Map of afghanistan positions of the ussr army. military operations. Ambushes and raids
"Dress code number eight - what we have is what we wear" - an army joke that has become an everyday reality in Afghanistan. Uniform uniformity of uniforms, rare for special forces in Afghanistan, was the subject of constant criticism from the higher command.
The combat uniform of the scouts was quite often replenished with items of captured uniforms, shoes and equipment. Judging by the radio interception of "gang groups", even they found it difficult to determine the identity of "some kind of armed people, unlike" Shuravi ". And no wonder, because. only SPETSNAZ units were allowed to conduct combat operations without the obligatory 40 OA body armor and steel helmet (helmet) for all personnel, which the Afghans associate with the appearance of the shuravi. This only privilege of the SPETSNAZ caused even the envy of the rest of the Contingent military personnel.
"Lightweight" was the main field uniform of the OKSV personnel throughout the "Afghan war". Only in the second half of the eighties, it was partially replaced by field uniforms of the “new model”, but it did not fully meet the requirements for the actions of personnel in a hot climate.
Lightweight cotton uniforms for hot areas included a jacket with an open collar and straight-cut trousers. The summer lightweight form of clothing suggested wearing panama and yuft boots with a suit.
Suits of a cut similar to the field uniform of the NATO countries were provided only to units of the Special Forces of the Ministry of Defense and the KGB of the USSR, designed to perform combat missions behind enemy lines. In SPETSNAZ, a suit for special forces was called a “jump” (training parachute jumps were made in it) or “sand”. The first name took root in the Union, and the second was more familiar to the "Afghans". The costume was sewn from a thin, but dense, sandy or olive-colored cotton fabric, but there were samples of uniforms and ocher colors. In Afghanistan, for SPETSNAZ, sand-colored uniforms were mainly received, which, unfortunately, quickly faded and acquired an almost white color.
The protective mesh suit (KZS) was part of the personal protection kit for military personnel against weapons of mass destruction. KZS consists of a cotton jacket with a hood and wide trousers. It is intended for single use in areas contaminated with toxic and radioactive substances. Due to its excellent breathability, the KLC was very popular among the entire personnel of the Limited Contingent. In the summer, only underwear was worn under the GLC, and in the cold season, he was dressed over other uniforms. The service life of the "one-time" KZS was short, and in the units of the Special Forces there was a constant shortage of this property of the chemical service.
Major V. Goratenkov (right), commander of the 668th Special Forces oo, conducts a review of the readiness of the 2nd company for a combat mission. In the center is a reconnaissance flamethrower in a KZS mesh protective suit. Kabul, spring 1988
Camouflage overalls or camouflage coat has a two-sided color. Thanks to this, one side of the camouflage coat (green) is ideal for operations in the "green", and the other (gray) - in the mountainous desert area. Company tailors in a matter of minutes altered overalls into a suit pair - pants and a jacket. A little later, the domestic military industry will take into account the Afghan experience and start producing camouflage suits instead of overalls. The flimsy fabric of the camouflage coat withstood only a few combat exits, after which the uniform turned into tatters... 
Summer field cotton uniforms of the “new model”, or more simply - “experimental”, for the personnel of the OKSV in the RA began to arrive in mass quantities from the mid-eighties. For sewing the "experimental" the same khaki cotton fabric was used as in the previous model of the field uniforms of the Soviet army. Due to the many overlays and pockets, the uniform turned out to be too “warm” for the Afghan summer ... The scouts put on the “experimental” for military operations only in the cool season, and in summer they preferred lighter clothes to her.
Subsequently, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, field uniforms of the “new model” will go down in history as “Afghan”. 
The winter cotton jacket and trousers of the “new model” had a detachable insulation. A detachable batting lining made it possible to use this uniform as a demi-season clothing. In some cases, the scouts wore only "insulation", which was due to its low weight and good thermal insulation properties. The lining of trousers, even in winter, was worn only when making a march by landing on armored vehicles or when a group was located for a day. 
