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From Manstein's breakthrough through the Perekop positions to the failure of the first assaults on Sevastopol, from the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation and the unsuccessful offensive of the Crimean Front to the Kerch disaster and the fall of the Main Base of the Black Sea Fleet, from the long German occupation of the peninsula to the swift (in just a month) liberation of Crimea in the victorious spring of 1944 year, when our advancing troops lost four times less than the defending enemy - this book analyzes in detail all the operations of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in the struggle for the Crimea.

Separately considered are the actions of our ground forces - tankers, infantry, artillery - and the combat work of the Soviet Air Force and the Black Sea Fleet.

Sections of this page:

The task of defeating the Soviet troops in the Crimea was first set on February 12, 1942 in the "Order on the conduct of hostilities on the Eastern Front after the end of the winter period" of the German Ground Forces High Command. It said the following: “Along with the liquidation of the enemy’s breakthrough west of Izyum, the immediate task of the army group [South. - A.I.] - a quick return of the Kerch Peninsula and the capture of Sevastopol is possible in order to free up forces for a further offensive.

Moreover, even before the start of the first offensive of the Crimean Front, E. von Manstein, in his report to the GA "South" on February 21, 1942, wrote in plain text: "The special danger of crises in the Crimea is combined with an exceptional chance of success."

Moreover, the commander of the 11th Army revealed this idea of ​​his own in a report on February 19: “In this part of the Russian front, in connection with the massing of forces by the enemy in a narrow space, in the rear of which the sea is located, a chance for success looms. There is no such chance on any other sector of the front - at least this spring. Even then, Manstein spoke of the need to defeat the grouping of Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula before the assault on Sevastopol.

The commander of the 11th Army proposed "a quick breakthrough to the harbors and the destruction of both armies located on the peninsula." In addition to the 22nd TD already promised to him, Manstein asked for a decisive success to allocate for the operation in the Crimea one more tank division from the 1st TA, as well as large aviation forces. True, at that stage of planning an attack on the Soviet troops on the Parpach Isthmus, he intended to use aviation mainly to influence the supply ports of Kerch and Kamysh-Burun.

At a meeting on March 28, 1942, F. Halder wrote down in his diary Hitler's main statements, in which Crimea was given priority even then: “Actions should begin in the south - in Crimea” and “Crimea. Kerch is the concentration of the main aviation forces. Soon these ideas were formalized in Directive No. 41 signed by Hitler on April 5, 1942. It defined the main goals of the 1942 campaign - the Caucasus and Leningrad. To release the large forces of the 11th Army, bogged down in positional battles on an isolated sector of the front, Directive No. 41 set the task of "clearing the Kerch Peninsula from the enemy in the Crimea and capturing Sevastopol." At a meeting with Hitler in April 1942, Sonderstern and Manstein presented a plan for an operation to defeat the Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula. The operation was codenamed Bustard Hunting (Trappenjagd).

The plan was in many ways reminiscent of the "sickle strike" with which the Allies in the West were defeated two years before the events described, in May 1940. The main attack was supposed to be carried out by the forces of XXX AK with three infantry divisions in the first echelon: 132nd Infantry Division ( on the right), 28th lpd (in the center) and 50th pd (on the left). Further, it was supposed to bring the 22nd TD into battle in the Arma-Eli area and envelop the maneuver in relation to the northern wing of the Soviet grouping on the Parpach Isthmus.

German scheme of attacking the Parpach positions of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division with landings from assault boats.

One of the widespread misconceptions about the events of May 1942 in the Crimea is the belief in the quantitative superiority of the Soviet troops over the German strike force. It is a consequence of an uncritical assessment of the data of E. von Manstein, who wrote in his memoirs about the offensive "with a balance of forces of 2.1 in favor of the enemy." Today we have the opportunity to turn to the documents and not to conjecture, together with Manstein, the "hordes of Mongols." As you know, by the beginning of the decisive battle for the Kerch Peninsula, the Crimean Front (with part of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla) numbered 249,800 people. In turn, the 11th Army on May 2, 1942, based on the number of "eaters", totaled 232,549 (243,760 on May 11) military personnel in army units and formations, 24 (25) thousand Luftwaffe personnel, 2 thousand . people from the Kriegsmarine and 94.6 (95) thousand people of the Romanian troops. In total, this gave over 350 thousand people of the total strength of Manstein's army. In addition, several thousand personnel of the Imperial Railways, the SD, the Organization of Todt in the Crimea and 9.3 thousand collaborators, referred to in the German report as "Tatars", were subordinate to her. In any case, there was no question of any significant numerical superiority of the Crimean Front over Manstein's troops aimed at it. Strengthening went in all directions. The 11th Army was transferred to the VIII Air Corps, specially trained for interaction with the ground forces by the Luftwaffe air force. In early May 1942, 460 aircraft arrived in Crimea, including a group of the latest Henschel-129 attack aircraft (15 aircraft).

It is traditionally argued that the defensive grouping of the troops of the Crimean Front was not created, the troops were in offensive formation, no reserves were allocated, which prevented the Soviet troops from effectively defending themselves. Documents now available indicate that the Crimean Front at the turn of April - May 1942, without any doubt, was preparing to defend itself. Moreover, in relation to the strip of the 44th Army, quite reasonable assumptions were made about the possible directions of enemy attacks: from Koi-Asan to Parpach and further along the railway and along the Feodosia highway to Arma-Eli. The Germans in "Hunting for bustards" chose the second option and advanced in May 1942 along the highway to Arma-Ely.

The entire strip, defended by the troops of the front, was fortified. Thus, during negotiations between the commander of the 47th Army and the headquarters of the front on May 3, 1942, Kolganov reported: “There is a continuous minefield in front of the front of the 47th Army [...] West of Tulumchak and south of Korpecha there is a second minefield. To cover the OP artillery, the advanced units were issued 50 anti-tank hedgehogs and 500 mines are issued. At the same negotiations, possible counterattacks of the 55th brigade were discussed.

If we talk about the position of the troops of the Crimean Front as a whole, then seven of its rifle divisions were in the first line on the front for about 22 km, seven rifle divisions at a distance of 3–12 km in depth were in army reserves, including two divisions on Ak- Monai positions. In the northern part of the peninsula, 20–25 km from the front, there were three rifle brigades (12th, 143rd Rifle Brigade, 83rd Motorized Rifle Brigade). Further to the east there was one cavalry division of front subordination (72nd cd), and on the eastern tip of the peninsula there was one rifle division (156th rifle division) also of front subordination.

By the beginning of the German offensive in the 44th Army, the 63rd Guards Rifle Division and the 276th Rifle Division were in the first line, and the veterans of the battles on the Parpach Isthmus, the 404th and 157th Rifle Divisions, were withdrawn for resupply to the rear, being at the same time an army reserve . The winter direction of the Headquarters on the mandatory occupation of the Ak-Monai positions was carried out, they were occupied by the 396th rifle division with three companies of high-explosive flamethrowers. That is, it is still incorrect to talk about the absence of reserves. Another purely defensive measure was the arrival on the Parpach Isthmus literally at the beginning of May of parts of the 151st fortified area (UR), intended to occupy the Ak-Monai positions together with the 396th Rifle Division (in the 44th A lane) and the 224th Rifle Division ( in lane 51st and 47th A). The UR was well staffed (2967 out of 2949 in the state), but poorly equipped with weapons. On April 29, 1942, out of 128 heavy machine guns, the 151st UR did not have a single one, and not a single one out of 32 45-mm guns. True, of the 32 76-mm guns, all were available. Moreover, it is curious that it was in the 343rd OPAB, which soon found itself on the path of the German strike force, that the vehicles allocated by the ABTU of the front were used in early May 1942 for their intended purpose, for the delivery of guns and ammunition.

The preparation by the German command of the operation during a long operational pause made it possible to select a vulnerable sector of the defense of the Crimean Front. It was the strip of the 44th Army adjoining the Black Sea, more precisely, its left flank. It is interesting to note that back in February 1942, the chief of staff of the engineering troops of the spacecraft, Major General I.P. Galitsky, in a report on the development of the Ak-Monai positions, designated the enemy’s strike along the coast of the Feodosia Gulf as “not promising success, since the Black Sea Fleet is a strong obstacle to this offensive action.” In fact, the Black Sea Fleet did not become a hindrance, one might even say, did not have any effect on the German offensive.

In the direction of the planned main attack of the Germans was the 63rd Guards Rifle Division. The national composition of the division was very heterogeneous. Summary data on the national composition of the compounds of the 44th A are shown in Table. 1. According to the data presented, it can be seen that the share of the peoples of the Caucasus in the 63rd Guards Rifle Division was quite significant, although not dominant. At the same time, one cannot fail to note the deployment of the Azerbaijani 396th Rifle Division, which had no experience in serious battles, to the Ak-Monai positions.

The state of defense of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division was not brilliant. An inspection carried out in the division for the execution of order No. 143 on strengthening the equipment of positions a few days before the German offensive (the report is dated May 7) showed: “the trenches and communication passages were made very narrow and small in places”, parapets were not decorated, there were primitive loopholes only some fighters.

In general, the 63rd Guards Rifle Division was one of the weakest formations of the Crimean Front. At the same time, it cannot be said that she was a completely outsider in terms of weapons. Poor manning of 45-mm guns was a common problem for Soviet troops in the Crimea in the spring of 1942, their number in divisions fluctuated from 2 to 18 per division, with an average of 6-8 pieces. As of April 26, out of 603 "forty-five" guns laid down in the state, the Crimean Front had only 206 guns of this type, out of 416 divisional 76-mm guns - 236, out of 4754 anti-tank rifles laid down in the state - 1372. It cannot be said that a quick solution to this problem was expected. According to the certificate of the chief of artillery supply, in the first decade of May, only 48 45-mm guns were expected to arrive (which is significant, all of them were intended for the 151st UR) and 1100 anti-tank guns. Approving the defense plan of the 44th Army, on April 26, the Military Council of the Front additionally ordered: "Provide all units of the first and second echelons with bottles of KS to fight tanks." The allocation of a mobile reserve of engineering units was also recommended, but these were measures of limited effectiveness. The main opponent of tanks was still artillery.

The problem of anti-tank defense was somewhat alleviated by the presence of four regiments of 76-mm SPM guns in the Crimean Front, but they still had to be at the right time in the right place. This was especially true, given the horse-drawn traction of the SPM regiments. In the general case, a massive enemy tank attack would be a big problem for any division of the Crimean Front. It is often forgotten that in 1942 the Red Army was on starvation rations, both in terms of weapons and ammunition. It was very difficult to reproduce in the Crimea in May 1942 the defense on the Kursk Bulge of the July 1943 model with four 45-mm guns and 29 Maxims of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division.

Tanks, primarily the T-34 and KV, could and did become the backbone of the defense of the Crimean Front. From April 12 to May 1, 1942, 82 tanks were repaired from among those previously disabled. The condition of the tank troops of the Crimean Front is shown in the table. The KV tanks remained the core of the tank forces of the Crimean Front (see Table 2).

Tanks 38(t) of the 22nd TD on the march, May 1942

In the event of an enemy offensive in the 44th Army, a plan of counterattacks was developed according to three options, finally recorded in combat order No. 028 of April 28, 1942. The first option was developed in the event of an enemy attack in the 51st Army along the railway Vladislavovka, st. Ak-Monai, the second - in case of a strike along the Feodosiya road to Arma-Eli, the third - in the event of a breakthrough in the area of ​​​​st. Ak-Monai and development of impact further along the railway. (actually the development of the first version). All three options included art. support from the RGC regiments.

As mentioned above, the 2nd option turned out to be relevant. He assumed the formation of two shock, "tank groups":

a) 56th brigade, 157th brigade, 13th mtsp-th and 124th brigade (counterattack from the area of ​​heights 63, 8 to the south-west);

b) 39th brigade, 404th rifle division and 126th brigade (counterattack from the Arma-Eli region to the south-west on As-Chalula).

The task was "to eliminate the broken pr-ka and restore the previous position of the left flank of the 44th army". An additional tank reserve was the 124th brig. Nevertheless, the Crimean Front did not have a full-fledged mechanized formation (tank corps) for delivering counterattacks. Several armored brigades and a motorcycle regiment were not a full-fledged equivalent of such a formation, neither in terms of numbers, nor in terms of weapons.

It is curious to note that later Colonel S.I. Chernyak in G.M. Malenkov wrote in November 1942: “I gave an order in the area where the division was located to prepare a defensive line and bury all the troops in the ground, to have a preparatory line in the depths.” However, as Chernyak describes the situation, he saw D.T. Kozlov inflicted a dressing and ordered "to give people a rest and prepare them for the offensive." In the light of the above combat order No. 028, this is not surprising, the formations were preparing for counterattacks.

At the same time, the practice of withdrawing to the rear on the Crimean Front had one significant drawback. The formations were withdrawn to the rear for resupplying with the preservation of their artillery regiments at the front. So, the artillery of the 404th and 157th rifle divisions, withdrawn to the rear by May, was in positions to support the 63rd Guards Rifle Division and the 276th Rifle Division. This created the prerequisites for the entry of divisions withdrawn into the reserve without artillery, as subsequently happened. It should not be thought that this was a decision characteristic only of the 44th Army. The same practice took place in the 51st and 47th armies. This made the artillery grouping of the Crimean Front, on the one hand, a strong enemy in the first line, but very vulnerable when breaking through this line.

At the same time, theoretically, the Crimean Front could repeat the success of March 20, 1942 with a tank counterattack, but only if the qualitative composition of the enemy grouping did not change. It was she who underwent changes that had fatal consequences for the Soviet troops in the Crimea. The German command reinforced the armored vehicles in the Crimea qualitatively. The 22nd TD received 12 newest Pz.IVs with a 75-mm long-barreled gun, 20 Pz.IIIs with a 50-mm long-barreled gun and Marder self-propelled guns with a 76.2-mm gun to the anti-tank division. In total, as of May 1, 1942, the 22nd TD consisted of 42 Pz.II, 120 Pz.38 (t), 20 Pz.III, 30 Pz.IV, and a total of 212 tanks. Two companies of the formation were equipped with armored personnel carriers, one in each motorized infantry regiment. Thus, the 22nd TD entered the battle in Operation Bustard Hunting in a much better condition than in the counteroffensive on March 20, 1942, despite the losses incurred. The 190th assault gun battalion also received new equipment - 6 self-propelled guns with a 75-mm long-barreled gun. In general, a fairly strong armored “fist” was assembled in XXX AK (as of May 7, 1942):

- The 132nd infantry division was attached to the 249th battalion of assault guns and the battery of the 197th battalion (a total of 22 "Sturmgeshyutz");

- The 28th lpd was attached to the 190th battalion of assault guns (15 self-propelled guns with a short barrel and 6 with a long one), as well as the 223rd company of captured tanks, consisting of 16 light and 2 medium tanks;

- The 50th infantry division was attached to the 197th battalion of assault guns (14 "Sturmgeshyutsev").

In early April 1942, Ion Antonescu was inspecting his troops in the Crimea. Taking the opportunity, Manstein asked the Romanian dictator for Romanian units, and the marshal soon sent the Romanian VII Corps to the Crimea, consisting of two divisions (19th infantry division and 8th infantry division). The commander of the 11th Army placed this corps on his left flank, in the zone of the Soviet 51st Army. There was a certain risk of a collapse of the front in the event of a Soviet offensive, just as it happened on February 27, 1942.

Self-propelled guns "Marder" of the early production series with a 76.2-mm gun. These self-propelled guns became one of the Germans' responses to the new Soviet armored vehicles.

The High Command turned a deaf ear to all Manstein’s requests for a second tank division (“headquarters of a tank corps with another TD from the 1st TA”), which he requested in his reports in January and February 1942. As a tank commander who had driving experience motorized corps in the summer of 1941, Manstein realized the need to use exactly two mechanized formations on the Kerch Peninsula: one to encircle the Soviet troops, and the second to strike in depth, to Kerch. Based on his experience in the Crimea in 1941, Manstein formed a battle group similar in tasks to the Ziegler brigade, but more numerous and better armed. It included the reconnaissance battalion of the 22nd infantry division, the battalion of the 391st infantry regiment, the 560th tank destroyer battalion, the 154th division (twelve 150-mm sFH37 (t)), a battery of 10-cm K18 guns (4 guns), a battery of assault guns of the 197th battalion, a company of Brandenburg saboteurs, a battery of rocket-propelled mortars, anti-aircraft guns, sappers and the Romanian 3rd motorized cavalry regiment Cornet. The battle group was headed by Colonel K. von Groddek. In addition to the Groddek brigade, the Muller battle group was formed from the infantry of the 401st infantry regiment and a battalion of the 105th regiment, mounted on trucks, reinforced by the 223rd tank destroyer battalion, a battery of assault guns and Romanian artillery. As a result, the mobile forces of the 11th Army (in addition to the 22nd TD) grew to five infantry battalions reinforced by artillery, which was already close enough to a tank division. R. Fortsik claims that Muller's group was subordinate to Groddek, but this fact is not traced according to the documents of the 11th Army. Rather, we can talk about two independently operating battle groups with a common task.

Mindful of the negative experience of the counterattack of the 22nd TD on March 20, for Operation Bustard Hunting, the Germans undertook a thorough study of the anti-tank ditch of the Ak-Monai positions, both with the help of aerial reconnaissance and through targeted interviewing of prisoners. It really was a serious engineering structure with a depth of 2-3 meters, a width of 4-4.5 meters on the surface and a width of 3 meters at the bottom. Particular attention was paid to the study of crossings across the ditch (which the Soviet troops needed to bring troops and supplies from the depths). However, these crossings were so seriously protected with mining approaches to them that it was concluded: "The anti-tank ditch should therefore be crossed away from these crossings." It is not surprising, because the prominent Soviet engineer I.P. had a hand in improving the defense of the Ak-Monai positions. Galitsky, who worked on the Crimean front from February to April 1942.

