Rossosh offensive operation. Ostrogozhko-Rossosh operation. Significance and results
A new book from the author of the bestsellers "Penal battalions and detachments of the Red Army" and "Armored troops of the Red Army". THE FIRST study of the history of the creation and combat use of Soviet tank armies during the Great Patriotic War.
They went a long and difficult way from the first failures and defeats of 1942 to the triumph of 1945. They distinguished themselves in all the major battles of the second half of the war - on the Kursk Bulge and in the battle for the Dnieper, in the Belorussian, Yasso-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and other strategic offensive operations. Possessing crushing power and phenomenal mobility, the guards tank armies became the elite of the Red Army and the main striking force of the "Russian-style blitzkriegs" that broke the back of the previously invincible Wehrmacht.
Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh offensive operation
The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, launched on November 19, 1942, decisively changed the strategic situation on the Soviet-German front in favor of the Red Army. Under these conditions, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided, using the success of the counteroffensive to the maximum, to launch a general offensive from Leningrad to the Caucasus. Without dispersing forces, as was the case in the winter of 1941/42, the Stavka concentrated its main efforts in the southwestern direction, that is, where the enemy was inflicted a particularly tangible defeat and where less stubborn resistance was expected. Here it was planned to use the forces of the Bryansk, Voronezh, South-Western, Southern and Transcaucasian fronts to defeat the troops of Army Groups "B", "Don" and "A", to liberate the Kharkov industrial region, the Donetsk basin and the North Caucasus. At the same time, the troops of the Don Front were ordered to liquidate the enemy grouping surrounded near Stalingrad. Active actions were also planned in other sectors of the front. In January 1943, an offensive operation was planned to break the blockade of Leningrad. In the northwestern and western directions, the armies of the Northwestern, Kalinin and Western fronts were to make another attempt to defeat the Demyansk and Rzhev-Vyazma groupings of the enemy.
At the beginning of January 1943, the active fronts of the Red Army consisted of about 370 rifle divisions and about 160 brigades, 19 tank and mechanized corps. In the reserve of the Headquarters there were only 14 rifle and airborne divisions, 3 tank and 4 air corps. The enemy had a little over 260 divisions on the Soviet-German front, including 208 German, the rest were Finnish, Hungarian, Romanian, Italian, Slovak and one Spanish. The German command intended to delay the advance of the Red Army in the southwestern direction. The threat that the armies of the Southern Front would enter the rear of the Caucasian group forced the enemy to leave part of the occupied territory, counting on holding the Donbass and part of the North Caucasus. The main forces of the opposing sides operated on the southern sector of the front - from Dolgorukov to Novorossiysk.
From January 13 to the defeat of the main forces of Army Group "B", the expansion of the front of the strategic offensive and the liberation of the Kharkov industrial region. The operation included the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh, Voronezh-Kastornensk and Kharkov front-line offensive operations.
The Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation was carried out in order to defeat the main forces of Army Group B (commanded by Colonel General M. Weikhs) and create conditions for a subsequent offensive in the Kharkov direction. Army Group B included the Italian 8th, Hungarian 2nd armies and the Kramer corps group - a total of about 270 thousand people, 2.6 thousand guns and mortars, more than 300 tanks and assault guns. From the air, it was supported by aviation of the Don Air Force Command, as well as part of the forces of the 4th Air Force and the Vostok Air Force Command - up to 300 aircraft in total. The enemy defense was of a focal nature and was developed in engineering terms only in the tactical zone. In the operational depth, there were no pre-prepared lines.
The main forces of the Voronezh Front (40th, 3rd tank, 2nd air armies, 18th separate rifle and 7th cavalry corps) and the 6th army of the Southwestern Front were involved in the operation. They took up defensive positions along the left bank of the river. Don from Kostenki to Novaya Kalitva, further south east of Mikhailovka, east of Tishkov, holding two small bridgeheads on the right bank, in the areas of 1st Storozhevoe and Shchuchye. In total, the troops participating in the operation numbered about 200 thousand people, up to 3 thousand guns and mortars, 909 tanks and 208 aircraft. They were 1.3 times inferior to the enemy in terms of manpower and 1.5 times in aviation, had an almost equal number of guns and mortars and 3 times more tanks. As a result of the decisive massing of forces and means in the directions of the main attacks, it was possible to create superiority over the enemy in infantry by 2.3–3.7 times, in tanks by 1.3–3 times and in artillery by 4.5–8 times.
According to the plan of the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation, it was planned to deliver three strikes in converging directions. The main blows were delivered: in the center of Army Group B (Hungarian 2nd Army) from the Storozhevsky bridgehead - the 40th Army; in the center of the Italian 8th Army from the area south of Novaya Kalitva - the 3rd Panzer Army. She was supposed to break through the enemy defenses and use her main forces to develop success in the north-western direction. By the end of the fourth day of the offensive, the army was to reach the Kamenka-Alekseyevka line, join up with the 40th Army and the 18th Separate Rifle Corps, and encircle the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh enemy grouping. For the quickest elimination of the encircled enemy grouping, the 18th separate rifle corps delivered a dissecting blow from the Shchuchinsky bridgehead in the general direction of Karpenkovo. In order to tie up the enemy in the Voronezh region, the troops of the 60th Army were to deliver a distracting blow from the bridgehead from the Storozhevoye-1 region to the north in the direction of Borisovo, Gremyache.
The actions of the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov) from the south were provided by the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front, advancing from the area southwest of Kantemirovka in the general direction of Pokrovskoye (125 km west of Kantemirovka). Simultaneously with the encirclement of the enemy, part of the forces of the 40th Army and the 7th Cavalry Corps, reinforced by the 201st Separate Tank Brigade, were to advance to the river. Oskol and form the outer front of the encirclement.
The operational formation of the troops of the Voronezh Front and the 6th Army was in one echelon with the allocation of reserves. The operational formation of all three strike groups was two-echelon. By decision of the commander of the 3rd tank army, General P.S. Rybalko, the first echelon included the 37th separate rifle brigade, the 48th guards, 180th and 184th rifle divisions, the 97th tank brigade of the 12th tank corps, the 173rd and 179th separate tank brigades. Their actions were supported by an artillery group consisting of the 39th, 389th and 390th separate guards mortar battalions, the 62nd guards mortar regiment, and the 135th, 265th and 306th howitzer artillery regiments. In the second echelon (breakthrough development echelon) were: the 15th tank corps (without two tank brigades) with the 368th anti-tank artillery regiment attached to it and the 47th separate engineering battalion; The 12th tank corps with the 1172nd anti-tank artillery regiment and the 46th separate engineer battalion attached to it. The commander's reserve consisted of the 111th rifle division, the 113th and 195th tank brigades of the 15th tank corps, whose arrival was delayed.
In preparation for the operation, special attention was paid to the fire support of the troops. In the breakthrough areas, the density of artillery in the 40th Army was 150-170 barrels per 1 km of the front, and in the zone of the 18th Rifle Corps and the 3rd Tank Army - 120-130 barrels each. According to D.V. Shein, 556 mortars (without 50-mm mortars), 682 guns and 287 rocket launchers were concentrated in the breakthrough section of the 3rd Panzer Army 16 km wide, which averaged 77.3 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front.
The pace of the operation was planned at 17–20 km per day for rifle units and 40–50 km per day for tank units. The introduction of the breakthrough development echelon into the battle was envisaged after the first echelon formations had broken through the enemy defenses to a depth of 3 km.
In the course of preparation for the operation, a system of measures was developed and put into practice to disguise and keep secret all regroupings of troops, to disinform the enemy and organize command and control. To this end, by order of the headquarters of the Voronezh Front, the 40th Army was to demonstrate the concentration of troops and preparations for the transition to the offensive from the Storozhevsky bridgehead in the direction of Korotoyak and from the area of the Svoboda railway station in the period from December 7 to 20, 1942. Subsequent events showed that the enemy had indeed been misled.
A feature of the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation was that instead of the method of sequential execution of tasks (breaking through the defense - encircling the enemy - crushing the encircled grouping into parts - destroying it piecemeal), it was planned to encircle and destroy the enemy as a simultaneous action. At the same time, the destruction was planned to be carried out without waiting for a complete encirclement and the creation of an external front. Another feature of the operation was that the main strike groupings of the troops of the Voronezh Front operated in completely different conditions. The troops of the 40th Army at the beginning of the operation were to make a frontal breakthrough of a well-developed enemy defense. In front of the formations of the 3rd Panzer Army was the enemy, who hastily went over to the defensive. In fact, conditions were created here for a rapid offensive against Rossosh and Alekseevka. “The common thing for all three of our strike groups was that at the first stage of the operation they operated on a narrow front,” recalled General of the Army M.I. Kazakov. - The 40th Army broke through the enemy defenses from a bridgehead of 13 kilometers. The 18th Rifle Corps had a breakthrough front of eight kilometers. And the 3rd Panzer Army struck from a line of 12-13 kilometers. At the same time, each of the groupings was separated from the other by a considerable distance: the breakthrough area of the 18th Rifle Corps was 50 kilometers from the breakthrough area of the 40th Army and 130 kilometers from the area of operations of the 3rd Tank Army.
On January 4, 1943, Colonel-General M.S. Khozin handed over to General P.S. Rybalko map with the combat mission of the army printed on it. It was introduced into battle in the zone of the 6th Army of the South-Western Front with the aim of striking “... in the general direction through Rossosh, Olkhovatka to Alekseevka and in a northern direction to Kamenka, Tatarino, in cooperation with units of the 40th and 6th armies, to surround and destroy the Rossosh-Pavlovsk-Alekseevsky enemy grouping, free the Liski-Kantemirovka, Liski-Valuiki railways.
On January 6, representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Generals of the Army G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky arrived in the 3rd Panzer Army. They held a meeting and briefing with the commanders of the formations. As a result, it turned out that there were problems with the transfer of transports with ammunition, fuel and troops by rail. After unloading, the units had to make a march to the planned areas of concentration, which took from 4 to 6 days.
"one. Today, in all areas, we have completed training with commanders, commanders of corps, divisions and brigades of all operational-tactical decisions and action plans. Comrade Moskalenko's decisions and action plan turned out to be better than others and most competently worked out . For the worse, the Shchuchinsky direction stands out - the Zykov building . According to the actions of Rybalko's army, the direction of the main attack had to be shifted west of the Kantemirovka-Rossosh railway in order not to overcome the railway line with tanks and avoid the prepared enemy cut-off positions prepared along the railway.
2. Rybalko's actions are linked to Kharitonov's actions and Zykov's corps. By linking actions with Kharitonov, we agreed with Comrade. Vatutin that Kharitonov will begin actions simultaneously with Rybalko, inflicting the main blow on the right flank of the army with the immediate task of reaching the river. Aidar; in the future Comrade. Kharitonov is obliged to act to the left of the 7th kk, move forward and secure the Urazovo-Starobelsk railway behind him. The 7th KK with ski brigades was tasked with capturing Valuiki and Urazovo and securing these railway junctions.
3. The main forces of 3 TA are obliged to capture Alekseevka, cut off the enemy’s escape routes and provide themselves from the west, uniting in the Alekseevka, Ostrogozhsk area with mobile troops 40 A and thereby complete the encirclement of enemy troops in the area known to you ... " .
The report also noted that the concentration of troops was going exceptionally badly: not a single echelon had yet arrived from the 4th mortar division; 15 echelons are still on the way from the 3rd Panzer Army; 10 echelons have not yet arrived from the 7th Cavalry Corps; of the three rifle divisions given to the front for reinforcement, only 5 echelons arrived. Even worse is the supply of ammunition and fuel. Therefore, representatives of the Headquarters considered it necessary to postpone the start of the offensive for two days. As a result, it was scheduled for January 12, 1943.
On the night of January 8, the troops of the 6th Army were replaced by units of the 37th Separate Rifle Brigade, the 48th Guards, 180th and 184th Rifle Divisions of the 3rd Tank Army. On the same day, the rifle battalions of the first-echelon formations carried out reconnaissance in force in order to clarify the front line of the enemy's defense and identify his fire system. At the same time, the command staff carried out reconnaissance and worked out the issues of interaction between the military branches directly on the ground.
The 37th separate rifle brigade was to advance on the right flank of the army, in the sector from Valentinovka to Pasekovo, with the immediate task of capturing the Solontsy region. Then subjugate the 173rd separate tank brigade and take Mitrofanovka by the end of the day.
The 180th Rifle Division, supported by the 173rd Separate Tank Brigade, the 265th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, and the 386th and 390th Separate Guards Mortar Battalions, broke through the enemy defenses in the Pasekovo area. Then she had to let parts of the 12th Panzer Corps through her battle formations and, using its advance, develop an offensive in the direction of Mikhailovka, Sofiyivka, having the immediate task of reaching the northern outskirts of Mikhailovka, and by the end of the first day of the operation, occupy Vasilyevka and Sofiyivka.
To the left of the 180th Rifle Division, the 48th Guards Rifle Division advanced with the support of the 97th Tank Brigade of the 12th Tank Corps, the 1172nd Antitank Artillery Regiment, the 206th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, and the 62nd Guards Mortar Regiment. After breaking through the enemy defenses, without slowing down the pace of the offensive, the division was to pass units of the 12th and 15th tank corps through their battle formations and, using their advance, develop the offensive in the direction of Shramovka, Vladimirovka, capture Shramovka and Elenovka. When parts of the division approached the area of Zlatopol, Mikhailovka, the 97th tank brigade returned to the command of the commander of the 12th tank corps.
On the left flank of the army in the direction of Kulikovka, the 184th Rifle Division advanced with the support of the 179th Separate Tank Brigade and the 138th Howitzer Artillery Regiment. It was supposed to let parts of the 15th Panzer Corps pass through its battle formations and, using its advance, to capture the Zlatopol-Kulikovka line.
The 12th Tank Corps, with the support of the 1172nd Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, the 46th Separate Engineer Battalion and the 319th Air Defense Regiment, entered the gap in the areas of the 180th and 48th Guards Rifle Divisions near Pasekovo. He was instructed to develop a breakthrough in the general direction of Mikhailovka, Shramovka, Lizinovka, Olkhovatka, upon reaching Shramovka, to allocate tank and motorized rifle brigades for operations in the direction of Sofiyivka, Rossosh, Goncharovka. By the end of the first day of the operation, the left group of the corps was ordered to go to the area of Lizinovka, Chagary, and the right group was ordered to occupy Rossosh.
The 15th Tank Corps, with the support of the 265th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, the 47th Separate Engineer Battalion and the 71st Air Defense Regiment, entered the gap in the sectors of the 184th and 48th Guards Rifle Divisions. He was to develop the offensive in the general direction of Kulikovo, Yelenovka, Novoselkovo, Nerovnovka, and by the end of the first day of the operation, go to the Novoselkovo, Aleksandrovka area.
In the zone of the upcoming offensive of the 3rd Panzer Army, the 543rd Infantry Regiment of the 387th Infantry Division, the remnants of the 114th Infantry Regiment, the 15th and 3rd SS police regiments, and the Grossdeutschland regiment were defending. In addition, it was planned to concentrate units of the 130th Infantry Division in Mitrofanovka, the 168th and an unidentified Infantry Division in Rossosh. The enemy's defense was a system of strong points equipped with full profile trenches and dugouts. In settlements, houses were adapted for firing points. Minefields were laid in the directions of the probable offensive of the Soviet troops.
Before the start of the operation on January 12, reconnaissance in force was carried out in the zone of the 40th Army by the forces of forward detachments, which penetrated into the enemy defenses 6 km along the front and more than 3 km in depth. At dawn on January 13, after a powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the first echelon of the army went on the offensive and by November 14 they had broken through the tactical defense zone of the enemy, creating favorable conditions for the active operations of the troops of the left flank of the 60th Army.
How did events develop in the zone of the 3rd Panzer Army?
The delay in the concentration of troops of the 3rd Tank Army and artillery of the RGK, the lack of ammunition, fuel and food supplies required for the offensive led to the postponement of the start of the offensive to the morning of January 14th. Due to heavy fog (visibility was limited to 5-10 meters), the army commander, General Rybalko, was forced to postpone the start of artillery preparation from 8:00 to 10:45.
After artillery preparation, which lasted an hour and a half, the rifle formations of the 3rd tank army, with the support of the 173rd and 179th separate tank brigades, went on the attack. The enemy, despite the losses incurred during the artillery preparation, put up stubborn resistance. As a result, the advance of infantry units was slow. Therefore, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, General Rybalko decided to introduce a breakthrough development echelon into the battle. This made it possible to break the resistance of the enemy, who began to hastily withdraw in the northern and northwestern directions. By the end of the day on January 14, the 12th Tank Corps under the command of Colonel M.I. Zinkovich advanced up to 18 km and captured Shramovka, and the 15th tank corps of General V.A. Koptsov, having overcome 20 km, took Zhilino, where he defeated the headquarters of the 24th Panzer Corps, the 385th and 387th Infantry Divisions and two SS regiments. With access to this line, the corps were forced to stop, since there was no fuel left in the tanks of the tanks.
On the night of January 15, only the 106th tank brigade (16 tanks) of the 12th tank corps under the command of Colonel I.E. Alekseev continued to advance. Bypassing the knots of resistance, she broke into Rossosh at dawn and liberated the city. However, in the middle of the day, the enemy, with the support of aviation, went on the offensive. The brigade, having used up almost all the fuel and ammunition, was surrounded. But the tankers did not flinch. With a swift blow, they made their way to the station and entrenched themselves. Here, in a fierce battle, the commander of the brigade, Colonel I.E. Alekseev.
