“This army was a serious force”: how Polish patriots helped the Red Army in the fight against Nazism. "This army was a serious force": how Polish patriots helped the Red Army in the fight against Nazism 1st division named after tadeusz Kosciuszko payroll

A group of patriotic Polish officers and soldiers, including Lieutenant Colonel Sigmund Berling, withdrew from the Anders army and remained in the Soviet Union. They became the initiators of the formation of the 1st Polish Infantry Division. Tadeusz Kosciuszko. The Poles living on the territory of the USSR were determined to join the armed struggle against the Nazis on the side of the Red Army. At the request of the anti-fascist Union of Polish Patriots, from May 14, 1943, an infantry division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko began to form from volunteer Poles in the village camps near Ryazan. This work was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Sigmund Berling. In August 1943 - March 1944, the 1st Polish Corps was created, under the command of the same Major General Sigmund Berling. In April 1944, the corps was reorganized into the Polish 1st Army. In October 1944, Lieutenant General V. Korchits took over command of the army, and from December Lieutenant General S.G. Poplavsky. By mid-1944, the 1st Polish Army united 4 infantry divisions, a cavalry regiment, 5 artillery brigades, a mortar regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery division, a tank and engineer brigades, 2 air regiments and other units.

By the decree of the Krajowa Rada Narodova, the supreme executive body of fighting Poland, on July 21, 1944, the 1st Polish Army and the Army of Ludov were united into the Polish People's Army, commanded by General Armor M. Жymerski. With the help of the USSR, in the second half of 1944, the 2nd Army of the Polish Army was created, commanded by Lieutenant General K. Sverchevsky, and from September 1944 by Lieutenant General S. Poplavsky. In December of the same year, he transferred command again to K. Sverchevsky. By the end of 1944, the Polish Army numbered 300 thousand people, and by May 1945 - 400 thousand. It consisted of 14 infantry, 40 artillery and anti-aircraft divisions, 7 artillery, 4 tank, 2 barrage, 1 cavalry, 1 motorized rifle, 1 mortar, 5 engineer brigades, 4 air divisions, dozens of rifle units and subunits of various arms and services ... At the request of the Polish command, Soviet officers were sent to the Polish Army to command positions or instructors.

Polish patriots, in military cooperation with the Soviet troops, made a worthy contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany. On October 12, 1943, near the village of Lenino, which is southeast of Orsha, the 1st Polish Infantry Division named after V.I. entered the battle as part of the 33rd Army of the Western Front. Kosciuszko. For heroism and courage in battles against the German fascist invaders, 239 soldiers of the division were awarded Soviet military orders. Captain Y. Khibner, Captain V. Vysotsky (posthumously), Private A. Kishvon (posthumously) were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the spring of 1944, under the command of the 1st Belorussian Front, the Polish Partisan Headquarters was formed, which played an important role in supplying the Human Army with weapons and other military equipment. Seven Soviet partisan formations and 26 separate partisan detachments operated on Polish territory, a total of 12 thousand people. In turn, more than 7 thousand Poles fought in the partisan detachments of Ukraine and Belarus.

At the end of February 1944, the 1st Polish Army entered the operational subordination of the command of the 1st Belorussian Front and, being in the second echelon of the front, took up defenses along the eastern bank of the Styr River. On July 22-23, 1944, during the Lublin-Brest operation, Polish troops entered the territory of Poland. Together with Soviet troops, they fought fierce battles to capture, hold and expand the bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula.

On August 23, 1944, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Mangushevsky bridgehead, Polish pilots made their first sorties. The 1st Polish Army took part in the offensive launched on September 10 in the central sector of the 1st Belorussian Front with the aim of helping the insurgents in Warsaw. On September 13, Soviet and Polish aviation dropped weapons, ammunition, food and medical supplies to the rebels, and covered their air strikes. September 14, 1st Polish Infantry Division. T. Kostyushko and the 1st tank brigade. Heroes of Westerplatte successfully fought to eliminate the bridgehead of German fascist troops in the interfluve of the Vistula and the Western Bug. During the Warsaw-Poznan operation in 1945, the troops of the 47th Army and the 61st Soviet Army, together with the formations of the 1st Army of the Polish Army, liberated Warsaw on January 17, 1945. Eleven units and formations of the 1st Army of the Polish Army received the honorary title of Warsaw. Together with Soviet troops, this army took part in breaking through the Pomeranian Wall, pursuing the enemy to the Baltic coast, and liberating the city of Kolobterg (Kolberg). During the assault on Gdansk and Gdynia, the 1st Polish Tank Brigade named after. Heroes of Western, which served as part of the 2nd Belorussian Front. In the Berlin operation of 1945, the 1st (as part of the 1st Belorussian Front) and the 2nd (as part of the 2nd Belorussian Front) army of the Polish Army took part, the 1st Polish Infantry Division. Kosciuszko, 1st mortar, 2nd howitzer brigades and 6th separate pontoon bridge battalion. They, together with the troops of the Red Army, fought directly on the streets of Berlin. The 2nd Army of the Polish Army then took part in the Prague operation.

