Weiss' plan of operation. "white plan" - the first experience of blitzkrieg. Diplomatic cover, disinformation measures

The main method of war of the Third Reich, due to lack of resources and the fact that Germany began to form its military power relatively recently, due to the prohibitions of the Versailles Treaty, until 1933, its capabilities were limited, was the "blitzkrieg".

The Wehrmacht tried to crush the main enemy forces with the first strike, by achieving the maximum concentration of forces in the main directions of attack. On April 3, 1939, the original plan for the war with Poland, the Weiss plan - the White Plan, developed by the headquarters of the German Armed Forces, was sent to the commander of the ground forces, air force and navy. By May 1, the commanders had to give their opinion regarding the war with Poland. The date of the attack on the Polyakov was also named - September 1, 1939. By April 11, the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) developed the "Directive on the unified preparation of the Armed Forces for the war for 1939-1940", it was signed by Adolf Hitler.

The basis of the White Plan was the "blitzkrieg" plan - the Polish armed forces intended to dismember, surround and destroy with swift deep blows. Armored units and the Luftwaffe were to play a big role in this. The main blows were to be delivered by the Army Group "North" from Pomerania and East Prussia and "South" from the territory of Moravia and Silesia, they were supposed to defeat the main forces of the Polish army west of the Vistula and Narew rivers. The German Navy was supposed to block the Polish bases from the sea, destroy the Polish Navy, and support the ground forces.

The defeat and capture of Poland was planned not only to solve the problem of Danzig and connect the territories of the two parts of the Reich (East Prussia was an enclave), but also as a stage in the struggle for world domination, the most important step in the implementation of the "Eastern program" of the Nazis, the expansion of "living space" Germans. So, on May 23, 1939, at a meeting with the military, Hitler said: “Danzig is by no means the object because of which everything is being done. For us, it is about expanding living space in the East and providing food, as well as solving the Baltic problem.” That is, there was no talk only about the defeat of Poland and the solution of the Danzig problem, there was no “Polish corridor”, from the very beginning they planned to deprive Poland of statehood, they were waiting for a policy of genocide and plunder of resources in favor of Germany.

In addition, the territory of Poland was to become an important springboard for an attack on the Soviet Union. The defeat of Poland was to be the first step in preparing an attack on France.

Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Walter Brauchitsch.

Hitler and Brauchitsch at the parade on October 5, 1939.

The capture of Czechoslovakia and Memel by Germany sharply complicated the military-strategic position of Poland, the Wehrmacht got the opportunity to strike from the north and south. With the capture of Czechoslovakia, the Wehrmacht and its capabilities strengthened, capturing a powerful Czech industry and a lot of equipment.

The main problem for the military-political leadership of Germany was the need to avoid a war on two fronts - an attack by the French army from the west, with the assistance of England. In Berlin, it was believed that Paris and London would continue to adhere to the course of "appeasement", the Munich course. So, the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Halder, wrote in his diary that Hitler was sure that England would threaten, stop trade for a while, maybe recall the ambassador, but would not enter the war. General K. Tippelskirch confirms this: “Despite the existing Franco-Polish alliance and the guarantees that England gave Poland at the end of March ... Hitler hoped that he managed to limit himself to a military conflict with Poland alone.” Guderian: "Hitler and his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop were inclined to believe that the Western powers would not dare to start a war against Germany and therefore they had a free hand to carry out their goals in Eastern Europe."

In principle, Hitler was right, Paris and London "saved face" by declaring war on Germany, but in reality they did nothing to help Poland - the so-called "strange war". And the opportunity was left to settle the bloodless "war" between Germany and France, England.

Hitler also played on the anti-Soviet sentiments of the elite of France and England, presenting the attack on Poland as a preparation for a strike against the Union, hiding his next stage on the path to dominance in Europe - the defeat of France. In addition, a quick, lightning-fast defeat of Poland was supposed to prevent the Anglo-French forces from actually being drawn into the war with Germany. Therefore, to cover the western border of Germany, a minimum of forces and means was allocated, without tanks. Only 32 divisions were deployed there, with 800 aircraft - Army Group "C", of which only 12 divisions were fully equipped, the rest were sharply inferior in their combat capabilities. They could only be used for positional warfare, and then only in secondary areas. These divisions were supposed to keep the defense on the border with a length of about 1390 km, with Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, the fortified line "Siegfried" was still under construction and could not be a reliable support.

By the beginning of the war in Poland, France alone had 78 divisions on the eastern border, more than 17 thousand guns and mortars, about 2 thousand tanks (excluding light armored vehicles), 1400 first-line aircraft and 1600 aircraft in reserve. In the very first days, this grouping could be significantly strengthened. Plus the support of the Navy and the British Air Force.

The German generals were aware of this and were very nervous, as Manstein wrote: “The risk taken by the German command was very large ... there is no doubt that the French army from the very first day of the war was many times superior to the German forces operating on the Western Front” .

German soldiers on the border of Poland.

The task of crushing the defeat of the Polish army, the maximum concentration of forces and means

The task of the total defeat and destruction of the Polish troops was finally formulated by A. Hitler at a meeting with the highest generals on August 22, 1939: “Goal: Destruction of Poland, elimination of its manpower. This is not about reaching some line or a new border, but about destroying the enemy, which should be steadily strived for by any means ... The winner is never judged and never asked ... ". The Directive on the plan of attack on Poland by the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Colonel General Brauchitsch, begins with these words: "The purpose of the operation is the destruction of the Polish Armed Forces."

To do this, the Wehrmacht concentrated its forces and means against Poland as much as possible: all the most trained divisions, all tanks, the 1st and 4th air fleets were directed against it. By September 1, 1939, 54 divisions were concentrated in full combat readiness (a few more were in reserve - a total of 62 divisions were put up against the Poles): in the North Army Group, 3 and 4 armies, in the South Army Group, 8, 10 , 14th Army. The total number of invasion forces totaled 1.6 million people, 6 thousand. artillery pieces, 2,000 aircraft and 2,800 tanks. In addition, the Polish command made it easier for the Wehrmacht by dispersing its forces along the entire border, trying to cover the entire border, instead of trying to tightly close the main directions of possible strikes, concentrating on them the maximum possible number of forces and means.

Gerd von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group South, had: 21 infantry divisions, 4 tank, 2 motorized, 4 light, 3 mountain rifle divisions; there are 9 more divisions in reserve, more than 1000 tanks. The commander of Army Group North, Theodor von Bock, had 14 infantry divisions, 2 tank, 2 motorized, 1 cavalry brigade, 2 divisions in reserve. Both army groups attacked in a general direction towards Warsaw, towards the Vistula, at Army Group South the 10th Army advanced on Warsaw, the weaker 8th and 14th supported it with offensive actions. In the center, the Wehrmacht concentrated relatively small forces, they had to distract the enemy, misleading him about the main directions of attack.

Gerd von Rundstedt, led Army Group South.

As a result, the Wehrmacht managed to concentrate overwhelming superiority on the directions of the main attacks: 8-fold in tanks, 4-fold in field artillery, 7-fold in anti-tank artillery. In addition, measures were successfully taken to camouflage large forces, including mechanized ones.

The maximum rate of advance of tank and motorized divisions was planned, they were assigned not to be distracted by the final destruction of the defeated Polish units, assigning this task, as well as covering the flanks and rear to the infantry divisions. They were supposed to prevent the Polish command from carrying out measures to mobilize, concentrate, regroup troops, and capture the most important economic regions intact. On August 14, Hitler set the task of defeating Poland as soon as possible - 8-14 days, after which the main forces were to be released for possible actions on other fronts. On August 22, Hitler declared: “A quick outcome of hostilities is necessary ... The main thing is speed. Persecution to the point of total annihilation."

An important role in disrupting the enemy’s mobilization measures was assigned to aviation, it was supposed to strike at Polish mobilization centers, disrupt traffic on the railways, along the highway, and prevent the Poles from concentrating the grouping of forces in the offensive zone of the 10 Army, in Western Galicia, west of the Vistula ; disrupt the organization of defense measures in the offensive zone of Army Group North at the Vistula-Drevenz line and on the Narew.

