Psychological approach to the analysis of the revolution: T.R.Gar. T. Gorr. Why do people rebellious why people rebellious
Ted Robert Garr. (T.R.GURR), Professor of the University of Maryland, one of the most famous representatives of modern theories of violence, received a doctoral degree in New York University in 1965, is one of the world authorities in the field of studying political conflicts and instability. Until 1989, TR. Garr worked in Princeton, University of Colorado and a number of other well-known research centers. The sphere of his research interests is to study threats to political regimes from 1800s to the present; It is the author of a multitude of research and practically-oriented research and prevention projects, is actively engaged in the problems of ethnic and religious minorities. Since 2001 Garr works on the study of risks and warning genocide, terrorism. He is a member of many specialized organizations on this issue, as well as by the author and editor of more than 20 books and monographs, published from the 1960s to 2010.
In his most famous work "Why people rebellious" TR GARR acts as a sociologist theorist and as a sociologist-practitioner; Based on an extensive material about the causes and features of several hundred conflicts, starting from 17 century, he tried to find the general patterns of any revolutionary movement associated with war, terror or the use of violence. The work of T.Grara "Why People Record" is actively used in applied sociology
T.r.gar is engaged in problems of protest behavior, ethnopolitical conflicts, internal political civil wrestling, including civil wars. By the civil wrestling, the author itself refers to the confrontation and collision of large social or ethnic groups that make up a single society. It is an interest in the inner wars and conflicts as a threat to the integrity of public structures. Theoretical, in fact, the study of the TRGGAR is based on a large amount of empirical data, including those obtained during historical and psychological research. By a large number of cross-nation comparisons, T.Gar explores many phenomena - from religious movements and classical uprisings and rebellion to modern partisan wars.
In many positions, his work intersects with the works of Ch. Tilly, in particular, with the work of the latter "from mobilizing to the revolution", which stated that the direct source of the political action is the activity and method of organizing people. However, Ch. Tilly, according to T.Gar, pays little attention to the process of social organization and how resentment and deprivation are transformed into mobilization.
He wonders, is situratively aggression and is it possible to construct a generalized concept of violence (including political) and use it to evaluate the "revolutionary potential" of individual nations and influence that various actions are on this potential.
The basis of its work is a microsolisiological approach, the search for psychological motives of aggressive behavior at the individual level. The author's task includes a search for universal determinants of aggression and violence; Their versatility is due to the fact that "most of the relevant general health theories are dealing with the sources and characteristics of the aggressiveness of all people, regardless of the nature of their culture." The source of aggression and violence is the relative deprivation as a scheme of perception by various social groups of life circumstances, leading to frustrations and dissatisfaction. With a significant discrepancy between the level of need for benefits and the conditions for implementing this need, frustration increases and, as a result, political violence. Relative deprivation may result:
Reduce opportunities against the background of growth of expectations;
Reduction and opportunities against the background of saving expectations;
Growth expectations against the background of permanent opportunities.
Being is well familiar with the works of Ch. Tilly (the theory of political mobilization), toskopol (social and political structures in the course of revolutionary transformations) and S.Tarrow (mass social movements), T.Gar reduces the understanding of protest and rebellion to the analysis of individuals, t .. To three factors:
Discontent and relative deprivation;
Convictions in the justification of protest actions and the benefits of their implementation;
Balance between the ability of dissatisfied act and the ability of the government to regulate their actions.
He believes that his model of political conflicts proposed in another 70s., Relevant in 2000s. When analyzing the manifestations of terrorism, ethnic and economic struggle, etc.
The model includes studies of the following points:
Analysis of relative deprivation;
Motivation of the response to political appeals and opportunities in the light of the relative deprivation experienced individuals;
Group identity and selection of political courses supporting / do not support these identities;
Group mobilization that determines the intensity of distribution of political protest and uprisings;
Methods that communicate power and personal mobility are transformed into a political action; internationalization of protest ideas;
Accounting of the role of legitimacy (violence) of the government, which indicates whether a protest is sent to the government or sewn into other directions;
International influence and pressure.
We are interested in the possibilities of its theory in relation to the sociological analysis of revolutions. It is possible to consider only pre-understanding the explanation of political violence as a key category analysis of the revolution.
T.Gar indicates that "starting from 1945. Attempts to overthrow governments were organized more often than national elections. But sometimes political violence led to the creation of new, more progressive societies. "
He clearly spread the concept of revolution and political violence. Political violence is determined by him as "a number of events, the common property of which is the real or threatened use of power shares," the revolution is defined as a "fundamental social change carried out through violence." Also to violence, they include partisan wars, government coups, rebellion, rebellion.
Violence is carried out in order to search for means of expressing their political interests or confrontation against the unwanted political course. This is mainly about achieving the party or the institution of its political goals within a certain order or outside it.
T.Gar emphasizes that "political violence is currently not a generally accepted category in social analysis," but its study is extremely important, because It is it threatening the political system:
Destroys her monopoly of power;
Violates the normal functioning of political processes.
Interestingly, violence in his understanding is a category that allows homogenize sufficiently different concepts: "Countries experiencing powerful political violence of any type, be it rebellion, terrorism, coup or goerilla, with a greater degree of probability there may be other species, but neither More nor with a smaller probability will not be drawn into a foreign conflict, "at the same time" .. Successions and processes that distinguish the rebellion from the revolution, at a generalized level of analysis are distinguished to the degree, and not types. "
Objects of its research are:
· Collective violence potential,
· Patinity of political violence,
· The magnitude of political violence
· Forms of political violence.
The potential of collective violence is the function of the scale and intensity of discontent separated by members of society: "The potential of political violence is the function of the extent that the political system and its agents are accused of such dissatisfaction."
It indicates that "the sociological theories of the revolution usually show interest in a specific connection between a certain number of prerequisites and the emergence of revolution as such. However, political violence is the phenomenon of omnipresent: a few of the synchronous societies could exist without it long enough, "therefore it is interested in the length of violence and the form of its manifestation, for microanalysis - the likelihood of violence at the time of time.
In sociological and social and historical studies, the attention of T.Grara attracts the ability to measure the intensity of violence; To this end, it is considering the theories of Ch. Tilly, P.Sorokina, but indicates the need to take into account the stiffness of deprivation as a factor, motivating people for long-term / short or intensive / weak violence. The size of political violence (as well as in Sorokina) is determined by T.Garr. With the help of three variables:
Scale;
Intensity (destructiveness);
Duration.
At the same time, it indicates that "various forms of violence are signs that do not form a simple measurement," because society can experience methers, but not revolution; revolution, but not coups; Pulls, but not meal: "Revolutionary manifestations should be assessed" in probabilities. " In this case, the well-known typologies of revolutions and conflicts (Ecstayna, Lassowell) notes.
Close to the traditions of historical sociology, the analysis and typology of Rummel conflicts are presented by T.Gar the most acceptable. The collection of statistics leads it to the conclusion that "the measurement of strong unrest is characterized by a large extent a spontaneous struggle in the form of turbines and demonstrations. This is radically different - and statistically, and essentially, from what can be called a measurement of revolutionality, which is characterized by a more organized and intensive struggle. This measurement of revolutionism has two components that appear as separate measurements:
Internal War (civil wars, partisan wars and some types of coups);
Conspiracy (conspiracy, uprisings and most state coups).