During the war years, the Soviet Union donated over 400,000 rifles and machine guns, 18,800 machine guns, 3,500 guns, 4,800 mortars, 670 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,200 aircraft to the Polish armed forces free of charge. 20 thousand Soviet generals and officers were sent to command positions in the Polish troops. During the war years, 29 Polish military units and formations, as well as 5 thousand Polish soldiers were awarded Soviet military orders. The Polish troops were commended 13 times in the orders of the Supreme High Command. In the battles for their Motherland Poland, the Polish Army lost about 18 thousand killed. The Soviet Armed Forces lost about 600 thousand people in the battles for the liberation of Poland.

Complex and contradictory history of Soviet-Polish relations during the Great Patriotic War. But even in those years, governments and peoples found a way to close cooperation in the struggle against a common enemy - fascist Germany. This is already history that we must remember so that its tragic pages will never be repeated.

Statement by Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs A.Ya. Vyshinsky to the representatives of the Anglo-American press in Moscow on Polish-Soviet relations dated May 6, 1943.

In view of the inquiries received from some representatives of the Anglo-American press regarding Soviet-Polish relations, I, on behalf of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, consider it necessary to acquaint you with some facts and points related to this issue.

This is all the more necessary at this time since the current Polish government, under the influence of pro-Hitler elements in it and in the Polish press, prompted the well-known decision of the Soviet government to break off relations with the Polish government, and Polish officials, the Polish press and Polish radio continue to spread numerous false statements. on the question of Soviet-Polish relations. At the same time, they quite often use the ignorance of wide public circles about the actual facts from the field of these relations.

I. About Polish military units formed in the USSR

Following the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet agreement on July 30, 1941, the formation of the Polish army on the territory of the Soviet Union began in accordance with the military agreement concluded between the Soviet and Polish command of August 14 of the same year. At the same time, by agreement between the Soviet and Polish command, the total strength of the Polish army was determined at 30 thousand people, and in accordance with the proposal of General Anders, it was also considered expedient, as soon as one or another division is ready, immediately send it to the Soviet Germanic front.

The Soviet military authorities, at the direction of the Soviet government, in every possible way assisting the Polish command in the most rapid resolution of all issues related to the accelerated formation of Polish units, fully equated the supply of the Polish army with the supply of the Red Army units that are in formation. To finance the activities related to the formation and maintenance of the Polish army, the Soviet government provided the Polish government with an interest-free loan in the amount of 65 million rubles, which subsequently, after January 1, 1942, was increased to 300 million rubles. In addition to these amounts allocated by the Soviet government, more than 15 million rubles of irrevocable allowances were issued to the officers of the newly formed Polish military units.

It should be noted that despite the originally established size of the Polish army at 30 thousand people, on October 25, 1941, the Polish army already numbered 41,561 people, of which 2,630 were officers. The Soviet government reacted favorably to the proposal of the Polish government, made in December 1941 by General Sikorski, to further expand the contingent of the Polish army to 96 thousand people. As a result of this decision, the Polish army was deployed in 6 divisions and, in addition, it was decided to increase the initially determined composition of the officer school, spare parts and army reinforcement units of 3 thousand people to 30 thousand people. The entire army, in accordance with the wishes of the Polish government, was transferred to the southern regions of the USSR, which was dictated mainly by climatic conditions, where the construction of camps was launched and headquarters, military schools, sanitary institutions, etc. were located.

Despite the difficult wartime conditions, in February 1942, the Polish army deployed already as part of the planned divisions and consisted of 73,415 people. However, despite the repeated assurances of the Polish command about their determination to bring their units into operation as soon as possible, the actual date for the appearance of these units on the front was invariably postponed. At the beginning of the formation of the Polish army, the date of its readiness was determined on October 1, 1941, and the Polish command declared that it considered it expedient to send its individual divisions to the front as soon as their formation was completed. Although the preparation of individual units was late, nevertheless, if not on October 1, then somewhat later, there was a full opportunity to fulfill this intention. Meanwhile, it was not fulfilled and the Polish command did not even once raise the question of sending the formed Polish divisions to the Soviet-German front. The Soviet government did not consider it possible to rush the Polish command with this matter, but still, 5 months after the start of the formation of Polish units, namely in February 1942, the Soviet government asked when the Polish units would start fighting against the Nazis. At the same time, the 5th division was named as having already completed its training. In raising this question, the Soviet government proceeded, first of all, from the direct and clear provisions of the Soviet-Polish military agreement on August 14, 1941, in clause 7 of which it was said: “Polish army units will be moved to the front upon reaching full combat readiness. They will act, as a rule, in formations no less than a division and will be used in accordance with the operational plans of the USSR Supreme Command. "

Despite such a categorical indication of a military agreement, General Anders, on behalf of the Polish government, subsequently declared that he considered it undesirable to bring separate divisions into battle, although on other fronts the Poles even fought in brigades. General Anders promised that the entire Polish army would be ready to take part in hostilities with the Germans by June 1, 1942. It is known that neither June 1, nor much later, the Polish command and the Polish government were ready to send the Polish army for hostilities against the Soviet-German the front did not show. Moreover, the Polish government and formally refused to send its units to the Soviet-German front, with the motivation that "the use of separate divisions will do nothing" and that "the possible combat training of one division will not meet our expectations" (Telegram from General Sikorsky of February 7 1942).