Destruction of the enemy by envelopment and encirclement: The White Plan was based on the idea of ​​deep encirclement, encirclement, and destruction of the main forces of the Polish armed forces west of the Vistula and Narew rivers. This plan was brought to life by a successful strategic position - the ability to deploy troops on the territory of the former Czechoslovakia. By the way, Slovakia also allocated a couple of divisions for the war with Poland. The Poles angered them so much with their territorial claims.

As a result, the Wehrmacht attacked with two flank groups that were far from each other, almost completely abandoning major operations in the center.

Theodor von Bock, commander of Army Group North.

Diplomatic cover, disinformation measures

In order to be able to strike as suddenly as possible, Berlin hid its intentions even from its allies, Rome and Tokyo. At the same time, secret negotiations were held with England, France, Poland, declarations of commitment to the idea of ​​peace were proclaimed, even the party congress scheduled for September was called the “peace congress”.

To intimidate the French to keep them from entering the war, Hitler defiantly visited the "Siegfried Line" at the end of July, although the command and Hitler knew that she was not ready to raise a fuss on the radio in the media, about her complete readiness and "impregnability". Even the photos of the "new" defensive structures were still old fortifications - until 1933. Rumors spread about the concentration of large forces in the West. As a result, in Warsaw they “pecked” and believed that if the war did start, the main forces of Germany would fight in the West, there would be auxiliary forces against it, and that they would even be able to carry out an offensive operation against East Prussia themselves.

Putting pressure on Warsaw over Danzig and the construction of a railway and a highway in the "Polish corridor", Berlin at the same time spoke about the general direction of the struggle - against the USSR, about a possible joint campaign to the East, the Poles were promised Ukraine and access to the Black Sea. Depriving Poland in this way of the only opportunity to survive, it will agree to the help of the USSR, which it has repeatedly offered, until the conclusion of a pact with Germany.

On the border with Poland, the construction of defensive structures was launched, lulling the vigilance of the Poles. This was one of the largest and most costly measures to mislead Poland. Since the spring of 1939, the so-called "Eastern Wall" was being built and the pace of construction was quite high, entire divisions of the Wehrmacht participated in the construction. At the same time, the construction also explained the high concentration of Wehrmacht forces on the border with Poland. The transfer of additional units to East Prussia was disguised by preparations for the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the victory over the Russian army near Tannenberg in August 1914.

Polish prisoners of war in a temporary German camp in Poland, September 1939.

Even covert mobilization began only on August 25, it was considered that there would be enough available forces and therefore the full deployment of all forces could be neglected. Therefore, we decided to temporarily refrain from creating a reserve army. Territorial divisions of the Landwehr. The deployment of aviation was planned only on the very first day of the war.

As a result, even before the official mobilization, Berlin was able to transfer and deploy for the invasion 35% of the wartime ground forces, 85% of armored, 100% of motorized and light divisions, only 63% of the forces allocated for the war with Poland. In the first operations against Poland, 100% of motorized and 86% of tank forces and only 80% of the forces planned for the entire military campaign against Poland were able to participate. This made it possible to carry out the first strike with all the might of the main forces, while by September 1 the Poles had completed only 60% of the mobilization plan, deploying 70% of the troops.

Campground of German troops in front of the border with Poland shortly before the German invasion. Shooting time: 08/31/1939-09/01/1939.

German dive bombers Junkers Ju-87 (Ju-87) in the skies of Poland, September 1939.

Outcome

In general, the plan was carried out, but the reasons for this were not only that the Wehrmacht was magnificent, there are other fundamental reasons: the weakness of Poland itself. The Polish elite completely failed the pre-war stage, both politically and diplomatically and militarily. They did not seek an alliance with the USSR, they finally became its enemy, they did not make concessions on the issue of Danzig and the construction of a highway and a railway to East Prussia - although there was a possibility that Berlin would limit itself to this and, as a result, Poland would, as it wanted, become a satellite of Germany , in the war with the USSR. They chose the wrong defense strategy - dispersing forces along the entire border, before the war they did not pay enough attention to aviation, air defense systems, and anti-tank artillery.

The Polish military-political leadership behaved disgustingly, not using all the possibilities for the struggle, they abandoned their people and the army, when they were still fighting, fled, thus finally breaking the will to resist.

Berlin was lucky that people not like de Gaulle were sitting in Paris, a blow from the French army would have put Germany on the brink of disaster, the way to Berlin was actually open. It would be necessary to urgently transfer forces to the West, stopping the offensive of the French army, the Poles would continue to resist. Hitler would have received a real war on two fronts, a protracted one, for which Germany was not ready, she would have had to look for a way out in diplomacy.

German soldiers inspect an abandoned single-turret Polish Vickers tank; it is distinguished from the usual one by a large air intake casing with a grill

Polish 7TP tanks, captured by the Germans, pass by the main stands at the parade on the occasion of the first anniversary of the surrender of Polish troops on October 6, 1940. The high stands are attended by Governor Hans Frank and Field Marshal Wilhelm List. Shooting time: 10/06/1940. Location: Warsaw, Poland.

The German army marches through the captured Warsaw, the capital of Poland.

Sources:
Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. 1937-1939. In 2 vols. M., 1981.
Kurt von Tippelskirch. Second World War. Blitzkrieg. M., 2011.
Manstein E. Lost victories. Memoirs of a Field Marshal. M., 2007.
Solovyov B.G. Surprise of an attack is a weapon of aggression. M., 2002.
http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/index.html
http://militera.lib.ru/h/tippelskirch/index.html
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/guderian/index.html
http://waralbum.ru/category/war/east/poland_1939/

PLAN "VICE"

On March 21, 1939, a few days after the capture of Prague, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, on behalf of Hitler, proposed to Lipsky, the Polish ambassador in Berlin, that the problem of the Danzig Corridor be solved by concluding a German-Polish agreement. According to this agreement, Danzig was to be returned to Germany, which also received rail and road transport routes connecting it with East Prussia, and thus finally recognized the corridor and the Polish western border. Hitler had already made similar proposals in October 1938 and again in January 1939, but the Polish government shied away from serious discussion. Poland's response to the new manifestation of the German initiative was a memorandum, which on March 26 the German ambassador presented to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was a refusal to provide transport routes through the corridor. They also expressed readiness to discuss with the German government the possibility of simplifying through travel for German citizens. Poland did not agree to hand over Danzig, but offered joint Polish-German guarantees of a free city. The ambassador added that he was uncomfortable, but he should point out that any further aspirations by the German government to get Danzig would mean war with Poland. Already three days earlier, measures were taken in Poland to partially mobilize and draw troops on the border with Danzig. In a conversation with the German ambassador in Warsaw on March 29, Polish Foreign Minister Beck justified these measures by saying that, after the incidents in Czechoslovakia and Memel, the increasing demands for the return of Danzig are perceived by the Polish side as a wake-up call. He explained that if Germany tried to unilaterally change the statute of a free city, it would be a "casus belli" for Poland.

These events were the last reason for the fact that Hitler once again began to plan a war with Poland. At the end of March, the head of the OKW, Colonel General Keitel, notified the head of the country's defense department, Colonel Warlimont, that the Fuhrer had instructed the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces of the Wehrmacht to prepare for military clashes with Poland by the end of August, which seemed inevitable. The Polish firm stand against all German attempts to peacefully solve the problem of the Danzig Corridor, and the mobilization activities carried out in Poland, forced Hitler to take such measures. For the High Command of each of the constituent parts of the Wehrmacht, the High Command of the Wehrmacht was to draw up a short directive in which it was necessary to set out the main of the military orders that the Führer had already issued.

As a result, the "Directive on the unified preparation of the armed forces for war for 1939-40" was issued. In its parts I and III, provisions were made for securing the borders of the German Reich and capturing Danzig. And the second part was devoted to the Weiss plan, as the plan of attack on Poland was conventionally called. I and III parts were sent on April 11, and II was transferred to Wehrmacht units on the 3rd of the same month. The most significant parts of this directive have already been published. Here it will suffice to reproduce the most important moments of Part II. It says that the current position of Poland requires, in addition to ensuring the protection of the eastern border, military preparations in order to eliminate all possible threats from the Polish side in the future. The attitude of the Germans towards Poland continued to be determined by the fundamental principle - to avoid any clashes. However, as soon as Poland takes a position threatening the Reich, and, despite the non-aggression pact of January 26, 1934, retaliatory actions will follow. Their goal will be the destruction of the Polish defense power and the creation in the east of the situation necessary for the defense of the country. At the latest, with the outbreak of conflict, the Free City of Danzig will be declared German territory. The political leadership considers it their task under such circumstances to isolate Poland, that is, to limit hostilities only to Poland. And because of the unfavorable situation in France and, accordingly, the passivity of England, a similar situation may occur in the very near future.