At the same time, on the morning of January 15, the 18th separate rifle corps went on the offensive, delivering the main blow to Kamenka. Part of the forces (one division) of the corps advanced in the direction of the Mark, Old Saguns, in order, in cooperation with the 270th Infantry Division, advancing from the Pavlovsk region, to destroy the left-flank corps of the Hungarian army.
On the morning of January 16, the main forces of the 12th Panzer Corps approached Rossosh, and the city was again liberated from the enemy. On the same day, units of the 12th Panzer Corps occupied Kamenka, and the 15th Panzer Corps occupied Olkhovatka. As a result, the Italian corps and part of the forces of the 156th Infantry Division were surrounded. It remained only to capture or destroy these units and formations. However, General Rybalko made a miscalculation: apparently carried away by the first success, he allocated too few forces for this purpose - only one division. The Alpine divisions of the Italians crushed its battle formations and began to retreat to Valuiki, however, without artillery and rears.
On January 17, the left-flank formations of the 40th Army, advancing from the north, reached Ostrogozhsk. By the end of the next day, the 15th Panzer Corps and the 305th Rifle Division of the 40th Army reached the Alekseevka area, closing the encirclement of the Ostrogozhsk-Rossoshansky enemy group. At the same time, the 12th Tank and 18th Separate Rifle Corps, with counter attacks from the south and north in the general direction of Karpenkovo, cut the encircled enemy grouping into two parts. One of them (5 divisions) was blocked in the area of Ostrogozhsk, Alekseevka, Karpenkovo, the other (8 divisions) - in the area north of Rossosh. Due to a lack of forces, the 3rd Panzer Army and the 18th Separate Rifle Corps were unable to create a solid internal encirclement front. Despite this, the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, General of the Army A.M. Vasilevsky, commander of the Voronezh Front, Colonel-General F.I. Golikov and member of the Military Council of the Front F.F. Kuznetsov on January 18 was assured I.V. Stalin that "the elimination of the enemy, surrounded in the area east of Rossosh, Podgornoye (up to five frontier divisions), and the destruction of individual groups in the area of Kamenka, Tatarino will require another two or three days." Subsequent events have shown the unrealizability of such a forecast.
The defeat of the Ostrogozhsk grouping of the enemy was completed only on January 24, the Rossosh grouping - on January 27th. But it was not possible to completely destroy them. They, having a significant numerical superiority, managed to break through to the west through the loose inner front of the encirclement. In total, during the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation, 12 divisions of Army Group B were defeated, three were destroyed, and heavy losses were inflicted on six divisions. The enemy lost over 140 thousand soldiers and officers, including 86 thousand prisoners. The troops of the 3rd Panzer Army, according to its headquarters, destroyed about 30 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, 28 tanks, 13 armored vehicles, 78 guns, captured about 73.2 thousand people, and also, as trophies, 44 tanks, 13 armored vehicles, 4517 trucks, 196 cars and 83 special vehicles, 39 aircraft, 196 guns. The losses of the army amounted to 11902 people, including 3016 killed and died from wounds, as well as 58 tanks and 60 guns.
During the operation, the troops of the 3rd Panzer Army gained significant experience in regrouping in winter off-road conditions, breaking through enemy defenses and developing tactical success into operational success, creating external and internal encirclement fronts. However, the lack of fuel and ammunition led to a decrease in the pace of the offensive, and the lack of forces did not allow the creation of a solid internal front of the enemy's encirclement.
Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh offensive operation
Preparations for the operation began on November 23, 1942, on the day of the completion of the encirclement of the Paulus army near Stalingrad, when the commander of the 40th Army, General K. S. Moskalenko (received the army in October from Major General F. F. Zhmachenko, who, in connection with this returned to his direct duties as deputy commander of the army) turned to the Supreme Commander with a request for permission to start hostilities on the Upper Don. Stalin was very interested in this proposal. A few days later, he sent a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, to the 40th Army, who at first was very skeptical. But, having visited the command post of the army, and then at the Storozhevsky bridgehead at the location of the 25th Guards and 107th Rifle Divisions, he finally declared: “I will report to the Supreme Commander on everything I saw and heard during my stay in the 40th Army. I will support the proposal to conduct an offensive operation.”
By that time, the 40th Army included four rifle divisions - 100th, 159th, 206th, 141st, one tank brigade (14th), two destroyer brigades and a number of artillery and mortar reinforcement regiments. With such a composition of the army, its defense on a 60-kilometer front, of course, was stretched out in one line, had no depth. However, already at the beginning of November 1942, some changes took place in the position of the army. By order of the new front commander, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov (he replaced N.F. Vatutin in this post on October 22), the front section from the northeastern outskirts of Voronezh to the settlement of Kremenchug was transferred to the neighbor on the right - the 60th Army, along with the troops defending this sector - the 100th, 159th and 206th rifle divisions. The 40th Army, on the left, cut down part of the 6th Army's strip, including the so-called Storozhevsky bridgehead, which later played an important role in delivering the main blow in the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation.
The Storozhevsky bridgehead was located on the western bank of the Don, 25 km north of the city of Korotoyak, and represented a territory measuring 13 km along the front and 8 km in depth. The settlements of Titchikha, Selyavnoye, the eastern part of the village of Storozhevoye 1st and Uryvo-Pokrovskoye were located here. They were liberated during the capture of the bridgehead at the end of July by the 25th Guards Rifle Division of Major General P. M. Shafarenko and other troops of the 6th Army. With the transfer of K. S. Moskalenko of Storozhevsky and - to the south - Uryvsky bridgeheads, the troops defending it, including the guardsmen of General P. M. Shafarenko, as well as the 107th Rifle Division, commanded by Colonel P. M. Bezhko.
There were other bridgeheads in the defense zone of the 40th Army, for example, in the area of Aleksandrovka, Arkhangelsk, and the Cherpetsky farm. But they were insignificant in area and gave only a small positional advantage. The Storozhevsky bridgehead, being in the hands of the Soviet units, posed an operational-tactical threat to the German command. Therefore, after repeated fruitless attempts to eliminate it, the German command was forced to keep more than two infantry divisions on the defensive here.
Most of the troops opposing the 40th Army were the 2nd Hungarian Army (6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 19, 20, 23rd Infantry Divisions, ski battalions of the 8th and 22nd Cavalry Divisions and 1 th armored Hungarian division), and in its ranks there were many soldiers and officers who did not want to fight for the interests of Germany, and this to a certain extent facilitated the solution of the problem.
By that time, Hungary, drawn by its government into the war on the side of Germany, had already suffered heavy losses on the Soviet-German front. Only in the period from October 1941 to September 1942, the 102nd, 108th and 109th Hungarian infantry divisions were almost completely destroyed, and the other four - 6th, 7th, 9th and 20th - lost about half of their personnel.
In September, the Horthy Hungarian troops opposing the 40th Army received a major reinforcement. But, despite the lull that lasted here throughout the autumn and part of the winter, they continued to suffer heavy losses, especially from Soviet snipers. This increased the demoralization of the Hungarian soldiers, their depressing mood. The troops opposing the 40th Army were located as follows: in the first echelon - Hungarian, in the second - German, and the latter were there not so much for joint operations and assistance to the ally, but to intimidate Hungarian soldiers who were not particularly willing to fight.
The 24th German Panzer Corps included 5 infantry divisions (19th, 213th, 298th, 385th, 387th), the 27th Wehrmacht Panzer Division, as well as several separate infantry regiments. In December 1942, this corps suffered significant losses and, in fact, by the beginning of 1943, did not manage to create a continuous front of defense. To the right of the 2nd Hungarian Army was the Italian Alpine Corps (a total of 57 thousand people), as well as the 24th Panzer Corps of the Wehrmacht, covering the front left by the Italian divisions during the December retreat.
The Hungarian and in some places German troops opposing the 40th Army reached the western bank of the Don at the beginning of July 1942, and since then, for more than five months, they have been creating and improving the defense. Its leading edge passed along the right bank of the Don, which rises almost a hundred meters above the left. This allowed the enemy to view the location of Soviet troops to a great depth and create a system of flanking fire along the riverbed and on the slopes of a steep bank.
On the front line, the enemy command concentrated the bulk of automatic weapons. For machine guns, a system of bunkers was built, interconnected by trenches with rifle cells. Communication passages branched off from the trenches into the depths of defense. The intervals between the bunkers, as well as the distance from them to the machine-gun crews behind the dugouts, did not exceed 75–100 m. All this was supplemented by three rows of wire obstacles arranged in front of the front edge, and in some areas - Bruno's spirals and hedgehogs. When it got dark, security groups of 5-6 people with light or heavy machine guns were posted to the wire fences. Patrols consisting of 2-4 people moved between them. Both of them were quite clearly visible, since the observers, equipped with signal pistols and rockets, illuminated the approaches to their forward edge every 1–2 minutes.
According to Soviet intelligence, the enemy's second line of defense was a system of strongholds located on heights, in settlements and individual groves. Each of them, depending on its size and tactical significance, had a garrison consisting of a platoon, company or battalion. The terrain in the depths of the enemy defense was crossed by ravines, small riverbeds, and copses. These natural obstacles were used to reinforce the defenses.
The strongest strongholds were equipped in the villages of Storozhevoe 1st and Uryvo-Pokrovskoye, as well as in the so-called Walnut Grove. Walnut Grove was located at Hill 185, not far from the front line of the enemy. The stronghold created there was a key point, and its capture would have undermined the entire defense of the troops opposing the 40th Army on the Storozhevsky bridgehead. It was also significant that in the Orekhovaya Grove and in Uryvo-Pokrovsky, units of one formation were defending, and in the neighboring Storozhevoy 1st, of another. It was Walnut Grove, thus, located at the junction of two connections, which to some extent facilitated the breakthrough of their defense. The stronghold located at Hill 185 was a key position.
On December 21, when a rather dense ring was created around the encircled enemy grouping near Stalingrad, and an attempt to unblock it ended in failure, the Supreme Command Headquarters again returned to the plan of defeating enemy troops in the Ostrogozhsk and Rossosh area. The start of the offensive was scheduled for January 12, 1943. For its implementation, two combined arms (6, 40) and 3rd tank armies, as well as the 18th separate rifle corps, were involved. By the beginning of the operation, the shock group of Soviet troops had 210 thousand soldiers and officers, 3155 guns and mortars, 797 tanks and 208 aircraft. The enemy Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh grouping, which included more than 21 divisions - six German, ten Hungarian and five Italian, numbered at least 260 thousand soldiers and officers and had over 300 tanks, 900 guns, about 8400 machine guns and more than 800 mortars.
Attaching great importance to this operation, at the beginning of January 1943, the Stavka again sent G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky to the Voronezh Front. Together with the front command, they refined its plan and assisted in the preparation. The plan of the operation provided for the main attack on the directions converging on Alekseevka by the forces of the 40th Army of General K.S. Moskalenko and the 3rd Tank Army of General P.S. Rybalko, by the end of the fourth or fifth day - the encirclement of enemy troops in the area of Ostrogozhsk, Rossosh and in a short time the completion of their defeat. An auxiliary frontal strike from the Shchuchye bridgehead in the direction of Shchuchye, Karpenkovo was to be delivered by the divisions of the 18th separate rifle corps of General P. M. Zykov. It was assumed that the actions of the 40th Army on the flanks would be provided by the 4th Tank Corps, and the offensive of the 3rd Tank Army - by the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front. It was planned to create the inner and outer fronts of the encirclement. By the end of the operation, it was planned to capture the line of Repyevka, Valuyki, Pokrovskoye.
Such a plan best suited the evolving situation, made it possible to make the best use of the operational advantage of the troops of the Voronezh Front - a bridgehead on the Don, covering the position in relation to the enemy, as well as his weakness. At the same time, the experience of the Stalingrad operation was also taken into account, but unlike the latter, a blow in converging directions here should have been delivered not by front-line, but by army formations. It is impossible not to mention such a merit of this plan as the conduct of a frontal cutting blow by the forces of the 18th Rifle Corps simultaneously with the encirclement, which created favorable conditions for the rapid defeat of a large enemy grouping.
During the preparation of the operation, many complex operational measures were envisaged. First of all, this is the regrouping of eight rifle divisions and six tank brigades from the depths and along the front, then the withdrawal to the initial offensive areas of the arrived cavalry and three tank corps, five rifle divisions, tank and three ski-rifle brigades, as well as three artillery divisions. At the same time, the concentration and regrouping were carried out in difficult conditions: up to 40% of formations and units made long night marches in snowstorms and snowstorms, along difficult roads at a distance of 100 to 175, and sometimes up to 350 km. Due to endless breakdowns, many tanks did not reach the front line. So, in the 3rd Panzer Army, only 306 out of 428 tanks arrived from the unloading station to the designated area. Individual formations, such as the 4th Panzer Corps, could not approach the start of hostilities at all.
Considering that an enemy offensive in the front line was unlikely, the command boldly went to weaken secondary directions and, due to this, created strike groups that, in terms of their combat capabilities, could crack the defense and develop success into operational depth. In total, 12 rifle divisions and 2 tank corps were concentrated on three sections of the breakthrough 34 km wide (12% of the total offensive front). This made it possible to achieve superiority over the enemy in terms of personnel by 2.7–3.2 times, in artillery by 5–8 times, in tanks by 1.3–2 times. Lines and positions in the secondary areas of the offensive were occupied by only individual units and subunits. The density here was one battalion per 10 km of the front.
Artillery played an important role in the coming offensive. With massive fire, it was supposed to ensure a breakthrough of the enemy defense to the entire tactical depth, prevent enemy counterattacks on the flanks, especially on the right, in every possible way contribute to the defeat of his reserves, and then the dissection and destruction of the entire grouping. In the 40th Army and the 18th Separate Rifle Corps, in the offensive zones of which, according to intelligence, the formation of the enemy's defense was the deepest, army and corps artillery groups were created. 120 minutes were allotted for the artillery preparation of the attack. A large number of guns were planned to be used for direct fire.
The decisive role in carrying out the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh offensive operation was assigned to the 3rd Panzer Army under the command of the old cavalryman, General P.S. Rybalko. It consisted of the 12th (30th, 97th, 106th brigade; 13th motorized rifle brigade, 13th mine engineering company, 6th reconnaissance battalion, 88th and 93rd mobile repair bases) and 15th (88th, 113th, 195th brigade; 52nd motorized rifle brigade, 5th reconnaissance battalion, 71st and 96th mobile repair bases) of tank corps and 39th reconnaissance armored battalion. Before the offensive, the army additionally included the 7th cavalry corps with the 201st tank brigade, the 180th and 184th rifle divisions, the 173rd separate tank brigade, the 8th artillery division, the 15th and 16th guards mortar brigades, 97th guards mortar regiment, 46th and 47th engineer battalions of the reserve of the Headquarters of the High Command.
According to the state, in the heavy tank brigade of the tank army, there were 24 heavy tanks KV and 27 light tanks T-60 / T-70 (as of January 3, 1943, the 3rd tank army had only one 97th heavy tank brigade of the 12th tank corps .- Note. ed.), and in the rest - 20 T-34 medium tanks and 26 T-70 / T-60 light tanks. As of January 12, 1943, the 201st Tank Brigade had 49 English-made tanks: 6 MK II Matilda and 43 MK III Valentine. As of January 15, 1943, the 173rd Tank Brigade had 5 KVs, 21 T-34s and 20 T-70/T-60s.
The army had the task of advancing in a 30-kilometer strip (from Pasekovo to Yasinovataya), by attacking the main forces from the area northwest of Kantemirovka, breaking through the defenses of the 24th tank corps of the enemy on a 10-kilometer section and developing an offensive in a northwestern direction. By the end of the fourth day of the offensive, the army was to reach the Kamenka-Alekseyevka line with tank corps, where it would join up with the troops of the 40th Army and the 18th Rifle Corps, advancing from the northeast, encircle and destroy the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh enemy grouping, and the 7th m cavalry corps to develop success in the western direction, take possession of Valuyki and Urazovo and cut the Kastornaya-Kupyansk railway. The depth of the army's task was 150 km, the average daily rate of advance of tank corps was 40 km, and that of rifle divisions was 20 km.
To support the combat operations of the army, the 227th assault and 205th fighter aviation divisions, the 646th and 715th night aviation regiments (U-2) of the 2nd air army were allocated.
During January 5, Commander P.S. Rybalko, with the commanders of tank corps, rifle divisions, heads of military branches and officers of the army headquarters, reconnoitered the area. The commander decided to break through the enemy defenses with three rifle divisions and a rifle brigade, reinforced with close support tanks and artillery, and use the tank corps and cavalry corps to develop success. Considering that in the offensive zone of the army the enemy's defense was insufficiently developed and its depth did not exceed 4 km, it was planned to bring tank corps into battle after the advance of rifle divisions to a depth of 3 km.
The 180th and 48th Guards Rifle Divisions advanced in the center, and the 37th Rifle Brigade and the 184th Rifle Division with reinforcements advanced on the flanks. At the same time, the 180th division received the 173rd separate tank brigade for reinforcement, and the 48th guards rifle division received the 97th tank brigade of the 12th tank corps.
The 12th tank corps, reinforced by the 1172nd anti-tank artillery and 319th anti-aircraft artillery regiments, as well as the 40th engineer battalion, received the task of entering the gap at the junction of the 48th guards and 180th rifle divisions, to by the end of the day, take control of Rossosh and Lizinovka and further advance on Kamenka. The 15th Tank Corps, reinforced by the 368th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, the 71st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment and the 47th Engineer Battalion, was supposed to go into a gap at the junction of the 48th and 184th divisions, by the end of the day to capture Ekaterinovka and further advance on Varvarovka and Alekseevka.
The army artillery group (then called the "long-range group") included the 38th and 129th cannon regiments of the 8th breakthrough artillery division, and the mortar group - the 15th and 16th guards mortar brigades.