Meanwhile, the shortage of food supplies to the USSR due to the outbreak of the war in the Pacific led to the need to reduce the number of rations given to non-belligerent military units in the interests of ensuring the supply of the belligerent troops. Since the Polish command did not show any desire to send at least any Polish military units to the Soviet-German front and continued to keep them deep in the rear, the Soviet government, of course, was forced to consider these units as non-belligerent troops, as a result of which the decision on reduction of food rations for non-belligerent military units.

Due to this, the Soviet government made a decision from April 1, 1942 to reduce the number of food rations to 44 thousand and to allow, in accordance with the wishes of the Polish government, the evacuation of Polish units to Iran in excess of the 44 thousand remaining in the Soviet Union. This evacuation was carried out in March 1942, when 31,488 military personnel left the USSR. Together with them, 12,455 people were allowed to leave. family members of Polish military personnel.

Refusing to withdraw its army to the Soviet-German front, the Polish government at the same time sought the consent of the Soviet government to conduct an additional recruitment to the Polish army on the territory of the USSR. Simultaneously with the proposal for an additional recruitment, the Polish government turned to the Soviet government with a note in which it spoke of such use of Polish military units, which meant nothing more than a refusal to use them on the Soviet-German front. In response to this note (dated June 10, 1942), the Soviet government notified the Polish government that, since, contrary to the agreement between the USSR and Poland, the Polish government did not consider it possible to use the Polish units formed in the USSR on the Soviet-German front, the Soviet government did not may allow the further formation of Polish units in the USSR.

Then the question was raised of the complete evacuation of the Polish army from the USSR to the Middle East, and in August 1942 an additional 44,000 Polish soldiers were evacuated.

Thus, the Polish government removed the question of the participation of Polish troops in a joint struggle with Soviet troops against Nazi Germany. The Polish government decided this issue negatively, contrary to its initial assurances, contrary to the solemn declaration made in the Declaration of December 4, 1941, that “the troops of the Polish Republic, located on the territory of the Soviet Union, will wage war against the German robbers hand in hand with the Soviet troops. ".

Before the second evacuation, the command of the Polish army asked to leave together with units of the Polish army 20-25 thousand family members of Polish military personnel. The Soviet government granted this request. In fact, by September 1, 1942, 25,301 people had already been evacuated. family members of Polish military personnel. In total, thus, left the USSR back in 1942, except for 75,491 people. Polish military personnel, 37,756 people. their family members.

Recently, the Polish ambassador, Romer, has brought up the question of additional departure from the USSR of 10 people. family members of Polish servicemen who did not manage to arrive at the evacuation points by the time of the evacuation. The Soviet government resolved this issue positively. Neither the command of the Polish army nor the Polish embassy made any other proposals to the Soviet government to evacuate the families of Polish servicemen.

All allegations that the Soviet authorities hindered or are hindering the departure from the USSR of Polish subjects, whose number is in fact not large, as well as members of the families of Polish military personnel who left the Soviet Union, are false.

All of the above testifies that the Soviet government took all measures to ensure the successful formation and deployment of the Polish army on the territory of the Soviet Union.

The agreement of July 30, 1941 and the Declaration of December 4, 1941 set before the Soviet government and the Polish government a completely definite and clear task - to unite the efforts of the Soviet and Polish peoples in a joint struggle against the Nazi robbers and occupiers, to create a Polish army inspired by this great idea and give her the opportunity to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Red Army for the independence of her homeland.

The Soviet government did everything necessary to solve this problem. The Polish government took a different path. It did not want to withdraw its divisions to the Soviet-German front, refused to use Polish troops against the Germans on this front, hand in hand with Soviet troops, and thus avoided fulfilling its obligations.

In connection with the question of the formation of the Polish army on the territory of the USSR, it is also necessary to dwell on the following:

After the reunification by the will of the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples of the Western regions of Ukraine and Belarus with the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the Belarusian Soviet Republic, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council was issued on November 29, 1939, by virtue of which, in accordance with the all-Union legislation on citizenship, the inhabitants of these regions acquired Soviet citizenship ... As I have already indicated, after the restoration of relations between the Soviet government and the Polish government and the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish military agreement of August 14, 1941, the Soviet government took a number of measures to facilitate the formation of the Polish army on the territory of the USSR. In order to facilitate the formation of this army and provide it with cadres, the Soviet government expressed its readiness, in the form of an exemption from the Decree of November 29, 1939, to treat persons of Polish nationality from among the inhabitants of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus as Polish subjects. Despite this manifestation of goodwill and compliance by the Soviet government, the Polish government reacted negatively to this act of the Soviet government and was not satisfied with it, based on its illegal claims against the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Meanwhile, the Polish government in August 1942, as I said before, withdrew its military units from the USSR, and thus there was no need for the further formation of Polish military units on Soviet territory. In view of the above circumstances, there was no need for that exemption in respect of persons of Polish nationality, for which the Soviet government expressed its readiness in December 1941. Therefore, on January 16, 1943, the Soviet government informed the Polish government that its earlier statement about its readiness to allow exemption from the Decree of November 29, 1939 in respect of the above persons of Polish nationality should be considered invalid and the question of the possibility of non-proliferation of the provisions of Soviet legislation on citizenship to them - those who have disappeared.