It is inclined to think that they have a certain degree of homogeneity, being united by the basic category of political violence: "The fundamental differences between the riots and revolutions are the differences in the degree of organization and concentration, marked by ecstay in its composite typology. The main differences between the inner war and the conspiracy components in the revolutionary dimension are formed only one of the scales. " General definitions of the forms of political violence T.Gar, borrowed by Ecstayn, are as follows:
Disorder. Relatively spontaneous political violence with the real and significant participation of the population, including political strikes, riots, political clashes and uprisings.
Conspiracy. High-organized political violence with limited participation of the population, including organized terrorist acts of a political nature, small-scale terrorism, small-scale partisan wars, coups and insurrection.
Internal war. High-organized political violence with large-scale participation of the population, intended to overthrow the regime or destruction of the state and accompanied by extensive acts of violence, including large-scale terrorism and partisan wars, civil wars and revolutions.
Thus, T.Gar checks hypotheses about political violence: its sources, forms, greatness, and indicates that "two topics, often considered in various theories of revolution, are addressed here only by passing: direct accelerators of violence long-term consequences of various types of violence." Therefore, it uses two types of variables:
Psychological;
Societal.
From the logic of his work it follows that psychological materials are required to explain to the motivational component and the establishment of causal ties between the societal conditions and political violence (the potential of collective violence and political violence, the likelihood that violence takes the form of riots, conspiracy or internal war). There is a need to show the dynamics of dissatisfaction, the politicization of dissatisfaction, implementing it in a violent action directed against political objects and figures: "The interrelated concepts of dissatisfaction of the deprivation are combined with most of the psychological states, express or expressed unnektyly, such as frustration, alienation, managed and targeted conflicts. , acute necessity and tension. "
Societal variables include:
The duration of cultural and subcultural sanctions on open aggression;
The duration and degree of success of political violence in the past;
Distinctness and prevalence of symbolic appeals justifying violence;
The legitimacy of the political system and the types of responses that it gives to relative deprivation.
Historical experience demonstrates T.Gar intensive focus of acts of political violence on the political system, i.e. It shows that "intensive dissatisfaction will be politicized with a high degree of probability."
The type of coherers and institutional support is influenced to the actualization of a gust to violence in specific socio-political community. If the mode and the power opposing him have approximately equal power of coer-controlling and institutional support, then political violence will be maximally, and it will take the form of an internal war with a high degree of likelihood. Current mode of mode, in fact, determine the form and duration of violence. Certain forms of coherers can contribute to the transformation of riots with large-scale revolutionary movements. Protest movements also use coerciless opportunities for group defense and attacks on the mode. The degree of institutional support for their and regimes is the function of the relative proportion of the number of national organizations that they managed to mobilize, the complexity and cohesion of these organizations and their resources and the extent that they are able to streamline the acquisitions, resolving conflicts and the sewage system of aggression. These mechanisms, as well as their possible temporality, it derives from classical examples of historical sociology, and at the same time indicates that many "Attitudi and Societal conditions that contribute to political violence may be present in a relatively unchanged form for a long period of time, they become relevant Political violence and effective in his genesis only when relative deprivation increases across and increases in intensity. " However, "intensively politicized dissatisfaction can also be large-scale and resistant for a long period, and without an explicit expression, because Corrosive control and institutional support are monopolized by the regime. "
Considering the social origins of revolutions, following the logic of Garra, it is necessary to first identify the tendency towards collective political violence. It in turn is associated with dominant values \u200b\u200bfor which major segments of the population feel their deprivation.
The living conditions of people change, and the adaptation to new conditions is possible either by innovation or the obverse of origins. "Innovative answers may contain an appeal to violence," which refers to activities including those who rebel against their socio-political community. Relative deprivation considers the perception by the actor of discrepancies between its value expenses and value opportunities, and value expenses - as good and living conditions, for which people are convinced, they can qualify with full right: "The value opportunities are benefits and conditions that, by their Opinion, they could get and retain, and values \u200b\u200b- desirable events, objects or conditions to which people seek. "
T.Gar uses a 3-member categorization of values, including:
Welfare values \u200b\u200b(direct contribution to physical well-being or self-realization). These are physical benefits of life and development, and the use of physical and mental capabilities;
The values \u200b\u200bof power (determination of the degree of influence on others and help to avoid interference of others in their own life). These are the values \u200b\u200bof participation in political life in organizing their own security through the use of political funds;
Interpersonal values \u200b\u200b(psychological satisfaction we are looking for in non-monitor interaction with other individuals and groups). These are the values \u200b\u200bof the status, collectivity and ideational communication.
According to T.Gar, this scheme is the most relevant genesis of collective relative deprivation, despite the fact that "the relative position of the individual can be rooted in the conditions of its own past, in an abstract ideal or and standards formulated by the leader or reference group."
T.Gar talks about the three patterns of violation of the equilibrium of the social conditions that contribute to the correlation of the desired and achieved values:
Decreasing deprivation (group value expenses are constant, value possibilities are reduced);
Aspirational deprivation (possibilities are unchanged, expectation increases or intensified);
Progressive deprivation (growth in expectations and reduction of opportunities).
Any of these patterns can act as a factor in political violence.
He notes that most theories include political violence due to decreasing deprivation. As an illustration, he cites the point of view of Aristotle on a revolution, the reasons for whom the undisturbality of the demagogues, forcing the Item class to unite partially "by nominating accusations against specific personalities, in part by excitement among the masses of the oligarchs against them. T.Gar notes that "in democracies there is a threat to the relatively high value position of the oligarchs, and in oligarchs - the low value position of the masses is stable."
With great attention, T.Gar refers to the thesis of P.Sorokina on the meaning of repression in the genesis of revolutions; which lies in the fact that the immediate cause of the revolution is the growth of the repression of "main instincts" in most of the society and the impossibility of satisfying them. Repressible instincts involve the emergence of collective self-preservation mechanisms, etc. Approximately in the same vein, it also considers the views of K. Marx and F. Engels, who saw the dissatisfaction of the proletariat as a result of absolute deprivation and repression.
Describing the decreasing deprivation, T.Gar gives examples of traditional societies, their reactions to natural disasters, epidemics, and indicate that the influence of decreasing deprivation is less significant for socio-economic transformations. Examples of absolute deprivation leads in particular Carsten in their research of fascist regimes, where certain social groups have responded stronger than others on fascist appeals; This particularly concerns those who have undergone threat or eradication due to social and economic changes whose positions in society were unstable. A special role in this process was the officers who accustomed to violence and who felt his deprivation in socio-economic life was played. In many ways, this position is similar to the point of view, said about the military elite and its role in revolutionary movements. But all the theories of revolutions converge in the fact that it is a decreasing deprivation that is a dominant pattern leading to revolutionary changes. With relative deprivation, which is an expression of readiness to act in this way, T.Gar matches a number of sociological concepts: values \u200b\u200band classes of values, value expectations, value possibilities, as well as dissonance, anomios and social conflict. "Relative deprivation .... It is essentially general in order to cover or relate with a majority of the general "Revolution prerequisites" identified in other theoretical analyzes. T.Gar emphasizes that it considers relative deprivation as an opportunity in addition to the pure definition of relative deprivation to synthesize other concepts.
