“He staked everything and lost”: why Hitler faced a catastrophe at the Kursk Bulge. German operation "citadel" on the Kursk Bulge Hitler's order 6 operation citadel
07.05.2015
BERLIN WAS GERMAN AND WILL BE GERMAN
This translation from the German order of the Fuhrer, dated April 15, 1945, is in the documents of the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. It was proposed to bring the following to the personnel of the troops of the Eastern Front, who were already fighting with their last strength:
“Soldiers of the Eastern Front! For the last time, Bolshevism launched an offensive with deadly hatred. He is trying to destroy Germany and exterminate our people. You, soldiers of the east, know what fate awaits your wives and children, for all men and children are killed, and women are raped in barracks, and whoever remains alive is driven away to distant Siberia. We foresaw this offensive and during January we tried to create a strong fortification, powerful artillery would meet the enemy with its fire. Its countless losses have been replenished with new units, but new units and Volkssturm strengthen our front. This time the Bolsheviks will meet the old fate, they will be drained of blood. "
Further, on behalf of the Fuehrer, shame and death penalty are threatened to all those "who at this moment will not fulfill their duty", all who retreat from their positions - "will be a traitor to their people." But "if everyone fulfills their duty on the Eastern Front, the last assault of the Asians will be broken just as our enemies in the West were broken, besides their maximum tension."
Therefore, as Hitler assures his soldiers:
“BERLIN was German and will be German, and Europe will never become Russian. Create close cooperation of all not to protect the depths of the homeland, but your children and wives and thus your destiny. During these hours all the people are looking at you. My eastern fighters - keep in mind that thanks to your courage, courage, perseverance and fanaticism, the Bolshevik fanaticism and invasion will be drowned in blood. If fate wipes out the main criminal of the war, the fate of this war and humanity will be a foregone conclusion. Signed by A. HITLER "
The translation, frankly, is rough, clumsy and far from ideal, but let us forgive these flaws to its author, the military translator of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 79th Rifle Corps, Lieutenant Mikhail Kandesbrat. In the end, he conveyed the essence accurately, without being a professional translator or linguist-philologist at all. And when (and where) could he receive a specialized education if in the fall of 1940 at the age of 21 he was drafted into the army from Western Belarus?
And he fought at first - on the fronts of Kalinin, 2nd Baltic and 1st Belorussian at all not as a translator. At least, this is what follows from his submission to the Order of the Red Star in the fall of 1944: “he showed courage and determination. Skillfully maneuvering the rear of the regiment, positioned them with the requirements of the regiment's combat operations, "ensured the delivery of ammunition to the front line, and" when the Germans threatened to break through from the flank, he organized a defense from the rear and held it for two days. "
In March 1945 he will be presented to the second Order of the Red Star - here already as a translator for the corps intelligence department: “Provides timely information about the enemy troops and their intentions. Skillfully, competently interrogating the prisoners of war, he achieves obtaining the correct data ", during the hostilities" he repeatedly went to the orders of our troops and interrogating prisoners on the spot, timely provided the corps command with valuable data about the enemy troops ... ".
But back to the document. Of course, this is not the last order of Hitler, but very characteristic of that moment by some deliberate loss by the leader of the Third Reich of the last ideas about the realities and the clear reckoning on ... a miracle - another "miracle of the Brandenburg House". As is known from history, the first "miracle of the Brandenburg House" the Prussian king Frederick II called the case when Russian troops, having won a victory at Kunersdorf in August 1759, instead of going to Berlin, suddenly turned to the useless Cottbus.
The second "miracle of the Brandenburg House" was the death of the Russian Empress Elizabeth Petrovna, when Peter III, who succeeded her on the throne, instead of finishing off the exhausted and already virtually defeated Prussia, suddenly took and concluded a separate peace with her. Apparently, Hitler, clearly inspired by these examples, dictated the order, believing that the death of US President Roosevelt, who died on April 12, 1945, was the long-awaited third "miracle of the Brandenburg House." Otherwise, it is simply difficult to explain such a clear inadequacy of a number of formulations.
However, in a number of assessments, the authors of the order, unfortunately, did not deviate so far from the truth. This, in particular, is evidenced by the eloquent confession of Lieutenant General Alexei Pronin - during the storming of Berlin, he was a member of the Military Council of the 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, and after the war - the head of the political department of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany.
Here is what General Pronin said, speaking in April 1946 at a scientific conference on the study of the Berlin operation of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front:
“During the offensive on this territory, many fighters, in a fit of anger, senselessly spoiled and destroyed things in the houses of the Germans, set fire to houses, outbuildings, and in some cases warehouses with food and various property. Some cities have suffered more from arson than from fighting. There were many incidents of violence and murder of Germans.
This was mainly due to the spontaneous outburst of hatred and revenge. Having burst into the territory with the German population, our people gave free rein to their feelings and poured out everything that they had sore during the war years.