These are the facts that shed full light on the circumstances of the formation of Polish military units on the territory of the USSR and the withdrawal of these units from the Soviet Union.

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR granted the petition of the "Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR" to form a Polish division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko on the territory of the USSR to fight jointly with the Red Army against the German invaders. The formation of the Polish division has already begun.

148. JV Stalin's answer to the question of the chief correspondent of Reuters about the dissolution of the Communist International on May 28, 1943.

The Moscow correspondent of the British Reuters agency, King, addressed the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, JV Stalin, with a letter in which he asked him to answer a question of interest to the British public.

J.V. Stalin replied to Mr. King with the following letter:

Mr. King!

I received a request from you to answer a question concerning the dissolution of the Communist International. I am sending you my answer.

Question. “British comments on the decision to liquidate the Comintern were very favorable. What is the Soviet point of view on this issue and on its impact on the future of international relations? "

Answer. The dissolution of the Communist International is correct and timely, since it facilitates the organization of the general onslaught of all freedom-loving nations against the common enemy - Hitlerism.

The dissolution of the Communist International is correct because:

a) He exposes the lies of the Nazis that Moscow allegedly intends to interfere in the life of other states and "Bolshevize" them. This lie is now put to an end.

b) He exposes the slander of the opponents of communism in the workers' movement that the communist parties of various countries are supposedly acting not in the interests of their people, but on orders from outside. This slander is now also put to an end.

c) It facilitates the work of the patriots of freedom-loving countries to unite the progressive forces of their country, regardless of their party affiliation and religious convictions, into a single national liberation camp - to launch the struggle against fascism.

d) It facilitates the work of patriots of all countries to unite all freedom-loving peoples into a single international camp to fight against the threat of world domination of Hitlerism, thereby clearing the way for the organization in the future of the commonwealth of peoples on the basis of their equality.

I think that all these circumstances, taken together, will lead to the further strengthening of the united front of the Allies and other united nations in their struggle for victory over Hitler's tyranny.

I believe that the dissolution of the Communist International is quite timely, since it is now, when the fascist beast is straining its last strength, that it is necessary to organize a general onslaught of freedom-loving countries in order to finish off this beast and rid the peoples of fascist oppression.

Yours faithfully I. Stalin

149. The position of the USSR in relation to the plans of European federations. From the editorial "On the issue of federations of" small "states in Europe" published in Izvestia on November 18, 1943.

The Soviet point of view fully recognizes that the liberation of small countries and the restoration of their independence and sovereignty is one of the most important tasks of the post-war order of Europe and the creation of a lasting peace. However, the Soviet point of view takes into account the specific situation in which small nations find themselves immediately after the end of the war. What will this situation really be? It is quite obvious that all European relations in the first period after the end of hostilities will be in a state of great fluidity and uncertainty. Small countries will take some time to fully understand the new situation created by the war. It will take time to sort out the newly established relations with neighboring and other states without any outside interference or external pressure aimed at encouraging these small countries to join one or another new grouping of states ...

At the Moscow Conference, the Soviet delegation, proceeding from the above principled considerations, stated with sufficient clarity that the premature and possibly artificial attachment of small countries to theoretically planned groupings would be fraught with dangers both for these countries themselves and for the future peaceful development of Europe. And this is quite understandable, since such an important step as federation with other countries and the possible renunciation of part of their sovereignty is permissible only through the free and well-considered expression of the will of the peoples.

A number of important conclusions follow from the above.

Firstly, it can be considered that the emigrant governments of the small countries occupied by the Germans, as not tightly connected with their peoples, will not be able to fully express the real will of their peoples in order to resolve such an important issue as the question of federation. Any attempt by emigrant governments, who are, as you know, in a special position, to do something like that, can be perceived by their peoples as imposing decisions that do not correspond to their desires and constant aspirations.

Secondly, it is very likely that even the new governments created in the now occupied countries will not yet be authoritative and stable enough to safely violate the will of the people and thereby cause any complications to tackle the issue of federation.

Third, and finally, there can be no doubt that only after the situation after the end of the war is already somewhat settled and the small countries acquire the necessary calmness and confidence in their independence, the discussion of the issue of federations can take on a more fruitful character.

The Soviet point of view comes down, in accordance with the above, to the recognition that it would be premature even now to outline and, thus, artificially encourage the creation of any federations or any other forms of unification of small states ...