By the time the tank army arrived at the unloading station, it (with the 173rd and 201st tank brigades attached to it) had 493 tanks, and only 371 tanks had arrived in the Kantemirovka area by the end of January 13. The remaining 122 tanks remained on the road due to technical malfunctions. Most of them were from the 15th Tank Corps, and primarily from the 113th and 195th Tank Brigades. This was explained by the fact that, when planning the offensive of the Voronezh Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command decided at first to strengthen it only with the 12th tank corps of the army, ordering the commander of the tank army to fully equip it with personnel and military equipment to the state at the expense of the 15th tank corps. At the same time, all the tanks of the 12th Tank Corps, which had the smallest supply of engine hours, were ordered to be transferred to the 15th Tank Corps, and new tanks from the 15th Corps to be transferred to the 12th Tank Corps. This was done at the expense of the 113th and 195th tank brigades. But soon it was decided to involve the entire tank army in the operation. Therefore, the regrouping of the 15th Panzer Corps began much later than the 12th Panzer Corps, and he had much less time to prepare for the offensive. Moreover, the 113th and 195th tank brigades arrived in the concentration area only by the end of January 12, having 10-12 tanks in service, the rest were on the way due to technical malfunctions. By order of the army commander, all serviceable tanks of these brigades were transferred to the 88th tank brigade of the corps, and the brigades were withdrawn to the army reserve with the task of organizing the collection and repair of lagging behind tanks. Thus, the 15th Panzer Corps was forced to start combat operations without two tank brigades, having only 74 tanks in service. Due to the delay in the regrouping of the rear, there was not enough fuel and ammunition.
During January 7–13, work was underway in all military units to prepare for the offensive. On January 8, the army's rifle divisions began reconnaissance of the enemy's defenses in combat, allocating one reinforced rifle battalion for this. In order to achieve a secrecy offensive, they were given the numbering of the battalions of the 350th Infantry Division of the 6th Army, which was defending here, which covered the concentration of the tank army.
By the end of January 13, the army troops took up their starting position for the offensive and were ready to strike at the enemy. By this time, the army had 371 tanks in service (with the 201st tank brigade attached to the 7th cavalry corps), 1588 guns and mortars (without anti-aircraft artillery), of which 355 anti-tank guns of 45 mm caliber, 47 installations of the RS BM-8 and BM-13. In order to create the necessary artillery densities for artillery preparation, anti-tank artillery was also involved.
Another feature of the use of tanks in this operation was that 7 separate tank brigades and a tank regiment were attached to the infantry formations of the first echelon to directly support the infantry. This made it possible to create tactical densities of 10–15 tanks per 1 km of the front, which made it possible to deliver a strong blow to the enemy. Moreover, tank brigades were not distributed among rifle regiments and battalions, but were used centrally. The tank corps of the 3rd Panzer Army were planned to be brought into battle on the very first day to complete the breakthrough of the main line of defense, and subsequently they were to develop an offensive in order to encircle the enemy grouping.
Aviation of the 2nd Air Army (commander - General K. N. Smirnov) was planned to be used by two groups in areas. The northern group supported the combat operations of the 40th Army and the 18th Separate Rifle Corps, and the southern group supported the offensive of the 3rd Tank Army and the 7th Cavalry Corps. The tasks of aviation are to support infantry and tanks when they break through the defense, cover mobile troops, strike at enemy reserves, its airfields and railways.
With regard to achieving the surprise of the offensive, A. M. Vasilevsky later recalled: “We developed and put into practice a whole system of measures to disguise and keep secret all the regroupings of troops and preparatory work. Much attention was also paid to measures to disinform the enemy. False regroupings of troops, covert placement of mock-ups of equipment, and clearing of roads from snow drifts in secondary directions were carried out. In the zones of the 38th and 60th armies, the concentration of artillery was simulated by equipping firing positions, zeroing in individual guns, etc. True, the covert deployment of strike groups was complicated by the limited area of bridgeheads from which the 40th army and the separate rifle corps. Therefore, almost all formations moved during the day along those roads that led to passive sectors of the front, and then, already at night, to actual regional concentrations.
In general, operational camouflage had a positive effect. As the commander of the 3rd Hungarian Army Corps, General Shtom, who was later captured, later showed, the Hungarian command, although it foresaw the offensive of the Soviet troops, but on a much smaller scale. This is understandable: after all, it determined the composition of the Soviet troops in the area of the Storozhevsky bridgehead only by a third. And the command of the 24th German tank corps in the direction of the main attack of the 3rd tank army in the Kantemirovka area did not reveal two tank and cavalry corps at all. In turn, the command of Army Group B expected the Soviet troops to go on the offensive from the areas of Liski and Pavlovsk, and therefore concentrated their reserve in the direction of the auxiliary, and not the main blow, of the Voronezh Front.
Due to the great remoteness of strike groups from each other, the front command assigned a special place to the organization of command and control of troops and close interaction between them. To this end, officers of the front headquarters were sent to the armies and corps, and auxiliary command posts for combat aviation groups were created at the headquarters of the armies. Since the front command was located 180 km from the southern sector of the breakthrough, an auxiliary front command post was also deployed in the 3rd tank army. The command posts of the armies and corps were brought closer to the formations of the first echelon.
The issues of material support of the operation were not left without attention. According to the decision of the commander of the troops of the Voronezh Front, it was planned to accumulate 3-3.5 ammunition ammunition and 5 refueling of fuels and lubricants. With all the desire to achieve this, it was not possible to achieve this by the beginning of the operation, especially in the 3rd Panzer Army. After all, for the supply of material resources, she had a total of about 270 vehicles and 88 tankers, and there was no horse-drawn transport at all. The commander had to use part of the combat vehicles for this, which entailed the dismounting of the motorized infantry and could lead to its lagging behind the tank brigades in battle. By the beginning of the offensive, the army managed to accumulate only 1-2 rounds of ammunition.
Measures were also taken to increase the mobility of troops in a snowy winter. For each division, 400-500 sledges were prepared to transport soldiers with heavy weapons. Parts were provided with skis, cars - with sets of chains.
Particular attention in the course of preparations for the offensive was paid to strengthening the 40th Army of General K. S. Moskalenko. The army, consisting of five rifle divisions, one rifle, three tank and two destroyer brigades, artillery and mortar divisions, was the northern strike force of the front and did not have numerical superiority over the enemy in either strength or means on its entire front. However, on the Storozhevsky bridgehead, the ratio of the number of battalions was 2.7:1, guns and mortars - 5:1, tanks - 1.3:1 in favor of the Soviet troops. This was the result of a decisive massing of the main forces and means in the breakthrough sector.
Parts of the reinforcement promised by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief began to arrive in the army already in December. The headquarters gave the army the 10th artillery division, led by Colonel V. B. Khusid, the 4th guards mortar division of Colonel S. A. Bordin and the 5th anti-aircraft artillery division of Colonel V. M. Shevelev. The army has not yet received such reinforcement with artillery even in August and September near Stalingrad. Now only three divisions had eight artillery regiments, two guards mortar brigades, two guards mortar regiments, and four anti-aircraft artillery regiments.
Thanks to this, as well as the concentration of military artillery, the army command was able, on the eve of the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh offensive operation, to carry out massing artillery weapons in the breakthrough area. Here it had 108 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front, and the army long-range artillery group consisted of eleven divisions, which had six guns of 122 mm caliber and above. In addition to the aforementioned rocket artillery division (4th), K. S. Moskalenko also had four separate regiments and one separate rocket artillery division at his disposal.
At the same time, there were fewer tanks in the army than planned. This was due to the fact that the 4th Panzer Corps could not arrive in time in the 40th Army zone and did not take part in the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation. Only three separate tank brigades (86, 116, 150 brigade) were at the disposal of K. S. Moskalenko. According to the list, they had 133 combat vehicles (in reality - 89), which were used to directly support the infantry. Due to the delay of the 4th tank corps, the army turned out to have slightly more tanks than the enemy, who had in the second echelon, northwest of the Storozhevsky bridgehead, the 700th combined tank battalion, numbering 10 medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.38 (t) , 10 self-propelled guns StuG.III.Ausf.F / F8 from the 201st assault gun battalion and 40 Czech-made light tanks Pz.Kpfw.38 (t) .
The combat composition of the tank troops of the Red Army in the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation (January 13–27, 1943)
| Name of connections | tank type | By the list | Note |
| 40th Combined Arms Army | |||
| 116th tank brigade (as of 01/13/1943) | HF | 23 | Tanks KV and T-70 are equipped with sirens-whistles for psychic attacks |
| T-70 | 5 | ||
| 150th tank brigade (as of 01/13/1943) | T-34 | 29 | 2 tanks equipped with anti-mine trawls |
| T-70 | 10 | ||
| T-60 | 4 | ||
| 86th tank brigade (as of 01/13/1943) | HF | 6 | - |
| T-34 | 12 | ||
| 26th and 34th separate divisions of armored trains | Each division had 2 armored trains | ||
| 18th Separate Rifle Corps | |||
| 96th tank brigade (as of 01/14/1943) | T-34 | 15 | On the tanks of the brigade the name was applied: "Chelyabinsk Komsomolets". |
| T-60 | 6 | ||
| BA-10 | 4 | ||
| 192nd tank brigade (as of 01/14/1943) | M 3 medium | 34 | Consisted of the 416th and 417th tank battalions |
| M 3 light | 16 | ||
| 262nd Tank Regiment (as of 01/12/1943) | KV-1S | 21 | - |
The beginning of the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh front-line offensive operation. In the first days of January 1943, representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the headquarters of the front and the armies conducted a check of readiness for the offensive directly in formations and units. It turned out that not everything planned could be completed by the deadline set from above. In a report to the Supreme Commander of January 7, G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky reported: “The concentration of troops, despite the assurances of Comrade. Khrulev, is going exceptionally badly: not a single echelon has yet arrived from the 4th mortar division, 15 echelons are still on the way from the 3rd TA, 10 echelons from the 7th KK have not arrived today, out of the three rifle divisions given to the front for reinforcement, only 5 echelons arrived. Supply of supply transports (ammunition, fuel) is even worse. Taking into account the disruption of railway transportation, we were forced to add plus two to the deadline known to you. So, the start of the operation was postponed to January 14th. But two days before the scheduled date, it was decided to conduct reconnaissance in force by the forces of the forward detachments.
On January 12, at 11:00 a.m., a firestorm hit the front line of those defending against the grouping of troops at the Storozhevsky bridgehead. Following a volley of rocket launchers, deafening explosions of 33 elongated charges were heard, laid by sappers under the enemy's barbed wire. Following this, the advanced battalions immediately entered the battle: they had to reveal the true outline of the front line of his defense.
Reconnaissance in force achieved its greatest success in the sector of the 40th Army, whose commander took a certain risk.
It must be said that back in early December, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in an order concerning the preparation of offensive operations on the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts, indicated: “... Since the Germans know about our M-30s, blowing up the entire front line of defense, they therefore learned the tactics the following: - only guards are left at the forefront, and the forefront of defense itself is carried to a depth of 4–10 km. We must oppose this German tactic with our own counter-tactics, and it consists in the fact that before we go on the offensive, we need to do combat reconnaissance in order to open the front line of the defense, and we must at all costs get to the front line of the enemy’s defense. Conduct a series of active reconnaissance, take prisoners and learn everything through them, so as not to waste ammunition in vain. Conduct reconnaissance in combat, in separate battalions, two days before the start of the operation.
K. S. Moskalenko was aware of the content of this order, and he fully understood its validity. At the same time, it was clear that it concerned those sectors where the front line of the enemy’s defense was not opened, therefore, this order could not apply to the zone of the upcoming breakthrough of the 40th Army, since here the front line of the enemy defense was carefully studied. The army command knew the organizational structure of each German, Hungarian or Italian division, its weapons, combat and numerical strength, the location of command and observation posts of divisions, regiments and battalions, the location of firing positions of artillery and mortars. Army intelligence even knew the names of the commanders of enemy units and formations.
But no matter how much K.S. Moskalenko proved this to the front commander, Lieutenant-General F.I. Golikov and his headquarters, nothing helped. The conversation was short:
Follow the order.
I had to do it, of course. But the commander of the 40th Army decided to do it in such a way that the enemy, even if he unraveled the plans of the attackers, would not have time to bring up reserves.
Since the offensive of the main forces was scheduled for January 14, it means that reconnaissance in force by the forces of the forward battalions had to be carried out on the 12th. Without dedicating the front commander and headquarters to his intentions, K.S. Moskalenko ordered - orally, of course: by January 12, to change troops on the bridgehead so that the divisions of the first echelon occupied the initial areas for the offensive; the main forces to be ready in the event of a successful advance of the forward battalions to immediately go on the offensive.
The decision was risky. The enemy could accidentally detect the appearance of new Soviet divisions at the forefront. However, this risk could not be compared with the serious threat that could arise if the army command, after conducting reconnaissance in battle, then gave the enemy two days to organize a rebuff to the offensive.
In accordance with this intention, the task was set for the advanced battalions, allocated by all four rifle divisions of the first echelon - 141, 25th Guards, 3rd, 40th and 107th. They were ordered, along with revealing the actual outline of the front line, to capture the most important strongholds of the enemy. It was primarily about the Walnut Grove, height 185, as well as the settlements of Uryvo-Pokrovsky and Goldaevka.
The attack of the advanced battalions on January 12 was preceded by an hour-long artillery preparation. It started at 11:00. A flurry of fire hit the front line of the enemy. It ended with a powerful volley of two BM-13 rocket artillery battalions. During this hour, the enemy's positions were processed by bombers of the 291st Assault Aviation Division.
Exactly at 12.00, the forward battalions of the 107th Rifle Division, together with parts of the 86th Tank Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel V. G. Zaseev (6 KV, 12 T-34), set out. The rifle units of Colonel P. M. Bezhko went on the attack in the direction of the main attack. They quickly covered the distance to the first trenches of the stunned enemy. A short battle ensued for Goldaevka and the dominant height located half a kilometer to the west of it. The fight ended with the capture of the settlement and the height.
There was only resistance in places. As for the Hungarian soldiers, they preferred to lay down their arms in whole units. Two hours after the attack began, more than a thousand soldiers and 32 officers surrendered to two advanced battalions of the 107th Infantry Division. Among the captured trophies were 20 artillery pieces, 75 machine guns, over a thousand rifles and machine guns. The losses of the 40th Army in this sector amounted to 5 killed and 42 wounded.
The attack of two forward battalions of the 25th Guards Rifle Division, Major General P. M. Shafarenko, was also successful. With the support of artillery and mortar fire, they, together with the 116th Tank Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel A. Yu. Novak (5 T-70, 23 KV, equipped with sirens-whistles for psychic attacks), after a two-hour battle, captured Orekhovaya Grove, defeating the enemy stronghold.
On this day, reconnaissance in force was also carried out in the offensive zones of the 18th Rifle Corps and the 3rd Tank Army. But since there the forward battalions were only tasked with revealing the true front line of defense and opening the enemy's fire system, having achieved this goal, they retreated to their original positions.
In front of the Storozhevsky bridgehead, in the offensive zone of the 40th Army, a different situation developed. As a result of the actions of the forward battalions, the enemy defenses were thoroughly disorganized. True, the worried enemy urgently transferred his 700th combined tank battalion here from Ostrogozhsk. Nevertheless, the troops, which penetrated 6 km along the front and more than 3 km in depth, firmly entrenched themselves on the achieved lines. Moreover, the attack of the infantry with tanks, combined with the artillery and mortar fire that preceded them, led to such a development of events that ours ourselves did not expect, namely: the enemy infantry division, to which the 700th combined tank battalion hastened to the rescue, despite to this, could not withstand the onslaught and by the end of the day on January 12 began to roll back to the west.
Thus, the risk turned out to be more than justified, and K.S. Moskalenko at the same time decided to use the current situation for the fastest entry into battle of the main forces of the first echelon of the army. During the night, the troops were pulled forward to new starting positions. At the same time, the army command amended the artillery offensive plan: since the strongholds on the front line had already been captured by the army, the artillery received new targets located in the depths of the German defense.
Late in the evening, K.S. Moskalenko reported to the front commander the situation in the army zone. Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov approved the decision to launch the offensive with the main forces the next morning.
At dawn on January 13, artillery preparation was carried out - even more powerful than the day before.
An important role in its success was played by the distribution of tasks and all targets between artillery groups. For example, the army artillery group, headed by the commander of the 10th artillery division, Colonel V. B. Khusid, first delivered fire strikes at headquarters and communication centers. Thus violating command and control of the troops, she moved the fire to the positions of artillery and mortars of the enemy. The bulk of the firepower of the German units did not have the opportunity to respond, since they had ceased to receive guidance data for firing.
Artillerymen found opportunities to further increase the power of a fire strike against the enemy through the use of various innovations. So, 120-mm mortars, of which there were about 50, usually operated in separate divisions (12-18 mortars in each). On the same day they were all united in one group. Its fire swept away wire barriers along with stakes, blew up entire minefields, destroyed the floors of dugouts, dugouts, trenches, literally sweeping the enemy out of them.
One of the prisoners told about the death of two-thirds of his company within 2-3 minutes, while it was under fire from Soviet mortars. An extraordinary effect was also produced by 40 guns, which were firing at direct fire on a half-kilometer front in the offensive zone of the 107th Infantry Division.
The results of the artillery preparation revealed after breaking through the enemy defenses confirmed its high effectiveness. At the forefront and in the depths, many bunkers, dugouts, observation posts, communication centers, junctions of trenches and communications, firing positions of mortars and artillery were destroyed.