The military orders of the directive were limited to a few sentences. It said that in order to destroy the Polish armed forces, it was necessary to prepare for a surprise attack, during which one could enter the southern flank of Slovak territory. And on the northern wing, it is necessary to establish a reunification between Pomerania and East Prussia as soon as possible. Concealed or open mobilization is allowed only on the eve of the offensive at the latest possible date. It was necessary to prepare for the start of the operation in such a way that the formations already available could be used without waiting for the planned deployment of mobilized formations. And it would depend on the political situation whether all the forces necessary to secure the borders in the west would be deployed, or some part of them would remain free and could be used for other purposes.

The development of the Weiss plan was aimed at ensuring that it could be carried out at any time from September 1, 1939. For this, the Wehrmacht High Command was instructed to draw up a planned table of interaction and agree on a time frame between the activities of its three components. The latter had to report their plans by May 1 and provide data for compiling an interaction table.

According to the text of this directive, it is not yet clear whether Hitler already decided at the end of March not to take into account all other possibilities for a war with Poland. And the fact that the offensive actually began on the previously appointed day - September 1, 1939, does not prove anything, since the time frame, of course, depended on His Majesty the case, which was shown by the events in the last days of August. Hitler's true intentions became clear from his speech, which he delivered on May 23 to the commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht armed forces and the chiefs of the General Staff of the army and the Luftwaffe in the imperial chancellery in Berlin during a discussion of the situation. At the same time, he bluntly stated that in the conflict with Poland, it would not be about Danzig, but about expanding living space in the east and providing food for the German people during the struggle with the Western powers. Poland was already on the side of Germany's enemies, so there was no question of sparing her. The first opportunity that arises must be used to attack Poland. The most important is the isolation of Poland. Matters must not come to a simultaneous clash with the Western powers. And if there is no firm conviction that the latter will remain on the sidelines in a conflict with Poland, then it is better to attack the Western powers and thereby deal with Poland.

Then Hitler began to talk about the measures that would need to be taken in the event of the intervention of England and France in the war with Poland. However, in fact, then he believed in such a possibility as little as then. And this despite the fact that the British Prime Minister Chamberlain on March 31 announced in the House of Commons that the British government considers it its duty, in the event of a threat to Polish independence, to provide Poland with any possible assistance. And although a few days later an agreement was reached between the British Government and the London-based Polish Foreign Minister to replace this temporary British promise to the Polish side with a long-term mutual agreement, Hitler considered it unlikely that England would risk the emergence of Danzig and the corridor new world war. He was inclined to believe that such behavior of the British government was dictated by the desire to maintain its prestige in the world and, with the help of grandiose deception, to keep Germany from further pursuit of foreign policy goals.

In the summer of 1939, according to this view, Hitler made almost no preparations for war with the Western powers. He limited himself to the most necessary measures of defense, and before the public, using all propaganda methods, emphasized the impregnability of the Western Wall, whose construction was still far from complete. Wehrmacht preparations for the campaign against Poland began in April. It cannot be described in detail due to lack of data. With regard to the land army, the training primarily consisted in the early call-up of reservists and senior rank and file for spring exercises, the creation of training units (second and third wave divisions) and the formation of 14 new divisions, the order for which Hitler gave personally (fourth wave). Thus, in the event of war, the land army grew by 102 divisions. Further, at the suggestion of the main command of the ground forces, during the summer a certain number of divisions were to go to the German-Polish border for trench work. Preparations for the first big autumn maneuvers of tank formations near the Polish border, timed to coincide with the 25th anniversary of the Battle of Tannenberg, were also only a camouflage for events related to the real deployment of troops against Poland. The plan of operation drawn up by the General Staff of the Army was changed, as will be explained later, at the initiative of Hitler, and was re-tested during a tour of the General Staff, which took place in the height of summer, under the leadership of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General of Artillery Halder. Further preparations by the Wehrmacht took place according to the “planned table of interaction for the Weiss plan”, compiled by the Wehrmacht High Command on the basis of data provided by the branches of the Wehrmacht armed forces in July.

By the beginning of August, relations between Germany and Poland had noticeably deteriorated. On August 4, the Polish government sent a harsh ultimatum to the Danzig Senate for allegedly deliberately preventing Polish customs inspectors from performing their duties. On the 9th, the German government urged Poland not to repeat such steps. The following day, the Polish government replied that further intervention by the Reich in relations between Poland and Danzig would be considered acts of aggression.

The seriousness of the situation revealed in this exchange of notes compelled the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, to travel to Salzburg on 11 August to meet with the German Foreign Minister. He spent the next two days at the Berghof in lengthy conversations with Hitler, who explained in detail the military-political position of Germany, according to which Poland would in any case, in a big conflict, be on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy and that at the moment its quick liquidation could be beneficial. because of the inevitable skirmish with the Western powers. Ciano remarked to this that, according to the Italian point of view, the conflict with Poland would not be limited to this country, but would develop into a European war. Hitler replied that they disagreed on this point. Personally, he was firmly convinced that the Western powers would eventually be frightened of the outbreak of a new world war. Ciano doubted this, he believed that in any case a general war should be taken into account, and explained that Italy was not yet ready for such a thing. Therefore, the Duce would have welcomed the postponement of the conflict for as long as possible. He proposed to reaffirm the will to peace of Italy and Germany by means of a joint communiqué and cherished the idea of ​​an international conference. Hitler categorically rejected this proposal and expressed his determination to act as quickly as possible at the next provocation of Poland and, in any case, determine its political position. When Ciano asked how long the Polish government should give an answer regarding its political position, Hitler replied that at the latest - at the end of August, since hostilities against Poland should be completed by early October due to weather conditions.

The next day, August 14, Hitler spoke in the same vein to the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, who arrived at the Berghof in order to report on the state of affairs. After a detailed description of the political situation and an assessment of the military strength of the Western powers, he again expressed confidence that England would interfere quite noisily in the German-Polish conflict, probably break diplomatic relations with Germany and completely stop trade with it, but would not use weapons. Of course, all this will happen only if the Wehrmacht achieves decisive success in Poland in the very near future. In 8-14 days the world will have to understand that Poland is on the verge of destruction. Naturally, the operations themselves can take longer. Nothing changes with regard to the deployment of troops in the east; in the west, everything must also be carried out systematically. However, all these will be events according to the planned interaction table. And the pre-announcement on the state railway is probably due on the 15th. And so it happened, on the same day the state congress of the party was silently canceled.

During this discussion, Hitler mentioned that negotiations for a trade treaty with the Soviet Union, which had begun in early July, had led to shaky political contact. He was going to send one prominent person to Moscow for personal negotiations. After the publication of records of these events, it seemed that the impetus for closer German-Russian relations came from the Soviet side. However, in the political conversation that followed, and later during the negotiations, it became clear that it was Hitler who was the driving force. In an effort to isolate Poland, he tried to win Stalin over to his side with a precautionary courtesy and to counteract the political-military negotiations with the Western powers in Moscow, the purpose of which was to attract the Soviet Union to participate in providing guarantees to the cities threatened by Germany. Willingly agreeing to the Russian desire after the conclusion of the non-aggression pact to strengthen German influence on Japan and create a common declaration about the Baltic countries, in relation to which the Soviet government wanted to have complete freedom of action, he overcame the initial distrust of the Soviet statesman and quickly came to an agreement with him. The day after the German-Soviet trade agreement was signed on August 19, Hitler asked Stalin in a personal message to receive the Reich Foreign Minister on August 22 or 23 at the latest. Stalin expressed his readiness. After that, on the 21st, the German Information Bureau and the Soviet News Agency reported that the Reich Foreign Minister would arrive in Moscow to conclude a non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. Ribbentrop arrived on the morning of the 23rd, and in the afternoon he had lengthy conversations with Stalin, as well as with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, during which some of the remaining questions were quickly resolved. On the night of August 24 at 2:00 CET, a non-aggression pact and a secret protocol were signed. According to the latter, in the case of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and the Polish state, the northern border of Lithuania is simultaneously the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR. The border between the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR will also approximately run along the line of the rivers Pissa, Nareva, Vistula and San. On the Soviet side, the interest of the USSR in Bessarabia is also emphasized. The German side declares its complete political disinterest in this area. The question whether the preservation of an independent Polish state is desirable in mutual interests, and what the boundaries of this state will be, can only be definitively clarified in the course of further political development. In any case, both governments will resolve this issue by mutual agreement.