Polish Army during the Second World War

Assuming the possibility of a joint struggle against Germany, on July 12, 1941, the Soviet leadership announced the 1st amnesty to the Poles who were in a settlement in various regions of the USSR.

On August 12, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree on amnesty for all Polish citizens who were imprisoned on Soviet territory as prisoners of war or on other grounds. On the same day, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved a joint resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) "On the procedure for the release and sending of Polish citizens amnestied in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR", which established the points of formation of Polish military units of the first stage.

According to the data of the NKVD of the USSR, set forth in the "Certificate on the number of resettled special settlers-siege, refugees and families of the repressed (deported from the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR and BSSR) as of August 1, 1941" in the USSR there were:

1. Former prisoners of war - 26.160.

2. Siegemen and foresters - 132.463.

3. Convicted and investigated - 46,597.

4. Refugees and families of the repressed -176,000.

Total 381.220.

1. Army of General Anders (1941 - 1943)

On July 30, 1941, with the mediation of Great Britain, the USSR and the Polish government in exile signed an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations and the beginning of the formation of Polish military units on Soviet territory.

signing an agreement

On August 1, 1941, the number of prisoners of war and exiled Polish citizens in the USSR was 381,220 people. The Polish army was to be formed both by compulsory conscription and on a voluntary basis. First of all, two light infantry divisions of 7-8 thousand people each and a reserve unit were formed. In the Gryazovetsky, Suzdal, Yuzhsky and Starobelsky NKVD camps for Polish prisoners of war, draft commissions were created, which included representatives of the Polish command, the Red Army and the NKVD.

On August 6, the former commander of the Novogrudov Cavalry Brigade (1937-1939), General Wladyslaw Anders, who was in Soviet captivity, was appointed commander of the Polish formations in the USSR.

On August 19, it was decided to deploy Polish formations in the Totsk and Tatishchevsk camps (in the Chkalovsk, now Orenburg, and Saratov regions, respectively), the headquarters in Buzuluk (Chkalovsk oblast).

By November 30, 1941, the Polish army in the USSR consisted of 40,961 people: 1965 officers, 11,919 non-commissioned officers and 27,077 soldiers. The 5th Infantry Division (14,703 people), the 6th Infantry Division (12,480 people), a reserve regiment (8,764 people), an army headquarters, a construction unit and an assembly point were formed. During formation, these units experienced an acute shortage of weapons and food.

In December 1941, the redeployment of Polish formations and rear units from the Volga region to Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) began. The dispatch of Polish soldiers to the front was planned on June 1, 1942. However, the lack of equipment (40% of the soldiers did not have shoes) and food did not allow the planned number of formations (6 divisions) and personnel (96,000 people) to be prepared by the deadline. The number of rations for the Polish army was reduced from 96,000 to 40,000 with 70,000 Polish troops. The Poles began to openly accuse the Soviet side of opposing the formation of their units. In particular, they were outraged by the refusal to enroll in their army Ukrainians, Belarusians and Jews who had Polish citizenship before 1939 and lived in the Polish territories that had been torn away in favor of the USSR. Quite often this prohibition was violated. In response, the Soviet government began to accuse the command of the Polish army in the USSR of unwillingness to fight against Germany on the Eastern Front.

The Polish government in exile insisted that Polish units would only participate in hostilities as a single Polish army, and not in separate formations included in the Red Army.

prime Minister Vladislav Sikorsky

On March 18, 1942, the Soviet government agreed to the proposal of the Polish side, supported by Great Britain, on the withdrawal of Polish units through Iran to the Middle East for further formation on the basis of supplying them with Western allies.

During 1942, 115,000 Polish servicemen and 37,000 members of their families left the USSR for the Middle East.

2. Polish Army (1943 - 1945)

After the units subordinate to the Polish government in exile were evacuated outside the USSR, the Soviet government began to form new Polish units. The decision was taken in February 1943. A significant number of Polish recruits still remained at the recruiting offices. The commanders were the Polish officers who remained in the USSR and who joined the Union of Polish Patriots (Zwiazek Patriotow Polskich) on March 15, 1943, headed by Wanda Vasilevskaya.

On April 25, 1943, the government of the USSR announced the severance of diplomatic relations with the Polish government in exile, which accused the USSR of the execution of Polish officers in Katyn.

On May 6, 1943, the State Defense Committee (GKO) issued a decree "On the formation of the 1st Polish Infantry Division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko". Colonel Zygmunt Henryk Berling, the former head of the military camp for Polish soldiers in Krasnovodsk, was appointed commander of the division.

S.Kh. Burling

On May 14, in the Seletsky military camps near Ryazan, the formation of the 1st Polish infantry division began (three infantry regiments, one regiment of light artillery, one separate anti-tank destroyer battalion; separate companies - reconnaissance and communications, a mortar division, anti-aircraft artillery units and parts of the rear) ...

On July 15, 1943, the Soviet command dispatched 325 Soviet officers to the 1st Polish Infantry Division.

On July 25, 1943, a military court of the Polish government in exile declared Colonel Berling a deserter and sentenced him to death.