The accuracy of artillerymen and mortarmen can be judged by the fact that they achieved such high results and at the same time completely met the established rate of ammunition consumption. Although, by the way, the army was provided with shells and mines so well that its artillery could afford, if necessary, and overspend them. Finally, the results of artillery preparation at dawn on January 13 say a lot about the fact that after it was completed, the Soviet infantry was able to attack at full height.
The troops of the first echelon of the army went on the offensive from the lines reached by the forward battalions. This made it possible to go on the attack on level ground, and not from the lowland, where the initial areas for the offensive were previously located. In addition, having entered the battle from a new frontier, the Soviet units avoided the need to fight through a deep ravine north of the settlement of Uryvo-Pokrovsky.
Thus, the good results of the operations of the forward battalions and the highly effective artillery preparation to a large extent contributed to the success of the offensive of the main forces.
Here it is necessary to say about the tasks that were set for them. In accordance with the directives of the Headquarters and the front, it was decided to build the army's battle formations in two echelons. The first of them included the 141st, 25th Guards, 340th and 107th Rifle Divisions, 116th, 150th and 86th Tank Brigades. They were ordered to break through the enemy defenses on a 10-kilometer front and, by the end of the first day of the offensive, reach the line of Storozhevoe 1st - Boldyrevka - Devitsa settlements.
The second echelon - the 305th rifle division and the 253rd rifle brigade - was supposed to enter the battle on the morning of the second day of the operation. The first of them was ordered to advance in the direction of the villages of Krasnoe, Alekseevka, the second - to the north-west in order to secure the right flank of the army's shock group.
The problem of securing the right flank became of paramount importance. The fact is that to the right of the breakthrough zone, on a 47-kilometer passive sector, the 40th Army held the occupied line with the forces of only one rifle regiment, training and machine-gun battalions. And the army corps of the enemy opposed them. In addition, to the north and northwest, in the region of Voronezh and Kastornoye, the 2nd German Army was located. The rifle regiment and two battalions mentioned above continued to demonstrate the concentration of troops for the offensive. But the enemy could take it on faith for the time being; and it was to be expected that it was there that he would try to act in response to a strike from the Storozhevsky bridgehead.
The threat from this side was more than real, since K.S. Moskalenko began an offensive operation without the 4th Panzer Corps, which, according to the plan, was supposed to strike just on the right flank of the shock group. Therefore, the army command decided to leave one of the two fighter brigades, reinforced by an army battalion of anti-tank rifles and a training battalion of a rifle division, in defense east of the village of Storozhevoye 1, to the south of which there was a breakthrough site. In addition, a strong strike group consisting of the 141st, 25th Guards Rifle Divisions, 253rd Rifle and 116th Tank Brigades was advancing on the right flank of the army. Moreover, the line they reached during the operation was supposed to be secured by the second fighter brigade.
Finally, on top of all this, the front commander, at the request of K.S. Moskalenko, sent the 322nd rifle division from his reserve to the area east of the Storozhevsky bridgehead, so that it could participate in parrying a possible counterattack from the right.
The threat to the left flank, where only a few combat units and two training battalions remained on the 28-kilometer front, was warned by the actions of the 107th Rifle Division and the 86th Tank Brigade. After breaking through the defense, they were supposed to, hiding behind a barrier from Korotoyak, strike to the south, to Ostrogozhsk. They had to liberate this city and thereby cut through the encircled enemy grouping already before interacting with the units of the 18th Rifle Corps and the 3rd Tank Army advancing to the left.
Earlier it was already said about the planned measures to cut the entire Ostrogozhsk-Rossoshansk enemy grouping, in the implementation of which the 107th Rifle Division and the 86th Tank Brigade took part. At the same time, the army troops advancing to the right of them were to reach the line Storozhevoe 1st - Kasyanov - Novaya Soldatka - Prudki - Ilovskoye by the end of the fourth or fifth day. There, near the city of Alekseevka, they were to link up with the 15th Panzer Corps of the 3rd Panzer Army and thus close the encirclement around the Ostrogozhsk-Rossoshansky enemy grouping.
Such were the tasks of the troops of the 40th Army in the operation to encircle and dissect this grouping. Their implementation, as already shown, began successfully. However, since only the 40th Army went on the offensive on January 13, the enemy directed his countermeasures against it.
In addition to the 700th combined tank battalion, on the same day, he transferred here two infantry regiments of the German 168th Infantry Division from the band of the 18th Rifle Corps. This made it easier for the latter to launch the next day, January 14, offensive operations from the Shchuchensk bridgehead. In the sector of the 40th Army, the arrival of enemy reinforcements slowed down the pace of the defense breakthrough.
In the first hours of the battle, the success of the offensive in the center and on the left flank was sharply indicated. The 340th Rifle Division of Major General S.S. Martirosyan, together with the 150th Tank Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel I.V. Safronov (4 T-60, 10 T-70, 29 T-34) and the 107th Rifle Division division of Colonel P. M. Bezhko with the 86th Tank Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel V. G. Zaseev. With powerful artillery support, which provided continuous fire for the attack of infantry and tanks, the attackers quickly moved forward.
Approximately a third of the artillery, being in combat formations behind the infantry chains, accompanied the attack of the infantry and tanks. She destroyed enemy anti-tank weapons and firing points that interfered with the advance of the infantry. Another third cleared the way for the infantry and tanks by fire from closed positions, and the last, changing firing positions, approached the attackers.
Artillery control was centralized, concentrated in the hands of the army artillery commander. He had a well-established connection - wired and radio. Thanks to this, it was possible at the right time to organize a massive fire on the places of concentration of the enemy both on the front line and in the depths of the defense. By thus creating a preponderance of powerful fire weapons, the army command could influence the outcome of the battle and provide the army troops with a continuous advance.
Parts of the 340th Rifle Division, having captured Uryvo-Pokrovsky, advanced on Boldyrevka. In this area, the 150th tank brigade encountered the counterattacking units of the German 700th combined tank battalion. A fierce battle ensued. Having lost 14 tanks and about 200 prisoners, the enemy abandoned Boldyrevka.
Among the prisoners was one of the officers of the 700th battalion, whose tank was rammed by our "thirty-four". He reported that his unit had about 60 tanks and 10 assault guns. From him, the Soviet command also learned that the first echelon of 30 tanks participated in the mentioned battle, which had the task of restoring the situation in the area of the Storozhevsky bridgehead. It followed from this that the German command still did not have a clear idea of the scale of the Soviet offensive. Further, from the testimony of the prisoner, it was clear that the units of the Red Army still had to deal with the second echelon of the 700th enemy battalion, located 5 km west of Boldyrevka. The liberation of this settlement and Hill 177 located not far away meant, among other things, that the Voronezh-Ostrogozhsk ring road was cut and thus the maneuver of German troops along the front was constrained.
By this time, the 107th Rifle Division had captured the enemy's stronghold in the village of Devitsa. About 200 prisoners were taken here.
Parts of the 25th Guards Rifle Division began to move forward only in the afternoon. Using the successful offensive of the 340th Infantry Division, they bypassed the right flank of the opposing enemy formation and started a battle for Dovgalevka. There they met with one of the two infantry regiments of the 168th German Infantry Division, which arrived as reinforcements. The fierce resistance of the enemy was broken only by the morning of January 14.
In general, the troops of the army achieved significant success during January 13. Its strike force broke through the main line of German defense 10 km along the front and in depth, liberated the settlements of Dovgalevka, Boldyrevka, Devitsa. The task of the first day of the operation was almost completely completed. On January 14, the 18th Rifle Corps and the 3rd Tank Army also began to break through the enemy's defenses.
The 40th Army continued the offensive that day. Its further task was to deepen the breakthrough and seize the second line of German defense, which the day before the troops of the army had reached in separate directions. Thus, it was supposed to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on it with their retreating troops and reserves being transferred here, to complete the rout of the opposing grouping. This task was complicated by the fact that some sections of the enemy's second line of defense were already occupied by units of three German infantry divisions - the aforementioned 168th, as well as the 68th and 88th, who managed to pull up to the breakthrough front.
To strengthen the onslaught and increase the pace of the offensive, on the morning of January 14, the command of the 40th Army sent the 305th Rifle Division and the 253rd Rifle Brigade from the second echelon into battle.
The 253rd Rifle Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel M.N. Krasin, was staffed by cadets from military schools. She was one of the best formations in the 40th Army and brilliantly justified the hopes placed on her. The brigade was brought into battle at the junction between the 141st and 25th Guards Rifle Divisions, which constituted, as it were, a group, which also included the 116th Tank Brigade. Two battalions of the latter worked closely with the 141st, and the other two - with the 25th Guards Rifle Divisions.
This group has been very successful. Parts of the 141st Rifle Division, bypassing the main forces of the opposing German division, delivered a blow to its flank and rear from the west. By the end of the day, they captured a strong knot of resistance in Storozhevoy 1st and started a battle for the village of Arkhangelskoye. The 253rd Rifle Brigade, advancing to the left, broke the enemy's resistance and advanced 8 km in fighting. As a result of the successful actions of these two formations, the breakthrough was expanded to the right, and the operations of the main forces of the army were reliably secured from the north.
In the meantime, the 25th Guards Rifle Division advanced 5 km to the west and captured the settlement of Mastyugino.
Between the 340th and 107th rifle divisions operating to the left, which were advancing in a southwestern direction, the 305th rifle division under the command of Colonel I. A. Danilovich entered the battle. She thus found herself in the direction of the main attack of the army, where the greatest success was indicated. Parts of this division acted skillfully and contributed to its further development. By the end of the day, they advanced 5 km and reached the second line of enemy defenses in the area of the village of Prilep. The 107th Rifle Division to the south of this area captured the settlements of Soldatskoye, Peskovatka, Kalinin, as well as the dominant bank of the Potudan River.
Thus, in two days of the offensive, the army expanded the breakthrough to 50 km along the front and deepened it to 17 km, reaching the enemy's second line of defense. Since it was not possible to capture it on the move, further attacks were postponed to the next morning.
The beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops, as evidenced by a number of documents, was a complete surprise for the German command. “We thought that this was a small-scale offensive, in order to improve positions and to expand the breakthrough of the Italian front. It was believed that this offensive would be only in the south. A blow to the north was not expected. By the time of the capture, it was a disorganized mass of infantrymen and artillerymen. Of the entire corps, up to 3 thousand people remained, the rest dispersed in small groups, no one knows where, ”said the captured head of artillery of the 3rd Hungarian corps, General Dezhe, who in the pre-war years was a military attache in Moscow for four years.
The development of the offensive and the encirclement of the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh group. On January 14, the remaining forces of the front went on the offensive, as well as the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front under the command of Lieutenant General F. M. Kharitonov. But in the directions of their attacks, the Germans put up strong resistance. So, the 184th Rifle Division of the 3rd Tank Army was left without tanks attached to it, which, when moving to their original positions, got stuck in a ravine covered with snowdrifts, suffered heavy losses and was stopped in front of the front line of the enemy defense. Equally unsuccessfully attacked the enemy and neighboring divisions. After a three-hour battle, the formations of the army wedged into the main defense line only 1–3 km. When the commander of the 3rd Tank Army, General P.S. Rybalko, brought units of the 12th and 15th Tank Corps into battle, the situation changed dramatically. By the end of the day, the corps advanced to a depth of 25 km, defeating the headquarters of the 24th German tank corps in the Zhilina area. The advance of the tank formations was facilitated by the offensive of the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front. As a result, his German command was not only unable to regroup its reserves from the south to the tank army breakthrough site, but was also forced to bring into battle against the 6th army of General F.M. Kharitonov the reserve 27th tank and 320th infantry divisions.
It was no less difficult to break through the defense in the offensive zone of the 18th separate rifle corps. Not only due to deep snow, but also due to poor organization of interaction, artillery escorts, and partly tanks of direct support, lagged behind the infantry. By the end of the day, the corps had not completed the task. In the morning, the 26th German infantry and 1st Hungarian tank divisions (20 Pz.Kpfw.IV.Ausf.F1, Pz.Kpfw.38 (t), 19 light tanks "Toldi I / IIa" were introduced into the battle in this direction , 18 Csaba armored vehicles). These operational reserves delayed parts of the corps for three days in front of the second line of defense.
On January 15, the 141st Rifle Division and the 253rd Rifle Brigade of the 40th Army operated most successfully. They advanced another 10 km, reached the Maslov Log - Yablochnoe line and created a real threat of reaching the rear of the 2nd German army in the Voronezh region. As a result of this, the German command hastily began to withdraw its divisions located along the Don, intending to throw them against the advancing troops of the 40th Army.
The 25th Guards and 305th Rifle Divisions broke through the enemy's second line of defense in the direction of the settlements of Repyevka and Krasnoye, advanced 20 km and captured the Skoritskoye - Fabritskoye - Komsomolets - Svistovka - Bogoslovka line. The enemy retreated in disarray, abandoning weapons and equipment. Only one of the 25th Guards Rifle Division that day surrendered 620 soldiers and officers of the Hungarian units. The division also captured 75 guns of various calibers, 120 tractors, 37 vehicles, 49 machine guns, 37 mortars, 1,123 rifles, 120 wagons, 54 anti-tank rifles and three depots.
On this day, the enemy offered the strongest resistance in the sector of the 107th Infantry Division. As a result, it progressed more slowly than in previous days. To strengthen the onslaught in the south-western direction, General K. S. Moskalenko also transferred the 340th Rifle Division here, leaving cover in its former sector. By the end of the day, parts of this division liberated the settlement of Ternovaya. The 150th tank brigade, which was still operating jointly with them, simultaneously broke through the enemy’s battle formations and captured the village of Lesnoye Ukolovo.
By the end of January 15, the army troops had broken through the enemy defenses to the entire tactical depth. On the right flank, the army troops advanced 20 km, on the left - 16 km, in the center - 35 km. army. The operational situation for solving this problem was quite favorable, because the German command committed all its reserves to the battle, and it did not have defensive lines prepared in the depths in these directions. Taking advantage of the situation, the 107th Rifle Division broke through to Ostrogozhsk on January 17, where, uniting with units of the 18th Rifle Corps, it surrounded the 10th Hungarian Infantry Division. At the same time, the 88th tank brigade of the 15th tank corps of the 3rd tank army under the command of Colonel I.I. Sergeev, without getting involved in protracted battles for individual strongholds and centers of resistance, broke into Alekseevka at 1800 on January 17. A day later, the 309th Rifle Division of Colonel A.P. Krutikhin established fire contact with her. Parts of the 8th Italian Army, the 7th Hungarian Army and the 24th German Tank Corps were surrounded.
At the same time, the 12th Panzer Corps rushed to the city of Rossosh. In the ensuing street battles, the personnel of the 106th tank brigade of Colonel I. Ye. Alekseev acted boldly, swiftly and courageously. The tank platoon of Lieutenant D.S. Folomeev, sent to conduct reconnaissance, defeated the headquarters of the 156th Italian infantry division to the west of the city and captured its banner. With the approach of rifle formations, the city of Rossosh was liberated. Developing the offensive, on January 19, parts of the corps captured the village of Karpenkovo, but at the same time they themselves suffered heavy losses: only 44 serviceable tanks remained in the 12th tank corps. Therefore, he was forced to go on the defensive, repelling the attacks of the enemy, who sought to break through to the west. On the morning of January 20, units of the 18th separate rifle corps of General P. M. Zykov approached Karpenkovo. As a result, the entire Ostrogozh-Rossosh group of the Wehrmacht was cut into two parts. Part of the German and Hungarian formations, as well as the entire Alpine Italian Corps (4 divisions), were surrounded.
Liquidation of the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh group. The results of the operation. By January 18, the troops of the Voronezh Front not only completed the encirclement and dissection of the Ostrogozh-Rossoshansk group, but also created an internal encirclement front. The total area of the encirclement area, where 13 enemy divisions were located, was about 2.5 thousand square meters. km. By the time the internal front was formed, the Soviet command managed to create an external front for encirclement by the forces of rifle formations and the 7th cavalry corps. Introduced into the breakthrough on the morning of January 15, this corps fought more than 100 km. On January 19, he captured the village of Valuiki, where he captured over 3,000 German and Italian soldiers and officers, captured large food depots and other military trophies. The corps itself lost 203 men killed. On the same day, for excellent military operations in the deep operational rear of the enemy, for the courage and valor of the personnel, the corps received the honorary title of Guards. Partisans played a significant role in the liberation of Valuyek. On the instructions of the commander of the cavalry corps, S. V. Sokolov, they blew up the railway tracks in the areas of Valuyki - Urazovo and Valuyki - Volokonovka, which did not allow the enemy to take food and other material values out of the city.
It should be noted that both the internal and external fronts of the encirclement were not continuous. Soviet troops occupied only road junctions and settlements on the most probable breakthrough routes, with 75% of the forces of the front taking part in the operation concentrated on the inner front of the encirclement. This created the prerequisites for the defeat of the enemy troops in a short time. But it was necessary to hurry, as the threat was growing that the encircled German troops would try to break through the ring.
In order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the Military Council of the front issued a leaflet with an appeal to the encircled enemy troops on behalf of the officer who was taken prisoner. “I, Natale Antonio, Colonel of the Royal Italian Armed Forces, awarded for military merit during the World War 1914-1918, participant in the war 1911-1914. in Libya and the wars of 1935–1936 in Albania, commander of the 27th Infantry Regiment of the 156th Vincenza Division, now I am a prisoner of the Russians and I urge you to stop fighting ... Soldiers, save your life and the honor of Italy. Get captured. I assure you that the Russians will treat you well." But the command of the encircled troops did not heed these prudent appeals. A desperate attempt was made to break out of the encirclement.
