy artillery fire, German tanks were forced to break formation even before entering into fire contact with our troops, and the “impudent mining” carried out by Soviet sappers greatly hampered the maneuver of combat vehicles. In total, the Germans lost 25 medium tanks and assault guns here from mines and heavy artillery fire.

German tanks, supported by assault guns, attack the Soviet defenses. July 1943. The silhouette of a bomber is visible in the air.

To enlarge - click on the image

The Mapder III tank destroyer moves past the exploded MZ Lee medium tank.

A column of one of the motorized units of the German troops is heading towards the front. Oboyanskoe e.g., July 1943

Having failed to take Cherkassy with a frontal attack, German troops struck in the direction of Butovo. At the same time, several hundred German planes attacked Cherkasskoe and Butovo. By noon on July 5, in this area, the Germans managed to wedge themselves into the defense line of the 6th Guards. army. To restore the breakthrough, the commander of the 6th Guards. I. Chistyakov's army brought in the anti-tank reserve - the 496th IPTAP and the 27th IPTAB. At the same time, the front command gave the order to the 6th Army. advance to the Berezovka area in order to liquidate the planned dangerous breakthrough of German tanks with a flank attack.

Despite the emerging breakthrough of German tanks, by the end of the day on July 5, the artillerymen managed to restore the precarious balance, however, at the cost of large losses of personnel (up to 70%). The reason for this was that the infantry units in a number of defense sectors withdrew in disarray, leaving the artillery in direct fire without cover. During the day of continuous fighting in the Cherkassk-Korovino area, the enemy lost 13 tanks from IPTAP fire, including 3 heavy Tiger types. Our losses in a number of units amounted to up to 50% of personnel and up to 30% of materiel.

On the night of July 6, a decision was made to strengthen the defensive lines of the 6th Guards. army with two tank corps of the 1st Tank Army. By the morning of July 6, the 1st Tank Army, with the forces of the 3rd Mechanized and 6th Tank Corps, took up defense on its designated line, covering the Oboyan direction. In addition, the 6th Guards. the army was additionally reinforced by the 2nd and 5th Guards. TK, which came out to cover the flanks.

The main direction of attacks of German troops the next day was Oboyanskoye. On the morning of July 6, a large column of tanks moved from the Cherkasy region along the road. The guns of the 1837th IPTAP, hidden on the flank, opened sudden fire from a short distance. At the same time, 12 tanks were knocked out, among which one Panther remained on the battlefield. It is interesting to note that in these battles, Soviet artillerymen used the tactics of so-called “flirting guns”, allocated as bait to lure enemy tanks. “Flirting guns” opened fire on the columns from a great distance, forcing the advancing tanks to deploy in minefields and expose their sides to the batteries lying in ambush.

As a result of the fighting on July 6, the Germans managed to capture Alekseevka, Lukhanino, Olkhovka and Trirechnoye and reach the second defensive line. However, on the Belgorod-Oboyan highway their advance was stopped.

German tank attacks in the direction of Bol. The beacons also ended in nothing. Having met heavy fire from Soviet artillery here, the German tanks turned to the northeast, where, after a long battle with units of the 5th Guards Tank. they managed to capture Luchki. A major role in repelling the German attack was played by the 14th IPTAB, which was deployed from the front reserve and deployed at the Yakovlevo-Dubrava line, knocking out up to 50 German combat vehicles (data confirmed by the report of the captured team).

SS artillerymen support the attack of their infantry with fire. Prokhorovskoe eg.

Soviet T-70 tanks of the "Revolutionary Mongolia" column (112 armored vehicles) are moving forward to attack.

PzKpfw IV Ausf H tanks of the Grossdeutschland (Greater Germany) division are fighting.

Radio operators of Field Marshal Manstein's headquarters at work. July 1943

German Panther tanks of the 10th Tank Brigade, PzKpfw IV Ausf G of the Grossdeutschland division and StuG 40 assault guns in the Oboyan direction. July 9-10, 1943

On July 7, the enemy brought up to 350 tanks into battle and continued attacks in the Oboyan direction from the Bol region. Lighthouses, Krasnaya Dubrava. All units of the 1st Tank Army and the 6th Guards entered the battle. army. By the end of the day, the Germans managed to advance in the Bol area. Beacons at 10-12 km. causing heavy losses to the 1st Tank Army. The next day, the Germans brought 400 tanks and self-propelled guns into battle in this area. However, the night before, the command of the 6th Guards. The army was transferred to the threatened direction by the 27th IPTAB, whose task was to cover the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. By the morning, when the enemy broke through the defenses of the infantry and tank units of the 6th Guards. army and the 1st Tank Army and came out, it seemed, onto an open highway; two “flirting” guns of the regiment opened fire on the column from a distance of 1500-2000 m. The column reformed, pushing heavy tanks forward. Up to 40 German bombers appeared over the battlefield. After half an hour, the fire of the “flirting guns” was suppressed, and when the tanks began to rebuild for further movement, the regiment opened fire on them from three directions from an extremely short distance. Since most of the regiment's guns were located on the flank of the column, their fire was very effective. Within 8 minutes, 29 enemy tanks and 7 self-propelled guns were destroyed on the battlefield. The blow was so unexpected that the remaining tanks, without accepting the battle, quickly retreated towards the forest. Of the destroyed tanks, repairmen of the 6th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army were able to repair and put into operation 9 combat vehicles.