Aspirational deprivation involves the growth of value expressions unchanged in the value position: these social groups have discomfort from the lack of means of achieving new or increasing expectations (mainly it concerns material benefits, political order and justice). T.Gar leads to the illustration of the European Trade and Industrial Centers of the Middle Ages and the early Renaissance as demonstrators of new opportunities and stimulants of growth in population requests. Also, other social groups can play the role of such stimulants, whose provision is significantly improved compared to those observing these conditions. In his work, such stimulants also act as collective violence stimulants.
Progressive deprivation is reduced by him, in fact, to the Davis model, according to which the revolution is most likely to occur when a prolonged period of economic and social development changes in the opposite direction.
T.Gar stresses that this pattern is characteristic of societies that are experiencing simultaneous systemic and ideological changes, or articulating ideological postulates of modernization in societies with structural rigidity, which prevents the exhibition of expansion values \u200b\u200boutside the specified framework.
This model can be used to classify some theories of revolution using the concept of "social change", which "... postulate that political violence is a consequence of a reduction in the responsiveness of social structures, beliefs, norms or all of them combined on the changes." Thus, actively used by T.Garrore theses of Davis say that the revolutionary state of consciousness requires "long, even familiar, but dynamic expectation of more extensive opportunities to meet basic needs", under which all types of values \u200b\u200bare meant. In addition, the "constant unrearent threat to satisfying these needs is required: not the threat that really returns people to the state of struggle for survival, but that leads their mental state to conviction that they cannot satisfy one or more of their basic needs. The decisive factor is a vague or specifically aware of fear that the foundation created for a long time will be lost. "
The political system is perceived as a source of such fears when the government suppresses such opportunities. Analyzing Russian, French, Nazi Revolutions, American Civil War and the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, it shows that economic depression and government refusal to satisfy this kind of claims led to outbreaks of violence. At the same time, it was preceded by the growth of value expectations, and he was preceded by the growth of value items. Reducing the possibilities that manifested in the reluctance of politicians to expand political rights, in the economic decline, created the conditions necessary for the outbreak of violence. "
T.Gar emphasizes that "progressive deprivation is a common theme of many old and new theories that attribute the revolutionary potential to a common social change." As an example, he leads the theory of Johnson, which in its theory of social dysfunction sources of political violence indicates that the conditions of the revolution are:
1. Disagreement of the social system from balance, i.e. the discrepancy between the structural of belief and the division of labor;
2. Failure to elite from actions to bring the system to equilibrium, as a result - loss of authority and an increase in use by eating violence;
3. The appearance of dysfunction accelerator (any condition that reduces the ability to control its armed forces).
It indicates that any type of relative deprivation can be applied to any type of society, however, they are more characteristic of socioeconomic societies.
In addition, the three proposed models of relative deprivation are not exhausted possible links between value expectations and value possibilities.
However, it should not be thought that the deprivation remains the only Garrome in question in the chain of the causes of revolutionary actions. It leads a lot of quotes from the classic theories of revolution, which, not contradicting its deprivation theory, and often even completing it, give it a fairly complete picture of the revolutionary situation.
Arguing about the causes of revolutions, it relies on the statement of Aristotle that the cause of the revolution is the desire to politically or economic equality by people who are not enough of this equality, and the desire of oligarchs to even greater inequality than the one that has already been established . The discrepancy in both cases between the fact that people have from political and economic benefits in relation to what they think should have to possess.
By quoting L.P. Edwards, T.Gar says that all revolutions are obliged to their emergence of "suppressing elementary desires", and violence in any revolution is proportional to the degree of such suppression. The feeling of repression or obstacle is developing when "people begin to feel that their legitimate aspirations and ideas are suppressed or perverted that their completely decent desires and ambitions are prohibited and intersect ..". Defined analogies with relative deprivation, he finds in the concept of W.Petti "Spasm", which means the fact, detecting that the satisfaction of basic needs in freedom and security is subject to some effect and, moreover, such pressure is considered as necessary and inevitable, and therefore . " It indicates that similar concepts are used in modern theories. So, Lassowel and Kaplan attributing the political instability of the discrepancy between the excompts and "degree .. the realization of values \u200b\u200bfor the masses." Zolchean claims that all activities, including revolutionary activity, begins with extremes, i.e. "Discrepancies between consciously and unconsciously desired or expected state of events or a real situation." Both of these concepts come from the state of the mind of revolutionary actors.
T.Gar emphasizes the connection of all these concepts with relative deprivation, even if the first refers to the macro level: at the individual level, they are easily interpreted with the concept of relative deprivation associated with them. If at an individual level, we are talking about the discrepancy between the value expectations of people and the means they have to obtain these values, then at the collective level it is a discrepancy between the value structures of communities and the adaptation patterns of the social system to the surrounding and its ability to perform functional requirements.
He notes that some researchers clearly use the concepts of "frustration" and "deprivation" to submit a motive for collective violence. So, Davis attributes revolutionary outbreaks of the frustration that stems from a short-term recession in the achievements following a long-term rise, which generates its continuation expectation. " Lerner also describes the gap between the fact that people want, and what they get both "frustration" and assumes that this particular gap has revolutionary consequences. He speaks of an imbalance between achievement and desire. A similar position can be found in Feyerabend, in whose works political instability is associated with aggressive behavior, which changes in accordance with the degree of "systemic frustration".
Galtung notes that members of society, which have economic or status benefits without comparable growth in politics, are located to the revolution. Geberle sees the source of the revolution in the existence of classes that fix the discrepancies of their real significance and the legal political position; ... Active revolutionary groups are usually those classes or subclasses, which are precisely the fact that they are no longer poor, feel illegally held back in their economic activity and participate in political decision-making. N.Smeler "Participation in Revolutionary, i.e. Value-oriented movements - the improvement in the main grounds - does not exclude the deprivation of relative. " Sowel binds not oppression with the revolution, but a change: quite often, when people are in the most desperate and wet position, they are in least inclined to rebel, because they lose hope, but only after their positions have improved, they began to feel the possibility of change , they can rise by oppression of injustice.
Explanations of the Puritan, American and French Revolution of Briton and Sochal are consistent with Davis's hypothesis. Thus, Briton writes about the Puritan, American, French and Russian revolution and attributes the "primary importance of the presence in the group / group of the feeling that the dominant social conditions impede their economic activity", i.e. The leading groups discover that their capabilities are limited.
T.Gar notes that "this proves the growth of economic expectations generated by improving the economic situation among those members of society, whose growth of achievements was interrupted by economic disasters and passivity of the political system." The presence of the failure of the elite attempts to develop further political rights and privileges, as it happened during the Puritan revolution 1640-1660. or events of the 30s. 20th century in Kenya. French revolution and both Russian revolutions, the Hungarian revolution of the 1950s. It clearly demonstrate that the promises of the reforms were one of the most important catalysts of the revolutionary process: the promised or expected reforms influenced people already dedicated.