This was further explained by the incorrect, primitive concept of revenge among some soldiers and officers, and many commanders and political workers of units and formations in the first days of their stay in the territory with the German population did not react to manifestations of reckless revenge and anger, they were like outside observers. "
Afterwards, General Pronin told how the political administration and the Military Council of the front fought against this, trying to explain to the soldiers that “a soldier of the Red Army will never be like the fascist cannibals, will never lose the dignity of a Soviet citizen. But this, by the way, is forgotten by those who, again under the flag of "revenge", rape German women in groups and alone. Is it so to satisfy the feeling of revenge on the enemy? Is it by raping a German girl that you avenge the tears of our people, for the blood shed by our people? No!
And one should think about that, lest someone behind a burning house or behind a German woman's skirt overlook the main thing - those sacred and noble goals of the war, for which our people took up arms - to beat mercilessly and finish off the fascist beast on its own territory " ...
“As a result of this work,” the general said, “a radical change has come in the attitude of our troops to the property seized by our units during the fighting.<…> The same change took place in the attitude of our troops towards the German population. " At least, the high-ranking political worker assured, “during the Berlin operation there were no mass manifestations of atrocities or violence. Isolated cases of such negative phenomena took place, mainly on the part of ombudsmen, drivers, servicemen of rear units and institutions.<…> The elimination of the atrocities against the German population led to a radical turn in the attitude of the German population in the Red Army. Thus, the rate of the Hitlerite command on the Volkssturm was broken and overturned, on the fact that the German population would defend their capital and the approaches to it until the last breath.
Authors:
Nuremberg trials, collection of documents (Appendices) Borisov Alexey
A.56. Hitler's order for the destruction of sabotage groups and "Commandos" of October 18, 1942 and Jodl's cover letter of October 19, 1942
[Document PS-503]
Fuhrer
and supreme
commander-in-chief
the Wehrmacht
Top secret
For command only
18.10.1942
I consider myself compelled to issue a tough order for the destruction of the enemy's sabotage groups and subject me to severe punishment for failure to comply. I consider it necessary to inform the commanders-in-chief and commanders of the reasons for the introduction of this order.
As in no other war in the past, in this war, the method of disrupting communications in the rear, intimidating the circles of the population working for Germany, as well as destroying militarily important industrial facilities in the occupied regions became widespread.
In the East, this type of hostilities, such as guerrilla warfare, last winter led to excessively heavy losses in our combat power, cost the lives of German soldiers, railway workers, workers of the Todt organization, imperial labor service, etc., significantly reduced the ability of transport to maintain combat the power of the troops and even led to many days of disruption and the termination of transportation. In the event of a successful continuation and, even more so, with the intensification of such conduct of hostilities, conditions may be created for the emergence of a severe crisis in one or another sector of the front.
Many measures against this both cruel and paralyzing activity did not succeed simply because the German officer and his soldiers confronted the danger without knowing its size, and as a result, in some cases, they did not act against enemy groups in the way that would be required to help the fight on the front line and thus the general conduct of the war.
Therefore, in the East, it was partly necessary to form special formations that could cope with this danger, or transfer the solution of this task to special formations of the SS. Only when the struggle against nonhuman partisans began and was carried out with boundless cruelty, successes did not fail to appear, which then eased the situation on the front lines of the front.
Therefore, in the entire eastern region, the fight against partisans is a fight for the final destruction of one of the parties. As soon as this provision becomes generally accepted in the troops, they will quickly cope with this phenomenon, otherwise their application will not lead to results that solve the problem, that is, it will be pointless.
England and America decided to wage a similar war, albeit under a different name. If the Russians are trying to send partisans to our rear by land and only in exceptional cases use aviation to transfer people and equipment, then England and America conduct such a war primarily by landing sabotage groups from submarines or from inflatable boats, or throwing agents onto parachutes. However, in essence, such conduct of the war does not differ from the partisan activities of the Russians.
After all, the tasks of these groups are as follows:
1. Creation of a general system of espionage with the voluntary help of the population.
2. Creation of terrorist groups and supplying them with the necessary weapons and explosives.
3. Conducting sabotage actions, which are aimed not only at disrupting our communications by destroying transport facilities, but also at the decisive moment in order to make the movement of troops impossible and to exclude the use of communications.
Finally, such groups must also target important military enterprises, destroying key enterprises in accordance with a scientifically developed program with explosions, in order to practically paralyze the entire industry.
The consequences of such activities are very dire. I do not know if every commander and officer realizes that the destruction of a single power plant, for example, could deprive the air force of thousands of tons of aluminum and that the large number of aircraft that the front needs to fight will not be produced, which thereby inflicts a huge harm to the homeland and heavy losses are caused among the fighting soldiers.
Moreover, this type of war is completely safe for the enemy. Since during the landing of his sabotage groups in military uniform, they are given civilian clothes, they can, depending on the circumstances, act as both military personnel and civilians. While they themselves have the task of ruthlessly destroying the German soldiers or even civilians who oppose them, they are not in danger of suffering serious losses during their actions, since they hope, in the worst case scenario, upon capture, to instantly surrender and thereby theoretically fall under the conditions Geneva Convention. There is no doubt that this, however, represents the worst kind of abuse of the Geneva Agreements, exacerbated by the fact that some of these groups even include criminals released from prison who can seek rehabilitation by participating in such actions. England and America will therefore have new volunteers in the future as long as they can rightly say that there is no danger for such people. In the worst case, they only need to attack people, objects of transport or structures, and then, when captured by the enemy, simply quickly surrender.