On July 9, the enemy continued attacks in the Oboyan direction. Attacks by tanks and motorized infantry were supported by aviation. The strike groups managed to advance here to a distance of up to 6 km, but then they came across well-equipped anti-aircraft artillery positions, adapted for anti-aircraft defense, and tanks buried in the ground.

In the following days, the enemy stopped ramming our defenses with a direct blow and began to look for weak spots in it. Such a direction, according to the German command, was Prokhorovskoye, from where it was possible to get to Kursk by a roundabout route. For this purpose, the Germans concentrated a group in the Prokhorovka area, which included the 3rd Tank, numbering up to 300 tanks and self-propelled guns.

And here is how events developed on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. Here, as well as on the northern front, a preemptive strike was launched against the Germans:
“...on the night of July 4, a Czech defector from the sapper battalion of the 52nd Army Corps said that all German soldiers had been given dry rations for five days and additional portions of schnapps. Judging that in the coming hours the Germans would go on the offensive, the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin, at dawn on July 5, following the planned plan, gave the order to the artillerymen to open pre-emptive fire on German forward positions and troop concentration areas. Intensive artillery counter-preparation lasted about half an hour...” (p. 273).
So the enemy suffered very significant losses here even before the start of the operation. And yet the German offensive began:
“... in terms of the number of guns, the weight of the salvo and fire control, the Russian artillery was incomparably stronger than the German one. The artillery pieces at Manstein's disposal were unable to destroy the Russian defensive positions or clear passages through the minefields. As a result, many tanks were blown up by mines on the approaches to Russian positions and were soon left behind by the advancing German infantry.
The tank crews received strict instructions:
“Under no circumstances should you stop the tank to assist damaged vehicles. Technical assistance is the responsibility of engineering units only. Tank commanders must continue to advance until the tank loses mobility. In cases where the tank loses its mobility, but the weapon’s combat effectiveness remains intact (for example, a technical breakdown or damage to the track), the crew must continue to fire from a stationary tank.”
This order, in essence, doomed the crew of the damaged tank to death, since numerous Soviet guns could shoot a stopped tank in a matter of minutes after it was detonated by a mine” (p. 275).
So the disposition, already before the start of the battle, obliged the Germans to prepare for a total war. It took on a total character, but mostly for the German side. Mellentin:
“We met fierce resistance, and despite the best efforts of our troops, they were unable to advance. In front of the “Great Germany” division there was a swamp, and Russian artillery fired heavily at its dense battle formations. The sappers were unable to establish the necessary crossings, as a result, many tanks became victims of Soviet aviation...” (p. 314).
Further:
“It was not possible to completely clear the area of ​​the minefields left by Soviet troops. The concentration on three kilometers of several hundred combat vehicles from different units, vehicles with four battalions of infantry and artillery tractors, with the road unprepared, could not lead to anything other than traffic jams on the main directions and losses during raids by attack aircraft of the 2nd VA and hits by mines. didn’t bring it” (p. 432).
“The headquarters of the 2nd SS Tank Tank was closely monitoring the situation. At this moment, for the corps command, as well as for the leadership of the entire army, it was very important to break through the front edge of the first most fortified Russian line as quickly as possible and make a decisive push towards the Prokhorovsk direction, even before the Soviet side pulled up mobile operational reserves” (p. 393).
But these mobile reserves, which would be a complete surprise for the Germans, were brought here in advance by us - after all, our generals were practicing meeting the enemy here. And this is how our “thirty-four” “talked” to the enemy already on the second day of his attacks, which were extremely rich in technology. And at that moment the positions of the 1st Tank were attacked by:
“...48th Panzer Corps, SS Panzer Division “Adolf Hitler”, two SS Panzer Corps, Motorized Division “Gross Germany”, SS Panzer Divisions “Totenkopf”, “Reich”, “Viking”.
But there was no time to be afraid of the enemy’s superiority...
The first blow was taken by the 2nd tank battalion under the command of Semyon Vovchenko. The battalion had 10 tanks, but fought with 70 enemy tanks. Within two hours, Semyon Vovchenko’s battalion destroyed 24 enemy tanks, including 14 “tigers”” (pp. 187–188).
So in the very first oncoming battles, our tanks already pretty much kicked in the teeth of the tanks of the future memoirist - each and every winner - Mr. Manstein. And they fought tooth and nail, already dying themselves, while trying to destroy another five “kulturtregers” hidden under the armor, trying in horror to dodge the burning Russian tank going to ram!
This is how Katukov’s wife, herself, understandably, a participant in this battle, describes the feat of Shalandin’s crew in this, the first battle of a tank brigade:
“...Shalandin and his crew members Vladimir Kustov, Vladimir Lakomtsev and Sergeant Pyotr Zelenin entered into battle with a numerically superior enemy. They acted from ambushes, bringing enemy tanks within direct shot range, and then, hitting the sides, burned two “tigers” and one medium tank. Yes, this required strong nerves and a courageous heart!” (p. 188).
But then Shalandin’s tank caught fire. However, instead of leaving the burning tank and being shot point-blank from the machine guns of the approaching enemy tank, the crew, most likely wounded and crippled by a shell hitting the tank, decided to die themselves, but to block the road to the enemy rushing to Kursk.