In August 1943, the 1st Polish Infantry Division, together with the 1st Polish Tank Regiment. Heroes Westerplatte and the 1st Fighter Aviation Regiment "Warsaw" (32 Yak-1 aircraft) made up the 1st Polish Corps (12,000 people), led by Major General Sigismund Berling.

1. Private 1st Infantry Division. T. Kosciuszko, 1945

2. Tankman of the 1st Polish armored brigade "Heroes of Westerplatte", Polish Army, 1944-1945.

3. Private 1st Infantry Division. T. Kosciuszko, 1945

On October 12-13, 1943, the first battle of the 1st Polish division took place near Lenino in the Mogilev region as part of the 33rd Army of the Western Front. The losses of the division reached 25% of the personnel (502 killed, 1776 wounded and 663 missing). On October 14, the Polish division was withdrawn for reorganization.

Polish Cross for the Battle of Lenino

In March 1944, Polish units were deployed to the 1st Polish Army (90,000 men), which included not only former Polish citizens, but also Soviet citizens of Polish (and not only) origin.

In the spring of 1944, about 600 Polish cadets were trained in Soviet flight and aviation technical schools.

In July 1944, the 1st Polish Army began hostilities. Operationally, it was subordinate to the 8th Soviet Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front and participated in the crossing of the Bug. The army became the first Polish unit to cross the Polish border.

On July 21, 1944, the 1st Polish Army was united with the Ludova Partisan Army (18 brigades, 13 battalions and 202 detachments) into a single Polish Army.

partisans of the army of Ludova

On July 26, the Polish 1st Panzer Corps was formed under the command of Colonel Jan Rupasov (later Brigadier General Jozef Kimbar).

In late July - early August, the 1st Polish Army participated in the liberation of Deblin and Pulaw. The 1st Polish Armored Brigade took part in the defense of the Studzian bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula south of Warsaw. It included three regiments of fighter aviation.

On September 14, 1944, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, together with the 1st Army of the Polish Army, liberated the suburb of Warsaw - Prague. On September 15, all 15 divisions of the Polish Army were redeployed here.

At the end of October 1944, 11,513 Soviet officers were serving in the Polish Army. About 40% of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Polish Army were Soviet servicemen of non-Polish nationality.

During the winter, the 1st Polish Army remained aimed at Prague, and in January 1945 participated in the liberation of Warsaw.

The Polish army participated in the breakthrough through central Poland, liberating Bydgoszcz on January 28. Then the 1st Polish Army was transferred to the north, and it took part in the battles, advancing along the Baltic coast. The main forces of the army took part in the assault on Kolberg, and the 1st Polish Armored Brigade was advancing on Gdansk. In Szczecin, the Polish 1st Army stopped to regroup, as its losses amounted to 5,400 killed and 2,800 missing.

By the beginning of the spring offensive in 1945, the 2nd Polish Army was formed under the command of Lieutenant General of the Soviet Army, and then the Polish Army Karol Karlovich Sverczewski (Karol Wacław Świerczewski).

K.K. Sverchevsky

The army consisted of the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Polish Armored Corps. The 2nd Polish Army was part of the 1st Ukrainian Front and operated north of the Czechoslovak border.

In 1945, the role of the Polish army increased markedly, since the number of Polish formations reached 200,000 people (1st and 2nd Polish armies, 1st Panzer Corps, 1st Air Corps and other units), amounting to about 10% from the total number of forces of the Soviet army that stormed Berlin.

The 1st Polish Army crossed the Oder and the Hohenzollern Canal.

On March 1, 1945, the 1st Separate Warsaw Cavalry Brigade, in the last Polish cavalry attack in World War II, stormed German positions in the Schonfeld area

In the last days of the war, the 1st Infantry Division took part in street fighting in Berlin, in particular in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Reichstag and the Imperial Chancellery.

The losses of the Polish troops during the Berlin operation amounted to 7200 killed and 3800 missing.

The 2nd Polish Army advanced in a southern direction and reached the outskirts of the capital of Czechoslovakia, Prague.

In total for 1943 - 1945. on the Eastern Front, the Polish Army lost 24 707 killed and 44 223 wounded.

By June 1945, the Polish Army numbered about 400,000 people. The Polish army in the east was the largest regular military force that fought alongside the Soviet army, and in the future formed the backbone of the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic.

monument to the Polish Army in Zandau

badge of veterans of the Polish Army

In the summer of 1942, 75,000 military and 35,000 civilian Poles who were caught in the USSR during the war fled to the Middle East with General Anders. From the rest, the 1st Polish Infantry Division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko was formed.

There were more than enough people who wanted to fight in its composition (for this they were released from the camps), but after Katyn it was tight with Polish officers in the USSR. Almost all of the survivors left for Iran, so the command staff for the division was recruited, "robbing" all fronts for officers of Polish origin. Most of these officers were staunch communists, many fought for the USSR in the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, and they were in charge of privates who were mostly nationalistic - so at first there were enough hidden dramas and conflicts in the division.

