In the night radio news for the first time, a summary of the main command of the Soviet army appears: “At dawn on June 22, 1941, the regular troops of the German army attacked our border units on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea and were held back by them during the first half of the day. In the afternoon, German troops met with the advanced units of the field forces of the Red Army. After fierce fighting, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. Only in the Grodno and Kristynopol directions did the enemy manage to achieve insignificant tactical successes and occupy the townships of Kalvariya, Stoyanov and Tsekhanovets (the first two are 15 km away and the last one is 10 km from the border).

Enemy aircraft attacked a number of our airfields and settlements, but everywhere they met a decisive rebuff from our fighters and anti-aircraft artillery, which inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. We shot down 65 enemy planes. "

It is known that on the first day of the war, the Wehrmacht troops advanced along the entire border 50-60 km deep into the territory of the USSR.

The Main Military Council of the Red Army is sending a directive to the troops, ordering from the morning of June 23 to inflict decisive counterattacks on the enemy groupings that have broken through into the territory of the USSR. For the most part, the implementation of these directives will only lead to even greater losses and worsen the situation of the army units that have entered the war.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill is making a radio address in which he promises the USSR all the help that Great Britain can give: “Over the past 25 years, no one has been a more consistent opponent of communism than me. I will not take back a single word that I have said about him. But all this pales before the spectacle unfolding now. The past with its crimes, follies and tragedies disappears. ... I must declare the decision of His Majesty's government, and I am sure that in due time the great dominions will agree with this decision, for we must speak out immediately, without a single day of delay. I have to make a statement, but can you doubt what our policy will be? We have only one and only unchanging goal. We are determined to destroy Hitler and all traces of the Nazi regime. Nothing can turn us away from it, nothing. We will never come to an agreement, we will never enter into negotiations with Hitler or any of his gang. We will fight with him on land, we will fight with him at sea, we will fight with him in the air, until, with God's help, we will rid the earth from his very shadow and free the peoples from his yoke. Any person or state that fights against Nazism will receive our help. Any person or state that goes with Hitler is our enemy ... This is our policy, this is our statement. Hence it follows that we will render all the assistance we can to Russia and the Russian people. We will appeal to all our friends and allies in all parts of the world to adhere to the same course and to carry it out as steadily and unswervingly to the end, as we will ...

This is not a class war, but a war involving the entire British Empire and the Commonwealth of Nations, regardless of race, creed or party. It is not for me to talk about the actions of the United States, but I will say that if Hitler imagines that his attack on Soviet Russia would cause the slightest divergence of goals or weakening the efforts of the great democracies who decided to destroy him, then he is deeply mistaken. On the contrary, it will further strengthen and encourage our efforts to save humanity from its tyranny. It will strengthen, not weaken, our resolve and our capabilities. ”

People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko signs a directive on air strikes 100-150 km deep into Germany, orders the bombing of Konigsberg and Danzig. These bombings did happen, but two days later, on June 24th.

The last of Stalin's visitors left the Kremlin: Beria, Molotov and Voroshilov. On that day, no one met with Stalin anymore, and there was practically no connection with him.

The documents record the first atrocities of the fascist troops on the territory they had just captured. The Germans, advancing, broke into the Albinga village of the Klaipeda region of Lithuania. The soldiers robbed and burned down all the houses. Residents - 42 people - were herded into a barn and locked up. During the day, the Nazis killed several people - beaten to death or shot. The next morning, the systematic destruction of people began. Groups of peasants were taken out of the barn and shot in cold blood. First, all men, then it came to women and children. Those who tried to escape into the forest were shot in the back.

Italy declares war on the USSR. More precisely, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ciano informs the USSR Ambassador to Italy Gorelkin that the war has been declared from 5.30 in the morning. “In view of the current situation, in connection with the fact that Germany has declared war on the USSR, Italy, as an ally of Germany and as a member of the Triple Pact, also declares war on the Soviet Union from the moment German troops entered Soviet territory, i.e. from 5.30 am on June 22 ". In fact, both Italian and Romanian units attacked the Soviet borders along with the German allies from the first minutes of the war.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov speaks on Soviet radio with a speech about the beginning of the war. “The Soviet government and its head comrade Stalin instructed me to make the following statement:

Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without making any claims to the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombarded our cities from their planes - Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others, and more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Enemy aircraft raids and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territory.

This unheard-of attack on our country is treachery unparalleled in the history of civilized nations. The attack on our country was carried out in spite of the fact that a non-aggression pact was concluded between the USSR and Germany and the Soviet government fulfilled all the terms of this treaty with all conscientiousness. The attack on our country was carried out in spite of the fact that during the entire period of operation of this treaty the German government could never "present a single claim against the USSR for the fulfillment of the treaty. All responsibility for this robber attack on the Soviet Union falls entirely on the German fascist rulers ... (full text of the speech) Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours. "

So the whole country learned about the beginning of the war. It was in this speech, on the very first day, that the war was called Patriotic - a parallel was drawn with the Patriotic War of 1812. Almost immediately, reservists went to the recruiting centers - those liable for military service, who remained in reserve and did not serve in peacetime. Recording of volunteers soon began.

An order comes to the Baltic Military District to withdraw the national corps of the Red Army outside the front-line zone, inland. Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian national corps were created a year before, by order of Stalin, after the occupation of the Baltic countries. Now these parts are not trusted.

German aviation inflicts crushing blows on USSR air bases. During the first hours of the war, 1200 aircraft were destroyed at 66 bases, most of them - more than 800 - right on the ground. Therefore, many pilots survived and aviation was gradually restored, including through converted civil aircraft. At the same time, the first German aircraft was destroyed in an air battle in the first hour of the war. In total, the Germans lost about 300 aircraft on June 22 - the largest losses in a day for the entire war.

Stalin confirms the signing of decrees on mobilization, the introduction of martial law in the European part of the USSR, a decree on military tribunals, as well as on the formation of the Headquarters of the High Command. Mikhail Kalinin signs the decrees as Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. All persons liable for military service born from 1905 to 1918 inclusive were subject to mobilization.

Ribbentrop holds a press conference for German and foreign journalists, where he says that the Fuehrer has decided to take measures to shield Germany from the Soviet threat.

In the Kremlin, Molotov and Stalin are working on a draft of Molotov's speech about the outbreak of war. At half past eight in the morning, Zhukov and Timoshenko arrive with a draft decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on general mobilization.

Goebbels speaks on German radio with a statement about the beginning of a military operation against the USSR. Among other things, he says: “At a time when Germany is waging a war with the Anglo-Saxons, the Soviet Union does not fulfill its obligations, and the Fuhrer regards this as a stab in the back of the German people. Therefore, the German troops have just crossed the border. "

The first wartime order appears, signed by Timoshenko, but approved by Stalin. This order ordered the USSR Air Force to destroy all enemy aircraft and allowed aircraft to cross the border for 100 km. The ground forces were ordered to stop the invasion and go on the offensive on all fronts, then go on to battles in enemy territory. This order, already little connected with what is happening on the border, the troops do not receive immediately and not all. Communication with the border areas is poorly established, from time to time the General Staff loses control over what is happening. By this time, the Germans were bombing airfields along with the planes that did not manage to take off. But, while many units, as before, according to Directive No. 1, do not give in to provocations, are dispersed and disguised, in some areas the troops are launching a counteroffensive. So the 41st Infantry Division repulsed the attack, entered the enemy's territory for 3 km and stopped the movement of five Wehrmacht divisions. On June 22, the 5th Panzer Division did not allow the German Panzer Division of Army Group "North" to pass near the town of Alytus, where there was a crossing over the Niemen, the most important strategic point for the advance of the Germans into the interior of the country. Only on June 23, the Soviet division was defeated by an air raid.

In Berlin, Ribbentrop summons the USSR Ambassador to Germany, Vladimir Dekanozov, and the first secretary of the embassy, ​​Valentin Berezhkov, and informs them of the start of the war: “The hostile attitude of the Soviet government and the concentration of Soviet troops on the eastern border of Germany, posing a serious threat, forced the government of the Third Reich to take military countermeasures ". At the same time, having made an official statement, Ribbentrop catches up with Dekanozov on the doorstep and quickly says to him: "Tell me in Moscow, I was against it." The ambassadors return to the Soviet residence. Communication with Moscow is cut off, the building is surrounded by SS units. All that remains for them is to destroy the documents. German generals report to Hitler about the first successes.

Ambassador Schulenburg arrives in the Kremlin. He officially announces the beginning of the war between Germany and the USSR, word for word repeating Ribbentrop's telegram: “The USSR has concentrated all its troops on the German border in full combat readiness. Thus, the Soviet government violated the treaties with Germany and intends to attack Germany from the rear, while it is fighting for its existence. The Fuehrer therefore ordered the German armed forces to confront this threat with all the means at their disposal. " Molotov returns to Stalin and retells his conversation, adding: "We did not deserve this." Stalin pauses in his chair for a long time, then says: "The enemy will be defeated along the entire front line."

The Western and Baltic special districts reported on the beginning of hostilities by German troops in the land sectors. 4 million soldiers of Germany and allies invaded the border territory of the USSR. 3,350 tanks, 7,000 different guns and 2,000 aircraft were involved in the battles.

However, Stalin, taking in 4.30 in the morning of Zhukov and Timoshenko, still insists that Hitler, most likely, does not know anything about the beginning of the military operation. “We need to make contact with Berlin,” he says. Molotov summons Ambassador Schulenburg.

V 04.15 the tragic defense of the Brest Fortress begins - one of the main outposts of the Western border of the USSR, a fortress where a year before that a joint parade of the USSR and Germany in honor of the seizure and partition of Poland took place. The troops occupying the fortress were completely unprepared for battle - among other things, in all the western border districts at about 2 am there was a break in communication, which was restored at about half past four in the morning. By the time when the message about Directive No. 1 reached the Brest Fortress, that is, about bringing the troops into combat readiness, the German attack had already begun. At that moment, 8 rifle and 1 reconnaissance battalion, 3 artillery battalions and several more detachments, about 11 thousand people in total, as well as 300 families of military personnel were stationed in the fortress. And although, according to all the instructions, the detachments were supposed to leave the territory of the Brest Fortress in the event of hostilities and conduct hostilities around Brest, they did not manage to break out of the fortress. But they did not concede the fortress to the German troops either. The siege of the Brest Fortress continued until the end of July 1941. As a result, more than 6,000 soldiers and their families were taken prisoner, the same number died.

At 3.40 in the morning, the People's Commissar for Defense Tymoshenko orders the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov to call Stalin at Blizhnyaya Dacha to inform him of the beginning of the German aggression. Zhukov hardly forced the officer on duty to wake up Stalin. The latter listened to Zhukov and ordered him to come to the Kremlin with Timoshenko, having previously called Poskrebyshev to call the Politburo together. By this time, Riga, Vindava, Libava, Shauliai, Kaunas, Vilnius, Grodno, Lida, Volkovysk, Brest, Kobrin, Slonim, Baranovichi, Bobruisk, Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol and many other cities, railway junctions, airfields, military - sea bases of the USSR.

The commander of the Baltic region, General Kuznetsov, reported on the raid on Kaunas and other cities.

The Chief of Staff of the Kiev District, General Purkaev, reported on the air raid on the cities of Ukraine.

The Chief of Staff of the Western District, General Klimovskikh, reported on the enemy air raid on the cities of Belarus.

V 03.15 the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Oktyabrsky, called Zhukov and said that German aviation was bombing Sevastopol. Hanging up the phone, Oktyabrsky said that “in Moscow they don’t believe that Sevastopol is being bombed,” but gave the order to open return artillery fire. The commander of the navy, Admiral Kuznetsov, after receiving Declaration No. 1, not only put the fleet on alert, but also ordered it to engage in hostilities. Therefore, the fleet suffered less on 22 June than all other branches of the armed forces. Reports begin to arrive with a difference of two to three minutes. All of them are about the bombing of cities, including Minsk and Kiev.

The first volleys of German artillery are heard. For the next 45 minutes, the invasion continues along the entire border. The most powerful artillery shelling begins, the bombing of cities, then - the crossing of the border by ground forces. Bridges across almost all, large and small, rivers on the border have been captured. Border outposts have been defeated, some of them by special sabotage groups even before the start of the operation.

The German Ambassador to the USSR, Schulenburg, receives a secret telegram from German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop with a detailed explanation of what he must say when reporting the beginning of the war to the Soviet government. The telegram begins with the words: “I ask you to immediately inform Herr Molotov that you have an urgent message for him and that you would therefore like to visit him immediately. Then please make the following statement to Herr Molotov. " In the telegram, the Comintern is accused of subversive activities, the Soviet government is accused of supporting the Comintern, it is said about the Bolshevization of Europe, the conclusion of the Soviet-Yugoslav treaty of friendship and cooperation and the accumulation of troops on the border with Germany.

Chief of the General Staff Georgy Zhukov reports to Stalin about Liskov's report. Stalin summons him and the People's Commissar for Defense Semyon Timoshenko to the Kremlin. They are joined by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov. Stalin refuses to believe the report and claims that the defector did not appear by chance. But Zhukov and Timoshenko insist. They have in their hands a prepared directive on bringing the troops to combat readiness. Stalin says: “It's early. Don't give in to provocations. " At the same time, on June 16, there was a report from Berlin: "All German military measures in preparation for an armed uprising against the USSR are completely completed and a strike can be expected at any time." Stalin asked for confirmation, but the war began earlier. By one o'clock in the morning, Zhukov and Timoshenko managed to convince Stalin to issue Directive No. 1. It contained an order to bring the troops into combat readiness, but at the same time not to succumb to provocations and "not to carry out any other measures without special orders." It was this directive that as a result became the main order for the first half of the day on June 22. As a result, many parts of the Soviet army did not offer resistance to the Wehrmacht until the moment of direct attack on them. Stalin approves, and Tymoshenko signs the declaration. Stalin leaves for a nearby dacha in Kuntsevo.

A Berlin-Moscow passenger train is passing through the border in the Brest region. In the opposite direction, trains with food and industrial goods move - ensuring supplies, in accordance with agreements between the countries. At the same time, Soviet border guards detained soldiers who were supposed to seize bridges: across the Narev River, a railway on the Bialystok-Chizhov road and a road bridge on the Bialystok-Belsk highway.

The border guards detained a defector from the German side, a carpenter from Kolberg, Alfred Liskov, who left the location of his unit and swam across the Bug. He said that at about 4 am the German army would go over to the offensive. The translator was not found right away, so his message was transmitted to the headquarters of Georgy Zhukov only around midnight. Alfred Liskov became the hero of the beginning of the war, they wrote about him in the newspapers, he became an active figure in the Comintern, then, presumably, he was shot by the NKVD in 1942. He was the third defector that day to announce the start of a military operation.

The German Ambassador to the USSR, Count Schulenburg, has been protesting about numerous violations of the USSR state border by German planes. The conversation between Molotov and Schulenburg is strange. Molotov asks questions about planes crossing the border, Schulenburg says in response that Soviet planes also end up on foreign territory on a regular basis. Molotov asks several questions about the complications of Soviet-German relations. Schulenburg says that he is completely unaware, since he is not informed of anything from Berlin. Finally, to the question about the recalled employees of the German embassy (by June 21, some of the embassy workers returned to Germany), Schulenburg replies - these are all insignificant figures that are not part of the main diplomatic corps.

According to a number of sources, it was at this time that Adolf Hitler signed an order for the immediate implementation of the "Barbarossa" plan, according to which the USSR should be occupied within the next 2-3 months. By this time, 190 German divisions had been pulled up to the border. At the same time, formally, the USSR has an advantage: although there are 170 divisions on the border, there are three times more tanks and one and a half more aircraft. All the invasion armies of the Wehrmacht, which by that time were pulled to the border of the USSR, received the order to start the operation at 13.00 Berlin time.