Mountain uniforms saved scouts from wind and rain in the autumn-winter period. The set of mountain uniforms, in addition to the climbing suit, included a woolen sweater and a balaclava, as well as mountain boots with high berets and tricones (spikes). A climbing suit, or more simply - a "slide" - was worn over underwear or other uniforms. The “gorka” jacket was worn at night in the mountains even in summer, despite the heat of the day, the nights in Afghanistan are quite cool. For SPETSNAZ, and for the rest of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, it was typical to mix all the available types of uniforms when it came to leaving for combat operations. Everything that was considered practical or was available at the moment was dressed for the "war". 
To perform certain combat missions, spetsnaz scouts sometimes changed into “spiritual” clothes. Elements of the Afghan national dress were especially widely used by scouts when conducting reconnaissance and search operations on foot and on captured "combat" vehicles, as well as during other special events. In multinational military collectives, dark-skinned guys from Central Asia and the Caucasus in national Afghan clothes outwardly did not differ much from Afghans. When establishing visual contact between the reconnaissance group and the enemy, this circumstance allowed the scouts to gain time and forestall the Mujahideen in action. 
“Old”, model already in 1954, but a comfortable backpack of a paratrooper is the main item of combat equipment of the Special Forces to this day. In the compact RD-54 and outside it (with the help of tie-downs) most of the property needed by the reconnaissance officer for combat operations was located. When the capacity of the RD-54 was not enough to accommodate all the necessary equipment, the scouts used alpine (from the mountain equipment), tourist or various trophy backpacks. Very often, scouts sewed additional pockets to the “erdeshka”, but cut off (as unnecessary) a bag for grenades and magazines. 
The combat equipment of scouts in Afghanistan necessarily included a cape, and, if possible, a sleeping bag. All conscripts were provided with raincoats, and there was a mistake with sleeping bags ... Army wadded sleeping bags were so heavy and voluminous that the question of their use by scouts was not even considered. At best, domestic sleeping bags were used by the personnel of the armored group. In the mountains and the desert, scouts preferred captured synthetic winterizer or foam sleeping bags. For the most part, these were civilian sleeping bags that came to Pakistan for Afghan refugees, but were found only among the Mujahideen. In addition to the mentioned sleeping bags, the "spirits" and, accordingly, the SPETSNAZ were much less likely to meet army English or other imported downy sleeping bags. 
The 7.62 mm AKMS and AKMSL assault rifles (with a strap for attaching a night sight) were more popular in SPETSNAZ than 5.45 mm assault rifles. The reason for this was the better stopping effect of the 7.62-mm bullet and the fact that the main small arms of the Mujahideen was the 7.62-mm Chinese model of the Kalashnikov assault rifle. With the relative autonomy of the actions of the reconnaissance agencies of the SPETSNAZ, the presence of the same type of ammunition in the enemy allowed the scouts to use captured from the enemy during the battle
7.62-mm cartridges (Chinese, Egyptian, etc.). The scouts were also impressed by the possibility of replenishing the ammunition load of their machine gun with captured cartridges with “explosive” bullets (armor-piercing incendiary), since Soviet troops in Afghanistan used similar domestic cartridges due to considerations "humanity"(?!) were practically not supplied. A serious argument in favor of the choice of scouts
The 7.62-mm Kalashnikov assault rifle was the presence of a silent and flameless firing device PBS-1 for it.
The 5.45-mm Kalashnikov assault rifle was the most widespread weapon of the units of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan. The SPETSNAZ were armed with the AKS-74, AKS-74N (with a strap for attaching a night sight) and AKS-74U (shortened) assault rifles. The 5.45-mm Kalashnikov assault rifle favorably differed from its 7.62-mm predecessor in the number of ammunition carried by the scout with their equal weight, better accuracy of fire and other ballistic characteristics. Unfortunately, the AKS-74 has less stopping power than the good old AKM, which is of no small importance in close combat. 
Knives as a military weapon were practically not used by SPETSNAZ. The only exceptions were those episodes when scouts silently eliminated the enemy, and several cases of hand-to-hand combat with the Mujahideen. But it was impossible to do without a knife in combat life and everyday activities. Scouts used automatic bayonet knives, HP reconnaissance knives, HA-43 army knives, Afghan combat daggers and utility knives, as well as various models of penknives and tourist folding knives.
