Entente forces. Triple Alliance and Entente. Russian culture at the beginning of the 20th century. Science and education
Triple Alliance
The basis of the Triple Alliance was formed in two stages, between 1879 and 1882. The first participants were Germany and Austria-Hungary, which concluded a treaty in 1879, and Italy also joined in 1882. Italy did not fully share the policy of the alliance, in particular it had a non-aggression agreement with Great Britain in the event of a conflict between the latter and Germany. Thus, the Triple Alliance included part of Central and Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Mediterranean Seas, some countries of the Balkan Peninsula, as well as western Ukraine, which was then part of Austria-Hungary.
Almost two years after the start, in 1915, Italy, which was suffering enormous financial losses, withdrew from the Triple Alliance and went over to the Entente side. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria sided with Germany and Austria-Hungary. After their accession the bloc was part of the Quadruple Alliance (or Central Powers).
The military-political bloc Entente (from the French “accord”) was also not formed immediately and became a response to the rapidly growing influence and aggressive policy of the countries of the Triple Alliance. The creation of the Entente was divided into three stages.
In 1891, the Russian Empire entered into an alliance agreement with France, to which a defensive convention was added in 1892. In 1904, Great Britain, seeing a threat to its policy from the Triple Alliance, entered into an alliance with France, and in 1907 with Russia. Thus, the backbone of the Entente was formed, which became the Russian Empire, the French Republic and the British Empire.
It was these three countries, as well as Italy and the Republic of San Marino, which joined in 1915, that took the most active part in the war on the side of the Entente, but in fact, 26 more states joined this bloc at various stages.
Among the countries of the Balkan region, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Romania entered the war with the Triple Alliance. Other European countries added to the list were Belgium and Portugal.
The countries of Latin America almost entirely sided with the Entente. It was supported by Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Haiti, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Brazil, Cuba and Panama. The northern neighbor, the USA, was not a member of the Entente, but took part in the war on its side as an independent ally.
The war also affected some countries in Asia and Africa. In these regions, China and Japan, Siam, Hijaz and Liberia sided with the Entente.
Sources:
- “History of the First World War 1914-1918”, team of authors, M.: Nauka, 1975.
- “The First World War”, Zaichonkovsky A. M. St. Petersburg: Polygon Publishing House LLC, 2002.
The Triple Alliance and the Entente are military-political blocs formed at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries by the main European powers. During the First World War, these coalitions were the main opposing forces.
Triple Alliance
The beginning of the division of Europe into hostile camps with the creation in 1879-1882 of the Triple Alliance, which included Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. It was this military-political bloc that played a decisive role in the preparation and outbreak of the First World War.
The initiator of the Triple Alliance was Germany, which in 1879 concluded an agreement with Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Treaty, also known as the Dual Alliance, was primarily directed against France and Russia. Subsequently, this agreement became the basis for the creation of a military bloc, which was headed by Germany, after which the European states were finally divided into 2 hostile camps.
In the spring of 1882, Italy joined the alliance of Austria-Hungary and Germany. On May 20, 1882, these countries entered into a secret treaty on the Triple Alliance. According to the agreement signed for a period of 5 years, the allies assumed obligations not to take part in any agreements directed against one of these states, to provide mutual support and consult on all political and economic issues. Also, all participants in the Triple Alliance pledged, in the event of joint participation in a war, not to conclude a separate peace and to keep the agreement on the Triple Alliance secret.
By the end of the 19th century, Italy, under the weight of losses from the customs war with France, began to gradually change its political course. In 1902, she had to conclude an agreement with the French on neutrality in the event of an attack on France by Germany. Just before the outbreak of World War I, Italy, as a result of a secret agreement known as the Pact of London, left the Triple Alliance and joined the Entente.
Entente
The response to the creation of the Triple Alliance was the creation in 1891 of the Franco-Russian Alliance, which later became the basis of the Entente. The strengthening of Germany, which was striving for hegemony in Europe, and the secret creation of the Triple Alliance led to retaliatory measures from Russia, France, and then Great Britain.
At the beginning of the 20th century, Great Britain, as a result of aggravated German-British contradictions, had to abandon the policy of “brilliant isolation”, which implied non-participation in any military blocs, and conclude military-political agreements with Germany’s opponents. The British signed an agreement with France in 1904, 3 years later in 1907 an agreement was concluded with Russia. The concluded agreements actually formalized the creation of the Entente.
The confrontation between the Triple Alliance and the Entente led to the First World War, in which the Entente and its allies were opposed by the Central Powers bloc led by Germany.
1. Germany and Austria from the Agadir incident to the end of the Balkan wars. Italy's position
Despite the partial successes achieved, as we have seen, by Austrian and German diplomacy acting in concert with it during the First Balkan War, even then, that is, in the spring of 1913, the imperialist circles of both Austria and Germany showed deep discontent and irritation . Still, all that remained of European Turkey was almost only Constantinople, and Turkey was seen as a stronghold for the future economic introduction of German industry throughout the Middle East; after all, Serbia emerged from the war much larger and stronger, and Serbia pursued an openly hostile policy against Austria. But the Second Balkan War finally dealt a heavy blow to the main calculations of Austro-German policy. True, Turkey conquered Adrianople and almost all of Thrace, but Serbia strengthened to such a significant extent as it had never dreamed of, and Bulgaria was cut down, lost a significant part of its new acquisitions, and, in addition, the performance of Romania and the territorial acquisitions of Romania for Bulgaria's account made Bulgaria an irreconcilable enemy of Romania, and this circumstance tore Romania away from Austria and Germany and threw it into the arms of the Entente.
The overall result was (and, most importantly, seemed) to the German ruling classes, as well as to the Austrian, a serious political failure.
And so, the summing up of old and new results in the German press began (or, more precisely, revived, because it had been widely practiced before - already since 1906). The external reason for this was the twenty-fifth anniversary of the reign of Wilhelm II in 1913. Of course, it was not domestic, but foreign policy that interested the German bourgeoisie in its various strata in 1913 - and even earlier, and foreign, and not domestic policy, also concerned Social Democracy. In the Social Democratic leadership circles they were well aware that things were approaching an armed conflict between Germany and the Entente, and only one thing was clear: the bulk of the workers, if not the entire working class as a whole, would unconditionally go to war, and not only would Social Democracy not restrain them , but will probably still be encouraged. The results of the path traveled so far, as far as foreign policy was concerned, were summed up, albeit with an emphasis on the mistakes made, but also with a mention - generally sympathetic - of some colonial acquisitions. The left opposition in the party judged differently, but it was then generally considered to be much weaker than it actually was.