The division commander was Zygmunt Berling, who once showed himself well in battles against Soviet troops near Lvov. By the time of the partition of Poland between the USSR and Germany, he was in retirement, but he was still arrested and placed in the Starobelsk POW camp, where he agreed to cooperate with the state security authorities. Those who did not agree to cooperate were shot.

The completion of training and sending to the front was planned on September 15, but at the last moment they remembered that this was the anniversary of the USSR's entry into Poland in 1939 - not the best date for the beginning of Soviet-Polish military friendship. So we went to the front on September 1.

On September 23, the Poles walked along a road broken by autumn rains near Lenino. Their division was transferred to the 33rd Army, which was faced with the task of binding the Germans in battle and diverting their attention from the offensive of the 10th Guards Army. The Poles were not told that their offensive was just an imitation. This was a common practice in the Red Army.

The command of the 1st Polish division was given a combat mission - to break through the German defenses in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Polzukhi, take the village and advance westward to the village of Pniewka. The commander of the 33rd Army, General Gordov, was in a frighteningly decisive mood - he stressed that the Poles are better armed than the neighboring Soviet divisions, so that they can be considered elite formations, which means that they should act decisively and boldly.

On the night of October 10-11, he ordered a reconnaissance by force of one battalion, and the next night another. In part, this helped to uncover the enemy's firing points, but unmasked the Poles. Having learned who was fighting against them, the Germans immediately turned on propaganda at full power: the loudspeakers alternated day and night with Dombrowski's mazurka with calls to kill commissars and Jews.

The Poles had to advance through the small valley of the Mereya River. The river itself presented no problems - the width is three meters, the depth is shallow - but the swamp around it made the valley almost impassable for heavy equipment. On the western edge of the valley, where the German troops were located, there were two heights 217.6 and 215.5, and behind them the villages of Polzukhi, Tregubovo, Punichi. The Poles had to attack them - through the swamp, under fire from two high-rise buildings.

On the morning of October 12, the 100-minute artillery preparation promised by Gordov was reduced to 40 minutes. At 10.30, at the signal of a green rocket, the 1st and 2nd regiments rose from the trenches and went in ranks towards the Germans.

Good fellows Poles, they are walking at full height, - one of the Soviet observers praised them.

At that moment, German machine guns and artillery started working from the heights, and the Poles had a hard time. They occupied the first lines of the German trenches and regrouped. The 1st regiment went to Trebugovo, the 2nd to Polzukhi.

The 1st regiment entered the village of Tregubovo and cut the connection between the village and height 215.5. The losses were already huge, the ammunition began to run out. The battle in the village continued for several hours, then the Poles were forced to retreat and gain a foothold in defense on the side of the hill.

The 2nd regiment was able to bypass Polzukhi from several sides, break into the village and hold it, despite the strong counter-attacks of the Germans.

In the second half of the day, the weather cleared up, and aviation appeared in the sky: the Ju-88 and Ju-87 bombers ironed the crossings across the Mereya, along which Burling was trying to pull up his tanks. This did not succeed: the induced crossings could not bear their weight.

By 14:00 the Polish offensive was finally stopped. By sunset, the Germans drove the 2nd regiment out of Polzukh.

Burling brought his reserve into battle: the 3rd regiment, which, with a sudden blow, took height 215.5 and an unnamed height beyond it. At night they tried to drive the Germans out of Polzuh again, but suffered heavy losses and withdrew.

In the morning, differences began in the Polish and Soviet mentality.

Burling, looking at the river valley densely littered with corpses, and knowing that in the neighboring Soviet divisions there were more losses and fewer successes, he considered the operation of the 33rd Army a failure. He announced this at the headquarters of the army, but General Gordov did not agree with him and in the most energetic terms demanded to continue the offensive.

Burling later wrote:

"Gordov, regardless of the motives of his actions, regardless of whether he was a fool or a madman, was a scoundrel."

On the morning of October 13, the Poles again went forward and immediately fell under a wall of dense fire. Soon the infantry lay down and could no longer advance.

Burling ordered to gain a foothold and went to the headquarters of the 33rd Army. There they again talked with Gordov, but now both used the most energetic expressions.

As a result, on the night of October 13-14, the Polish units were replaced by the Soviet 164th Infantry Division, and the Poles were taken to the rear.

Who was the initiator of this decision is unknown. Perhaps General Gordov, who was tired of listening to the wrangling, perhaps Stalin's favorite writer Wanda Vasilevskaya, who could have asked the Boss directly.

1st Polish Infantry Division. T. Kosciuszko lost about 3 thousand soldiers during the two-day battles near Lenino. Killed - 510 people, wounded - 1776, missing - 652, taken prisoner - 116 ... The division lost 27% of its personnel, which in percentage terms exceeds the losses of the II Polish Corps in the Battle of Monte Cassino.

For the Europeans, such losses - a third of the composition in two days - were excessive (especially given the lack of results), for the Soviet military - acceptable. Vyacheslav Molotov, in a conversation with the writer Wanda Vasilevskaya, called the losses of the Poles near Lenino "normal".