There is no doubt that with his great foreign policy success, Hitler reinforced his intention to resort to a military solution to the German-Polish conflict. He considered it practically impossible for the Western powers to actively intervene on the side of Poland. This was clearly manifested in his speech, which he delivered after the announcement of both news agencies about the conclusion of the contract. This happened on Tuesday, August 22, at noon in the great hall of the Berghof. The commanders-in-chief of the three types of troops of the Wehrmacht, the heads of staffs and the heads of departments of the High Command of the Wehrmacht were present.

Hitler, in his speech, which lasted for many hours and was interrupted only by a short break for lunch, declared that it had been clear to him for a long time that sooner or later things must come to a collision with Poland. He made the decision to act back in the spring after Poland sharply rejected the German proposal to resolve the issue of the Danzig Corridor. Yes, and the following weighty reasons speak in favor of the fact that it is impossible to postpone the military clash that has become inevitable until another, possibly even more unfavorable moment.

1. Success largely depends on him. No other German statesman enjoys the confidence of the German people as he does. He has such great authority as no other person in Germany possessed. Its existence is a factor of great significance. However, at any moment it can be destroyed by some criminal. The second personal factor is the Duce, whose strong personality is the only guarantee of allied loyalty to Italy. The royal court cannot be relied upon, since the court is basically against Mussolini, and in the expansion of his empire, he sees only a burden for himself. Benevolent neutrality can be expected from Spain, but only as long as Franco is in charge, which guarantees a certain stability of the current system.

2. On the part of the enemy, as far as outstanding personalities are concerned, the picture was negative. Chamberlain and Daladier are unlikely to dare to go to war. For them, making such a decision is much more difficult than for the Germans, since they will risk a lot, and they can win quite a bit. Germany has nothing to lose. Its economic situation is such that it can only last a few years. Field Marshal Goering can attest to this.

3. The political situation is also favorable for Germany. The situation in the Mediterranean has been tense ever since the Abyssinian war. In the Middle East, the events in Palestine have also given rise to a situation that causes alarm throughout the Muslim world. In East Asia, the Sino-Japanese conflict binds the Anglo-Saxon forces. However, the consequences of the world war are becoming more and more noticeable, both for England and for France. Ireland has almost completely seceded from the British Empire, South Africa is striving for greater independence, India is causing more and more trouble every year. The UK is in grave danger. As for France, she is now in decline due to the stalled development of her popular spirit, and problems with corruption in her domestic politics only increase this weakness. Thus, in the Mediterranean, the threat comes only from Italy. In the Balkans, since the capture of Albania, which took place on Easter 1939, a balance of power has been established. Yugoslavia can be considered a devoted friend of Germany, but it is weak and bears the germ of disintegration, due to its internal political relations and foreign political vulnerability. Romania is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Turkey is ruled by weak leaders, so one should not expect energetic policies from it. So at the moment the general situation for Germany is developing quite favorably, but it is doubtful that in two or three years these circumstances will continue.

4. In the end, it is extremely important to test the new German Wehrmacht in a limited conflict before it comes to the final settlement of accounts with the victorious powers of the world war. This test of the Wehrmacht will be of great importance both for himself and for his position in public opinion.

It was hard for him to decide on the former policy of mutual understanding with Poland, which had been carried out since 1934. The acceptance of the proposals that Hitler made to the Polish government for the final settlement of the question of the Danzig Corridor, as well as for determining future German-Polish relations, was probably hindered by England. To this, Poland responded with a partial mobilization and concentration of troops near Danzig, which led to tensions that eventually became unbearable. The enemy must not be allowed to unleash the inevitable armed conflict if there is no desire to transfer the initiative to the wrong hands. England is trying with all her might to come to a dubious compromise requiring certain obligations for Germany, and to speak again in the language of Versailles, but she will not succumb, because the moment is most favorable for isolating Poland and final action.

Although military action against Poland is a risk, it must be taken with iron determination. However, both last autumn and this spring, he is absolutely sure that the risk will justify itself, since both England and France have committed themselves to helping Poland, but neither is able to fulfill it. And the Anglo-Polish negotiations have not yet led to the conclusion of an agreement. It seemed impossible to him that a British statesman would take the risk of participating in a war in such a difficult world situation. However, this time England will try to avoid the mistakes made in the spring of 1938, which led to an early surrender, and therefore will try to bluff until the last moment. As for France, in view of the low birth rate, she is unlikely to make great sacrifices in a bloody war. Both countries have only two options to help Poland: a blockade of Germany and an attack in the west. The first would be fruitless, as Germany would meet it with territorial gains in the east. The second is unthinkable for psychological reasons and hopeless, because none of the countries would violate the neutrality of Belgium and Holland. An attack by Great Britain and France on Italy is also unlikely. In the worst case, in view of the fact that German production is now much better developed than in 1918, Germany will be able to endure the long war that England will always strive for.

As for the Soviet Union, on which the Western powers were going to place all their hopes in the event of the conquest of Poland, a non-aggression pact will be concluded in Moscow in the near future. The initiative came from Soviet Russia. Hitler himself had been convinced for quite a long time that Russia would never agree to any English proposal. After all, Stalin is not interested in preserving Poland and knows that if it comes to war between Germany and the Soviet Union, his regime will come to an end, no matter whether his soldiers emerge victorious or defeated from the war. Thanks to the German-Russian non-aggression pact, the Western powers have lost all their trump cards, which will have a decisive influence on their future decisions. For Germany, however, the conclusion of this pact means not only an extraordinary economic strengthening, but also a complete turn in its foreign policy. The beginning of the destruction of the hegemony of England. Now that the necessary diplomatic preparations have been made, the way is open for the soldiers.

After a short break for lunch, Hitler continued. According to him, the further course of action of England and France still cannot be predicted with absolute certainty. All the more decisive action is needed. A firm attitude in society is the duty of everyone. This is highly dependent on the example guide. The German people, under the psychological consequences of the greatest crisis in their history, must, through sacrifice and hardship, re-assert their strength. The fight is not machines, but people, psychological factors are crucial. The final victory can be achieved only thanks to the unshakable strength of the spirit, which is shown by the example of Frederick the Great. Such a course of action is fraught with success.

The task of the Wehrmacht is to destroy the Polish armed forces, even if war breaks out in the west. This is not about reaching a certain line, but about the destruction of all the living forces of the enemy. At the same time, you do not need to save the material part and save ammunition. Hitler was going to give a pretext for unleashing the conflict with the help of propaganda. Credibility doesn't matter. It's not about truth, it's about victory. Therefore, there should be no pity, no manifestations of human feelings. The German people cannot live in the current territory, and he has pledged to provide them with more living space. 80 million people must receive what they are entitled to, their existence must be ensured.

The speed in achieving the result is of great importance during the operation. Both offensive wedges must quickly break through to the Vistula and Narew. Management must quickly adapt to the new environment. New Polish formations must be broken up quickly. The enemy must be hit with merciless attacks by the Luftwaffe. German technical superiority should be great to get on the nerves of the Poles. He has high hopes for the German soldiers, his faith in their courage and ability is unshakable.

After the defeat of Poland, he will establish a new eastern frontier, which, however, will be different from the line that the army must reach. He thinks about increasing the territory of the state with the help of neutral countries or a protectorate over Poland.

Hitler ended his speech by saying that he firmly believed that the new German Wehrmacht was up to the mark and that he would announce the start date for the operation later, probably on Saturday morning. However, before lunch the next day, it was announced that the offensive was scheduled for August 26 at 4.30.