So that in the future the German side does not suffer serious consequences as a result of the use of such methods by the enemy, the latter must be informed that each sabotage group will be destroyed to the last person, without exception. This means that the probability of being alive here is zero. Thus, under no circumstances can any group - sabotage, subversive or terrorist be simply captured and taken prisoner and treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention, and would not be destroyed to the last person under any circumstances ...
In the messages that should be contained in the reports of the Wehrmacht, only briefly and succinctly inform that a sabotage, terrorist or subversive group has been captured and destroyed to the last person.
I therefore expect that both the commanders of the armies and individual commanders will not only understand the need for such actions, but will take up with all their energy to carry out this order. It is imperative to report on officers or non-commissioned officers who, due to any weakness, do not fulfill the order, and after the danger has passed, they must be brought to the strictest responsibility. Both the homeland and the soldier fighting at the front have the right to expect that in the rear they have a guaranteed food base and ensure the supply of weapons and ammunition important for war.
This is the reason for my issuing this order.
If it becomes expedient to leave one or two people alive for interrogation, then after interrogation they should be immediately shot.
Adolf Gitler
High Command
wehrmacht
Fuehrer's rate,
No. 551781/42 d
Top secret
For command only
22 copies
Instance 21
Delivery only through an officer
In development of the instructions on the destruction of groups for terror and sabotage (dated 10/18/1942), an additional order of the Fuehrer is sent.
This order is intended only for commanders and in no case should reach the enemy.
Restrict subsequent distribution to addressees in accordance with the calculation.
The authorities included in the calculation of the waste are responsible for ensuring that all duplicated copies of the order, including all copies made, are collected and destroyed along with this copy.
Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
On behalf of: Jodl
IMT, vol. 26, pp. 115-120.
From the book Generals and officers of the Wehrmacht tell author Makarov VladimirANNEX 1. Order of the command No. 931/42 of the 2nd Panzer Army "Destruction of terrorist and sabotage groups" and Appendices No. 1 and 2 with extracts from the army order dated March 3, 1942 regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, partisans and the civilian population Translation from
author Borisov AlexeyOrder of the chief of the main economic department of the SS Field to the heads of the working groups and commandants concentration camps about maximum use work force prisoners from April 30, 1942 g. Berlin 30 April 1942 Directives and instructions that were given
From the book The Nuremberg Trials, collection of documents (Appendices) author Borisov AlexeyA.54. Records of Goering's meeting with the heads of German directorates in the occupied countries and regions, held on August 6, 1942, and a cover letter from the chief of staff, authorized for the four-year plan Kerner, dated August 8, 1942 [Document
From the book The Nuremberg Trials, collection of documents (Appendices) author Borisov AlexeyHitler's order on the introduction of forced labor in the occupied territories of September 8, 1942 [Document PS-556 (2)] The Fuehrer and the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht Fuehrer's headquarters, September 8, 1942 Numerous
From the book The Nuremberg Trials, collection of documents (Appendices) author Borisov AlexeyP.65. Order of the Chief of Staff of the OKW on the extension of Hitler's order of October 18, 1942 on the destruction of commando groups to all formations of Anglo-American troops, except for those fighting on the front line, dated June 25, 1944 [Document PS-551]
author Gribkov Ivan VladimirovichAppendix 6 Order No. 108 on Lokotsky District Self-Government October 28, 1942 On the compulsory education of children In order to expand the cause of public education and raise the cultural level of the population, I ORDER: § 1C November 1 p. d. introduce compulsory education for the district
From the book The Master of the Bryansk Forests author Gribkov Ivan VladimirovichAppendix 9 Order No. 102 for the Lokotsky District Self-Government on October 23, 1942 On the organization of winter aid In order to meet the wishes of the progressive people of New Russia to conduct a campaign of winter aid to the population affected by the actions of the Soviet government, war and
From the book The Master of the Bryansk Forests author Gribkov Ivan VladimirovichAppendix 10 Order No. 114 on the Lokotsky District Self-Government October 31, 1942 On the fight against banditry Recently, the incidence of raids by bandits remaining in the forests on the civilian population of the Okrug entrusted to me has become more frequent. This is due to the fact that the bandits remaining in the forests
author of SovinformburoOperational summary for October 5, 1942 Morning message on October 5 During the night of October 5, our troops fought with the enemy in the Stalingrad region and in the Mozdok area. On other fronts, no changes occurred.
From the book Summaries of the Soviet Information Bureau (June 22, 1941 - May 15, 1945) author of SovinformburoOperational summary for October 10, 1942 Another Hitler fake Recently, the German command announced that German troops allegedly surrounded and destroyed 7 Soviet divisions south of Lake Ladoga, took 12.370 prisoners, captured or destroyed 244 tanks, 307 guns, 491
From the book Summaries of the Soviet Information Bureau (June 22, 1941 - May 15, 1945) author of SovinformburoOperational summary for October 11, 1942 Morning message October 11 During the night of October 11, our troops fought with the enemy in the Stalingrad area and in the Mozdok area. No change occurred on other fronts. Evening Post October 11 Through October 11
From the book Summaries of the Soviet Information Bureau (June 22, 1941 - May 15, 1945) author of SovinformburoOperational summary for October 12, 1942 Morning message October 12 During the night of October 12, our troops fought with the enemy in the Stalingrad area and in the Mozdok area. No change occurred on other fronts. Evening Post October 12 Through October 12
From the book Summaries of the Soviet Information Bureau (June 22, 1941 - May 15, 1945) author of SovinformburoOperational summary for October 13, 1942 Morning message October 13 During the night of October 13, our troops fought with the enemy in the Stalingrad region and in the Mozdok region. On the other fronts, no changes occurred.