As for the bourgeois press, the picture was quite clear. And it was in the press associated with large industry, with agricultural interests, with large stock exchange and banking capital, in the press of various conservative, patriotic, national-liberal shades, along with a proud indication of the brilliant prosperity of the country, that the assessment of foreign policy varied in tone, but was uniform essentially: failure of diplomacy, lack of clear goals, indecision and, as a result, almost complete failure. They spoke in every way about the failure of the entire Moroccan policy, starting with William's trip to Tangier in 1905 and ending with Agadir and the agreement with France regarding Morocco in 1911; it was pointed out that the Moroccan case is only an example of the extent to which it is impossible now, with the existence of the Entente, to wait for the acquisition of any overseas colonies. On the other hand, it was emphasized that in its other aspiration - to the Middle East, to Baghdad - German economic and general policy encountered serious obstacles created by the two Balkan wars. Finally, they touched upon the ambiguous position that Italy occupies in the Triple Alliance, ready to go over to the side of the Entente, allowing in its press a violent campaign against Austria, and even on such a burning issue as the Trieste and Triente regions of Austria, inhabited by Italians (“Italia irredenta " - unredeemed, i.e. not yet liberated Italy - this is how these provinces were called in the Italian press). The instability of the Triple Alliance was contrasted with the fortress of the Entente, which nothing could not only destroy, but even shake.
From all this criticism, the most dangerous conclusions were drawn: “We are strong, but the emperor is timid and indecisive; We annually make huge sacrifices for the army and navy, we have a thriving industry, a perfect state and economic organization, capable of militarizing the entire country in the blink of an eye, and all these forces and capabilities remain unused, and we give in to everyone: and the “degenerating”, torn apart parties of France, and not today or tomorrow Russia, ready to catch fire with the revolutionary flame, and England, which does not know how to cope with Ireland.” These were the main thoughts of the critics. But if the emperor is not in place, then let him give up his place to the most worthy. This conclusion has been reached. Not to mention the demonstrative enthusiasm for every belligerent antics of the crown prince, not to mention the articles in the daily press (very revealing), representatives of imperialist thought just in 1913 and at the very beginning of 1914 decided to finally clarify and popularize this opposition : “peace-loving”, capable only of warlike idle talk, but in reality an indecisive and compliant emperor to the young, strong, “fresh”, brave crown prince. Two books by Paul Limann were published one after another: “Der Kaiser” in 1913 and “Der Kronprinz” in the spring of 1914. The first book had 435 pages, the second - 295, and, however, both were widely distributed and had enormous success, were quoted, reviewed, and became a very bright and noticeable phenomenon on the book market in Germany before the war.
It is difficult to imagine a more scathing criticism of Wilhelm and a more enthusiastic praise of the Crown Prince than these two books. And the point of view in both books is the same: go to battle! (Losschlagen!). Don't waste time! Only war can give Germany everything it needs. That's the moral of these books and others like them. This does not mean anything that at the same time, on the occasion of the anniversary, several other books were published, full of the most Byzantine, courtier flattery addressed to Wilhelm. Neither he nor anyone else could be deceived: they were dissatisfied with the emperor. Boastful and threatening speeches and gestures were not enough - they demanded that he act accordingly. Otherwise, something worse could have happened again than what happened in 1908 regarding an unsuccessful conversation with a representative of the Daily Telegraph.
And just then a special, very loud incident occurred, which illuminated with an ominous light the true meaning of all this imperialist opposition and its likely consequences. The incident occurred in the “imperial region,” that is, in Alsace-Lorraine, which in general was an open wound precisely from the point of view of foreign policy. Ever since the Peace of Frankfurt in 1871, when the provinces taken from France were incorporated into the German Empire, the German government did not know how to arrange them. It was impossible to include them in Prussia due to the displeasure of Bavaria and other southern German states close to Alsace-Lorraine. The division between Prussia and Bavaria (such a plan also existed and lasted for a long time) also turned out to be practically fraught with great difficulties. German nationalists never wanted to make them a special state of Germany (like Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, Saxony, etc.), who were afraid that if Alsace-Lorraine was given such a degree of independence, it would develop dangerous separatism. The German Empire nevertheless made this decision, but with a delay of 47 years, namely in October 1918, when the military defeat of Germany was already clearly visible and when there were several weeks left before its surrender and before the French army entered Metz and Strasbourg . Thus, Alsace-Lorraine lived almost the entire existence of the German Empire in the position of a conquered country, ruled by the will of the imperial governor. It was not until 1911 that an attempt was made to provide Alsace-Lorraine with some degree of self-government. According to this “constitution”, the right of elections was given to the local Landtag created at the same time, which was given the responsibility for matters of internal improvement. Of course, actual power and real strength remained entirely in the hands of the governor appointed by the emperor, and even more precisely - in the hands of the military authorities of those corps that were located in this border area.
Actually, in Alsace-Lorraine there were no those fiery feelings towards France, which were always written about so persistently in the French press; it was more an illusion or a French patriotic “white lie,” although the existence of certain sympathies for France could not be denied, and these sympathies were most fueled by the absurd German imperial policy regarding Alsace-Lorraine. This policy consisted either of gross oppression or attempts to appease. Actually, there was not a single class of the population in Alsace-Lorraine that would definitely strive to join France. The working class did not show the slightest separatist inclinations; the big trading bourgeoisie and the financial world were closely connected with the German domestic market and the German stock exchanges; Only a part of the industrial bourgeoisie showed noticeable regret about the lost rich French market and about the enormous opportunities associated with the colossal colonial empire of France. Let us not forget that in powerfully industrialized Germany Alsace-Lorraine was only one of the industrial provinces, and if it had been part of France, then there, among the few French industrial districts, it would have stood in first place in many respects. Finally, among the intelligentsia, among the small and middle bureaucrats (not newcomers, but native), among the small and middle trading bourgeoisie, among the landowners, friendly feelings and warm memories of France were preserved. But... that's all.
Half jokingly, half seriously in Alsace-Lorraine they said that the imperial government itself was most concerned about stirring up Francophile feelings with its nagging and oppression. Of course, this policy, with all its unevenness, was dictated to Germany by the fact that in France not a single cabinet governing the country, from 1871 until the war of 1914, agreed to recognize the final and irrevocable separation of Alsace-Lorraine from France , and the German government (and people) knew well that Alsace-Lorraine was one of the main causes that could ignite a world fire at any moment. That is why, depending on the greater or lesser degree of hostility shown by the French in each given period towards Germany, Wilhelm II either agreed to soften the regime or made threatening speeches. In 1911, the “constitution” was given in order to attract the population to the empire and create a moral impossibility for the French to continue talking about the liberation of suffering brothers, etc. But this time the tone could not be maintained for long. Already in mid-May 1912, William II told the mayor of Strasbourg that he was dissatisfied with the population of Alsace-Lorraine and that he would destroy the constitution and annex Alsace-Lorraine to Prussia. True, this was not stated in a public speech, but still the publicity was very wide.
