On the night of July 4-5, the commander of the Central Front, Marshal Rokossovsky, was informed about the captured German, who claimed that the offensive would begin in a few hours. Zhukov, together with Rokossovsky, decided to conduct a preemptive artillery bombardment. Before dawn, in the areas of concentration of enemy strike groups on both fronts, Soviet troops conducted a powerful artillery counter-preparation, as a result of which German troops suffered small losses. Subsequently, Zhukov recalled that this blow had more of a psychological significance, he did not inflict particularly large losses on the enemy, but he delayed the start of his offensive by several hours

The Germans drove and brought to Kursk everything that was considered the best in the Wehrmacht. By the beginning of June, the Nazis had over 900 thousand personnel in the Kursk direction.

The opposing fronts - Central and Voronezh - had more than 1,300,000 personnel, 19,000 guns and mortars, about 3,500 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, more than 2,000 aircraft. Directly in their rear, the Steppe Front of I.S.Konev was deployed - up to 580 thousand personnel, 8500 guns and mortars, more than 1600 tanks. As you can see, we significantly outnumbered the enemy in forces and means.

In the region of the Kursk salient, we had eight defensive zones with a total depth of up to 300 kilometers. The volume of work carried out quickly is amazing - only trenches and trenches were dug almost 10 thousand kilometers! In all tank-hazardous areas - minefields, anti-tank areas, ditches. Everywhere there are wide strips of wire fences, some of them energized. Our sappers managed to disguise huge defensive structures. Even during reconnaissance from the air, the enemy failed to establish what was hidden in the depths of our defenses.

At 2.20 am, where enemy strikes were expected, our artillery rumbled. Subsequently, it turned out that on the Central Front there were only 10 minutes left before the start of the enemy artillery preparation. On our side, the roar of a thousand guns, on the other side, individual shots, which soon ceased.

Having suffered serious damage, the enemy was able to launch an offensive against the Central Front .. The fascists launched an attack not only weakened, but tormented by grievous forebodings. The shower of shells hitting them opened my eyes - the Russians know, the Russians are ready! Zhukov, on the other hand, increased his exactingness. In his opinion, the artillery counterpreparation should give more, the fire was often fired on areas, and not on specific targets. Our bombers and attack aircraft entered the battle at dawn.

In the fight against hordes of tanks, the outcome of each battle was decided by the resilience and skill of the soldiers and commanders.

Sometimes the attackers could not get past our leading edge. If they penetrated into the depths of the defense, then they met all the new lines, covered with minefields, massed and accurate anti-tank artillery fire.

Steppe front.

On July 12, the largest tank battle in the entire history of World War II took place in the Prokhorovka area. It was attended by about 1200 tanks on both sides.

The partisan war weakened the fascist war machine and helped drive the invaders from Soviet soil.

The counter-offensive of the Red Army near Kursk ended with an outstanding victory for us.

Irreplaceable losses were inflicted on the enemy, all his attempts to hold strategic bridgeheads in the regions of Orel and Kharkov were thwarted.

The success of the counteroffensive was ensured primarily by the skillful choice of the moment for our troops to go over to the offensive. It began in conditions when the main shock groups of the Germans suffered huge losses, and a crisis was defined in their offensive.

The significance of the victory of the Soviet troops at the Kursk Bulge goes far beyond the boundaries of the Soviet-German front. It had a tremendous impact on the further course of the Second World War. As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces and the transfer of more and more formations to the Soviet-German front, favorable conditions were created for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy and their advance to its central regions. As a result of the victory at Kursk and the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the Dnieper, a radical change ended not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the entire Second World War in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

If the Moscow battle was an example of heroism and dedication, when there was really nowhere to retreat, and the Battle of Stalingrad forced Berlin to plunge into mourning tones for the first time, the Battle of Kursk finally announced to the world that now the German soldier would only retreat. No more piece of native land will be given to the enemy! It is not for nothing that all historians, both civilian and military, agree that the Battle of the Kursk Bulge finally predetermined the outcome of the Great Patriotic War, and with it, the outcome of the Second World War. There is no doubt that the significance of the Battle of Kursk was correctly understood by the entire world community.