Knives were used for cutting packs from a destroyed caravan, minor repairs of weapons and equipment, opening canned food, cutting bread and vegetables, butchering animals and cleaning fish, as well as for other purposes.
DRY RATIONS
In the PAP of units in Afghanistan, all military personnel were provided with three hot meals a day, and dry rations for the period of combat missions. Dry rations "Standard No. 5" were intended for the military personnel of the SPECIAL FORCE units. For operations in the highlands during the stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the production and supply of troops with high-calorie mountain rations - summer and winter - was established. In the summer heat, scouts often left part of the dry rations in the barracks, and in winter they also took additional food: bread, canned fish and meat, condensed milk and other products that they received in a warehouse, bought in a store or got by others, to one fighter known ways. Sometimes the monotonous soldier's diet was supplemented by local products: fresh meat, fish, vegetables and fruits; various oriental sweets and spices. 
There were many tasks: the operational provision of formations, units and individual subunits with maps, topographic and geodetic reconnaissance, the production of terrain models for command and control agencies and interaction at all levels in the preparation and planning of operations, topographic training of troops.
One of the main tasks of the topographic service was to provide maps of the combat operations of the troops on the territory of Afghanistan and to create stocks of maps for the planned directions of the theater of operations. At the initial stage, the troops did not have large-scale maps of the entire territory of this country. The largest was a 1:200,000 scale map - for conducting reconnaissance and organizing road marches, but it did not display specific objects, did not have precise landmarks, and therefore did not allow solving many tasks in the interests of the troops. Therefore, initially in 1982-1983 they began to urgently make maps at a scale of 1: 100,000, and then on their basis, satellite images and the results of topographic and geodetic reconnaissance, from 1983-1984 they began to create maps at a scale of 1: 50,000 for work in the most operationally important areas Afghanistan, which already allowed artillery to fire at target coordinates. Then there was an increase in the "fifty" cards: with the change in the situation as a result of hostilities, with the clarification of some natural features, operational corrections were made to them. And when we covered the entire area of Afghanistan with maps at a scale of 1:50,000, we also created special maps of geodetic data due to this. This is how the geodetic basis appeared - the exact coordinates of some objects, points, so necessary for the firing of missile troops and artillery, for linking the combat formations of troops to the terrain.
By 1985, by 1985, troops of the 40th Army were provided with maps of a scale of 1: 100,000 by 70-75 percent, by 1986 - by almost all 100. And maps of a scale of 1: 50,000 were completely provided somewhere by 1986-1987 .
How was the topographic survey carried out?
Topographers of all formations and units of the 40th Army were involved in conducting topographic reconnaissance of the area during the period of the advancement of troops and in the course of hostilities. Probably 60 percent of all topographic reconnaissance fell on aerial photography. Especially before major military operations. There was a squadron of aircraft near Kabul, among them an An-30 aircraft with equipment for photographing from the air - it flew to the most important areas. Photographing in this case was carried out by the pilots themselves, since they were more prepared to work with this technique, and the topographers who flew with them only clarified the task for them. The aviators had their own photo laboratory, and when we processed the captured information together with them on the ground, such work bore good fruit. Although the An-30 flew under the cover of helicopters, topographic reconnaissance from the air was still quite a risky business - at any moment these aircraft could be knocked out. But, thank God, this never happened.
On the ground, all the necessary information was collected in the course of natural everyday observations. The specificity of Afghanistan was that no one sent any special topographic and geodetic expeditions anywhere, topographers moved throughout the territory only as part of the troops during certain operations. Everything was noted. For example, convoys, as a rule, were driven by army, divisional, brigade topographers, and before any march they reminded drivers and senior vehicles: "Guys, you see something suspicious somewhere - report right away." What was noticed? Where there was no vegetation before, a bush suddenly appeared - which means that this is a landmark for someone. A triangle of stones appeared by the road, clearly laid out by human hands - also a landmark. Similar information was given to us by intelligence units, special forces. Later, after the topographers determined the coordinates of the discovered landmarks, the artillerymen gave harassing fire there, and sometimes this was effective.