The 306th Artillery Command, headed by Lieutenant General J. Zukertort, was allocated to control the artillery collected for Operation Bustard Hunting. I must say that the Germans as a whole quite highly appreciated the artillery of the Crimean Front. One of the reports written at the end of the operation directly admits: “Due to the constant change of positions by enemy artillery and the large number of these positions, it could only be a question of deterring enemy artillery by setting up smoke screens and firing explosive shells over areas.” That is, the emphasis was placed on blinding observation posts in order to reduce the effectiveness of artillery countermeasures. J. Zukertort also noted one feature of the actions of the Soviet artillery, which it was decided to use: “The Russians always open fire from the bulk of their guns about half an hour after the start of the attack; thanks to this, it is possible at first to support the infantry attack with the help of all our artillery. Artillery activity also became for the 11th Army a means of misleading the Soviet command about the direction of the main attack. There was no artillery preparation, counter-battery firing, firing at fortifications, sighting in the XXX AK zone. On the contrary, in the zone XXXXII AK, already 10 days before the start of the offensive, a systematic counter-battery fight and shooting at various targets was carried out.

Apparently, this disinformation campaign had a certain impact on the assessment of the situation by the Soviet command. According to available data, the German offensive was expected against the "center and right wing of the armies of the Crimean Front". It cannot be emphasized here that the task of determining the direction of the enemy's strike is in itself very difficult. Even in the classic example of a successful deliberate defense of the Central Front in the summer of 1943, on the Kursk Bulge, the Germans struck at the weakest 15th Rifle Division V.N. Dzhangavs and hacked its defenses on the first day of the battle. It was hard to expect a better decision from the Crimean Front in May 1942 than K.K. Rokossovsky in the summer of 1943

Tank Pz.IV with a 75-mm long-barreled gun in the Crimea. May 1942 Crimea became a testing ground for new German armored vehicles.

On the whole, there is no doubt that the command of the Crimean Front considered the possibility of the enemy going over to the offensive. The German strike was expected, paying attention to the supply of all types of supplies and the activation of the Air Force. In the ZhBD of the Crimean Front in early May 1942, the conclusion was recorded that the enemy was preparing "for active operations in the Kerch direction." Moreover, the first, yet false alarm rose literally in the first days of the month. At the negotiations S.I. Chernyak with D.T. Kozlov, on the night of May 3, mentioned the cutting of wire by the Germans, and the conclusion was made: “with dawn it can go on to active operations.” In the same conversation, the front commander recalled the need to be ready to switch to radio communications.

One of the last "bells" about the upcoming German offensive was the flight to the Soviet side of the Croatian pilot Nikolai Vucina on the morning of May 4, 1942, who was interrogated personally by Marshal S.M. Budyonny. N. Vucina bluntly said that in the Crimea "the Germans are thinking of advancing between May 10-15."

One of the first who began to advance to attack Soviet positions on the Parpach Isthmus was the reinforced company of the 436th Infantry Division, intended for tactical landing in the rear of Soviet positions, behind the anti-tank ditch. Traditionally, this landing is called "boat", but he landed with the help of sapper assault boats with an internal combustion engine. They were originally intended to force rivers. The landing was carried out, respectively, by the forces of the engineering unit: the 902nd assault boat team. The difference between such boats and boats was the high speed of movement.

Since the harbor of Feodosia was crammed with mines, the landing of infantry landing on boats was carried out from 20.30 on May 7 at Cape Ilya (empty boats with a small draft could pass through the harbor without interference). The landing was almost thwarted due to the appearance of the silhouette of the ship, identified by the Germans as a torpedo boat. However, this did not have any consequences, at 1.45 am on May 8 the silhouette disappeared and at 2.30 am the assault boats began to move in conditions of excitement of 3 points (which forced two people to hold the engine). The disruption of this enterprise, bordering on an adventure, could be carried out by the weakest forces of the Black Sea Fleet boats, but the Germans did not encounter any interference from the Soviet fleet. From the air, the landing was covered by fighters, they are mentioned in the German report.

At 4.00 am Berlin time on May 8, the boats leave for the designated area and at 4.15 am, deployed in a deployed formation at a speed of 25 km / h, go on the attack. At 1 km from the shore, boats with landing forces come under fire from Soviet artillery, but overcome it, and 500 meters from the shore they begin to be hit by infantry weapons. As a result, 11 boats are disabled, 4 more are turned over, and landing is carried out from 28 boats. On the shore, the landing party encounters a field of FOGs (high-explosive flamethrowers), but according to the German action report, losses from flamethrowers were insignificant and the minefield of FOGs was quickly cleared. The landing was an unpleasant surprise that aggravated the situation on the left flank of the 44th Army. As indicated in the report of the reconnaissance department of the 44th Army, the landing force occupied the pillbox, “cutting off our units defending in the west. slopes of the city of As-Chalule ". It must be said that in the report in hot pursuit of the events, the estimate of the size of the landing force was quite realistic - 150 people.

As early as eight in the evening on May 7, 1942, when there were several hours left before the German offensive, the headquarters of the artillery of the Crimean Front had strong information about the impending transition of the Germans to the offensive. With the sanction of the front command, a decision is made at 4.00 on May 8 to conduct counter-training and an order is issued for counter-training. The beginning of the counter-preparation actually coincides with the enemy's artillery strike. The author failed to find any mention of Soviet counter-training and the effect it produced in German operational documents. There is only the phrase "Russian artillery fire is weak" in the 11th Army ZhBD, but it is not clear to which time interval it refers.

Tanks of the 22nd TD in the Crimea. The pear-shaped muzzle brake of 75-mm long-barreled guns of the early type is clearly visible on the right side of the image.

German artillery preparation begins at 3.15 Berlin time on May 8 with a powerful, but very short, only 3 minutes, fire strike. One of the means of achieving success for the Germans was 150-mm rocket-propelled mortars, which made a strong impression on the 77th Rifle Division in March 1942. On the morning of May 8, they acted with highly concentrated fire, which was provided by six batteries at once. Also on May 8, the impact of 150-mm mortars was reinforced by 280-mm and 320-mm rockets. The anti-tanker G. Biderman from the 132nd Infantry Division later wrote in his memoirs:

“A battery of six rocket launchers could fire 26 projectiles, flying with a nerve-destroying roar, producing a terrible effect. The fragments from these shells did not produce the same impression as fragments from artillery shells, but the explosion of the shell on detonation in a confined space or at close range led to the rupture of blood vessels from the shock wave. Enemy soldiers in close proximity to the site of the explosion were soon demoralized by eardrum tearing ruptures, and the usual, instinctive fear quickly gave way to horror and panic. Stoic Russian soldiers, usually insensitive even to raids by "pieces", often became helpless under such shelling.

It is not surprising that this weapon made a strong impression on not the strongest division of the Crimean Front, i.e., the 63rd Guards Rifle Division. As indicated in the report on the use of rocket-propelled mortars: “The breakthrough of the 49th bp at 6.00 in the morning into the anti-tank ditch was facilitated (perhaps, in principle, provided) by the moral impact on the enemy (the direct physical impact on the enemy who was in deep trenches is much less)”. Indeed, the infantrymen of the 28th Infantry Division reached the anti-tank ditch already at 4.00 in the morning.

A key role in the success of the German offensive was played by the speed of action and powerful artillery and air strikes in the first hours of the operation. The report on the actions of the 28th lpd stated: “Shortly after that [reaching the line of the ditch. - Auth.] begins a pre-agreed strike of "pieces", which occurs as timely as possible. The enemy on the main line of defense gets hit just at the moment when the advancing infantry has reached the anti-tank ditch. At the same time, artillery from all available barrels opens the strongest fire at the designated breakthrough site. As a result, the advanced companies of the 28th LPD manage to break into the anti-tank ditch south of the road. As a result, already in the first hours of the operation, the 132nd Infantry Division and the 28th Infantry Division formed bridgeheads to the east of the anti-tank ditch. Moreover, the 132nd Infantry Division is advancing 3 km east of the moat. Not only parts of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division were crushed, but also the left-flank 343rd opab of the 151st UR, its commander, Captain Mikhailov, was seriously wounded.

In fairness, it should be noted that not everywhere it was possible to make a strong impression on the Soviet infantry. The 50th Infantry Division on the left wing of XXX AK was not successful. The same report on the actions of rocket-propelled mortars stated: “Two fire strikes (117 explosive and 54 incendiary shells) failed to destroy the enemy, dug in at a narrow height of 69.4, 1.5 km east of Koi-Asan in a trench up to half a meter wide and deep up to 3 meters (powerful attacks of the "pieces" also turned out to be ineffective) ". The more experienced 302nd Rifle Division of the 51st Army was defending here. Also, at first, the 276th Rifle Division of the 44th Army held its positions.

It should be noted that the consumption of ammunition by the 11th Army on the first day of the Bustard Hunt was very high: 1718 tons. For comparison, even in the most intense days of the assault on Stalingrad, Paulus's army did not shoot more than 1000-1300 tons. Given the small space that the artillery of the 306th command hit, the effect of the German artillery preparation was obviously above average.

The scheme of countering the Soviet artillery from the 306th command was based on the blinding of observation posts. Also, the shelling of the areas of observation posts led to a rupture of wires and loss of control. As later noted in the report of the 11th Army on the breakthrough of the Parpach positions: “According to the prisoners, the enemy’s telephone network was damaged so badly that the Russian command had confusion.” In general, this was a fairly typical phenomenon, the loss of communication due to massive artillery strikes. The report of the 306th command also stated: "The enemy fired little (from individual guns or platoons, rarely batteries) and completely chaotically and at random."

However, this assessment does not fully reflect the impact of Soviet artillery on the course of the battle, at least in the morning of 8 May. The construction of bridges across the ditch was under fire from the 457th and 53rd artillery regiments of the RGK, and the artillery of the 276th rifle division also worked on targets in the 63rd Guards Rifle Division. The Soviet rocket artillery participated in repulsing the enemy offensive from 4.42 by one division of the 25th GMP, and from 5.30 by the entire regiment. This impact has not gone unnoticed. The report on the actions of the 28th lpd stated:

“After wedging in, enemy infantry fire in the immediate vicinity of the wedging area is not very strong, but Russian artillery is becoming more and more active. Batteries of small and medium caliber are shelling the area on both sides of the anti-tank ditch. One or more volley fire batteries carry out zeroing and begin to fire at the crossing over the ditch.

Soviet heavy tank KV, shot down on the Kerch Peninsula. May 1942

Moreover, the report of the 28th LPD directly indicates the rather serious impact of the Soviet artillery regiments on the course of hostilities: “Under heavy enemy artillery fire, the commander of the short-range artillery regimental group that supported the advancing regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Klose and his adjutant, die. For some time, the leadership of the artillery was beheaded, valuable time was lost and not used to continue the offensive.

However, soon a turning point in the hostilities occurs, not in favor of the Soviet troops. By about 10:00 on May 8, the artillery of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division east of the moat was suppressed. The 53rd Artillery Regiment, having used up ammunition, at about 11.00 retreats to spare base points in the area of ​​​​the city of Kabush-Ube. In the meantime, by noon, German sappers are completing the construction of a bridge over the ditch, assault guns are being transported across it, and the regrouping of artillery is also being completed. The task of the advancing was facilitated by the preservation of part of the existing crossings. The report on the actions of the 197th battalion of assault guns directly states: "Unharmed part of the crossings built by the enemy across the ditch fell into our hands." However, in addition to this, the walls of the ditch were used to undermine the passage of self-propelled guns. This gives new impetus to continue the offensive. As noted in the report on the actions of the 28th lpd: "The Russians soon lose their stability and begin to retreat everywhere."

Another angle of the same car. Pay attention to two holes in the stern of the tank. Presumably these are holes from 75-mm armor-piercing shells.

In general, a breakthrough in the first line of Soviet defense became possible due to the well-functioning interaction of infantry, artillery and sappers. The report of the 197th assault gun battalion states: “Interaction with the infantry and sappers was excellent. Despite the strongest mining and active enemy defense (artillery, anti-aircraft defense, mortars, anti-tank missiles, snipers), the Parpach ditch was overcome by noon on the first day of the offensive. The battalion later even starred in the OKH training film Assault Guns and Sappers.

Soviet artillery, located to the west of the anti-tank ditch of the Ak-Monai positions, during the battle from 5.00 to 14.00 on May 8, almost all were out of order, with the exception of four guns of the 766th ap. In the front-line report on the activities of artillery, it was especially emphasized: "The overwhelming majority of the means of thrust were destroyed by aviation fire." A long operational pause at the front allowed the Germans to prepare well for an attack on the Parpach positions.

An attempt to bring the tanks of the 44th Army into battle for a counterattack was carried out with a great delay. The first to enter the battle at about 11.00 was the 126th OTB on T-26 tanks in the lane of the 276th rifle division, counterattacking from the Arma-Eli state farm to the southwest. The battalion lost 4 T-26s burnt out and 8 T-26s knocked out. It was impossible to break the bridgeheads occupied by the German infantry to the east of the ditch by a small group of light tanks.

The main body of the tank troops of the 44th Army entered the battle only in the afternoon. That is, when the Germans had already transported assault guns across the ditch. Being alerted at 4.15 in the morning, the 39th brigade was inactive until 12.00 on May 8, which gave the enemy the opportunity to break through deep enough into the formation of the army of S.I. Chernyak. Only in the afternoon, a brigade consisting of 2 KV, 1 T-34 and 14 T-60 began to move forward and collided with the enemy on the march at the heights. 50, 6 to the east of the Ak-Monai positions. In a few hours of battle, the 39th brigade lost both of its KVs and 5 T-60s, 1 T-34 was damaged (it was in service until May 16).

The expansion of the bridgehead, the construction of crossings and the reflection of tank counterattacks allows the 28th infantry division to enter the 83rd infantry division in the footsteps of the advancing vanguard and use them against height 63.8. From this height, as stated in the report of the 28th LPD, "the enemy is again conducting strong flanking fire." The height was held by the 819th Rifle Regiment of the 396th Rifle Division, which was knocked out of position at about 1600, which forced the 276th Rifle Division to begin retreating to the line of height. 63, 2, Mount Mezarlyk-Oba. This withdrawal, in turn, forces the artillery of the northern sector, which occupied positions on the heights, to withdraw. 63, 8, further to the northeast, also in the area of ​​high. 63, 2 and mountains Mezarlyk-Oba.

At this moment, hopelessly late for the turning point of the battle, the 56th brigade of the 44th army enters the battle. For unknown reasons, the brigade's order to advance was given even more late than to other units, only at 16.00 on May 8. The brigade was ordered to act according to option No. 2 in two groups, holding down and shock. The 13th MCP operated with the brigade. She spoke at 17.00 and until 23.00 fought in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bheight 63.8 and the Feodosia highway. However, the opposition of the attackers was stronger than expected. Assault guns, including a new model, became the enemy of Soviet tankers. As a result, all 7 tanks of the KV brigade were disabled, and in total it lost 17 vehicles. In fact, the process of gradual grinding by the enemy of the KV and T-34 of the Crimean Front, capable of counteracting the enemy’s tank attack, began.

It should be noted that the Germans also have considerations regarding unrealized opportunities. The report of the 28th LPD on the results of the battles stated: “In order to use the favorable situation, the division command suggests the corps command to send at least part of the forces of the tank division into battle in order to complete the enemy’s confusion and prevent him from equipping a new line of defense in depth. However, due to lack of time, it is no longer possible to bring a tank division into battle. A certain reinsurance with the introduction of the 22nd TD following the failure on March 20 somewhat slowed down the pace of development of the success of the 11th Army. The situation for the introduction of a tank division into battle was indeed quite favorable.

By the end of the day on May 8, a huge gap gaped in the formation of the 44th Army. The 63rd Guards Rifle Division was overturned, the 276th Rifle Division withdrew to the northeast, and there was practically no solid front. One of the first in the direction of the breakthrough was the 72nd cavalry division of the hero of the Civil War, Major General V.I. Books (4684 people, 7 BA-10, 12 BA-20, 12 76-mm and 18 45-mm guns). She was alerted already on the morning of May 8, and at 20.00 an order was received to take up defensive positions in the rear of the 44th Army. Division V.I. Books came out at midnight and by 5.00 reached the line in the Uzun-Ayak area. Of course, it was a rather weak barrier. Nevertheless, at that time the front command still had a fairly strong tank "fist" (see Table 3).

In a brief report on the actions of the 44th Army, prepared in June 1942 on the basis of the results of the battles by Major A. Zhitnik, it was indicated that the order of the front on the new outfit of forces was indeed received and deciphered at 4.30 am on May 9, 1942. It stated that The 390th Rifle Division, the 83rd Regiment and the 56th Tank Brigade are not included in the 44th Army, but are transferred to the commander of the 51st for a counterattack. At this moment, S.I. Chernyak showed arbitrariness and decided not to give up the 390th Rifle Division, but to use it for the planned counterattack (notifying V.N. Lvov in encryption). However, as A. Zhitnik writes, at 0600 the 390th Rifle Division began to retreat without warning to the 51st Rifle Division. In turn, this retreat led to the retreat of neighboring divisions.

Information about the withdrawal is indirectly confirmed by the report of the 229th detachment. The KV battalion concentrated to attack together with the 390th Rifle Division, but at 5.30 a representative of the 51st Army arrived at the location of the battalion and, as a result, the tank fist from the 8th KV was ... withdrawn back to the Kiyata area, where it was for the entire first half of the day on May 9 . It is impossible not to recognize the rather serious disorganization of the already practically prepared counterattack.

Commander of the 72nd Cavalry Division, hero of the Civil War, Major General V.I. Book.

The Germans actually got several hours to pull up artillery through the passage in the ditch and systematically bring the 22nd Panzer Division into battle. It must be said that, compared with the dynamically developing events of May 8, the next day the parties rather slowly moved on to active actions. Having crossed the moat, the 28th Infantry Division, meanwhile, turned its front to the north, covering the eastern flank with a bicycle battalion. It was counterattacked by tanks around 08:00–09:00, it was a fresh 124th detachment on the T-26, which lost 5 tanks in the attack. However, the general counterattack in the first half of the day did not take place. The 40th brigade, on the morning of May 9, went to the area east of Parpach, stood still all day. The 56th brigade and the 13th MCP also remained in place.