From the book Summaries of the Soviet Information Bureau (June 22, 1941 - May 15, 1945) author of SovinformburoOperational report for October 14, 1942 Morning message on October 14 During the night of October 14, no changes occurred on the fronts. Evening message on October 14 B during October 14 on the fronts significant changes did not happen. On October 13, our aviation on
From the book Summaries of the Soviet Information Bureau (June 22, 1941 - May 15, 1945) author of SovinformburoOperational summary for October 15, 1942 Morning message on October 15 During the night of October 15, no significant changes occurred on the fronts. Evening message on October 15 During October 15, our troops fought with the enemy in the Stalingrad area and in the Mozdok area. Ha
From the book Summaries of the Soviet Information Bureau (June 22, 1941 - May 15, 1945) author of SovinformburoOperational summary for October 16, 1942 Morning message October 16 During the night of October 16, our troops fought with the enemy in the Stalingrad area and in the Mozdok area. There were no significant changes on other fronts.
I decided to launch the Citadel offensive, the first offensive this year, as soon as weather conditions permit.
This offensive is of decisive importance. It must end with swift and decisive success. The offensive should give us the initiative for the spring and summer of this year.
In this regard, all preparatory measures must be carried out with the greatest care and energy. In the direction of the main blows, the best formations, the best weapons, the best commanders and a large amount of ammunition must be used. Every commander, every rank-and-file soldier must become aware of the decisive significance of this offensive. The victory at Kursk must be a torch for the whole world.
I order:
1. The aim of the offensive is a concentrated blow, carried out decisively and quickly by the forces of one shock army from the Belgorod region and the other from the region south of Orel, by means of a concentric offensive to encircle the enemy forces in the Kursk region and destroy them.
In the course of this offensive, in order to save forces, a new reduced front should be taken along the Nezhegol-Korocha-Skorodnoye-Tim-east of Shchigr-r. Pine.
2. It is necessary;
a) make extensive use of the moment of surprise and keep the enemy in the dark, first of all, about the time of the start of the offensive;
b) to ensure the maximum massing of the strike forces in a narrow sector so that, using the local overwhelming superiority in all means of the offensive (tanks, assault guns, artillery, mortars, etc.), with one blow to break through the enemy's defenses, achieve a connection of both advancing armies and thus close the encirclement ring;
c) as quickly as possible to transfer forces from the depths to cover the flanks of shock groupings so that the latter can only advance forward;
d) timely strikes from all directions against the surrounded enemy do not give him a break and hasten his destruction;
e) carry out the offensive at the fastest possible pace so that the enemy cannot avoid the encirclement and bring up powerful reserves from other sectors of the front;
f) by quickly creating a new front, release forces in a timely manner to carry out subsequent tasks, especially mobile formations.
3. Army Group South strikes with concentrated forces from the Bel-Gorod-Tomarovka line, breaks through the front at the Prilepy-Oboyan line, joins at Kursk and its eastern part with the advancing army of Army Group Center. To provide cover for the offensive from the east, reach the Nezhegol-r. Korocha-Skorodnoe-Tim, however, to prevent the weakening of the massed forces in the direction of Prilepa, Oboyan. To cover the offensive from the west, use part of the forces, which simultaneously set the task of striking the encircled enemy grouping.
4. Army Group Center delivers a massive attack by the advancing army from the Trosna-region line north of Maloarkhangelsk, breaks through the front in the Fatezh, Veretinovo sector, concentrating its main efforts on its eastern flank, and joins up with the shock army of Army Group South near Kursk and the eastern ... To cover the advancing grouping from the east, it is necessary to reach the Tim-east of Shchigr-Sosna line in the shortest possible time, without allowing the weakening of forces in the direction of the main attack. Use part of the available forces to cover the advancing grouping from the west.
Parts of Army Group Center, brought into battle in the sector west of the river. Troena to the demarcation line with Army Group South, have the task of pinning down the enemy with the beginning of the offensive by carrying out local attacks with specially created strike groups and timely striking the encircled enemy grouping. Continuous observation and aerial reconnaissance ensure timely detection of the enemy's withdrawal. In this case, you should immediately go on the offensive along the entire front.
5. Concentration of the forces of both army groups for the offensive should be carried out in depth, far from the starting positions, so that, starting from 28 April, on the sixth day after the order was given by the main command of the ground forces, they could begin the offensive. In this case, all measures should be taken to disguise, maintain secrecy and mislead the enemy. The earliest onset is 3.5. Advancement to the starting positions for the offensive should be carried out only at night, subject to all camouflage rules.