And so it was. Nobody specifically drove the Poles to the slaughter, as they first thought - it's just that the Red Army has always fought like this, it was its military style. Polish soldiers were later convinced of this many times, taking part in all the main Soviet offensives.

Formation of the 1st Division. T. Kosciuszko and 1st Polish Corps

After the transfer of General Anders' army to Iran, a group of Polish communists, which published the journal of Polish emigration "New Horizons", came up with a proposal to create the Union of Polish Patriots (UPP). The task of this organization was to work with the Poles who remained in the USSR, to create regular armed units subordinate to the Red Army with the aim of liberating Poland and creating such a post-war state structure that was to rely on close cooperation with the USSR. In early May 1943, the SPP received the consent of the Soviet Union to form the 1st Infantry Division. T. Kosciuszko. The Seletsky military camp near Ryazan was chosen as the place of formation. Colonel Zygmunt Berling was appointed commander of the division. The division consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd infantry regiments, 1st light artillery regiment, 1st tank regiment, anti-tank artillery battalion, women's battalion. E. Plater and a squadron of fighter aircraft. After three months of preparation, on July 15, 1943, on the anniversary of the Battle of Grunwald (on July 15, 1410, the combined Polish-Lithuanian-Russian army defeated the forces of the knights of the Livonian Order. - Note. ed.), The 1st division took the oath and received the banner.

In connection with the large number of Polish volunteers arriving at the Seletsky camp, the SPP proposed to the Soviet government to create on the territory of the USSR the 1st corps of the Polish Armed Forces, to which it received consent. By the end of 1943, the corps management, two infantry divisions, the 1st artillery brigade named after V.I. General J. Bem, 1st Tank Brigade named after. heroes of Westerplatte. The formation of the 3rd Infantry Division. R. Traugutt, as well as a number of other divisions and support units.

On September 1, 1943, the 1st division and the 1st tank regiment were transported by rail to the area of \u200b\u200bthe Vyazma river. On October 9, having concentrated their forces and assets 20 kilometers south-west of Smolensk, they became part of the legendary 33rd Army of the Western Front.

October 7, 1943 1st Infantry Division. T. Kosciuszko, under the command of General Z. Berling, who was at the same time the commander of the 1st corps of the Polish Armed Forces in the USSR, received the following combat mission: together with the Soviet 42nd Infantry Division on the right flank and the 290th Infantry Division on the left flank, break through deep echeloned defense of German troops near the city of Lenino and develop an offensive in the direction of the Dnieper River.

In the zone of responsibility of the 1st division, units of the 39th corps of the 4th German army were defending, which had a large number of artillery pieces and tanks. The defense of the German troops was built on the swampy terrain of the Mereya river valley, additional obstacles were created by the numerous ravines and hills that existed in the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages of Polzukhi and Trigubovo.

On the morning of October 12, after artillery preparation with the use of Katyushas, \u200b\u200bthe 1st battalion of the 1st regiment conducted reconnaissance in force in the area of \u200b\u200bheight 215.5. The 1st Infantry Division and neighboring formations launched an offensive. The infantrymen crossed the Mereya River, captured the height on the opposite bank in a bloody battle, approached Trigubovo and captured Polzukhi, breaking through the first position of the German defense.

Further offensive was stopped by enemy counterattacks. In addition, it was not possible to transport the tanks through the swampy terrain at the scheduled time, which was done only in the afternoon, and as a result of the German air raids, there were tangible losses. In the middle of the day, the 1st and 2nd regiments repelled, respectively, three and two counterattacks in the Trigubovo area. The entire personnel of the division was under enemy bombardment.

In the evening of the same day, the 1st regiment, which had suffered heavy losses, was replaced by the 3rd regiment. On the night of October 12-13, reconnaissance was carried out and attacks on the held positions were repelled.

The German command, making sure that they were opposed by Polish troops, threw fresh forces into the battle area. The next night, the 1st division changed its deployment, moving to the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Nikolenko.

The Battle of Lenino was the baptism of fire for the 1st Division. It became a symbol of Polish-Soviet military comradeship. During the battle, the personnel of the division destroyed about 1,500 enemy soldiers, captured 320 prisoners, 58 guns and other weapons. Its own losses amounted to 502 killed, 1776 wounded, that is, about a quarter of the personnel. For participation in the battle, 293 soldiers and officers received Polish and Soviet military awards. Three of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Soldiers who fell on the battlefield rest in a mausoleum erected on the battlefield.

Simultaneously with the events described above, the formation of the 1st corps of the Polish Armed Forces took place in the camp near Ryazan. The main task was the training of young officer cadres, carried out mostly by Soviet teachers. The training of officers of the infantry and artillery was carried out, a Polish battalion was created in the Ryazan Infantry School, as well as a group of Polish cadets in other Soviet military schools. In January 1944, units and subunits formed near Ryazan were transported by rail to the Smolensk region, where they united with the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Tank Regiment.

In March and April 1944, Soviet troops liberated Volyn and Podolsk, a fairly significant part of the population of which were Poles. Thus, conditions were created for the further formation of new armed units.

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