From that moment on, German troops begin to move to their initial positions along the border. On the night of June 22, they should launch an offensive in three general directions: North (Leningradskoe), Center (Moscow) and South (Kievskoe). A lightning-fast defeat of the main forces of the Red Army was planned to the west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers, in the future it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass with the subsequent exit to the Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line. Operation "Barbarossa" German generals under the leadership of Paulus have been developing since July 21, 1940. The plan of the operation was fully prepared and approved by the directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht No. 21 dated December 18, 1940.

June 22, 1941. 1st day of war

The day before, June 21, at 13:00. German troops received the conditional signal "Dortmund". It meant that the offensive according to the Barbarossa plan should begin the next day at 3 hours and 30 minutes.

On June 21, a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was held, after which the order (directive No. 1) of the NKO of the USSR was issued and transferred to the western military districts on the night of June 22, 1941: “During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden German attack on the fronts is possible. LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, ODVO ... The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions ... At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa military districts be in full combat readiness to meet a possible surprise strike from the Germans or their allies. "

On the night of June 21-22, German saboteurs began to operate on the territory of the USSR in the border zone, violating communication lines.

At 3 o'clock. 30 minutes. along the entire western border of the USSR, the Germans began artillery and aviation training, after which the German ground forces invaded the territory of the USSR. 15 minutes before that, at 3 o'clock. 15 minutes, the Romanian Air Force launched air strikes on the border areas of the USSR.

At 4 o'clock. 10 min. The Western and Baltic special districts reported on the beginning of hostilities by German troops in the land sectors of the districts.

At 5 h. 30 min. German Ambassador to the USSR Schulenburg handed over to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov a declaration of war. The same statement was made in Berlin to the USSR Ambassador to Germany Dekanozov.

At 7 o'clock. 15 minutes. directive No. 2 was issued signed by Timoshenko, Malenkov and Zhukov: “On June 22, 1941, at 04:00 am, German aviation, without any reason, raided our airfields and cities along the western border and bombarded them.
At the same time, German troops opened artillery fire in different places and crossed our border ... The troops with all their might and means attack the enemy forces and destroy them in the areas where they violated the Soviet border. "

The western border military districts of the USSR were transformed into fronts: the Baltic special - into the North-Western front, the Western special - into the Western, Kiev special - into the South-Western.

The beginning of the defense of the Liepaja naval base.

In the evening, directive No. 3 of the NKO of the USSR was issued, signed by Timoshenko, Malenkov, Zhukov, instructing the fronts to destroy the enemy with powerful counterattacks, "regardless of the state border."

The offensive of the German troops took the enemy by surprise ... everywhere we easily managed to capture bridges over water obstacles and break through the border strip of fortifications to the full depth ... resistance, threw it back and advanced with a battle on average 10-12 km! Thus, the way is open for mobile connections.

June 23, 1941. 2nd day of war

• 2nd day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 2nd day of defense of the Liepaja naval base.
• 2nd day of Border battles.

June 24, 1941. 3rd day of war

• 3rd day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 3rd day of defense of the Liepaja naval base.
• 3rd day of Border battles.
• 2nd day of the Red Army counterattacks in the Siauliai and Grodno directions.
• 2nd day of a tank battle in the Lutsk-Brody-Rivne region.

The Leningrad Military District was reorganized into the Northern Front.

June 25, 1941. 4th day of war

• 4th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 4th day of defense of the Liepaja naval base.
• 4th day of the Border battles.
• The third, last, day of the Red Army's counterattacks in the Siauliai and Grodno directions.
• 3rd day of a tank battle in the Lutsk-Brody-Rivne region.

The air forces of the Northern Front and the aviation units of the Northern and Red Banner Baltic fleets simultaneously attacked 19 airfields in Finland, where Nazi and Finnish aviation units were concentrated for operations on our targets. Having made about 250 sorties, the Soviet pilots destroyed many enemy planes and other military equipment at the airfields that day.

The Odessa Military District was reorganized into the Southern Front.

On June 25, the enemy's mobile units were developing an offensive in the Vilensk and Baranovichi directions ...

The enemy's attempts to break through on the Brodsky and Lvov directions are met with strong opposition ...

In the Bessarabian sector of the front, the troops of the Red Army firmly hold their positions ...

The assessment of the situation in the morning generally confirms the conclusion that the Russians have decided to conduct decisive battles in the border zone and withdraw only in certain sectors of the front, where they are forced to do so by the strong onslaught of our advancing troops.

June 26, 1941. 5th day of war

• 5th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 5th day of defense of the Liepaja naval base.
• 5th day of the Border battles.
• 4th day of a tank battle in the Lutsk-Brody-Rivne region.

During June 26, in the Minsk direction, our troops fought against the infiltrated enemy tank units.

The fighting continues.

In the Lutsk direction, large and fierce tank battles are going on throughout the day with an obvious advantage on the side of our troops ...

Army Group South is moving slowly forward, unfortunately suffering significant losses. The enemy operating against Army Group South has a firm and energetic leadership ...

On the front of Army Group Center, operations are developing successfully. In the area of ​​Slonim, the enemy's resistance was broken ...

Army Group North, encircling individual enemy groups, continues to systematically advance eastward.

June 27, 1941. 6th day of war

• 6th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 6th, last, day of the defense of the Liepaja naval base.
• 6th day of the Border battles.
• 5th day of a tank battle in the Lutsk - Brody - Rivne region.
• Day 2 of the defense of the naval base on the Hanko Peninsula.

During the day, our troops in the Shauliai, Vilensk and Baranovichi directions continued to retreat to positions prepared for defense, stopping for battle at intermediate lines ...
Along the entire sector of the front from Przemysl to the Black Sea, our troops firmly hold the state border.

June 28, 1941. 7th day of war

• 7th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 7th day of the Border battles.
• 6th day of a tank battle in the Lutsk-Brody-Rivne region.
• Day 3 of the defense of the naval base on the Hanko Peninsula.

... A major tank battle unfolded in the Lutsk direction during the day, involving up to 4,000 tanks from both sides. The tank battle continues.
Stubborn intense battles with the enemy are going on in the Lvov region, during which our troops inflict significant defeat on him ...

June 29, 1941. 8th day of war

• 8th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• 8th, last, day of the Frontier battles.
• 7th, last, day of a tank battle in the Lutsk - Brody - Rivne region.
• 4th day of defense of the naval base on the Hanko Peninsula.

German and Finnish troops launched an offensive in the Murmansk direction.

A strategic defensive operation began in the Arctic and Karelia.

On June 29, Finnish-German troops launched an offensive along the entire front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland ...

In the Vilna-Dvinskoe direction, attempts by the enemy's mobile units to influence the flanks and rear of our troops, which were withdrawing to new positions as a result of battles in the Shauliai, Keidany, Panevezh, Kaunas area, were unsuccessful ...
In the Lutsk direction, the battle of large tank masses continues ...

The Germans pursued the goal of disrupting the deployment of our troops in a few days and seizing Kiev and Smolensk with a lightning strike within a week. However ... our troops still managed to turn around, and the so-called lightning strike on Kiev, Smolensk was thwarted ...

Heavy fighting is still going on on the front of Army Group South. On the right flank of the 1st Panzer Group, the 8th Russian Panzer Corps penetrated deeply into our position ... This penetration of the enemy, obviously, caused a lot of confusion in our rear in the area between Brody and Dubno ... Separate groups are also operating in the rear of the 1st Panzer Group. enemy with tanks that even move long distances ... The situation in the Dubno area is very tense ...

In the center of the strip of Army Group Center, our completely mixed divisions are making every effort not to let the enemy out of the inner ring of the encirclement, desperately making his way in all directions ...

On the front of Army Group North, our troops are systematically continuing their offensive along the designated directions to the Western Dvina. All available crossings were captured by our troops ... Only part of the enemy troops managed to get out of the threat of encirclement in the eastern direction through the lake region between Dvinsk and Minsk to Polotsk.

June 30, 1941. 9th day of war

• 9th day of the defense of the Brest Fortress.
• Day 5 of the defense of the naval base on the Hanko Peninsula.
• 2nd day of the strategic defensive operation in the Arctic and Karelia.

The formation of the people's militia began in Leningrad.

All power in the USSR passes to the newly formed State Defense Committee (GKO) consisting of: Stalin (chairman), Molotov (deputy chairman), Beria, Voroshilov, Malenkov.

On the Vilensko-Dvinskoe direction, our troops are engaged in fierce battles with the enemy's motorized equipment ...
In the Minsk and Baranovichi directions, our troops are engaged in stubborn battles against the superior forces of the enemy's mobile forces, delaying their advance at intermediate lines ...

In general, operations continue to develop successfully on the fronts of all army groups. Only at the front of Army Group "Center" did a part of the encircled enemy grouping break through between Minsk and Slonim through the front of Panzer Group Guderian ... On the front of Army Group "North" the enemy launched a counterattack in the Riga region and wedged into our position ... Increased activity of enemy aviation in front of the front was noted army group "South" and in front of the Romanian front ... On the side of the enemy there are already completely outdated types of four-engine aircraft.

Sources of

• 1941 year. - M .: MF "Democracy", 1998
• History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945 Volume 2. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1961
• Franz Halder. War diary. 1941-1942. - M .: AST, 2003
• Zhukov G.K. Memories and Reflections. 1985. In 3 volumes.
• Isaev A.V. From Dubno to Rostov. - M .: AST; Transitbook, 2004

Most of the memoirs of Soviet military leaders tirelessly repeat the idea that the beginning of the Great Patriotic War found most of the Red Army soldiers sleeping peacefully, which is why the troops of the border districts were defeated. Naturally, Stalin is to blame, who did not heed the warnings of the military and to the last resisted putting the army on alert. Likewise, the French and German generals in their memoirs swore that they did their best to dissuade Napoleon and Hitler, respectively, from attacking Russia, but they did not listen. The goal in all three cases is the same - to push the blame for defeats off of oneself onto the head of state, and each time a study of the documents gives a completely opposite picture.

Ten days to assemble an army

In normal times, a military unit resembles a disassembled constructor: each detail lies in its own box. Equipment - in parks, preserved. Ammunition, fuel, food, medicine, etc. - in the appropriate warehouses. For the unit to be able to fight, the designer must be assembled. That is, to bring the troops on alert.

By the RVS directive No. 61582ss of April 29, 1934, three provisions were established in the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA): normal, enhanced, and a position of full readiness. Each involved a whole list of activities. Somewhat later, in Soviet times, such a list for bringing a howitzer battalion on alert (it was brought to me by the writer Valery Belousov, a former artillery officer) looked like this:

“Howitzer division of 122 mm M-30 howitzers. Divisional artillery level. Three batteries of six guns. Directorate (scouts, signalmen, headquarters), rear services (economy, traction, first-aid post). The staff is about one and a half hundred people.

Of the three batteries in ordinary peaceful life, the first is deployed, firing. The remaining 12 guns are in the park. On the blocks to relieve the springs. With barrels sealed with inhibitor paper, with hydraulics merged from the pistons of the recoil and recoil brake cylinders. Naturally, there are practically no personnel in the two batteries.

What is full alert?

1. To take on personnel up to the number of employees in the state, namely, six people per gun, drivers for all tractors, and a service platoon.

2. De-preserve the tractors, that is, install the batteries, refuel the vehicles with fuel, water and oil.

3. Scroll the mechanisms, clean the guns from grease, rinse them with kerosene, fill in the hydraulics, pump the pneumatics, receive and install the sights (optics are stored separately).

4. Get ammunition and bring them into oxnarvid, that is, finally equip: remove them from the boxes, wipe them with kerosene, unscrew the persistent covers and screw in the fuses, put them back in the boxes, put them in weights (plus signs to plus signs, minus signs to minus signs), load into equipment ...

5. Get compasses, rangefinders, binoculars, radios, telephones, cables, check connections, get code tables. The foremen get dry rations, the mechanics fill up their cars.

6. Get personal weapons and ammunition.

7. Conduct elementary combat coordination, at least a couple of times going to the training ground.

When the command "alarm" is given, everyone grabs their clothes, without dressing, rushes to the equipment and takes it out of the location to the area of ​​concentration. "

And that's not all. Ammunition is received in warehouses, and the warehouses are subordinate to the Main Artillery Directorate, and without an order from Moscow, not a single warehouse worker will even sneeze. The same applies to all other types of contentment. Bringing the unit to combat readiness is preceded by an avalanche of orders. Without all this, the army simply cannot fight.

But she fought, which means she was put on alert, and the documents confirm this.

“From the directive of the KOVO Military Council to the military councils of the 5th, 6th, 12th, 26th armies. June 11, 1941.

"one. In order to reduce the terms of combat readiness of covering units and detachments allocated to support the border troops, take the following measures:

Rifle, cavalry and artillery units

a) Have a carry-on supply of rifle cartridges in sealed boxes. For each heavy machine gun, have 50 percent of the ammunition load packed and stowed in boxes and 50 percent of the loaded magazines for a light machine gun.

Store boxes with cartridges, boxes with stuffed tapes and disks in a sealed form in subdivisions in specially guarded premises.

b) Store hand and rifle grenades in sets in unit warehouses in special boxes for each unit.

Photo: Anatoly Garanin / RIA Novosti

c) 1/2 of the ammunition load of artillery shells and mines of the emergency reserve for all parts of the cover should be in a finally equipped form. For military anti-aircraft artillery, to have 1/2 of the ammunition load of artillery shells of non-stock in the finally equipped form.

d) Store military-chemical, engineering and communications equipment in the warehouses of units, in sets for each subdivision.

e) Store the wearable food supply and personal belongings of the fighters in a prepared form for packing in duffel bags and knapsacks.

f) Have two refueling stations for all types of vehicles - one filled into the tanks of machines (tractors) and one in tanks (barrels). "

Please note: the directive was released on June 11th. There are still ten days before the war, and measures to bring troops to combat readiness are in full swing. The terms of alert readiness after carrying out these measures were set by the same directive: for rifle and artillery units on horse-drawn traction - 2 hours; for cavalry, mechanized units and mechanical artillery - 3 hours. The pre-war night would be enough.

"To bring the execution by 24 o'clock on June 21"

The next line of preparation for war is June 18th. On this day, a directive came from the General Staff, after which the units began to withdraw to the concentration areas.

“From the order for the 12th mechanized corps No. 0033. June 18, 1941.
[...] 4. At 23:00 on 06/18/41, the units leave the occupied winter apartments and concentrate ... approx. "Lenta.ru").

5. Marches should be performed only at night. In concentration areas, carefully camouflage and organize all-round security and surveillance. To dig cracks, to disperse the troops up to the company with the distance of the company from the company 300-400 meters. "

Pay attention to the timing - the corps literally rushed out of the military camps.

“[...] 8. By 23:00 on 06/18/41 inform the headquarters of the corps (Jelgava) by telephone or telegraph with the conditional number" 127 "about the departure from winter quarters.

10. The command post of the 12th mechanized corps from 04:00 on 20.06.41 - in the forest 2 km west of the dv. Nice (1266). Until 22:00 18.06.41 corps command post - Jelgava. "

In the early 1950s, the Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces conducted a survey of Soviet military leaders regarding the concentration and deployment of troops in the western border military districts in June 1941. They recalled that they received orders to withdraw their units to the concentration areas on June 18-19.

“Colonel General of Tank Forces P.P. Poluboyarov (former head of the armored forces of the PribOVO):

“On June 16, at 23:00, the command of the 12th Mechanized Corps received a directive to put the formation on alert ... On June 18, the corps commander raised the formations and units on a combat alert and ordered them to be withdrawn to the planned areas. This was done during June 19 and 20.