6. To mislead the enemy, continue preparations for Operation Panther in the zone of Army Group South. The training should be strengthened by all means (demonstrative reconnaissance, the advance of tanks, the concentration of ferry means, radio communications, agent actions, the spread of rumors, the use of aviation, etc.) and carried out as long as possible. These measures to mislead the enemy must also be effectively supported by appropriate measures for the defense capability of the troops stationed there (see paragraph 11 of this directive). In the zone of Army Group Center, measures should not be taken to mislead the enemy on a large scale, but by all means it is necessary to hide from the enemy the true picture of the situation (withdrawal of troops to the rear and false transfers, movement of transport in the daytime, dissemination of false information about the timing the beginning of the offensive only in June, etc.)
In both army groups, units newly arriving in the shock armies must observe radio silence.
7. In order to maintain secrecy, only those persons whose involvement is absolutely necessary should be involved in the design of the operation. New faces should become familiar with the concept gradually and as late as possible. This time, it is imperative to avoid that, through negligence or negligence, the enemy becomes aware of our plans. By strengthening counterintelligence to ensure a constant fight against enemy espionage.
8. Troops intended for the offensive, taking into account the spatially limited and precisely known objectives of the offensive (as opposed to previous operations), must leave behind all the vehicles that can be dispensed with in the offensive, as well as any ballast burdening them. All this only hinders and can adversely affect the offensive impulse of the troops and make it difficult to quickly supply the next forces. Therefore, each commander must be imbued with the desire to take with him only what is necessary for the battle. Corps and divisional commanders must strictly enforce this requirement. It is necessary to introduce strict regulation of movement on the roads. It must be carried out in the most decisive manner.
9. Orders for supply, as well as for the immediate and complete registration of all captured prisoners, local residents and trophies, as well as for the conduct of propaganda to destroy the enemy are given in Appendices 1-3.
10. The air force also uses the available forces in the main attack directions. It is necessary to immediately begin coordination of issues of interaction with the command structures of the Air Force. Pay particular attention to the observance of secrecy (see point 7 of this directive).
11. For the success of the offensive, it is of decisive importance that offensive actions in other sectors of the front of Army Groups South and Center cannot force us to postpone the start of the Citadel offensive or to prematurely withdraw the formations participating in it. Therefore, both army groups must, along with offensive operation "Citadel" to systematically prepare by the end of the month the defense in the remaining and, above all, in the threatened sectors of the front. At the same time, first of all, it is necessary to accelerate by all means the construction of defensive positions, to cover the tank-hazardous areas with a sufficient number of anti-tank weapons, to create tactical reserves, to timely reveal the directions of the enemy's main strikes by active reconnaissance actions.
12. Upon completion of the operation, it is envisaged:
a) transferring the demarcation line between Army Groups South and Center to the general line Konotop (for Army Group South) - Kursk (for Army Group South) - Dolgoe (for Army Group Center);
b) the transfer of the 2nd Army, consisting of three corps and nine infantry divisions, as well as units of the RGK, which will be further specified, from Army Group Center to Army Group South;
c) the release by Army Group Center of an additional three divisions to the reserve of the main command of the ground forces in the region northwest of Kursk;
d) withdrawal from the front of all mobile units for their use in accordance with new tasks. All movements of the 2nd Army formations must correspond to these plans.
I reserve the right, even during the period of the operation, depending on the course of hostilities, to gradually reassign the headquarters and formations mentioned in paragraph 12-6 of this order to Army Group South.
I also reserve the right, in the event of a planned development of the operation, to immediately launch an offensive to the south-east (Panther) in order to exploit the confusion in the enemy ranks.
13. To the army groups to report on the preparations for the offensive and defensive actions carried out on the basis of this operational order, with the attachment of maps of a scale of 1: 300000 with the plotted group of forces in the initial position, as well as the distribution table of the RGK units and the plan agreed with the command of the 4th Air Fleet and the Vostok Air Force command measures to support the Citadel offensive from the air, as well as a plan of measures to misinform the enemy. Submission deadline - 24.4.
On April 15, 1943, Adolf Hitler signed the Wehrmacht Headquarters Operational Order No. 6. The document approved the procedure and conditions for conducting Operation Citadel, which was destined to become the last major offensive maneuver of Nazi Germany.
The plan of the German command assumed the delivery of powerful lightning strikes on the formations of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA), stationed in the Kursk region, in July 1943. The success of Hitler's blitzkrieg opened the way to the previously abandoned Stalingrad and made it possible to launch an offensive against Moscow again.
“In the direction of the main strikes, the best formations, the best weapons, the best commanders and a large amount of ammunition must be used. Every commander, every rank-and-file soldier is obliged to become aware of the decisive significance of this offensive. The victory at Kursk should be a torch for the whole world, "Hitler's order said.
- The crew of the German tank "Tiger"
- globallookpress.com
- Andrey Kotliarchuk
Lack of resources
The Citadel's task was to eliminate the so-called Kursk salient, or Kursk Bulge. As a result of the March 1943 battles of the year, the Red Army established itself in the area west of Kursk, which wedged into the territory of the USSR occupied by the Germans by about 120 km. Soviet troops occupied a convenient foothold, which made it possible to continue the liberation of the southern regions of the RSFSR and eastern Ukraine.