A year and a half later, an incident broke out that had more consequences. This happened in December 1913. The matter began with an insignificant incident: Lieutenant von Forstner had a clash in the city of Zabern (in Alsace) with local inhabitants, whom he grossly insulted. Colonel Reiter took his side, arbitrarily arrested some citizens and put them in prison. Forstner and Reuther were prosecuted, but ultimately came to nothing: both went unpunished. A request was made to the Reichstag, but both the Minister of War and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg completely sided with the officers. In France, this episode brought enormous benefit to the chauvinistic agitation that had been waged there against Germany with particular force since the election of Poincaré as president of the republic.
The incident also had domestic political consequences. The heir to the throne, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, considered it his duty to actively intervene in this story. It must be said that in general, as has already been noted, the German imperialists (the most ardent and decisive) placed great hopes in the crown prince during these years. Wilhelm's eldest son had already made several ardent warlike speeches, in which, by the way, he praised and enthusiastically described the war, the battlefield, hussar attacks, etc. By the way, I note that later, during the entire world war, he never even the cannon shot did not approach the battlefield and always revealed prudence taken to the very last extreme in protecting his person from any dangers, in which his efforts were crowned with the most complete success. Of course, these properties did not in the least prevent him from inciting chauvinistic passions before the war to the best of his ability and by all means leading things to a bloody catastrophe.
Now in Holland (where he fled at the same time as his father, and just as hastily, in November 1918), he publishes books, talks with newspaper correspondents and never ceases to prove how peaceful he has always been. A curious capacity for hypocrisy and deliberate lies in order to evade responsibility makes him similar to his father, even though he was in some supposed “opposition” to the emperor. In these decisive years (1912–1914), he won the enthusiastic devotion of the Pan-German party precisely because he did not miss an opportunity to declare his readiness to draw the sword to defend the interests of his homeland, etc. The template phraseology of patriotic textbooks for high school - that’s, in fact, , all that he had at his disposal on occasions of his public appearances, but coming from the heir to the throne and at such a tense moment, these sonorous and empty phrases acquired an ominous meaning.
After Lloyd George's speech (on the Moroccan question in 1911), the Crown Prince appeared in the Reichstag and here, when a conservative speaker exclaimed: “Now we know where our enemy is!”, the Crown Prince demonstratively expressed his full agreement and pleasure about these words Regarding the Zabern incident, the Crown Prince also considered it his duty to warmly congratulate Colonel Reiter (who illegally imprisoned civilians in a cellar overnight for allegedly insulting an officer’s uniform) on his brave deed. “Ahead!” (Immer feste drauf!) - the telegram read. The Conservative and National Liberal press passionately defended the conduct of the military in Zabern and were enthusiastic about the Crown Prince's words. “Although pessimism has now penetrated deep into the hearts and become the dominant mood of these years” (in the words of the Crown Prince’s enthusiastic admirer Paul Limann), the Crown Prince strongly encouraged the fallen spirit of the extreme imperialists. At the same time, a very sensitive and alarming question was posed to the emperor. There could be no doubt as to where this demonstrative ovation for the crown prince was heading at each of his public appearances (for example, after the parades at Tempelhof), accompanied by an equally demonstrative silence when the emperor appeared; where do these praises of the brave crown prince in articles and books also tend, with a persistent emphasis on the general despondency and general disappointment with the indecisive and too peaceful policy of the emperor.
The opposition on the right was evident; the opposition on the left - the Social Democratic - was neutralized by the victory of revisionism, the general gigantic growth and prosperity of industry and all the consequences of this growth. Wilhelm could not help but sense the danger rising towards him from the right. And as always, he hastened to concede, especially since in essence this concession did not cost him much. After all, the only difference between him and the chauvinistic pan-German “opposition” was that he was somewhat slow in implementing the slogans of a policy of conquest and aggressive actions. The times came when large capitalists and everything that depended on them (and almost everything depended on them) threatened to look for themselves - and find in the crown prince - a more energetic implementer of their desires. Judging by the testimony of the Belgian King Albert, which will be discussed in another connection, by the end of 1913, Wilhelm had finally become accustomed to the idea of the necessity and inevitability of war; judging by some acts of government policy, this idea was already becoming more and more strengthened in ruling circles from the beginning of 1913.
As for Austria-Hungary, the position of the Habsburg Monarchy after both Balkan wars became unusually complicated, and at the same time, in some respects, Austrian diplomacy began to act much more freely than before. Let us clarify this seemingly contradictory double statement. There is no need to talk much about the difficulties: the enemy - Serbia - has become unusually stronger, and extensive agitation against Austria has arisen in Serbia, clearly supported by King Peter and the government. They either hoped to spark an uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or to attract Russia to a common action. It was not possible to count on a Bulgarian counterbalance to the same extent as Austrian diplomacy was accustomed to it: not only Serbia, but also Romania stood fully armed against Bulgaria, which was extremely weakened. In the depths of Austria-Hungary itself, Czech separatism was intensifying. The Czech Republic, the only component of the Habsburg Monarchy, combined all the advantages of a highly developed industry with a superbly equipped and productive agriculture, was economically completely “autonomous”, could easily do without the rest of the empire, and therefore with particular force and irritation demanded political autonomy. In Hungary, the protest of the Slavs suppressed there became more and more audible, and the landowning aristocracy that ruled Hungary found it increasingly difficult to retain power in their hands.
In addition, another factor was added that greatly worsened the position of Austria (and therefore Germany): Italy, which already in 1911 had shown an unwillingness to take into account the interests of its two “allies” by attacking Turkey, in 1913 further strengthened this character of its politicians. In fact, even from the first times of the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, it was known that Italy would not provide armed assistance in the event of a war between Austria and Germany against such a coalition in which England would take part. In other words: if Austria and Germany fight only against Russia and France (and any other power except England), Italy takes part in the war on the side of its allies, but if England takes the side of France and Russia, then Italy will remain neutral. Thus, the more the Entente strengthened, the more the bonds connecting the Triple Alliance actually weakened. Little of. The Italian government was determined to assert its influence in the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. often acted against Austria. And besides, the more the boldness of the anti-Austrian propaganda in Serbia grew, the more the anti-Austrian agitation also intensified in Italy in those (“irredentist”) circles that sought to tear the Triente and Trieste regions away from Austria.
However, in parallel with the growth of all these difficulties, the view represented more and more among the Austrian rulers, represented most of all by the heir to the throne - Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Hungarian Minister Count Tissa and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Berchtold. But according to this view, it is possible to save the Habsburg state from division and destruction only by putting an end to the great power plans of Serbia with a decisive blow, and therefore we need to hurry while this is still possible, since time is working against Austria. Franz Ferdinand, a gloomy, withdrawn, suspicious person, did not like Wilhelm II and did not trust him, but he knew that Wilhelm II would certainly support Austria if Austria started a war, because Germany could not let its only ally be defeated and thereby blocking their access to the Middle East, with which German industry and export trade firmly linked their future destiny even when the Baghdad Railway was first laid. It was this confidence that gave Franz Ferdinand and Berchtold complete freedom of movement.