According to most theories of violence, revolutions occur when the threat arises for the majority of significant, distinct or fundamental values, however, T.Gar doubts this postulate due to its insufficient empirical confirmation. Revolutionary theories involve the importance of one class of values: for K. Marx, these are economic values \u200b\u200bfor H.Alandt - the desire for freedom, etc. A number of other theories of the revolution assumes that the suppression of any or all types of human values \u200b\u200bcan translate to political violence, in particular to the revolutionary forms (D. Edvards, U.Petti, P.Sorokin). T.Gar concludes that relative deprivation in relation to any class of commonly supported values \u200b\u200b(welfare, power, interpersonal values) leads to collective violence. Moreover, people can possess both non-cultivated values, the significance of which becomes clear only in the threat of these values. In addition to the class of values, the most important role is played by value plurality - the availability of alternative paths to achieve the more desirable social status. Narrow capabilities strengthen the desire for collective violence.
Each revolution relies on the public layer, which is stronger than others feel disappointed, writes T.Gar. For example, with a comparative analysis of fascism in different countries, it was possible to highlight those groups that were stronger than others on fascist appeals. These people felt that due to changes in society (financial crisis, unemployment, etc.) their future under threat. For example, in the early stages, the officers of the First World War played a large role, which, returned from the front, found that they could not find a job. At the same time, they felt offended unemployment - after all, they fought for this country, and now turned out to be poor. Plus, these are people who are accustomed to shoot and kill on the front, etc. The higher the suppression of the most "elementary desires", the stronger the scope of violence in society. For example, Lynch's vessel frequencies, T.Gar writes, in the US south between 1888 and 1930, changed inversely proportionate to the economic welfare index. From here you can withstand the inverse pattern - if we see a high level of political violence in the state, it means that there is something very and very bad with the economy. Among the economic disasters, pushing people to violence, there may be economic depression, inflation, unemployment, etc. These factors act primarily on unqualified workers, "blue collar" and a lower part of the middle class. The "upper middle class" and the highest layer of influence provide high taxes and business limitations.
Hozelice and Willner also associate deprivation with the potential of the revolution: "Unrealized aspirations produce feelings of disappointment, but unrealized expectations find their way out in sensations of deprivation. Disappointment Usually tolerant, deprivation is often unbearable. The deprivated individual feels the motivation to correct ... the material and mental frustrations that have arisen with him have become available to him. Since disappointment can generate seeds of a starting revolution, deprivation serves as a catalyst for revolutionary action. " This is confirmed by conflict studies (Galtug, Cupper, etc.)
Thus, T.Gar concludes that most theories explaining violent collective behavior work with the concepts of more or less closely related to relative deprivation. Meanwhile, the concept of relative deprivation seems to be broader to it, since "incorporates not all concepts (does not include, for example, the intensity of value expectations), and does not provide for the establishment of causal communication between variables and events of violence to which, as expected, they pushes people . If large groups of people experience deprivation in relation to the past experience, we are talking about falling the value of the Company's value conditions; This may occur as a result of a decrease in the production of material benefits, reduce control over public order by the political elite, intervention of foreign states, loss of convictions and values. Value opportunities may fall in separate segments of society as a result of the loss of the group in the struggle for values.
The deprivation measurement is carried out by T.Garrrom through the introduction of the variable "the intensity of relative deprivation". The intensity is a function of several psychocultural variables:
A large discrepancy between expectations and capabilities;
High importance of values \u200b\u200b(T.Gar talks about "value reporting");
Availability of alternatives to satisfying needs;
Time, because "If anger is an expression of despair on a short period of time, it will quickly be intensified before decouring."
T.Gar notes that these determinants of dissatisfaction are applicable to both individuals and entire groups of people. Quantitative data show that the degree of deprivation or dissatisfaction is associated with the degree of riots. So, another Rosto showed that high prices and unemployment determine the degree of cruelty of an open protest in England 1790-1850., In Revolutionary France. These hypotheses are confirmed by cross-substitutional studies using aggregated data; It is also possible to do it not on aggregated, but on direct data.
When considering the value disclosure, TGR indicates that at a high level of marginalness in the country, the hierarchy of values \u200b\u200bwill amount to the values \u200b\u200bof economic, security, community, values \u200b\u200bof ties, status values, the values \u200b\u200bof participation, the values \u200b\u200bof self-realization. In the modernization postcolonial society, the power of participation and security values \u200b\u200bcould be more distinct than the values \u200b\u200bof welfare or impersonal values. At the same time, individual classes or status groups may have a hierarchy of values, significantly different from adopted in society.
At the same time, the more severe people are motivated to achieve the goal or maintaining the status achieved, the more obstacles cause them from them, and the stronger the subsequent prompting to violence. "
Interesting the fact set by T.Garrrom as a result of the analysis of an extensive array of research: with long frustration, collective behavior reproduces the apathy and submission patterns. However, while the presence of a coercive policy or military control over the disloyal part of the population is the source of the displacement of relative deprivation in time, which proves that the repressive impact does not lead to a decrease in the level of aggression. Thus, it is precisely for weakening political regimes T.Gar places responsibility for the development and emergence of new deprivation and the growth of violence. Another source of the displacement of relative deprivation in time is to exhaust economic resources or a change in the structure of the economy, which reduces the possibility of maintaining the welfare of individual groups of the population; But these cases are more characteristic of dynamic industrial societies. Sometimes, in static traditional societies, these processes acquire chronic character (rural uprisings, anarchism).
The scale of relative deprivation is a variable where the unit is the collectivity and showing the share of members of the community having a certain level of dissatisfaction. This share changes depending on the types of societies and therefore, including revolutionary consequences - in particular, in cases where a significant part of the working-age population is experiencing the effects of economic recession, inflation, falling prices for consumption of consumption in export-oriented monocultural economies and T .P. Similar "risk populations" can be extended through various approaches. In addition, T.Gar notes the uneven influence of various types of relative deprivation on groups involved in various sectors of the economy (agricultural sectors, industrial, etc.), or on separate classes or demographic groups.
Relative deprivation associated with safety values, according to T.Gar, is associated with repression or prevalence of freedom and order requirements. Another condition of the conditions of the relative deprivation are mobility limitations.
Thus, revolutionary actions as an option of violence are most feasible in countries where "most citizens are keenly feel deprived of the goals representing the greatest value for them, and at the same time devoid of opportunities to act with the help of non-violent methods."
At the same time, 3 sources of expectation growth and changes in their perception can be distinguished:
Demonstration effect (show new samples of life);
Articulation of new beliefs explaining the growth of the expectations;
Effects of rising value positions.
Predestly researchers are interested in conditions that determine the growth of expectations in industrialized and transitional societies. Considering the modernization as a demonstration of new life standards and the "revolution of growing frustrations", he refers to Lerner, which shows the role of leaders in this process, as well as the concept of the intelligent consumption of holton, a number of other explanations of the mechanisms of demonstration and accompanying its structural patterns: "showing the results of modernization Increases the expectations of welfare and interpersonal values \u200b\u200b- economic benefits, the benefits of personality development, status, pleasures from urban social life. The demonstration effect also applies to the values \u200b\u200bof power, "indicates T.Gar. In particular, this is how they are interpreted by the French revolution of 1848, as well as a number of European uprisings that happened a year later. On the example of them, Somalia is shown that "a successful revolution can provide people with suitable models how to reduce the obvious coercivity of the regime."