The Germans intended to deliver two converging attacks from the north and south. From the Oryol side, the ledge was supposed to cut off the troops of Army Group "Center", from the side of Belgorod - formations of Army Group "South".
It was assumed that the Wehrmacht units would advance to Kursk approximately 30 km per day and in five days would completely complete the encirclement of the Soviet troops.
The main striking force of the Germans was assault aircraft and armored formations, which received reinforcements in the form of the latest heavy tanks T-5 "Panther", T-6 "Tiger" and self-propelled guns "Ferdinand". Hitler hoped to literally ram the deep defenses of the Red Army in separate narrow areas, and then build on this success by pulling up infantry units.
- Soviet tank troops on the streets of Stalingrad in early 1943
- globallookpress.com
- Berliner Verlag / Archiv
A significant part of the German command opposed the Fuhrer's view of the Citadel. The main reason for the generals' doubts was that the Nazi war machine had not yet recovered from the defeat at Stalingrad. According to historians, it took Germany about six months to fully recuperate.
Even his most loyal military leader, Field Marshal Walter Model, entered into a discussion with Hitler. In particular, he warned the Fuehrer that the Red Army in a short time was able to create a deep and effective defensive line.
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The commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Hans Gunther von Kluge, and Colonel General Heinz Wilhelm Guderian, considered Germany's leading tank strategist, convinced Hitler that the country might not have enough resources to carry out a large-scale offensive operation.
Guderian openly told the Fuehrer that a defeat at the Kursk Bulge would lead to irreparable losses and would mean a military disaster. However, the leader of Nazi Germany attached decisive importance to the Citadel and urged the generals to start the operation. With great difficulty, German commanders persuaded Hitler to postpone it for a month, to July 5, 1943.
The Wehrmacht pulled 50 divisions (900 thousand people), 2 thousand tanks, 2 thousand aircraft and 10 thousand artillery pieces to the Kursk salient. Before the offensive, Hitler's address was read to the soldiers, in which he stated that the German army had achieved tremendous technical superiority over the enemy.
The best ground formations were thrown to storm the ledge - 1st Division Leibstandarte CC "Adolf Hitler", 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich", 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf". Air support for the Nazis was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.
"In order to maintain secrecy"
One of the most important conditions for success, Hitler considered the observance of maximum secrecy in the preparation of the Citadel. The Fuehrer was aware of the increased power of Soviet military intelligence and feared that copies of all plans would end up in Joseph Stalin's office.
“In order to maintain secrecy, only those persons whose involvement is absolutely necessary should be devoted to the design of the operation. New faces should become familiar with the concept gradually and as late as possible. This time, it is imperative to avoid that, due to negligence or negligence, the enemy becomes aware of our plans, ”Hitler's order emphasized.
Despite desperate attempts by the Nazis to observe precautions, the Soviet command received all the necessary information about the development of the Citadel in a timely manner. Most of data on the operation was obtained in Great Britain ("the Cambridge Five"), in Berlin (agent Werther, who became the prototype of Stirlitz) and through a spy network in Switzerland.
Suffice it to say that already on April 16, 1943, a day after Hitler signed an order to prepare the Citadel, Soviet agents were aware of the plans spelled out in the document.
The headquarters of the Supreme Commander immediately received information that during the summer campaign the Wehrmacht would attack from the direction of Orel and Belgorod.
In addition, the success of the Soviet Union was ensured by the reform that Stalin carried out at the request of the front commanders. In April, in the structure of the Red Army, the Main Intelligence Directorate was created, which was engaged in ensuring the activities of the agent network, and the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, whose tasks included frontline intelligence.
On April 19, 1943, Stalin signed an order "On the state of military intelligence agencies and on measures to improve its combat activities." The document noted that insufficient attention is paid to military intelligence in the Red Army. It was about the fact that reconnaissance units often acted autonomously or carried out combined-arms missions.
The order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief freed the scouts from the army routine and made it possible to systematize the collection of information about the enemy. According to the new order, captured Germans or documents found in the Red Army were immediately delivered to the intelligence departments. From there, all relevant information flowed to the headquarters.
The measures taken to strengthen reconnaissance units helped to determine the deployment of reserves, the types of military equipment and the number of troops that the enemy concentrated near the Kursk salient.
Information about the movements of Wehrmacht units near the front line, as a rule, came to the Soviet command from radio intercepts. In May - June, effective frontline reconnaissance nullified the attempts of the Germans to disguise offensive maneuvers.
Change of tactics
The information obtained by Soviet intelligence became the key to a well-organized defense of the Kursk salient. The line of engineering structures and minefields on the arc stretches for 550 km. By July 1943, the Red Army had concentrated 1.9 million soldiers, more than 20 thousand guns, 5 thousand tanks and 2 thousand aircraft in the area of \u200b\u200bthe defensive operation.
The headquarters of the Supreme Commander was aware of the plans of the Germans to use the latest heavy equipment to break through the defenses in narrow areas. "Tiger", "Panther" were considered at that time the best tanks in the world in terms of power and protection. And "Ferdinand" in terms of tactical and technical characteristics had no equal for several years after the war.