All the obtained topographic information flowed to the heads of the topographic services of divisions, brigades, and from them to me, the head of the topographic service of the 40th Army. We summarized this information and transferred it to the topographic service of the Turkestan military district, which at that time worked according to the wartime staff - the number of officers was increased. From there, the information for further processing was distributed among the topographic and geodetic detachments of the Topographic Service of the USSR Armed Forces, which had to make appropriate corrections to the maps within the specified time frame. In stationary conditions, four topographic and geodetic detachments of central subordination worked simultaneously - Noginsk, Golitsyn, Irkutsk, Ivanovo and Tashkent Cartographic Factory. In addition to them, in each military district there were two or three field topographic and geodetic detachments, which were also engaged in the operational correction of maps. Each of the detachments worked on a certain region of Afghanistan according to the order of the Military Topographic Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.
Already corrected and supplemented maps again entered our topographic service, which was stationed in the vicinity of Kabul near the headquarters of the 40th Army, in the Darulaman region. The sorting soldiers of the army topographic unit, which was located there, quickly typed these maps, loaded them into special AShT vehicles (army headquarters topographic vehicle based on ZIL-131) and transported them piece by piece. When it was necessary to deliver maps more quickly, we were given helicopters.
For inserts from a personal file
| PRIVATE BUSSINESS PAVLOV Boris Nikitich
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- During your trip, did the troops experience a shortage of maps?
There were enough cards and there were no problems, because the machine prints one sheet, ten thousand - the difference is in an extra half an hour of time. The cards were printed for us by the Irkutsk, Kiev, Minsk factories and the Dunaev Moscow factory. But basically the Tashkent factory - until the very withdrawal of troops. In addition, marching cartographic units were printed: structural units that, both in the field and in stationary conditions, ensured the publication of the required number of maps.
We made special maps and combat graphic documents on our own. In the army topographic unit there were printing presses of the type OP-3, OP-4, "Romayor", "Dominant". The last two are imported, and OP-3, OP-4 are domestic vehicles, which were installed both permanently and in the traveling version on Ural vehicles. They were served by soldier-specialists: laboratory assistants, photographic laboratory assistants and directly printers, who were trained at the request of the districts by the Zvenigorod training topogeodesic detachment - the only educational institution of its kind.
Special maps included maps of mountain passes and passes, maps of overcoming water lines, snow avalanches, maps of geodetic data. From larger maps, we took coordinates and transferred them to small-scale ones. Maps of geodetic data were indispensable especially for gunners. When we urgently needed more than usual number of special cards, we sent the originals by plane to Tashkent and after 2-3 days they brought us the already published edition.
And why was it necessary to make mock-ups, why couldn’t it be limited to just cards?
On the map, not everything reached the consciousness of the commanders. After all, there are only mountains and rocks, and one had to have a good imagination and an ideal visual memory in order to understand everything with the help of a single map. And everything was immediately visible on the layout: where is which mountain, where does the gorge lead, which parts follow which, how do they move forward and from where. The layout is an ideal practice for future actions. All operations required the production of separate layouts for working out interaction issues, so this was another main type of our activity - the production of layouts of the terrain at the level of the army headquarters. Similar mock-ups were made at the headquarters of divisions, brigades and regiments - their own mock-up workers worked everywhere. And in general, planning operations, working out the actions of troops and setting tasks on these mock-ups is a common practice for all formations and units of the 40th Army in Afghanistan.
We made layouts of the area almost 2-3 times a month directly in front of the army headquarters. Especially for these purposes, a site was allocated, closed with a camouflage net, so that no outsiders could see the mock-ups. Only strictly defined persons entered this site. For the manufacture of models, as a rule, earth, sand, cement, paints and figures were used, which were cut and sawn by our soldiers. Their actions were led by intelligent officers. It was a very laborious, serious and painstaking work. It happened that the team was given to us at 10 pm, and by 6 am the model had to be ready. And the dimensions of each of these models were considerable - about 6x10 meters. Not only the command of the army headquarters, but also all the chiefs of the military branches and services have always given this work of topographers the highest rating.