In addition, leadership plays an important role in organizing collective violent actions. Leadership is a significant factor for the development of the organization, and leadership qualities and skills can be more likely to find among the representatives of the elite or among people who have experience in the activities of other people.
The empirical studies of the revolutionary leadership suggest that the essential majority of the leaders were immigrants from medium and higher strata their societies. Almost nothing is known about the peasant wars and uprisings, headed by the peasants themselves. They may be representatives of entrepreneurial circles, clergy, professionals and intelligentsia, skilled workers. Revolutionary leaders can be marginal in the sense that they feel their social position and prospects for promotion unreliable, but they rarely appear from the lower classes. A distinctive feature of revolutionary movements and internal wars is to essential participation in their high classes, especially at the level of leadership. Briton and other scientists who studied the classic European revolutions emphasized that dissatisfaction was widespread not only among ordinary people, but also among large segments of higher and middle classes. "Desertion of Intellectuals" is often referred to as a harbinger of the revolution: Ch. Tilly shows that armed crowds in Wanda 1793g. They consisted of peasants and artisans in the same proportions, as they were distributed as part of the rural population, but they also recruited from representatives of the bourgeoisie and the old elite. Seton-Watson in the overall review of the revolutionary and conspiratorial movements of the 20th century comes to the conclusion that the leadership in them primarily proceeded from the intelligentsia, which would not be a base of popular support. Moreover, at the increase in the riches of the masses, the role of the leaders is reduced, since the role of consciousness of the masses is growing.
At the same time, the question of the influence of migration and education as dissatisfaction catalysts is very controversial, which is confirmed by empirical data; The growth in the expectations is not tightly determined by the demonstration, and only occurs in certain circumstances, namely, the conversion of new values \u200b\u200bis necessary. By conversion, he understands the rejection of all rules and beliefs that establish the current level of expectations. In addition, "as a necessary catalyst for susceptibility to the revolutionary ideology of people ... it is necessary to ensure knowledge about a plight." In this case, they become susceptible to ideologies, justifying new and intensified expectations.
Analyzing the demonstration effect of ascending mobility, it uses the RanSender methodology, and shows that the growth of the Group's expectations is associated with changing the values \u200b\u200bof the most "quick winning group" having a homogeneous economic status. " People choose as reference groups comparable to them. This refers to the economic, status values \u200b\u200band participation values. According to Davis and a number of other researchers, a high level of income concentration is associated with the emergence of revolutions, as well as with land inequality and inequality of the economic development of regions. T.Gar assumes that this connection is carried out through the feeling of operation, which is experiencing less developed territories or groups, which provokes an increase in relative deprivation and outbreak of violence.
All this leads to the need to analyze social sources of deprivation as a basis for revolutionary actions. Speaking about determinants of value opportunities, T, Garr highlights 4 patterns that limit value opportunities.
1. Patterns of value reserves;
In societies with relatively fixed or inflexible reserves, the value possibilities of most groups are almost static. At the same time, any value acquisitions of one group will reduce the values \u200b\u200bof other groups and reduce their capabilities. If there is a flexibility of reserves, such situations have less pronounced conflict consequences. As an illustration, he cites events in Argentina of the 1950s. and a number of Latin American countries, where a change in the distribution mechanism of land resources and restricting political participation for many layers was dominant attitudes for bursts of violence. This is where radical groups preparing the soil for revolutions are used: thus actively exploited by the disbelief of the masses in the fact that the elites are ready to share values, and thus the population is preparing for the answer to any action of the latter as a threat to irreparable deprivation.
2. Informative in the performance of desires and value opportunities;
From the previous experience of the group and the conditions of its social life, its conviction depends on the ability to keep the resource. As a rule, it is more relevant for the experience of value losses, which is successfully illustrated by the behavior of the peasant layers in traditional societies. Moreover, "The higher the indicator of the expansion of value reserves, the greater the intensity of relative deprivation among groups with differentially low value possibilities."
3. Value welfare and political violence;
Since economic values \u200b\u200bhave relative flexibility and can be increased to the extent to which society has the potential for their growth, they are most involved in the policies of the redistribution of government values, satisfying the growth of expectations of large groups due to smaller, which causes growth to deprivation of smaller groups and strengthens the motivation The latter to political violence. In addition, economic values \u200b\u200bare more distinct, since they are associated with primary needs and therefore their cutting always entails the growth of violence, especially in the conditions of marginal economic recession or wars. Although some of the values \u200b\u200bdo not have sufficient flexibility (life, land), they do not violate the general picture of the correlation. The most obviously these trends are manifested in developing societies where short-term economic recessions are inevitable.
4. Interpersonal values \u200b\u200band political violence.
Here, T.Gar examines such sources of revolution as:
Loss of ideacyal consistency (loss of faith or disadvantage of consensus on the beliefs and norms defining social interaction). The higher the relative deprivation of the values \u200b\u200bof welfare, authorities, status, utility values, the more likely to reduce the ideological consistency.
Change status (status properties can be flexible, but ideally the top of the status hierarchy can take only one group that infringes the possibilities of others).
Separately, mention should be mentioned about the values \u200b\u200bof power. They have a two-way effect on the value possibilities: in the presence of political participation and distributed values \u200b\u200bof government, the relative deprivation will be intensified; In pronounced discontent groups, the value possibilities of these groups in the political and societal sphere will increase. At the same time, he analyzes the views on the revolution as a result of the desire for power, freedom or participation (H.Alandt, D. Briton, W.Petti, Sch. Krozier, Mozka), in general, taking them into account, however, relates them to More to leaders, and not to the masses. In addition, he believes that the inability of the state plays a greater extent here to adapt to the requirements of public changes, i.e. Characteristics of the political regime and political system. It is extremely unclear here the position of the Solkra himself, which uses both works that speakers the inability of the elite to adapt and work speaking administrative non-adaptation of the regime. For example, Briton indicates that the ineffectiveness of the government was one of 4 conditions common to pre-revolutionary governments during the Great Western Revolutions: "The government mechanism has become clearly ineffective in part due to negligence, in part due to the failure of attempts to make changes to the old institutions, in part due to With new conditions ... Economic expansion and new cash classes, create unbearable tension in the government mechanism adapted to more simple, primitive conditions. "
An important component in the formation of a revolutionary situation and the revolutionary result, according to theory of T.Garra, is the translation of collective violence into a political field.
The dissatisfaction itself "is only an unstructured potential of collective violence", and it leads to political violence if attitudes of people focus on political objects and institutional frameworks weaken. T.Gar notes that the presence of regulatory and utilitarian expectations (excuses) of people from such violence is required to implement political violence.
It considers both psychocultural and ideological excuses of violence.
The first is the requirements and prohibitions of socialization, adopted within the framework of this culture or personal characteristics acquired in the process of socialization of the individual. Communication with collective violence of such attitudines allow you to establish, for example, the work of Losella, who wrote about the "movement of private affects to political objects" here it is important to take into account the degree to which "aggression is internalized by representatives of culture." In fact, all these practices are implemented in family education and are associated with the estapunctivity or intrapaunctivity of frustrations, as well as with the presence of traditions of political violence in this culture. The latter define the types of situations acceptable to which for most people is collective violence. In many ways, the presence of violence in historical experience plays a role, justifying its use in the future. The political system is the institution, which will be the most responsibility for what is happening in modern or modernizing societies. Thus, since the political system is a practically the only institution with resources and powers for exercising large-scale transformations, the political system becomes both a goal and a means of such actions. This causes that, according to empirical research, up to 90% of the violence has been politicized. The political system itself contributes to the politicization of discontent by concentrating power and resources, as well as a decrease in its level of legitimacy.