On June 16, by order of the district headquarters, the 3rd mechanized corps was also put on alert and concentrated in the indicated area at the same time. "

Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov (former commander of the 8th Army):

“By the end of the day, oral orders were given to concentrate troops on the border. On the morning of June 19, I personally checked the progress of the order. "

Major General I.I. Fadeev (former commander of the 10th rifle division of the 8th army):

“On June 19, 1941, an order was received from the commander of the 10th rifle corps, Major General I.F. Nikolaev on bringing the division to combat readiness. All units were immediately withdrawn to the defense area, occupied bunkers and artillery firing positions. At dawn, the commanders of regiments, battalions and companies on the ground clarified the combat missions in accordance with the previously developed plan and brought them to the attention of the platoon and squad commanders. "

Major General P.I. Abramidze (former commander of the 72nd Mountain Rifle Division of the 26th Army):

“On June 20, 1941, I received the following message from the General Staff:“ All subunits and units of your compound located on the border itself should be withdrawn several kilometers back, that is, to the line of prepared positions. such will not violate the state border. All units of the division must be put on alert. The execution should be brought to 24 o'clock on June 21, 1941 "".

As you can see, the troops were concentrated and, if necessary, deployed, and even the date of the attack was precisely known. So the famous Directive # 1, issued on the night of June 21-22, was not the last desperate attempt to save the situation, but the natural ending of a whole series of orders.

Who was in Stalin's office

If you believe the recollections of the then Chief of the General Staff Georgy Zhukov, when on the evening of June 21, he and the People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko, having received information about another defector, came to Stalin in order to persuade him to allow him to bring the troops into combat readiness, they found the leader alone, then the members of the Politburo appeared ...

However, according to the magazine of visitors to the Stalinist office, by the time Timoshenko arrived (19:05), the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov had already been sitting there for half an hour. Together with the People's Commissar of Defense, the People's Commissar of the NKVD Lavrenty Beria, the chairman of the State Planning Committee Alexei Voznesensky, the head of the personnel department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Georgy Malenkov, who was in charge of the defense industry, the chairman of the defense committee under the Council of People's Commissars, the commander of the Kiev military district, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, and several other people came up.

After the end of the part of the meeting devoted to the mobilization of industry, Voznesensky leaves at 20:15. At the same time, Tymoshenko left, so that in half an hour he would return with Zhukov, the first deputy commissar of defense, Marshal Semyon Budyonny, and People's Commissar of State Control Lev Mekhlis.

The second, military part of the conference began. The military districts were transformed into fronts, Budyonny was appointed commander of the armies of the second line, Mehlis was appointed head of the political propaganda department of the Red Army, Zhukov was entrusted with the general leadership of the Southwestern and Southern fronts. All four and Malenkov, then the head of the Central Committee's personnel department and secretary of the Central Committee, left Stalin's office at 22:20. Molotov, Beria and Voroshilov remained with the leader. At 11 o'clock the office was empty. What did they do next?

The answer is simple: people have been working hard all afternoon - they actually need to eat! Stalin dined just about eleven in the evening, his lunches served simultaneously as working meetings. So the assumption that the future members of the State Defense Committee moved from the Stalinist cabinet to the Stalinist apartment seems the most logical.

At this time, Timoshenko and Zhukov in the People's Commissariat of Defense were writing Directive No. 1 in a cipher pad. According to the first edition of the memoirs of the People's Commissar of the Navy Nikolai Kuznetsov (later the admiral corrected them in accordance with the general line about the resisting proposals of the military to Stalin), at about 11 pm in the People's Commissariat of Defense “the People's Commissar in an unbuttoned tunic walked around the office and dictated something. At the table sat the chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov and, without stopping, continued to write a telegram. Several sheets of a large notebook lay to the left of him ... Perhaps an attack by the Nazi troops, - began the conversation S. K. Timoshenko. According to him, the order to bring the troops to a state of combat readiness to repel the expected enemy attack was received by him personally from I.V. Stalin, who by that time already had, apparently, the relevant reliable information ... "

Now this is more like the truth!

Writing, encrypting and decrypting a directive is a long process. The telegram went to the troops at 00:30 in the morning, to the fleets even later. What did Admiral Kuznetsov do when he learned about the impending attack? That's right: he immediately gave the order to call the fleets and warn subordinates orally. Why, as is commonly believed, did not the People's Commissar of Defense do this?

And who, by the way, said that he did not?

The most interesting memories were left by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR Matvey Zakharov, who was the chief of staff of the Odessa Military District before the war. On the evening of June 21, he was in Tiraspol at a field command post, fully equipped in case of war, while the commander of the district was still in Odessa.

“At about 22 o'clock on June 21, the commander of the district troops summoned me for negotiations from Odessa on the BODO apparatus. He asked if I could decipher the telegram if I received it from Moscow. The commander was told that I could decipher any encryption from Moscow. The question followed again: "They ask again, confirm your answer, can you decipher the encryption from Moscow?" I was extremely surprised by the repetition of the request. I replied: "I am reporting for the second time that I can decipher any encryption from Moscow." An instruction followed: "Expect the receipt of encryption of special importance from Moscow. The Military Council authorizes you to decrypt the encryption immediately and give appropriate orders."

Naturally, he immediately gave the appropriate orders. But here's what happened next:

“After assessing the situation, at about 11 pm on June 21, I decided to call the commanders of the 14th, 35th and 48th rifle corps and the chief of staff of the 2nd cavalry corps to the offices ... All of them were given the following instructions: 1. Headquarters and to raise the troops on alert and withdraw from the settlements. 2. Covering units to occupy their areas. 3. Establish communication with border units. "

Please note: the chief of staff of the Odessa district begins to act two hours before receiving the directive. He, in fact, does not need an order - the order of actions is dictated to him by previous measures and a plan to cover the state border. Therefore, he took the strange double request from the district headquarters (clearly following a double request from Moscow) as a signal for action, like most other military leaders.

But what about the famous story about three divisions of the 4th Army of the Western Military District, stationed in Brest and caught up in German artillery fire right in the barracks? Is this really an invention? No, it's absolutely true. However, one should not forget that the commander of the 4th Army, Alexander Korobkov, and the commander of the Belarusian Military District, Dmitry Pavlov, were shot shortly after the start of the war for acts very similar to sabotage. But this is already a subject for a separate investigation, as well as the question of why the Soviet commanders, who had received documents in advance on bringing the troops to combat readiness, in the fall of 1941 were at the walls of Moscow and Leningrad.

“On June 21, at 21.00, a soldier who escaped from the German army, Alfred Liskov, was detained at the site of the Sokal commandant's office. Since there was no interpreter in the commandant's office, I ordered the commandant of the area, Captain Bershadsky, to deliver the soldier to the city of Vladimir by a truck to the headquarters of the detachment.

At 0.30 on June 22, 1941, the soldier arrived in the city of Vladimir-Volynsk. Through an interpreter at about 1 am, soldier Liskov indicated that on June 22 at dawn the Germans should cross the border. I immediately reported this to the officer in charge of the headquarters of the troops, brigade commissar Maslovsky. At the same time, I personally told the commander of the 5th Army, Major General Potapov, by telephone, who reacted suspiciously to my message, not taking it into account.

I personally was also not firmly convinced of the veracity of the soldier Liskov's message, but nevertheless called the commandants of the precincts and ordered to strengthen the security of the state border, to put up rumors on the river. Bug and in the event of a crossing of the Germans across the river, destroy them with fire. At the same time I ordered that if anything suspicious is noticed (any movement on the adjacent side), immediately report to me personally. I was at the headquarters all the time.

The commandants of the polling stations at 1.00 on June 22 reported to me that nothing suspicious was noticed on the adjacent side, everything was calm ... "("Mechanisms of War" with reference to RGVA, f. 32880, on. 5, d. 279, l. 2. Copy).

Despite doubts about the reliability of the information transmitted by the German soldier, and the skeptical attitude towards it on the part of the commander of the 5th Army, it was promptly transferred to the "top".

From a telephone message from the UNKGB in the Lviv region to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR.

" On June 22, 1941, at 3:10 am, the UNKGB in the Lviv region transmitted the following message by telephone to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR: “A German corporal who crossed the border in the Sokal region showed the following: his surname was Alfred Germanovich Liskov, 30 years old, a worker, a carpenter of a furniture factory in Kolberg (Bavaria), where he left his wife, child, mother and father.

The corporal served in the 221st sapper regiment of the 15th division. The regiment is located in the village of Tselezha, which is 5 km north of Sokal. Drafted into the army from the reserve in 1939.

He considers himself a communist, is a member of the Union of Red Front-line soldiers, says that life in Germany is very difficult for soldiers and workers.

Before the evening, his company commander, Lieutenant Schultz, gave an order and said that tonight, after artillery preparation, their unit would begin crossing the Bug on rafts, boats and pontoons. As a supporter of the Soviet regime, upon learning of this, he decided to run to us and inform us. "("History in documents" with reference to "1941. Documents". Soviet archives. "Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU", 1990, No. 4. ").

G.K. Zhukov recalls: "At about 24 hours on June 21, the commander of the Kiev district, MP Kirponos, who was at his command post in Ternopil, reported on high frequency [...] another German soldier appeared in our units - 222- 1st Infantry Regiment of the 74th Infantry Division. He swam across the river, appeared to the border guards and said that at 4 o'clock the German troops would go on the offensive. M. P. Kirponos was ordered to quickly transmit a directive to the troops on bringing them to combat readiness ... ".

However, there was no time left. The above-mentioned head of the 90th border detachment M.S. Bychkovsky continues his testimony as follows:

"... In view of the fact that the translators in the detachment are weak, I summoned a German teacher from the city who speaks excellent German, and Liskov repeated the same thing again, that is, that the Germans are preparing to attack the USSR at dawn on June 22, 1941. himself a communist and said that he had come to warn him on his own initiative.

Without finishing the questioning of the soldier, I heard heavy artillery fire in the direction of Ustilug (the first commandant's office). I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory, which was confirmed immediately by the interrogated soldier. I immediately began to call the commandant, but the connection was broken ... "(cit. ist.) The Great Patriotic War began.

03:00 - 13:00, General Staff - Kremlin. The first hours of the war

Was Germany's attack on the USSR completely unexpected? What were the generals, the General Staff and the People's Commissariat for Defense undertaking in the first hours of the war? There is a version that the beginning of the war was overslept corny - both in the border units and in Moscow. Confusion and panic arose with the news about the bombing of Soviet cities and about the transition of fascist troops to the offensive in the capital.

Zhukov recalls the events of that night: “On the night of June 22, 1941, all employees of the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense were ordered to remain in their places. At that time, the People's Commissar of Defense and I were in continuous negotiations with the commanders of the districts and chiefs of staff, who reported to us about the increasing noise on the other side of the border. This information they received from the border guards and the forward covering units. Everything indicated that the German troops were moving closer to the border. "

The first message about the beginning of the war came to the General Staff at 0300 hours on June 22, 1941.

Zhukov writes: “At 0300 hours, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, FS Oktyabrsky, phoned me on HF and said:“ The VNOS [air surveillance, warning and communication] system of the fleet reports on the approach from the sea side of a large number of unknown aircraft; the fleet is in full combat readiness. I ask for instructions "[...]

“At 4 o'clock I again talked to FS. Oktyabrsky. He reported in a calm tone: “The enemy raid has been repulsed. An attempt to strike at the ships was thwarted. But there is destruction in the city. "

As can be seen from these lines, the Black Sea Fleet did not take the beginning of the war by surprise. The air attack was repulsed.

03.30: Chief of Staff of the Western District, General Klimovskikh, reported on the enemy air raid on the cities of Belarus.

03:33 The chief of staff of the Kiev district, General Purkaev, reported on the air raid on the cities of Ukraine.

03:40: The commander of the Baltic region, General Kuznetsov, reported on the raid on Kaunas and other cities.

03:40: People's Commissar of Defense S. K. Timoshenko ordered Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov to call Stalin at Blizhnyaya Dacha and report on the beginning of hostilities. After listening to Zhukov, Stalin ordered:

Come with Tymoshenko to the Kremlin. Tell Poskrebyshev to summon all the members of the Politburo.

04.10: The Western and Baltic special districts reported on the beginning of hostilities by German troops in the land sectors.

At 4:30 am, members of the Politburo, People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov gathered in the Kremlin. Stalin asked to urgently contact the German embassy.

The embassy said that Ambassador Count von Schulenburg asks to be received for an urgent message. Molotov went to meet with Schulenberg. Returning to the office, he said:

The German government has declared war on us.

At 7:15 am, JV Stalin signed a directive to the USSR Armed Forces to repel Hitler's aggression.

At 0930 hours, in the presence of S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov, J.V. Stalin edited and signed a decree on mobilization and the imposition of martial law in the European part of the country, as well as on the formation of the Headquarters of the High Command and a number of other documents ...

On the morning of June 22, it was decided that at 12 o'clock VM Molotov would address the peoples of the Soviet Union with a Statement of the Soviet Government to the peoples of the Soviet Union.

"JV Stalin," recalls Zhukov, "being seriously ill, of course, could not make an appeal to the Soviet people. He, together with Molotov, drew up a statement."

"At about 13 o'clock, J. V. Stalin called me," Zhukov writes in his memoirs, "and said:

Our front commanders do not have sufficient experience in guiding troops' combat operations and, apparently, were somewhat at a loss. The Politburo has decided to send you to the Southwestern Front as a representative of the Headquarters of the High Command. We will send Shaposhnikov and Kulik to the Western Front. I called them to my place and gave the appropriate instructions. You need to fly immediately to Kiev and from there, together with Khrushchev, go to the front headquarters in Ternopil.

I asked:

And who will be in charge of the General Staff in such a difficult situation?
J.V. Stalin replied:

Leave Vatutin to yourself.

Don't waste time, we'll manage somehow.

I called home not to be expected, and after 40 minutes I was already in the air. Then I just remembered that I hadn't eaten anything since yesterday. The pilots helped me out by treating me to strong tea with sandwiches. " (the chronology is based on the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov).

05:30. Hitler announces the beginning of the war with the USSR

On June 22, 1941, at 5:30 am, Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels, in a special broadcast on Greater German Radio, read out Adolf Hitler's address to the German people in connection with the outbreak of the war against the Soviet Union.

“... Today, 160 Russian divisions are stationed on our border,” the appeal said. “In recent weeks, there have been continuous violations of this border, not only ours, but also in the far north and in Romania. that they carelessly fly over this border, as if they want to show us that they already feel they are the masters of this territory.On the night of June 17-18, Russian patrols again invaded the territory of the Reich and were driven out only after a long skirmish. But now the hour has come when it is necessary to oppose this conspiracy of the Jewish-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and also the Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik center in Moscow.

German people! At this moment, the greatest in its length and volume of military action that the world has ever seen. Allied with the Finnish comrades are the fighters of the victor at Narvik near the Arctic Ocean. German divisions under the command of the conqueror of Norway, together with the Finnish heroes of the struggle for freedom under the command of their marshal, defend Finnish soil. The formations of the German eastern front are deployed from East Prussia to the Carpathians. On the banks of the Prut and in the lower reaches of the Danube to the Black Sea coast, Romanian and German soldiers are united under the command of the head of state Antonescu.

The task of this front is no longer to protect individual countries, but to ensure the security of Europe and thereby save everyone.

Therefore, today I decided to put the fate and future of the German Reich and our people back into the hands of our soldiers. May the Lord help us in this struggle! "

Battles all along the front

Fascist troops launched an offensive along the entire front. Not everywhere did the attack develop according to the scenario conceived by the German General Staff. The Black Sea Fleet repulsed an air raid. In the south, in the north, the Wehrmacht failed to gain an overwhelming advantage. Heavy positional battles began here.

Army Group North ran into fierce resistance from Soviet tank crews near the town of Alytus. Capturing the crossing of the Niemen was critical to the advancing German forces. Here, units of the 3rd Panzer Group of the Nazis stumbled upon organized resistance from the 5th Panzer Division.

Only dive bombers managed to break the resistance of Soviet tankers. The 5th Panzer Division did not have air cover, under the threat of the destruction of manpower and materiel, it began to withdraw.