In the morning of May 9, V.N. Lvov is trying to organize a counterattack against the enemy grouping, advancing from Arma-Eli to the north, to the rear of his army. The slow gathering of forces can be explained by the desire of the Soviet command to deliver a strong enough counterattack to influence not only the Arma-Eli area, but also the enemy troops that had broken through to the west in the 44th Army zone. According to the plan of V.N. Lvov, outlined in order No. 0025 / OP dated 0.10 May 9, an attack was supposed in the direction of the city of Mezarlyk-Oba, height. 63, 8, As-Chalule, i.e. to the seashore. However, time, of course, worked against the Crimean Front. Any delay only exacerbated the situation.

Around noon, after pulling up artillery, the 28th Infantry Division resumed its offensive and captured Arma-Ely. It must be said that in the report of the formation, the resistance of the Soviet troops is not regarded at this moment as weak: “Powerful artillery fire, including multiple launch rocket systems, is being fired by the enemy from the north and northwest. Losses cannot be avoided." According to Soviet data, the 456th and 457th Ap RGCs operated here. The advance of the enemy in Arma-Eli forces the Soviet artillery from 14.00 to retreat further north in echelons to the area of ​​Mount Kaiman, the barrow Syuruk-Oba.

On the afternoon of May 9, rain poured down, which eroded the soil and worsened the conditions for the movement of troops. It should be noted here that in the May offensive, the changeable Crimean weather turned out to be on the side of the Germans. They managed to achieve a turn in their favor before the rains poured down. As stated in the report on the actions of the 28th lpd: “If the period of bad weather had begun a day earlier, the success of the breakthrough - a prerequisite for the success of the entire operation - would have been in question. The transfer of artillery and heavy weapons, their effective and necessary support for the advancing infantry would become impossible.

In conditions of worsening weather, the 22nd Panzer Division joins the German offensive. It should be noted that the first entry for May 9 in the ZhBD of the 22nd TD reports the shelling of the route of the formation’s advancement at 2.20–2.30 am by a “Russian warship”. However, nothing is said about the effect of the shelling. The advance of the tank division takes place through the lane of the 132nd Infantry Division.

With the general slowness of the gathering of forces by both sides, the Germans nevertheless made the first move, introducing the 22nd tank division into battle around 16.00–17.00. As indicated in the report of the 229th brigade, the commander of the 51st Army personally (General Lvov was true to himself and controlled from the front line) sets the battalion the task of counterattacking the enemy moving from Arma-Eli to the Kara-Oba and Syuruk-Oba mounds. These were already two columns of tanks of the 22nd TD. At that moment, the 229th detachment had 8 KV in service. The infantry of the 236th Rifle Division began to retreat under the blows of enemy tanks. The situation as a whole was similar to the German offensive on March 20, but with regard to technology, the balance of power has fundamentally changed.

In the tank battle that began at about 16.45 at Arma-Eli on May 9, 1942, the 229th registrar immediately lost 5 KV. At the same time, the tankers of the battalion claimed to destroy 28 enemy tanks, including 6 tanks destroyed by the company commander, Lieutenant Timofeev, who died in this battle. The actions of the tanks managed to somewhat stabilize the situation, but only in the form of holding back the advance of the enemy. The non-simultaneous entry into battle of Soviet tank units also played a negative role. Later, the 40th brigade received a reproach for the passivity of actions on the afternoon of May 9th. The report of the brigade indicates its participation in the counterattack after 19.30, without its losses, but this was already a few hours after the 22nd TD entered the battle.

The Germans managed to knock out the Soviet heavy tanks that found themselves on the battlefield with much greater efficiency than on March 20. As stated in the report of the headquarters of the 11th Army on the results of the breakthrough of the Parpach positions: “The successes of the 22nd TD in breaking through the Parpach position and advancing through Arma-Eli to the north were largely determined by the presence of new weapons. Thanks to this weapon, the soldiers had a sense of superiority over the Russian heavy tanks. Soviet sources confirm a qualitative change in the situation: “Among the new means used by the enemy, the presence of shells that pierce the armor of the KV and set it on fire attracts attention.” Therefore, it was not possible to turn parts of the 22nd TD into flight with a KV strike.

As reported by the headquarters of the Crimean Front S.M. Budyonny at 5.00 on May 10, the enemy preempted the strike group of the 51st Army in terms of the start of the offensive, the 390th Rifle Division was thrown back, and the front was opened. It should be noted that the front command personally observed what was happening. In negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky D.T. Kozlov said that together with L.Z. Mehlis on the 9th "we observed a fierce battle between our infantry, artillery and enemy tanks." The advancing 236th Rifle Division and the 157th Rifle Division were forced to engage in battle until they were completely concentrated. At the same time, the advance of the 22nd TD and 28th LPD on the evening of May 9 was limited to an area about 3 km north of Arma-Eli. The low pace of the German offensive so far made it possible to maintain relative order and retreat in an organized manner. Several regiments of artillery operating in the Arma-Eli area, on the night of May 11, withdrew to the Kiyata area.

The actions of the Germans in the zone of the 44th Army were much more like a "blitzkrieg". As indicated in the ZhBD of the 11th Army, the Groddek brigade, without encountering resistance (and shelling from the Black Sea Fleet from the sea), advanced along the coast into the depths of the Kerch Peninsula. Already in the morning of 8.30 on May 9, she passed Seitjeut. As noted in the ZhBD of Manstein's army, the still surviving artillery of the 44th Army became a victim of the offensive: "Groddek's forward formation destroyed several enemy batteries." In the conditions of the collapse of the front, even infantry formations quickly moved forward. At 17.30 on May 9, the headquarters of the 44th Army in the Uzun-Ayak area was hit by units of the 132nd Infantry Division, "forcing the squadron to destroy documents and withdraw under direct fire from tanks and submachine gunners of the pr-ka." As a result, the already extremely difficult situation was aggravated by the loss of control.

In one of the orders issued on the evening of May 9, P.P. Vechny wrote: “The military council of the front near Lvov. I have no connection with him." On the one hand, the practice of front-line management had unconditional positive features. It was used by such recognized masters of their craft as G.K. Zhukov, V. Model, E. Rommel. On the one hand, D.T. Kozlov and L.Z. Mehlis can be understood, the counterattack of the 51st Army decided a lot. On the other hand, in conditions of unstable communication, this led to untimely decisions in other areas.

"Death Road" Abandoned on the road leading to Kerch, Soviet vehicles.

On the chief of staff of the front, Major General P.P. On the eternal afternoon of May 9, there was a great burden and responsibility in decision-making. He was by no means sitting idly by. It was on May 9 that he made an attempt to restore the integrity of the left wing of the front. So, in the middle of the day, the 12th and 143rd brigade were transferred from the reserve to the 44th army. Moreover, the first was subordinate to S.I. Chernyak right at its location, in the Agibel area, Kr. Shar, and the second made a march to the Adyk region with access to the designated area by 4.00 on May 10. The size of the brigade, however, left much to be desired; on April 23, the 143rd brigade consisted of 2208 people, significantly less than the staff. To the south, in the region of Bash-Kyrgyz, Mavlyush, the 72nd cd was advanced. However, these forces failed to build a continuous line of defense. The front from the Parpach positions expanded like a funnel. As a result, from the left flank of the 72nd cd near Mamlush to the sea, there was space, covered only by the remnants of the 404th rifle division and the 63rd guard division, the 54th infantry regiment and junior lieutenant courses. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the German command also sent reserves into battle, in this case the 170th infantry division of XXX AK. She aimed at Agibel, shackling the collected P.P. Eternal reserves. Moreover, the Groddek brigade, moving along the seaside road, meeting weak resistance, by the evening of May 9, reached the area of ​​the Kenegez state farm. That is, it turned out to be literally a stone's throw from the Turkish Wall. The front, which was still being built up by the command, turned out to be deeply outflanked.

"Abkhazia" in Sevastopol. May 1942

On the evening of May 9, an order was issued by S.M. Budyonny to the “strike of the Lvov group in the direction of the Peschanaya gully”. However, at the negotiations held at 3.00 am on May 10, L.Z. Mehlis and D.T. Kozlov with I.V. Stalin shows a refusal to try to turn the tide in his favor by decisive actions in favor of withdrawing to a new line of defense. The command of the Crimean Front already doubted the advisability of continuing the offensive: "tanks will not pass." As a result, Stalin bluntly said: "If you manage and have time to detain the enemy in front of the Turkish Wall, we will consider this an achievement."

By that time, measures had already been taken to fill the defensive line of the Turkish Wall. By order of the headquarters of the Crimean Front, the 156th Rifle Division was advanced from the reserve to the Turkish Wall, which was ordered "by the end of 10.5 to complete the exit for the defense of the Turkish Wall line [on] the Natashino, Bikech front." This front was about 20 km long and did not completely cover the Turkish Wall. As of April 23, the 156th Rifle Division had 10,603 personnel and had 131 light and 59 heavy machine guns. This was a good indicator, but the 20 km front was twice the authorized norm. The right flank of the 156th Rifle Division, adjacent to the Sea of ​​Azov, was to be covered by retreating units, and on the left flank from Bikech to Uzunlar, prefabricated units from the front reserve were advanced. These were four reserve rifle regiments, courses for junior lieutenants, two battalions of front-line courses. In negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky on the night of May 11 D.T. Kozlov expressed concern that the 156th Rifle Division was "almost 50% staffed by Dagestanis." Looking ahead, it must be said that the division, taking into account the situation, showed itself well.

Later, Manstein wrote in his memoirs: “If the enemy succeeded, after he left the Parpach position, again take up defensive positions somewhere, our offensive would have bogged down.” In this, on the one hand, there was an element of dramatization of the situation. On the other hand, it was precisely to prevent the occupation of intermediate positions that the commander of the 11th Army sent the Groddek brigade to the Turkish Wall. It was, rather, about conducting the operation "Hunting for bustards" at the highest possible pace. Moreover, it should be noted that it was on May 10 that Manstein gave a certain head start to his opponents by sending the Groddek brigade to the north, "in order to block the roads leading through Marfovka and Sultanovka as soon as possible." In a sense, such a turn can be justified by the desire to prevent the withdrawal of Soviet units from occupying the Turkish Wall.

The turn of the Groddek brigade to Marfovka on May 10 was traditionally described in domestic works as an airborne assault followed by a landing. As such, he was designated in the report of the front headquarters of May 12. V.S. Abramov rightly noted that parachutes of supply containers could be mistaken for landing.

Despite the rather skeptical attitude of the front command to the counterattack of the 51st Army, it continued on the afternoon of May 10th. In essence, it became a means of withdrawing the troops of the 51st and 47th armies from the planned encirclement. Realizing the growing crisis, the front command throws into battle its last reserve - the 55th brigade of M.D. Sinenko, seized from the right flank of the front. She received an order at 20.00 on May 9 (still from K.S. Kolganov) to concentrate in the Oguz-Tobe area. Due to the sagging of the roads, the advance was slow and ended only by 8.00 on May 10. Here, to Oguz-Tobe, the 77th Guards Rifle Division of Colonel M.V. Volkov. Order for a counterattack by M.D. Sinenko received it belatedly, as a result, the counterattack scheduled for 11.00 followed only in the afternoon of May 10.

Chaos disaster. Abandoned equipment on the shore in Kerch. May 1942

As a result, the counterattack of the 51st Army began with attacks from the 40th Tank Brigade, which had been inactive the previous day, with the 650th Rifle Regiment of the 138th Rifle Division. In view of the muddy ground, 6 KV and 3 T-34s from the brigade go into battle, met with heavy fire on the southern slopes of the Syuruk-Oba barrow. As a result, 3 KV and 1 T-34 were burned. The report on the actions of the 28th LPD notes "the strongest enemy fire from the western flank" and writes about the need to "repel several strong enemy attacks, including with tank support." However, in the direction of the main attack, the Germans manage to take height by 14.30. 66, 2. Only after 16.00 the brigade of M.D. Sinenko went into battle and collided with the 22nd TD in the Oguz-Tobe area, when the encirclement was already almost closed. The counterattack was not successful, 5 were burned and 2 KV tanks of the 55th brigade were knocked out, 2 more were out of order for technical reasons. The fact of a tank battle is confirmed by the ZhBD 22nd TD, the Germans claimed 20 wrecked Soviet tanks. Indeed, the 55th brigade also lost 11 T-26s and T-60s. Already after 19.00, the 229th brigade took part in the battle, losing one KV. According to the front-line report, it was the only serviceable KV at that time. Thus, quite in the spirit of the scattered attacks of the previous days, the Soviet tank units attacked sequentially, allowing the enemy to gradually knock out the most dangerous KV and T-34s for them. The ZhBD of the 11th Army stated: “The attempts of enemy tanks to prevent encirclement by counterattacks from the north on Oguz-Tobe were thwarted by the actions of the 22nd TD and VIII Air Corps. Many enemy tanks have been destroyed."

The reports of tank units and formations almost unanimously note the appearance of a new highly effective weapon in the enemy's hands. The report of the 55th brigade reports: “The enemy uses a new system of anti-tank guns mounted on a tank or attached to a tank, which, in the presence of a high initial velocity of the projectile, pierced armor 140 mm thick in the frontal part of the KV tank for departure.” Moreover, it should be noted that the document states: "The size of the hole is up to 80 mm." This indicates the hit of a caliber armor-piercing projectile. Subsequently, with the widespread use of the latest 75-mm guns on the Soviet-German front, until 1943 they were more often used by the Germans with cumulative shells (as they were called in the Red Army, "termite"). In the Crimea, the latest technology of the Wehrmacht used the most effective caliber armor-piercing shells that pierced the armor and exploded inside the tank. The report of the 229th detachment reads: “The enemy used shells against our KV tanks, which pierced the KV tanks from 4-5 shots. When breaking through the armor, the KV tank ignites inside. The phrase "from 4-5 shots" probably refers to shooting at long distances, according to German sources, shooting at HF ​​from a distance of up to 1800 meters is noted with defeat from the 4th shot.

The battlefield was left to the Germans, and they had the opportunity to inspect the wrecked vehicles. The conclusion was expected: "The bulk of the KV and T-34 was unambiguously destroyed by shells of 7.62 and 7.5 cm" . Accordingly, the 140th anti-tank division of the 22nd TD, re-equipped with self-propelled guns with a caliber of 76.2 mm on the chassis of the 38 (t) tank, announced the destruction of 24 Soviet tanks, including about 10 KV and 2-3 T-34s, and The 204th TP of the 22nd TD (12 Pz.IV with KwK40, 20 Pz.III with KwK39) claimed to destroy "about 50 Russian" tanks, including 12 KV and 2–3 T-34s. Regarding the 6 new assault guns, it was indicated that they “destroyed an average of 3 Russian tanks” (without specifying the type, 15–20 vehicles, some, obviously, KV or T-34). According to Soviet data, 27 KV and 3 T-34s were lost in the May battles, hit by enemy artillery fire. In this regard, the Soviet and German data converge quite well - most of the KV and T-34 fell victim to new types of guns. Of course, the battles did not take place with a “dry score” - the Germans admit the irretrievable loss of 21 tanks from the 22nd TD in the May battles, including 2-3 Pz.IV with KwK40, 2-3 Pz.III. The total losses can be estimated from the division's report dated May 28, 1942, according to which there were 10 Pz.II, 50 Pz.38 (t), 6 Pz.III, 6 Pz.IV (with a short 75-mm cannon) and 4 Pz.IV (with a long-barreled gun), that is, there were 76 vehicles in service from those available on May 1, 1942 212.

As for the impact on Soviet tanks from the air, Soviet data do not confirm the great success of the Khsh-129 anti-tank attack aircraft. According to the documents of the BT and MV of the Crimean Front, only 15 tanks fell victim to air strikes, mainly T-26 from 126 rebates. In his report and actions of the 55th brigade M.D. Sinenko directly denied significant impact from the air, according to him, his units reached Oguz-Tobe "without losses in personnel and materiel from the bombardment."

The light cruiser "Molotov" enters the Northern Bay of Sevastopol. 1942

As a result of unsuccessful tank battles for the Soviet side in the afternoon of May 10, 1942, the encirclement ring of the main forces of the 51st and 47th armies was actually closed. Only a narrow corridor along the shore of the Arabat Bay remained at the disposal of the Soviet units. The report on the actions of the 28th LPD admitted: “Only in the very north near the sea, north of the Oguz-Tobe heights, where the tank division could not quickly break through, large enemy units retreat. However, they are forced to leave their heavy equipment and weapons stuck in muddy soil. Typical of military disasters was the transformation of important highways into a "road of death." The road Parpach - Sultanova - Kerch was packed in four rows and was subjected to devastating enemy air raids.

Early in the morning, at 4.30–5.00 am on May 11, the German advance northward from Arma-Ely continued. The 138th and 77th Guards Rifle Divisions and partly the 236th Rifle Division came under attack. The Germans managed to capture the village of Oguz-Tobe and the slopes of Mount Oguz-Tobe. Thus, they were able to control the breakthrough along the coast with fire.

On the same morning, at 11.30, from a raid by German aircraft on a command post located on Mount Konchi, the commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov. The army was headed by the chief of staff, Colonel G.I. Kotov. Despite the growing chaos, the body of V.N. Lvov was taken out and on May 13, 1942, sent by PS-84 aircraft to Tbilisi. General Lvov enjoyed great respect and authority, was an active and energetic commander.

The death of the commander, of course, worsened the position of the 51st Army. There was also another unfavorable operating factor. In his report, L.Z. Mehlis from 13.40 on May 11, acting Commander of the 51st Army Kotov wrote: "The Military Council of the Army does not have a plan and instructions from the front on the further actions of the 51st A units." At the same time, there is an order signed by the chief of staff of the front P.P. Vechny, dated May 10 and instructing the 51st Army: "Begin the withdrawal on the night of 11.5". The withdrawal was supposed to be beyond the line of the Turkish Wall. Orders similar in content existed to the 44th and 47th armies. At the same time, neither in the description of the actions of the 44th Army by A. Zhitnik, nor in S.I. Chernyak does not mention such an order. All the above-mentioned orders are written by hand on the letterhead of the chief of staff of the front (apparently, personally by P.P. Vechny), but they have neither numbers, nor signatures of the Military Council of the front, nor marks of dispatch. This leads to the conclusion that the orders were not issued and sent to the troops. Thus, almost a day of precious time was lost.