Then the commander of the front troops gave the order to defeat the enemy. On the morning of January 19, fighting began to eliminate groups in Ostrogozhsk and in the forest, northwest of Alekseevka. Subsequently, the regiment commander from the Vincenza division testified: “On the morning of the 17th, chaos reigned in Podgorny (north of Rossosh). Fires, robberies, chaotic and feverish movement of vehicles ... Little by little, streams of units departing from the front merge into one river, forming one huge column; this increases the danger and makes the march more difficult.... How many skirmishes, how many violent fights to force the weak to yield! Everyone is in a feverish hurry, trying to get away from danger.
The Italian and German troops, trapped in the forest, made desperate, but unsuccessful attempts to break through to Novy Oskol. By January 24, the defeat of the main enemy forces was completed. Only a small part of them retreated to the Oskol River. The chief of staff of the 2nd Hungarian Army reported on the general situation to Budapest: “Undoubtedly, the situation is terrible ... What I saw was the greatest disappointment in my life ... Some of the top commanders behaved ugly, retreated, abandoned the leading battles of the unit.” On January 21, the commander of Army Group B, Field Marshal M. Weichs, reported to Hitler: “Due to losses in manpower and equipment, this sector of the front can no longer be firmly held in its hands.”
The liquidation of the Rossosh group was carried out sequentially. At first, it was cut off, and by January 20, its southern part was destroyed, consisting of almost four divisions. A week later, the liquidation of the troops that escaped from the pocket and retreated to the area east of Valuyek was completed. The commanders of the Italian divisions of the Alpine Corps "Kuneenze", "Julia" and "Vincenza" along with their headquarters were captured. From the Italian Alpine Corps, only 6,200 people escaped from the encirclement.
The Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation continued for 15 days. During these fortnights, the German defense was broken through on a 250-kilometer stretch. Soviet troops advanced 140 km, freeing up an area of 22.5 thousand square meters. km. Favorable conditions were created for the further offensive of the Red Army units in the Kharkov direction and in the Donbass. During the operation, more than 15 out of 21 enemy divisions were defeated, and 6 divisions were severely defeated. From January 13 to 27, the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht troops exceeded 123 thousand people, of which only 97 thousand were prisoners (taking into account about 11 thousand people who surrendered in the offensive zone of the 6th Army). Soviet troops captured 160 tanks, 3,160 guns and mortars, and 11,424 vehicles. A significant amount of military equipment and property of the enemy was destroyed during the fighting. At the same time, the losses of the Soviet troops were relatively small. For example, the 3rd Panzer Army lost less than 12,000 men, while the 40th Army lost 4,500 officers and men.
At the same time, despite the fact that the operation was carried out in favorable conditions for the Soviet troops, not all available opportunities were used to the full. The destruction of the encircled group in the area of Ostrogozhsk and Rossosh continued until January 27, that is, 9 days. This was mainly due to the fact that by the time the inner front of the encirclement was formed, there were not enough forces in its western sector to cut off the enemy's escape routes. As a result, some German units managed to escape from the ring and avoid capture. Nevertheless, as a result of the operation, the prerequisites were created for inflicting even more powerful blows on the enemy.
As a result of the defeat at Stalingrad of the main grouping of German troops, the general situation on the Soviet-German front in the winter of 1942/43 changed in favor of the Red Army.
In order to maximize the use of the success achieved at Stalingrad, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned to launch an offensive in the early 1943 in the Voronezh-Kursk and Kharkov directions, through a series of front-line offensive operations, united by a single strategic goal - to defeat the German Army Group "B" and liberate from the enemy strategically important Kharkov industrial region. Initially, it was supposed to defeat the enemy troops defending in the area of the upper reaches of the Don between Voronezh and Kantemirovka (2nd Hungarian and 8th Italian armies).
By the end of December 1942, the 2nd German, 2nd Hungarian armies and the Alpine corps of the 8th Italian army were defending in front of the left wing of the Bryansk Front and in front of the Voronezh Front, which included a total of twenty-three infantry and one tank divisions and separate tank brigade. The enemy air forces in this direction had about 300 aircraft.
Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin at the end of December 1942, even during the successful offensive of the Soviet troops in the region of the middle reaches of the Don, personally instructed the commander of the troops of the Voronezh Front on the preparation and conduct of an offensive operation by the troops of the center and the left wing of the front in order to encircle and destroy enemy troops defending on the Don near Ostrogozhsk and Rossosh.
The idea of this operation was to break through the enemy defenses with three shock groups and, developing an offensive in converging directions to Alekseevka, Ostrogozhsk and Karpenkovo, to surround and destroy his grouping, which was defending on the Don between Voronezh and Kantemirovka.
To manage the preparation and conduct of the Ostrogozh-Rossosh operation, representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command - an army general and a colonel general were sent to the Voronezh Front.
In accordance with the general operational plan, it was decided to involve fifteen rifle divisions from the Voronezh Front, three rifle and three ski rifle brigades, one cavalry and three tank corps, nine separate tank brigades and one separate tank regiment, or 65 % rifle formations and 90% tanks.
On the Storozhevsky bridgehead and immediately behind it on the left bank of the Don, the main forces of the 40th Army were concentrated, consisting of five rifle divisions, one rifle brigade and the 4th Tank Corps with reinforcements. The 40th Army, under the command of a major general, was to break through the enemy defenses with its main forces and develop attacks on Alekseevka and Ostrogozhsk.
The main forces of the 18th separate rifle corps, commanded by a major general, were concentrated on the Shchuchen bridgehead, which were supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses and develop an offensive in the western and southwestern directions, towards the troops of the northern and southern groups in order to connect with them in districts of Ostrogozhsk and Kamenka.
The commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army P. S. Rybalko talks with a tanker, presented to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Winter 1943
The southern shock group of the front was made up of the main forces of the 3rd Panzer Army under the command of a lieutenant general. Tank formations were to break through the enemy defenses and develop enveloping strikes from the area northwest of Kantemirovka in the northern and northwestern directions towards the troops of the 40th Army and the 18th Rifle Corps and, by the end of the fourth day of the operation, connect with them in the areas of Kamenka, Ostrogozhsk and Alekseevka.
In the reserve of the front in each of the strike directions it was supposed to have one rifle division.
The total depth of the front-line operation was planned at 140 km, the rate of advance: for rifle formations - 15-20 km per day, and for tank formations - 35 km per day.
One of the most difficult tasks of the preparatory period of the operation was the rapid and covert conduct of intra-front regroupings and the timely withdrawal to the initial areas of formations and units arriving from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The regrouping covered all the armies of the front and had to be carried out in a limited time and over considerable distances. Up to 40% of formations and units had to march over a distance of 100 to 175 km. The regrouping began on December 26 and ended on January 4.
Despite all the difficulties, the regrouping of troops was completed in a timely manner, with the exception of the reserves transferred to the front by the Headquarters. As a result, the start of the operation was postponed from 12 to 14 January.
The operational formation of the Soviet troops was characterized by a decisive concentration of forces in the main directions due to a sharp weakening of forces in the secondary sectors of the front, where individual units were left. Such a bold decision was justified by the fact that an enemy offensive in the front line was unlikely.
A decisive concentration of forces and means on the axes chosen for strikes ensured the operational density and superiority over the enemy necessary for a breakthrough.
By the beginning of the offensive operation, the 2nd Air Army under the command of a Major General of Aviation included two fighter divisions, two assault aviation divisions and one division of night bombers (208 combat aircraft), which were divided into two groups, northern and southern.
The Ostrogozhsk-Rossoshanskaya offensive operation can be divided into two stages according to the nature of the unfolding hostilities and their results.
During the first stage of the operation, which lasted three days - from January 13 to 15, the troops of the front broke through the enemy defenses in all three directions and created the necessary conditions for the development of the operation to encircle and dismember his Ostrogozh-Rossoshansk grouping.
The second stage - the encirclement and destruction of the enemy grouping lasted twelve days (from January 16 to January 27). During the first three days, the troops of the front carried out a maneuver to encircle and dismember the enemy grouping and formed the inner and outer fronts of the encirclement. In the next nine days - from January 19 to 27 - the final liquidation of the encircled enemy troops took place.
Breakthrough of the tactical depth of the enemy defense in the offensive zone of the 40th and 3rd tank armies and the 18th separate rifle corps proceeded in various conditions.
The transition to the offensive of the 40th Army was preceded by the battles of the advanced battalions of two rifle divisions of the army's shock group on January 12. As a result of their actions, success was developed by the introduction of the main forces of the divisions on a 6-kilometer front and wedging to a depth of 3-3.5 km. The enemy was forced to transfer from Ostrogozhsk to the Storozhevsky bridgehead the 700th German tank detachment, which included 100 tanks and assault guns.
Having assessed the emerging success in the zone of the 40th Army, the front commander made the correct and appropriate decision for the given situation - to use the success of the 107th and 25th Guards Rifle Divisions and ordered the commander of the 40th Army to go on the offensive with the main forces not on the 14th, but on the morning of the 13th January.
At dawn on January 13, the troops of the first echelon of the 40th Army, after artillery preparation, went on the offensive from the line reached on January 12 by the forward battalions. By the end of the day, the enemy's main line of defense in front of the Storozhevsky bridgehead was broken through on a 10-kilometer front. The enemy command, having used up its tactical reserves during the day, began to transfer part of the forces from the operational reserve to the Storozhevsky bridgehead from the south.
On the morning of January 14, the offensive unfolded in all three directions. On the same day, the neighboring 6th Army of the Southwestern Front also went on the offensive.
By the end of the day on January 14, the 40th Army increased the breakthrough to 50 km along the front and up to 17 km in depth. However, the army troops did not complete the task of capturing the enemy's second line of defense from the move.
During the day, the commander of the 40th Army brought the second echelon into battle: the 305th Rifle Division - to develop the offensive in the direction of the main attack and the 253rd Rifle Brigade - to expand the breakthrough towards the right flank.
Only by the end of January 15 did the formations of the 40th Army complete the breakthrough of the enemy's tactical depth of defense. The front of the army's offensive by this time had increased to 100 km; the depth of advance was 20 km on the right flank, 35 km in the center and 16 km on the left flank.
In a difficult situation, a breakthrough was made in the tactical defense zone of the enemy in the zones of the 3rd Tank Army and the 18th Rifle Corps.
The enemy, expecting the main attack of the Soviet troops from the bridgehead near the village of Shchuchye, concentrated operational reserves in this direction, and also carried out additional work to improve their defensive positions. The strike force of the 18th Rifle Corps, after a two-hour artillery preparation, went on the offensive on January 14 and by the end of the day broke through the enemy's main line of defense. However, the further development of the breakthrough was complicated. The enemy brought in this direction most of the forces from the operational reserve (26th German infantry and 1st Hungarian tank divisions) and, with their stubborn resistance, for three days pinned down parts of the corps in the second line of defense.
New data on the enemy in the sector of the 3rd Panzer Army received just before the start of the offensive required our command to make a number of changes to the artillery preparation plan for the attack. Instead of the planned two ten-minute fire raids, an hour and a half artillery preparation was carried out.
Due to the fact that the army did not have sufficiently complete and accurate data on the front line of the enemy defense, the enemy fire weapons were not suppressed. Therefore, the three rifle divisions of the first echelon of the 3rd Panzer Army, which went on the attack, immediately met fierce resistance from the German units occupying the main line of defense. The battles for the main strip were tense. Only after a three-hour battle did the rifle divisions, with tank brigades assigned to them, manage to penetrate 1-3 km into the main defense line in some sectors.
In order to quickly break through the enemy's main line of defense, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army brought into battle the second echelon - two tank corps, with the introduction of which the situation in the army's offensive line changed radically. Parts of the 24th German Panzer Corps, defending in the breakthrough zone of the 3rd Panzer Army, began to withdraw in the northern and northwestern directions.
By the end of the day on January 14, tank corps broke through the enemy defenses on a 10-kilometer front and advanced to a depth of 23 km, breaking away from the infantry by 6-8 km. Rifle formations of the army, using and consolidating the success of tank corps, during the day advanced from 2 km on the right flank to 14 km on the left flank.
The task set on the first day of the operation by rifle formations was not fully completed. The tank corps also failed to complete the task of the first day of the offensive and reach the Rossosh region and to the south of it. The pace of the offensive of the tank corps turned out to be two times lower than planned, since they were involved in breaking through the enemy's main line of defense. In addition, operating in difficult terrain, they used up all the fuel and all the ammunition already on the first day of the operation. In anticipation of the supply of ammunition and fuel, tank units stood all night on January 15th.
During the second day of the offensive, tank corps, replenished with ammunition and fuel, launched a pursuit of the retreating enemy, and by the end of the day their main forces advanced 20-35 km. The separation of tank corps from rifle troops during the day amounted to 15-25 km.
The rifle formations of the army on January 15 also operated successfully, especially the 184th division, which advanced 20 km during the day of the battle. However, the lag of the right-flank formations of the army - the 37th rifle brigade and the 180th division, caused by the stubborn resistance of the enemy in the area of \u200b\u200bthe settlement of Mitrofanovka, significantly hampered the advance of the main grouping of the army. The offensive front of the 3rd Panzer Army by the end of January 15 was expanded to 60 km. The depth of advance of tank corps increased to 40-50 km. Favorable conditions were created for the development of an offensive with the aim of encircling and destroying the main forces of the Ostrogozhsk-Rossoshansky grouping of the enemy in cooperation with the 40th Army and the 18th Rifle Corps.
Thus, by the end of January 15 in the 40th and 3rd tank armies, the breakthrough of the tactical depth of the enemy’s defense was completed. The 18th Rifle Corps failed to completely overcome the enemy's resistance in the second line of defense. The enemy managed to occupy it with his reserves and delayed the advance of the corps. But the involvement of enemy reserves in the breakthrough sector of the 18th Rifle Corps helped the flank strike groups of the front to successfully complete the tasks assigned to them.
The city of Rossosh is free. January 16, 1943
The main forces of the 40th Army and the 15th Tank Corps of the 3rd Tank Army, developing the offensive at an increasing pace in converging directions to Alekseevka, reached the Ilovskoye, Alekseevka area by the end of January 18 and completed the encirclement of the Ostrogozhsk-Rossoshansk enemy group. On January 16, Rossosh was almost completely liberated, where the tankers of the 106th brigade of the colonel were the first to break in.
In the same period, the 12th Panzer Corps, advancing from Rossosh, went to the Karpenkovo area and established contact with units of the 18th Rifle Corps. Simultaneously with the development of the offensive in the main axes, the shock groupings of the front continued to expand the breakthrough towards the flanks. On January 17, the 40th Army, with its left-flank 107th Rifle Division, reached the city of Ostrogozhsk, where it joined up with the 309th Rifle Division and the 129th Rifle Brigade of the 18th Rifle Corps that had approached there on January 17 and 18. In essence, the Soviet units surrounded the enemy grouping, which was defending itself in the sector of the front between the Storozhevsky and Shchukhensky bridgeheads.
Simultaneously with the development of the offensive with the aim of encircling and dismembering the enemy grouping, Soviet troops also created an external encirclement front. In the north and northwest, this task was carried out by the right-flank formations of the 40th Army, which, continuing to advance during January 16-18. By the end of January 18, they created an outer front of the encirclement. In the southwest, the outer front of the encirclement was formed by the forces of the 7th Cavalry Corps. This corps, introduced into the breakthrough on the morning of January 15 from behind the left flank of the 3rd Panzer Army, successfully provided for the entire front-line operation from the south. Advancing in the general direction on Rovenki, Valuyki at an average rate of 30 km per day with heavy snow drifts and active enemy aircraft, on the sixth day of the operation, the corps captured the important railway junction of Valuyki and entrenched itself in the Volokonovka, Urazovo sector. Acting on the outer front of the encirclement at a distance of 75 km from its inner front, the corps reliably ensured the subsequent actions of the front troops for the final liquidation of the troops of the Ostrogozhsk-Rossoshansk group of the enemy.
Thus, on the sixth day of the operation, the troops of the Voronezh Front formed the inner and outer fronts of the encirclement of the enemy group.
The formed inner front of the encirclement with a length of over 300 km was not continuous. The units and formations surrounding the enemy grouping occupied only the most important road junctions and settlements located on the most probable enemy withdrawal routes. The encircled enemy grouping at that time had about thirteen divisions (five Hungarian, four German and four Italian). Only two Hungarian divisions, the remnants of the 700th German tank detachment and one regiment of the 168th German infantry division, were able to escape the encirclement, which were driven back to the north and fought on the outer front of the encirclement.
The entire encircled enemy grouping was cut into two large isolated parts by the attacks of the main forces of the 18th Rifle Corps on Kamenka and the 12th Tank Corps of the 3rd Tank Army on Karpenkovo. The first of them (Ostrogozhsk-Alekseevskaya), which consisted of the remnants of five divisions, was surrounded in the Ostrogozhsk, Alekseevka, (claim.) Kamenka area. At the same time, three divisions from this group were blocked in Ostrogozhsk, where an independent center of encirclement was formed. The second large enemy group (the Rossosh group), which numbered up to eight divisions, ended up in the Podgornoye, Rossosh, and Belogorye regions. By the time the encirclement of the enemy was completed, the troops of the front had already captured about 52 thousand people.
In the period from January 19 to January 27, 1943, the final liquidation of the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan group of the enemy was carried out. Fighting to destroy enemy troops in Ostrogozhsk and in the area northeast of Alekseevka continued from January 19 to 24. Troops of all three shock groups of the front took part in these battles. Simultaneously with the liquidation of enemy troops, the 40th Army had been regrouping its forces since January 20 to carry out the subsequent Voronezh-Kastornenskaya operation. The liquidation of the Rossosh group of the enemy was carried out in the period from January 19 to 27 by the joint efforts of the troops of the 3rd Tank Army and the 18th Rifle Corps, also with the simultaneous regrouping of troops for the subsequent Kharkov operation of the Voronezh Front. Initially, the southern part of it, consisting of about four divisions, was cut off from the Rossoshansk group of enemy troops. By January 20, these troops were mostly destroyed in the area east of Rossosh. In the period from January 21 to 23, the remaining forces of the Rossoshan group in the Podgornoye region were destroyed. In the period from January 24 to 27, 1943, the complete destruction of the remnants of the Rossoshanskaya enemy group that escaped from the encirclement and left the area east of Valuyki was completed.
The Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh offensive operation of the troops of the Voronezh Front lasted 15 days. During this time, the Soviet troops completely completed the task - they surrounded and destroyed a large enemy grouping defending on the Don between Voronezh and Kantemirovka, liberated the important railway section of Liski - Kantemirovka and, moving 140 km deep into the enemy location, reached the river. Oskol.
During the operation, the troops of the front defeated the 2nd Hungarian army, the Italian Alpine and 24th German tank corps, and most of the forces of the operational reserve of Army Group B. In total, more than fifteen enemy divisions were completely defeated by the troops of the front during the fighting. In addition, six enemy divisions suffered significant damage. In the battles from January 13 to 27, the troops of the Voronezh Front captured over 86 thousand enemy soldiers and officers.
Memorial sign in honor of the Osrogozh-Rossosh operation. Voronezh region, Rossosh.
The results of the operation led to a sharp change in the balance of forces in the Voronezh Front in favor of the Soviet troops. Having defeated the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh grouping of the enemy, the troops of the front created favorable conditions for conducting a new offensive operation in cooperation with the troops of the Bryansk Front in order to encircle and destroy the main forces of the 2nd German army, which was defending in the Voronezh and Kastornoye regions. Having captured the important railway junction of Valuiki and reached the Kastornoe-Voroshilovgrad railway for a considerable distance, the Soviet troops deprived the enemy of the opportunity to use the rocade to maneuver forces and means along the front. At the same time, access to the river. Oskol in the Valuyek area created favorable conditions for the Soviet command to conduct an offensive operation in the Kharkov direction as well.
Vladimir Fesenko,
Senior Research Fellow, Research
Institute of Military History VAGSh Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,
Candidate of Historical Sciences
Supplemented and edited on 02/07/2019.
Tanks in the attack on Mtsensk April 27, 1942
Since the beginning of April 1942, the command of the 3rd Army decided to once again try to capture the city of Mtsensk, for which the 240th Rifle Division and the 771st Rifle Regiment of the 137th Rifle Division were involved. On April 25, on the basis of the order received that day from the army headquarters, the headquarters of the 150th Tank Brigade allocated the 3rd tank company of the 1st TB from 10 tanks to participate in this operation T-26. From 22.00 on April 25, all 10 tanks were transferred on railway platforms from Gorbachevo station to Chern station, where they unloaded and by 0.30 on April 27 arrived under their own power in Bolshaya Kamenka (7.3 km northeast of Mtsensk). Here the commander of a tank company verbally received the following task from the commander of the 3rd Army: to go to the area of the village of Stepurino (now the village of Tsvetochny, northeast of Mtsensk), take cover, and then suppress enemy firing points at a height of 230.7 with fire from a place and thereby support the infantry attack of the 771st SP.
Having gone out for reconnaissance, the company commander discovered that it was impossible to travel to Stepurino, because. the bridge across the ravine in front of this village was destroyed. Conducting reconnaissance of ways to bypass this ravine, the company commander arrived at the headquarters of the 137th Infantry Division (note - located in the village of Pyatnitskoye, although, perhaps, the command post of the commander of the 137th SD in the grain state farm was meant), where he received from the commander 137 -th SD lieutenant colonel Vladimirsky oral task: 5 tanks to attack in the direction of Mtsensk, 2 tanks to attack south, to Kazan, and 3 tanks to support the infantry with fire from a place.
So the headquarters of the ABTV of the 3rd Army reported about this. The commissar of the tank company, political instructor Ananin, also reported that it was 5 tanks T-26 was sent to attack the eastern outskirts of Mtsensk, and 2 tanks - to attack Kazan. Ananin does not mention 3 more tanks in his report. Lieutenant Colonel Vladimirsky himself later (May 3) reported that at 12.00 on April 27, only 5 tanks arrived at him T-26 that he specifically sent 3 tanks to support the infantry attack on Mtsensk, and 2 tanks to support the actions of the reconnaissance company to capture height 199.7 (3 km southeast of Mtsensk). About 5 more tanks T-26, allegedly sent to attack Mtsensk, Vladimirsky does not mention.
Despite the fact that the company commander informed Vladimirsky that he had the task of supporting the infantry attack only with fire from a place, and asked him to give him time to bring the tasks to the crews and reconnaissance of the combat course, Vladimirsky did not pay attention to this, as a result which the tanks were brought into battle on the move, without reconnaissance and without any linkage of their actions with the infantry and artillery.
In the meantime, at 0630, after a 1.5-hour artillery preparation, the 771st Rifle Regiment (left) and the 836th Rifle Regiment of the 240th Rifle Division (right) went on the offensive. The 2nd battalion of the 15th motorized regiment of the 29th motorized division (XXXV.AK, 2.Panzerarmee), defending at the turn of heights 228.1 and 230.7, opposed these 2 regiments. During the artillery preparation, all 16 German bunkers discovered by Soviet intelligence on the front line of the enemy were destroyed, the enemy was suppressed by artillery and retreated to Mtsensk, thanks to which, by 8.30, the 771st and 836th rifle regiments occupied heights 228.1 and 230.7 to the north -east of Mtsensk, and by 11.30-12.00 they reached the gardens northeast of Mtsensk, where they met organized enemy machine-gun fire, and in some areas - barbed wire and minefields. The enemy adapted stone buildings and structures for bunkers on the eastern outskirts of the city, unsuppressed enemy artillery fired from the western outskirts - a total of 10-12 guns. It was at this stage of the battle that the tank company of the 150th Tank Brigade arrived at the disposal of the headquarters of the 137th SD.
5 tanks attacking Mtsensk T-26 800 meters east of the city were stopped by a minefield. Despite the demands of the commissar of the tank company, political officer Ananin, to the commander of the 771st Rifle Division to make passages for the tanks in the minefield, he did not take any measures to clear mines, and the tanks were forced to support the infantry with fire from a place because of the minefield. Having used up all the ammunition and 15-20 discs of cartridges each, the tanks retreated to their original positions for refueling.
The commander of the 137th SD, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimirsky himself, reported that not 5, but only 3 tanks T-26 reached the southwestern slopes of a height of 230.7 and " they didn’t go further, referring to the fact that there is a minefield» . Finally, at the end of the fighting, the headquarters of the 137th SD reported that by 13.00 7 tanks had reached the minefield in the area of \u200b\u200bheight 214.6 T-26 where they are then " stomped for a long time in one place, not providing adequate support to the infantry».
2 more tanks T-26 Together with the reconnaissance company of the 137th SD, they were thrown into the attack on a height of 199.7, from where the enemy fired at the infantry of the 771st Rifle Division advancing on Mtsensk. When approaching this height, the tank T-26 No. 293 was, according to some sources, hit by a direct hit by a heavy artillery shell, according to other sources, the tank was blown up by a mine, the caterpillar, the left middle carriage, and the drive wheel cover were broken. The crew (tank commander lieutenant Baryshev, driver sergeant Pestov, turret gunner junior sergeant Rudichev) remained inside the wrecked tank. Having shot the ammunition, the 2nd tank T-26 moved back to original positions.
After a 30-minute artillery attack at 15:00, Soviet troops resumed the assault on Mtsensk, captured the slaughterhouse and the prison area, but suffered heavy losses, especially in command personnel. At 17.00-17.30, an air strike continued in 3 groups of 14 aircraft, after which the enemy launched a counterattack with the forces of 350-500 infantry (note - also, according to some reports, 4 tanks supported the infantry). Having succumbed to panic, the 3rd battalion of the 836th rifle regiment of the 240th rifle division first ran, leaving heights 228.1 and 214.6, then the 3rd battalion of the 771st SP, after which the panic spread to their neighbors battalions.
The 2nd battalion of the 771st regiment, which was in the 2nd echelon at a height of 230.7, also succumbed to panic and left the height. According to the report of the headquarters of the 150th Tank Brigade, " tanks covered this line independently and only after a three-fold demand from the commissar of the company, political instructor Ananin, to the commander of the 137th infantry division, the infantry was sent for defense to the line, which was covered by tanks» . Literally word for word, this report was reproduced in its report by the headquarters of the ABTV of the 3rd Army. Contrary to this evidence, the commander of the 137th SD, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimirsky, stated that “ tanks during this period did not take any part in the battle and did not complete a single task» .
The commissar of the tank company, political instructor Ananin, reported that the enemy’s counterattack began when all the 5 tanks that had previously participated in the attack on the eastern outskirts of Mtsensk T-26 replenished with ammunition. By order of the division commander, the tanks counterattacked the enemy advancing to a height of 230.7 and threw him back, destroying several groups of German infantry, after which they independently held the reached line for some time, waiting for their infantry to approach. During this battle, tanks set fire to a fuel tank on the outskirts of Mtsensk, which set fire to neighboring buildings. The Germans, who jumped out of the burning houses, were machine-gunned to death.
In just a day on April 27, the 3rd tank company of the 1st TB of the 150th TBR, having used up 1.5 ammunition, destroyed 4 bunkers, 1 firing point and up to an infantry company, but lost 1 tank T-26 wrecked and 1 tank T-26 stuck in a German trench. Supported by tanks, the 771st Rifle Regiment on April 29, according to updated data, lost 84 personnel.. Also at 9.30 on April 27, 4 bombers Ju-88 under cover of 6 fighters Me-109 dropped up to 80 bombs on the Gorbachevo station, where at that time a tractor was being loaded onto the railway platform S-65 1st TB. The explosion of a bomb that exploded 8 meters from the platform hit the tractor (the radiator burned out, the lower crankcase was broken), assistant died. com. 3rd company of the 1st TB for those. parts military technician 1st rank Alexander Yurkov.
Battles near Mtsensk on April 28-29, 1942. The results of the offensive
On April 27, 1942, in order to reinforce the strike force advancing on Mtsensk, the headquarters of the 3rd Army ordered the allocation of its motorized rifle battalion to the 150th tank brigade. On the same day at 19.00, the battalion left Kobylinka, plunged into the train and, after unloading at the Polzikovo station, arrived under its own power in Bolshaya Kamenka, where he received the task of becoming subordinate to the commander of the 137th SD to secure height 230.7. Arriving in Pyatnitskoye, by 12.00 on April 28, the battalion entered the disposal of lieutenant colonel Vladimirsky, after which he received from him the task of advancing in the 2nd echelon behind the 2nd battalion of the 771st joint venture and firmly gaining a foothold at the line: the western slopes of a height of 230.7 - square grove (south of height 230.7).
At 4:00 pm on April 28, the 771st Rifle Regiment attacked Hill 230.7 and by the end of the day captured the western slopes of the height and a square grove. Lieutenant Colonel Vladimirsky described the tank support provided to the regiment as follows: “ Only 2 tanks completed the task, the rest turned back every minute and, under the threat of execution, could hardly go back» . The Germans (29th MD) estimated the strength of the Soviet units attacking them as 4 tanks and up to an infantry company.
On the day of April 28, the 771st Rifle Regiment, supported by tanks, according to updated data, lost 752 personnel.. No losses of the 150th Tank Brigade on April 28 are known.
After the 2nd battalion of the 771st joint venture cleared the western slopes of a height of 230.7 and a square grove, Vladimirsky again ordered the motorized rifle battalion to secure this line for itself, and the tank company to place 1 tank on the northwestern slopes of a height of 230.7 and 3 tanks - in a square grove. At 03:00 on April 29, Vladimirsky arrived at the location of the motorized rifle battalion, where he discovered that the battalion had not organized its defense at all, had not sent combat guards and reconnaissance, and had not dug in heavy machine guns. The tank company only pushed 2 tanks into a square grove, without pushing a single tank to a height of 230.7.
At 05:00 on April 29, the enemy, with up to 2 infantry companies, counterattacked the 771st Rifle Regiment and a motorized rifle battalion from the direction of Mtsensk and Hill 214.6. Leaving a height of 230.7 and a square grove, the motorized riflemen retreated in disarray to the grain state farm (now the village of Krasny Oktyabr). Only in the second half of the day did the headquarters of the 137th SD manage to collect the remnants of the battalion in the amount of 54 people in the ravine behind the state farm. Some units of the 150th MSB fled to Pyatnitskoye.
During the flight of motorized riflemen, both tanks standing in a square grove T-26 also left their positions and fled from the German infantry. During this withdrawal, one of the tanks near the grove with its left caterpillar hit a German trench, sat on its belly, knocked off the tracks, after which the crew abandoned their tank. Again, the tank was occupied by the crew only on the night of May 3rd.
In total, according to the headquarters of the German 29th motorized division, its 15th motorized regiment during the counterattack on April 29 captured 1 tank, 1 anti-tank gun, 1 mortar, 2 heavy machine guns, 9 prisoners, there were 20 killed and 5 defectors in its sector , the regiment itself lost only 21 personnel (6 - killed, 15 - wounded).
After the regrouping of the 150th motorized rifle battalion in the 2nd half of the day on April 29 with the remaining tanks T-26 On the 1st TB counterattacked and by 18.00 again took the height of 230.7 and a square grove to the south of this height. During the re-occupation of the square grove on April 29, the 150th motorized rifle battalion captured 1 prisoner from the 15th motorized regiment (29th MD), 2 81-mm mortars, 4 light machine guns, 2 machine guns, handing over all this to the 137th rifle division . According to the army headquarters, the prisoner was captured not in a grove, but on the western slopes of a height of 230.7.
After taking the square grove and height 230.7, the motorized riflemen were replaced by the 771st rifle regiment and located 400 meters east of the square grove. In the 1st echelon on the western edge of the square grove and on the western slopes of a height of 230.7, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 771st joint venture (120 bayonets) took up defense, in the 2nd echelon on the eastern slopes of a height of 230.7 stood 3rd battalion of the 771st joint venture (30 bayonets). After these hostilities, 140 people remained in the motorized rifle battalion, and the tank company was reduced to 7 serviceable tanks. 1 more tank T-26(No. 293) from April 27 remained shot down in the area of \u200b\u200bheight 199.7, 1 T-26 fell into a German trench on April 29, 1 T-26 broke down (gas line burst).
In total, on April 29, according to preliminary data, the 150th tank brigade lost 70 personnel, as well as 2 82-mm mortars and 13 machine guns (1 easel, 12 light machine guns) broken by enemy artillery fire. The commander of the 150th MSB, Major Oreshkov, was slightly wounded, the commissar of the 150th MSB, the senior political instructor (approx. - probably the senior political instructor Nagorny), was seriously wounded, the chief of staff of the 150th MSB, Major Ochkasov, was seriously wounded, the commander and commissar of the 1st Infantry were killed company, 2 deputy political officers, the commander and commissar of one of the rifle companies were wounded.
The nominal list of irretrievable losses of the 150th Tank Brigade for April 28-30 includes only 3 motorized riflemen killed(April 28 - Red Army machine gunner Vladimir Zdankevich, April 29 - Red Army riflemen Ivan Nikolaev and Nikolai Polikashin); also on April 29-30, 2 people died of wounds in field hospitals. The names of the deceased commanders of the 150th MSB are not known at all. On April 29, the 771st Rifle Regiment, according to updated data, lost 485 personnel .
In total, during the fighting from April 27 to April 29 east of Mtsensk, the 150th tank brigade, according to its own data, disabled 1 tank, 1 armored car, 1 passenger car, 1 gun, 5 dugouts and up to an enemy infantry company, losing 1 tank T-26 lined and 54 personnel (7 - killed, 47 - wounded). The nominal list of irretrievable losses of the 150th Tank Brigade for April 27-30 includes 4 killed and 2 who died from wounds. Supported by the brigade, the 771st Rifle Regiment lost 1,431 personnel on April 27-30. The exact losses of the 240th Infantry Division during these days are not entirely clear. The headquarters of the 29th motorized division opposed to the Soviet troops reported that from April 27 to May 1, in the battles in the Mtsensk region, the division lost 1 mortar, 1 heavy field howitzer, 3 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, 1 37-mm anti-tank gun, 427 personnel composition (86 - killed, 336 - wounded, 5 - missing), however, destroyed 320 Soviet soldiers, captured 382 prisoners and, among other trophies - 2 tanks .
The fighting in the 1st half of May 1942
Since April 30, 1942, a calm has been established east of Mtsensk. According to reports from the headquarters of the 771st Rifle Regiment until about May 3, the 150th motorized rifle battalion was in the 2nd echelon of the 771st Rifle Regiment, after which, probably on the night of May 3, together with the 3rd battalion of the 771st Rifle Regiment, it was advanced to the 1st echelon and occupied the defense sector between the 1st and 2nd rifle battalions along the western slopes of height 230.7. Tanks of the 3rd company of the 1st TB were located as firing points on the western and eastern slopes of this height.
On May 4, the headquarters of the 137th SD clarified the losses suffered by the motorized rifle battalion and the 3rd company of the 1st TB of the 150th Tank Brigade. According to these data, in total, since April 27, the 150th tank brigade has lost 63 personnel: 59 people (4 - killed, 6 - missing, 45 - wounded, 4 - sick and hospitalized) - motorized rifle battalion, 4 people (1 - killed, 2 - wounded, 1 - shell-shocked) - tank company.