Bombers dived into Soviet tanks until noon on 23 June. The division lost almost all armored vehicles and, in fact, ceased to exist. However, on the first day of the war, the tankers did not leave the line and stopped the advance of the Nazi troops inland.

The main blow of the German troops fell on Belarus. Here the Brest Fortress stood in the way of the Nazis. In the first seconds of the war, a hail of bombs fell on the city, followed by heavy artillery fire. After that, units of the 45th Infantry Division went on the attack.

Hurricane fire of the Nazis caught the defenders of the fortress by surprise. However, the garrison, which numbered 7-8 thousand people, put up fierce resistance to the advancing German units.

By midday on June 22, the Brest Fortress was completely surrounded. Part of the garrison managed to escape from the "cauldron", part was blocked and continued to resist.

By the evening of the first day of the war, the Nazis managed to capture the southwestern part of the fortified city, the northeast was under the control of Soviet troops. Pockets of resistance remained in the territories controlled by the fascists.

Despite the complete encirclement and overwhelming superiority in people and technology, the Nazis failed to break the resistance of the defenders of the Brest Fortress. Clashes continued here until November 1941.

Air supremacy battle

From the first minutes of the war, the USSR Air Force entered into a fierce battle with enemy aircraft. The attack was sudden, some of the aircraft did not manage to rise from the airfields and were destroyed on the ground. The greatest blow was taken by the Belarusian Military District. The 74th Attack Aviation Regiment, which was based in Pruzhany, was attacked at about 4 o'clock in the morning by the Messerschmites. The regiment did not have air defense systems, the planes were not dispersed, as a result of which the enemy aircraft smashed the equipment as at a training ground.

A completely different situation developed in the 33rd Fighter Aviation Regiment. Here the pilots entered the battle as early as 3.30 am, when a German plane was shot down by Lieutenant Mochalov's flight over Brest. This is how the site of the Aviation Encyclopedia "Corner of the Sky" describes the battle of the 33rd IAP (article by A. Gulyas):

"Soon about 20 He-111 flew into the airfield of the regiment under the cover of a small group of Bf-109. At that time there was only one squadron, which took off and entered the battle. Soon it was joined by the other three squadrons returning from patrolling the Brest-Kobrin area. The enemy lost 5 aircraft in the battle. Two He-111s were destroyed by Lt. Gudimov. The last victory he won at 5.20 am, ramming a German bomber. Twice more, the regiment successfully intercepted large groups of "Heinkels" on the distant approaches to the airfield. already in the last liters of fuel, the I-16 regiments were attacked by Messerschmitts. No one was able to take off to help. The airfield was under continuous attack for almost an hour.

123 Fighter Aviation Regiment, whose airfield was located near the town of Imenin, as well as the 74th Attack Aviation Regiment, did not have anti-aircraft cover. However, its pilots were in the air from the first minutes of the war:

"By 5.00 am BN Surin already had a personal victory - he shot down Bf-109. On the fourth sortie, being seriously wounded, he brought his" seagull "to the airfield, but could no longer land. Obviously, he died in the cockpit while leveling ... Boris Nikolayevich Surin fought 4 battles, personally shot down 3 German planes. At sunset, two Bf-109s were sent as victims of his brisk "seagulls"! .. "- the Aviation Encyclopedia informs.

"At about eight in the morning, four fighters piloted by Mr. M.P. Mozhaev, officers G.N. Zhidov, P.S. Ryabtsev and Nazarov flew out against eight Messerschmitts-109s. , the Germans knocked it out. Rescuing a comrade, Mozhaev shot down one fascist. Zhidov set fire to the second. Having expended the ammunition, Ryabtsev rammed the third enemy. Thus, in this battle the enemy lost 3 vehicles, and we lost one. For 10 hours the pilots of the 123rd IAP were driving heavy battles, making 10 -14 and even 17 sorties. Technicians, working under enemy fire, ensured aircraft readiness. During the day, the regiment shot down about 30 (according to other sources, more than 20) enemy aircraft, losing 9 of its own in the air. "

Unfortunately, in the absence of communications and the reigning confusion, the timely delivery of ammunition and fuel was not organized. War machines fought to the last drop of gasoline and the last bullet. Then they froze dead on the airfield and became easy prey for the Nazis.

The total losses of Soviet aircraft on the first day of the war amounted to 1,160 aircraft.

12:00. Radio speech by V.M. Molotov

At noon on June 22, 1941, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov read out an appeal to the citizens of the Soviet Union:

"CITIZENS AND CITIZENS OF THE SOVIET UNION!

The Soviet government and its head, Comrade Stalin, instructed me to make the following statement:

Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without making any claims to the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed our cities from their planes - Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others, and more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Enemy aircraft raids and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territory.

This unheard-of attack on our country is treachery unparalleled in the history of civilized nations. The attack on our country was carried out in spite of the fact that a non-aggression pact was concluded between the USSR and Germany and the Soviet government fulfilled all the terms of this treaty with all conscientiousness. The attack on our country was carried out in spite of the fact that during the entire period of operation of this treaty the German government could never present a single claim against the Soviet Union for the fulfillment of the treaty. All responsibility for this predatory attack on the Soviet Union falls entirely on the German fascist rulers.

Already after the attack, the German ambassador in Moscow Schulenburg at 5.30 a.m. made me, as the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, a statement on behalf of his government that the German government had decided to launch a war against the Soviet Union in connection with the concentration of Red Army units near the eastern German border.

In response to this, on behalf of the Soviet government, I declared that until the last minute the German government had made no claims against the Soviet government, that Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, despite the peace-loving position of the Soviet Union, and that thereby Nazi Germany was the attacking party. ...

On the instructions of the government of the Soviet Union, I must also declare that at no point did our troops and our aviation violate the border, and therefore the statement made this morning by the Romanian radio that allegedly Soviet aviation fired at Romanian airfields is a complete lie and a provocation. The same lie and provocation is the whole of today's declaration of Hitler, who is trying, retroactively, to concoct accusatory material about the failure of the Soviet Union to comply with the Soviet-German pact.

Now that the attack on the Soviet Union has already been accomplished, the Soviet government has given an order to our troops to repulse the robbery attack and expel the German troops from the territory of our homeland.

This war was imposed on us not by the German people, not by the German workers, peasants and intellectuals, whose suffering we well understand, but by a clique of bloodthirsty fascist rulers of Germany who enslaved the French, Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece and other peoples ...

The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its unshakable confidence that our valiant army and navy and the brave falcons of Soviet aviation will honor their duty to the homeland, to the Soviet people, and deal a crushing blow to the aggressor.
This is not the first time our people have to deal with an attacking arrogant enemy. At one time, our people responded to Napoleon's campaign in Russia with a Patriotic War, and Napoleon was defeated, came to his own collapse. The same will happen with the arrogant Hitler, who has announced a new campaign against our country, the Red Army and our entire people will once again wage a victorious patriotic war for the homeland, for honor, for freedom.

The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its firm conviction that the entire population of our country, all workers, peasants and intellectuals, men and women, will treat their duties and work with due consciousness. Our entire people must now be united and united as never before. Each of us must demand from ourselves and from others discipline, organization, dedication, worthy of a real Soviet patriot, in order to meet all the needs of the Red Army, navy and aviation in order to ensure victory over the enemy.

The government calls on you, citizens and women of the Soviet Union, to rally your ranks even more closely around our glorious Bolshevik Party, around our Soviet government, around our great leader, Comrade Stalin.

Our cause is right. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours".

The first atrocities of the fascists

The first case of atrocities by the German army on the territory of the Soviet Union falls on the first day of the war. On June 22, 1941, the Nazis, advancing, broke into the village of Albinga, Klaipeda region of Lithuania.

The soldiers robbed and burned down all the houses. Residents - 42 people - were herded into a barn and locked up. During the day on June 22, the Nazis killed several people - beaten to death or shot.

The next morning, the systematic destruction of people began. Groups of peasants were taken out of the barn and shot in cold blood. First, all men, then it came to women and children. Those who tried to escape into the forest were shot in the back.

In 1972, a memorial ensemble to the victims of fascism was created near Ablinga.

The first summary of the Great Patriotic War

RED ARMY MAIN COMMAND SUMMARY
for 22.VI. - 1941

At dawn on June 22, 1941, the regular troops of the German army attacked our border units on the front from the BALTIC to the BLACK SEA and were held back by them during the first half of the day. In the afternoon, German troops met with the advanced units of the field forces of the Red Army. After fierce fighting, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. Only in the Grodno and KRISTYNOPOL areas did the enemy manage to achieve insignificant tactical successes and occupy the townships of KALVARIA, STOYANUV and TSEKHANOVETS (the first two are 15 km away and the last 10 km away from the border).

Enemy aircraft attacked a number of our airfields and settlements, but everywhere they met a decisive rebuff from our fighters and anti-aircraft artillery, which inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. We shot down 65 enemy aircraft. from the RIA Novosti funds

23:00 (GMT). Winston Churchill's speech on BBC radio

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill made a statement on June 22 at 23:00 GMT in connection with the aggression of Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union.

"... The Nazi regime possesses the worst features of communism," in particular, he said on the BBC radio. Over the past 25 years, no one has been a more consistent opponent of communism than I. I will not take back a single word that I said about it.But all this pales before the spectacle unfolding now.The past with its crimes, madness and tragedies is disappearing.

I see Russian soldiers standing on the doorstep of their native land, guarding the fields that their fathers have cultivated since time immemorial.

I see them guarding their homes, where their mothers and wives pray - yes, for there are times when everyone prays - for the safety of their loved ones, for the return of their breadwinner, their protector and support.

I see tens of thousands of Russian villages, where livelihoods are pulled out from the ground with such difficulty, but where there are primordial human joys, where girls laugh and children play.

I see the vile Nazi war machine approaching all this with its dapper, rattling spurs of Prussian officers, with its skillful agents who have just pacified and tied a dozen countries hand and foot.

I also see a gray drilled obedient mass of fierce Hunnic soldiers approaching like clouds of crawling locusts.

In the sky I see German bombers and fighters with unhealed scars from the wounds inflicted on them by the British, rejoicing that they have found what they think are easier and more reliable prey.

Behind all this noise and thunder, I see a bunch of villains who plan, organize and bring this avalanche of disasters to humanity ... must speak up immediately, without a single day of delay. I have to make a statement, but can you doubt what our policy will be?

We have only one and only unchanging goal. We are determined to destroy Hitler and all traces of the Nazi regime. Nothing can turn us away from it, nothing. We will never come to an agreement, we will never enter into negotiations with Hitler or any of his gang. We will fight with him on land, we will fight with him at sea, we will fight with him in the air, until, with God's help, we will rid the earth from his very shadow and free the peoples from his yoke. Any person or state that fights against Nazism will receive our help. Any person or state that goes with Hitler is our enemy ...

This is our policy, this is our statement. Hence it follows that we will render all the assistance we can to Russia and the Russian people ... "

Or - so what happened in the pre-war days in the NKO and the General Staff, in the western districts, how the troops were withdrawn according to the Covering Plans and from what date, how did the troops rise on alarm on the night of the attack, how BEFORE the German attack, "red" packets were opened in the districts and on whose command, how did the General Staff of the General Staff misinform the Kremlin and other facts ...

(A new chapter from a new book ...)

Part 1.

Unfortunately, many of our modern historians are also specialists in spiritualism. ... Instead of simply taking documents from the pre-war days at TsAMO, but studying: and what was done or not done in those May and June days, they diligently wonder - and what there "thought" about a possible war with Germany, Stalin or Zhukov or someone else from the military-political leadership of the USSR.

They take such historians, the same "intelligence reports", and not found by them in the archives of intelligence, but published in the collection of documents "1941. Documents "(the so-called" robin "), published under the leadership of the anti-Soviet and Gorby's accomplice in the collapse of the USSR Yakovlev, and on these" summaries "they begin to invent - so what was Stalin thinking! Was he expecting an attack in June 1941, was he expecting some kind of "ultimatums" from Hitler and other nonsense about the "thoughts" of the beetles ...

Unambiguously, intelligence data, starting from the same March 41st about Germany's preparations for an attack on the USSR, about the "date" of the attack, of course, were "contradictory" and of course there was no clear date of the attack there, already in March - 22 June! And although the closer to mid-June, the more often "June 22" is shown in these reports as the most accurate date of the attack, on this our historians compose: since the data were "contradictory", and the date of the German attack was constantly "floating" and "changing" in these reports, Stalin could not unequivocally determine which date was the most reliable. And that means - the attack for him was "sudden", in the sense of "unexpected". After all, he never found out the exact date and therefore did not take any particular measures for a possible attack. Apparently - he was waiting for intelligence to report him the exact date and time, and apparently signed by Hitler, and did not wait ...

And both professional historians and amateur researchers suffer from this “spiritualism”, inventing what Stalin or the same Zhukov “thought” there. All of them are essentially guessing, and instead of thinking, with all the data on the "dates", which date Stalin took as the most "reliable", these historians know for sure - Stalin never chose the most accurate of them !!!

But everything is simple. If you want to know what Stalin "thought" about the dates of the attack - see WHAT decisions he made, and the military followed him - in May-June 1941! And you can easily see this - see what activities were carried out in the districts in June according to the directives of the NCO and the General Staff, what directives were sent to the districts from Moscow, and what orders were issued in the districts themselves - in pursuance of these directives of the NGO and the General Staff. And based on what is known today from the events held in May-June in the USSR in preparation for the war with Nazi Germany, it is clear that the preparations were quite extensive. And everything was tied exactly to the 20th of June in the end.

Much has been known for a long time about the withdrawal of troops from the internal districts to help the western districts. And in this regard, it is Zhukov including, all this can be credited - in terms of preparation for war in June 41st, he personally did as early. GSh is his best in his power and competence! But - not on "personal initiative", but precisely on the orders and instructions of Stalin, he did something - as the second person in the army after the people's commissar (minister) of defense Tymoshenko.

One can only add - before sending these troops on the ground, some armies were mobilized, raised all their stocks of ammunition and fuel and lubricants and went west in full combat readiness. But some armies were planning to mobilize on the spot. And if they arrived before June 21, then on the spot they received additional vehicles from the local RVCs and registered officers from the local auto enterprises, if required. And even more so this was done after June 22.

Consider briefly the events of those days (main) June 41st, which according to quite accessible "sources" can be restored by ANY researcher. And even more so - it can be EASILY for a historian who has access to archives. We will show this "chronology" - both for the "rezuns" and for those who blindly believe in the "memoirs" of the Zhukovs, in which the pre-war events are not shown at all, and even more so to the common reader ...

(For all the facts below, all the necessary "links to sources" were given in my research on the topic "June 22" - in 7 books published since 2010, and also facts and documents found by researcher G. Spaskov at TsAMO will be used here , which he cites in his work "Bring on alert" ...)

At the beginning of June, in connection with the strengthening of the grouping of German troops on the other side of the border, the Military Councils of the western districts began to send requests to the NKO and the General Staff with proposals-requests for the withdrawal of troops from the districts closer to the border according to the Covering Plans. Also in early June, the General Staff sent out reports to the districts with data on the number of German troops near our border.

As the study "1941 - lessons and conclusions" shows: "By June 5, 1941, the mobile cells left at the points of permanent deployment had to draw up a plan for accepting horses, a wagon train and mechanical transport and submit applications for their transportation to new areas. General base by this time had actual data on the final concentration of enemy troops and the timing of his attack". (M, 1992, p. 84)

However, GSh-Zhukov sent troops from the internal districts to the border ones - most often they were not mobilized. As indicated by the "lessons and conclusions" - "The General Staff, in moving troops to the operational areas of divisions from the internal military districts without equipping them with the transport required by the state, made a gross mistake." After all - this is "It is obvious that under these conditions, it was necessary to carry out the transportation to the theaters of military operations only with completed, trained formations with military reserves of fuel, food and ammunition." " The mistakes of the first world war were repeated in the fact that the Siberian units in 1941 moved to the western border also unmobilized and accepted reinforcements during the war. "

Those. - The General Staff, Zhukov, on the eve of the war, did completely ignore the negative experience of the First World War?….