On May 11, the command of the 51st Army saw the withdrawal of the 138th, 302nd, and 77th Rifle Divisions from the semicircle. As reported by the acting Commander of the 51st Army Kotov Mekhlis, this was achieved "thanks to the exceptional heroism of the 77th Rifle Division." The remnants of the 55th brigade also took part in the battle, including immobilized KV tanks that fired from a place. All this together allowed the 138th and 304th divisions to break out of the "boiler". Accordingly, the 236th and 390th Rifle Divisions and the 83rd Motorized Rifle Brigade remained on the outer front of the encirclement, waiting for a breakthrough. As Kotov noted in the same report, a planned withdrawal was possible, “but the 390th Rifle Division failed again. Her two regiments fled from the front.

The fate of those who remained surrounded was unenviable. One of the last means of influencing the encircled was volleys of rocket-propelled mortars, the report on their actions emphasizes "the decisive importance of May 11 in striking the enemy, crowded at the Ak-Monai station." According to the documents of the opposite side, by the evening of May 11, the position of the “cauldron” was already close to disintegration and defeat. As noted in the ZhBD of the 11th Army, "the resistance of the enemy is weakening." When summing up the results of the day, Manstein’s army railway department stated: “According to incomplete data, so far 26,710 people have been captured, 223 guns, 14 anti-aircraft guns, 2 multiple rocket launchers, 88 anti-aircraft guns, 137 mortars, 173 tanks, 66 aircraft and a huge mass of hand weapons, equipment and stocks of various property.

V.S. Abramov, in his book, expresses doubts about the size of the "cauldron" under Ak-Monai. However, the encirclement of large forces of the Crimean Front did take place. The Germans already announced in a report at 0.20 on May 12 (apparently, after clarification) about 40,260 prisoners, captured as trophies 402 guns, 41 anti-aircraft guns, 197 tanks, 153 anti-tank guns, 210 mortars, 66 aircraft, 2000 machines of all types. This, of course, is not the highest figure in the series of "boilers" of 1941-1942. In 1941, at least 2-2.5 times more prisoners were declared in the encirclement near Uman and Melitopol. Nevertheless, this was a serious blow for the Crimean Front.

Heavy artillery is drawn to Sevastopol. On the march, a barrel wagon of 420-mm Czech-made mortars.

Meanwhile, S.I. Chernyak discovered the fact of the deep coverage of the flank of the newly restored front of his army. On May 11, he tries to organize a counterattack on the flank and rear of the “Kenegezskaya group of the pr-ka” (i.e., the Groddek brigade) from the Kara area with the forces of the remnants of the 404th SD, withdrawn from the second echelon of the 276th SD and the 190th Cavalry Regiment of the 72nd i cd . However, the 276th Rifle Division did not reach Kara at the appointed time, and the attacks of the 404th Rifle Division were unsuccessful. The remaining units of the 44th Army were pinned down from the front by XXX AK infantry.

In the ZhBD of the 11th Army there is an entry relating to the evening of May 11: “Groddek’s brigade, after breaking through the enemy’s positions on the Tatar ditch, is fighting with large enemy forces just southwest of Saraimin.” The fact that the enemy had crossed the line of the Turkish Wall already on May 11 is confirmed by Soviet documents. In the evening operational report of the 156th Rifle Division, it is indicated that its 530th Rifle Regiment is fighting in the area south-west of Sayramin. This sharply worsened the position of the Crimean Front. While the main forces of the 51st and 47th armies were still fighting in the encirclement in the Ak-Monai area, the saving line of the Turkish Wall had already been broken through by the advancing enemy.

Carriage of 210-mm mortars on the march in the Crimea. Heavy artillery systems were dismantled and brought into position for firing already in position.

It is impossible not to emphasize the curious, from the point of view of the historian, fact that the orders of L.Z. Mehlis in the last days of the Kerch catastrophe were preserved in the personal belongings of the headquarters officer of the 10th sk, Major Pashchenko, who died already in 1944, and were transferred to the archive after his death. At 5.20 on May 12, the Military Council of the Crimean Front orders the 51st Army (actually again) "to withdraw units by the end of 13.5.42 beyond the defensive line of the Turkish Wall to the Sultanovka area and to the north." It was ordered "not to get involved in major battles with the enemy west of the Turkish Wall line." In pursuit of the order of the front headquarters at 6.00 on May 12, L.Z. Mekhlis hurries Kotov (who has become commander of the 51st A) with a separate note in which he emphasizes the significance of his actions: “The main thing is to save manpower and equipment and arrive in time for the Turkish Wall.” The 51st Army was ordered to go to the Alekseevka-Sultanovka area. This was one of the main claims against the front command: a two-day delay with orders to withdraw troops to the Turkish Wall (the conversation with I.V. Stalin took place on the night of May 10, and the listed orders were given in the early morning of May 12).

According to these instructions, it is clear that the front headquarters already had a very rough idea about the real state of the units pressed to the sea in the "boiler". On the morning of May 12, the ZhBD of the 11th Army recorded: "The battles for cleaning the boiler around Ak-Monai, which were fought jointly by XXXXII AK and VII Romanian AK, have been completed." That is, the defeat of the encircled troops of the two armies of the Crimean Front has already become a fait accompli.

The reaction of the front command to the breakthrough of Groddek was the directive No. 022 / OP issued at 23.30 on May 11 to the troops of the 44th Army "to continue the withdrawal in the direction of Sultanovka". In the report on the actions of the 44th Army, it is not mentioned; moreover, attention is drawn to the fact that there was no communication with the front headquarters. At the same time, it is impossible not to pay attention to the phrase “continue to withdraw”. In fact, the troops of the 44th Army were indeed already retreating. Already at 18.00 on May 11, the 72nd cd received an order to withdraw with access to the line adjacent to the Turkish Wall in the Marfovka area. Also in the report of the commander of the 72nd cd V.I. The book indicates that at 3.45 on May 12, he received an order from the headquarters of the 44th A to withdraw to the line from the Turkish Wall to Sayramina and Orta-Eli. That is, in essence, a line was built from the shaft to the lake. Tabechikskoe, covering Kerch.

Nevertheless, the headquarters of the 44th A really retreats to Sultanovka, where at 6.00 on May 12 S.I. Chernyak meets with D.T. Kozlov and L.Z. Mehlis at the headquarters of the 156th Rifle Division (i.e., already after the order given to the 72nd Rifle Division to withdraw beyond the Turkish Wall). Here the commander of the 44th Army personally receives an order to "immediately withdraw all units of the army behind the Turkish Wall." At the same time, the 157th Rifle Division, the 72nd Cavalry Division and the 12th Rifle Regiment were withdrawn from him into the reserve of the front, leaving the 44th Army of the 143rd Rifle Regiment, the remnants of the 404th, 276th and 396th Rifle Divisions under the control of the 44th Army. Accordingly, on the afternoon of May 12 and on the night of May 13, units of the 44th Army retreated to the Turkish Wall and beyond it. By 15.00 on May 12, the 72nd Cavalry Division entered the area from Sairamina to Orta-Eli, setting up a barrier to spread the Groddek group further to Kerch.

Meanwhile, the German command deploys the forces released after the liquidation of the "cauldron" to the east and the mobile units attack in the direction of Sultanovka. The defense on the Turkish Wall receives another gap, this time near Sultanovka, where units of the 22nd TD (excluding the tank regiment) and Muller's advance detachment break through. Mekhlis even considered it necessary to report to S.M. about this event (the 143rd brigade "left the occupied line") Budyonny.

Already a few units of combat vehicles of brigades and battalions withdrew to Kerch. The 229th brigade lost the last 2 KV on the Turkish shaft in an unsuccessful attempt to hold on to it. According to inaccurate data, by the evening of May 12, 1942, 1 T-34, 27 T-26, 7 KhT-133 and 10 T-60 remained on the move.

At 2.00 am on May 14, directive No. 01051 of the headquarters of the Crimean Front follows with an order to take up the defense of the Kerch bypass. The flanks of the bypass relied on the lake. Chokrakskoye, oz. Churubashskoye and Kamysh-Burun, and it passed through Bagerovo and the dominant heights to the west of Kerch. As A. Zhitnik later wrote in his report on the actions of the 44th Army: “This line did not have any pre-prepared defensive structures.” The army also lost a significant part of its artillery. In the meantime, on the afternoon of May 14, German troops reached the approaches to Kerch and broke through the city's defense bypass. The ZhBD of the 11th Army noted: "The enemy desperately defended himself with the support of numerous tanks, but our soldiers broke through the inner defensive belt of the city." It is not entirely clear what numerous tanks we are talking about, because, according to Soviet data, Kerch was defended by the remnants of the 39th brigade represented by 5 T-60s and 1 T-26 and the armored division (armored vehicles) of the 72nd cd.

600-mm "Karl" on the march. The self-propelled carriage distinguished the Karl from a series of archaic heavy guns from the First World War.

In addition to tanks, from May 14 to May 18, 1942, armored train No. 74, built at the plant named after. Voikov. He acted on the site from the plant to the Kerch station. On May 18, the railway track was destroyed, and the armored train was destroyed. At that moment, fighting was already underway on the territory of the plant. Voikov.

On the night of May 15, the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 170385, addressed to D.T. Kozlov, which began with the words: “Do not surrender Kerch, organize defense like Sevastopol”. However, given the events of the past day, this instruction was hopelessly late - the Germans were already on the territory of Kerch.

Officially, the evacuation of the troops of the Crimean Front began on May 14 in accordance with the order of I.V. Stalin at 3.40 am: “Start the withdrawal of the troops of the Crimean Front to the Taman Peninsula ...” The evacuation was carried out from the port of Kerch, from the piers of the KVMB, the plant named after. Voykov, Traps, Enikale, Zhukovka. At first, according to the order, only the wounded, the secret materiel (Guards mortars), and RGK artillery were transported. There was no longer any talk of any evacuation of tanks, tractors and even vehicles from Kerch and Yenikale. About 300 cars, tractors and motorcycles were burned at the crossing, first of all people were rescued. Of the 6789 people of the personnel of the tank units and formations of the Crimean Front, 3022 people, 44.5%, were evacuated from the Kerch Peninsula. According to the report of the head of the sanitary department of the front, a military doctor of the 1st rank N.P. Ustinov managed to withdraw 42,324 wounded, of which 4,919 were seriously wounded. Ustinov emphasizes "all the wounded", but, apparently, he means the wounded who managed to enter the hospitals.

For the crossing of the Kerch Strait of guns, only the so-called "bolinder" was used, which was inactive at night, as a result of which the chance to save a significant part of the artillery that had retreated to the Kerch region was missed. As a result, only 7 guns and 7 tractors of the 457th AP RGK and 29 GMCh installations were transported to the Chushka Spit (according to other sources). According to the report of the artillery headquarters of the SCF, compiled in the wake of the events in June 1942, the Crimean Front lost 157 76.2 mm mountain guns, 67 76 mm guns of 02/30, 210 76 mm divisional guns of 39, 25 107-mm guns 10/30, 24 122-mm guns mod. 31 and 31/37, 257 122 mm howitzers of various types, 21 152 mm howitzers and 103 152 mm howitzer guns mod. 37 y. In this regard, it is interesting to note that in the calculation of trophies by the Germans following the defeat of the Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula, the absence of optics in 98% of the guns was especially noted, although 15% of the guns they got in good condition. In total, the Germans claimed to capture or destroy 1450 vehicles, 154 tanks, almost 800 guns.

To cover the evacuation, a defense is organized based on advantageous positions. The offensive of the units of the 28th Infantry Division on the western tip of the Yenikalsky Peninsula collides in the middle of the day on May 16 at an altitude of 175.0 (Mount Khroneva on the then maps) "with very dense and accurate fire from the defenders, entrenched in rocky shelters and firing from rifles and machine guns." The German infantry lie under fire, despite the vigorous support of the assault guns, which have shot all the ammunition, the attacks are not successful.

In the last days of the fighting on the Kerch Peninsula, the defense of the remnants of the Crimean Front broke up into several pockets of resistance pressed against the shore. At Gleika, Mayak and the lighthouse itself (Yenikalsky Mayak), Soviet soldiers and commanders took up defensive positions on a steep bank. As a result, the German artillery attack on May 18 on the area of ​​the lighthouse fell on an empty place, and the subsequent attack ran into a flurry of fire. As noted in the report on the actions of the 28th LPD: “Artillery is not able to support the attack due to the small distance separating our attacking units from the enemy. In addition, the trajectory of the projectiles does not allow covering enemy positions located on a steep bank. The support of assault guns and the use of flamethrowers also did not bring results to the attackers. The Germans managed to turn the tide with the massive use of mortars (judging by the context and the report on the use of Nebelwerfers - 280-mm rocket launchers) on the morning of May 19th. As emphasized in the report of the 28th lpd: "In stubborn hand-to-hand combat, one has to capture a very rugged rocky area." The Germans announced the capture of 8250 prisoners, a third of whom were wounded and the discovery of about 1400 dead.

In the same period, on May 18–19, a tense struggle for the Yenikale region unfolded. Consolidated detachments from the remnants of the 77th Guards Rifle Division, the 302nd, 404th Rifle Divisions and the 95th Border Regiment ensured the evacuation of the remnants of the troops of the Crimean Front. Defense here at the front Dangerous, high. 102, 0 (dominant on the outskirts of Yenikale), Kapkany held about 3,500 people armed only with rifles, PPSh, light machine guns and grenades. They no longer had mortars and artillery. The detachments were commanded by colonels M.V. Volkov, M.K. Zubkov, N.I. Ludwigov. Stubborn defense made it possible to transport 18-20 thousand people across the strait to the Taman Peninsula during the night of May 18-19 alone. It was here, in the Yenikale region, that L.Z. Mekhlis, who returned back from Taman. Those who saw Mekhlis in Yenikal said that he persistently sought death. In the middle of the day on May 19, he left the Kerch Peninsula.

On May 19, the 132nd Infantry Division attacked Fort Totleben with the support of 280-mm rocket launchers (440 shells were fired). Bulky installations with a short range of fire required special conditions of use, and here they were available: the defenders of the plant had no artillery left. According to German data, after the impact of rocket mortars, the Totleben fort was occupied by the 132nd Infantry Division with the loss of 5 people. It should be noted that the consumption of ammunition by the 11th Army on May 19 was the maximum for the entire period of the struggle from May 11 until the end of the operation - 536 tons. Despite this, as emphasized in the ZhBD of the 11th Army: "It is only with great effort that the enemy succeeds in recapturing every inch of land."

"Self-propelled mine" - wedge "Goliath", controlled by wire.

Another representative of the “wonder weapon”: the Borgward B.IV radio-controlled wedge. Their use in the conditions of Sevastopol was not very successful. Regularly, the tankette drove up to the target and unloaded a box of explosives in front of it.

At 3.45 am on May 20, 1942, the crossing from the Kerch Peninsula ended. However, fighting continued throughout the day on 20 May. One of the nodes of resistance of the Soviet troops in the Kerch region remained the metallurgical plant named after. Voikov, who unsuccessfully stormed the 170th Infantry Division. As a last resort, 580 280mm rockets were fired at the ruins of the factory. The impact of rockets broke the resistance of the plant garrison. However, combing the territory of the plant continued until the evening of May 20. According to German data, the loss of Soviet units at the plant. Voikov, 1800 people were killed, and 4400 fighters and commanders were also taken prisoner here.

In the early morning of May 20, the 46th Infantry Division captured the fort and the settlement of Yenikale, and then moved from east to west of the peninsula. According to German data, in the region of Yenikale and the dangerous losses of the Red Army amounted to 3,000 killed and 5,440 captured. The losses of the 28th LPD, 46th and 170th Infantry Division for May 20 amounted to 186 killed, 17 missing and 522 wounded. In total, in the period from May 8 to May 19, 1942, the Crimean Front, the Black Sea Fleet and the AVF lost 162,282 people irretrievably and 14,284 people wounded in the period from May 8 to May 19, 1942, a total of 176,566 people.

The total losses of the Manstein army in Operation Bustard Hunting are shown in Table. 4. According to the data presented, it can be seen that the 28th Infantry Division suffered the greatest losses, advancing in the direction of the main attack during the breakthrough of the Parpach positions and ensuring the introduction of the 22nd Panzer Division into the breakthrough. In second place in terms of losses was the 132nd Infantry Division, which also participated in the breakthrough of the Parpach positions and intense battles in the east of the Kerch Peninsula. It should be noted that the data of the medical service are somewhat different from the figures given by Department IIa. The medical service of the 11th Army reported 1,412 killed, 291 missing, and 5,885 wounded during the time interval of May 8–22, 1942, excluding Romanian units. However, these data appear to be incomplete due to the poor matching of the reports of the medical service with the personal records of the dead and wounded officers. In general, the losses of the 11th Army in Operation Bustard Hunting must be recognized as sensitive, but moderate.

TABLE 4

After the Germans occupied the smoking region of Kerch and Yenikale, soldiers and commanders of the Red Army still remained on the peninsula to fight in the Adzhimushkay quarries. The defeat of the Crimean Front was the first of a series of catastrophes in the spring and summer of 1942. One of the most difficult periods of the war began for the Soviet troops. A long year and a half remained before the start of the liberation of the peninsula.

Summing up the results of the confrontation between the Crimean Front and the German 11th Army, it is advisable to provide data on the consumption of ammunition by the parties. According to the statements of the GAU KA, for the first half of 1942, the Crimean Front used up 258.6 thousand rounds of 76-mm divisional guns, 211.9 thousand rounds of 76-mm mountain guns, 49.0 - 107-mm cannon, 33.3 thousand - 122-mm cannon, 216.6 thousand - 122-mm howitzer, 30.7 thousand - 152-mm howitzer and 92.2 thousand shots for 152-mm howitzer cannons. The Crimean Front was the absolute leader in spending 107-mm shots - it accounted for almost a quarter of the entire consumption of shots of this type by the Red Army. In terms of 152-mm rounds for howitzer-cannons, the share of the Crimean Front accounts for 13.7%. In total, the Crimean Front accounted for 10.7% of the consumption of all ground artillery shots of the entire Red Army in January-June 1942 (although in June 1942 the Crimean Front had already ceased to exist).