In total, as of May 5, 1942, the 150th tank brigade consisted of 1,550 personnel, and also had: 37 tanks (1 KV-1,7 T-34, 2 T-40, 18 T-26, 7 BT, 2 Pz.III), 19 tractors, 254 vehicles (11 cars, 179 trucks, 64 special), 1 motorcycle, 9 guns (4 37 mm and 5 45 mm), 12 mortars, 3 anti-tank rifles, 26 machine guns (2 anti-aircraft, 6 easel , 18 manual), 89 assault rifles, 930 rifles, 446 pistols, 14 radios. Of the above equipment, there were 17 tanks on the move (1 T-34, 2 T-40, 13 T-26, 1 BT), 11 tractors, 192 cars, 1 motorcycle. 1 tank BT-2(probably, No. 311), 5 tractors and 50 vehicles were under major repairs, the rest of the equipment was in current and medium repairs. Of the weapons, all 4 45-mm anti-tank guns and 5 machine guns (3 easel and 2 manual) were subject to complete replacement. 3 armored tractors not already mentioned in this list T-16 were sent for overhaul between 28 April and 3 May.
On May 2, the headquarters of the 3rd Army gave the 240th Rifle Division a combat order to replace the 771st Rifle Regiment of the 137th SD by the morning of May 4, leaving the 150th Motorized Rifle Battalion in place. On the night of May 5, the motorized rifle battalion was subordinated to the headquarters of the 931st rifle regiment of the 240th SD, on May 6 it took over the defense sector of the 771st SP on the western and northwestern slopes of height 230.7, and late in the evening on May 7, the 771st rifle the regiment was completely replaced by the 842nd and 931st rifle regiments (240th SD) and withdrawn from the forward positions. The 150th motorized rifle battalion remained to defend Hill 230.7 at the junction between the 842nd and 931st regiments.
On the night of May 5, a tractor Voroshilovets"a tank shot down in the area of \u200b\u200bheight 199.7 was evacuated T-26 No. 293, after which only 1 tank T-26 The 3rd company of the 1st TB remained on the battlefield stuck in a German trench in no man's land 150 meters from enemy positions and 250 meters from Soviet positions. During the day, the tank was defended by its crew, which was under the tank with a machine gun. Guards from 2 squads of riflemen with light machine guns were sent to the tank for the night, while the crew rested at that time. At night, the enemy made attempts to destroy the tank by sending small groups to it. As a result of these small skirmishes, the driver and turret gunner of the tank were wounded. Later, work was organized to dig out the tank in order to put on the tracks and take the tank out on its own. Sapper work continued for 3 nights, but on May 12 the enemy opened heavy artillery fire on the tank; at 13.00, the tank was destroyed by a direct hit from a heavy projectile and burned down.
Earlier, on May 11, the enemy fired heavily for 140 minutes on the tanks of the 3rd company of the 1st TB buried at a height of 230.7. One of the tanks T-26 was broken by 2 direct hits of shells and burned down, the tank crew survived. Later, the tank was evacuated by tractor to the rear. Also, under this shelling, the motorized rifle battalion lost 3 personnel on May 11 (1 - killed, 2 - wounded). In response to these actions of the enemy, on May 12, one of the remaining tanks at the height of the defense T-26 with his artillery fire he destroyed 1 dugout and 2 enemy kitchens.
The main forces of the 150th Tank Brigade did not participate in any combat operations these days and remained in the reserve of the 3rd Army. On May 8-9, both tank battalions of the 150th Tank Brigade, in accordance with the order of the Army Headquarters received by the brigade headquarters on May 7, moved to a new concentration area, located: 1st Tank Battalion - in the area of the village of Spasskoye; 2nd TB - in the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages of Yasny Ugolok, Krasnaya Niva (southwest of the village of Chern).
As of May 10, the 150th Tank Brigade had 1,561 personnel. In total, during the fighting from May 1 to May 10, the 150th tank brigade lost 49 people (4 - killed, 2 - missing, 41 - wounded, 2 - sick and hospitalized), incl. 1st tank battalion lost 6 people (1 killed, 4 wounded, 1 sick), 2nd tank battalion - 1 sick. In the nominal lists of irretrievable losses of the 150th Tank Brigade for the same days, there is only 1 killed(On May 2, the turret gunner of the tank of the 1st TB, junior sergeant Grigory Barnev, died near Bolshaya Kamenka); 2 more motorized riflemen died from previous wounds on 3 May at a nearby field hospital.
In total, during the hostilities from April 27 to May 12, 1942, the 3rd company of the 1st TB of the 150th TBR lost 2 tanks T-26 burned down, 4 personnel (1 killed, 3 wounded), and the 150th motorized rifle battalion lost 68 personnel, 6 machine guns (3 heavy and 3 light), 3 PPSh, 11 rifles and carbines, 2 revolvers . In the nominal lists of irretrievable losses of the 150th Tank Brigade for the same period of time, there are 5 killed; 4 more people died of wounds in nearby hospitals .
2nd half of May - June 1942
On May 12, 1942, the headquarters of the 3rd Army issued combat order No. 0037 to the 150th Tank Brigade: “ allocate 5-6 tanks with the task of moving otd. tanks at night along the roads: Shelamovo, Raspopovo; Raspopovo, Kostomarovo - Yudino; Spasskoe-Lutovinovo, Kostomarovo - Yudino"- in order to demonstrate accumulations of tanks in the former location of the 150th tank brigade - the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages of Troitskoye, Shelamovo and Kostomarovo.
May 14 5 tanks T-26 1st TB started this event. Also on the night of May 14, a train with 17 new tanks arrived at the Chern station and unloaded. T-34 from Stalingrad - all tanks became part of the 150th Tank Brigade. Finally, it was on May 14 that the engine was delivered to the only tank in the 150th tank brigade. KV-1, which for more than 3 months practically did not get out of the repair.
On the second half of the day on May 15, the 150th tank brigade made a new regrouping, concentrating with its tank battalions - in the center and on the eastern edge of the Skuratovsky forest, which is near the village of Bolshoe Skuratovo. During the night, the equipment was buried in the ground. In total, by 17.00 on May 16, the 150th tank brigade had 17 serviceable tanks in its area (1 KV-1, 11 T-34, 5 BT) . On May 17, an anti-tank battery pulled up to the western edge of the same forest from Khmeleva, and on May 18, an anti-aircraft battery moved to an unnamed height with shrubs south of the Skuratovsky forest.
On May 19, the 150th tank brigade received 3 new tanks for replenishment KV-1. On the evening of May 19, the 931st Rifle Regiment of the 240th Rifle Division, like the 150th Motorized Rifle Battalion, began surrendering the occupied defense sector to units of the 283rd Rifle Division. Having handed over its positions overnight at the height of 230.7 to the 860th rifle regiment, the motorized rifle battalion at 12.00 on May 20 concentrated in the location of the main forces of the brigade.
In total, during the fighting from May 10 to 20, the 150th tank brigade lost 19 personnel (5 killed, 4 missing, 10 wounded). Almost all the losses fell on the share of the motorized rifle battalion. No personal lists of irretrievable losses of personnel of the 150th Tank Brigade for the same days were clearly preserved. If we add up the loss figures for April 27-29, May 1-10 and May 10-20, then the total losses of the 150th tank brigade for April 27 - May 20 will be approximately 122 personnel: 16 people were killed, 6 were missing, 98 were wounded, 2 fell ill. The 150th tank brigade itself during the period of hostilities in the area of \u200b\u200bheight 230.7 east of Mtsensk from April 27 to May 20 destroyed 1 tank, 1 armored car, 1 passenger car, 1 cannon, 15 dugouts and bunkers, up to an infantry company .
On the same day, May 20, an anti-tank detachment was formed as part of the 150th tank brigade, consisting of 2 fighter companies (from the 150th SME and the 240th SD), an anti-tank battery (4 45-mm anti-tank guns) and 4 anti-tank rifles. The detachment, led by senior technician-lieutenant Konstantin Boyko, began organizing anti-tank defense near the villages of Andreevka, Kazatskoye, Ilyinka, west of the village of Chern. Ahead of him (the area of Krasny Khutor, Gunkovo, Khmelevaya and groves to the east), the training battalion of the 137th Infantry Division, subordinate to the headquarters of the 150th Tank Brigade, organized the defense; to the left (region (claim.) Gunkovo, height 256.7, nameless height 500 meters south of the Skuratovsky forest, Spasskoye) organized the defense of the training battalion of the 240th rifle division subordinate to the headquarters of the 150th TBR.
brigade headquarters - in the village of Spasskoe;
the 1st and 2nd tank battalions - in the forests southeast of the Vypolzovo station, where they moved on May 20;
150th motorized rifle battalion - in the area: (claim.) Gunkovo, height 256.7, nameless height 500 meters south of the Skuratovsky forest, Spasskoye;
150th anti-tank detachment - in the area: Andreevka, Kazatskoye, Ilyinka;
an anti-aircraft battery - at an unnamed height south of the Skuratovsky forest;
control company - in the forest 500 meters southwest of Spasskoye;
a maintenance company - to the villages of Bolshiye Ozerki;
the rear of the brigade is in the villages of Popovka and Kozatskaya.
On May 20, on the basis of the order (No. 0210) of the headquarters of the Bryansk Front of May 7, the 150th Tank Brigade completed the transition to states No. 010 / 345-010 / 352. In total, on May 20, the brigade had 1,677 personnel, 53 tanks (4 KV-1, 24 T-34, 2 T-40, 17 T-26, 6 BT), 22 tractors, 1 vehicle, 204 vehicles (9 cars, 140 trucks, 55 special vehicles), 8 motorcycles. Because according to the states, the brigade was supposed to have 1107 personnel, 46 tanks, 5 tractors and 129 vehicles, a fairly large number of personnel and equipment of the brigade remained in excess of the state. Of this supernumerary number, on May 20 or a little earlier, 50 people were seconded to a tank school and 32 people to the 18th reserve rifle regiment in the city of Efremov; 8 vehicles were also seconded. At the same time, 14 vehicles and 1 tank that were under overhaul were excluded from the lists. BT, as well as 2 tanks knocked out near Mtsensk T-26 .
A little later, 6 more tanks were received HF-1 replenishment, after which by 17.00 on May 21 the 150th tank brigade had 55 tanks in service (10 KV-1, 23 T-34, 2 T-40, 14 T-26, 6 BT) and 2 tanks (1 T-34, 1 T-26) in current repair, which was 11 tanks more than the number of tanks due to the brigade in the state.
On May 21, the headquarters of the 150th Tank Brigade ordered the troops to include 12 tanks (2 T-40, 10 T-26) and 2 trucks from the 1st and 2nd TB, 8 anti-tank rifles and 4 trucks from the 150th MSB, the entire anti-tank battery, a sapper platoon and a reconnaissance squad of Sergeant Vishnyakov from the 150th control company, as well as 8 anti-tank rifles from 240th SD.
On May 23, 4 tanks were handed over to the PFS warehouse No. 1 in the city of Yelets T-26, and all remaining 9 tanks on the move T-26 and 1 tank T-40 The 1st and 2nd TBs became part of the 150th anti-tank detachment of the updated composition, which now, in addition to tanks, a tank destroyer company of the 240th SD and an anti-tank battery, had 8 anti-tank rifles from the 150th SME, a reconnaissance squad and a sapper platoon from 150 th control company.
On May 24, all 6 tanks were sent to the headquarters of the 3rd Army BT (BT-7№13799;BT-5 №№6235, 6713, 9116, 9129; BT-2 15016) of the 2nd TB, after which 47 tanks remained in the 150th tank brigade (10 HF-1 , 24 T-34, 2 T-40,11 T-26) and 1 tank tractor T-26- almost regular number.
1st tank battalion:
5 KV-1(№№598, 618, 620, 622, 625);
12 T-34(№№9583, 062, 158, 166, 193, 235, 320, 335, 363, 378, 392, 400);
11 T-26(No. 94-K, 219, 293, 388, 532, 2498, 4545, 10020, 10336, 310307 and one unknown) and 1 tank tractor T-26№427.
2nd tank battalion:
5 KV-1(№№4598, 508, 549, 555, 637);
12 T-34(№№48381, 53134, 53140, 086, 137, 180, 316, 367, 385, 389, 396, 405);
2 T-40(№№720, 1078) .
By the end of the day on May 26, on the basis of an order from the headquarters of the 3rd Army, both training battalions left the subordination of the headquarters of the 150th Tank Brigade and left its sector; their positions in the area of the villages of Gunkovo, Andreevka and height 256.7 by the end of the same day were taken over by the 150th motorized rifle battalion, and both tank battalions at 3.00 on May 27 returned back to the Skuratovsky forest.
On June 1, by order of the headquarters of the ABTU of the Bryansk Front, 3 tanks of the 2nd TB were handed over to the 4th separate reserve training tank battalion: a gasoline tank T-34 No. 137 and 2 T-40(Nos. 720 and 1073). On June 1, the military tribunal of the 3rd Army sentenced the commander of the 150th Tank Brigade, Sergeant Anton Samokhvalov, to 10 years in the camps - all known losses of the brigade in those days. After all the reorganizations and rearrangements of personnel, on June 6, the 150th tank brigade had in service 1359 personnel, 167 vehicles, 51 horses, 9 guns (4 37-mm, 4 45-mm, 1 76-mm), 18 mortars , 8 anti-tank rifles. The tank fleet by 17.00 June 6 consisted of 44 tanks (10 HF-1, 23 T-34, 11 T-26) and 1 tractor tank T-26- all on the go.
On June 6, the headquarters of the 3rd Army, by its combat order No. 0045, ordered the 283rd Rifle Division with the strength of 2 rifle battalions with the powerful support of 3 artillery battalions, an RS battalion, an armored train battalion and a tank company from the 150th Tank Brigade on June 9 to seize height 228.1 (near the northeastern outskirts of Mtsensk) and by capturing prisoners, establish an enemy grouping in the area of Mtsensk. On the basis of this order, on June 8, a company of 8 tanks T-26 and 1 tractor of the 1st TB of the 150th Tank Brigade left at the disposal of the headquarters of the 283rd SD, but due to the postponement of the operation for a day, the tanks did not reach the concentration area, but concentrated in the area of the village of Lgovo (4 km south-west of the village of Bolshoe Skuratovo). With the onset of darkness, according to the oral order of the deputy. com. According to the ABTV of the 3rd Army of Colonel Oparin, the company of light tanks returned to the location of the 150th anti-tank detachment. Instead, from 22.00 on June 9 to 02.00 on June 10, a company of 10 tanks moved to the location of the 283rd Infantry Division in a grove northwest of Levykino (northeast of the city of Mtsensk). T-34 1st TB. At the very beginning of the transition, near the village of Medvezhka, senior lieutenant Konstantin Demidov, a platoon platoon of the 1st TB, fell out of action: the hatch of his own tank fell on him. 2 tanks left in place T-34 1st TB - No. 392 "Stepan Razin" and No. 400 "Nikolai Ostrovsky" - with their crews were transferred to the 2nd tank battalion.
Having reached their original positions, the tanks of the 1st TB by 3.00 June 10 were dug in and camouflaged. Having stood at Levykino until June 12 and never took part in the battles, the company was removed from its original positions and by 4.00 on June 13 returned to the location of the 1st tank battalion in the forest south of the village of Krasnaya Niva (southeast of the village of Bolshoe Skuratovo), where both tank battalions crossed on the night of 12 June.
Until July, there were no significant changes in the disposition of the 150th Tank Brigade. On June 22, the tanks of the brigade began to test the infantry of the 240th, 283rd and 287th rifle divisions. The losses in the brigade at that time were only non-combat: on June 23, the military tribunal of the 3rd Army sentenced the Red Army soldier Konstantin Teseev to 10 years in the camps, on June 26 the gunner-radio operator senior sergeant Konstantin Latyshev was sentenced to the same term, and on July 2 the Red Army soldier was sentenced to the same term Petr Holstinin.
On July 8, 2 T-26(No. 388 and 532) of the 1st TB, after which 42 tanks (10 KV-1, 23 T-34 and 9 T-26) and 1 tank tractor T-26. The brigade also had in service 1369 personnel, 158 vehicles, 48 horses, 3 76-mm, 7 37-mm and 45-mm guns, 17 mortars, 8 anti-tank rifles.
; ; ; the next part of the article
1. The position of the Soviet Army.
The war against the USSR was considered by the Nazis as a war of annihilation, the result of which was supposed to be racial genocide. The Russian people, Hitler considered "subhuman", and their existence was justified only from an economic point of view, that is, the Russians could only be slaves. His plans included the complete destruction of our people. When planning the war, the German command counted on the short-term military operations. Hitler wanted to turn the territory of the USSR into a raw material base for the German Reich, in order to later conquer England and the USA.
But having invaded the USSR, the Nazis learned that this was not just an attractive territory, but a country, a people that would spare nothing to protect their land and their inhabitants. Having quite serious losses in the first stage of the war, the Soviet troops were still able to frustrate the Nazi plans for the transience of the war. As a result of the counteroffensive near Moscow, with the support of their people and the help of their allies (USA), the Nazis' confidence in victory in World War II was destroyed. To continue the conduct of hostilities, Hitler needed new energy resources, and he decided to move his activity to the south. He hoped with an offensive to the south of the country, to seize the initiative of waging war in his own hands. The main allies of the Nazis were Italy and Japan, who hoped for a new redivision of the world and the strengthening of their position in the postwar period.