VS OdVO sent such a request yet June 6th- in connection with the expectation of an attack by Romania and German troops on the border of the OdVO on 12 June.

VS KOVO June 9 also made a request for a withdrawal and tried to start raising the border divisions with their subsequent withdrawal to their defense lines, in the foreground. In connection with the expectation of an attack on June 17, June 11, KOVO issued a directive for border divisions on the implementation of measures “In order to reduce the cover parts and detachments allocated to support the border troops", In which it was ordered to carry out measures that would allow, in the event of an alarm signal, to quickly lead the troops to the b.g. and occupy the lines of defense.

By PribOVO- such a request is still unknown. However, most likely the commander of the district, General Kuznetsov, who personally arrived in Moscow, at a personal meeting with Stalin June 11 could well have discussed this issue ... When Stalin had Zhukov (with Timoshenko), who brought him a directive to enter the PP.

Those. as soon as the concentration of troops began on the other side, and even more so the date of a possible attack - the threat of war - came from intelligence, and a response immediately followed - the Military Councils of the districts ("republics") themselves sent requests to the NCO and the General Staff for the withdrawal of troops according to the Covering Plans, our troops were put on alert and moved to their concentration areas along the PP. And Timoshenko and Zhukov with these requests from June 9-10 came to Stalin on the 11th and proposed to introduce the "Cover Plan of 1941".

However, Stalin does not agree to such a directive, since this would lead to the beginning of mobilization in these districts, which in those days could have exposed the USSR, which was still neutral in the ongoing world war, as an aggressor. What shouldn't have been allowed. Therefore, Stalin gives permission to the military - to begin withdrawing troops according to cover plans - to the areas provided for by the PP. And the directives-permits of the General Staff of June 11-12, received by the districts, indicated - for now, the withdrawal of troops only from the 2nd echelon and reserves. The border divisions were instructed to wait for a "special order of the People's Commissar" for their entry into the concentration areas, and even more so for the occupation of the lines on the border itself. At the same time, the mechanized corps, as formations that were not directly involved in repelling the first attacks of the Germans under certain directives of Moscow, after June 14, were also to be put on alert.

ODVO got permission already June 6th by phone from G.K. Zhukov, and then a telegram came to Odessa confirming this conclusion of the "deep" divisions (the telegram has not yet been published, but its presence is confirmed by the "archival diggers") - no one will lead the troops to the regions under the Covering Plan without such permits-directives in writing. After that, on the night of June 8, the OdVO divisions began to withdraw.

ZAPOVO also received the verbal permission of the number June 9-10, at 7.00 on June 11, the first divisions of the 2nd echelon of the district began to withdraw and on June 11 for Minsk they signed and sent the directive of the NKO and the General Staff on the withdrawal of the "deep" divisions of the district to the "areas provided for by the cover plan." Moreover, for the unapproved May PP.

Those. Zhukov, without waiting for the formal, written permission of Stalin, has already begun to withdraw troops via the PP! Then written orders came to that. Those. Zhukov verbally coordinated with Stalin those permissions ...

KOVO a directive for the withdrawal of all troops of the 2nd echelon to Kiev was signed 12 June... However, if Minsk and Riga were ordered to withdraw troops strictly according to the new PP, which in the district should have been completed by the end of May, then Kiev was ordered to withdraw troops according to a certain map. In which the concentration areas were somewhat closer to the border than in the PP worked out by the KOVO headquarters by June 2. As we have already found out - to prepare a retaliatory strike - immediate.

Sun PribOVO perhaps he also sent his request and signed a directive to the withdrawal of the "deep divisions" 12 June... Or maybe they did not send the request - June 11 F. Kuznetsov, together with the PMC PribOVO Dibrov, personally visited Stalin. Those. Perhaps in PribOVO, the decision to withdraw the 2nd echelon was made at this meeting - perhaps this "request" of the Armed Forces of the Okrug Kuznetsov and Dibrova simply brought with them to Moscow themselves.

As researcher S. Chekunov shows: “In the course of two evening meetings on June 9, decisions were made to start the main deployment. As a result of these meetings, the 16th army was reoriented to Ukraine, directives were sent to the border districts to start the advancement of deep divisions (Pavlov and Kuznetsov received directives personally in Moscow, field communications were sent to KOVO), the commander of PribOVO received personal instructions to bring the district into combat readiness.

All decisions were made precisely late in the evening on June 9th. And the directives were issued to Pavlov and Kuznetsov on the 11th. After returning to PribOVO, a withdrawal plan was drawn up, then Kuznetsov turned to Moscow in encryption, where he described the actions being taken and asked for approval.

Extract from Kuznetsov's encryption:

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR

To bring the district to combat readiness, I made and am implementing the decision:

1. 48, 23 and 126 SD began marching movement to the new areas assigned to them. Please approve .... ".

On the encryption there is Vatutin's resolution: “t. Vasilevsky. Report with a map. Does it coincide with the instructions of the NGO ”.

These directives from June 8-11-12 from the districts it was required to withdraw to the concentration areas along the PP (or a certain map as for KOVO) rifle divisions of the districts and reserves - 2nd echelons. For the mechanized corps of the western districts, there were separate directives after June 14 and from June 16 in the PribOVO they were raised on alarm, given in full b.g. and two mechanized corps of the district - the 3rd and 12th - were brought to the "collection areas" and concentration. June 18-20 in OdVO - they raised their 2nd MK, in KOVO they raised two mechanized corps from 8 - 4th and 19th, in ZAPOVO - they depicted raising one (6th) MK out of six mechanized corps of this district.

That is, all the most combat-ready and powerful mechanized corps of the border districts on June 18-20 were brought to an increased b.g. and were taken out to the "Collection Areas". To prepare a future retaliatory strike "to Lublin" and "to Suwalki", from the Lvov and Bialystok "ledges". But formally - according to the PP. Also, but after June 19, in the same KOVO, Ryabyshev's 8th mechanized corps began to be prepared for a retaliatory attack. Also powerful enough.

The deadline for the end of the withdrawal of 2 echelons and reserves - was established by these directives - by July 1. But in this case, it doesn't really matter. After all, this is nothing more than the deadline for the end of the withdrawal of the division, which, according to the PP, should be from the border in up to 100 km.

On the one hand, it was still difficult to withdraw them technically faster in peacetime. On the other hand, according to pre-war plans - in any case, not these divisions participate in the first battles (after all, part of the border divisions, according to the same directives, were withdrawn - "by June 17" and in the same KOVO some border divisions began to withdraw even earlier). After all, the border divisions are the first to enter the battle. Most of them were in number - 10-12 thousand. Those. - in "states close to wartime states." That allowed them to enter the battle "immediately", and while they are fighting heroically and perishing - the rest of the troops are mobilized and occupy their lines according to the Covering Plans ...

According to the standards for putting on alert in full combat readiness, they were given a few hours, and they had to fight heroically - 10-15 days. Supported by the aviation of the districts and mechanized corps. Moreover, the mechanized corps of the "first echelon" or the same anti-tank brigades that were attached to ALL the border armies (except for the army that covered the Brest direction!) - were quite combat-ready and also already in the very first day of the war - having received the missing ( cars and tractors), also enter the battle and carry out their tasks on the PP.

So - Zhukov became on February 1, 41st early. The General Staff immediately brought the border divisions up to these very "12 thousand" - so that they could enter the battle in their standards, without waiting for mobilization. On combat alert - leaving the barracks for several hours. And while they are dying on the border at the time set for them according to the cover plans - a few days or better for a week or two - the rest of the troops (second echelons and reserves with mechanized corps), which have already begun to move towards their concentration lines along the PP - from June 11-15 - they have the opportunity and time to complete their withdrawal and take their positions on the PP. And in the PP, it was scheduled - the border divisions enter the battle in the event of an attack, they are actively helped by the MK and ATRBR, and the rest of the troops - the 2nd echelons and reserves of the districts - are mobilizing and deploying. And they are withdrawn, complete the withdrawal at this time to their areas of concentration. Exactly the same "war plans" were written in the USSR BEFORE the war and AFTER then, and the pogrom of the beginning of the Second World War in no way influenced the essence of these "war plans" in the USSR. Because in their essence - they were quite literate and "reasonable" ...

I hope everyone has figured out why there is a date for these directives and FOR THESE divisions - "by July 1". And then there are researchers that on this date they will build versions that our military did not know the date of the attack, they made a mistake with it - if on June 11 they gave the dates for the second echelons to leave by - July 1. Those. it means only on this date, on July 1, not earlier, the military was expecting an attack by Germany in the NKO and the General Staff. As the same M. Meltyukhov wrote, “the Soviet military-political leadership incorrectly assessed the degree of threat of a German attack” and therefore the Red Army “was caught off guard on June 22”. And the fact that it "had neither an offensive nor a defensive grouping" is the result of this very "wrong assessment" of the threat of an attack! ("Stalin's Lost Chance, M. 2008, p. 363)

Alas. This date is not the time for the end of the deployment of the troops of the districts on the PP in connection with the "expected on July 1" attack. This is the end time for the withdrawal of these specified specific divisions, which do not engage in combat in the first hours of the war. And this time is purely normative - faster in peacetime it is stupidly impossible to withdraw divisions. Therefore, part of the troops was withdrawn not by July 1, but even later. And then, by the way, the time for the withdrawal of these divisions in wartime was already accelerating, and the timing was changed even BEFORE June 21. As the head of the ZAPOVO department later showed, specific divisions from the directive of the NKO and the General Staff of 11 June for Minsk with a deadline for withdrawal on July 1 were already set in the district - June 22-23 to be in the areas of their concentration. And these areas along the PP - the line where from the border for these divisions ...

So - it is unwise to dance from this date FOR SECOND echelons and compose on it - that an attack was not expected before July 1. The orders for these parts have DIFFERENT dates - for the end of the withdrawal. And later on July 1st. But we will not begin to write on this that the attack was expected on July 10? Literally on June 19 and June 20, Tymoshenko issued orders for disguises and there dates - and July 15 is LATER! And what - are we going to compose on this, invent what the NGO and the General Staff "thought" that our military attack was not expected before July 15 or 20 - until the paint dries up in the hangars? In fact - the date as June 22 - in the Kremlin, in principle, they knew from the end of April ... as the likely date of Hitler's attack.

So, on June 11, Zhukov tried to propose to Stalin to put the Cover Plans into effect with a formal directive. Which would mean starting and mobilizing. He refused, but allowed the second echelons and reserves of the districts, as well as the mechanized corps, to be withdrawn via the PP. The General Staff sends to the districts, signed on June 11-12, directives for the withdrawal of these "deep" divisions, but they stipulate that the border divisions should not be withdrawn until the special order of the People's Commissar. Wherein border divisions, the replenishment of which (not mobilization, but rather additional staffing) should take place in the event of a threat of war, in a "threatened period", at the expense of the population of neighboring villages in a matter of hours, On June 12, they receive orders for the transition to the wartime state.

June 11-12 Timoshenko and Zhukov turned to Stalin with a proposal to appeal to Hitler and the German government in order to allow our Commission to check-inspect their border area - for the absence of a threat of a German attack on the USSR. Stalin refused them, saying that Hitler would not give permission to check their troops at the border anyway, time would be wasted on this fuss with the commission, and therefore it would be easier to do it differently ... And at the same time, Stalin gave permission to the NCO and General Staff - to begin the withdrawal of the second echelons of border districts according to cover plans. On June 11, a directive is signed for ZAPOVO, on June 12 - for KOVO and PribOVO. The districts received these directives, they began to withdraw the second echelon through the checkpoint and every day, at 22.00, they sent reports to the General Staff on how they were withdrawing their corps. Pavlov at 7 o'clock in the morning on June 11th began to withdraw the first "deep" divisions, at 22:00 on the 11th he signed and sent to the General Staff Report No. 1, and at 22:00 on June 21 he sent Report No. 11 ...

June 13 and 14 published "TASS message", the Soviet Government, in which Hitler-Germany probed for a desire to attack the USSR. The message states that the USSR is "sure" that Germany also does not want war, as the insidious England spreads rumors, and, like the USSR, is not going to attack (in the near future). With this message-provocation, Hitler was exposed in the event of his attack by an aggressor in any way! If he replies that, of course, he is not going to attack and these are all the nasty intrigues of England, then attacking a week later, as our intelligence is actively reporting these days, he clearly presents himself as an aggressor. And if he does not answer, then attacking, all the same - he is the aggressor. Also, this "Message" indicated that the collection of attorneys held in the USSR was no more than the usual planned "training sessions", and if the troops were moving somewhere, it was only in order to check the work of the railway transport.

After it became clear that Hitler did not intend to respond to the TASS message, the directives for KOVO and PribOVO were signed on June 12 and sent to Riga and Kiev on June 14 in the evening. Indeed, in KOVO the attack was expected on June 17, and in PribOVO on June 20 - according to their intelligence. At the same time, ZapOVO, Belarus, began the withdrawal of their "deep" divisions - already at 7 o'clock in the morning on June 11th. And on June 15-16, the first divisions of these districts also began withdrawing to their concentration areas. In these directives of the NKO and the General Staff from June 11-12, there was a restriction - not to raise border divisions "until the special order of the People's Commissar", however, according to these directives, separate border divisions located in winter quarters located far from the border began to be withdrawn to the border.

After June 14- there were directives of the NKO and the General Staff to bring full combat readiness - mechanized corps (MK). With the withdrawal of them to their collection areas.

As you can see, those formations - the mechanized corps of the first echelon, all the more so, which, together with the border divisions, were supposed to take a blow and give the opportunity to the reserves and the 2nd echelons of the border districts, and even more so - the armies of the internal districts, which began to withdraw from the end of May into the border circles - they received their order for WITHDRAWAL on the PP WITH BREDING ACCORDING TO combat readiness - a WEEK before a possible German attack !!!

June 14-15 KOVO and PribOVO received their directives dated June 12 - for the withdrawal of 2 echelons and reserves, according to a certain map. At the same time, separate, border divisions of KOVO began to withdraw according to the instructions of GSh-Zhukov as early as 12 June.

June 17 the same KOVO gave a request - what to do with the assigned ones? They were told - "fees" assigned - to extend ...

June 16-17- in the PribOVO regiments, inclusive, they brought the directive for the district - to bring the air force and air defense to heightened combat readiness, and to the border divisions - to occupy almost trenches on the border. And the district directive says - This is done in view of a possible German attack on the night of June 20!(As the researcher S. Chekunov in PribOVO shows, after receiving the directive of the NCO and the General Staff on June 12 on the withdrawal of the second echelons and reserves on the PP, they gave their orders and the same “Order No. No. 00229 dated 06/18/1941 - formation of communication teams to carry out order No. 0052. A June 19 an order was issued on the execution of order No. 0052 regarding the occupation of communication centers. ")

In PribOVO to June 18-19 verbal orders of the commander of the district led to a complete bg. their seven border divisions (out of 9) and withdrew along the PP to the border. And they even put in the trenches themselves those battalions that, according to the PP, were supposed to sit there during the threatened period and which had been on the border under the guise of work since May 5. This was done in connection with the expectation of an attack on June 19-20, and these divisions remained on the border until June 22. On June 18-19, Kuznetsov issued more orders to bring to the b.g. of all the troops of the district, after which the headquarters began to move to Panevezys. On June 18, the commander of the district personally and verbally gave orders for the withdrawal of border divisions in the same 8th army of Sobennikov, and as researcher S. Chekunov shows, "Sobennikov received a written order in the form of encryption on the same day."