Also, the Crimean Front during its existence in 1942 used up 758.5 ​​thousand 82-mm mortar mines, 37.8 thousand 107-mm mortar mines and 46.9 120-mm mortar mines. At the same time, the share of the Crimean Front accounts for 17.4% of the consumption of 82-mm mines by the entire Red Army. He was the absolute leader in the use of this type of weapon, and by a wide margin.

Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 155452 of June 4, 1942, with the analysis of the defeat of the Crimean Front, simultaneously determined the punishment of its command, including the representative of the Headquarters. Army commissar 1st rank L.Z. Mekhlis was removed from the post of deputy people's commissar of defense and head of the Main Political Directorate of the spacecraft with a reduction in rank to corps commissar. The command of the front and the armies was removed from office and demoted in rank with the wording "to test him in another, less difficult military job." D.T. Kozlov was demoted to Major General. Army commanders S.I. Chernyak and K.S. Kolganov was demoted to the rank of colonel. The exception was P.P. Eternal, sent to the disposal of the head of the General Staff of the spacecraft. This was a kind of recognition of his efforts to stabilize the situation in the last days of the existence of the Crimean Front.

Romanian infantry on the march. Crimea, 1942

Conclusions. The first analysis of the defeat of the Crimean Front was made by the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 155452 of June 4, 1942, signed by I.V. Stalin and A.M. Vasilevsky. However, in this document, written in the hot pursuit of events, the analysis of what was happening is given hastily and without taking into account enemy data. Nevertheless, this directive of the Stavka to this day remains the basis of criticism of the command of the Crimean Front. Therefore, it is advisable to discuss what happened in May 1942 on the Kerch Peninsula, starting from the claims formulated in it. The thesis stated at the beginning of the directive “the Crimean Front had a great superiority over the enemy in infantry and artillery” was analyzed at the beginning of the section, this statement is not supported by the documents of the parties.

The directive goes on to state the facts with references to the "experience of modern warfare". First of all, it is stated that “the command of the Crimean Front stretched its divisions into one line” and “one division accounted for no more than two kilometers at the front.” Operational documents of the Crimean Front show that this is not so, and even not so at all. Firstly, one division in the first line accounted for 3.1 km of the front. Secondly, two divisions of the second line occupied Ak-Monai positions. Thirdly, the armies had a second echelon whose task was to launch counterattacks. In addition, there were formations in the depths of the formation of the troops of the front, which were in reserve, which could be used to restore its integrity and launch counterattacks. These are the 72nd cd, the 390th rifle division (formally under army command), the 12th and 143rd brigade, and the 83rd brigade. Actually, they were used during a defensive battle, actually building a new front of defense, but they were pinned down by an enemy infantry attack from the front and outflanked by the Groddek brigade. The command of the Crimean Front can be reproached for relying on counterattacks, which involved the advancement of reserves and their use outside equipped positions. In the conditions of the massive use of the Air Force by the enemy, this became almost impossible.

The second reproach from the Headquarters was the assertion: "the command of the Crimean Front in the very first hours of the enemy's offensive let go of command and control of the troops." On the one hand, the loss of control of the troops, of course, took place. Radio communication, despite all the admonitions of the front headquarters, was not a strong point of command and control in the Crimea. However, the statement “in the very first hours” is still not entirely true. Really serious problems arose already as chaos and destruction increased.

Another claim of the Headquarters was the reproach of the “bureaucratic and paper method of commanding the troops by the front command and comrade. Mehlis". It was alleged that "instead of personally influencing the course of the operation, they spent time at many hours of fruitless meetings of the Military Council." This reproach looks doubly strange in view of the fact that I.V. Stalin personally forbade D.T. Kozlov and L.Z. Mekhlis to be at the headquarters of V.N. Lvov May 10. The front commander, and this is documented, went to the troops with the aim of influencing the course of the counterattack of the 51st Army. This counterattack really decided the fate of the main forces of the troops entrusted to him. Personal presence at the venue seems to be more than justified. The recommendation at the end of the directive to visit "more often in the troops, armies, divisions" in relation to D.T. Kozlov and L.Z. Mekhlis, and even more so V.N. Lvova looks ridiculous. However, this did not help the Crimean Front.

More meaningful is another claim in the directive of the Headquarters: “the command of the front and comrade. Mekhlis did not ensure the execution of the order of the Stavka in a timely manner, they began the withdrawal with a delay of two days, and the withdrawal took place in an unorganized and disorderly manner. Indeed, there was a delay in the retreat to the line of the Turkish Wall. The 51st Army did not receive the order to withdraw in time. At the same time, it is impossible not to note the conditions for the withdrawal: the sagging of roads and the impact of enemy aircraft, which complicated the movement of troops in the daytime. In addition, the loss of the tank battle at Arma-Eli predetermined the encirclement and defeat of a considerable part of the forces of the Crimean Front and the technical impossibility of withdrawing them to the Turkish Wall.

E. von Manstein was an experienced military leader who understood well the principles of using mechanized units. Actually, the Crimean Front had essentially nothing to oppose to the two mobile formations of the 11th Army - the 22nd Panzer Division and the Groddek brigade. The troops of the front were preempted in reaching the Turkish Wall already on the second day of Operation Bustard Hunting. The “sickle strike” of the 22nd TD and the fast breakthrough of the Groddek brigade to the Turkish Wall were already almost impossible to parry at the same time.

In essence, the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 155452 bypassed, if not the main, then one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Crimean Front: the absence of a full-fledged independent mechanized unit in its composition in the presence of such a unit in the 11th army of the enemy. Manstein actually had the equivalent of two such formations, including Groddeck's brigade and Müller's forward detachment. In turn, the fact of the absence of this connection was a direct consequence of the abandonment of tank divisions in August 1941. The restoration of such structures began in May 1942 (the formation of tank corps) and the Crimean Front was not affected. It was the tank corps that became the most important means of conducting defensive operations in the large bend of the Don in July 1942 and on the Kursk Bulge in July 1943.

420-mm mortar "Gamma" in position.

Atypical for other directions was the use by the Germans in the Crimea of ​​massively new models of anti-tank weapons, including tanks and self-propelled guns with long-barreled guns. It was they who became the decisive factor in May 1942, predetermining the catastrophe of the Crimean Front and the failure of its tank forces in the defense of the Kerch Peninsula.

On the whole, the Crimean Front became a victim of massing by the German command of forces and means, including the latest models of weapons and equipment. At the same time, the front itself was not in the best position in terms of weapons, and the national factor had a tangible effect on the combat effectiveness of the formations. In the critical situation of May 1942, the national factor manifested itself to a much greater extent. The need to use formations from the depths led to the introduction of national formations into battle, and they did not always show their best side. This primarily concerns the 390th Rifle Division, as well as the 396th Rifle Division in the Ak-Monai positions. At the same time, on the whole, the 77th Guards Rifle Division with a mixed and diverse national composition showed itself well.

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Sevastopol defense (September 1854 - August 1855)

Reflection of the bombardment of the Anglo-French fleet by the Alexander battery on October 5, 1854. Artist F. A. Roubaud. 1905

During the events of the Crimean (Eastern) War of 1853-1856. the main place is occupied by the heroic defense of Sevastopol. For more than 11 months, Russian soldiers and sailors defended Sevastopol in the fight against a numerically superior enemy, showing heroism, courage and courage.

After Turkey declared war on Russia on October 4 (16), 1853, active operations were carried out on land and at sea. On the Danube, Russian troops fought unsuccessfully near Oltenitsa on October 23 (November 4), but rebuffed the Turks on December 25, 1853 (January 6, 1854) at Chetati. In the Caucasus, in the battle near Akhaltsikhe on November 14 (26), 1853, the 7,000-strong garrison of General I.M. Bebutov defeated the 36,000th army of Ahmet Pasha.

The fighting at sea was successful. A particularly heavy blow to Turkey was delivered in the Battle of Sinop, where on November 18 (30), 1853, a squadron under the command of the Vice Admiral of 8 ships during the Battle of Sinop destroyed the Turkish squadron of Osman Pasha of 16 ships.

The defeat of Turkey hastened the entry into the war of Great Britain and France. On December 23, 1853 (January 4, 1854), the Anglo-French fleet entered the Black Sea. On February 9 (21) Russia declared war on Great Britain and France. On March 11 (23), 1854, Russian troops crossed the Danube at Brailov, Galats and Izmail and concentrated in Northern Dobruja. On April 10 (22), the Anglo-French squadron bombarded Odessa. In June - July, the Anglo-French troops landed in Varna, and the superior forces of the Anglo-French-Turkish fleet (34 battleships and 55 frigates, including most of the steam ones) blocked the Russian fleet (14 battleships, 6 frigates and 6 steamships). frigates) in Sevastopol.

At the end of August, the combined fleet of England and France, consisting of 89 warships and 300 transports, approached Evpatoria. On September 1 (13), the allies unimpededly began the landing of an expeditionary force of 28 thousand French, 24 thousand British, 7 thousand Turks with 122 guns. The landing lasted 6 days.

The commander-in-chief of the Russian troops in the Crimea, Prince A. S. Menshikov, decided to give battle to the enemy army at a pre-selected position on the Alma River - on the way from Evpatoria to Sevastopol. Near the Alma River, up to 30 thousand Russian troops were concentrated with 96 guns. On September 8 (20) a battle took place, which the Russians lost.

Having been defeated on the Alma, Menshikov with the army withdrew first to Sevastopol, but then, fearing that the enemy would cut him off from the central regions of Russia, and also with the aim of freedom of maneuver and the ability to threaten the flank and rear of the enemy, on September 12 (24) withdrew troops to Bakhchisarai . Almost simultaneously, the allies undertook a flank march to Balaklava, from where they intended to launch an attack on Sevastopol.

By the evening of September 12 (24), the allied army approached the Belbek River and from here the next day began a flank movement to the south side of the city. On the morning of September 14 (26), the French took up positions on the Fedyukhin Heights, and the British occupied Balaklava. The Allied fleet entered the Balaklava harbor.

With the departure of Menshikov's army from Sevastopol, a formidable danger loomed over the city. Sevastopol sailors, led by Kornilov and Nakhimov, left without the support of the army in the face of a possible attack from the army and fleet of the enemy at any moment, began preparing the defense of the city on their own.

Sevastopol is located on both sides of the Big Bay (raid). Three bays protrude into the southern coast: Artilleriyskaya, Yuzhnaya, on both sides of which the city is spread, and Kilen Bay. The southern part of the city is divided by the South Bay into the city side, which lies to the west of the bay, and the ship side, to the east of it. The area located south of the Big Bay and the city is known as the Chersonese Peninsula. It ends with steep cliffs of Sapun Mountain. There are three dominant points here: Malakhov Kurgan, the barrow in front of it and the height of Mikryukov. In the western part of the Chersonesos peninsula there is the Karantinnaya beam, to the west of which Kamysheva beam extends. To the northeast of the Bolshaya Bukhta, a ridge extends, which forms an almost impregnable position facing the Baidarskaya Valley and Balaklava, where the Mekenziev Heights (named after Rear Admiral Mekenzi, the founder of Sevastopol) rise towards the Bolshaya Bay, and even further - the Inkerman Heights. height.

Plan of the fortress of Sevastopol. "Atlas of fortresses of the Russian Empire"

View of Sevastopol. Album "Eastern War". Florence, 1856

Between the Balaklava mountains, the position on the Mekenziev and Inkerman heights and the cliffs of the Sapun Mountain lies the valley of the Black River. The Fedyukhin Heights adjoin the left bank of the Black River, and higher, up to Sapun Mountain, a ridge stretches, called the Semyakin and Gasfort Heights.

The area on which Sevastopol is located is convenient for organizing a strong defense from the sea and inconvenient for defense from land.

For the defense of the northern side of the city and the raid, it was built back in 1818. The northern fortification, which looked like an octagonal fort, with 4 small bastions. The fort had 50 guns.

The defense of the Sevastopol raid from the sea consisted of 8 strong stone and earthen batteries. By the spring of 1854, coastal defenses were strengthened. She had 14 batteries with 610 guns, including 28 bombs. Regarding the defense of Sevastopol from land, there was an opinion that it was impossible to land a large landing force and, consequently, it was impossible to attack Sevastopol with large forces from land. On the south side, Sevastopol was weakly fortified. In the southern defensive position, instead of the planned 6 bastions of 12 guns each, only the 6th bastion was actually completed. In total, on the southern defensive line with a length of 7 km, there were only 145 guns installed in unfinished fortifications.

Taking advantage of the fact that the Anglo-French command did not dare to attack Sevastopol on the move, urgent measures were taken to strengthen the defense of the city. On September 11 (23), in order to prevent enemy ships from breaking through to the inner Sevastopol roadstead, it was decided to flood 5 sailing battleships and 2 frigates across the entrance to the bay. Other sailing ships, all steamships and frigates were left for the defense of Sevastopol and taken to the bay under the protection of batteries. Artillery and ship crews (about 18 thousand people) were taken ashore from them, of which 22 battalions were formed.

On September 13 (25), 1854, a state of siege was declared in Sevastopol. The city's defense was led by a vice admiral, who was officially considered the chief of the defense staff. His closest assistants were the commander of the squadron, Vice Admiral Nakhimov, who was appointed head of the South Side, and Rear Admiral (head of defense of the Malakhov Kurgan). The general management of engineering work was carried out by an engineer-colonel. The garrison of Sevastopol after the departure of the field army to Bakhchisaray, together with the naval officers and sailors written off to the shore, totaled more than 16 thousand people.

The leaders of the defense inspired the soldiers and sailors of Sevastopol, the entire population of the city to resist the enemy. An ardent patriot of his homeland, Kornilov invested his whole soul, all his knowledge and energy, his outstanding organizational skills in the defense of Sevastopol. Strict and demanding in business, but caring and fair in relations with his subordinates, he enjoyed universal respect and love. According to contemporaries, Kornilov was the creator of that military spirit, enthusiasm, courage and dedication that did not leave the defenders of Sevastopol until the last days of the siege.

On September 15 (27), Kornilov delivered a speech in front of the Sevastopol garrison: “Comrades, we have the honor of defending Sevastopol, defending our own fleet! We will fight to the last! We have nowhere to retreat, the sea is behind us. I forbid all the heads of the units to beat the lights out, the drummers must forget this fight! ... ".

The defenders of Sevastopol, including women and children, worked tirelessly day and night. The construction of fortifications on the northern approaches to the city was led by Kornilov himself. Everything that could be used was brought ashore from the ships. In his letters dated 14 (26) and 16 (28) September, Kornilov wrote: “We have been fortifying the city all day ... Work is in full swing on the fortifications; we know neither sleep nor fatigue; even the prisoners are zealous... Meanwhile, the enemy is approaching Sevastopol... We are not discouraged here, we are strengthening ourselves as best we can, as means allow. The chain of redoubts, bastions, and various types of batteries will soon provide an uninterrupted line of cannon fire. Vice-Admiral Nakhimov supervised the work on the southern side of the city.

People worked in three shifts, even at night by the light of lanterns. Every morning from 5 to 6 thousand people went to work, in the evening they were replaced by others.

Underground War Gallery. Defense of Sevastopol

Men hollowed out rocky ground, and women from afar carried the earth in baskets and bags. Appeared in Sevastopol and such a battery, which was erected by some women. She began to be called - "Maiden". As a result of the selfless work of the defenders of Sevastopol, the city was prepared to repel enemy attacks. “... We did more in a week than we did in a year before,” Kornilov wrote about this feat of Sevastopol in his diary.

Fortification defense near Sevastopol consisted of 4 positions. 3 positions were equipped on the South side and one on the North side.

The fortifications of the land (southern) front were (from east to west): 1st, 2nd bastions, Malakhov Kurgan (Kornilov bastion), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 bastions. This was the main defensive line. During the siege, a number of fortifications (forward and intermediate) were built to strengthen this main line. The most important of them were: in front of the 2nd bastion - the Selenginsky and Volynsky redoubts, in front of the Malakhov Kurgan - the Kamchatka lunette, between the Malakhov Kurgan and the 3rd bastion - the Gervais battery, and between the 3rd and 4th bastions - the Schwartz redoubt.
The redoubts and bastions of the main defensive line were connected by trenches. For the first time in history, a zone of continuous artillery and rifle fire (200 m deep) was created in front of the main defensive line, which made it possible to conduct concentrated fire in given directions. The fire system was supplemented by a system of engineering barriers (ditches, mines, land mines, wolf pits).

Behind the main defensive line was the second line, which served to withdraw troops during the artillery shelling. The third line, which ran partly within the city, consisted of houses adapted for strongholds and served to shelter the main reserves.

In the second position, as well as in the main one, bastions and redoubts were erected to ensure the actions of individual artillery batteries.

During the first 3 weeks of the Sevastopol defense under the leadership of E. I. Totleben, V. P. Polzikov, A. V. Melnikov and other military engineers, the defenders of the city built over 20 fortifications (batteries), and the number of artillery on the South side alone was increased to 341 guns (including 118 heavy ones) against 144 that the enemy had. In Sevastopol, a defense in depth was created in a short time, based on the ideas of the outstanding Russian fortification theorist A. Z. Telyakovsky. However, the people of Sevastopol, creatively approaching the provisions of Telyakovsky, developed them further. The defense they created made it possible to effectively use all forces and means, including naval and coastal artillery. The basis of the defense was the bastions.

The defense created near Sevastopol was the best example of field fortification of that time. It fully met the conditions of the terrain and the requirements of tactics.

September 18 (30) Anglo-French-Turkish troops (67 thousand people, of which 41 thousand French, 20 thousand British, 6 thousand Turks) reached the approaches to Sevastopol from the south. The enemy fleet consisted of 34 battleships and 55 frigates, including 4 battleships and 50 frigates.