To the second, various "conceptual systems intended for interpreting activities about dissatisfaction", or ideational systems arising in social stress situations. As a rule, these systems are more likely to justify political violence. The appearance, in particular, revolutionary ideologies is attributed to both the needs of revolutionary movements and the expression of social stresses and conflicts, as well as a produced excuse for revolutionary leaders. It can be successfully replaced by slogans, "clothed in the memories of the offense and violence" used to symbolize actions and their unity. Ideologies, slogans are triggered if people experience intensive dissatisfaction and are not sure about the sources of discontent, but have faith in the ability to change. This kind of "cognitive insecurity of people" allows the ideologies to "explain to them the loss of community or spill anger"; The choice of the most attractive ideologies is carried out in 4 grounds:
They explain the actions about dissatisfaction;
They coincide with the experience of the depressed layers;
They focus anger on probable responsibility agents;
They specify attractive goals (i.e. offer a direct, famous enemy, the ability to observe external groups and possibly - the aggression emanating from them).
At the same time, one of the most effective effects of slogans and ideologies as mobilization tools is the conviction of people in the fact that political violence can provide the acquisition of values \u200b\u200bfor themselves, the corresponding price of risk or guilt, incl. Formed on a utopian-emotional basis, and promises of the organizational order, "Since the revolutionary doctrines penetrate the consciousness of ordinary participants in a fragmentary, rather than a connected form, and since dissatisfied is initially predisposed to aggression, but it is likely that the violent means will be presented for the revolutionary audience more important than non-violent "
In many ways, the rationality of violence is justified by the effective achievement of goals with its help in historical experience or experience of other groups. This, in turn, is associated with the development of communications, allowing to demonstrate attractive samples of life, the symbols of political aggression (less often - the call for weapons or confronts to the traditions of political violence) and those intensify value expenses.
The response to the revolutionary manifestation of violence from the depressed layers is usually represented by repressive actions of the regime. To analyze the model of the revolution, taking into account this component, T.Gar believes necessary to use the concept cossess Balance.
Political regime, facing the use of force, usually "directs additional resources on repression"; And there are only two restrictions on the growth of force and counterfeit: the depletion of resources and the acquisition of resources for the genocide victory.
The magnitude of violence is inversely proportional to the coercivity abilities of the political regime, as Tahr assumes, dividing the point of view of the authors of most theories of violence in this regard. If the regime and dissidents have approximately equal strength, a revolution or internal war becomes the most likely, rather than other forms of political violence. Frequent occurrence - the emergence of the situation when the regime weakens, "and its insufficiency or inefficiency leads dissidents to the idea that they have equal or stronger control"; It is in this case that rebellion, local uprisings and other forms of protest tend to quickly outrun into revolutionary movements. (France 1789, Mexico 1912, Hungary 1956) or create a basis for a successful state coup (Russia 1917, Egypt1953). In the case of a favorable balance, chronic disorders are more likely.
The coercivity of the regime is determined, so:
Scale of control (shares of the population subject to law enforcement);
The size of the armed forces and security forces to their resources;
The loyalty of these forces to the regime;
Stiffness of sanctions.
At the same time, T.Gar assumes that "the coherers control of the curvilinearine mode changes with the size and resources of its armed forces and security forces, having the smallest value when the size and resources are at the average level, as well as with the rigidity and size of sanctions, being the weakest at the average Stiffness level.
Analyzing the views of the various authors for the reasons related to the weakening of the state, it leads to an example of the theory of the solemaker, connecting the weakening with the effectiveness of social control institutions, Janos (weakening the legitimate forces), and others, and "regimes are exposed not only to unrestrained anger caused by new patterns Sanctions, but also accumulated hostile, transferred from the previous era of applying more rigid repressive control. Two other factors are effective. The weakening of the mode of the regime can lead to a decrease in the scale of its control, which contributes to the increase in the control of dissidents and the subsequent shift of the balance of coer-controlling towards equilibrium. The weakness of another kind is to reduce loyalty to the armed forces regime. " The actions of these factors are illustrated by an example of the French revolution, as well as more than 19 cases of a revolutionary lift caused by defeat in the war. It should be the conclusion that the ability of the mode to coer-controlling depends on the loyalty of the military (coherers). The basics of loyalty may vary (the threat of legitimacy of the regime, the threat of negative sanctions, manipulate positive sanctions by regime), when it can be carried out both direct violence and participation in conspiracies, in case the dissidents are confident in the insufficient loyalty of the armed forces. "Since the revolution involves an armed uprising, it implies a clash with professionally trained and equipped troops under the command of the military elite .." he quotes Johnson. And success, and fail, and the decision on the attempt of the revolution is based on the confidence that the Armed Forces will support the revolution. Moreover, "many revolutions following the weakening of government control are represented by the inconstancy of coercions over the preceding periods, or increased inconsistency during the relaxation periods, or to others." On the part of the dissidents, the manifestations of coer-controlled control are also observed; It is manifested in the scale of control, the concentration of disseps supporters in the underwent areas and their military resources, and the degree to which military forces of the regime are convinced of the need to harm dissidents. Moreover, this should be carried out by regular supervision and intimidation in certain territories.
Another necessary component of the revolutionary model, according to Garra, is balance of institutional support.It is defined as follows. And elite, and dissidents can best create and hold long support for themselves, providing their followers of action patterns that have predictably reward consequences. The degree of institutional support is determined by "such structural characteristics of the regime, and dissident organizations, such as the scale, connectivity, complexity and ability of organizations to ensure their members value powers and means of protest expression."
Conditionally divided by the population on loyal, active dissidents and neutral, one can determine the situation with a number of indicators:
Sizes and distribution of these groups in the population;
The level of their organization in support mode or dissidents.
In fact, institutional support is the ability to direct the actions of organizations and groups without supporting coercions. The high probability of the occurrence of revolutionary movements than other, in the case when institutional support is low, and dissatisfaction is intensively and distributed, and attempts to construct a new culture. At the same time, the closer to the equality of dissident and regime institutional support, the higher the probability of the inner war and the revolution.
Special attention T.Gar pays organizational cohesion and complexity of dissident groups as the factor of the procession of protest movement in the revolutionary. Although "the specific organizational characteristics of the dissident groups are widely changed depending on the circumstances of the Group's formation, the objectives of the leaders and followers, the social and economic situation and the nature of the response of the regime into their activities ... The most obvious reason is that many dissident organizations, especially those Who are the goals begins to be limited, rather than revolutionary nature, are originally neutral or regulatory-oriented associations and only subsequently draw up or involved in the open opposition. " The revolutionary organizations of China and Vietnam, developed during the prolonged revolutionary wars, were seen as the most interesting and indicative patterns for the study of TGGR, developed during the prolonged revolutionary wars.