Exactly what Bismarck feared happened (who expressed this fear more than once): Germany found itself in the position of a power that, in fact, often not only does not dictate the first steps to its incomparably less powerful and dependent ally, but is forced to follow it. And the more discontent grew in the imperial circles of Germany against Emperor Wilhelm II for his indecisiveness, the more dependent Wilhelm II became on Franz Ferdinand and his advisers, because he would not be forgiven for not providing sufficiently strong support to “Germany’s only friend.” These were the conditions concerning the issue of internal cohesion of parts in the Triple Alliance. These conditions inspired the greatest anxiety in those observers who did not want war and saw clearly to what extent the Balkan events of 1912–1913. she was brought closer.
Let us now see how the same Balkan events affected the relationships of individual parts in the Entente. We will see that the Entente, too, through small and large diplomatic provocations, thickened the political atmosphere in Europe in these last pre-war years.
2. France and Russia at the beginning of the Poincaré era. Franco-Russian relations in the light of the latest documentation. Ministry of Poincare. Election of Poincaré as President of the French Republic
From the very beginning of the attacks to which Turkey was subjected, i.e. from 1911, when the Italians began the conquest of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the driving force of the Entente gradually became not England, as it had been until now, but Russia. The point was not that back in 1910 the English King Edward VII, the main inspirer and leader of the Entente, died, and not that in 1911–1912. The English liberal cabinet was absorbed in pressing issues of domestic policy, which had already been discussed earlier (the implementation of social reforms that had already passed, budgetary affairs), and in 1912–1913. - sharply aggravated Irish complications.
All this had its significance, but the main thing was different. There was some contradiction in the very structure and internal nature of the Entente. Edward VII created it, and Sir Edward Gray (after the death of the king) supported it at first as a, so to speak, protective force, striving, according to its tasks, to keep Germany within firmly defined boundaries and not give it the opportunity to disrupt the established situation either in Europe or elsewhere globe. This does not mean that the Entente once and for all abandoned the idea of being the first to rush at Germany at the right time in order to break its economic and political strength. But precisely on the occasion that would be convenient, and at the time that should have come, far from now. In the meantime, wait and watch for Germany to make mistakes and dangerous steps. This circumstance put Germany, of course, in an extremely delicate and difficult position: after all, the combined forces of the Entente were so colossal, its material capabilities were so limitless, and due to its power and enormity it had such an attractive force that by the very fact of its long existence the Entente took away from Germany possible allies in the upcoming struggle - Italy and Romania, and most importantly - time worked in favor of the Entente, and not in favor of Germany. Time will give England the opportunity to overcome all the difficulties of domestic politics, pacify Ireland, and create a land army; time will allow Russia to complete the reorganization and rearmament by 1917 (as planned in 1911–1912), time will make it easier for France to fully implement artillery reform and implement universal conscription in its colossal colonies. And then the Entente will crush Germany without any doubt. Germany's only real ally - Austria - will also eventually lose the Czech Republic; maybe some other parts will fall away from it.
In short, the contradiction inherent in the Entente was that it was too strong and that waiting was too profitable for it to have a policy that could only be “defensive.” The idea of the need for a “preventive war,” which first occupied German military circles at the very beginning of the 90s, when the Franco-Russian alliance was concluded, again surfaced in the German press, and this time with much greater force than before. But the contradiction in the Entente began to manifest itself in another way - in the policies of its constituent parts. It seemed advantageous to England to wait and prepare, and to some leaders of Russian and, to a much lesser extent, French politics, since it was subject to Russian pressure, it sometimes began to seem more expedient to reap the fruits directly and take advantage of the power of the Entente without much delay.
The most active and restless diplomat of the Entente at this time was Izvolsky, who was in 1906–1910. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire, and since 1911 Russian Ambassador in Paris. Persistent, energetic, very devoted to his idea, he completely suppressed Foreign Minister Sazonov; its influence was all the more destructive because the idea was based on incorrect calculations. The idea was that Russia could and should take advantage of the unique combination, when England is its friend, in order to finally break through to the Balkan Peninsula, overturning the resistance of Austria, and, if necessary, even Germany. The calculation was incorrect primarily because Izvolsky (and his entire school) driven into the revolution of 1905 was taken as the end of the upheavals, the Third Duma as the beginning of a normally developing constitutional system, the agrarian reform of November 9, 1906 as the resolution of the agrarian question, the era Sukhomlinov - for transforming the army, having looked through all the terrible realities behind these phantoms and decided that Russia is capable of withstanding and winning in a clash with both central empires.
The failure that befell Izvolsky in 1908–1909, during the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, showed him that there were enormous difficulties in the path of active Russian policy in the Middle East, but did not at all change the main line of his behavior. When he arrived in Paris as the Russian ambassador in 1911, he immediately began to strive for a leadership role in the Entente. It was arranged by chance that Izvolsky’s first steps in Paris were taken when the whole world was still under the impression of the Agadir incident and its finale. Germany made a threat against France, but Lloyd George's shout was enough - and she immediately got scared and retreated. Izvolsky believed too much in the cries of the German imperialist press, which compared this humiliation of Germany with the defeat of Prussia at Jena by Napoleon I. “There are no words for this Jena of German politics! Cover your face, Germany, before this page of your history! (Verhulle dein Antlitz, Germania, vor diesem Blalt deiner Cieschichte!),” wrote German “patriots” after the Franco-German agreement, and many (including Izvolsky) took this at face value, i.e., as an admission of powerlessness, and not for artificial teasing and incitement to fight (as it really was). And so, the thought of daring, of a bold, energetic policy in the Balkans and Asia Minor finally took possession of Izvolsky.
There were almost no delays in St. Petersburg. True, Kokovtsov, the first minister in 1911–1913, the minister of finance in previous years, was an opponent of any policy of adventures, Sazonov (since he occasionally opposed Izvolsky) also sometimes tried not to forget about caution, but in general Izvolsky did not encounter serious difficulties. To atone for the shame of the Manchu defeats, to reward oneself in the Middle East, to give Russian industry and trade new markets, and simply to seize new lands - all this seemed tempting. And besides, the same fatal delusion, based on a profound misunderstanding of the properties of diplomatic struggle, was at work here, as in December 1903 and January 1904: “I will take Korea, but there will be no war, because I don’t want war” (this noted by Witte in his memoirs). Exactly the same aberration was repeated in Russian politics of 1912–1914: “I will do what seems necessary to me in the Balkans and Asia Minor, but there will be no war, because I don’t want it.”
True, this time more caution had to be exercised, but even this time the calming consideration that “there will be no war until I want it” was in full effect. But the fact is that in 1903 Japan really did not want war, and in 1913 in Germany the most powerful classes were not afraid of war, some civilian dignitaries and some military wanted war, the crown prince was not afraid of war, Moltke wanted war, but Wilhelm II stopped hesitating. And all the actions of the Entente, especially the conquest of Morocco, irritated and insulted Germany. Under these conditions, the restless energy of Izvolsky, who believed that after Agadir there was nothing particularly shy with Germany, and the serene confidence of Nicholas II, convinced that things would not come to war anyway, since he, in fact, did not want war, should have led to a number of dangerous complications.