And here you just have to imagine what horror gripped the crew only a moment before the seemingly successful German ace, who nevertheless set fire to our medium tank with his heavy tank? And what did the crews of all the other German tanks who were nearby at that moment think when they saw this whole picture? And what, perhaps most importantly, did you hear? After all, the communications of the German tanks, unlike ours, worked excellently. At that moment, defense factories were working to improve its quality not only in the part of Europe overrun by Hitler, but, as it turns out, throughout the whole world.
They saw, and most importantly, heard with the dying cry of horror from their colleagues, a prospect that was too unhappy for themselves: in order to escape from the Russian tankers, it is not enough to knock out their tank - they must also move away from the set fire to a respectful distance in time. And this is in order not to fly up into the air from an overabundance of shells, which Europe, which equipped the Germans so generously for their campaign in the East, so generously provided. After all, this in a different situation is simply a priceless warehouse located under the feet of German tankers, who are now simply obliged to detonate in a collision with these crazy Russians!
And our burning tank:
“...went to ram the “tiger”. The “Tiger” caught fire, but the entire crew of our tank also died” (p. 188).
The enemy, of course, hardly counted on this. AND:
“...analysis of the incoming information indicated that the level of resistance of the Soviet troops was underestimated. Each message from the divisions confirmed the previous one - the troops continue to mark time. The prepared plan to break through the advanced positions of the Russians collapsed already at the initial stage, and with it the entire schedule of the corps’ offensive” (p. 393).
This is how these events were described from the German side:
“On the southern front of the arc, a day after the start of the offensive, through the efforts of the 48th Panzer Corps of General Knobelsdorff and the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of General Hausser, the Germans managed to wedge themselves into the Russian defenses... Hoth decided at the first rays of the sun to strike across the Berezovaya River with the forces of the 3rd Panzer divisions and “Greater Germany” divisions. But at night a thunderstorm broke out, torrential rain poured down, the water in the river overflowed its banks and turned the adjacent meadows into a muddy muddy swamp. Under cover of darkness, the Russians brought artillery and tanks to the ruins and surviving houses on the north bank, and both German armored divisions suffered heavy damage from direct Russian fire as they formed up in tight battle formations at dawn. During the day, under the cover of smoke screens, German sappers persistently established crossings. Overhead, a furious artillery duel raged between Soviet guns and concentrated tanks, accompanied by continuous raids by German dive bombers, with which Hoth sought to compensate for the lack of heavy artillery. By evening, the Germans, despite serious losses, were unable to advance a single step. On the night of July 6–7, both divisions were pulled back and reorganized” (p. 279).
“... well-prepared positions, a well-thought-out system of artillery fire and engineering structures - all this amazed the enemy and suggested that if victory were achieved in this operation, then a very high price would have to be paid for it” (p. 451).
But even in other parts of this battlefield, the defeat of the attacking side was already visible at the very beginning:
“Already the first hours of the fighting showed that the reliance on a massive attack by heavy combat vehicles on the Russian defense did not justify itself.
“...Shackled by minefields and natural obstacles, the advancing tanks were a good target for the Russians,” note G. Heinrici and V. Gauk. “Therefore, super-heavy tanks were unable to actually demonstrate their striking power” (p. 114–115)” (p. 431).
There was also some confusion inherent in battles of this scale. This is how the “tiger” company from the 503rd detachment of the 19th TD, Major General G. Schmidt, completed its attack:
“The division report noted:
“...The Tiger company, which crossed during the day under the command of Captain Heitman, failed to break through the enemy fortifications around the Mikhailovka suburb. Almost all the “tigers” were disabled by mines” (TsAMO RF, f. 38 A, op. 9027, d. 46, l. 151–152).
Nine “tigers” were blown up by mines, seven of them on their own…” (p. 435).
And this is how our artillerymen fought here. On July 7, captain of the artillery division Vasily Mironenko accomplished his feat. When, in the heat of battle with the German “tigers,” the gun crew was killed, and enemy tanks were already close to the battery:
“...Mironenko took the place of the gunner and, loading the gun himself, began to shoot the tanks point-blank. He set six tanks on fire. A shell exploded next to him, and Vasily Mironenko was killed. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union” (p. 190).
And this is just one of many episodes that glorified the steadfastness of the Russian people on this fiery Kursk Bulge. Because:
“...despite huge losses, the Germans were unable to break through our front. The enemy has encountered an impenetrable wall” (p. 190).
Here's another episode:
“A hot situation has also developed in the zone of the 6th Tank Corps.
...here the enemy ran into stubborn resistance from the tankers. The enemy lost 74 tanks and had no success” (p. 190).
“Our troops showed courage and bravery. They did not spare their lives, showing mass heroism. These were infantrymen, artillerymen, tank crews, doctors, and logistics personnel - all as one. Everything was given for victory” (p. 191).
Here's the next episode:
“The commander of the 3rd company, Lieutenant Kruglov, let 56 enemy tanks pass through the company. The company was hidden in the cracks, and not a single soldier flinched, there were no losses in the company. After three attacks, enemy losses - 20 tanks were burned and destroyed” (p. 191).
And here is what the Germans who fought here report. Erhard Routh:
“The development of the operation has reached a crisis point. We have no reserves left to throw into battle” (p. 306).
Here are the impressions of our front-line intelligence officer Vladimir Karpov about this moment of the Battle of Kursk:
“Tank armadas, bombed by aviation and shot by artillery, burned in the fields like iron cities.
Finally the Nazis retreated. At first slowly, every now and then rushing into ferocious counterattacks, then faster, but still organized, from line to line. Our troops were hot on their heels. No, not only by the divisions that remained in reserve, but mainly by the same ones that fought to the death in defense. Tired, unshaven, smoke-soaked fighters pressed back the enemy day and night. Fatigue accumulated to such an extent that people sometimes fell asleep on the move and moved forward half asleep, with their eyes closed, holding their hand on a cart, a cannon, or a neighbor” (pp. 226–227).
But until the very moment of its retreat, this southern, more powerful enemy group advanced during this deadly week in one of the sectors to a distance of up to 35 km. But even this, with the speed of advance of tank columns of 5 km per day, speaks specifically about the mountains of corpses that the Germans sacrificed for this last attempt to move across our land with the aim of capturing it.
“On July 6 alone, the enemy lost here more than 200 tanks, tens of thousands of soldiers and about 100 combat aircraft” (p. 153).
“...two guards divisions of General I.M. Chistyakov, in a daily battle, were able to break the plan of the enemy command and hold on their lines the most powerful tank formation of the GA “South” - the Knobelsdorff corps” (p. 364).
“The division of Brigadefuehrer T. Wisch was also marking time. Its armored groups were unable to immediately break through the sector of the 151st Guards. sp... From the diary of the division's summary: “The artillery preparation of our offensive on 5.7.43 went according to plan and, according to the testimony of prisoners, very successfully. The breakthrough with the last bomb at 4.05 was successful only as far as the anti-tank ditch, where the troops lay down and dug in under flanking fire from enemy batteries from the western bank of the Vorskla” (Stadler S. Op. cit. S. 43).
The reader probably noticed an inconsistency in the report: the artillery barrage was successful, but there was no breakthrough. This form of reporting, “we are acting according to a well-developed plan, but there are no results,” was widespread in the German army. The reason for its survivability is its versatility, it suited everyone: both the higher command (everything is going according to plan, failures are a temporary phenomenon), and the executors (we are acting according to your plan; it is brilliant, of course, the enemy’s stubbornness is not taken into account in it and everything is wrong, as we wanted, but we are heroes and under your leadership we will certainly win). After the war, the beaten Wehrmacht generals transferred this proven technique to memoir literature” (p. 388).
But if the Germans only report on some supposed success of their actions, very wisely avoiding mention of losses, then this is what the operational reports of our units looked like that day:
“His headquarters reported in detail to the command of the 1st TA in an operational report by 12.00 on July 7 about the results of the battles on July 6 and the condition of the corps:
“...10th ICBM... Losses: 3 T-34s, 1 person killed, 3 people wounded. Destroyed: 36 tanks, 9 vehicles and up to 70 enemy soldiers and officers...
1st infantry brigade... 13 people were killed, 84 people were wounded. Losses of material and weapons: heavy machine guns - 1, carbines - 1, armored personnel carriers - 1, vehicles - 5. Destroyed: 40 enemy tanks, of which 23 were burned, 17 were knocked out, vehicles with ammunition and infantry - 7, warehouses with ammunition - one and up to 400 soldiers and officers.
3rd ICBM... Losses in materiel and personnel: 3 T-34 tanks, 3 vehicles, one 45-mm cannon, one 76-mm cannon, one heavy machine gun. Killed - 7 people, wounded 10 people. Destroyed: up to 20 enemy tanks, the rest is being confirmed.
1st Guards Tank Brigade... Losses: (burned out) 8 T-34s, 3 T-34s were knocked out and remained on the battlefield, one 76-mm gun was destroyed, one vehicle was knocked out, 16 people were killed, 25 people were wounded. Destroyed: 18 enemy tanks (knocked out), of which 3 T-6s, two anti-tank guns, destroyed to a company of enemy infantry.
49th Tank Brigade... Losses: 7 T-34s burned out in battle, 4 T-34s did not return from the battle. Total losses: 11 T-34s. In personnel: killed - 11 people, wounded - 10. Destroyed: 4 tanks, of which 2 T-6s, 5 armored tractors, 3 ammunition wagons and 150 soldiers and officers" (p. 585–586) .
This is how these losses were recorded in the enemy camp. Division "Gross Germany":
“On July 4, the division’s tank regiment had 112 combat-ready tanks... after two days of fighting, Strachwitz’s regiment lost more than half of its tank fleet - 53%.
The Panther brigade found itself in a more difficult situation. According to the staff, it had 192 linear tanks... According to the same report from the corps headquarters, by the end of the day on July 6, only a fifth remained in service - 40 combat vehicles.
Most of the T-5 - more than a hundred tanks - failed due to technical reasons and required repairs. But in combat conditions, both the command of the 48th Tank Tank and the 4th TA, in general, did not care for what reasons they failed. The main thing is different: the shock formation of the Civil Aviation Unit “South” almost instantly lost such a significant amount of military equipment... But in the “Citadel” plan, calculations were made for these forces, certain goals and tasks were set for them, and considerable ones. And everything collapsed. The sharp loss of combat capability of the brigade and serious problems with its use, along with a significant lag of the troops of AG Kempf, had a very significant negative impact on the actions of the troops of the 4th TA during the first stage of the operation and were important factors that “collapsed” the “Citadel” (p. 587–588).