Meanwhile, on August 22, the British government officially announced that the information about the forthcoming conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union was taken into account, and immediately decided that such an event in no way affected its obligations towards Poland. At the same time, Chamberlain sent a personal letter to Hitler in which, referring to the mobilization measures already taken and in preparation, he emphasized the determination of Great Britain to support Poland, but also expressed his readiness to participate in direct German-Polish negotiations and, as soon as a peaceful atmosphere was achieved, to discuss problems relating to Germany and England. Late in the evening of August 23, Hitler delivered a reply letter from the Berghof to the British Ambassador, Nevil Henderson. In it, he argued that England's behavior destroyed Poland's desire to negotiate with Germany and encouraged the Polish government to launch a wave of terrorist attacks against German ethnic groups in Poland and economically "strangle" Danzig. It also stated that the German government would not allow itself to be distracted by recent British statements from the Reich's interests with respect to Poland, and that further British mobilization measures would entail the immediate mobilization of the German Wehrmacht.

The next day, Hitler returned from the Berghof and the Minister of Foreign Affairs from Moscow to the capital of the Reich. Although after Chamberlain's letter there was no longer any doubt about how England would behave in the event of an attack on Poland, on August 24, in the House of Commons and the House of Lords, the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax once again recognized their responsibility to Poland. Both houses of the British government on the same day passed the Emergency Powers Act, according to which the government was authorized to take without delay all the measures required, depending on the gravity of the situation. And even then it still seemed that Hitler still believed that Britain would not side with Poland because of the risk of war. Solely to make it easier for the British Government to back out of this commitment, Hitler decided to make a final offer to England. He invited the British ambassador to come to the Imperial Chancellery on August 25 at 13.30 and told him that under any circumstances he decided to eliminate the "Macedonian state of affairs" on the eastern border of the Reich and solve the issue of the Danzig corridor. However, after the solution of this problem, he is going to turn to England with an even broader proposal. He expressed his willingness to conclude an agreement that guaranteed the integrity of the British Empire, and to bring the forces of the German Reich into battle if limited colonial claims required it. However, German obligations to Italy should not be affected by this. Hitler also firmly resolved "never again to come into conflict with Russia." He is also ready to agree to a reasonable limitation in armaments and to recognize the western frontiers as inviolable. In the end, he suggested that the British ambassador immediately go to London for an oral report and handed him a short protocol with a record of his words. Sir Nevil Henderson expressed his readiness, but objected that he felt obliged to say that Great Britain would not back down from its promise to Poland and could only come to an agreement with Germany after a peaceful settlement of the German-Polish conflict. The next morning, Henderson left for London on a plane provided to him by the German side.

According to the planning table of the interaction of the Weiss plan, Hitler was to give the order to start the offensive on August 25 in the afternoon, as previously established. However, at 12.00 he clarified with the command of the ground forces until what time the decision could be postponed. He was told that the order, at the latest, should follow at 15.00. Hitler took advantage of this delay, as he initially wanted to wait for the British ambassador to receive reports of his intentions. After a conversation that lasted about an hour, Hitler, despite Henderson's assurances, gave the order at 3:00 p.m. to launch the offensive at 4:30 the next morning. Apparently, he was sure that the British government would heed his previous proposal and finally decide to refuse military assistance to Poland.

At 5 p.m., a spokesman for the information office in London told the Foreign Office press office by phone that a formal British-Polish Mutual Assistance Treaty was being concluded at that very moment. This message caused shock in the imperial office and made Hitler doubt whether he had correctly assessed the course of action of England. In any case, it seemed to him necessary to wait for the reaction of the British Cabinet to his proposal before taking action. So he decided to delay the attack. He ordered the commanders-in-chief of all types of Wehrmacht troops to arrive at his place at 19.00 and ordered that military operations not be launched temporarily and that the movement of troops be immediately stopped. However, the deployments to the east and west and the mobilization activities ordered earlier in the day must continue. August 26 was considered the day of the beginning of mobilization. Around 20.00, the High Command of the Wehrmacht transmitted these orders in writing. At night, the Wehrmacht’s operational leadership was dominated by anxiety whether they would be able to transmit the refutation of the offensive order received so late in time to the units of the operational formations that were on the offensive border. The fact that they succeeded is an amazing achievement of the work of the Wehrmacht administration.

The turbulent course of the next day can here be depicted briefly. On 28 August at 10:30 p.m., Sir Nevil Henderson transmitted the British Government's reply to Hitler's message. This reply included a memorandum in which England expressed her readiness to discuss any agreements after a peaceful solution of the German-Polish conflict and proposed direct negotiations between Germany and Poland to reach an understanding and sign a treaty that would satisfy important Polish interests and give guarantees to other powers. The memorandum went on to say that the Polish government expressed its willingness to accept such negotiations. England assured that she would use all her influence to reach a satisfactory solution.

On 29 August at 6:25 p.m. Hitler delivered his reply to the British ambassador. The note stated that the Reich could no longer tolerate the Polish abuse of power against Danzig and the persecution of the German people in Poland. Hitler questioned whether such disagreements could be resolved through direct negotiations. However, he accepted the British proposal and agreed with the mediation of the British government in organizing the arrival of an empowered Polish representative in Berlin. The German Government, it was said further, expects the arrival of this mediator the next day, but in the meantime it will develop a proposal for resolving the differences, which it considers acceptable. Sir Nevil Henderson was quick to point out that this proposal sounded like an ultimatum. Hitler vehemently denied this and explained that haste was required in view of the danger of killing German citizens in Poland and that on the border, where two armies fully ready for battle were facing each other, things could come to unpleasant incidents.

That same evening, Henderson briefed the Polish ambassador on the German response and added that the Warsaw government should immediately be asked to immediately appoint someone to represent Poland's interests. The next morning at 0400, the British Government informed Berlin that the German response would be carefully examined, but, it was stressed, it was unreasonable to expect a Polish representative to arrive in Berlin within 24 hours. On the afternoon of August 30, the British Prime Minister delivered a personal note to the Führer asking the German government - and he made a similar request to the government of Poland - to take steps to avoid border incidents. At midnight the British Ambassador conveyed to the Reich Foreign Minister his government's expected reply to the German note of 29 August. It said that the British government immediately informed the Polish side of Germany's readiness to take part in direct negotiations with Poland, but considered it impossible to establish a connection between Warsaw and Berlin today. Sir Nevil Henderson verbally added as instructed that his government was not in a position to advise the Polish side to send a representative to Berlin, and suggested that they resort to the usual diplomatic procedure, that is, to hand over the German proposals to the Polish ambassador for transmission to Warsaw. The Reich Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, objected that the English mediation only manifested itself in the fact that in the afternoon a general mobilization was announced in Poland, and the question of the German proposals was no longer relevant, since the representative of Poland did not appear before midnight. However, he wants to read to the ambassador the proposals drawn up by the government of the Reich. He then read to Sir Nevil Henderson a sixteen-point document in German. These were Germany's proposals to settle the issue of the Danzig Corridor and the problem of German national minorities in Poland. It said that Danzig was immediately returned to Germany, the territory of the corridor, with the exception of the Polish port of Gdynia, should independently determine its nationality by voting, which would need to be held no earlier than after twelve months, and until that moment it should be subject to an international commission, which needed to be created immediately. Germany or Poland, after receiving the results of the vote, received extraterritorial routes for communication with Danzig and East Prussia or Gdynia. As for the German-Polish national question, it must be submitted for consideration by an international investigative committee. Ribbentrop categorically declined Sir Nevil Henderson's request to look at the document, as these proposals were said to be out of date.

Despite this, the British government continued to try hard to arrange direct German-Polish negotiations. After further announcements in Warsaw, it informed the Reich government at noon on 31 August that the Polish government would get in touch with it through its representative in Berlin. Indeed, the Polish Ambassador Lipski appeared at the Foreign Office at 6.15 pm, but only to report that his government had carefully considered the possibility of direct negotiations proposed by the British side. However, he must answer in the negative to the question of the Reich Foreign Minister as to whether he is authorized to negotiate the German proposals. On the radio at 21.00, they officially announced the options for resolving the Polish-German conflict proposed by the German government. The Polish side, through a radio message, categorically rejected these proposals as completely unacceptable.