Were the Afghans allowed to these models at the army headquarters?
There were persons who were admitted with the permission of the army commander. Because commands were sent down from Moscow from above - to teach them to fight, and we allegedly only supported them. However, as soon as they were allowed to our models, the operations were not so successful.
How did you assess the topographic training of Soviet officers?
In general, the topographic training of troops was weak at all stages from 1979 to 1989. And what is characteristic: lieutenants, the same platoon commanders who came from schools, or senior officers more or less knew the topography, but between these categories, as it were, some kind of gap formed: the company commanders thoroughly forgot everything that they once taught, behaved as if they were seeing the map for the first time. In addition, maps of mountainous areas are more difficult to read than maps of the plains, because there were no clearings, swamps, forests, lakes in Afghanistan. The inability to read maps sometimes led to the fact that commanders, mostly motorized riflemen or tankers, led their units to the wrong place. I had only 112-118 people in the army topographic unit, deployed in wartime staff, of which about 18 officers, including lieutenants, who conducted topography classes directly in the troops with officers of any rank up to colonel. They were informed in detail about some innovations, corrections or additions on the maps that appeared, so that they could read the map correctly and set tasks for their subordinates without errors. It got to the point that as soon as we arrived at some units, the leadership tried to seat all the officers who were possible in topographic training classes - they felt a vital need. And our topographers once again began to explain everything to them, starting with conventional signs: where what means.
The Afghans had their own maps, did you somehow use them in your work?
Of course, we studied them, but they did not find application for us. These maps were in Farsi or English and very old editions. In addition, literally in a single quantity, they displayed only separate pieces of the terrain. The Afghans did not have a solid map of the whole of Afghanistan. Even maps at a scale of 1:50,000 are sheets of 30x30 cm, that is, if you measure them, they are only 15x15 km. What good did they do to us? Therefore, there was no reason to resort to the help of translators - our maps were better: visual, easy to read, understandable to any Soviet officer. From the military counterintelligence officers, such information reached us that the dushmans were looking for opportunities to get exactly Soviet maps by exchange or ransom.
Were there cases when military personnel lost their cards during military operations or due to negligence?
There were such cases, but it was not regarded as an emergency. Because a 1:200,000 scale map - "two hundred" was not considered secret. "Sotka" was marked "For Official Use". Yes, a 1:50,000 scale map was secret, but "fifty" or, as they were also called, "half-kilometer" officers of regiments, brigades and divisions, as a rule, were not issued - they were available only to staff officers within the operational control of the army. The officers of the field units received only “hundredths” cards with some partial information.
And what cards did we leave to the Afghan government troops before the withdrawal?
We left them full maps at a scale of up to 1:100,000. And "fifty" maps were left only for certain areas - the points of deployment of their military units. This was due to precautionary measures so that the card data would not then get into other countries. All other 1:50,000 scale maps I exported completely back to the territory of the USSR.
Was the topographical part of the army often subjected to attacks or shelling at the point of permanent deployment near Kabul?
There were a lot of shelling. In these cases, we had shelters dug in the ground, the barracks were lined with sandbags. The shelling was carried out with rockets mainly in the evening. Dushmans launched RS from a distance, maybe 5-6 km. As a rule, 2, 3, 4 shells, no more, because almost immediately our battery returned fire. During my business trip from 1987 to 1989, there was not a single dead among topographers. One soldier was wounded by a fragment from the RS on the territory of the unit, and one truck - "ZIL-131" ASHT was blown up by a mine - it turned out all over, but due to the maps, people remained alive, they were not even injured.
Another danger is mines. And not only on the roads, when we moved with the columns. From our topography there was a path directly to the headquarters of the 40th Army. We walk, we walk, everything seems to be fine, suddenly: broads - someone was blown up by an anti-personnel mine.
How is it that the territory was protected?