In the spring of 1942, the Soviet command prepared a plan for the spring-summer campaign. Stalin, having information that Germany's losses turned out to be very significant, and the Soviet army, although it suffered losses in the face of valuable personnel, had better equipment. By the spring of 1942, the USSR had more than 400 divisions, 11 million. soldiers and officers, more than 10 thousand tanks, and more than 11 thousand aircraft. However, the new replenishment had no idea about military training and there was still little technical equipment. Stalin was sure of the advantage of his positions, based on the results of the winter battles. And he believed that in 1942 the main enemy forces would be defeated. It was believed that the Germans would advance in two directions: central and southwestern. The main blow was supposed to be against Moscow, and the blow directed at the North Caucasus would have a secondary character. Some of the military leaders believed that in the current situation it was necessary to switch to strategic defense (Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov). Stalin did not "want to sit and wait for the enemy to strike", did not accept the very concept of defense, considered it unworthy of the Red Army. It was to accept Zhukov's proposal for an offensive with the aim of defeating the Rzhev-Vyazma group of Germans. It was also decided to launch an offensive movement in the regions of Leningrad, Demyansk, Orel and Crimea. The situation that developed on the Soviet-German front in May-June 1942 turned out to be extremely difficult for the Soviet troops. An attempt to liberate besieged Leningrad was defeated. Our Army suffered significant losses in the Crimea and near Kharkov.
By mid-June, the balance of power in the south was in favor of the Nazis, and the German command began to develop a new offensive movement plan, it was called "Blau". The 2nd field and 4th tank armies were to launch an offensive against Voronezh, and the 6th field against Ostrogozhsk. Upon reaching Voronezh, the 2nd and 4th armies were to strike at Kantemirovka, where they would be joined by the 1st tank army. The Germans wanted to defeat the troops of the Southwestern Front. And then move on to Stalingrad and the Caucasus. As a result of the destruction of the German aircraft, information about the upcoming operation "Blau" fell into the hands of the Soviet command. Stalin ignored the information received and was sure that the enemy would strike at Moscow. As a result, the necessary measures were not taken to strengthen the wounded borders.
The German command decided not to change plans, but to strike as quickly as possible, which began on June 28, 1942. Attempts by the headquarters to organize a counterattack were unsuccessful. Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky wrote that the defense at the junction of the Bryansk and Southwestern fronts was broken through to a depth of 80 kilometers, the enemy strike group threatened to break through to the Don and capture Voronezh. July 4, 1942 German troops reached the approaches to Voronezh, and on July 6 they crossed the Don and captured part of the city. But they failed to capture the entire city. The position of the Soviet troops continued to deteriorate. The Hungarians and Italians arrived to help the Germans. From October 1942 there was a temporary lull on the Soviet-German front.
The leadership of Nazi Germany attached particular importance to propaganda among Russian military personnel and the civilian population. The decomposition of the enemy troops, the decrease in morale, the stimulation of support for the occupation regime among the inhabitants of the occupied regions, were considered by the Nazis as necessary means to maintain power in Europe. The main document for conducting propaganda was the directive signed by General A. Jodl in June 1941, “Instruction on the use of propaganda according to the Barbados option”. The main goals of this document were: undermining the authority of the USSR, a positive idea of captivity, increasing dissatisfaction among the civilian population with the situation in the country. The main means of propaganda was printed materials: leaflets, various brochures.
After the completion of Operation Blau, the strike groups of German troops moved south. The German command attached particular importance to holding a defensive line on the Don River. Troops of generals F.I. Golikov and N.F. Vatutin kept the defense on the eastern bank of the Don. During July-September 1942, the troops of the Voronezh Front were actively fighting, holding back the enemy and preventing him from moving to Stalingrad - at that time there were fierce battles. It was these military operations that became a turning point in the Great Patriotic War and in World War II. The headquarters developed new plans for the liberation of Voronezh. Several planned operations remained unfinished. The main successful outcome of the summer fighting was the capture and retention of bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don. This event played an important role in the course of the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh offensive operation.
2. Operation planning.
As a result of the counter-offensive of the Soviet Army near Stalingrad, the headquarters of the German 6th field army, 5 German corps, 2 Romanian divisions, numerous rear units - up to 160 separate units in total - were surrounded. The number of encircled enemy troops exceeded 280 thousand people. Major General K.S. Moskalenko, a plan was developed, the purpose of which was to recapture a section of the Voronezh-Rostov railway from the station. Freedom to Millerovo, for this it was necessary to strike at Kantemirovka, Ostrogozhsk and Rossosh. Stalin approved the new plan. By order of Stalin, G.K. arrived at the command post of the army. Zhukov, and personally examined the enemy defenses. At first he was skeptical about the plan proposed by Moskalenko, but after carefully studying all the nuances, he approved the plan. The start of preparations had to be postponed due to the situation near Stalingrad. And only in December, the Stavka issued a directive on the preparation of the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh offensive operation. The purpose of this operation was: the liberation of the Liski-Kantemirovka railway and the destruction of enemy troops on the Upper Don. So it was necessary to do, for a further offensive on Kursk and Kharkov. The offensive plan was as follows - three strike groups were created: the northern group struck from the Storozhevsky bridgehead in the direction of Boldyrevka, Krasnoye, Alekseevka; part of the forces of the northern group struck at Ostrogozhsk; the southern grouping - from Kantemirovka to Alekseevka, where it was supposed to connect with the northern one. A strike was planned in the direction of Rossosh, Karpenkovo.
It was planned not only to create internal and external encirclement fronts, but also to dismember the enemy army into several parts, this was supposed to lead to the destruction of the enemy. The Ostrogozhsko-Rossosh operation was to become a new word in the development of the theory and practice of conducting offensive operations. Six future Marshals of the Soviet Union took part in the development of this operation. The preparation of the operation consisted in the transfer of troops allocated by the Headquarters and in the regrouping of existing ones. Such large-scale actions were tried to be carried out as discreetly as possible. Therefore, the goal of our fighters was to misinform the enemy, to create the appearance that the strikes would be on the wrong sectors of the front.
The winter of 1942-1943 was snowy, and the lack of railway lines made it difficult for troops to move. Therefore, the local population was organized to clear the roads. Progress to the destination was difficult: they moved at night, over long distances, they carried materiel on sleds. The army was specially prepared for combat in winter conditions. For the secrecy of the upcoming operation, the ongoing political information played a big role. But the enemy could not be underestimated, intelligence could detect movements on the Soviet front and strike at those sectors that were weakened. It was also necessary to strengthen the flanks, counterattacks on the bases of the wedges were one of the favorite methods of the Germans. This led to the fact that Soviet troops often found themselves surrounded. A number of measures have been taken to prevent this. Actions were taken to mislead the German enemy: railway stations were cleared on passive sectors of the front, the delivery and unloading of repair tanks, one-time offensive actions, and others. All these measures had their effect, and the fascists expected the main blow from the area of Liski and Pavlovsk.
One of the important conditions for a successful offensive - surprise, in the preparation of the Ostrogozhsko-Rossoshanskaya operation, was fulfilled. The start of the operation was originally planned for January 12, but due to some difficulties it was postponed to January 14. There were problems with material support. The aviation forces were rather weak. To strengthen their positions, the Soviet command had to remove all guns and mortars from the passive sectors of the front, such a step was very risky. One of the important means of a successful breakthrough was the presence of tanks. Therefore, most of the available tanks on the Voronezh Front were involved in the operation.
It became known that the Germans suffered serious losses after the defeat at Stalingrad and on the Middle Don. And to replenish their army, they resorted to mobilizing the population in the territories they occupied. These were both Poles and Ukrainians.
All the shortcomings a few days before the onset could not be corrected. There was not enough weapons, fuel. There was no proper level of military training. All this could only be compensated for by the high morale of the soldiers. For this, various events were held, rallies and talks were held in military units. Political work was also carried out with the local population: leaflets were printed saying that the defeat of the German yoke was close, that those who left with the Nazis would be in eternal slavery, that they had nothing to fear from Soviet power, that the Red Army was advancing and after the war a new joyful life in your own land!
3. Ostrogozhsko-Rossosh offensive operation.
Two days before the start of the operation, it was necessary to carry out reconnaissance in force in order to know more about the location of the enemy. The tactics of the Germans was as follows - they carefully masked the front line of defense. And in order not to waste ammunition, it was necessary to have more specific information about your opponent. On the eve of the operation, Soviet soldiers took actions to neutralize the enemy, identify the exact front line of defense, German and Hungarian soldiers were destroyed and captured. The captured Hungarians said that the German command concealed what the situation really was. And if they knew that the affairs of the Germans are so bad, then everyone would have dispersed a long time ago. The Hungarian army was not ready for the frosty Russian winter. There was not enough warm clothes, there was little food.
The tactical success achieved on January 12 posed the question to the command - should we wait for January 14 (the date scheduled for the offensive), or start the offensive now? It was decided not to wait, and on January 13 bombardment of aviation began on the headquarters of the enemy and attacked his front line. Soviet troops destroyed enemy planes, troop concentrations and other technical means of the enemy.
With their fire, the artillerymen and mortarmen partially paralyzed the enemy, thereby getting them to engage in disorderly combat. This situation helped to prevent the appearance of the main enemy forces on the front line. And by 10.00 the first line of the Hungarian defense was broken through. The command was able to introduce fresh forces into the breakthrough, paralyze the enemy forces. During January 12-13, Soviet soldiers managed to fulfill the plan planned for the first day of the offensive: Uryv was liberated, the enemy grouping defending the northwestern part of Uryva was destroyed, the enemy was captured, and Hill 178.1 was captured. The invaders tried to keep Boldyrevka, but they failed, and she was released. A large number of Russian soldiers distinguished themselves in the first days of the offensive. They fought bravely for every inch of their native land. They boldly rushed to the attack, which confused the enemy army. In the village of Devitsa, the Germans had a heavily fortified stronghold. During the battle, our defenders managed to liberate part of the village. The enemy was finally driven out of the Maiden on the night of January 14, at the same time the Kalinin farm was liberated. On the morning of January 14, the division headquarters moved to Devitsa.
Things were not so successful on the right flank. Due to weather conditions, the fire system of the Hungarians was not completely suppressed. And only by lunchtime did they manage to capture the height of 185.6, which played a large role in the enemy's defense system. In the battle for Dolgalevka, Soviet soldiers faced stubborn resistance. The fight was fierce. It was decided to postpone the attack for the night. In this village, the Germans had the headquarters of a heavy artillery regiment and reserve units of the Germans. Having freed Dolgalevka, they broke through the tactical defense zone of the enemy. Thus, on the first day, the defense line of the 2nd Hungarian Army was broken through in several areas. The morale of the enemy has fallen!
The next day, January 14, all the strike groups of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive. The main task was to prevent the enemy from creating a new line of defense. On the night of January 15, a battle began for the village of Arkhangelskoye, the enemy nevertheless retreated, leaving warehouses with ammunition and food. The breakthrough of our troops, along the intended path, continued. On January 15, another 20 settlements were liberated by the forces of units of the 40th Army. To decompose the morale of the enemy, the political agencies printed out leaflets that were dropped from the aircraft among the enemy troops.
The death of the 2nd Hungarian army continued. The German command, guided by Hitler's order, did not give a decision to retreat, although the army command saw the need for this. People died from cold, hunger and the advance of Russian troops.
After breaking through the Hungarian defense, units of the 40th Army developed an offensive with units of the 18th Rifle Corps and the 3rd Tank Army to create internal and external fronts to encircle the Ostrogozhsko-Rossoshansky enemy group. The left-flank formations advanced towards Ostrogozhsk and Alekseevka, and the right-flank formations to the north and north-west, providing protection from the counterattack of the 2nd German army from the Voronezh region.
After breaking through the second line of the Hungarian defense, the 25th Infantry Division launched an offensive in a westerly direction. The settlements of Skoritskoye, Lyagushevka, Fabritskoye, Krasnolipye, Repyevka and others were liberated. And everywhere the liberators were greeted with joy. People had to endure a lot of pain and suffering. The Nazis mocked the wounded, killed, burned and staged demonstration executions of the civilian population.
Messages from the Soviet Information Bureau, stating that: the advance of the Russian troops in the southern direction was successful, released from. Korotoyak and many settlements were reported to all fighters and commanders. The fighting spirit of the soldiers was raised in every possible way. On the night of January 18-19, Soviet troops stormed the western outskirts of Ostrogozhsk. This city was important for the enemy, as it was located on the railway line going to Valuyki. And also nearby were the roads to the south, along which the enemy was going to withdraw his troops. Soviet troops liberated Alekseevka, Valuyki, Kamenka, as a result of which the enemy was squeezed into a ring. By the evening of January 20, the 107th Infantry Division had completely captured Ostrogozhsk.
The result of the first seven days of the offensive was: the complete defeat of the 9th, 6th, 20th, 7th, 13th and 10th infantry division of the Hungarians and the 168th infantry division of the Germans. It was the collapse of the 2nd Hungarian army on the Don, the remnants of the army began a disorderly retreat, in forty degrees of frost. They had neither food nor warm clothing.
The task of the 18th Rifle Corps was to break through the enemy defenses - the 7th Army Corps of the 2nd Hungarian Army and attack in the western, southwestern and southern directions, and connect with the 40th and 3rd Tank Army. It was decided to carry out a breakthrough from the Shchuchyonsk bridgehead against the positions of the Italian corps. On January 14, at eight o'clock in the morning, the offensive began. The enemy again had to make sure of Russian power, strength and fury. The fight went on for 2 hours. The Germans and Magyars were scared to death, they surrendered and retreated.
In the occupied settlements, the Nazis arranged their own rules: they raped women, took away food and clothes from civilians. Cattle were stolen, crops were destroyed. They were forced to work, and for not going to work they were severely punished. During the first 2 days of the offensive, units of the 18th Rifle Corps advanced 25 km.
According to the plan of the Ostrogozhsko-Rossoshansk operation, the 3rd Panzer Army was supposed to strike from Kantemirovka in a north-western direction, in order to connect with units of the 40th Army and encircle the enemy. It was necessary to strike in a general direction through Rossosh, Olkhovatka to Alekseevka and in a northern direction to Kamenka, in cooperation with units of the 40th and 6th armies, to surround and destroy the Rossosh-Pavlovsk-Alekseevsky enemy grouping. Release the railroads Liski - Kantemirovka, Liski - Valuyki. The offensive was successful, the Russian soldiers, inspired by their small victories, fought desperately. The enemy began to retreat to the north and northwest, he was frightened, angry, cruel. Soviet troops reached Lizinovka, freeing the occupied territories. Now they were faced with the task of mastering Rossosh and Olkhovatka. It was necessary to block the highways Rossosh - Arkhipovka, Rossosh - Shaposhnikovo and cut off the retreat routes for the invaders to Olkhovatka.
Even shortly before the liberation of Rossosh, the Italian soldiers were sure of victory, they wrote soothing letters home and expected that all this would end soon. The Italian troops had outdated uniforms, when they got to the Soviet-German front, they felt hatred from the Russian population, and contempt from the Germans. They were fed poorly, weapons and equipment were not enough. And they themselves said that they could not wage such a war. The Alpine Italians were accustomed to slow fighting in the mountains, but they got lost in the steppe.
The liberation of Rossosh lasted until 24:00 on January 16th. The enemy did not want to give up their positions and put up fierce resistance. Immediately, the military commandant's office began to work in the city, traitors and traitors began to be identified. As a result of the liberation of Valuyek and Urazovo, the enemy command lost the ability to control its troops along the Kastornoye-Valuyki railway section. On January 18-19, 1943, the Ostrogozhsko-Rossosh group of the enemy, numbering up to 13 German, Hungarian and Italian divisions, were surrounded. The destruction of the encircled enemy took place simultaneously with the redeployment of the troops of the Voronezh Front for the upcoming Voronezh-Kastornenskaya and Kharkov offensive operations. Partisan detachments made a great contribution to the liberation of our country.
4. Significance and results.
The Ostrogozhsko-Rossosh operation lasted 15 days. During these 15 days, the Red Army surrounded and destroyed the enemy grouping on the Don between Voronezh and Kantemirovka. Soviet troops completely destroyed 14 enemy infantry divisions, the German divisional group "Vogelein", the 700th German brigade. Six infantry and one tank divisions were severely defeated. By January 23, 1943, Soviet troops had captured 71,450 prisoners and destroyed up to 52,000 enemy soldiers and officers. The total number of those caught in Russian captivity was 86,000 enemy soldiers and officers, only during the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation. Many trophies were captured: various weapons, tanks, cars and other provisions.
The Ostrogozhsko-Rossosh operation became a huge contribution to the development of military affairs. The troops of the Voronezh Front were simultaneously attacking in three directions. This was the first time during the Great Patriotic War when one front, having an unfavorable balance of forces, made a breakthrough in three directions. Under the conditions of this operation, for the first time, a reinforced rifle corps advanced in a separate direction, acting as one of the strike groups, between the two main ones. In the course of the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation, valuable experience was gained in attacking from bridgeheads.
One of the differences from the offensive operations carried out in 1941-1942 was that a characteristic moment in the development of tactics was the conduct of reconnaissance in force. The forward battalions were supported by tanks, artillery and aircraft. It was also an innovation that the dismemberment and destruction of the enemy was carried out simultaneously with the environment.
By the beginning of the offensive operation, the troops of the Voronezh Front did not have superior forces, but thanks to the skillful command, it was possible to reorganize in a short time and strengthen the necessary directions at the expense of secondary sectors. And it was very risky. The success of the Ostrogozhsko-Rossoshanskaya operation was due to the high rate of advance of the troops of the front, which required from them a high moral and physical effort during the operation.
Military historian V.P. Morozov highly appreciated the significance of this operation. He saw an inextricable link between the Battle of Stalingrad and the Ostrogozhsko-Rossosh operation. It was she, in his opinion, that became the standard for all subsequent offensive operations.
Literature:
- “Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation -“ Stalingrad on the upper Don ”, - S.I. Filonenko, A.S. Filonenko. - 2nd ed., corrected. and additional - Voronezh: Quart, 2005. - 416 p.;