At that time, the decision to fight or to solve the matter by peace had already been taken. The Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces informed the Führer on the afternoon of August 28 that it was no longer possible to control the concentration of his own forces in the immediate vicinity of the German-Polish border in the state in which they were formed on the 25th. It is necessary either to disperse or to move forward, in the current situation it is not possible to stand in one place for a long time. After that, Hitler set a new date for the start of the offensive. It was September 1, but at that time there was still the possibility of a postponement or even cancellation of the offensive. However, he told Colonel General von Brauchitsch that all his efforts were aimed at placing Poland in an unfavorable position in the negotiations. On the afternoon of August 30, all types of Wehrmacht troops were given a preliminary order to prepare for the start of the offensive, which should begin on September 1 at 4.30 in the morning. If, however, in the course of negotiations, as was said later, another delay is required, then it will only be a matter of one day, since after September 2 the attack can be ignored, because then all operations will have to be carried out in late autumn under very unfavorable conditions. weather conditions. After waiting in vain for a Polish representative in Berlin on the 30th, on August 31, at about 4 p.m., Hitler gave the final order to start the attack the next morning. According to the proposal of the commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, the offensive was to begin at 4.45 a.m. German summer time.

The question remains whether Hitler really counted on the fact that Great Britain would remain on the sidelines and a new world war would not be unleashed. Probably yes, and this is evidenced by the depressed mood in the imperial office on the day when England and France announced their entry into the war, and the fact that Hitler refused on August 31 to order the evacuation of the civilian population from the western border zone. It must be borne in mind that the Western Powers, who entered the war for their own prestige, had to behave completely passively. Directive No. 1 for the conduct of war, issued for the Wehrmacht units on August 31, stated: “In the West, responsibility for the conduct of hostilities should be assigned exclusively to England and France. Minor violations of our borders must first be eliminated locally. The neutrality guaranteed by us to Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland must be strictly observed. The German land frontier in the west must not be crossed at any point without my express permission. The same applies to naval operations, as well as other operations at sea, which may be regarded as military operations. For the time being, the Air Force must confine itself in its actions to the air defense of state borders and strive, if possible, not to violate the borders of neutral countries when repulsing attacks, both by individual aircraft and small aviation units.

For the attack on Poland, the main command of the ground forces allocated 52 divisions, which numbered about 1.5 million people. It included 39 active divisions, among them all tank, motorized and light formations, and 13 divisions of the second and third waves. The defense of the western border was entrusted to Army Group C under Colonel-General von Leeb, which commanded Liebmann's 5th Army, Colonel-General von Witzleben's 1st Army and Dolmann's 7th Army. By the beginning of the war, it had 31 divisions at its disposal, among them 12 active, and if necessary, 5 more divisions of the second wave and a little later formed 14 divisions of the fourth wave could join them. It is also necessary to take into account the 58 thousand people mobilized by the imperial service of labor service, and 158 thousand workers of the Organization Todt, who were sent to build the West Wall and who were supposed to help in its defense. In total, it had about 950 thousand people at its disposal.

The main objective of the campaign plan against Poland developed by the General Staff of the Army was to destroy the main forces of the Polish army, presumably located in the bend of the Vistula between Krakow and Bromberg, with the help of an enveloping offensive from the southwest and northwest. To do this, there were two army groups: the southern one under the command of Colonel General von Rundstedt (including 35 divisions from the army reserve) in Upper Silesia and Slovakia and the northern one - Colonel General von Bock (including 17 divisions from the army reserve and 1 cavalry brigade) on the western border of the corridor and in East Prussia. In Army Group South, the movement in the direction of the main attack fell on the shoulders of the 10th Army of Artillery General von Reichenau. With the help of strong tank and motorized forces, the armies were to break through from the territory of Kreuzburg to the Vistula near Warsaw, that is, their task was to move in a northeasterly direction. On the right, they were covered by the 14th Army of Colonel-General List, whose main forces headed from Upper Silesia in an easterly direction, and the remaining units from Slovakia through the Beskydy in the northeast, in order to turn north after the destruction of the enemy forces located in the industrial region of Poland to east of the Vistula. The left flank of the Reichenau army was under the protection of the 8th army of the infantry general Blaskowitz, which, having settled in echelons, was supposed to advance from the territory of Breslau towards Warsaw and at the same time take on the expected side attack from the Polish forces assembled at Poznan and repel the attack.

The High Command of the Ground Forces set the following goal for Army Group North as the first task: the elimination of the corridor and the destruction of the Polish forces defending it. To this end, the 4th Army of General of Artillery von Kluge from the area in the vicinity and north of Schneidemühl acted eastward, and the main forces of the 3rd Army of General of Artillery von Küchler deployed in East Prussia from the southwestern corner of the province moved southwest. After completing this task, both armies were to move towards Warsaw in order to unite with the southern shock wedge there and close the ring around the Polish forces in the bend of the Vistula. However, this distribution of forces did not find the approval of Hitler. He believed that the 4th Army alone was sufficient to eliminate the corridor, and wanted to send only one weak group against the Grudziadz fortress. On the contrary, the main forces of the 3rd Army were to attack the territory east of Warsaw through the Narew and the Bug in order to prevent a new consolidation of the Polish forces behind the Vistula and eliminate this water barrier as early as possible. Thus, the 4th Army was instructed to establish contact with East Prussia, capture the Vistula crossing between Bromberg and Grudziadz and then, together with the group sent from East Prussia to capture Grudziadz, move southeast to unite with the northern wing of Army Group South ". The High Command of the Ground Forces ordered the 3rd Army, for their new extremely important task of striking beyond the Vistula after the opening of the corridor, to use the tank and motorized forces of the Kluge army, which would cut off Warsaw in the east in a timely manner and, together with the mobile units of the 14th Army that had approached Chełm from the south destroy the remnants of the Polish army on the eastern bank of the Vistula.

Plan Weiss was the first German blitzkrieg plan in World War II. And since this plan was the first, it also expressed the distrust of the German staff officers in the abilities of mobile (motorized) formations. In this regard, the role of infantry divisions is quite large, which had to work hard in the Carpathians and East Prussia, as well as near the river. Bzura (Greater Poland). And in general, the Weiss plan, as will be shown below, had many elements taken from the plans and experience of the 1914-1915 campaigns.

The creators of the Weiss Plan aimed at the destruction of the Polish Army, but at the same time the plan was drawn up long before the war, and the Germans could not know what the plan for deploying the enemy army would be. Therefore, the plan directed against the enemy army was in reality directed against the economic and political centers of Poland. The German military leadership believed that the enemy would defend these centers, and therefore be defeated near them. Typical German self-importance and belittling the enemy's abilities ...

The first target in Weiss's plan was the "Polish Corridor" with Danzig and Gdynia. To carry out this task, 15 divisions were assembled: about 5 in East Prussia and 10 to the west of the "half of the corridor". This goal was achievable even in the conditions of the staunch defense of the Poles; therefore it should be recognized as true. In addition, the capture of the "Polish corridor" guaranteed the restoration of communication with East Prussia and dramatically improved Germany's strategic position.

The second (most achievable) goal of the operation was the industrial region of Poland around Lodz. Two armies (about 20 divisions) were allocated to strike in this area, but these armies had to ram the defenses of the strongest enemy grouping. In reality, this was done fairly quickly. But that doesn't mean the decision was right. If the Polish government had not been so weak, a dozen more divisions could have been mobilized in the Lodz region. And if the Polish command had not been so committed to the ideas of French military thought, it would have been able to send five more divisions to this area, which in reality were cut off in the Poznan region, and also to Lodz it would be possible to transfer the mobile reserves of the Polish Army, which in reality were not. How long would the Wehrmacht have to ram this defense, and what kind of sacrifice would it cost?! And now the question is: "The German General Staff was so far-sighted that they foresaw the collapse of the state and the army in Poland? Or did the staff officers consider the enemy much weaker and more stupid than themselves?"