Before approaching this heroic page of our Motherland, let us make a small footnote. Today, and not only today, Western historians attribute the victory in World War II to the Americans, Montgomery, Eisenhower, but not to the heroes of the Soviet army. We must remember and know our history, and we must be proud that we belong to the peoples who saved the world from a terrible disease - fascism!

1943rd year. The war is entering a new phase, the strategic initiative is already in the hands of the Soviet army. Everyone understands this, including the German staff officers, who, nevertheless, are developing a new offensive. The last offensive of the German army. In Germany itself, things are no longer as rosy as at the beginning of the war. The allies land in Italy, the Greek and Yugoslav forces are gaining strength, all positions in North Africa are lost. And the vaunted German army itself has already undergone changes. Now everyone is being rounded up under arms. The notorious Aryan type of the German soldier is diluted by all nationalities. The Eastern Front is a nightmare for any German. And only the possessed Goebbels continues to broadcast about the invincibility of German weapons. But does anyone else believe in this, except himself and the Fuehrer?

The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad and its subsequent general offensive in the winter of 1942/43 in the vast area from the Baltic to the Black Sea undermined the military power of Germany. To prevent the decline in the morale of the army and the population and the growth of centrifugal tendencies within the bloc of aggressors, Hitler and his generals decided to prepare and conduct a major offensive operation on the Soviet-German front. With its success, they pinned their hopes for the return of the lost strategic initiative and a turn in the course of the war in their favor.

It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go over to the offensive. However, in mid-April, the Supreme Command Headquarters revised the method of planned actions. The reason for this was the data of Soviet intelligence that the German command was planning a strategic offensive on the Kursk salient. The headquarters decided to wear down the enemy with a powerful defense, then launch a counteroffensive and defeat his strike forces. There was a rare case in the history of war when the strongest side, possessing a strategic initiative, deliberately chose to start hostilities not by attack, but by defense. The development of events showed that this bold plan was absolutely justified.

(...) Soviet military intelligence was able to timely reveal the preparation of the Hitlerite army for a major offensive in the Kursk salient using the latest tank technology on a massive scale, and then set the time for the enemy's transition to the offensive.

Naturally, under the prevailing conditions, when the expected blow of the enemy by large forces was quite obvious, it was necessary to make the most expedient decision. The Soviet command faced a difficult dilemma: to attack or defend, and if defend, then how? (...)

Analyzing the numerous intelligence data on the nature of the enemy's upcoming actions and on his preparation for the offensive, the fronts, the General Staff and General Headquarters were increasingly inclined towards the idea of ​​going over to a deliberate defense. On this issue, in particular, there was a repeated exchange of views between me and the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov in late March - early April. The most specific conversation about planning military operations for the near future took place on the phone on April 7, when I was in Moscow, at the General Staff, and G.K. Zhukov was on the Kursk salient, in the troops of the Voronezh Front. And already on April 8, signed by G.K. Zhukov, a report was sent to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the situation and considerations about a plan of action in the Kursk salient, in which it was noted: “I consider it inexpedient for our troops to go on the offensive in the coming days in order to forestall the enemy. it will be, if we exhaust the enemy on our defenses, knock out his tanks, and then, bringing in fresh reserves, we will finally finish off the main grouping of the enemy by going over to the general offensive. "

I had to be with I.V. Stalin when he received the report of G.K. Zhukov. I well remember how the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, without expressing his opinion, said: "We must consult with the front commanders." Having given the General Staff an order to request the opinion of the fronts and obliging to prepare a special meeting at Headquarters to discuss the plan of the summer campaign, in particular the actions of the fronts on the Kursk Bulge, he himself called N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovsky and asked to submit his views by April 12 on the actions of the fronts (...)

At a meeting held on the evening of April 12 at Headquarters, which was attended by J.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, who arrived from the Voronezh Front, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and his deputy A.I. Antonov, a preliminary decision was made on deliberate defense (...)