In this case, the implementation of several patterns is likely:
With a low level of dissident support, the pattern of disorders is likely (characteristic of societies in the early stages of modernization);
With the support of the regime in most sectors, conspiracy pattern is created (characteristic of the states of the centralist sense);
With a closed organization for dissidents and support for the regime by a limited number of loyal - patter of the internal war (these are non-centralist states of the average level of development).
Seriously adjusts the possibility of the revolution and the presence of channels for the expression of protest such channels as media, voting and other forms of political participation: they remove aggressive impulses. To explain this, T.Gar uses a psychological explanation of the "displacement of frustration" when, with a high threat of retaliation for aggression, the connection of frustration with a genuine frustration is lost and the form of aggression is becoming more indirect.
Describing mass revolutionary movements, T.Gar notes that they occur with the greatest probability, if dissatisfaction is intensively and widely distributed both among the elite and in the masses and as a result of the absolute and relative deterioration of many conditions of social existence.
It should be noted that all models described by T.Garrome and the determinants offered to them are probabilistic: patterns have the ability to be implemented, but always implemented.
Thus, the model of the revolution proposed by TGGROR is not fundamentally new. He actively uses the achievements of social and political theory, organically, including them in its own model. Thus, they used various models of the revolutionary hopper processes, Briton (as well as the interpretation of his model, the 10-stadium model of Schwartz, the theory of Midlarist and Tanner, the thesis of Galtung that members of society with economic or status benefits are predisposed to the revolution, who have economic or status benefits without comparable growth opportunities to participate in politics, theses Geberle on the need to have a social class or several classes that are not satisfied with the existing distribution of political power; and active revolutionary groups (classes or subclasses, which are precisely the fact that they are no longer poor, feel illegally held in their economic activity and participating in making political decisions), the thesis of the Blemera on a combination of participation in revolutionary value-oriented movements with relative deprivation , etc. In our opinion, the most close to the revolutionary model of Tagra, the ideas of Soule, who saw in the revolution is not the result of oppression, but the result of changes: being in deep deprivation, the population is not prone to uprisings or revolutionary actions, while in the presence of positive The dynamics of deprivation begins to realize and stimulate the revolutionary movement. T.Gar offers its model, the most generalizable position of its predecessors.
T.Gar Why people rebellious. - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2005. p.7.
T.Gar. Why do people rebellious. - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2005 -c.43.
For example, the counter-revolutionary movement of Vandy.
Occupy positions in the segments of the company below middle classes.
TR Garr. Why do people rebellious. - SPB.: Peter, 2005. S. 75
T.R.Gar. Why do people rebellious. - SPb.: Peter, 2005. P. 165.
Validity is a strength of motivation to acquire or maintain the desired value position; Presentation of the class of valuables for collectivity is the average strength of the desire for the desired value position.
T.R.Gar. Why do people rebellious. - SPb.: Peter, 2005. C.103.
The exception is E. Pugachev, Mao, the leaders of the French revolution.
See the analysis of the work of C. Tillie in this monograph.
The awakened consciousness shows the man of the absurdity of being, the incomprehensibility and injustice of the human life. This creates a riot, the purpose of which is a transformation, which means an action. The main motive of the rebellion, according to Camus, is that "a person is the only creature that refuses to be what it is."
The most significant work of Albera Cami, which reveals the idea of \u200b\u200bthe rebellion, is the book "Raunting Man" (or "Buntar"). This book is the story of the idea of \u200b\u200bBunt against the injustice of the human life. The riot appears as a requirement of human solidarity, in common for all people the meaning of existence. The rebellion rises from his knees, says "no" to the oppressor, conducts the border with which one who believed himself believed by Mr., and through which he had previously allowed penetration into his life negative circumstances.
Starting the concept of rebellion, Camus compared the riot and the concept of murder. He is asked about the justification of the murder. Camu believed that the initial item of his philosophy remained the same - this is an absurd questioned by all values. Absurd, in his opinion, prohibits not only suicide, but also the murder, since the destruction of himself like this means an attempt on a unique source of meaning, which is the life of every person. Bunth carries the creative beginning. Thus, the riot and murder logically contradict each other. Having committed the murder, the ruster splits the world, destroying the most common and unity of people.
The riot unconditionally implies a certain value. Firstly, the rioty man opposes everything that it is valuable for him, that such is not. By apparing the example of a slave rebellion against his Mr., Camus comes to the conclusion that the slave rebels against the previous order, which denies something inherent in the community of all oppressed people. Individual itself is not the value that he intends to defend. This value is all people at all.
At the same time, the camp is distinguished by the concept of riot and cornituality. Embroitness is caused by envy and is always directed against the obvious object. Bunth, on the contrary, seeks to protect the person. Rising protects himself, what it is, the integrity of his personality, seeks to force himself. Thus, it makes the conclusion of the Cam, the abnormality carries a negative start, the riot is positive. The author of this thought expresses his disagreement with some philosophers who identified the Bunctric Spirit and Curb.
In his work, Camus notes that the rebellion is impossible in societies where inequality is too large (for example, caste societies) or equality absolutely (some primitive societies). The author emphasizes that the riot is possible in those societies where the theoretical equality hides a huge actual inequality.
The awareness of the absurdity of being and unreasonable peace is the root cause of the rebellion. However, if the experience of absurdity is individually, then in the rebar, it is aware of himself as a collective one. It turns out to be general fate, writes Camus.
Exploring the concept of rebellion, the Cama allocates a number of renovations of the rebellion and determines the characteristic features of each of them.
1. Metaphysical (philosophical) Riot is a rebellion of a person against his lot and against the entire universe. A vivid example is a slave rising against his master and his slave. That is, the metaphysical rebellion rebellion against the lot accepted to him as a separate individual. He seems to express in such a way that he is deceived and deprived of the universe itself.
Cama indicates one interesting feature. The slave protesting against the Mr., thereby simultaneously recognizes the existence of Mr. and His power. The metaphysical rebellion, acting against the strength determining his mortal nature, at the same time approves the existence of this force. Thus, such a riot does not deny the highest strength, and, recognizing it, challenges it.
2. The historic riot - riot, the main purpose of which, according to Cami, is freedom and justice. The historical riot seeks to provide a person to the reign in time, in history. Camus claims that today's story with her sat down forces people to admit that the riot is one of the essential measurements of man. He is the historical reality of mankind, which should not be running.
Cami immediately divides the concepts of the riot and revolution. He believes that the revolution begins with the idea, while the riot is a movement from individual experience to the idea. Studying historical facts, he suggests that the riot is a phenomenon in which a person is spontaneously trying to find a way out of his "Sisyphan of the situation." Therefore, the writer does not recognize the organized, prepared revolution, considering it contrary to his concept. He also considers illusory any hope that the revolution can really give a way out of the situation that it is caused. In addition, the writer believes that the revolution in her genuine value, humanity has not yet known, since the Genuine Revolution sets the goal of universal unity and the final completion of history. The revolutions that have already happened until now only to replace one political system to another. Even started as an economic, any revolution eventually became political. And this is also the difference between the revolution from the rebellion.
In addition, the revolution and the riot pursue various goals. The revolution involves the use of a person as a material for history. Bunth asserts the independence of man and human nature. The riot comes from denial in the name of the statement, and the revolution is from absolute denial.