It seemed that there was a force that could stop Izvolsky. He was in Paris, without France and its support he could not act; He even influenced St. Petersburg, his superiors and Emperor Nicholas II by promoting the French. Meanwhile, the French rulers for a long time showed great restraint and caution. What happened in Paris in 1912–1913?
We now have some materials that allow us to get a general idea of what happened behind the scenes of French and Russian politics in the last years before the war. In the first place here we need to put “Materials on the history of Franco-Russian relations for 1910–1914,” a collection of secret diplomatic documents of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published in Moscow in 1922, a huge volume of 720 pages, without which from now on no one can a historian even worthy of this name has no right to talk about Europe before the war of 1914 (although this book was published rather carelessly): this is the entire correspondence of Izvolsky with St. Petersburg on all fundamental issues of Entente policy. The four volumes of Poincaré’s memoirs cited below also provide something, which must be used with caution. Then you need to name the papers of the French ambassador in St. Petersburg (from June 14, 1912 to February 20, 1913) Georges Louis, published in Paris in 1925. These papers were published by journalist Ernest Judet, to whom the papers were given for publication by Louis's widow (Judet E. Georges Louis, Paris, 1925). Based on these sources and drawing on some others (which, however, are all incomparably less valuable), we will try to determine the essence of what happened in Paris in 1911–1914. in the field of foreign policy and, in particular, in the range of issues related to the Franco-Russian alliance.
Let us first recall the internal political situation in France at this moment. The elections of 1910 gave a majority to the left-bourgeois movements (radicals and radical socialists were elected to the chamber 252, adjacent “independent socialists” - 30, left republicans - 93); right-wing parties and the right center received: conservatives - 71 seats, nationalists - 17, progressives - 60; finally, the united socialist party - 74 seats. Government power in these years (1910–1914) was therefore in the hands of ministries, which, in general, differed very little from each other in the field of all issues of domestic policy: in fact, the main difference in shades between them was that some (formerly to the left ) talked about a radical income tax and other related financial reforms, while others did not talk about it (or talked less); neither one nor the other carried out any of these reforms. And it was not domestic politics that was in the foreground. The foreign policy of these last pre-war ministries was not the same. Some of them more reflected in this sense the aspirations of the colonial party, large financiers (who played in France the same huge role in foreign policy matters as large industrialists in Germany); others were more representative of the opinions of the middle and petty bourgeoisie, who were cautious and more peaceful. But the first current was stronger, more organized and gained the upper hand every year; He had much more means of influence and necessary moves at his disposal. The middle and petty bourgeoisie could, moreover, always be alarmed by the threat of the collapse of the Entente, the end of friendship with Russia; and these classes had a rather vague understanding of foreign policy. The press that they read and which day after day instilled in them foreign policy views, was published by big financial capital and for the needs and purposes of big capital. That is why, when we talk about the dissimilarity of the foreign policy of the French cabinets that ruled the country in 1910–1914, we mean more nuances than fundamental differences.
Since 1909, Briand had been at the head of the government; after the elections, he made some changes in his cabinet (November 3, 1910) and continued to rule until February 27, 1911. After him, the office of Moniz, who stood to the left, ruled, and - also to the left of Briand, who stood - the Caillot cabinet (from June 23, 1911) . On January 10, 1912, Caillot resigned from power. Even then, strong opposition arose against him from big capital, who were afraid of too radical measures in the field of income taxation; but the remarkable thing was that they seemed to have taken an overly friendly and conciliatory tone towards Germany.
On January 14, 1912, Senator Poincaré was called to power by the President of the Republic, Fallier. He was then fifty-two years old, had been in parliament for a long time, but had never played a prominent role until now. He carefully and slyly maneuvered between parties during the era of the Dreyfus affair and took the side of Dreyfus only when it became quite clear that the Dreyfusards would win. He behaved the same way during the struggle for the separation of church and state in 1903–1905, and in all acute cases in general. Gifted with a large and flexible mind, extreme persistence and consistency in the pursuit of his goals, caution and foresight and at the same time decisiveness at critical moments, great composure and restraint, an undeniable gift of speech, skill where necessary, intimidation where necessary, affection and flattery to influence those around him, Poincaré never hesitated to eliminate his opponent if he showed stubbornness or was generally inconvenient. (In this sense, the memoirs of Charles Humbert, “Chacun son tour,” which appeared in 1925, are interesting, giving an idea of what an unattainable “master” of political struggle Poincaré could be if necessary.)
He was a terrible fighter and entered the arena at the most favorable moment for himself. For twelve consecutive years he was destined to influence France and Europe from then on, and after the break of 1924–1925. regain full power in July 1926. What drove this man? This question for us, of course, is less significant than the other - which groups of French society, which classes found in it their representative and exponent of their aspirations? In any case, it must be said that the structure of his beliefs never changed any noticeably. He waited in the wings for a long time (he was not very keen on portfolios) and entered the stage only when the balance of real forces in the country and parliament was in favor of the views he represented. When I just noted his careful maneuvering between parties and his reluctance to become very involved in any of the pressing issues that worried the country (like the Dreyfus affair or the separation of church and state), I did not mean the ordinary, so often encountered political careerism, but something more complex, which even Poincaré’s enemies did not deny.
He always emphasized his indifference to domestic politics, to all issues of internal political struggle, and deliberately did not want to associate himself closely with any issue that divided French society, since this issue did not concern foreign policy. Of course, he was a “republican”, of course, he stood from the point of view of defending the bourgeois parliamentary republic from attacks both from the monarchists and, especially from the left - from the socialists, but somehow it turned out that neither the monarchists had any feelings for There was intense hostility towards him, and the socialists for a long time did not see in him such a fierce enemy as, for example, in Clemenceau or Millerand. They made a decisive campaign against him when it became clear where his foreign policy was heading, but he was never, either in the eyes of Jaurès, or in the eyes of Renaudel or Léon Blum, Jaurès’s successors in leadership of the Socialist Party, such an embodiment of social reaction or the policy of persecution, what it was, for example, in 1906–1909. or in 1917–1920 Clemenceau. All parties knew that Poincaré, if necessary, would go as far as any of them halfway, as the other would not on all issues of domestic policy, as long as he was not prevented from pursuing foreign policy uncontrollably. That is why, when the all-powerful property classes in France in the broadest sense of the word felt threatened by a revolutionary explosion after the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the strengthening of revolutionary syndicalism in Paris and other major centers, they put forward Clemenceau as their defender, and not Poincaré, who would never have become the first minister at that moment, and would not have taken on the role of “chief gendarme”, “chief policeman” (le premier flic de France), as Clemenceau proudly called himself. Poincaré did not want to do this matter, which he essentially sympathized with, with his own hands, although, of course, he liked social conservatism. He was saving himself for another moment.