June 19 in this district they also issued an order in which they ordered to immediately finish work in the border areas, which could be occupied " only in case of violation of the enemy's borders". It also required - " To ensure fast occupation of positions as in the foreground and the main defensive zone corresponding the units must be perfectly alert". It was ordered " strengthen combat readiness control, do everything without noise, firmly, calmly. "

And most importantly, it was ordered:

"4. Minefields to establish according to the plan of the commander of the army where they should stand according to the plan of defensive construction.<…>... Obstacles and other anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles to be created according to the plan of the army commander - also according to the plan of defensive construction.

1. Shtarm, corps and divisions - in touch KP that provide VET by the decision of the appropriate commander.
2. 6... Our moving units must go to their areas of shelter. <…>
3. Continue to persistently replenish the units with ammunition and other types of supplies .... " (TsAMO, f. 344, op. 5564, d. 1, l. 34-36)

Was there for PribOVO from the General Staff that one "telegram to the General Staff of June 18"? It is difficult to say - without studying the incoming documents to the PribOVO from the General Staff, or outgoing from the General Staff, you cannot definitely establish this. Most likely, such a "telegram" was sent to PribOVO from Moscow earlier - on June 16th. But in any case, the PribOVO command by itself, without orders from Moscow, could not do such things as mining in the border zone, and even more so it could not and would not withdraw its border divisions according to the Covering Plan on "personal initiative" ...

June 17 Stalin hosted the leaders of the NKGB-NKVD, where he used to swear at their "sources" in Berlin, who were driving obvious misconceptions about the fact that the Germans, in the event of an attack, would first of all bomb some auto repair shops near Moscow. As P.A. showed in his memoirs. Sudoplatov, also: “On the day Fitin returned from the Kremlin, Beria, summoning me to his place, gave the order to organize a special group of intelligence officers under his direct subordination. She was supposed to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage actions in case of war. At this point, our first task was to create a strike group of experienced saboteurs capable of resisting any attempt to use provocative incidents on the border as a pretext for starting a war. Beria stressed that our task is not to give German provocateurs the opportunity to carry out actions similar to the one that was organized against Poland in 1939, when they seized a radio station in Gleiwitz in Germany. " (PA Sudoplatov, "Special operations. Lubyanka and the Kremlin 1930-1950", M. 1997, ch. 5. Soviet intelligence on the eve of the war)

It was planned to transfer this group by aircraft to those areas on the border where German provocations were planned, could have occurred or would have already begun, but they did not manage to form it ...

June 18 there was Zhukov's team at the request of KOVO dated June 16 - to start occupying SDs on the new border and to prepare for filling - SDs on the old border ...

The chief of staff of KOVO Purkaev showed after the war about this occupation of the URs and we analyzed it above:

« June 13 or 14 I made a proposal to the Military District Council: to the borders of VLADIMIR-VOL YN SKOGO UR "a, completed by construction, but not having weapons and troops in the structures , withdraw rifle divisions, according to defense plan without occupying the foreground.

The Military Council accepted this proposal. Corresponding orders were given to the Commander of the 5th Army.

The next morning, General KIRPONOS called me to his office, a member of the Military Council was also present there. General KIRPONOS threw me an accusation that I allegedly wanted to provoke a war with the Germans with my proposals.

I immediately summoned the Chief of the General Staff, General Zhukov, from the office of General KIRPANOS to the "VCh" and reported to him about my proposal to the Military Council of the district bring several divisions to the completed construction of the UROV line(without occupying the foreground), and that yesterday the Military Council of the district approved this decision and I gave the corresponding orders to the Commander 5, and today the Commander of the district forces accuses me of provocation, but does not cancel his yesterday's decision. I asked Comrade ZHUKOV to give instructions.

Comrade ZHUKOV ordered troops to the UROV line to withdraw; take careful camouflage measures so that troops from the border are not observed.

I asked Comrade ZHUKOV to convey these instructions personally to General KIRPANOS, to whom I handed over the telephone receiver.

I don’t remember exactly how many divisions of the 5th Army were withdrawn (it seems two divisions) ”. (Website of the RF Ministry of Defense "On the Eve of the War")

If anyone does not know - Volodymyr-Volynskiy UR is an area to the north of the "Lvov salient" where the Germans delivered their main blow directly to Ukraine. Those. - nsh Purkaev, in his words, in the morning June 15th(!), after Zhukov's directive on the withdrawal of 2 echelons, which so far prohibited the withdrawal of border divisions through the PP, he still requested by phone Zhukov's permission to occupy the UR in the most dangerous direction of the German strike, which actually happened. Those. - everyone knew perfectly well where the Germans would hit and they were taking measures - from June 13th.

In fact, as S. Chekunov shows, Zhukov gave permission to occupy this district on June 12! (“The proposal on the promotion of rifle divisions of the 5th Army on June 11 was sent to the General Staff, on June 12 the chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov approved the proposal for promotion (TsAMO. F. 16a. Op. 2951. D. 261. L . l. 22-23) "." I am writing exclusively from memory ... ", M. 2017, T. 2, p. 9)

The regiments of the three border divisions of the 5th A - 45th, 62nd and 87th SD began to withdraw from June 15-16. And when these divisions began to withdraw to the UR north of Lvov, the chief of staff of the same 87th Rifle Division issued an order for reconnaissance - a week before the war:

« INTELLIGENCE ORDERN04. STADIW 87

VL. VOLYNSKY 15.6.41

MAP 42000

1. With the beginning of the withdrawal of units of 87 SD from the assembly areas on alarm to the mobilization area, send reconnaissance from the units to the line:

16 SP - Berchin, Pyatydni

96 SP - high. 95.2, east. 2 km of Khotyachevi Sukhodoly.

283 SP - Khrenov - high. 101.5 app. 1 km Vulka Falemichskaya.

43 ORB - Oran.

Intelligence mission: establish the presence, composition and direction of advancement of enemy units from the border ". (TsAMO, f. 283 joint venture, op. 26514s, d.20, sheets without numbering - the document on the site "Memory of the People" was found and published by the researcher G. Spaskov)

This Stronghold was powerful enough. In the strip of the Vladimir-Volynsky UR, formations and units of the 9th MK, artillery units were deployed
BM of the reserve of the Supreme Command, parts of special anti-tank formations - PTBR. And those in the increased b.g. two more rifle divisions - created quite a serious obstacle for the Germans. Who, in this very place, delivered their main blow in this direction - by the Army Group "South" ...

Purkaev June 16 gave a written request to the General Staff for training and other URs. And M. Solonin found this correspondence, where Zhukov gave an answer in the form of a resolution:

« June 16 Again, signed by the KOVO Military Council in full force, the following telegram is sent to the General Staff: "I ask permission to employ the personnel of the Kamenets-Podolsk and Mogilev-Yampolsky Districts of the reinforced concrete structures of the first line of these Districts."... The document has a long resolution written in black pencil: “Occupation of Kamenets-Podolsk and Mogilev-Yampolsky URs is permitted. Prepare the Ostropolsk UR along the old border for the occupation of UR units for the purpose of training and cobble together. Urgently complete the formation of the UR units for the Kiev UR, and then prepare the UR for staffing. " And the signature: “Zhukov, 18.6” . " (M. Solonin) ...

Kamyanets-Podilsky and Mogilev-Yampolsky URs are located to the south of the "Lvov salient". The defense zone of the 17th SC of the 12th Army. Where in the 1st echelon were the 60th and 96th rifle divisions, and where, according to the directive of the NKO and the General Staff, the 164th rifle division had to be withdrawn from June 12 - by June 17.

That is, as you can see, Zhukov, while not allowing all the KOVO border divisions to be withdrawn via the PP, gave instructions to occupy the URs on both "flanks" of the "Lvov salient" KOVO. And it was both the 12th and 18th June. And, as in PribOVO, already on June 16-17, in KOVO, they were supposed to begin to withdraw their border divisions to the border zone - to occupy the Fortifications in this case.

Three divisions of the 5th army north of Lvov occupied their UR by June 21, but to the south - in the Kamenets-Podolsk region by June 17, the 164th rifle division was withdrawn - according to the directive of the NKO and the General Staff of 12 June. But she certainly did not occupy the UR itself, having become a camp in the "gathering area". In this sector, the defense was to be held by the 12th Army under the command of Major General P.G. Ponedelina (nsh Mr. B.I. Arushunyan.), 17th Rifle Corps.

Judging by Purkaev's answer, apart from two divisions of the 5th A of other divisions, in other armies, KOVO, closer to the border, into the defense zone, was not withdrawn. However, researcher G. Spaskov found in the TsAMO the Journal of Combat Actions (ZhBD) of the 17th SK of the 12th Army, which clearly states - Zhukov's order on class Kamyanets-Podolsky and Mogilev-Yampolsky URs was performed: “ Command 17th c ... 11.6.41. ordered corps units to move closer to the state border and camp with the task of strengthening the state border and in readiness in the event of a violation of the state border without spending a lot of time to take up defense and repel the violators.

Units of the 17th rifle corps in fulfillment of the assigned task of the corps commander by the evening of 13.6.41. concentrated in the camp in the areas of their defense sectors .... ". (TsAMO, f. 851, op. 1, d. 7, l.1,2)

Those. this border UK since June 11, began to withdraw along the PP to the defense area. And apparently without approval for the time being from Zhukov.

And when Zhukov, on the 18th, confirmed by a "resolution" the occupation of the UR in the 12th Army, according to the reply of the Chief of Staff of the 96th Guards Rifle Division Vladimirov, the 17th SK and " ... took up a defensive line along the state border on 18.6.41. by order of the headquarters of 17 sk. All regiments entered their defensive zones, intercepting all important directions.<…>All units of the division, by order of the headquarters of the 17th brigade, were brought to the BG to the end of 16.6, and 18.6 had already entered their lanes to occupy previously prepared positions.<…>units went into their defensive zones with the onset of darkness ... The artillery means of the division were moved to the OP ... "(" I am writing solely from memory ... ", M. 2017, p. 210)

The facts from the combat log of the 17th brigade, that three border divisions of this corps were withdrawn into the defense zone by June 21, are also confirmed by other sources: “ On June 13, 1941, units of the 17th rifle corps took up defensive lines directly at the state border and began to equip positions". (From the memoirs of veterans of the 60th mountain rifle division - "Battle for Bukovina", Uzhgorod, "Karpaty", 1967, p.38. These facts were also found by G. Spaskov)

(For information, General Ponedelin was taken prisoner on August 7, 41st. shot already August 25, 1950….)

The withdrawal of the border division to the Stronghold is precisely the withdrawal of it to the border according to the defense plan, as Purkaev showed. And the border divisions of all districts on June 18-19 also received their order to withdraw to the regions along the PP - right up to the occupation of trenches on the border. And this conclusion on the PP also implies bringing these divisions to the battlefield, and already in these withdrawn divisions themselves these days, their orders were issued precisely - to bring them to combat readiness ... And June 15th Kirponos and issued orders based on the directive of the General Staff of 12 June on the withdrawal of the "deep" divisions. Those. - in Kiev, the directive of the General Staff of June 12, on the withdrawal of "deep divisions" on a certain "map" received a minimum by the end of June 14th.

Researcher S. Chekunov posted one of these orders in November 2013 at the Militer forum:

Top secret Special importance

Ex. No. 2 To the commander of the 55th rifle corps

1. To increase combat readiness, I order by the morning of 25.6 Move the 55th sk from the quartering points to the camp site in the area of ​​DUNAEVTSY, NV. EAR.

The corps headquarters should be located in DUNAYEVTSY.

1. March of the corps build in accordance with the attached scheme on the map 500,000 in Appendix No. 1.

... (routes for divisions are written here - S. Chekunov)

Departure from the points of deployment for the specified connections and hull parts - 20.00 18.6 ... The corps headquarters remain in VINNITSA until 20.00 23.6; from 20.00 23.6 go to DUNAEVTSY.

In order to conceal the movement, the marches should be made at night and special measures should be taken to preserve military secrets.

1. The passage of the corps to the area of ​​the camp site should be carried out with the conduct of tactical exercises... For the transition period, I set the following combat training tasks:

a / To work out the organization and technique of performing long night marches with the adoption of air defense, anti-tank and anti-tank defense measures.

b / To teach Headquarters and units the ability to quickly and covertly settle down on rest at halts, overnight stays and days with the adoption of all security and camouflage measures.

c / Train units and Headquarters in rapid deployment and entry from the march into battle / offensive and oncoming /.

For instructiveness, a number of exercises should be conducted with a designated enemy, sending small units and subunits for this purpose to areas of large halts, overnight stays and days, to which to time the outset and conduct of the battle.

1. With parts of the hull to the camp site withdraw fully transportable stocks ammunition and fuels and lubricants. Take with you mobile sets of cards and the package of Special Importance that you keep under No. 0025.
2. For the protection of winter apartments leave a strictly minimum number of servicemen in each unit, mostly unsuitable for a hike for health reasons.

Do not take families with you to the new camp area.

Commander of the KOVO troops

Colonel General Kirponos

Member of the Military Council of KOVO

Corps commissar Vashugin

Chief of Staff KOVO

Lieutenant General Purkaev "

What do we see in this order? Everything is simple - the corps is not being taken to the border, and therefore the date of the end of its withdrawal is in no way tied to a possible attack. After all, the first battle is taken by the border divisions, and not this 55th SC, which will have to have time to complete the withdrawal, while the border divisions die. According to PP KOVO, this corps is the reserve of the district, is located behind the back of the 12th Army and does not immediately take part in battles on the border from the first minutes.

This order states that the conclusion must be carried out with the development of educational questions. On this, the "rezuns" build versions that in this way the corps went to exercises or as exercises and this conclusion has nothing to do with the expected German attack - but this is stupidity. This is what they always do in the army - "flash on the right ... flash on the left." So that the personnel do not get bored.

(By the way, there were already inadequate admirers of Rezun who are trying to prove by the fact of such "exercises" that in fact they did not expect an attack by Germany, and everything that was done in June, in the pre-war days, was carried out to train the USSR's attack on Germany first, naturally in July. ... Well, and accordingly, the so-called directive No. 1 of 22.20 on June 21 is not a directive on the transfer of ALL troops, air force, air defense and fleets, which by the evening of the 21st should have been in increased bg - in full bg .. And the directive for checking the "lines" of communication ...)

It is indicated - to take with you ALL stocks of b / p, fuels and lubricants, mobile cards and the same "red package" in which the tasks of the corps are stored according to the Covering Plan. Those. The 55th sk should go in an increased bg. minimum, because he goes in full force. And the date of the withdrawal of this sc is no longer "by July 1", as indicated in the directive of the NCO and the General Staff of the 12th for KOVO, but "by June 25" ...

Someone believes that this corps was not brought to the bg. at the same time and it was not necessary to do in this case? So this order, this is an order for the district for this UK - about the withdrawal. But in the UK itself, they later gave their order for withdrawal - there was no other way. Similar to what General Shestopalov gave in his MK in PribOVO:

"ORDER ON THE MILITARY UNIT 9443.

Mountains. MITAWA.

(Map 100000).

1. With the receipt of this order bring all units on alert.
2. To bring the units into combat readiness in accordance with the plans for raising on combat alert, but not to declare the alarm itself ... "...

As S. Chekunov writes about the withdrawal of troops before June 22: “All actions of June 1941 were documented and took place in accordance with the planned actions. ... At first they acted on the basis of the April documents, then on the basis of the May documents. As a result, with minor changes it turned out according to the document dated May 15 (these are not considerations) ...

For greater accuracy with regard to plans: the concentration went in accordance with the plan, the essence of which is set out in Vatutin's notes dated 06/13/14/1941. Attached to the note dated 06/13/1941 is a map dated 05/15/1941. This was the base. ... The certificates (in fact, there are TWO documents) Vatutin attached to the map, the content of which is described in the document. All movements are documented, relocation locations are indicated. "

That is, Stalin forbade the military, Zhukov, even to think about a "preemptive strike", but the general withdrawal of troops still followed the map drawn specifically for this "plan" ?!