The garrison of Sevastopol by this time consisted of 36,600 people. The increase in the number of troops stationed in Sevastopol was explained by the fact that Menshikov with the army moved from Bakhchisaray to Sevastopol. At the same time, part of the forces was allocated to strengthen the defense of the city. On the Sevastopol roadstead there were 16 sailing battleships, 6 steam and 4 frigates. In total, 3904 guns, 1 million shells and 325 thousand gunpowder charges were concentrated in Sevastopol.

October 3 (15) Kornilov gave his last order. It said: “From the first day of the taxation of Sevastopol by an excellent enemy in strength, the troops intended to defend it expressed their resolute readiness to die, but not to give up the city ... In the course of a short time, by the tireless activity of everyone - both officers and lower ranks - strong fortifications grew out of the ground , and the cannons of old ships are placed on these formidable strongholds.

October 5 (17), 1854 at 6 o'clock. 30 minutes. the first bombardment of the fortress began. The enemy opened fire on all the defensive structures with 126 heavy guns, and by noon they were joined by another 1340 ship guns. He counted on a powerful bombardment from the sea and land to destroy the land fortifications of the fortress and take it by storm.

Sevastopol responded with powerful artillery fire from 250 guns. Here is what his direct participant in Sevastopol Slavoni writes about this battle: “A terrible battle began to boil: the earth groaned, the surrounding mountains trembled, the sea gurgled ... and at the same time, hellish fire broke out from our batteries. Enemy ships and steamers fired at our batteries in volleys; bombs, red-hot cannonballs, buckshot, brandkugels ... rained down like hail; crackling and explosions were everywhere; all this merged into a terrible and wild rumble; it was impossible to distinguish shots, only a wild and terrifying gurgling was heard; the earth seemed to stagger under the weight of the fighters ... And this fierce battle did not stop for a minute, lasted exactly 12 hours and stopped only when it was completely dark. The defenders of the city managed to achieve close fire interaction between naval and fortress artillery.

The defenders of Sevastopol showed great stamina and courage. So, for example, on the 3rd bastion, the gun servants changed three times, but the people continued to do their duty. About the 10th battery in just one day, October 5 (17), 2700 cores and unexploded bombs were collected, but it continued to fire. Russian gunners, despite being wounded, did not leave the battlefield. On this day, many defenders of Sevastopol died, among them the talented organizer and head of the defense of the city, Admiral Kornilov. At the place where he was killed, the sailors made a cross from the cannonballs.

The sailors and the population of the city spent the whole night from October 5 (17) to October 6 (18) in hard work to correct the damage. To the amazement of the enemy, by the morning of October 6 (18), the Sevastopol fortifications were restored and ready to repel new enemy attacks.

Defense of Sevastopol. Artist F. A. Rubo. 1904

Defense of Sevastopol 1854 - 1855

The enemy's first attempt to capture Sevastopol failed. The plan of the Anglo-French command was thwarted by the heroic defense of the Russian troops.

After the death of Kornilov, the defense of Sevastopol was headed by Vice Admiral Nakhimov. Under his direct supervision, work was carried out to strengthen the defensive lines, to build additional coastal batteries and protect them, and combat battalions of sailors were formed. He knew everything that was happening on the bastions: who needed shells, where reinforcements needed to be sent, and he always provided assistance in time. He spent the night where he had to, slept, often without undressing. He gave his apartment to the infirmary. The admiral enjoyed great prestige and love among the defenders of Sevastopol. Nakhimov was everywhere and everywhere, inspired by his example, helped in word and deed. The hero of Sinop, the favorite of the sailors and the entire population of Sevastopol, an ardent patriot of his homeland, he was the soul of the heroic defense of Sevastopol.

The bombardment of the city from land by siege batteries continued for several more days, but to no avail: the Sevastopol men managed to fix everything that had been broken during the day during the night. Thanks to the tireless work of the talented Russian engineer Polzikov and Rear Admiral Istomin, who led the defense of the Malakhov Kurgan, it was turned into a powerful fortification, which until the end remained the main stronghold of the Sevastopol defense.

The stubborn resistance of the garrison forced the English commander-in-chief Raglan and the French general Canrobert to postpone the assault and move on to a slow siege. The allied command planned to start a new assault on Sevastopol in two weeks.

The enemy was preparing for a new assault on Sevastopol, moving closer and closer to the line of its fortifications. After the battle won on the Black River on August 4 (16), 1855, the allied troops began to actively prepare for the general assault on Sevastopol. The Anglo-French command represented by generals J.-J. Pelissier and J. Simpson carried out another bombardment of the city from 800 guns, which was carried out from 5 (17) to 8 (20) August. During this time, the enemy fired 56,500 shells, and the Russians - 29,400. The next, sixth, most powerful, bombardment of Sevastopol from 807 guns, including 300 mortars, was carried out from August 24 to 27 (September 5 - 8). Up to 150,000 shells were fired across the city. Malakhov Kurgan was especially heavily bombarded, against which 110 guns operated, of which 40 were mortars. This incredible cannonade, shaking and crushing the Russian fortifications, showered their defenders with a hail of bombs, grenade shots and bullets. In addition to ordinary shells, the enemy launched rockets and threw barrels filled with gunpowder. Everything that science, art and the experience of centuries created and opened up a destructive force - everything was exhausted to the bottom, for the destruction of the Sevastopol fortifications and the death of their defenders.

As a result of many days of fierce shelling, the 2nd and 3rd bastions and the fortifications of the Malakhov Kurgan were destroyed. Russian losses amounted to 7561 people killed, 89 guns and 113 machine tools.

On August 27 (September 8) at 12 noon, 13 divisions and one enemy brigade launched the last assault on Sevastopol. The enemy directed the main blow to the 2nd bastion and Malakhov Kurgan. 57,500 people were allocated for the assault. They were opposed by 40 thousand defenders of Sevastopol.

After artillery shelling, French troops (about 39 thousand bayonets) attacked the Ship side (General Bosquet commanded them). The assault was carried out simultaneously along the entire defensive line of Sevastopol. 10 thousand Frenchmen suddenly attacked the Malakhov Kurgan, on which there were only 1,400 soldiers and 500 artillerymen. Meanwhile, the French forces kept arriving. Soon all the commanders were killed or wounded in the Russian regiments, however, having lost control, the soldiers continued to fight. The defenders of the Malakhov Kurgan, after fierce fighting under the pressure of superior enemy forces, were forced to retreat.

All this time, enemy attacks continued on the 2nd bastion, where 7,000 Russians fought with 18,000 French. These attacks of the enemy were repulsed three times by the defenders of the bastion until the fire from the enemy guns mounted on the Malakhov Kurgan forced the defenders to retreat. The assault on the 3rd bastion was led by the British (11 thousand people). However, after the first unsuccessful attack, the British did not resume them any more. Also unsuccessful for the enemy ended his offensive against the City side of Sevastopol, which began after Malakhov Kurgan was taken.

Thus, the French managed to capture the Malakhov Kurgan and the second bastion. At other points, all attacks were repulsed. But with the loss of Malakhov Kurgan and the 2nd bastion, the line of defense of Sevastopol was broken just at the point on which its strength as a whole depended. The capture of Malakhov Kurgan, which represented a key position in the defense system of Sevastopol, was a turning point in the course of the siege.

Gorchakov, having familiarized himself with the state of affairs, decided to abandon further struggle for the city and ordered the troops to be withdrawn to the North Side. On August 27 (September 8), Russian troops, having blown up warehouses and fortifications on the South Side, crossed partly on ships, partly along the constructed floating bridge to the North Side, and then joined up with Menshikov's army. Simultaneously with the crossing of the troops, the remaining ships of the Black Sea Fleet were sunk in the bay. The organized withdrawal of the entire Russian army with artillery and rear during one night was a unique event in the history of wars.

Sevastopol. Monument to the lost ships. Sculptor A. G. Adamson, architect V. A. Feldman and military engineer F. O. Enberg. 1905

Thus ended the heroic defense of Sevastopol. The Allies did not achieve his surrender. The Russian army in the Crimea survived and was ready for further battles.

"Brave comrades! It is sad and hard to leave Sevastopol to our enemies, but remember what a sacrifice we made on the altar of the fatherland in 1812. Moscow is worth Sevastopol! We left it after the immortal battle of Borodino. The 349-day defense of Sevastopol surpasses Borodino! But not Moscow, a pile of stones and ashes went to the enemy in the fateful year 1812. So, we didn’t leave Sevastopol to our enemies, but only the burning ruins of the city, set on fire with our own hand, keeping behind us part of the defense, which our children and grandchildren will proudly pass on to distant offspring, ”the order of the commander-in-chief of August 3 (15), 1855 said The Allies lost about 73 thousand people during the Sevastopol defense (not counting the sick and those who died from diseases). Russians - 102 thousand people. During the siege, the enemy fired 1356 thousand artillery shots. In addition, the French fired over 26 million rounds of ammunition. On the Russian side, 1027 thousand shells were used up.

The heroic 349-day defense of Sevastopol was an important stage in the development of military art. It became an example of the skillful organization of active defense, based on the joint actions of the ground forces and the navy in the defense of the seaside fortress. Despite the superiority of the enemy in the number of troops, artillery and the quality of weapons, defense in depth, combining maneuver with fire and reliance on engineering structures, the adopted system of artillery and rifle fire, mine warfare, allowed the defenders to successfully repel enemy attacks. The combination of fire with a trench system marked the beginning of positional methods of warfare. Russian soldiers demonstrated high moral and combat qualities, wrote a glorious page in the combat annals of the army and navy.

Cathedral of the Holy Equal-to-the-Apostles Prince Vladimir in Sevastopol - an Orthodox church, the burial place of Russian admirals and naval officers - a monument of architecture and history.
Architects K. A. Ton and A. A. Avdeev

The soldiers of the Red Army in the days of the second Sevastopol defense of 1941-1942 became worthy successors and continuers of the heroic deeds of the Sevastopol people. They not only repeated the feat of those who fought on the bastions of the famous Russian city in 1854-1855, but also showed even greater stamina and mass heroism in the fight against the Nazi invaders.

Leaving Sevastopol, Gorchakov stationed his troops on the Inkerman and Mekenziev heights. Urgent measures were taken to strengthen the engineering defense of the North side. Together with the approaching reserves, Gorchakov had about 50 thousand people and was ready to continue the fight.

Colonel Dmitry Vorobyov,
Deputy Head of the Research Department
Institute of Military History of the Military Academy of the General Staff
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

Panorama "Defense of Sevastopol". Artist F.A. Roubaud

The defense of Sevastopol is the most tragic and heroic page of the Crimean War of 1853-1856.

Defense of Sevastopol

In 1854, the armed forces of France, England, Turkey and Sardinia (Italy) invaded the Crimean Peninsula. The city had defense only from the sea. When the siege of the city began on September 13, batteries and fortifications were already created under enemy fire, which had an advantage both in weapons and in manpower: 34 battleships and 55 frigates (most of them steam) blocked the Russian fleet (14 battleships sailing, 6 frigates and 6 steam-frigates). The number of landing troops was 62 thousand people with 134 field and 73 siege weapons. They concentrated in the bay of Sevastopol and planned to complete the assault on the city within a week. But the enemy underestimated the defense capability and heroism of the Russian troops.

V.E. Pamfilov "Wagon with the Wounded". Study for the panorama "Defense of Sevastopol"

On September 1, 1854, troops landed near Evpatoria, and the enemy troops moved to Sevastopol. The first major battle in the Crimean War took place on September 8, 1854 on the Alma (at the mouth of the Alma River), where the Russian army was stationed in order to stop the enemy and prevent him from capturing Sevastopol outright, because. the city was not yet ready to repel the attack. The Allied troops numbered up to 59 thousand soldiers, 132 guns, and the fleet provided artillery support from the sea.

The Russian army led the defense under the command of Adjutant General Prince A.S. Menshikov, under his command there were 35 thousand soldiers and 84 guns. The allies won an undeniable victory on Alma, now the path to Sevastopol was open, but the battle suspended their movement to Sevastopol, this made it possible to prepare for the siege and avoid taking the city left without troops by storm. It was a deceitful move: the allies believed that they were fighting with the vanguard of the Russian army, when it was not so: “Indeed, who could believe that the Russians had only a handful of troops left to protect the Crimea, to preserve the Black Sea Fleet, when did you get used to counting our army in a million?”

L. Jones "Battle of the Alma"

The defense of Sevastopol was led by the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral V.A. Kornilov and Vice Admiral P.S. Nakhimov. In order to block the enemy's breakthrough into the Sevastopol harbor, 5 battleships were flooded, naval guns and crews became part of the city's defenders. All fortification work was carried out under the guidance of engineer-lieutenant colonel E.I. Totleben, who since that time has become the soul of defense. The steadfastness and courage of Russian soldiers, sailors and residents of the city shocked the whole world.

D.W. Carmichael "The Bombardment of Sevastopol"

The first bombing of Sevastopol on October 5 did not bring heavy losses, but V.A. was mortally wounded. Kornilov.
Malakhov Kurgan became the center of defense. The second assault on the city began on March 28, 1855, at the cost of very heavy losses, the invaders managed to push our positions. The third and fourth assaults had the same results, but on June 28 P.S. was killed in a shootout. Nakhimov. Napoleon III gave the order to take the fortress, regardless of the losses. But the fifth attack was again unsuccessful, and the allies began to prepare for a decisive assault. On August 27, the sixth and final assault on Sevastopol began. 8 French, 5 British divisions and 1 Sardinian brigade took part in the offensive, 60 thousand fighters against 40 thousand of ours, but most of them stood on the back line of defense. The battle went on with mixed success. The French captured and held Malakhov Kurgan. At all other points of defense, miracles of courage were performed, the Russians repulsed the attack, but the further defense of Sevastopol no longer made sense, it was not possible to hold out under such circumstances. Prince Gorchakov gave the order to leave Sevastopol, during the night he transferred troops to the north side. The city was set on fire, the powder magazines were blown up, the warships in the bay were flooded. The allies did not dare to pursue the Russians, believing that the city was mined. Only on August 30 did they enter the ruins of Sevastopol.

The siege of Sevastopol lasted 11 months; during this time, the allies lost about 70 thousand people, not counting those who died from diseases; Russians - about 83.5 thousand

But with the capture of Sevastopol, the Russians did not stop the unequal struggle: 115 thousand people settled along the northern shore of the large bay; Allied troops numbering more than 150 thousand of one infantry took up positions from the Baidar Valley to Chorgun, along the Chernaya River and along the southern shore of a large bay. The ensuing military lull was interrupted only by sabotage by the interventionists.

The heroic defense of Sevastopol became known far beyond the borders of Russia and influenced the course of the peace negotiations: the interventionists were forced to agree to peace negotiations at all on conditions that they had not counted on at the beginning of the war.

The defense of Sevastopol provided the experience of war with the joint forces of the army and navy. It is reflected in the panorama of F.A. Rubo "Defense of Sevastopol", which is located in Sevastopol in a special building.

Heroes of the Sevastopol defense

Vladimir Ivanovich Istomin (1809-1855)

IN AND. Istomin. Portrait by an unknown artist

Born into a noble family in the Pskov province. In 1827 he graduated from the Naval Cadet Corps with the rank of midshipman. In the same year, he participated in the Battle of Navarino and was awarded the Distinction of the Military Order of St. George and promoted to midshipman. Later he received numerous awards, participated in campaigns and joint operations of the army and navy. Commanding the ship "Paris", he distinguished himself in the Battle of Sinop and was promoted to Rear Admiral. P.S. Nakhimov especially noted the actions of the ship "Paris" in this battle and wrote: " It was impossible to stop admiring the beautiful and cold-bloodedly calculated actions of the Paris ship.

When the siege of Sevastopol began, Istomin was appointed commander of the 4th defensive distance of the Malakhov Kurgan, and then chief of staff under Vice Admiral V. A. Kornilov. November 20, 1854 Istomin was awarded the Order of St.. George 3rd degree. He was one of the most courageous and active participants in the defense of Sevastopol. After the death of Kornilov, he did not leave his positions for a single day, he lived on the Kamchatka redoubt, in a dugout.

On March 7, 1855, when Istomin was leaving his dugout, his head was blown off by a cannonball. Istomin was buried in the Sevastopol Cathedral of St. Vladimir, in the same crypt with Admirals M.P. Lazarev, V.A. Kornilov, P.S. Nakhimov.

Vladimir Alekseevich Kornilov (1806-1854)

K. Bryullov "Portrait of V. Kornilov"

Born in the family estate of the Staritsky district of the Tver province in the family of the Irkutsk governor. Graduated from the Naval Cadet Corps.

He distinguished himself as a midshipman on the flagship "Azov" in the Battle of Navarino. In the outbreak of the Crimean War, he commanded the Black Sea Fleet. After the Anglo-French troops landed in Evpatoria and were defeated on the Alma, Kornilov received an order from the commander-in-chief, Prince Menshikov, to flood the ships of the fleet in the roadstead in order to use sailors to defend Sevastopol from land, but refused to obey the order. Then Menshikov gives the order to remove Kornilov from command of the fleet, to which Kornilov replied: “Stop! This is suicide... what you are forcing me to do... but it is impossible for me to leave Sevastopol surrounded by the enemy! I am ready to obey you."

Kornilov is considered the founder of positional warfare.

During the first bombardment of Sevastopol, V.A. Kornilov died heroically on Malakhov Hill.

Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov (1802-1855)

P.S. Nakhimov

Born into a noble family in the Smolensk province, the village of Gorodok, Vyazemsky district. Graduated from the Naval Cadet Corps. Under the command of M.P. Lazareva made a trip around the world on the frigate "Cruiser". He distinguished himself in the Battle of Navarino in 1827, participated in many battles, had many awards. In 1845 he was promoted to rear admiral and commanded a brigade of ships.

During the Crimean War of 1853-1856, Nakhimov in stormy weather discovered and blocked the main forces of the Turkish fleet in Sinop and defeated them in the Battle of Sinop on November 18, 1853, skillfully carrying out the operation, for which he was awarded by Nicholas I the Order of the Holy Great Martyr George the Victorious.

During the defense of Sevastopol, after the flooding of the fleet, he defended the southern part of the city, was highly respected by the soldiers and sailors, who called him "the benefactor father."

On June 28, 1855, he was mortally wounded in the head by a bullet on Malakhov Kurgan and died two days later.