And so, this moment came when, in January 1912, he was called to the Elysee Palace and he came out, invested with the title of First Minister. In 1912, the property-owning classes were no longer afraid of the social revolution, and in general the increasingly complicated pan-European situation commandingly attracted everyone's attention and overshadowed everything. Part of the property-owning classes - the petty bourgeoisie, perhaps almost the entire middle class, that is, the majority of the entire nation, because the petty bourgeoisie included the entire property-owning peasantry - did not want war; the working class did not want war (in France there were no sections of the working class that would be inclined towards an “energetic” foreign policy, as was observed in Germany among the “labor aristocracy”). In France, the leaders of stock exchanges and giant banks (though not all), the colonial party (all of them), large exporters, shipowners and a host of professions materially connected with the colonies stood for an energetic foreign policy; Large industrialists also stood even more on the side of this “energetic policy” and most of all, of course, those who in their immediate material interests were associated with militarism: owners and shareholders of arms and steel factories, shipyards, etc. All this large capital , who controlled almost the entire readable press and was powerful in parliament, and placed all his hopes in Poincaré.
The irritation of French small craft against the all-conquering German competition also helped him; The interest of all layers of the bourgeoisie and part of the peasantry in Russian loans also helped, leading to a tendency to support the Russian system and with further loans to encourage the dangerous external adventures of Russian diplomacy - although opinions sometimes differed greatly on the last point. Poincaré’s idea was precisely presented in France in such a guise so as not to immediately frighten the petty and middle bourgeoisie: “We are peace-loving, but what to do if war is inevitable? It is necessary, firstly, to arm ourselves, and secondly, to stock up on allies and strengthen our friendship with them by all means.” True, it was reported with some concern that the new head of government, deep down in his soul, did not see the possibility of avoiding war; repeated the words that allegedly escaped from Poincaré’s cousin, the great mathematician Henri Poincaré, at the first moment when he was informed that Raymond Poincaré had become first minister: “My cousin is war” (My cousin - e "est la guerre). But with his characteristic caution and dexterity, Poincaré himself avoided any compromising words. He preferred to act; his actions did not fatally create and even eliminated obstacles that could interfere with the war, although he never ceased to strenuously emphasize his devotion to the interests of peace.
It should be noted that the famous nickname “Roincare-Ia-Guerre” became attached to him even before the World War. It was instinctively felt that the new ruler was in no way a new obstacle to war. If Falner had been at the Elysee Palace in 1914, there would have been no war, as Stéphane Pichon later said.
First of all, Poincaré freed Izvolsky's hands. The very next day after his assumption of power, January 15, 1912, Poincaré visited Izvolsky and “assured of his firm intention to maintain the closest relations with Russia and direct the foreign policy of France.” Immediately after this, Izvolsky began working on the difficult task of eliminating the French ambassador Georges Louis from St. Petersburg: Georges Louis was a representative of peaceful politics and quite stubbornly resisted the active steps of Russian diplomacy on the Balkan Peninsula. He tried to soften friction with Austria and Germany and was considered by Izvolsky to be one of the unreliable friends of the Franco-Russian alliance and the Entente. Acting on Poincare, Izvolsky managed to undermine the official position of Georges Louis. However, even before his resignation at the end of February 1913, Georges Louis was powerless to fight Izvolsky, on whose side, it seemed, was the chairman of the French Council of Ministers himself.
Demonstrations followed manifestations. Unveiling a monument to King Edward VII in Cannes in April 1912, Poincaré (in the presence of Grand Duke Michael) declared: “France deeply values the blessings of the world and does not think about provocative politics, but it is clearly aware that in order not to be attacked or challenged, she must certainly maintain her naval power at the height. We, of course, must first of all rely on our own strength, but these forces receive a significant increase due to the support provided to us by our allies and friends.” Reporting these words to St. Petersburg, Izvolsky adds that Poincaré himself also explained to him that “these festivities had a clearly expressed character of a manifestation of mutual solidarity between all three powers - participants in the Triple Entente.” In July 1912, meetings were held in Paris between the chiefs of staff of the Russian and French armies, as well as naval headquarters, and “the chief of the French naval staff fully understood the need, in the interests of both allies, to make it easier for Russia to dominate the Black Sea by putting appropriate pressure on the fleets of our possible opponents , that is, mainly Austria and, perhaps, Germany and Italy.”
Thus, the policy of not yet the entire Entente, but of France and Russia, begins to seem to be oriented towards Constantinople and the straits, although even then, as after the war, France did not at all want the destruction of Turkey. There was a clear play of interests here: Poincaré needed Russia, and events that did not (as it later turned out) have serious political significance, such as the visit of Nicholas II to Potsdam (in 1910) or the return visit of Wilhelm II to the Baltic port on July 4, 1912 ., worried and irritated French politicians and forced them to take steps that were pleasing to the Russian government. And Russian diplomacy took advantage of this to direct the spearhead of the Entente against the growing influence of Germany in the Turkish Empire. During the era of the First Balkan War, Poincaré, in response to soundings of the soil from the Russian side, told Izvolsky (November 4/17, 1912) that “if Russia fights, France will also enter the war, because we know that Austria is in this matter Germany will stand." This statement followed Poincare's trip to Kronstadt (in August of the same 1912), when the French chairman of the Council of Ministers was received in St. Petersburg with exceptional courtesy.
Germany's concern about these demonstrations was growing. Wilhelm II (at this time already under the influence of Foreign Minister Kiderlen-Wächter, who did not want war at that moment) took some steps towards France: three German battleships were sent to the Baltic Sea to meet Poincaré, who was traveling to Russia, and greeted him with cannon fire with fireworks. Immediately after this, Kiderlen-Wächter had a conversation with an employee of the French newspaper Figaro, where he expressed friendly thoughts about the possible peaceful cooperation of France and Germany. But these trial balloons had no consequences. Sazonov, having personally met Poincaré in St. Petersburg, reported to Nicholas II about his following “personal impressions”: “... in his person, Russia has a faithful and reliable friend, possessing a remarkable statesmanship and unyielding will. In the event of a critical moment in international relations, it would be highly desirable that the head of the government of our ally would be, if not Mr. Poincaré himself, then a person with the same decisive character and no fear of responsibility as the current French First Minister.”
The momentous day of the presidential election was approaching. The left side of the House and Senate wanted to nominate Pamsa for president, the right side wanted to nominate Poincaré, chairman of the Council of Ministers. Pamsa's candidacy meant a softening of the tense political atmosphere; Poincaré's candidacy united supporters of the continuation of the “energetic policy.” “Tomorrow is the presidential election,” Izvolsky wrote to Sazonov on January 16, 1913, “if, God forbid, Poincaré is defeated, it will be a disaster for us.”