Warsaw was the fourth goal of the plan under consideration, while an attack on it was possible only after achieving goals 1 and 3. In this case, the first grouping attacked from East Prussia from the north, covering Warsaw from the east, and the second attacked with two armies (from the Lodz region and from Czestochowa district), blocking the capital of Poland from the west. At the same time, the German staff officers took the direction of the main attack from the experience of the WWI, when an attack on Warsaw from the north-west was delivered during the Warsaw-Ivangorod operation. This goal was definitely not too close. Lodz has already been mentioned, but the offensive from the north was very difficult. Only the limited resources of V. Prussia could be used for it, since all the bridges across the Vistula in the "Polish corridor" would have been blown up during the retreat of the Polish troops. And at the same time, the units of the Wehrmacht advancing from the north would have to force the Narew and the Bug, take Modlin by storm and defeat the enemy's Modlin grouping. Theoretically, breaking through the line on the Narew, consisting of Modlin and nearby fortifications, was immediately impossible. (The Poles in 1939 were too careless and simply did not put him on alert, believing that the Germans would get bogged down in the “Polish corridor” for a long time ...) And therefore, if the mobilization in Warsaw had succeeded, the attack on the capital of Poland from the north would have been stopped . By the way, here the Germans also used the experience of the First World War. For the first breakthrough through the Narew, the direction Mlava - Prasnysh - Rozhan was used, as during the offensive from the north in July 1915.

And the fifth goal of the plan was to cut off the eastern regions of Poland from the western ones, as the Germans tried to do in 1915. To do this, it was planned to throw the moving units onto the eastern bank of the Bug from East Prussia (remembering the major setback near Osovets, the German staff chose a more western route) and from Lvov (from Eastern Galicia), as was done in July 1915 after the Third Battle of Galicia . If there were enough forces for this number, which is unlikely in the case of a staunch defense of the Poles, then it would be possible to surround the entire army of Poland and gradually finish it off at Warsaw. You look, and the government of Poland would have been captured, and there they would have agreed on surrender.

In general, the plan smacked of a big adventure. And it’s good that the Polish government fled along with the army leadership, that the Polish army did not reach the European level in terms of weapons; that there was no leader in the country capable of rousing the people and shaking up the army; that corny failed to arm the reservists. Somehow I can’t believe that the German headquarters foresaw all this. And if you didn’t predict, then the plan is not bad, but no more ...

And there was nothing brilliant in this regard (for example, in comparison with the campaign plan in France). There was only one difficult-to-predict move in it - a blow to the upper reaches of the Bug, but this operation could be carried out only at the second stage of the war. At the same time, the plan of attack on Warsaw from the north and southwest was read by the Polish command. And the Poles should have foreseen other moves of the Wehrmacht if they had learned the lessons of WWI well. So the execution of the plan depended solely on the brute force of the Wehrmacht and on luck. The Wehrmacht turned out to be stronger than the Polish Army, and Hitler was once again lucky, because his opponent's knees trembled at the right moment. With a competent defense of Poland and active mobilization of the population, Germany could, according to this plan, achieve the occupation of the “Polish corridor” and territories west of the Vistula (possibly also territories west of the San) in a month. However, the Poles would have been able to hold the line San - Vistula - Narew, which threatened disaster for the Wehrmacht, which was not ready for a protracted war on two fronts.

Plan for the German attack on Poland (Plan Weiss)

The position taken by Poland at the present time requires, in addition to the implementation of measures in accordance with the developed plan "Securing the borders in the east", the conduct of military preparations in order, if necessary, to put an end to any threat from it once and for all.

1. Political background and goals.

Germany's position towards Poland continues to be based on the principle: avoid complications. If Poland changes its policy towards Germany, which has hitherto been based on the same principle, and assumes a position that threatens her, then it will be necessary to settle the final scores with her, despite the existing treaty.

The aim would then be to destroy the military power of Poland and create in the East a situation corresponding to the needs of the defense of the country. The Free City of Danzig will be declared German territory immediately after the outbreak of the conflict.

The political leadership considers it their task to isolate Poland as far as possible in this case, that is, to limit the war to military operations with Poland.

The intensification of the internal crisis in France and the resulting restraint of England in the near future could lead to the creation of such a situation.

The intervention of Russia, if she were capable of it, in all probability, would not hurt Poland, since this would mean the destruction of her by Bolshevism.

The position of the Limitrophs will be determined solely by German military requirements.

The German side cannot count on Hungary as an unconditional ally. Italy's position is determined by the Berlin-Rome axis.

2. military considerations.

The great goals of the creation of the German armed forces are determined, as before, by the hostile attitude on the part of the Western democracies. The Weiss plan is only a prudent measure to supplement the general preparations, but in no case should it be regarded as a precondition for military action against Western adversaries.

After the outbreak of the war, the isolation of Poland can be carried out to an even greater extent if it is possible to start hostilities with unexpected strong blows and achieve quick successes,

The general situation, however, will in any case also require the adoption of appropriate measures to protect the western borders, the German coast of the North Sea, as well as the airspace above them.

With regard to limitrophe states, especially Lithuania, precautions must be taken in case Polish troops pass through them.

3. Tasks of the armed forces.

The task of the German armed forces is to destroy the Polish armed forces. To do this, it is desirable and necessary to prepare a surprise attack. A secret or open general mobilization will be announced at the latest possible date, on the day preceding the attack.

As regards the use of the armed forces provided for securing the frontiers in the West (see point 1 "Securing the frontiers"), no other orders are to be given for the time being.

The rest of the borders should only be under supervision, and the borders with Lithuania should be protected.

4. Tasks of the branches of the armed forces:

A) Ground troops.

The goal of the operation in the East is to destroy the Polish ground forces.

For this, the Slovak territory can be used on the southern flank. On the northern flank, a link should be quickly established between Pomerania and East Prussia.

Preparations for the start of operations must be carried out in such a way that it would be possible without delay to set out first with available forces, without waiting for the planned deployment of mobilized formations. It is possible to covertly take up initial positions with these forces immediately before the day the offensive begins. I leave this decision to myself.

The political situation will determine the need to concentrate in the respective areas all the forces intended to secure the borders in the west, or to partially use them as a reserve for other purposes.

b) Naval Forces.

In the Baltic Sea, the tasks of the Navy are:

1) Destruction or exclusion from the war of the Polish naval forces.

2) Blockade of sea routes leading to Polish naval strongholds, in particular to Gdynia. At the moment the invasion of Poland begins, a period is set for the ships of neutral states to leave Polish harbors and Danzig. After this period, the navy has the right to take measures to establish a blockade.

Consideration should be given to the negative consequences for the conduct of naval operations, which will be caused by giving the ships of neutral countries a time limit to leave ports.

3) Blockade of Polish maritime trade.

4) Ensuring maritime communications between Germany and East Prussia.

5) Covering German sea communications with Sweden and the Baltic states.

b) Reconnaissance and taking cover measures, if possible covertly, in the event of an intervention by Soviet naval forces from the Gulf of Finland.

For the protection of the coast and the coastal strip of the North Sea, appropriate naval forces should be allocated.

In the southern part of the North Sea and in the Skagerrak, precautions should be taken against the unexpected intervention of Western powers in the conflict. These measures should not overstep the bounds of the bare essentials. They should be done inconspicuously. At the same time, everything that could have an adverse effect on the political position of the Western Powers must be resolutely avoided.

V) Air Force.

A sudden air attack on Poland should be ensured, leaving the necessary forces in the west.

In addition to the destruction of the Polish Air Force in the shortest possible time, the German Air Force must first of all perform the following tasks:

1) Prevent the Polish mobilization and disrupt the planned strategic concentration and deployment of the Polish army.

2) To provide direct support to the ground forces, and above all to the advanced units, from the moment they cross the border.

The possible redeployment of aviation units to East Prussia before the start of the operation must not jeopardize the exercise of surprise.

The first flight of the border should coincide with the start of hostilities of the ground forces.

Raids on the port of Gdynia are allowed only after the expiration of the period given to neutral ships to go to sea (see paragraph 4b).

Create air defense centers in the region of Stettin ((* Szczecin;)), Berlin, in the industrial regions of Upper Silesia, including Moravian Ostrava and Brno.

Print. on Sat.: The USSR in the struggle for peace ... S. 326-329.

Here it is printed according to the book: Year of the Crisis. 1938-1939. Documents and materials in two volumes. Compiled by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1990. Document No. 265.

The electronic version of the document is reprinted from the site http://katynbooks.narod.ru/

Seventy years ago, our country experienced the most terrible and destructive moments of modern history, which forever changed the course of Russia's development and the fate of the Russian people. But for the whole world, the war began a little earlier, in 1939, when the Nazi government decided to treacherously attack Poland without warning. This event is considered the beginning of World War II.

balance of power

In 1939, a very tense international situation developed in Europe: the spirit of war hovered everywhere, but to the end, no one believed in the beginning of direct hostilities on the part of Germany. In addition, the majority of the population of England and France, countries included in the anti-fascist coalition, advocated a peaceful solution to the German conflict.