So. On June 8-11 and 15, the withdrawal of the second echelons and reserves of the districts, as well as the mechanized corps of the "1st line", began. And from June 17-18, the withdrawal began according to the Covering Plans and border divisions! With all these units on alert, respectively!

How many divisions were on alert after June 18? Only in one PribOVO - its two mechanized corps and 7 border divisions along the PP of the district - along the land part of the border. Out of 9 registered in the PC of the district.

In ZapOVO - not a single border division was alerted after June 18 and was not brought to the line of defense on the border. In addition to the divisions of the 6th MK for sure. And those - through one place were taken out. After that, the chief communications officer of the ZAPOVO Grigoriev said at the investigation - "and even after the directive of the General Staff of June 18, Pavlov did not bring the troops into combat readiness" ... And in this case, he speaks of the directive of the General Staff of June 18, not "about bringing them to the bg." but about the directive on the WITHDRAWAL of border divisions under the Covering Plan. That OBLIGED to just bring these divisions (troops) into combat readiness with an automatic machine.

However, the opposite things were happening in the ZAPOVO - to reduce combat readiness and even to disarm the troops. What the commanders of the Brest divisions spoke of as a treacherous sabotage, and the same No. 22nd TD of Brest Kislitsyn wrote to Pokrovsky: “a technical exhibition of equipment and weapons in service with the Soviet Army. Her equipment was completed on June 21st, and On June 22, at 6 o'clock, the entire officer corps was supposed to appear for her viewing. 4th Army. All types of combat, special and transport vehicles, artillery and mortar systems, shells, mines and cartridges, military engineering and military technical property with a full description of the tactical, technical and combat properties were concentrated at the exhibition. The entire exhibition went to the enemy... It is still difficult to understand whether the opening of the exhibition was an accidental coincidence with the first day of the war, or whether it was the work of the enemies. "

Those. at the time of the attack and execution of Brest, at the training ground, at least in Brest, they should have gathered all officers 4th Army ?!

And Kislitsyn also clearly showed who was the source of that "secret instruction" for the removal of cartridges and ammunition from the barracks and equipment of his tank division in Brest - from the headquarters of the 4th Army, from Sandalov:

“Two weeks before the war (approximately) a top secret instruction and order was received from the headquarters of the 4th Army on the removal of ammunition from tanks and storage of this ammunition in the NZ warehouse. To the division commander, Major General Viktor Pavlovich PUGANOV, I reported these documents and asked him to immediately write to the army commander about the inexpediency of removing ammunition from tanks and storing them in the "NZ" warehouse on the banks of the Bug River, tk. this meant, in my opinion, the elimination of the combat readiness of the division. " ("I am writing solely from memory ...", M. 2017, p. 428. Details of Kislitsyn's answer - TsAMO, f. 15, op. 725588, d.29, l. 39-46)

Let me remind you that the laying of the w / p in the equipment in the districts was carried out according to a separate May (from May 15) directive of the General Staff ... and according to the Covering Plans. And 10 days, a week before the attack, Korobkov disarms the divisions of Brest….

And then in his "memoirs" Sandalov told how he, on the morning of June 21, together with Korobkov, "checked" his border divisions:

“Two rifle regiments of the division are entirely stationed at the border on the right flank of the army, and one remained with the division headquarters in Vysoky. Artillery regiments from the Brest firing range returned to the division. The division commander claims that German units are sitting in the trenches on the other side. Today, German planes flew into the Vysokoye area, which, in his opinion, undoubtedly discovered our assault aviation regiment that had moved here in the morning. Colonel Vasiliev believes that the Germans are accumulating forces for an attack, and he asked me bluntly why we were not taking any measures. ”

According to Sandalov, it turns out that one border division, and this is the 49th Rifle Division of the 4th Army, seems to have almost taken up defenses at the border and its artillery from the training ground near Brest returned to the division. But this is a lie. The division's artillery was indeed in the division, except for the anti-aircraft division, which remained at the training camp. And since April, units of the division were indeed in the forests near the Bug River, on the border. But here is what Major Gurov S.I., who was in German captivity from July 41 to April 45, showed to Pokrovsky the chief of staff of this division in 1956, the division of which was supposed to hold the defense in the Brest UR:

"In April, unit commanders, battalion commanders, and divisional commanders were familiarized with their sectors and areas of defense on the ground."

However, “We did not manage to build a fire system taking into account the fire of the UR, because UR headquarters categorically refused to issue a fortified fire system. district, referring to the fact that they have an order of the district headquarters, categorically forbidding to give any information about the UR.

The division had to defend the UR without knowing its fire system.

The artillery was in the division, with the exception of the ZAD, which was at the collection station. Krupki ".

On June 21, an operational game took place in this division, more precisely, the game was at the headquarters of the 4th Army in Kobrin, in the evening at 21 o'clock the 49th SD Gurov left for Vysokoe and learned from the division commander that “the division headquarters is today, i.e. 06.21., Moved to a new place, to the headquarters of the 31st LAP, and that the commanders of the units, the chiefs of staff must by 6.00 22.06. come to the exercises at the Brest artillery range "...

Gurov shows that “The division was deployed in the 42nd RD zone, and the assigned zone for the defense of the 49th RD was 30 km to the north-west and to which it was necessary to move along the river. Bug, being under artillery fire. " And “The division entered the battle in extremely unfavorable conditions for it: on the sleeping people, suddenly, a hurricane of enemy fire from all types of weapons was brought down and at the same time bombing from the air began. The battalions working at the UR were shot at point-blank in tents from machine guns and mortars. Artillery warehouses, petrol warehouses, warehouses with equipment and food were destroyed by aircraft within 10 minutes. "

Those. Sandal's "craftiness" that as many as TWO regiments of this division were, and even with their own artillery on the border and seemed to be almost defending there - this is the lie of the bastard responsible for the pogrom of the 4th army and the Brest direction. This SD did not occupy a position, but DISLOCATED in the area. And its line of defense along the PP was in a completely different place, to which it was still necessary to stomp 30 kilometers ...

Gurov also testified that at 13.30 on June 22, he "received a package through the captain of the army headquarters, which contained a warning order signed by the People's Commissar of Defense, comrade Timoshenko, to withdraw troops to the starting lines." And it looks like this is not an order from the so-called. directive number 1 - about the complete bg .. The order of the NPO on "bringing to the starting line" is an order to open the "red" packets. But after 4 o'clock in the morning this was definitely not the case from the General Staff to the districts! That is, there was a certain order from Tymoshenko on the introduction of the Covering Plan, and it was sent to the districts BEFORE the attack! At 3.30 Pavlov gave the order to open the "red" packets and it was not his "personal" initiative! After all, he "referred" to Gurov in it - precisely to the order of the NCO and the General Staff!

And at the end of his answer to Pokrovsky, Gurov wrote:

“I add the following:

a) 22.06 to 6.00 by order of the headquarters of the army, all commanders of units and early. headquarters were supposed to be at the Brest artillery range.

b) I was called at 10.00 on 22.06 to the headquarters of the District, to the organizational department, with a mobplan.

c) The anti-aircraft division has been removed from the border for collection - Art. Krupki.

d) Beginning. artillery of the army, starting in May m-ts, demanded to transfer the artillery of the division to the Brest arpoligon. To our objections that it was impossible to leave the division on the border without artillery, he reported to the commander of the army, Mr. Korobkov, who on June 21, after an operational game, personally ordered me, under my responsibility, that the artillery was at the range in the morning of June 23.

e) Transfer of the division headquarters to a new location on 21.06. disrupted the operational work of the headquarters.

f) Arrival with a great delay of the exceptional importance of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense.

I still doubt that all of the above facts related to 06/22/1941 are just a coincidence. If the division had been warned at least ten hours in advance, the situation would have been completely different. " (S. Chekunov, "I write exclusively with the sweat of memory ...", M. 2017, p. 408-416)

And here is what they were doing in the 3rd Army of the ZAPOVO:

“Everyone knew that the war was close, that it was inevitable. But there were prohibited whatever measures were taken to bring the troops into combat readiness, even in equipping the areas of concentration, observation and command posts in case of war, not to mention the defensive structures on the defensive lines outlined on the maps. Once at a meeting when the “red packets” were completed, I persistently asked the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army, Major General Kondratyev, for permission to supplement the ammunition in tanks with shells and disks with cartridges of up to 0.5 ammunition, since 0.25 ammunition was packed according to the instructions. And I was categorically refused, besides this, I received a comment not to apply on this issue anymore. " (From the memoirs of N.M. Kalanchuk, chief of staff of the 29th TD 11 MK 3rd A - "Combat operations of the 29th tank division of the 11th mechanized corps." The memoirs are kept in the funds of the Grodno State Historical and Archaeological Museum. at the request of the museum staff.)

In all districts, border divisions were stretched along the border-front from 30 to 40 km. Moreover, most often the border in these places was quite “passable” according to the terrain. And the German or the same Finnish units in the Leningrad Military District then simply bypassed the divisions' defense units, even if they were withdrawn to the border via the PP from June 17-18.

The front width of the ZAPOVO on June 22 was about 470 km... For defense, covering the border, were intended 10 divisions in the first echelon. If we assume that the front was continuous, then for each rifle division of the first echelon there would be 47 km front. But taking into account the terrain, the front is shrinking. In addition, these divisions were propped up from the rear by 6 tank divisions, 4 mechanized divisions, and two cavalry divisions. In addition, there were corps units, anti-tank brigades, URs, artillery of the RGK, border guards.

Those. in reality, this district was kind of "protected" in this regard - taking into account swamps and forests, there is not so much for each division, and as a result, it was necessary to defend the border in Belarus. Those. - Zhukov fully understood that a strong (or rather, the main) blow was possible on Belarus and, while drawing up the Covering Plans for the districts, he fully took into account the specifics of the military geography of this district, and in reality this district could and should have held back the first strike with its border divisions! And give the rest of the troops time to deploy and mobilize.

But everything was leveled by the fact that these divisions, unlike the PribOVO or ODVO, were not withdrawn at all from the 18th on the PP. What NSh 28 sc and complained about - with a timely withdrawal, they would not have missed Guderian so easily. The result was a breakthrough by the Germans in Belarus and the Baltic states, which led to a retreat in the same KOVO or ODVO, where the troops were completely holding the defense on the border in the early days.

In PribOVO it was formally better than in ZAPOVO. On the 300 km the front of the land border - 9 divisions plus means of amplification. Those. - on average, it seems like about 33 km goes to the border. But - there are fewer "forests and swamps". However, with these "swamps" everything is not so simple. In military academies, just in the "military geography" in the classroom, the students were told: it was in June that the groundwater in these places - seriously sinks. Why did they only withdraw 7th out of 9 border crossing points registered in the BCP? One division, the 48th, went to the 11th Army to Morozov and, although they began to withdraw it from June 16-17, it did not manage to enter the defensive zone by June 22. Divisional commander Bogdanov eventually became a punisher of the Germans. Why the rest, the same 128th, who are on the border have not been withdrawn from June 18 to their own lanes - here the prosecutors have to deal with each separately.

And in KOVO - by approximately 800 km of front 17 border divisions plus means of amplification. Those. - there was under 50 km to the division. But on KOVO - its border divisions Zhukov these days directly forbade to occupy the borders themselves on the border - along the BCP. However, three border divisions of the 5th Army - the 45th, 62nd, and 87th rifle divisions - were withdrawn to the URs around the Lvov salient, and also had to go to the URs of the division and in the 12th Army, south of the Lvov salient - 60 -I and 96th Rifle Division of the 12th Army. Which also went to their URs by June 21st.

Also, as G. Spaskov shows in his research, bringing in bg. was carried out in the 41st and 97th divisions of the neighboring 6th Army.

Also, some borderline, in secondary areas, the order of the General Staff (Zhukov) to withdraw via the PP, to the border - received. These are, for example, the 72nd Abramidze State Police Department, in the 26th Army, which had up to 100 km of the border under its responsibility. And also next to the 72nd Guards Rifle Division in the 26th Army it was brought in b.g. 99th Rifle Division, where, according to the answer of the chief of staff of this division, General Gorokhov, “Divisional units as units located on the state border were constantly on alert and in a very short time could occupy their defense sectors, especially since the commanders of the artillery regiments, Comrades ... Losev and Murashev, leaving with the troops in the area of ​​firing positions (marching camp), deployed observation posts, prepared fires for some of the targets already spotted ... ". ("I am writing solely from memory ..." M. 2017, p. 271) And researcher Spaskov found such evidence about the withdrawal of the 99th by PP to the position - on June 19 " all units left the camp, took the foreground in the designated areas of the border cover ". (Artemenko I.T., "From the first to the last day. Notes of a front-line soldier." did not exist and was introduced only by wartime states.)

Plus, according to the directive of June 12, for KOVO, they brought the 164th Rifle Division in the 12th Army to the border, at the junction with the ODVO. In total, 10 border crossing points KOVO were listed in b.y. after June 11 and was withdrawn via the PP to the concentration areas in the area of ​​their defense! Readily occupy the defense lines themselves, the trenches on the border - in a matter of hours. And some even managed to occupy the trenches themselves ...

ODVO went in conjunction with KOVO, but he withdrew his border divisions along the PP by June 15 approximately. Bringing them to combat readiness on June 18 also ... And even in the United States, in Russian-language newspapers, "warmongers, whiteguard scum" wrote - on the border in Bessarabia these days there are constant clashes on the border ...

In general, in any case, on the "average" on the border, our border lines stretched from 25 to 40 km per division. The "norm" according to the Regulations for a division in defense was no more than 10 km! And in the directions of the main attacks of the enemy - about 6 km for a division of 14 thousand personnel!

Was it only in KOVO that their units were withdrawn to the URs? No.

The Chief of the General Staff wrote a resolution at the request of KOVO and let someone in the General Staff try not to fulfill the directive on this resolution in the response to the district. Was the directive of the General Staff for the occupation of the URs from June 18-19 communicated to other districts and, accordingly, to the command of the URs except for KOVO? Yes. The same directives were issued to other districts and had to be communicated and communicated to other districts.

This is what is shown in the article "State Border Dressing in Concrete":

“Major General M.I. Puzyrev, chief of staff - Colonel A.S. Lauta, and the head of the political department was regimental commissar I.G. Chelizhenko. The headquarters of the UR was located in Brest, presumably on the street. Pushkinskaya, house 17.

June 20 1941 year the headquarters and the political department of the fortified area relocated to High. " (L. Bibik, senior researcher of the memorial complex "Brest Fortress-Hero". Source - magazine "Army", 2.1999, p. 24-25)

Pay attention - from what date did the UR headquarters leave Brest, to its "field command post" Vysokoe, 50 km north of Brest and not far from the border - where later Guderian's tanks were trampled, and in what rank was the commander of this UR ...

June 18 the air defense, the air forces of the border districts and the fleet were brought to increased combat readiness - in "readiness number 2" ...

The following telegrams were received in the ZAPOVO in the air division and regiment:

"Sov. secret Series "G"

DECRYPTED TELEGRAM N217

From Lida Submitted 4-08 21.6.41 Accepted 8-00 21.6.41

Received by OShShS 8-05 21.6.41 Deciphered 8-15 21.6.41.

Address: To the commanders of the AD, the chiefs of the air-based regions, to the frames of the individual AP.

Air Force Commander ordered all units to be put on alert, bring the required amount of ammunition to take the necessary measures to mask airfields, materiel and transport. To convey about the execution 21.6.41g. I repeat 21.6.41g. to 18-00. " (TsAMO, f. 14 Guards. BAP, op. 178446, d. 2, l. 310 - the document was found and published by the researcher G. Spaskov)

In the same PribOVO, order number 00229 says: “By the end of June 19, 1941, the head of the air defense zone should bring the entire air defense of the district into full combat readiness ...". But in fact, they did not introduce readiness No. 1, but No. 2 - increased readiness ...