The next day, January 17, 1913, Poincaré was elected president of the French Republic. A few days after this event, he told Izvolsky that “as President of the Republic, he will have full opportunity to directly influence the foreign policy of France.” And he immediately added that “it is very important for the French government to be able to prepare French public opinion in advance for France’s participation in a war that could arise on the basis of Balkan affairs.” Izvolsky was jubilant (see his letter to Sazonov dated January 30, 1913). He was convinced - and in this he was not at all mistaken - that, having become president of the republic, it was Poincaré, and no one else, who would continue to manage the foreign policy of France and that, not to mention the personal characteristics of the imperious Poincaré, the French constitution, contrary to generally accepted opinion, , gives the president and his personal interventions a lot of scope.
The first significant act of the new president was the recall of Ambassador Georges Louis from St. Petersburg (February 24, 1913) and the appointment in his place of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Théophile Delcasse, the same one who, as described in its place, was supposed to leave in June 1905 under pressure from German threats regarding Morocco. He was considered the main enemy of Germany and an active assistant of Edward VII in the creation of the Entente. His resignation in 1905 gave rise to such rejoicing in Germany that Wilhelm II, as a reward for the successful (in his opinion) policy of Chancellor Bülow, which caused such a brilliant result, immediately gave Bülow a princely title. Since then, every rumor about Delcasse's return to foreign policy affairs has generated anxiety and irritation in Germany and evoked memories of how Delcasse (before his resignation) advised Prime Minister Rouvier not to retreat even at the risk of armed conflict.
And now, after an eight-year stay away from foreign politics, Delcasse was appointed French ambassador to St. Petersburg, and, as all of Europe immediately learned, at the personal request of the President of the Republic, Poincaré.
In Germany this was taken as an insult, a threat and a hostile demonstration. Things turned out in such a way that the creator of the Entente, England, seemed to begin to play a passive role in the general direction of the policy of this Triple Entente, and France and Russia began to play an active and directing role. Dark clouds were gathering over Europe. In December 1912, the German Minister (State Secretary) of Foreign Affairs Kiderlen-Wächter, one of the few talented German diplomats, died. In Germany, supporters of quick decisions, strong movements, and cutting the Gordian knots with a sword clearly gained the upper hand.
Kronprinz in Germany, ministers Berchtold and Tissa and Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Austria, Izvolsky in Paris came more and more to the fore. And both sides, before taking the first decisive preparatory actions, looked intensely at England: it seemed that some changes were brewing there. Both sides, during 1913 and at the beginning of 1914, read in the eyes of this sphinx what they wanted, that is, directly opposite intentions, excluding one another.
Let us consider the main elements of English political life in the last months before the war; we will see that it was indeed very difficult to understand the exact goals and predict in advance the likely actions of the British cabinet at the decisive moment.
The formation of opposing blocs took place over a number of years. Their configuration changed under the influence of the dynamics of foreign policy contradictions.
Triple Alliance- a military-political unification of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy - was created back in 1882. However, distinct forms of bloc confrontation emerged during local armed conflicts at the turn of the century. These were the first wars for the redistribution of territories: the Spanish-American War (1898), the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). The Moroccan crises, the Balkan wars, and national liberation revolutions in a number of colonial and semi-colonial countries had no less active influence on the formation of the system of bloc confrontation.
At the time of the signing of the Entente Cordiale (Entente Cordiale) by England and France, Russia was at war with Japan. Before signing the treaty with France, England had already concluded a military-political alliance with Japan directed against Russia, thus the Anglo-French alliance was directed mainly against Germany. In the current conditions, Germany tried to take advantage of the Russo-Japanese War to weaken Russia’s political and economic positions, but at the same time took into account the danger of the emerging alliance between England and France, inclining Russia towards an alliance. This was evidenced by the meeting between German Kaiser Wilhelm II and Russian Emperor Nicholas II in the summer of 1905.
The further aggravation of contradictions between Germany, France and England served First Moroccan Crisis 1905-1906 At the Algeciras (Spain) conference on the problem of Morocco, France received strong support not only from England, but also from Russia, which was a step towards Russia’s entry into the Entente. A member of the Triple Alliance - Italy - also supported France, recognizing its claims to Morocco, thereby moving away from Germany and Austria-Hungary.
A year after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, England, taking into account the emerging imbalance of power in the East and growing hostility from Germany, signed an agreement with Russia, which defined the spheres of influence of the two countries in Iran, Afghanistan, Northeast China and Tibet.
The agreement between England and Russia finally formalized the bloc Entente.
The steady growth of the power of the German navy led to increased confrontation with the first naval power in the world - England.
The main epicenter of controversy on the eve of the First World War was Balkans, where the interests of not only the great Jaw villages, but also the small peoples inhabiting this
region. Traditionally oriented towards Russia, Bulgaria and Serbia in 1912 concluded an alliance treaty with a number of secret annexes, which provided for a joint armed action in the event of a violation of their sovereignty, as well as attempts to partition Macedonia. This treaty was directed primarily against Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Greece and Montenegro soon joined him, forming a broad coalition that went down in history as Balkan Union.
In the autumn of 1912 it began First Balkan War created a military-political union with Turkey. The reason for the war was the anti-Turkish uprising in Albania and Macedonia and Turkey's refusal to grant autonomy to Macedonia. Intervention in the conflict of the great powers (Austria-Hungary, Russia and
By 1914, Europe was split into two major alliances, which included the six most powerful powers. Their confrontation escalated into a world war. Britain, France and Russia formed the Entente, and Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy united in the Triple Alliance. The split into alliances aggravated the explosiveness and completely quarreled the countries.
The beginning of the formation of alliances
Having won a series of victories (1862-1871), Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck created a new German state, united from several small principalities. However, Bismarck feared that after the formation of the new state, neighboring countries, especially France and Austria-Hungary, would feel threatened and begin to take action to destroy Germany. Bismarck saw the only way out was to create alliances to stabilize and balance forces on the geopolitical map of Europe. He believed that this could stop the inevitability of war for Germany.
Dual alliance
Bismarck understood that France was lost as an ally for Germany. After the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War and the occupation of Alsace and Lorraine by Germany, the French had a sharply negative attitude towards the Germans. Britain, on the other hand, sought dominance and actively prevented the formation of any alliances, fearing possible competition from them.
Based on these circumstances, Bismarck decided to turn to Austria-Hungary and Russia. As a result, in 1873 they united into the Alliance of the Three Emperors, the participants of which guaranteed mutual support if hostilities suddenly began. Five years later, Russia decided to leave the union. The following year, the remaining members of the alliance formed the Dual Alliance and now began to consider Russia a threat. They agreed to provide military assistance if Russia attacked them or provided military support to anyone else.
Triple Alliance
In 1881, Italy joined the two countries participating in the alliance, and the Triple Alliance was formed, and France was now added to the list of threat factors. Moreover, the alliance guaranteed that if any of its participants found itself in a state of war with two or more states, the alliance would come to the rescue.