But the plans of the Wehrmacht never provided for any diplomatic agreements, from the very beginning all German actions were thought out in advance, and peace negotiations and agreements turned out to be a strategic move to divert the attention of rivals.

Nazi plans

Only years later, the public was able to understand how the Second World War began and what caused it, because this event led to a complete reshuffle of forces in Europe and around the world.

With the advent of the Nazis to power, Germany's priorities were aimed at achieving only one goal - the assertion of the German nation over others and sole domination. For several years, the country's economy was actively reviving, the military complex was building up, and the younger generation grew up and was brought up in the spirit of the exclusive mission of the Germans on earth.

background

By 1939, Germany had reached a fairly high level of development, and the next step of the fascist government was the idea of ​​​​expanding "living space" through a military campaign in the east of Europe. Thanks to a skillful and thoughtful policy, Hitler was able to convince the leaders of France and England that he did not intend to launch hostilities in Europe against any country in the near future.

Therefore, the Polish campaign of the Wehrmacht came as a kind of surprise for Chamberlain and the head of France, in Europe, to the last, they hoped for the success of diplomatic negotiations.

official reason

There have always been mutual territorial claims between Germany and Poland, including over some African countries. But the main conflict flared up around the route to the Baltic Sea and the city of Danzig, which the Germans had long tried to claim. Hitler and Ribbentrop several times unsuccessfully persuaded Poland to voluntarily recognize German power, threatening Warsaw with war and subsequent division of the country, as they had just done in Czechoslovakia.

The warnings did not work, Poland refused any cooperation with the Nazis. But this did not at all upset the Nazi environment: in the ruling circles of the Wehrmacht, a new stage of aggressive activity was already developed and ready for implementation - Operation Weiss.

Nazi strategy

Hitler's propaganda actively disseminated information about Poland's guilt in unleashing the conflict, and the fact that Warsaw refused to return the free city of Danzig to Germany was called the reason for the contention.

The Weiss plan provided for the rapid and almost unrequited seizure of the entire territory, the destruction of infrastructure and the establishment of its own regime. For these purposes, it was planned to use aviation, infantry and tank troops, as well as a special unit, the responsibility of which included Polish generals in relation to the goals of the main German forces.

The plan for the German attack on Poland was thought out to the smallest detail: it should surround the main enemy troops from the south and not give him time to mobilize and deploy the main forces. Hitler hoped that England and France would not dare to enter the war, as they were bound by the previously signed peace treaty, but nevertheless provided for the possibility of opening a second front and put the army led by Generals W. Leeb to guard the western borders with France and Belgium and the Netherlands.

The readiness of the parties for war

Given the state of the economy and which Germany / Poland had in 1939, the outcome of the Nazi operation was quite predictable. Hitler's army was significantly superior to the opponent in terms of technical equipment. In addition, the Germans managed to organize a quick and successful mobilization, about which Warsaw knew almost nothing until the end.

The Polish army was significantly inferior in numbers, moreover, from the very beginning, the government decided to deploy all forces along the borders over a rather large territory. Such a wide dispersal weakened the army and made it the most vulnerable to a powerful and massive blow from the opponent.

Reason for attack

From the very beginning, Operation Weiss included several provocative measures designed to provoke aggression on the part of Poland. Hitler announced to his generals that a good reason would soon be given for the start of hostilities, and whether it would be plausible no longer matters, since the winners are not judged.

On August 31, 1939, a group of German saboteurs, posing as Polish activists, broke into the building of the radio station in the city of Gleiwitz, fired several shots and uttered a propaganda text in Polish against Germany. Immediately they shot several people brought with them. Subsequently, it turns out that they were disguised German criminals.

Invasion

In response to the “aggression” from Warsaw, in the early morning of the city, German bombers inflicted several crushing blows on the military infrastructure of Poland, ships joined the attack a little later, and the ground army launched massive offensives along the entire border.

Operation Weiss, the start date of which is also considered the first day of the Second World War, provided for the rapid destruction of the entire aviation complex of Poland, so the first attacks were carried out precisely on the airfields of the country. Already at the beginning of hostilities, the Polish leadership understood the futility of waging war, but there was still hope for the help of the countries of the anti-fascist coalition, so the defense continued.

Course of events

Despite the suddenness of the Nazi attack, the enemy troops put up fierce resistance. Events in Poland in September 1939 unfolded at lightning speed: after the destruction of all the Warsaw Air Force, Hitler allowed tank troops to enter. The opponent was not ready to repel the attack, especially since the flat location contributed to the rapid advance of the Nazis inland.

On September 3, England and France declared war on Germany, and, by agreement with Poland, these countries were to immediately intervene in the hostilities. French military forces even crossed the border, but were almost immediately withdrawn. So the allies of the anti-fascist coalition missed the only moment when their intervention could still stop the advance of the fascists.

Fierce fights

Border battles in Pomerania and Silesia ended in complete defeat and the retreat of the Polish troops. The Weiss plan fully justified itself: within five days of the start of hostilities, the Nazis received a free path to Warsaw. Successful attacks by the SS allowed them to divide the Polish army into several disparate parts that had neither communication with the center nor a single plan for further action.

The fighting continued near Warsaw, the defenders of the city fought valiantly and, despite a significant superiority of forces, held the line for several days. But the German side used a devastating air attack, more than five thousand bombs were dropped, after which the capital surrendered.

Defeat

Operation "Weiss" led to a complete collapse Already by September 17, many of the Polish military units capitulated or were taken prisoner. But the fiercest fighting continued until October. The Polish generals wanted to break through the German defenses and leave for Romania, where it was planned to organize a center of resistance and wait for help from the allies.

The situation was aggravated by the introduction of Soviet troops, at that time Stalin considered the German government to be his ally, in addition, the two countries were bound by a non-aggression pact, so the Soviet army entered the Polish lands under the pretext of resolving the situation in the disintegrating state. The direct participation of the Soviet Union in the Polish-German conflict has not been proven, this time the Kremlin preferred to take a wait-and-see attitude.

Neither England nor France were in a hurry to send their troops, so with the fall of Warsaw, and a little later, other large cities, the independent state of Poland ceased to exist. In the following months, the guerrilla war continued, and some parts of the defeated troops continued to fight in the armies of the countries of the anti-fascist coalition.

The reaction of England and France

In how the Second World War began, and, most importantly, how it continued, there is a large share of the fault of the allied countries - England and France. The Polish operation was the first attempt for the Wehrmacht to seize territory by military means, so Hitler did everything possible to protect himself from opening a second front in the event that European countries entered the war.

A non-aggression pact was concluded with the governments of England and France, and the military elite of Germany believed that even with unfavorable developments, Chamberlain would not dare to intervene. And so it happened: the allied countries were not ready for the Polish operation of Hitler and hesitated for several days with the decision to declare war. Only on September 3, England officially entered the fight against fascism, followed by France, Australia, the African Union and Canada. The United States has remained neutral up to a certain point.

The declaration of war on Germany had little to do with the humanistic desire to help the Polish people: both England and France were seriously concerned about the growing strength of Hitler and feared, first of all, for the integrity of their own countries.

Results

Millions of dead, hundreds of destroyed cities, redrawn borders and spheres of influence - all this brought with it the Second World War. The German attack on Poland was inevitable. With the rise of the Nazis to power, the outbreak of hostilities was only a matter of time. The first experience of a victorious war was very successful, the Nazi state significantly expanded its borders, annexing the city of Lodz, Poznan, Pomeranian, Silesian, Kielce and part of the Warsaw lands.

Other countries also managed to snatch their pieces of victory, the USSR returned Western Ukraine and Belarus, Slovakia - some areas that had previously been ceded to Poland under the Treaty of Versailles, and Lithuania returned the Vilnius Territory.

The Polish campaign of the Wehrmacht, aimed at destroying the independence of this state, dividing the territories and asserting its own authority as a great power, justified itself for all purposes. After the victory, Germany again tried to lull the vigilance of England and France by offering them peace, but the countries responded with a decisive refusal and began a systematic struggle against