And despite all this, many German units never budged. But subsequently, the Germans continued to mark time, assuring their command that they were winning victory after victory:
“On the morning of July 7, fierce enemy attacks began again” (p. 153).
However, over the next two days:
“...the enemy lost at least 200 more tanks and a lot of other equipment. His infantry units already numbered in their ranks no more than half of their original strength” (p. 133).
Serious damage to the enemy was caused by competent mining of military installations intentionally abandoned by our troops. Here's just one example:
““Good results have been obtained from the activation of TOS facilities in the high areas. 228.6.
The plan for mining the heights included the following. The attacking enemy infantry following the tanks, when they capture the heights, should be driven into previously mined trenches, dugouts and bomb shelters and completely destroyed there. This plan was a complete success... on the site at the height. 228.6, 12 enemy tanks and up to one and a half battalions of infantry were destroyed” (TsAMO RF, f. 203, op. 2845, d. 227, l. 13)” (p. 390–391).
And this is just one of many episodes when the attacking side is often simply unable to protect itself from such losses. But those fields of glory of Russian weapons were simply stuffed with such “surprises”, when the already bloodless German formations at Stalingrad were finally finished off and since then the enemy continued to yield to us more and more in manpower.
Mellentin:
“The speed with which the Russians laid mines was amazing. In two or three days they managed to lay over 30 thousand mines... Despite the fact that we advanced deep into the Russian defenses up to 20 km, there were still minefields around us, and further advance was hampered by anti-tank defense areas. In this regard, the most skillful camouflage of the Russians should be emphasized once again. Not a single minefield, not a single anti-tank area could be discovered until the first tank was blown up by a mine or the first anti-tank gun opened fire. It is difficult to directly answer the question of how German tanks managed to overcome all this powerful anti-tank defense...” (p. 469).
There is only one thing that Mellenthin, understandably, is too embarrassed to mention: the mountains of mangled iron and cannon fodder of the German general’s compatriots. Because:
“...one cannot but agree with the beaten German general” (p. 469).
Meanwhile, this very effective means of defense, one of the surprises prepared specifically for this German offensive, was perfectly used not only in front of Mellenthin. Minefields:
“... were widely used by all armies defending the Kursk ledge” (p. 469).
But even fragments of fairly successful military operations of individual formations of the German army in the Battle of Kursk did not bring any benefit to the enemy:
“... along with positive results, the breakthrough of the SS Corps brought a number of significant problems. Moreover, they arose like a chain reaction - one gave rise to another. The main one is that the front of the 2nd SS Tank Corps turned out to be significantly extended, more than 40 km. In addition to the fact that he was constantly subjected to strong pressure, including from tank units, his divisions had open flanks. It was not possible, as expected, to break the Russian resistance at the junction of the 48th Tank Tank and the 2nd SS Tank Tank. This led to the fact that Knobelsdorff on July 6 failed to withdraw the corps to the Yakovlev area and replace Hausser’s left-flank division. And he, in turn, was unable to reduce the front of the 2nd SS Tank Tank and concentrate significant forces on the breakthrough site in the northeast direction.
The failures of AG Kempf had a significant impact on the situation in the direction of the main attack of the 4th TA, and on the situation in the Prokhorovsky direction itself. Its troops moved far from what was originally intended - shoulder to shoulder with the SS corps. She continued to mark time... Already on the morning of July 6, a new strong and quite active Russian tank corps appeared in the floodplain of the Lipovy Donets. The presence of two tank groups at the base of the strike wedge of the 2nd SS Tank Tank: in the area of ​​Novye Lozy and Yakovlevo-Pokrovka constrained its actions and forced it to divert significant forces for cover. The “Dead Head” and the main forces of “Das Reich” are already concentrated along the floodplain of the Linden Donets. At the same time, the main forces of the Leibstandarte, due to the active actions of enemy tank forces from the north, were unable to advance further than Yakovlev; its battle group, including the tank regiment, fought heavy defensive battles...
At the same time, the 48th Tank Corps failed to create a bridgehead on the western bank of the Pena... The Russians held firm everywhere, strengthening the areas of the rifle units with numerous tanks. The concentration of tank formations on the flanks of the 48th Tank Tank increased the danger of an attack under the base of the entire 4th Tank...
In the current situation, on July 7, Hoth intended to suspend attempts to break through to the north and northeast ... to solve the problem of the threat to the flanks of both corps, and the left wing of the army” (pp. 613–614).
Thus:
“Instead of creating a grandiose cauldron for the Soviet fronts, the enemy drove himself into the steel vice of our defense... the armored fist of Army Group South was cut into several separate parts... Hoth and Manstein broke through the layered defense, albeit with iron, but outstretched “fingers”” (with 778–779).
So even very modest successes only brought more trouble to the Germans:
“The well-thought-out and long-tested tactics used by M.E. Katukov, allowed five tank brigades to pin down three enemy divisions and part of the Das Reich tank regiment” (p. 629).
Our rocket artillery also provided very significant assistance here. Here is one of the results of her shelling:
““...they fired a salvo from 4 M-13 installations. After which reconnaissance reported that in the indicated squares 140 burnt vehicles were found, transporting infantry, ammunition and fuel” (TsAMO RF, f. 11 Guards Tk, op. 1, d. 28, l. 276)” (p. 636) .
What horrors of the stampede of only a few German soldiers who survived in this hell by chance lie behind these dry, laconic figures extracted from the archive?!
But such successful attacks on the enemy with rocket artillery were not the exception here, but the norm:
“We fired a volley from open firing positions with direct fire at fascist tanks and infantry. As a rule, several tanks were knocked out, and the infantry was practically destroyed. Then our tanks entered the battle, and the combat vehicles quickly drove away and took cover in the ramps” (p. 765).
So the Germans had a rather hard time on the Kursk Bulge. And because:
“The breakthrough into the areas planned by Goth came with great difficulty. The Russian lines turned out to be much stronger and more resistant to heavy tank attacks than expected. And thanks to the introduction of operational tank reserves into battle, the Soviet side created conditions under which, even splitting the front of the 6th Guards in half. And having actually broken through the second line of defense, the 4th TA was completely pinned down by the battle throughout the entire offensive sector, and even the divisions of the 2nd SS Tank Tank were unable to close their flanks, not to mention their corps. The divisions of Hausser's strike group fought in the corridors they had broken through, experiencing strong pressure not only along the front, but also on the flanks. Hausser was forced to allocate substantial funds to cover them. This led to a dispersion of forces and did not allow the formation's efforts to be concentrated in the direction of the main attack. The absence of a continuous breakthrough front and the constant flank threat were the most important problems that both the command of the 4th TA and the GA “South” had to solve in the coming days. After all, AG “Kempf” on July 7 failed to overcome the line of the 7th Guards. And to reliably cover the right wing of Hoth’s army.
In addition, another important factor has appeared that will negatively affect the actions of Manstein’s formations - the failures of the 9th A of General V. Model of the GA “Center”. She was completely bogged down in the defense of the troops of the Central Front of General K.K. Rokossovsky. Already on the evening of July 7, the Wehrmacht High Command took a number of steps to break the deadlock in the situation in its zone. And Berlin was forced to seize the means of reinforcement for Kluge from Manstein” (pp. 661–662).
But such “help” was only “Trishkin’s caftan”, which could not be extended on two fronts.
The Germans’ technology was such that in order to continue the full-fledged offensive of their bulky tanks, it was necessary to wait “by the sea of ​​​​weather.” That is, in order to advance, they needed the puddles to dry up...
And they waited for this:
“On the third day of the offensive, the soil dried out enough... and the 48th Tank Corps was finally able to cross to the northern bank of the river. Hoth's army had now almost half overcome the Russian army defense zone and came close to the second defensive line. To the right of Knobelsdorff's corps, three SS divisions managed to penetrate even deeper into the Russian defensive formations, but, unlike Knobelsdorff, the SS corps commander was unable to push back the Russians on a wide front. Instead, each SS Panzer division made its own hole and now, suffering heavy losses, tried to advance further north under continuous enemy flank fire” (p. 280).
“Analyzing the situation, Goth realized: very serious problems are beginning to arise with the Citadel, the offensive is experiencing significant disruptions, losses are growing, and there is no need to think about reserves” (p. 695).
“By the end of July 9, 1943, the Nazi At the cost of huge losses, the troops managed to wedge themselves into the defenses of the Voronezh troops. front (Commander General of the Army N.F. Vatutin) in the Oboyan direction to a depth of 35 km" (vol. 6, p. 612).
“For two days, the grenadiers of the 3rd Panzer Division and the motorized infantry of “Greater Germany” stubbornly stormed the Russian positions. In continuous fierce battles, they captured a number of villages straddling the Pena River valley, and by the evening of July 11, they forced the Russians to retreat to a forested area north of Berezovka. A quadrangular protrusion approximately 15 kilometers deep and 25 kilometers wide was pressed into the defense of the Voronezh Front - a pitiful result of a week of colossal efforts and losses...
In the offensive sector of the SS Panzer Corps, even this limited success could not be achieved. The grenadiers found themselves forced to fight so hard to protect the flanks of the wedged tank divisions that the division commanders could hardly pull back the tanks that were at the edge of the wedges. On July 11, the “Reich” and “Adolf Hitler” divisions managed to connect with each other, but the “Totenkopf” division still remained isolated from them.
This was the last and most fierce battle fought by SS divisions, staffed only by Germans. After Operation Citadel, Himmler will open access to the SS troops to an influx of volunteers from occupied countries and criminal rabble from the civilian prisons of the Reich” (p. 281).
So if Stalingrad only begins to grind the bones of the aggressor who invaded our country, then the Kursk Bulge will already complete the destruction of elite units made up exclusively of Germans. And all because after this battle there will no longer be enough Germans left to recreate the SS units.
What can you say to this?
What they came for is what they got.