Thus, the riot (as mentioned above), in contrast to the revolution, created. He assumes that humanity should live for the sake of the creation of what it is.
3. The riot in art is a riot that makes creativity. This riot is manifested in simultaneous denial and approval: Creativity denies the world for what he lacks, but denies in the name of what the world is at least sometimes.
Bunct in art, according to Camus, is the creator of the Universe. Any creator with their works transforms the world, as if pointing to the imperfection of this world. According to Camus, art argues with reality, but does not avoid it. However, the writer points to the inevitability of the existence of creativity: "If the world was clear, there would be no art in it."
Camus finds restrictions of the rebellion in the man itself, released from the sufferings and bring riot and solidarity from them. Such a person knows about his rights, expresses his human dimension and consciousness of the infancy of the tragedy of human existence in Bunte. The protest against the human day is always doomed to a partial defeat, but he also needs a person as his own work - Sisif.
Photo Reuters.
"Why do people rebellious." This is the name of the classical study of the American sociologist Ted Robert Garra, very useful for analyzing mass protests in Russia.
The delivered Question Garr is responsible for this: it's all about the growth of relative deprivation (Relative DepRIVATION, RD). Relative deprivation is perceived by individuals the discrepancy between their expectations and real capabilities, between "it is necessary" and "there", meanwhile, and what people have. Obviously, RD is microponia, applicable to individual individuals, in contrast to the macropionic "legitimacy" applied to the political system as a whole.
Today, events in Russia are increasingly described as a full-scale legitimation crisis. But such a consideration sooner or later leads to paradoxes. In general, the study of literature devoted to the problem of legitimation, suggests that sociologists, like other humanities, are abused by words, especially for this (abuse. - MB) created.
In fact, legitimacy is non-violent regulatory effectiveness. Those or other norms are legitimate if they can be accepted and equally regularly implemented independently of the specific coercion and explicitly threatening sanctions. It remains incomprehensible why norms, even yesterday, who had non-violent effectiveness, today for their implementation require coercion and threatening sanctions.
According to Garru, RD growth of some part of the population leads to delegitimation of the political system in the eyes of this part of the population. This allows you to abandon dichotomy: either the legitimen mode, or not. It turns out possible to introduce a quantitative measure, called the scale of legitimacy, is the proportion of people among the population of the country, having a sense of legitimacy of the political system above a certain threshold. As such a threshold, you can, for example, consider the vote in the presidential election for the candidate personifying the system. Then, if you trust the official data, the scale of the legitimacy of the system in 2004 (71.3% of Vladimir Putin at the turn of 64.4%) - 45.9%, in 2008 (70.3% for Dmitry Medvedev at the Table 69 , 6%) - 48.9%, and in 2012 (63.6% for Vladimir Putin at the turn of 64%) - 40.7%.
As we can see, fall in absolute figures (if they are not falsified) not so large, but having super-proportional consequences - since it happened at the expense of capitals and other major cities.
Consider, because of which there was a gap between the expectations of Russian residents and their real possibilities in 2004-2012. Such reasons are obviously several:
1) improved awareness of Russian citizens on political rights and freedoms in Western countries (thanks to the Internet and travel abroad);
3) failure to fulfill the power of many issues of promises due to high system costs and, in particular, proceedable corruption;
4) the unrestrained populism of opposition parties actually detached from the state in managing the state and, therefore, not responding to the voter for non-efficient promises;
5) the unwillingness of the current authority to enter into a constructive dialogue with civil society institutions, power pressure on the opposition.
This is dictated by the "package" of response:
1) the termination of the anti-Western hysteria;
2) an increase in the participation of the masses in political life, the restoration of the independence of the courts, strictly observing the principle of separation of the authorities;
3) control of civil society for the implementation of the promises of the current government;
4) the distribution of part of ministerial portfolios among opposition parties, to admission to the executive power at least at the regional level (early elections of the governors);
5) the policy of constructive dialogue and concessions regarding civil society and the extra system opposition.
It is important here to keep in mind that the use of violence and increasing social spending is not enough to reimburse the deficit of legitimacy. As Garrine pointed out: "One suppression is clearly ineffective to resolve violent conflicts in the long term, if not in short, since it is more likely to inspire without consent, but resistance. No more accurate is the assumption that discontent has primary physical sources, therefore, the medicine from it is to satisfy the material needs. People seek many living conditions, other than physical welfare, not the last of which are security, status, sense of community and the right to manage their own deeds. "
GARR TR Why do people rebellious. St. Petersburg., 2005. P. 60-61.
Habermas Yu. The problem of legitimation of late capitalism. M., 2010. P. 168.
GARR TR Decree. op. Pp. 247.
GARR TR Decree. op. P. 449-450.
I bought Teda Garra "Why do people rebellious" ("Why Men Rebel?"), Publisher "Peter", 2005. It is in the "keystore" 268 p.
Translated. The work is old, 1970, but, nevertheless, a delta. At least structured, written in postmodern meuts, modern ooo-sighs about the "specifics of Islam", etc.
GARR there reveals the concept of political violence Cherki social deprivation. He has a rather applied study, exits in empirical expressions. The text is structured, with hypotheses, conclusions, tables - completely in the Sorokinsky style.
Annoying Translation V. Anurina. On the one hand, he, in general, is not bad. On the other, some kind of unnecessary meticulous: the translator begins to make footnotes and explain what expectation, accumulation, goerilla, compensation, frontier, behaviorism, etc. Sometimes, when the translator does not translate, but simply translirries the terms, the feeling is created that he or does not understand which of the English words to choose, or not well knows how to distinguish terms simply from the long English words \u003d). And it leaves this at the discretion of the reader (a strange approach, given that he is not enough to read what accumulation explained). The first thing that rushes into the eye is "COOrsive (COERCIVE) control", but there can still be pulled out a bunch of everything. This creates a feeling of overloading text terms, which is incorrect (for example, the "behavioral level" could be translated into Russian, as well as the "Antecendes of the French Revolution" - and not produce extra footnotes). And again - "Frontier" we explain, and "Fühurprincip" - only we translate from German to footnote, mostly text, as in the original transmitted in German. What kind of principle is that the reader would tell the reader, if he does not know what is "Frontier". At the same time, Coups D "Etat (in the original - in French), for some reason translated and in the main text is represented in Russian, and the footnote is already given a French version).
And, here I excavated: "The expansion of political participation channels and the recruitment bases increases on elite positions increases the disabels of eligious groups." Here in the footnote, it is explained that ELIGIBLE - 1) the one who can be elected 2) is suitable, desirable. Let the reader guess. It is wonderful that even if the term German or French, the translator does not indicate this, simply writes "Russian tracing with ..." in general, I have not yet been read, just leave. All these are real translation glitches and the absence of appropriate scientific editorial, which is what is annoyed.
Although, on the other hand, the hydrate, for example, was transferred even worse, as if some students were worked with gigantic self-conceit, and even with typos. Although it is already time to get used to get used that in terms of the edition of scientific literature we know who knows who makes the hell know that the hell knows how. Pah-pah-pah.
And so - the book should be taken to whom the topic is interesting.
UPD: And with all this, what is "Attitud" citizen Anurin, who did not bother his reader to explain, although there is through the page in the last chapters "Attitud, Attitud". \u003d)))