Italy, being the weakest member of the alliance, insisted on including an additional clause in the treaty stating that it had the right to withdraw from it if the Triple Alliance acted as an aggressor. Soon after, Italy signed a treaty with France, promising their support if they were attacked by Germany.
"Reinsurance" agreement
Bismarck was frightened by the possibility of a war on two fronts, which meant settling relations with either France or Russia. The Germans' relations with the French were badly damaged, so Bismarck's choice fell on the Russians. The Chancellor invited Russia to sign a “reinsurance agreement.” Under the terms of this treaty, both parties were required to remain neutral in the event of a war breaking out with a third country.
However, this treaty was valid only until 1890, then the German government canceled it, sending Bismarck into retirement. Russia sought to keep the treaty in force, but Germany did not want this. This decision is considered the main mistake of Bismarck's successors.
Franco-Russian alliance
Bismarck's carefully crafted foreign policy began to unravel after his departure. In an effort to expand the German Empire, Kaiser Wilhelm II pursued a policy of aggressive militarization. The expansion and strengthening of the German fleet caused concern in England, France and Russia, which was the reason for the unity of these countries. Meanwhile, the new German government proved insufficiently competent to maintain the alliance created by Germany, and Germany soon faced the distrust and hostility of the European powers.
In 1892, Russia, within the framework of a secret convention, entered into an alliance with France. The terms of this alliance provided for mutual assistance in case of war, without imposing other restrictions. The Alliance was created as a counterweight to the Triple Alliance. Germany's departure from the political course laid out by Bismarck put it in a dangerous position. Now the empire faced the threat of war on two fronts.
Increasing tension between Europe's major powers has forced Great Britain to consider the need to join one of the alliances. Britain did not support France in the Franco-Prussian War, but the countries nevertheless concluded the Entente Cordiale treaty among themselves in 1904. Three years later, a similar treaty appeared between Great Britain and Russia. In 1912, the Anglo-French Naval Convention made this connection even stronger. The alliance came into force.
World War
When Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated in 1914, Austria-Hungary's response was immediate. Over the next few weeks, a full-scale war broke out across Europe. The Entente fought the Triple Alliance, which Italy soon abandoned.
The parties to the conflict were confident that the war would be fleeting and would end by Christmas 1914, but it lasted 4 long years, during which time the United States was also drawn into the conflict. Over the entire period, it claimed the lives of 11 million soldiers and 7 million civilians. The war ended in 1919 with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles.
The Triple Alliance, which included Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, took shape from 1879 to 1882. The formation of the Triple Alliance was aimed at achieving hegemony in the world. The Entente bloc was created as a counterweight to the Triple Alliance. The name "Entente" is translated from French as "consent". It included Russia, France, Great Britain.
Attempts to weaken the Entente were made by the Triple Alliance more than once. A convenient reason was the contradictions between Russia and England in Iran. However, Russia's military campaigns in the Balkans, carried out in the period from 1912 to 1913, made it possible to significantly strengthen relations between the countries of this military-political bloc. But it should be noted that relations between the Entente member countries periodically worsened. The Triple Alliance and the Entente were powerful opposing forces.
The Entente alliance finally took shape not long before World War I. After the revolutionary events of 1917, it represented a union of many more countries. The Entente included: Japan, Belgium, Greece, Serbia, Romania and so on. The main roles were played by France, the USA and England.
The leadership of the Entente was carried out during conferences between the allied countries in the period from 1915 to 1918. But this was not enough to create a unified leadership of the union. The reasons for the lack of unified leadership were: the dissimilarity of interests of the countries participating in the union, different distances from theaters of military operations, and different military capabilities.
February Revolution of 1917 in Russia
Since the revolution of 1905-1907 did not resolve the economic, political and class contradictions in the country, it was a prerequisite for the February Revolution of 1917. The participation of Tsarist Russia in the First World War showed the inability of its economy to carry out military tasks. Many factories stopped operating, the army experienced a shortage of equipment, weapons, and food. The country's transport system is absolutely not adapted to martial law, agriculture has lost ground. Economic difficulties increased Russia's external debt to enormous proportions.
Intending to extract maximum benefits from the war, the Russian bourgeoisie began to create unions and committees on issues of raw materials, fuel, food, etc.
True to the principle of proletarian internationalism, the Bolshevik party revealed the imperialist nature of the war, which was waged in the interests of the exploiting classes, its aggressive, predatory essence. The party sought to channel the discontent of the masses into the mainstream of the revolutionary struggle for the collapse of the autocracy.
In August 1915, the “Progressive Bloc” was formed, which planned to force Nicholas II to abdicate in favor of his brother Mikhail. Thus, the opposition bourgeoisie hoped to prevent revolution and at the same time preserve the monarchy. But such a scheme did not ensure bourgeois-democratic transformations in the country.
The reasons for the February Revolution of 1917 were anti-war sentiment, the plight of workers and peasants, political lack of rights, the decline in the authority of the autocratic government and its inability to carry out reforms.
The driving force in the struggle was the working class, led by the revolutionary Bolshevik Party. The allies of the workers were the peasants, demanding the redistribution of land. The Bolsheviks explained to the soldiers the goals and objectives of the struggle.
The main events of the February revolution happened quickly. Over the course of several days, a wave of strikes took place in Petrograd, Moscow and other cities with the slogans “Down with the tsarist government!”, “Down with the war!” On February 25 the political strike became general. Executions and arrests were unable to stop the revolutionary onslaught of the masses. Government troops were put on alert, the city of Petrograd was turned into a military camp.
February 26, 1917 marked the beginning of the February Revolution. On February 27, soldiers of the Pavlovsky, Preobrazhensky and Volynsky regiments went over to the side of the workers. This decided the outcome of the struggle: on February 28, the government was overthrown.
The outstanding significance of the February Revolution is that it was the first popular revolution in history of the era of imperialism, which ended in victory.
During the February Revolution of 1917, Tsar Nicholas II abdicated the throne.
Dual power arose in Russia, which became a kind of result of the February revolution of 1917. On the one hand, the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is a body of people's power, on the other hand, the Provisional Government is an organ of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie headed by Prince G.E. Lvov. In organizational matters, the bourgeoisie was more prepared for power, but was unable to establish autocracy.
The provisional government pursued an anti-people, imperialist policy: the land issue was not resolved, factories remained in the hands of the bourgeoisie, agriculture and industry were in dire need, and there was not enough fuel for railway transport. The dictatorship of the bourgeoisie only deepened economic and political problems.
After the February revolution, Russia experienced an acute political crisis. Therefore, there was a growing need for the bourgeois-democratic revolution to develop into a socialist one, which was supposed to lead to the power of the proletariat.
One of the consequences of the February revolution is the October revolution under the slogan “All power to the Soviets!”