June 19 even the political commanders of the Air Force informed the divisional commanders of the SAD (mixed air divisions attached to each army in the districts) - the date and time of a possible attack is 3.00 on June 22 ... The General Staff instructed the air divisions not only to disperse the planes across the airfields, but also to collapse them, build half-caponiers to protect against fragments - if there is no way to camouflage the planes. And as the commanders show, answering Pokrovsky, this work was carried out. Aviation Major General Andreev A.P., Commander of the Air Force of the 8th A PribOVO:

"one. It was not known exactly about the possibility of an attack by Nazi Germany on the night of 22.6.41, but units of the Air Force of the 8th Army, like all units of the Air Force of the district, were warned by the command of the Air Force of the district about the possibility of an attack on June 16-17. It was ordered to withdraw the units to field airfields, and where this cannot be done - to disperse the planes on the main ones and dig them in for cover from being hit by aerial bombs. Introduce squadrons on duty in fighter units, one per regiment, and the rest of the flight and technical personnel will be at the unit's location. " (S. Chekunov, "I am writing solely from memory ...", M. 2017, p. 268)

Those. - after June 17, the Air Force was put on high alert. However, due to the fact that in the spring of 41st the People's Commissar Timoshenko carried out a reduction in the staff of technical personnel and equipment with gunsmiths of one aircraft in the Air Force, they began to serve three cars, the construction of these caponiers was not completed.

Has the Air Force command in the districts been informed about the possible date of the German attack - June 22? It was brought. How is this known? So to the commanders-pilots in specific field armies "Pokrovsky's questions" were posed somewhat different from those that were posed to the rest of the officers. And one of them sounded like this: “3. Did the Air Force Command of the ____ Army know about a possible attack by Nazi Germany in the morning of June 22? "

I hope it is understood - no one will raise a question on an investigation about a certain event, if this event would not have happened at all…

"4. When was the order to bring the ____ Army's Air Force to combat readiness received and what was done by the ____ Army's Air Force command in pursuance of this order?

1. To what extent by the morning of 22.6 were the air forces of the ____ army prepared for repelling sudden raids by fascist aircraft? "

The word "sudden" was underlined in the question itself ...

General Andreev testified that since June 17, they were informed in the PribOVO of a possible attack and brought them to an elevated battlefield. Burlakin:

« About June 16-17 at 17.00 the commander of the 188th regiment, Colonel IVANOV, summoned the commanders of the units and read out a directive, I do not remember whose, the PribVO or the 11th Army, I think the PribVO. I can’t list the entire directive exactly, but I remember some of the points, in which the following was said:

The Germans concentrated a large number of infantry and motorized divisions on the state border. The border crossing is expected on the night from 19 to 20.6.

The directive required all property and ammunition to be loaded onto vehicles. To hand out gas masks to the personnel (then the BSS-MO-2 gas mask was secret), to withdraw some of them from the camp on the night of 20.6-41 and disperse them.

Disperse the artillery by batteries in the forest.

Keep the planes fully fueled, the pilots should be on duty at the planes. I don’t remember any other items.

In accordance with the directive, the division commander gave instructions on the night of 20.6-41 to withdraw the regiments from the camp and conduct a night lesson on the topic: a battalion in a guard detachment, which I did. The battalion working on the border was simply warned about the possible start of hostilities. " (S. Chekunov, "I am writing solely from memory ...", M. 2017, p. 251)

Researcher G. Spaskov found in TsAMO ZhBD 11th Rifle Corps PribOVO "TsAMO RF, f.833, op.1, d.6, ll.1-5), in which, starting from the morning of June 18 and until the attack of Germany it is shown in detail how they were brought up in b.g. and taken out to the border via the PP. And in this Journal they made notes - how and where the individual corps units were being withdrawn, how and where the Germans were advancing - which summed up the day: on June 20 - "There were no combat actions during the night at 20.6 and on the day of 20.6", on June 21 - "Combat there were no actions during the day. " As you can see, the regiment commander Burlakin did not invent the date of the expected attack - on the night of June 20. The attack was expected in PribOVO exactly on the 20th, and measures were taken. By permission-order from Moscow, of course ...

June 18-19 the western districts received orders to withdraw the district headquarters to the field command posts. But if the PribOVO and KOVO deadline was specified - by June 22, to withdraw the headquarters of the districts to the field management, then Zhukov gave Minsk the command to withdraw the headquarters by June 23.

ODVO withdrew its headquarters by the end of June 21 and was ready to work under the leadership of General M.V. Zakharova - the commander himself left Odessa at 9 pm for Tiraspol. The KOVO headquarters was not brought out in full force - the Operations Department dealing with the reception and decryption of telegrams of the General Staff, together with its chiefs I.Kh.Bagramyan, was left by Purkaev in Kiev and arrived in Ternopil only in the morning of June 22, at 7 o'clock.

In PribOVO, the headquarters with the command was in Panevezys and was ready to receive commands from Moscow, but the commander F.I. Kuznetsov "got lost" somewhere in the units of Morozov's 11th Army and then they could not find him for almost a day. Instead of Kuznetsov, Klenov had to command him at these hours. In ZAPOVO, Pavlov sent part of the headquarters officers (from the same operative department - Fomin later answered Pokrovsky that he was not in Minsk that night) sent to the field command post in Obuz-Lesna on June 21, but the headquarters itself remained in Minsk. And the headquarters in Minsk could receive the ciphers of the General Staff.

June 19-20 border guards become subordinate to the commanders of border divisions, where border divisions went through the PP these days to their borders on the orders of the NKO and the General Staff (Moscow), to the border zone, and in some sections of the border the border guards even transfer their positions to the troops ...

(Note: The transition of border posts to the subordination of army commanders was determined by the Decree of the Politburo - Stalin, dated June 22, 1939:

"eleven. With the exit of the Red Army troops to the state border, all the border units of the NKVD located in the sector come under the operational subordination of the commander of this sector. " ("From the Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the interaction of border troops and units of the Red Army in the border zone. June 22, 1939. Approve, as amended, the draft directive of the NKO and the NKVD to military councils of districts and armies, chiefs of border troops of districts on interaction of the border troops of the NKVD and parts of the Red Army in the border strip. Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) ... ", CA FSK Russia)

And on June 16, Beria gave the order to the border troops: “ With the outbreak of hostilities, transfer to the subordination of the field command... Contact the unit stationed at the border detachment, establish contact by mutual information. Report execution urgently. " (Kislovsky Yu. G. Victory was born in battles on the border. M., 2005, p. 172) And the division commanders and regiment commanders, responding to Pokrovsky, showed that in the pre-war days they took the border guards under their command. And until the border guards were taken to the rear - from June 25, having assigned them the tasks of protecting the rear of the Red Army, they fought along with army units on the border.

Major General of the Border Service V. Gorodinsky in his book “The Truth of History or Mythology? Little-known pages of the service and combat activities of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War "(M.2016) writes that" a number of border districts on the western border did not move into the operational subordination of the command of the Red Army on June 22, but 12 June 1941 20 [20 Panarin IN The First World Information War. Collapse of the USSR. SPb. 2010, p. 98; Panarin I. N. The collapse of the USSR was carried out not by the USA, but by Great Britain // Russian Bulletin. - 2010. - No. 18 (September); Beria L.P. Stalin does not believe in tears. Personal diary 1937-1941. -M. 2011.-p.266.]

However, this is unlikely - that on June 12, the border guards began to go under the command of the commanders of the border divisions. This could have happened not earlier than on the 18th, when border divisions began to enter the border zone, along the PP. But he also writes that allegedly “1-2 days before the start of the war, in some border detachments, an enhanced version of the protection of the state border was even canceled.” ...)

June 19"The fleets and flotillas were ordered to go into operational readiness No. 2." ("1941 - Lessons and Conclusions", p. 86)

(Note:Here it is necessary to clarify one more important point ...

Some "rezuns" are worried: "An amazing thing - the Order of the People's Commissar of Defense dated June 19, 1941 -" To withdraw by 22-23 06. the Western Front administration, formed on the basis of the ZAPOVO administration at the field command post in the Obuza-Lesna area "is, and there is an Order with" Bring on high alert "- no .... Did you eat the mice in the archives? And in all districts (fronts). "

Alas - even those who understand that the order "dated June 18" could not but be because there is its "continuation" in the districts in the divisions in the form of orders to bring the divisions into the b.g., they do not quite understand that - THERE IS NO ONE AND THERE WASN'T order to bring in b.g. ALL troops - military arms "June 18"! Those. - ONE GENERAL and SINGLE ORDER of NGOs and General Staff for ALL troops around the neighborhood - "Bring the troops to combat readiness" WAS NOT, and COULD NOT BE in those days - until June 21!

Everything was "simpler" - the Air Force, Air Defense and Navy received their orders for "readiness number 2" on DIFFERENT days, June 16-19, and these orders are in place. But the army, in the districts, received "June 18" orders for something else - NOT ABOUT BRIDGING troops of border districts into an "increased" b.g., but about - specific WITHDRAWAL according to the Covering Plan of their border divisions... And already THAT is what OBLIGEDED the division commanders to bring their divisions into combat readiness by OWN ORDERS... Today TsAMO puts Koi on the net. Those. - the districts were brought, in contrast to the Air Force, Air Defense and the Navy, into an increased b.g. according to another scheme, not by direct one order. And not in one day.

Indeed, in the army in those days there were only two degrees of b.g. - "constant" and immediately "complete". Which, at the same time, did not provide for the beginning of mobilization - even when entering a full one. Those. - if anything - fight with what you have ...

Pilots with poeoshniki and naval officers came up with - "readiness number 2", for the "threatened" period, from which it takes a couple of hours to go to "full" ("readiness number 1"), but Meretskov and Zhukov did not manage to come up with an intermediate degree b.g. - "increased" for the army. And if it was necessary to increase the level of combat readiness of the army higher than the "permanent" one, but it was still impossible to introduce the "full" one, then it was stupidly impossible to give the "short" command to the army - "Bring to the increased bg"! In those days, the divisional commander, having received such an order, simply would not have understood: what should he do, what measures should be taken in this case?

Increased b.g. today it differs from the full one in only a couple of provisions - the issuance of cartridges to the hands and the beginning of mobilization. And since in those days, mobilization was not at all associated with the introduction of a full b.g. then the divisional commander could theoretically receive an order - "Bring the compound to full bg." and if he was given an "addition" - "not to hand out cartridges", then theoretically he would have led his division to a higher b.g. But. Degree "increased" bg. although there was no, and the "difference" between the increased and full division commander did not know in those days, but having received such an order with "restrictions" he would certainly understand what he needed to do. However, to give such an order BEFORE June 21 - on the "complete" bg. (albeit with "restrictions") it was simply IMPOSSIBLE - for political reasons! As well as to give the order "Proceed to the implementation of the PP" and at the beginning of mobilization - formally, in those days, until the moment of the German attack! After all The USSR would immediately be declared an "aggressor" and at the same time we get a second front from Japan! And Stalin could not allow this!

Therefore, an increase in the "degree" of bg. in the army in those days, in the threatened period, when it is still impossible to introduce "full" at once, it went through separate instructions, orders and orders. And the same withdrawal of the border divisions on the PP also "obliged" the divisional commander to increase the degree of bg. their parts - as Zhukov himself later wrote.

So - you need to look in the archives not mythical, one for all "order of June 18" on bringing the troops of the western districts to combat readiness, but look - what orders and what were generally going on in those days from the NCO and the General Staff - what measures to increase " degree "bg, increasing combat readiness went to the districts. Which today are included in the list of measures carried out when the "increased" combat readiness is introduced. It is necessary to look at whether there were orders for the withdrawal of border divisions along the PP - which also obliged the division commander to bring his units into combat readiness. Indeed, when the division is withdrawn according to the Covering Plan, to the area according to the PP, the division commander is simply OBLIGED to bring his regiments into combat readiness - "automatically"!

And all these orders are stored in the folder of outgoing encryption messages of the OU GSh. And including the Air Force and Air Defense - to enter "readiness number 2", from June 17-19, which today, by the way, is not known in the published form. And according to the conclusion of the border crossings on the PP, from "June 18" are also stored there ... But - not in TsAMO, by the way, this daddy is lying.

But - as the division commander Abramidze showed, on the 20th he was given a "message from the General Staff," according to which he had to withdraw from the border all his units working there, "to the line of prepared positions. Do not respond to any provocations from the German units; until such people violate the state border. All parts of the division must be put on alert. To bring the execution to 24.00 on 21.6.41 ". What he reported to the General Staff in the presence of the army commander - at 24 hours on June 21.

Those. in fact, in the orders of the General Staff on the withdrawal of border divisions along the PP, without occupying the "lines of prepared positions" themselves, as it was in the same PribOVO, the General Staff additionally indicated this - " All parts of the division must be put on alert»!…

As researcher S. Chekunov shows, “On June 20, 1941, the command of the 72nd Mountain Rifle Division received a directive from the Military Council of the Kiev Special Military District No. carried out work in the areas that were intended for them according to the cover plan. The directive did not contain any orders to bring the units into combat readiness "(Note" 10 "to the answer of the division commander Abramidze," I am writing solely from memory ... ", vol. 2, p. 258).

The fact is that the orders of the General Staff sent even "personally" to some divisions will go through the duplication of the Armed Forces of the districts, through the headquarters of the armies. And as Chekunov clarifies, Abramidze was instructed to remove from the border ALL of his units, those that work on the border "except for those that were working in the areas that were intended for them under the cover plan." But the divisional commander showed - he was ordered to withdraw his regiments to the lines of prepared positions on the PP, i.e. - he was not only instructed by KOVO itself - to stop work at the border ...)

June 20 there was a command from the General Staff - to coordinate their PPs with the fleets to the districts - within two days ...

The Baltic Fleet has already informed the PribOVO headquarters that it has introduced an increased b.h.

“On June 20, the commanders of the Leningrad, Baltic special and Odessa military districts were instructed to work out the issues of interaction with the fleet in accordance with the cover plan within two days (TsAMO, f. 229, op. 164, d. 1, l. 31)” (“1941 year - lessons and conclusions ", p. 86)

This is also shown by Major General I.P. Makara, head of the department of history of wars and military art of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, candidate of historical sciences, member of the editorial board of the Military Historical Journal, in the article “From the experience of planning the strategic deployment of the reflection "- VIZh № 6, 2006, p. 3-9): - “At the same time, measures were taken to increase the combat readiness of the Navy. On June 19, by the decision of the People's Commissar of the Navy, the fleets and flotillas were transferred to operational readiness No. 2. The next day, the commanders of the Leningrad, Baltic Special and Odessa military districts received instructions from the General Staff to work out the issues of interaction with the fleet in accordance with the cover plan within two days. "...

June 20 F. Halder wrote in his service diary: « ... Information about the enemy: An increased attentiveness of the Russians was noticed in some areas. (The enemy takes up positions in front of the front of the 8th Army Corps.) ... "

This 8th German AK was part of the 9th German field army, which occupied its initial positions in the Suwalki ledge. And in front of him - in the ZAPOVO was our 3rd Army, its 56th rifle division, but it definitely did not occupy a position. There, on the border, they worked, God forbid, rifle battalions reinforced by artillery divisions and no more. But next to it, in PribOVO, also "opposite" this 8th AK of the Germans, a division of the 11th Army of the PribOVO, 28th rifle division was withdrawn to the border ... (See Appendices No. 10 and 18 in "1941 - lessons and conclusions", showing German and our units as of June 22nd.)

But about Belarus, Halder, already in his memoirs, "Memoirs of a Soldier," wrote: "Careful observation of the Russians convinced me that they were unaware of our intentions. In the courtyard of the fortress of Brest, which could be seen from our observation posts, to the sounds of an orchestra, they conducted a set of guards. The coastal fortifications along the Western Bug were not occupied by Russian troops ”….