General engineer Eduard Ivanovich Totleben (1818-1884)

E.I. Totleben. Portrait by an unknown artist

From an old Thuringian family, born in Russia. He studied at the Engineering School in St. Petersburg, but did not complete the course due to heart disease. Participated in several expeditions in the Caucasus with a team of sappers.

During the Crimean War, he participated in the organization of defensive work, strengthened all the approaches to the city with strong frontal and flank defenses with cannon and rifle fire. He worked continuously day and night. In a short time created a solid defensive line. The Allies were unable to take Sevastopol with an open attack and began a siege on 28 September. On June 8, Totleben was wounded by a bullet in the leg through and through, but continued to lead the defensive work. But his health deteriorated, and he left Sevastopol.

Sailor Petr Markovich Koshka (1828-1882)

Bust of sailor Peter Koshka

He was born in Ukraine, in the village of Ometintsy, Kamenetz-Podolsky province, to the family of a serf, and for free-thinking he was given to the sailors by the landowner.

During the days of the Sevastopol defense, among other sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, he was sent ashore. He was distinguished by bold actions, courage, resourcefulness in battle, especially distinguished himself in reconnaissance and in the capture of prisoners.

His exploits and image are captured in many works of art.

Once, with one knife, he captured three French soldiers, another time, under enemy fire, he dug the body of a Russian sapper blasphemously buried to the waist in the ground near the enemy’s trench and carried it to the 3rd bastion. 5 bullets hit the sapper's body. For this feat he was awarded the Distinction of the Military Order of St. George.

It is said that Koshka dragged a boiled beef leg straight from a French cauldron at night, and another time during the day he took away an enemy horse. He sold the horse, and donated the money to the monument to the deceased comrade.

In one of the sorties he was wounded with a bayonet in the chest.

In January 1855 he was promoted to sailors of the 1st article, and then to quartermaster.

After the war he was treated, but then he was called up again, he served in St. Petersburg.

Died of a fever after falling through the ice while rescuing two girls.

Surgeon Nikolai Ivanovich Pirogov (1818-1881)

N.I. Pirogov. Engraving by G. Grachev

Born in Moscow in the family of a military treasurer. Graduated from the Medical Faculty of Moscow University. At the age of 26 he became a professor. He headed the Department of Surgery at the St. Petersburg Medical and Surgical Academy.

During the Crimean War, he was the chief surgeon of the besieged Sevastopol. He invented a technique, as a result of which he managed to avoid the amputation of wounded limbs. He was the first to use a plaster cast in the treatment of bone injuries. In the besieged Sevastopol, he organized the Exaltation of the Cross community of nurses to care for the wounded. Pirogov is the founder of military field surgery. For the first time, he operated on the wounded with anesthesia with ether anesthesia.

After the Crimean War, Garibaldi saved his leg. But for criticizing the backwardness of the Russian army and its weapons, he fell into disfavor with Emperor Alexander II.

Dasha Sevastopolskaya (Daria Lavrentyevna Mikhailova) (1836-1892)

Dasha Sevastopolskaya

Born in a sailor's family, not far from Kazan. Her father died in the battle of Sinop. She was orphaned at the age of 15. I bought a wagon at my own expense and equipped a camp dressing station. Soldiers and sailors loved her, they admired her courage - Dasha was on the front line and took out the wounded from there.

For her feat, she was awarded by Emperor Nicholas I a gold medal with the inscription "For diligence" on the Vladimir ribbon to be worn on the chest and 500 silver rubles. “After her marriage, the Sovereign promised to invite another 1,000 silver rubles for the acquisition.”

Information about her further fate is contradictory, as is the date of death.

Defense of Sevastopol 1941-1942
	Neighborhoods of Sevastopol and Crimea
	German victory
	Third Reich
Commanders
G. I. Levchenko	E. von Manstein
I. E. Petrov
F. S. Oktyabrsky
Side forces
As of June 6, 1942: 118,890 people. 116 aircraft, 47 tanks, 455 army artillery guns, 151 coastal artillery guns (100-305 mm) 1770 mortars 12 M-8 rocket launchers	As of June 6, 1942: 203,800 people. 1060 aircraft, 150 tanks, 670 field and siege guns, 655 anti-tank guns, 720 mortars
about 18 thousand killed, 5 thousand wounded, 95 thousand prisoners; 622 artillery pieces and 758 mortars, 26 tanks; cruiser "Chervona Ukraine", 4 destroyers, 4 large transports, submarines S-32 and Shch-214;	Soviet data: general: 300 thousand non-refundable: 60 thousand no German data. alternative data: 35.5 thousand people, of which 27.0 thousand people were German losses and 8.5 thousand Romanian, of which 4300 and 1600 people died, respectively.

Defense of Sevastopol and the battle for the Crimea(September 12, 1941 - July 9, 1942) - the fighting of the Soviet and German troops in the Crimea.

background

By the end of September 1941, German troops captured Smolensk and Kiev and blockaded Leningrad. In the southwestern direction, the enemy also achieved significant success: in the battle near Uman and in the Kiev pocket, the main forces of the Southwestern Front of the Red Army were defeated, most of Ukraine was occupied. In mid-September, the Wehrmacht came to the approaches to the Crimea.

Crimea was of strategic importance as one of the routes to the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus (through the Kerch Strait of Taman). In addition, the Crimea was important as a base for aviation. With the loss of the Crimea, Soviet aviation would have lost the possibility of raids on the oil fields of Romania, and the Germans would have been able to strike at targets in the Caucasus. The Soviet command understood the importance of holding the peninsula and concentrated on this, abandoning the defense of Odessa.

The position of the troops before the start of the operation

The only land route to Crimea lay through the Isthmus of Perekop. In general, the defense of the peninsula was assigned to the 51st Separate Army, formed in August, directly subordinate to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, under the command of Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov. Three rifle divisions covered the northern direction: the 276th (commander Major General I.S. Savinov) - the Chongar Peninsula and the Arabat Spit, the 156th (Major General P.V. Chernyaev) - Perekop positions, 106- I (colonel A. N. Pervushin) stretched for 70 kilometers along the southern coast of the Sivash. Three cavalry divisions - the 48th (Major General D.I. Averkin), the 42nd (Colonel V.V. Glagolev) and the 40th (Colonel F.F. Kudyurov), as well as the 271st the rifle division (col. M. A. Titov) had anti-amphibious missions. Four divisions formed in the Crimea - 172nd (colonel I. G. Toroptsev), 184th (colonel V.N. Abramov), 320th (colonel M.V. Vinogradov), 321st (colonel I. M. Aliev) guarded the coast.

On September 12, advanced German units reached the Crimea. The commander of the 11th Army, Manstein, decided to create a grouping of troops consisting of: the 54th Army Corps, the 30th Army Corps, the 3rd Romanian Army and the 49th Mountain Corps, removed from the Rostov direction, artillery, engineering troops and anti-aircraft artillery. Air support was provided by units of the 4th Air Force of the Luftwaffe.

By mid-October, by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Primorsky Army was transferred from Odessa. Thus, the Soviet troops began to number 12 rifle divisions (probably, from two to four of them were not finally formed) and 4 cavalry divisions. At the same time, the Germans were able to allocate the 11th Army, consisting of 7 infantry divisions, to capture the Crimea (according to Manstein's memoirs - six: 22nd, 72nd, 170th, 46th, 73rd, 50th) and the Romanian mountain corps of two brigades.

The course of hostilities

Battles for Perekop

On September 24, German troops, with the help of two infantry divisions (46th and 73rd), with the support of artillery and aviation, went on the offensive on the Perekop Isthmus. In the course of heavy fighting, they managed to break through the Turkish Wall by September 26 and capture the city of Armyansk. The counterattack, hastily organized by the commander of the operational group, Lieutenant General P. I. Batov, by the arriving units of two rifle and cavalry divisions, did not lead to the desired result. By September 30, Soviet troops retreated to the Ishun positions, where they repulsed German attempts to develop the offensive. Manstein, due to heavy losses (about 16% of the personnel in both divisions) and the almost complete consumption of ammunition (artillery shot even the "emergency reserve"), as well as the fact that part of the forces - the SS motorized division "Adolf Hitler" and the 49th mountain corps, - were diverted to the Rostov direction, refused further advancement. According to German data, as a result of the fighting, 135 guns, 112 tanks and 10 thousand prisoners were captured.

Fights for the Ishun positions and the abandonment of the Crimea

On October 18, the 11th German Army, with the forces of three divisions, launched an offensive against the Ishun positions. They were defended by units of the 9th Rifle Corps with the help of coastal batteries and separate units of the Black Sea Fleet. Heavy fighting continued for 5 days, in which the Germans gradually pushed back the Soviet troops. On October 24, the units of the Primorsky Army launched a counterattack and fought a fierce oncoming battle with the enemy for two days. However, on October 26, Manstein introduced two fresh infantry divisions at the junction of the armies and broke through the defenses on October 28. Parts of the Red Army, providing scattered resistance to the better organized and more mobile formations of the Nazis, withdrew to Sevastopol, Kerch and partially dispersed in the mountainous terrain. The attempt of the retreating Soviet troops to gain a foothold on the Kerch Peninsula was unsuccessful. As a result, under pressure from the German 42nd Army Corps (three infantry divisions), the remnants of the 51st Army could not hold out in the Crimea and by November 16 were evacuated to the Taman Peninsula. The coastal army, consisting of five rifle and three cavalry divisions, withdrew to Sevastopol. They were pursued by the 54th Army Corps (two infantry divisions and a formed motorized brigade), in addition, the 30th Army Corps, as part of two infantry divisions, crossed the Crimean Mountains to reach the southern coast of Crimea and cut the Alushta-Sevastopol road.

Defense of Sevastopol

Sevastopol fortified area

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Sevastopol defensive region (SOR) was one of the most fortified places in the world. The SOR structures included dozens of fortified gun positions, minefields, etc. The defense system also included two so-called "armored batteries" (BB), or forts armed with large-caliber artillery. Forts BB-30 (commander - G. A. Alexander) and BB-35 (commander - A. Ya. Leshchenko) were armed with 305 mm guns.

First assault

In Soviet historiography, the first assault on Sevastopol is considered to be the attempts of German troops to capture the city on the move during October 30 - November 21, 1941. Foreign, primarily German, historians, on the contrary, do not single out these attacks as a separate phase of the battle.

From October 30 to November 11, battles were fought on the distant approaches to Sevastopol, from November 2, attacks began on the outer line of defense of the fortress. There were no ground units left in the city, protection was carried out by the marines of the Black Sea Fleet, coastal batteries, separate (training, artillery, anti-aircraft) units with fire support from ships. True, even the Germans only advanced detachments reached the city. At the same time, units of scattered Soviet troops retreated to the city. The Soviet group initially consisted of about 20 thousand people.

At the end of October, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to reinforce the garrison of Sevastopol with the forces of the Primorsky Army (commander - Major General I.E. Petrov), which until then had defended Odessa. On October 16, the defense of Odessa was terminated and the Seaside Army was transferred by sea to Sevastopol. The reinforcement forces amounted to 36 thousand people (according to German data - more than 80 thousand), about 500 guns, 20 thousand tons of ammunition, tanks and other types of weapons and materials. Thus, by mid-November, the garrison of Sevastopol totaled - according to Soviet data - about 50-55 thousand people.

On November 9-10, the Wehrmacht managed to completely surround the fortress from land, but during November, rearguard forces made their way to their own, in particular, parts of the 184th NKVD rifle division, which covered the withdrawal of the 51st army.

On November 11, with the approach of the main grouping of the 11th Wehrmacht Army, battles broke out along the entire perimeter. Within 10 days, the attackers managed to slightly wedge into the front line of defense, after which there was a pause in the battle.

Landing in Evpatoria

On January 5, 1942, the Black Sea Fleet made an amphibious landing in the port of Evpatoria with the forces of a marine battalion (commander - Lieutenant Commander K. G. Buzinov). At the same time, an uprising broke out in the city, in which part of the city's population and partisans who arrived to help took part. At the first stage, the operation was successful, the Romanian garrison, up to a regiment, was driven out of the city. However, the Germans soon brought up reserves. In the ensuing street battles, the enemy managed to gain the upper hand. On January 7, the battle in Evpatoria was over. The landing forces were partially killed in an unequal battle, partially captured.

Kerch landing

On December 26, 1941, the Soviet command attempted a strategic offensive in the Crimea, known as the "Kerch landing". At the end of January 1942, the Crimean Front of the Red Army was formed on the Kerch Peninsula. Despite initial success, the offensive of the Soviet army was stopped. At the end of May 1942, the enemy defeated the main forces of the Crimean Front during Operation Bustard Hunting, after which the third assault on Sevastopol began.

Aviation actions

Luftwaffe

The actions of Army Group South were supported by the 4th Luftwaffe Fleet, which at the beginning of the invasion of the USSR consisted of two air corps - IV and V, with a total of about 750 aircraft of all types. In the winter of 1941, V Air Corps from the fleet was transferred to the Mediterranean theater. At the beginning of May 1942, to support the offensive against the Kerch grouping of Soviet troops in the Crimea, the VIII Luftwaffe Air Corps under the command of V. von Richthoffen, specially designed to support important ground operations (See Operation Bustard Hunting), was deployed. After the end of the fighting on the Kerch Peninsula, the VIII Corps was transferred to Sevastopol. With the start of an active offensive, Sevastopol was subjected to massive air strikes: on average, Luftwaffe aircraft made 600 sorties per day. About 2.5 thousand tons of high-explosive bombs were dropped, including large calibers - up to 1000 kg.

Second assault

The defense of Sevastopol from land was based on a series of large permanent structures (artillery forts). To destroy the forts, the Germans used large-caliber siege artillery. In total, over 200 heavy artillery batteries were located on a perimeter of 22 km. Most of the batteries consisted of conventional large caliber field artillery, including 210mm heavy howitzers and 300mm and 350mm heavy howitzers from World War I. Super-heavy siege weapons were also used:

• howitzer Gamma Mörser - 420 mm
• 2 self-propelled mortars Karl - 600 mm

Near Sevastopol, a super-heavy 800-mm Dora-class gun was also used for the first and last time. The gun with a total mass of more than 1,000 tons was secretly delivered from Germany and secretly placed in a special shelter carved into a rock mass in the Bakhchisarai region. The gun entered service in early June and fired a total of fifty-three 7-ton projectiles. The fire of the "Dora" was directed against the forts BB-30, BB-35, as well as underground ammunition depots located in the rock masses. As it turned out later, one of the shells pierced a rock mass 30 m thick. Against less fortified pillboxes and bunkers, 88-mm anti-aircraft guns and 20-mm and 37-mm quick-firing anti-aircraft guns were widely used, firing direct fire.

Initially, the German command planned to start the assault on November 27, 1941, however, due to weather conditions and partisan actions, by November 17, 50% of the auto-drawn transport and 4 of the 5 steam locomotives available to the 11th Army were out of order, as a result of which the assault started December 17th. After a massive artillery preparation, the German units went on the offensive in the valley of the river. Belbek. The 22nd Lower Saxon and 132nd Infantry Divisions were able to break through into the fortification zone south of the valley, the 50th and 24th Divisions, having suffered heavy losses, could not advance at all.

After the Soviet landing in Feodosia, the German command was forced to transfer the 170th Infantry Division to the Kerch Peninsula, while the rest of the units continued to storm the fortress. German troops were able to approach Fort Stalin. However, by December 30, the offensive capabilities of the 11th Army had dried up. According to Manstein, the withdrawal of German units to the starting lines was his initiative, Soviet historiography claims that the German troops were knocked out by a series of counterattacks.

Last Assault

For the summer assault, the German command as part of the 11th Army used the forces of six corps:

• 54th Army: 22nd, 24th, 50th, 132nd Infantry Divisions;
• 30th Army: 72nd, 170th Infantry, 28th Light Divisions;
• 42nd Army: 46th Infantry, Motorized Brigade Groddek;
• 7th Romanian: 10th, 19th infantry, 4th mountain divisions, 8th cavalry brigade;
• Romanian mountain: 1st mountain, 18th infantry division, 4th mountain brigade;
• 8th Aviation Corps.

The 42nd Army and 7th Romanian Corps were located on the Kerch Peninsula, their units were supposed to be used to replace divisions that would suffer the greatest losses. The 46th Infantry and 4th Mountain Divisions replaced the 132nd and 24th Divisions in the second phase of the assault. Anticipating heavy losses, the command of the 11th Army requested an additional three infantry regiments, which were used in the last stage of the battle. Several anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the 8th Aviation Corps were used to conduct ground battles. The army also had at its disposal the 300th separate tank battalion, three divisions of self-propelled guns, 208 batteries of guns (not counting anti-aircraft guns), including 93 batteries of heavy and super-heavy guns. Assessing the power of artillery, Manstein says: "In general, in the Second World War, the Germans never achieved such a massive use of artillery." Comparing the strength of the parties in terms of manpower, he twice claims that the German-Romanian army and the Soviet garrison were quantitatively equal.

The book "Lost Victories" provides information that was at the disposal of the headquarters of the 11th Army about the Soviet forces in Sevastopol: Headquarters of the Primorsky Army, 2nd, 95th, 172nd, 345th, 386th, 388 1st Rifle Divisions, 40th Cavalry Division, 7th, 8th, 79th Marine Brigade. According to Manstein, 7 Soviet divisions and 3 brigades are "at least equal" to 13 divisions, an aviation corps and 3 brigades (not counting individual infantry and artillery regiments, and numerous units that were part of each of the 6 corps directorates ).

The assault began on June 7th. The stubborn struggle and counterattacks of the defenders continued for more than a week. In the attacking German companies, an average of 25 people remained. The turning point came on June 17: southern section, the attackers took up a position known as the "Eagle's Nest" and reached the foot of the Sapun Mountain. On the northern the site was captured by the fort "Stalin" and the foot of the Mekenziev heights. On this day, several more forts fell, including the BB-30 battery (as the Germans called it, Fort Maxim Gorky-1).