Bibliography

1. Garth B.L., Shearer W.L., Clark A., Karel P., Craig W., Orgill D., Stettinius E., Jewkes D., Pitt B. From Barbarossa to Terminal. A view from the West. Political literature. M., 1988.
2. Zamulin V. Kursk break. "Yauza" "Eksmo". M., 2007.
3. Katukova E.S. Memorable. M., 2002.
4. Koltunov G.A., Soloviev B.G. Battle of Kursk. M., 1970.
5. Routh E. Tank battles on the Eastern Front. LLC "AST Publishing House" M., 2005.
6. Karpov V. Take alive. Soviet writer. M., 1980.
7. Marshal Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. Volume 2. Publishing house of news press agency. M., 1978.
8. Soviet Military Encyclopedia. Tt. 1-8. Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense. M., 1976.

The memorial complex “Poklonnaya Height 269” is located near the village of Molotychi, Fatezhsky district, Kursk region, where during the battles on the Northern face of the Kursk Bulge in July 1943, the command post of the 70th NKVD Army was located, which defended these heights before the advancing 9th German Army. The memorial complex was erected on the initiative and organization of the Kursk Community Association in Moscow with the aim of perpetuating the feat of Soviet soldiers who, at the cost of their lives, prevented the Nazi invaders from breaking through to Kursk in July 1943.

Construction of the complex began on November 12, 2011, when the Worship Cross was installed. The inscription on it reads: “Here in July 1943 the hardest battles of the Battle of Kursk took place - the decisive battle of the Great Patriotic War. At the cost of their lives, the soldiers of the 140th Infantry Division did not allow the enemy to reach strategic heights. In one day, July 10, 513 people were killed and 943 wounded. Eternal memory to the defenders of the Fatherland. The worship cross was installed on November 12, 2011 by grateful descendants.

V.V. Pronin and S.I. Kretov with a veteran on the day of the installation of the Worship Cross

Worship cross on opening day

Installation of the Worship Cross

Opening of the Worship Cross 11/12/2011

After declassifying military archives and studying documents, it became known that the facts of courage and resilience of Soviet soldiers and officers, as well as the civilian population on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, especially on the left flank of the front in the area of ​​Molotychevsky - Teplovsky - Olkhovatsky Heights, were kept silent.

Our soldiers fought heroically against an enemy who had significant technical superiority in comparison with the equipment of the Soviet troops. 34 of them became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Most are posthumous.

The favorable location of the height near the highway, from which visibility in good weather is open to the outskirts of Kursk, explains the reason for the Germans’ fierce zeal for these heights.

portraits of 34 heroes of the Soviet Union at the Poklonny Cross

On July 19, 2013, Metropolitan German of Kursk and Rylsk, together with representatives of the Kursk community in Moscow, visited the above places. Their importance was noted in terms of perpetuating the memory of the heroism of soldiers and officers on the line of the Northern front of the Kursk Bulge and he blessed the implementation of the project.

Metropolitan German at Poklonnaya Heights 2013

On July 12, 1943, units of the Central Front launched a counter-offensive, inflicting such a blow on the Nazis after which their offensive impulse was broken, Operation Citadel to capture Kursk and create a pocket for Soviet troops was canceled. On this day in 2014, the ceremonial laying of a time capsule with an appeal to descendants took place: “A time capsule with an appeal to descendants is kept here. This capsule was laid on July 12, 2014 in the presence of the leaders of the Kursk region, philanthropists, and landscapers on the day of laying the foundation for the construction of the “Angel of Peace” monument of the “Poklonnaya Height” Memorial Complex. Open the capsule on July 12, 2043."