Guarded. But there were also many Afghan service workers there. And sometimes, solid dust rose from the wind - many different people in camouflage and without walked with their half-covered faces tied up. It seems that none of the Afghans should have been strangers, but they penetrated. They were paid money for it. They crawled in somehow, put mines anywhere. It happened that not only ours, but they themselves were undermined. Somehow, at about 4 p.m., I was walking with Colonel Nikolai Elovik, deputy head of the engineering troops of the 40th Army, from headquarters to my unit, suddenly at some point there was an explosion and everything went flying. Squeal, groan. They approached: a 15-year-old Afghan boy is lying, his eyes are open, without arms, without legs. Whether he breathes is unclear. We looked: "Kolya, what are we going to do?". I had a raincoat with me - they dropped it, put the guy there, intestines and everything else, and carried it to the clinic, which was nearby.
When did they themselves leave Afghanistan?
I was among the last to go out in mid-January 1989, since the cards were needed until the very end. Fierce battles were already going on outside our town between the dushmans themselves: they divided the territory among themselves, and just during this period I was instructed to withdraw a column - about 70 pieces of equipment. The column was mixed: our topographic part on trucks with equipment, special equipment and materials; units of the security battalion of the army headquarters; divisions of the Special Department; some rear units. We were given 2 tanks and 3 infantry fighting vehicles. Air cover - "turntables" Mi-24, which appeared in pairs with an interval of half an hour. On the road from Kabul to Termez there were outposts from the 103rd Airborne Division and the 108th Motorized Rifle Division. We were given a day to march. On January 14, our convoy concentrated near the bridge across the Amu Darya River and only at the beginning of February crossed the river and settled in the Termez region. The columns went through the day - so we went out in stages.
Your convoy was not fired upon?
It passed without incident, and before us there were cases of shelling of columns, there were both wounded and losses. What happened after us, we no longer knew. Then we lived for another month in tents in a training center near Termez on the border, immediately across the river, where our servicemen were once trained before being transferred to Afghanistan. Because the command of the army set the task: to be in full combat readiness with all the technical support in case of returning back - this was envisaged. A month later, on February 15, we were given the command to leave for the points of permanent deployment.
Soviet war in Afghanistan e lasted 9 years 1 month and 18 days.
Date of: 979-1989
Place: Afghanistan
Outcome: The overthrow of H. Amin, the withdrawal of Soviet troops
Enemies: USSR, DRA against - Afghan Mujahideen, Foreign Mujahideen
Supported by : Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, USA, UK, Iran
Side forces
USSR: 80-104 thousand military personnel
DRA: 50-130 thousand military personnel According to the NVO, no more than 300 thousand
From 25 thousand (1980) to more than 140 thousand (1988)
Afghan war 1979-1989 - a prolonged political and armed confrontation between the parties: the ruling pro-Soviet regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with the military support of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) - on the one hand, and the Mujahideen ("dushmans"), with a part of the Afghan society sympathizing with them, with political and financial support of foreign countries and a number of states of the Islamic world - on the other.
The decision to send troops of the USSR Armed Forces to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in accordance with the secret resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. friendly regime in Afghanistan. The decision was made by a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, A. A. Gromyko and L. I. Brezhnev).
To achieve these goals, the USSR sent a group of troops into Afghanistan, and a detachment of special forces from among the emerging special unit of the KGB "Vympel" killed the incumbent President H. Amin and everyone who was with him in the palace. By decision of Moscow, the protege of the USSR, the former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Afghanistan in Prague, B. Karmal, became the new leader of Afghanistan, whose regime received significant and versatile - military, financial and humanitarian - support from the Soviet Union.
Chronology of the Soviet war in Afghanistan
1979
December 25 - Columns of the Soviet 40th Army cross the Afghan border on a pontoon bridge across the Amu Darya River. H. Amin expressed gratitude to the Soviet leadership and ordered the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRA to assist the troops being brought in.
1980
January 10-11 - an attempt at an anti-government rebellion by artillery regiments of the 20th Afghan division in Kabul. During the battle, about 100 rebels were killed; Soviet troops lost two killed and two more were wounded.
February 23 - tragedy in the tunnel at the Salang pass. During the movement of oncoming columns in the middle of the tunnel, a collision occurred, a traffic jam formed. As a result, 16 Soviet servicemen suffocated.