From that moment on, German artillery could bombard the Northern Bay, and the supply of reinforcements and ammunition became impossible. However, the inner ring of defense was still preserved, and the frontal assault did not bode well for the Germans. Manstein decided to attack the inner ring not in the forehead from the southeast, but in the flank from the north, for which it was necessary to cross the Severnaya Bay. The southern shore of the bay was heavily fortified, and the landing seemed almost impossible, which is why Manstein decided to bet on surprise. On the night of June 28-29, without artillery preparation, the advanced units of the 30th Corps in inflatable boats secretly crossed the bay and suddenly attacked. On June 30, Malakhov Kurgan fell. By this time, the defenders of Sevastopol began to run out of ammunition, and the commander of the defense, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, received permission from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to evacuate. The evacuation plan provided for the removal of only the highest and senior command staff of the army and navy, the party activists of the city. The evacuation of the rest of the military, including the wounded, was not expected.

The evacuation of the high command began with the help of aviation. 13 PS-84 aircraft took about 200 people to the Caucasus. About 700 commanding officers were taken out by submarines. Several thousand more were able to escape on light watercraft of the Black Sea Fleet. The commander of the Primorsky Army, General Petrov, was evacuated on the Shch-209 submarine on the evening of June 30.

The remnants of the Primorsky Army, deprived of the highest command, retreated to Cape Chersonese, where they resisted for another three days. German General Kurt von Tippelskirch announced the capture of 100 thousand prisoners, 622 guns, 26 tanks and 141 aircraft at Cape Chersonese. Manstein is more cautious in reporting that 30,000 Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner at the extreme tip of the peninsula and about 10,000 in the Balaklava area. According to Soviet archival data, the number of prisoners did not exceed 78,230 people, and there was no capture of aviation equipment: the aircraft remaining in service at the time of the 3rd assault were partially redeployed to the Caucasus, partially dumped into the sea and flooded. In the period from July 1 to July 10, 1942, 1726 people were taken out of Sevastopol by all types of vehicles, mainly the command and political staff of the army and navy.

For the capture of Sevastopol, the commander of the 11th Army, E. von Manstein, received the rank of field marshal, and the entire personnel of the army received a special sleeve insignia "Crimean Shield".

results

The loss of Sevastopol led to a deterioration in the position of the Red Army and allowed the German troops to continue their offensive towards the Volga and the Caucasus. More than a hundred thousandth grouping, located on a strategically important sector of the front, was lost. Soviet aviation could no longer threaten the Romanian oil fields in Ploiesti, the Soviet fleet lost the ability to act on enemy communications in the northern and northwestern parts of the Black Sea. In addition to the battle-hardened fighters of the Primorsky Army, qualified personnel from among the inhabitants of the fortified city were lost.

At the same time, the German command won the victory at an exceptionally high price. The main task of the Wehrmacht was to free the 11th Army from near Sevastopol for further use in the directions of the main attacks of the summer campaign of 1942. According to Manstein, after the capture of Sevastopol, the forces of the army subordinate to him should have been transferred across the Kerch Strait to the Kuban in order to cut off the retreat routes of the Red Army, retreating before Army Group A from the lower Don to the Caucasus, or at least kept in reserve behind the southern flank, which may have prevented the defeat of the German troops at Stalingrad. However, due to the huge losses incurred, this task could not be completed. The German command, in the midst of the summer offensive, was forced to give units of the 11th Army and the Romanian corps a rest of six weeks, which was used to receive reinforcements. Manstein himself was on vacation in Romania until August 12. However, after his return, it turned out that out of 13 divisions, 3 brigades and six corps departments involved in the Crimean peninsula, only four divisions and two corps departments could be used for further operations:

• The 7th Romanian Corps, consisting of the 10th and 19th Infantry Divisions, was sent to the Stalingrad area;
• the headquarters of the 42nd corps and the 42nd division were transferred to Taman;
• The 72nd division is involved in Army Group Center (on a secondary sector).

The 50th German division, the Romanian mountain corps: the 1st and 4th mountain, 18th infantry divisions, the 4th mountain brigade, the 8th cavalry brigade were left in the Crimea; The 22nd division was sent to Crete, where it remained until the end of the war (it did not take part in hostilities in North Africa); the headquarters of the 54th and 30th corps, the 24th, 132nd, 170th, 28th light (mountain rifle) divisions went to the Leningrad region, where active operations were not expected in the coming months. As Manstein writes: "it was necessary to find out the possibilities for striking and draw up a plan for an attack on Leningrad." That is, the divisions, in essence, continued to undergo reorganization until September 6, when they were brought into battle against the 2nd shock army. At the same time, units of the 18th Army were not redeployed from near Leningrad for use in the directions of the main attacks.

The German command lost the ability to use the 11th Army in the Caucasus or near Stalingrad, and also lost the ability to use Richthofen's 8th Aviation Corps in these areas, which, no later than August 27, ended up in the same place as Manstein's army - in the Leningrad region.

Memory

To celebrate the 50th anniversary of the victory on Sapun Mountain, a bullet-shaped chapel of St. George was erected. It took exactly 77 days to build it, and on May 6, 1995, the chapel was consecrated by Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev and All Ukraine. The architect was G. S. Grigoryants, the angel at the cross was made according to the sketches of Archpriest Nikolai Donenko. The authorship of the icon of St. George the Victorious belongs to the Honored Artist of Ukraine G. Ya. Brusentsov, and the mosaic version (located above the entrance) was made by the artist V. K. Pavlov.

When the implementation of the Barbarossa plan began in mid-1941, an attack on the Crimean peninsula was not even planned. The implication was that when major Soviet political centers like Moscow came under German control, the entire Soviet Union would fall apart on its own.

But those hopes were quickly dashed in July 1941, when two Soviet air attacks on Axis oil fields in Romania, launched from Sevastopol, destroyed 11,000 tons of oil.

Composition of the Attack Forces of the Wehrmacht

On July 23, 1941, Adolf Hitler issued Directive 33, which prioritized the conquest of the Crimea. On August 21, Hitler declared that "the capture of the Crimean peninsula is of tremendous importance for the protection of oil supplies from Romania."

The attack on Sevastopol was entrusted to the eleventh army under the command of a colonel general. In October 1941, the army was released from other tasks of the Barbarossa plan, so now it was focused on attacking the Crimea.

Lacking sufficient tanks, Manstein could not carry out the mobile action with which he had succeeded in France. Instead, he relied on his infantry. Romanian troops were also under his command. Some of the Romanians, especially the Mountain Brigade troops, were known as elite fighters, but in general the Romanians were ill-equipped, so they never deployed independently without close German support.

The beginning of the invasion of the Crimea

On October 18, General Erik Hansen, the commander of the 54th German Corps, together with the 22nd, 46th and 73rd Infantry Divisions, launched an attack on the Soviet 51st Army in Ishuni. Although the Soviet army was heavily outnumbered and air superior, Hansen's army made slow progress, capturing Yishun on 28 October after the arrival of three groups of BF109s that overwhelmed the Soviet air force. Soviet troops retreated to Sevastopol, which marked the beginning of the siege.

The beginning of the siege of Sevastopol

Even before the remnants of the Soviet 51st Army began to retreat towards Sevastopol, Vice Admiral Philip Oktyabrsky had already prepared thousands of people for the construction of defensive structures.

He also formed several naval infantry units from the ship's sailors; the sailors were not trained in ground combat, but they helped raise the numbers that Oktyabrsky desperately needed on the front lines. On October 30, the Navy's Black Sea Fleet brought in the 8th Naval Infantry Brigade from Novorossiysk to further alleviate the situation.

On October 30, 1941, advanced units of the German 132nd Rifle Division were discovered. The Soviet army opened fire with 305 mm coastal defense guns on the suspected German position; the location of these guns, coastal battery 30, would soon be called "Fort Maxim Gorky I".

Meanwhile, the Soviet naval infantry withstood the first attack on Sevastopol. On November 9, 19,894 soldiers, ten T-26 tanks, 152 guns and 20 mortars arrived from the sea, and Oktyabrsky already had 52,000 soldiers at his disposal.

On November 10, Manstein finally decided that he was prepared enough to launch a full-fledged offensive. The German 50th Rifle Division under General Friedrich Schmidt attacked first, capturing the village of Uppa near the Chernaya River southeast of Sevastopol.

The next day, the 132nd Rifle Division under the command of Lieutenant General Fritz Lindemann captured the Mekenzia farm in the northeast. By November 15, the attack was halted by a furious response from Soviet soldiers and sailors, supported by naval artillery from the Paris Commune. Manstein refused to advance on November 21, having lost 2,000 soldiers, although the losses of the Soviet army were much greater.

In December 1941, Oktyabrsky received reinforcements from the sea in the form of the new 388th Rifle Division, and Soviet engineers took advantage of the brief respite to lay extensive minefields while Manstein's men regrouped for a new attack.

The next German attack began on December 17, at six in the morning artillery bombardment began. 34 Yu-87 "Shtuka" and 20 bombers were preparing for the attack, which began with the advance of the 22nd Infantry Division into the territories held by the Soviet 8th Naval Brigade north of the Belbek River.

Soon the German 50th and 132nd rifle divisions also launched an offensive against the central line of defense. On December 22, the 8th Naval Brigade retreated towards the city, and on December 23 the German 170th Infantry Division and the Romanian 1st Mountain Brigade captured a strategic point southeast of the city.

Meanwhile, the Axis forces also headed towards Kerch on the eastern side of the peninsula. Soviet Lieutenant General Vladimir Lvov made a daring amphibious landing with 5,000 soldiers of the 51st Army on 26 December, followed by a larger landing of 23,000 soldiers of the 44th Army with a tank battalion at Feodosiya on 29 December. This move forced Germany to delay the next attack on Sevastopol in order to deal with the new threat.

Previously, Hitler had demanded that Sevastopol be captured by the end of the year in order to raise the morale that had fallen after the unsuccessful invasion of Russia, but this demand was not fulfilled. At that time, the losses of the German army were much higher than expected - only from December 17 to December 31, they lost 8,595 soldiers. The Soviet army, as in almost any battle of the Second World War, received much greater losses of personnel - 7,000 dead and 20,000 prisoners.

On January 15, 1942, Manstein launched a hasty counterattack, capturing Feodosia, however this offensive was launched before his troops were ready, due to which they failed to destroy the 44th and 51st armies, but this attack did not allow the Soviet armies to keep the initiative. The Soviet soldiers knew that it was vital to seize the initiative and launched a series of attacks from February to April 1942. All attacks failed in an attempt to break through the line of defense of the German army, which continued to besiege Sevastopol on land.

The course of the defense of Sevastopol

After a long period of preparation, Manstein decided that the time had come for a new large-scale offensive. On May 8, 1942, he launched Operation Bustard Hunting, which called for an attack by General Maximillian's corps on the Soviet 44th Army on the south coast.

The operation began at four in the morning with a ten-minute artillery barrage, and by half past seven the forward Soviet troops were defeated under the pressure of German attacks from the front and the landing of the 902nd assault group and the 436th infantry regiment in the rear. After numerous German and Romanian forces moved towards Kerch.

On May 9, the important airport in Marfovka, thirty kilometers from which the offensive began, was already captured by German troops, who destroyed 35 I-153 fighters stationed there. Lieutenant General Dmitry Kozlov panicked, which allowed Manstein to advance further with the 22nd Panzer Division, which quickly destroyed the remnants of the 51st Army.

On May 14, German troops entered Kerch from the eastern side of the peninsula, and on May 20 they captured the city completely. Due to the panic and inaction of Kozlov and his men, only 37,000 soldiers were evacuated from Kerch, while 28,000 were killed and 147,000 captured. Manstein's victory effectively destroyed three Soviet armies with only 3,397 casualties.

After Operation Bustard Hunting, the 22nd Panzer Division was moved from the Crimea to the north, in preparation for the operation in Kharkov.

With pressure relieved in the east, the Germans again concentrated on Sevastopol, launching Operation Sturgeon Fishing. At five forty in the morning on June 2, 1942, a major bombardment of defensive positions near Sevastopol began. At six in the morning the Luftwaffe joined the attack and dropped 570 tons of bombs.

On the night of June 6, the Soviet army, which had previously fired artillery against the attacks of German batteries, opened fire on German positions. Oktyabrsky knew that this bombardment had to come from the north, otherwise it would not have lasted so long. As Oktyabrsky suspected, the Germans were on the move. The soldiers of the 132nd Rifle Division moved towards the Belbek River, and the 22nd Rifle Division also changed its location. Progress was slow, but the Germans advanced through heavy Soviet mortar fire and air strikes. In the afternoon, at about seven in the evening, the first and only counterattack of the battalion of the Soviet 747th Infantry Regiment began; the Germans lost 2,357 men, including 340 killed.

Also, on June 7, Fretter-Pico, whose corps occupied the southern defensive line of the Soviet army, decided that he would not sit back while the generals in the north earned glory in a large-scale offensive, and began to probe the Soviet defenses. He achieved little success, but his attack resulted in a disproportionate amount of casualties, and Manstein forbade him to attack in this manner.

On June 8, the Soviet army launched a counterattack, but despite tank support, coordination between infantry, artillery, and tanks was poor and the attack failed. At ten in the morning the Germans attacked, and, having suffered losses of 1,700 soldiers, advanced three kilometers closer to Sevastopol. On June 9, the 132nd German Rifle Division attacked the coastal battery 30 Fort Maxim Gorky, but was pushed back twice, at ten in the morning and at noon, by the Soviet 95th Rifle Division. Several other Soviet counterattacks also took place on June 9, but they did not significantly contribute to the course of the battle.

On June 11, Major General Ivan Petrov launched a large-scale counterattack using all the artillery available in Sevastopol against the German 132nd Infantry Division. The counterattack reached a distance of a kilometer behind the German front line, but the Soviet troops were exhausted both morally and in ammunition to make something of this success. By the end of the day, they had lost the captured territories under the attacks of effective German aircraft. To the south, Fretter-Pico also made another attempt to advance. The 401st Regiment of the German 72nd Rifle Division allowed it to advance two kilometers, and Fretter-Pico sent his reserves, the 266th Rifle Division, and captured one of the forts.

On June 13, Hansen's corps captured Fort Stalin, which was a weakly defended anti-aircraft position with three machine gun points. Despite only 200 soldiers inside, the fort's defenders fought bravely for over an hour before falling. At five thirty in the morning, when the Soviet troops learned that Fort Stalin had fallen, the nearest fort, Volga, opened fire on it, followed by a counterattack that failed to recapture the fort. Nearly all of the fort's two hundred defenders were dead. Smaller but fierce battles like the one at Fort Stalin were repeated over the next few days in a war of attrition.

On June 16, Hansen dispatched the 132nd Infantry Division against Coastal Battery 30, Fort Maxim Gorky, while the 22nd and 24th Rifle Divisions attacked the center of the Soviet line of defense held by the Soviet 95th Rifle Division, broke through the defenses, destroying the front line and leaving shore battery 30 itself. The German 436th and 437th Infantry Regiments reached the fort and began their attack. A strike bomber destroyed the fort's western tower as the others slowed down due to lack of ammunition. Under such pressure, the entire northern defense line collapsed. While the Germans were methodically clearing Soviet bunkers with grenades and flamethrowers, on June 20 their troops reached Severnaya Bay. On June 21, after a two-day battle, the Germans captured Fort Lenin along with 158 prisoners. On June 23, Fort Konstantinovsky was captured. With the defeat of the northern defenses, Hansen's troops moved south, where Fretter-Pico advanced much more slowly.

To compensate for the slow advance of the corps, Romanian reinforcements were called in. Prior to this, the detachments of Major General George Avramescu were not instructed to carry out any major offensives. However, when they launched their first major offensive, they proved their worth by breaking through Soviet defenses near the Chernaya River, where the Germans failed, capturing a Soviet stronghold dubbed "Bastion II", and then driving off a counterattack. On June 27, Hansen's troops joined forces with Avramescu's troops east of the Chernaya River.

On June 29, at night, the German troops achieved the effect of complete surprise when the 902nd and 90th assault teams crossed the North Bay with 130 boats. The Soviet forces realized what was happening too late and fired flares to alert headquarters when the coast was already overrun. Petrov had six T-26 tanks at his disposal, which could have been used to protect the coastline, but due to his indecision, the moment was lost. In the south, the German corps attacked, defeating the 7th Soviet naval brigade and the 775th rifle regiment. German victories on the border of the Northern Bay and in the south cut off the Soviet troops, weakening them for the upcoming attack on Sevastopol.

On the night of June 30, Soviet troops destroyed a large ammunition depot near Severnaya Bay to prevent the Germans from capturing it. This warehouse was inside a champagne factory whose buildings also served as a field hospital for 2,000 wounded, some of whom may have still been in the building when it collapsed.

On June 30, the order was given to evacuate Sevastopol. All defenses afterward fell as the soldiers ran in every possible way for their lives. On July 1, Petrov and Oktyabrsky left the city in a submarine, leaving behind 23,000 people, many of them wounded. Later that day, German troops entered the city. Manstein tried to exclude the Romanians from the final offensive, not wanting to share the glory with them, but Major General Georg Manoli disobeyed the order, sending the 4th Mountain Division into the city and placing the Romanian flag on the statue of Nakhimov. The final act of defiance was carried out by the troops of the 109th Rifle Division fighting the bunkers around Coastal Battery 35 and the men who were fighting on the airstrip at Cape Khersones. Both flanks were defeated on 4 July.

The result of the battle for Sevastopol

The battle for Sevastopol cost both sides a lot, even according to the most modest calculations. About 18,000 Soviet soldiers died, 95,000 were captured, and only 25,157 people were successfully evacuated. The German 11th Army suffered losses of 4,264 dead, 21,626 wounded and 1,522 missing, for a total of about 27,000 soldiers. Romanian casualties were 1,597 dead, 6,571 wounded and 277 missing, for a total of 8,454.

The city itself was also badly damaged, mainly due to prolonged and powerful artillery shelling, half of the buildings in Sevastopol were destroyed. The capture of Sevastopol had.

Epilogue

Even before the city was completely captured, Manstein received the rank of field marshal for his victory, and a vacation in Romania. As soon as he left, For the next two years, Germany held the city, and the killings continued under the control of SS Gruppenführer Alvenslieben.