Capsule laying ceremony 2014

On May 7, 2015, the monument “Angel of Peace” was opened, which was erected for the 70th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War at height “269”, as the main object of the Memorial complex of the Northern face of the Kursk Bulge - the location of the command post of the 70th NKVD Army, which defended together with other military formations of the Central Front, the defense of the Molotychevsky - Teplovsky - Olkhovatsky heights from July 5 to July 12, 1943, where a grandiose battle took place that decided the fate of the whole World and marked the beginning of the irrevocable expulsion of fascism from Europe.

visit of the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative to the Central Federal District
to Poklonnaya Height 269

Installation of the monument. November 20, 2014

The first bucket of earth. Start of installation work
Monument to the Angel of Peace. August 6, 2014

Installation of the monument November 20, 2014

Installation of the monument to the Angel of Peace. November 20, 2014

Opening of the monument 05/07/2015

The monument is a 35-meter sculpture, the top of which is crowned by an eight-meter angel who holds a wreath and releases a dove. The monument faces the West with a call from the Russian people to stop the new fascism. Standing at the site of the death of more than 70 thousand Soviet and German soldiers, the “Angel of Peace” reminds all of humanity how it all ends.

The author of the artistic composition “Angel of Peace” is sculptor A.N. Burganov. - a world-famous sculptor who made a huge contribution to the development of the national school of monumental sculpture. His monuments and large monumental ensembles are installed in the largest cities of Russia and abroad.

A.N. Burganov

Angel of Peace

The composition is illuminated, thanks to which a beautiful picture opens at night (an Angel soaring over the Kursk land).

On December 10, 2015, at the Cultural Center of the FSB of Russia, a solemn ceremony was held to award laureates and diploma holders of the FSB of Russia competition for the best works of literature and art about the activities of the federal security service. In the Fine Arts category, the first prize was awarded to Alexander Nikolaevich Burganov, sculptor and author of the stele.

Presentation to A.N. Burganov Prize of the FSB of Russia

Award of the FSB of Russia

The construction of the memorial complex was noted by President V.V. Putin. In 2016, a letter of gratitude was presented from the President to the head of the regional public organization ROO “Kursk Community” for his active personal participation in the preparation and holding of events dedicated to the seventieth anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

Letter of gratitude from the President

Presentation to V.V. Pronin Letter of Gratitude from the President of the Russian Federation

On February 12, 2016, construction began on a temple in honor of the glorious and all-praised supreme apostles Peter and Paul. On July 12, 1943, the counter-offensive of Soviet troops began on the Northern Front on the day of the above-mentioned feast day. The official start to the work was given by Alexander Mikhailov, Vladimir Pronin and Bishop Veniamin of Zheleznogorsk and Lgov. They laid a capsule in the foundation of the building with an appeal to descendants.

laying a capsule in the foundation of the Temple

construction of the Temple

At the memorial complex “Poklonnaya Vysota 269” on August 16, 2016, His Eminence Benjamin, Bishop of Zheleznogorsk and Lgov consecrated the bells and the main dome for the temple in honor of the holy chief apostles Peter and Paul. A special feature of the consecration was that in order to sprinkle the bells with holy water, the Bishop ascended to a height using special equipment. But the dome was consecrated on the ground.

Consecration of the Dome and bells of the temple

On August 20, 2016, a solemn ceremony of erecting a cross on the dome of the church under construction in honor of the holy apostles Peter and Paul took place at the memorial complex. Witnesses to this event were veterans of the Great Patriotic War, a delegation from the Kursk Community Association, young people, and residents of nearby areas who came here to honor the memory of the fallen Soviet soldiers. Among the honorary guests of the ceremony were the Governor of the Kursk Region Alexander Mikhailov, the Honorary Citizen of the Kursk Region and Fatezhsky District, the head of the community Vladimir Pronin, the General Director of Management Company Metalloinvest Andrey Varichev and many other high-ranking officials. Alexander Mikhailov, in his welcoming speech, expressed the hope that the built temple would become a spiritual center for the residents of Kursk and neighboring regions.

Installation of crosses

In addition, the geoglyph “70 years of Victory” was created here - a giant inscription that was “written” by pine seedlings. Each letter contains from 100 to 200 trees, and its height will be 30 meters. Giant letters can be seen driving along the V. Lyubazh – Ponyri highway at the foot of the monument, as well as from a bird’s eye view or on satellite images.

It is also planned to restore the army command post dugouts.

The Worship Cross, the “Angel of Peace” monument, the Temple and other objects of the Memorial complex were built exclusively on donations from individuals and legal entities - Kursk residents living in Moscow and the Kursk region for future generations.