The frontal armor of the latest tracked vehicles could withstand shells from most Soviet artillery pieces. Given the technical superiority of the Germans, the command of the Red Army radically changed the tactics of battles against tank armada.
Enormous attention was paid to the installation of minefields and anti-tank ditches. With the start of the Citadel, the need to pave the way for tanks greatly hampered the advance of the Wehrmacht and gave the Red Army time to regroup its forces. Instead of the planned 30 km per day, the invaders were approaching Kursk by 8-10 km at best.
On the way of the movement of German tank columns, Soviet troops constantly set up ambushes. Superiority in artillery allowed the Red Army to fire at one German tank in a crew, which sometimes consisted of 10 guns. The key task of the gunners was to hit the sides, undercarriage and barrel of "impenetrable" German vehicles.
The tank formations of the Red Army, equipped with the legendary T-34s, which also could not penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand, operated in a similar way. Soviet tanks took advantage of their mobility. Making diversionary maneuvers, they bypassed the clumsy German vehicles and struck at their vulnerable parts.
Another army
On July 11, 1943, the offensive of the invaders collapsed. The Wehrmacht was forced to begin the transfer of reserves. On July 12, on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge, near the Prokhorovka railway station, a grand tank battle took place, which, as historians believe, did not bring victory to either side.
From July 12 to August 18, 1943, the Red Army conducted the Oryol offensive, dropping the Army Group Center. From 3 to 23 August 1943, during the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the Red Army defeated the southern flank of the enemy. In the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht lost the best formations and in the fall was forced to leave the entire Left-Bank Ukraine.
In an interview with RT, the head of the scientific department of the Russian Military Historical Society, Candidate of Historical Sciences Yuri Nikiforov noted that the Germans had carefully thought out the Citadel. According to him, the operation was excellently prepared, but the balance of power by the summer of 1943 was on the side of the USSR.
“In my opinion, Hitler and the German generals, in principle, did not count on serious success. There is a point of view that the Citadel was, in fact, a defensive operation. After Stalingrad, the victory at Kursk would have had rather political and inspirational significance for the Nazis. Germany could demonstrate its strength and vitality to the people and to the whole world, ”Nikiforov said.
The expert called the excellent work the key to the success of the RKKA soviet intelligence officers, who obtained all the information necessary for the front command.
In addition, according to Nikiforov, the Nazis did not take into account the significant superiority of the Soviet group in manpower and equipment near Kursk.
“In the Battle of Kursk, we saw other soviet soldiers and other generals. The actions of the accumulated experience of the Red Army were more coordinated and perfect from a tactical point of view. The professionalism and courage of our commanders and soldiers did not allow the Germans to realize their plans. At Kursk, Hitler staked everything - and lost, "Nikiforov summed up.
Operational order number 6
I decidedAs soon as weather conditions permit, launch Operation Citadel, the first offensive this year.
This offensive is of decisive importance. It must end with swift and decisive success. The offensive should give us the initiative for the spring and summer of this year.
In this regard, all preparatory measures must be carried out with the greatest care and energy. In the direction of the main blows, the best formations, the best weapons, the best commanders and a large amount of ammunition must be used. Every commander, every rank-and-file soldier is obliged to become aware of the decisive significance of this offensive. Victory at Kursk must come torch for the whole world.
I order:
1. The purpose of the offensive is: a concentrated blow, carried out decisively and quickly by the forces of one shock army from the Belgorod region, and the other from the region south of Orel, by means of a concentric offensive, to encircle the enemy forces in the Kursk region and destroy them.
In the course of this offensive, in order to save forces, a new, reduced front should be occupied along the Nezhega - r. Korocha-Skorodnoe - Tim-east of Shchigr - r. Pine.
2. Necessary
a) make extensive use of the moment of surprise and keep the enemy in the dark, first of all, about the time of the start of the offensive;
b) to ensure the maximum massing of the strike forces in a narrow sector so that, using the local overwhelming superiority in all means of the offensive (tanks, assault guns, artillery, mortars, etc.), with one blow to break through the enemy's defenses, to achieve a combination of both advancing armies and thus close the encirclement ring;
c) transfer forces from the depths as quickly as possible to cover the flanks of the strike groupings so that the latter can only advance forward;
d) timely strikes from all directions against the surrounded enemy do not give him a break and hasten his destruction;
e) carry out the offensive at the fastest possible pace so that the enemy cannot avoid the encirclement and bring up powerful reserves from other sectors of the front;
f) by quickly creating a new front in a timely manner - to free up forces to perform subsequent tasks, especially mobile formations.
3. Army Group South strikes with concentrated forces from the Belgorod-Tomarovka line, breaks through the front at the Prilepy-Oboyan line, joins up at Kursk and east of it with the advancing army of Army Group Center. To provide cover for the offensive from the east, reach the Nezhega - r. Short - Skorodnoe - Tin, however, at the same time, do not allow the weakening of the massing of forces in the direction of Prilepa, Oboyan. To cover the offensive from the west, use part of the forces, which simultaneously set the task of striking the encircled enemy grouping.