March - the first major offensive operation of the OKSV units against the Mujahideen - the Kunar Offensive.
April 20-24 - Massive anti-government demonstrations in Kabul are dispersed by low-flying jets.
April - The US Congress authorizes $15 million in "direct and open assistance" to the Afghan opposition. The first military operation in Panjshir.
June 19 - decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the withdrawal of some tank, missile and anti-aircraft missile units from Afghanistan.
1981
September - fighting in the Lurkoh mountain range in the province of Farah; the death of Major General Khakhalov.
October 29 - the introduction of the second "Muslim battalion" (177 OSSN) under the command of Major Kerimbaev ("Kara Major").
December - the defeat of the base point of the opposition in the Darzab region (Dzauzjan province).
1982
November 3 - Tragedy at the Salang pass. More than 176 people died as a result of the explosion of a fuel tanker. (Already during the years of the civil war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, Salang became a natural barrier and in 1997 the tunnel was blown up on the orders of Ahmad Shah Massoud to prevent the Taliban from advancing to the north. In 2002, after the unification of the country, the tunnel was reopened).
November 15 - meeting of Y. Andropov and Ziyaul-Khak in Moscow. The Secretary General had a private conversation with the Pakistani leader, during which he informed him about the "new flexible policy of the Soviet side and understanding of the need for a speedy resolution of the crisis." The meeting also discussed the question of the expediency of the war and the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the prospects for the participation of the Soviet Union in the war. In exchange for the withdrawal of troops from Pakistan, it was required to refuse assistance to the rebels.
1983
January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, dushmans abducted a group of Soviet civilian specialists numbering 16 people. They were released only a month later, while six of them died.
February 2 - The village of Vakhshak in northern Afghanistan was destroyed by bombs in retaliation for the hostage-taking in Mazar-i-Sharif.
March 28 - meeting of the UN delegation headed by Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordoves with Y. Andropov. He thanks the UN for "understanding the problem" and assures the mediators that he is ready to take "certain steps", but doubts that Pakistan and the US will support the UN proposal regarding their non-intervention in the conflict.
April - an operation to defeat opposition groups in the Nijrab Gorge, Kapisa province. Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.
May 19 - Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan V. Smirnov officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and Afghanistan "to set a date for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops."
July - Dushman offensive on Khost. An attempt to blockade the city was unsuccessful.
August - the hard work of D. Cordoves' mission to prepare agreements on a peaceful settlement of the war in Afghanistan is almost completed: an 8-month program for the withdrawal of troops from the country has been developed, but after Andropov's illness, the issue of the conflict was removed from the agenda of Politburo meetings. Now it was only about "dialogue with the UN".
Winter - hostilities intensified in the Sarobi region and the Jalalabad valley (the reports most often mention the province of Laghman). For the first time, armed opposition detachments remain on the territory of Afghanistan for the entire winter period. The creation of fortified areas and resistance bases directly in the country began.
1984
January 16 - Dushmans shot down a Su-25 aircraft from the Strela-2M MANPADS. This is the first case of successful use of MANPADS in Afghanistan.
April 30 - During a major operation in the Panjshir Gorge, the 1st Battalion of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses.
October - over Kabul from the Strela MANPADS, dushmans shoot down an Il-76 transport aircraft.
1985
April 26 - Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war revolt in the Badaber prison in Pakistan.
June - army operation in Panjshir.
Summer is a new course of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for a political solution to the "Afghan problem".
Autumn - The functions of the 40th Army are reduced to covering the southern borders of the USSR, for which new motorized rifle units are involved. The creation of basic base areas in hard-to-reach places of the country has begun.
1986
February - at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev makes a statement about the beginning of the development of a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.
March - the decision of the R. Reagan administration to start deliveries to Afghanistan to support the Mujahiddins with the Stinger ground-to-air MANPADS, which makes the combat aviation of the 40th Army vulnerable to ground attack.
April 4-20 - an operation to defeat the Javar base: a major defeat for the dushmans. Unsuccessful attempts by Ismail Khan's detachments to break through the "security zone" around Herat.