4. Army Group "Center" inflicts a massive attack by the advancing army from the Trosna - area north of Maloarkhangelsk, breaks through the front in the Fatezh, Veretinovo sector, concentrating its main efforts on its eastern flank, and joins up with the shock army of Army Group "South" near Kursk and east , to cover the advancing grouping from the east, it is necessary to reach the Tim line - east of Shchigr - r. Pine, while not allowing the weakening of forces in the direction of the main blow. To cover the advancing grouping from the west, use part of the available forces.
Parts of the Army Group Center, entered into battle in the sector west of the r. Trosna to the demarcation line with Army Group South, have the task of pinning down the enemy with the beginning of the offensive by conducting local attacks with specially created strike groups and timely striking the encircled enemy grouping. Continuous observation and aerial reconnaissance ensure timely detection of the enemy's withdrawal. In this case, you should immediately go on the offensive along the entire front.
5. Concentration of the forces of both army groups for the offensive should be carried out in depth, far from the starting positions, so that, starting from 28.4, on the sixth day after the issuance of the order by the main command of the ground forces, they could begin the offensive. In this case, all measures should be taken to disguise, maintain secrecy and mislead the enemy. The earliest onset is 3.5. Moving to the starting positions for the offensive should be carried out only at night, subject to all the rules of camouflage.
6. To mislead the enemy, continue preparations for Operation Panther in the zone of Army Group South. The training should be strengthened by all means (demonstrative reconnaissance, the advance of tanks, the concentration of ferry facilities, radio communications, agent actions, the spread of rumors, the use of aviation, etc.) and carried out as long as possible. These measures to mislead the enemy must also be effectively supported by appropriate measures for the defense capability of the troops stationed there (see paragraph 11 of this directive). In the zone of Army Group Center, measures should not be taken to mislead the enemy on a large scale, but by all means it is necessary to hide from the enemy the true picture of the situation (withdrawal of troops to the rear and false transfers, movement of transport in the daytime, dissemination of false information about the timing the beginning of the offensive only in June, etc.).
In both army groups, units newly arriving in the shock armies must observe radio silence.
7. In order to maintain secrecy, only those persons whose involvement is absolutely necessary should be involved in the design of the operation. New faces should become familiar with the concept gradually and as late as possible. This time, it is imperative to avoid that, due to negligence or negligence, the enemy becomes aware of our plans. By strengthening counterintelligence, ensure a constant fight against enemy espionage.
8. Troops intended for the offensive, taking into account the spatially limited and precisely known objectives of the offensive (as opposed to previous operations), must leave behind all the vehicles that can be dispensed with in the offensive, as well as any ballast burdening them. All this only hinders and can adversely affect the offensive impulse of troops and make it difficult to quickly supply subsequent forces. Therefore, each commander must be imbued with the desire to take with him only what is necessary for the battle. Corps and divisional commanders must strictly enforce this requirement. It is necessary to introduce strict regulation of movement on the roads. It must be carried out in the most decisive manner.
9. Orders for supply, as well as for the immediate and complete registration of all captured prisoners, local residents and trophies, as well as for the conduct of propaganda to destroy the enemy are given in Appendices 1-3.
10. The Air Force will also use all available forces in the direction of the main attack. It is necessary to immediately begin coordination of issues of interaction with the command structures of the Air Force. Pay particular attention to the observance of secrecy (see point 7 of this directive).
11. For the success of the offensive, it is of decisive importance that the enemy should not be able to force us to postpone the start of the Citadel offensive or to prematurely withdraw the formations participating in it with offensive actions in other sectors of the front of Army Groups South and Center. Therefore, both army groups must, along with the offensive operation "Citadel", systematically prepare by the end of the month defenses in the remaining and, above all, in the threatened sectors of the front. At the same time, first of all, it is necessary to accelerate by all means the construction of defensive positions, to cover the tank-hazardous areas with a sufficient number of anti-tank weapons, to create tactical reserves, to timely reveal the directions of the enemy's main strikes by active reconnaissance actions.
12. Upon completion of the operation, it is envisaged:
a) transferring the demarcation line between Army Groups South and Center to the general line Konotop (for Army Group South) - Kursk (for Army Group South) - Dolgoye (for Army Group Center)
b) the transfer of the 2nd Army, consisting of three corps and nine infantry divisions, as well as units of the RGK, which will be further specified, from Army Group Center to Army Group South;
c) the release by Army Group Center of an additional three divisions to the reserve of the main command of the ground forces in the region northwest of Kursk;
d) withdrawal from the front of all mobile units for their use in accordance with new tasks. All movements of the 2nd Army formations must correspond to these plans.
I reserve the right, even during the operation, depending on the course of hostilities, to gradually re-subordinate to Army Group South the headquarters and formations mentioned in paragraph 12.b of this order.
13. To the army groups to report on the measures for the preparation of the offensive and defensive actions carried out on the basis of this operational order, with the attachment of maps of a scale of 1: 300,000 with the plotted grouping of forces in the initial position, as well as the table of distribution of the units of the RGK and the plan agreed with the command 4- First Air Fleet and the Vostok Air Force Command measures to support the Citadel offensive from the air, as well as a plan of measures to misinform the enemy. Submission deadline - 24.4.
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