May 4 - at the XVIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, instead of B. Karmal, M. Najibullah, who previously headed the Afghan counterintelligence service KhAD, was elected to the post of Secretary General. The plenum proclaimed the policy of solving the problems of Afghanistan by political means.
July 28 - M. Gorbachev defiantly announced the imminent withdrawal of six regiments of the 40th Army from Afghanistan (about 7 thousand people). The withdrawal date will be rescheduled at a later date. In Moscow, there are disputes about whether to withdraw troops completely.
August - Massoud defeated the base of government troops in Farkhar, Takhar province.
Autumn - Major Belov's reconnaissance group from the 173rd detachment of the 16th special forces brigade captures the first batch of three Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile systems in the Kandahar region.
October 15-31 - tank, motorized rifle, anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Shindand, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kunduz, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kabul.
November 13 - The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU sets the task of withdrawing all troops from Afghanistan within two years.
December — an emergency plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA proclaims a course towards a policy of national reconciliation and advocates an early end to the fratricidal war.
1987
January 2 - An operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces General of the Army V. I. Varennikov was sent to Kabul.
February - Operation "Strike" in the province of Kunduz.
February-March - Operation Flurry in Kandahar province.
March - Operation Thunderstorm in the province of Ghazni. Operation Circle in the provinces of Kabul and Logar.
May - operation "Volley" in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul. Operation "South-87" in the province of Kandahar.
Spring - Soviet troops begin to use the Barrier system to cover the eastern and southeastern sections of the border.
1988
Soviet spetsnaz group preparing for operation in Afghanistan
April 14 - Through the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The USSR and the USA became the guarantors of the agreements. The Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its contingent within 9 months, starting from May 15; The US and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.
June 24 - Opposition detachments captured the center of the province of Wardak - the city of Maidanshahr.
1989
February 15 - Soviet troops are completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the Limited Contingent, Lieutenant-General B.V. Gromov, who, allegedly, was the last to cross the border river Amu-Darya (the city of Termez).
War in Afghanistan - results
Colonel General Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army (led the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan), in his book "Limited Contingent" expressed this opinion regarding the victory or defeat of the Soviet Army in the war in Afghanistan:
I am deeply convinced that there is no basis for asserting that the 40th Army was defeated, nor that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered the country without hindrance, completed their tasks, unlike the Americans in Vietnam, and returned to their homeland in an organized manner. If we consider armed opposition detachments as the main enemy of the Limited Contingent, then the difference between us lies in the fact that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans only what they could. 
The 40th Army had several main tasks. First of all, we had to assist the government of Afghanistan in resolving the internal political situation. Basically, this assistance consisted in the fight against armed opposition groups. In addition, the presence of a significant military contingent in Afghanistan was supposed to prevent aggression from outside. These tasks were fully completed by the personnel of the 40th Army.
The Mujahideen, before the start of the withdrawal of OKSVA in May 1988, never managed to carry out a single major operation and failed to occupy a single large city.
Military casualties in Afghanistan
USSR: 15,031 dead, 53,753 wounded, 417 missing
1979 - 86 people
1980 - 1,484 people
1981 - 1,298 people
1982 - 1,948 people
1983 - 1,448 people
1984 - 2,343 people
1985 - 1,868 people
1986 - 1,333 people
1987 - 1,215 people
1988 - 759 people
1989 - 53 people
By rank:
Generals, officers: 2,129
Ensigns: 632
Sergeants and soldiers: 11,549
Workers and employees: 139
Out of 11,294 people 10,751 people discharged from military service for health reasons remained disabled, of which - 1st group - 672, 2nd group - 4216, 3rd group - 5863 people
Afghan Mujahideen: 56,000-90,000 (civilians from 600 thousand to 2 million people)
Losses in technology
According to official data, there were 147 tanks, 1314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel trucks, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters. At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, no information was published on the number of combat and non-combat losses of aviation, on the losses of aircraft and helicopters by type, etc.
Economic losses of the USSR
About 800 million US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget to support the Kabul government.