After making a preliminary decision on a deliberate defense and on the subsequent transition to a counteroffensive, a comprehensive and thorough preparation for the upcoming actions was unfolded. At the same time, reconnaissance of the enemy's actions continued. The Soviet command knew exactly the timing of the start of the enemy offensive, which were postponed three times by Hitler. At the end of May - beginning of June 1943, when the enemy's plan was quite outlined to inflict a strong tank strike on the Voronezh and Central Fronts using for this purpose large groupings equipped with new military equipment, the final decision was made on deliberate defense.

Speaking about the plan for the Battle of Kursk, I would like to emphasize two points. Firstly, that this plan is the central part of the strategic plan for the entire summer-autumn campaign of 1943 and, secondly, that the supreme bodies of strategic leadership, and not other command structures, played a decisive role in the development of this plan (...)

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh fronts had 1,336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,172 aircraft. In the rear of the Kursk salient, the Steppe Military District (from July 9 - the Steppe Front) was deployed, which was the reserve of the Headquarters. He was supposed to prevent a deep breakthrough from both Orel and Belgorod, and when going over to a counter-offensive, build up the force of the blow from the depths.

The German side introduced 50 divisions, including 16 armored and motorized ones, into the two shock groups intended for the offensive on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk salient, which made up about 70% of the Wehrmacht's tank divisions on the Soviet-German front. In total - 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, about 2,050 aircraft. An important place in the enemy's plans was assigned to the massive use of new military equipment: Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, as well as the new Focke-Wulf-190A and Henschel-129 aircraft.

Fuehrer's Address to the German Soldiers on the Eve of Operation Citadel, no later than July 4, 1943

Today you are embarking on a great offensive battle that can have a decisive impact on the outcome of the war as a whole.

With your victory, the conviction of the futility of any resistance to the German armed forces will be strengthened stronger than before. In addition, the new brutal defeat of the Russians will even more shake the faith in the possibility of the success of Bolshevism, which has already been shaken in many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Just like in the last big war, their belief in victory will disappear in spite of everything.

The Russians achieved this or that success primarily with the help of their tanks.

My soldiers! Now you finally have better tanks than the Russians.

Their seemingly inexhaustible human masses have so thinned out in the two-year struggle that they are forced to call on the youngest and oldest. Our infantry, as always, is as much superior to the Russian as our artillery, our tank destroyers, our tank crews, our aircrafts and, of course, our aviation.

The mighty blow that will overtake the Soviet armies this morning must shake them to their foundations.

And you should know that everything can depend on the outcome of this battle.

As a soldier, I clearly understand what I require of you. Ultimately, we will achieve victory, no matter how cruel and difficult this or that particular battle may be.

German homeland - your wives, daughters and sons, selflessly rallying together, meet enemy air strikes and at the same time work tirelessly for the sake of victory; they look with fervent hope at you, my sol-dates.

ADOLF GITLER

Klink E. Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation "Zitadelle". Stuttgart, 1966.

PROCESS OF BATTLE. Eve

From the end of March 1943, the Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command worked on a strategic offensive plan, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush the enemy defenses along the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. However, in mid-April, on the basis of data from army intelligence to the leadership of the Red Army, it became clear that the Wehrmacht command itself was planning to carry out an attack under the foundations of the Kursk salient in order to encircle our troops located there.

The idea of ​​an offensive operation near Kursk arose at Hitler's headquarters immediately after the end of the fighting near Kharkov in 1943. The very configuration of the front in this area pushed the Fuhrer to strike in converging directions. In the circles of the German command, there were also opponents of such a decision, in particular Guderian, who, being responsible for the production of new tanks for the German army, adhered to the point of view that they should not be used as the main striking force in a big battle - this could lead to a waste of forces ... The strategy of the Wehrmacht for the summer of 1943, according to such generals as Guderian, Manstein, and a number of others, should have become exclusively defensive, as economical as possible in terms of the expenditure of manpower and resources.

However, the bulk of the German military leaders actively supported the offensive plans. The date of the operation, code-named Citadel, was set for July 5, and the German troops received a large number of new tanks (T-VI "Tiger", T-V "Panther") at their disposal. These armored vehicles were superior in firepower and armor resistance to the main Soviet T-34 tank. By the start of Operation Citadel, the German forces of Army Groups Center and South had up to 130 Tigers and more than 200 Panthers at their disposal. In addition, the Germans significantly improved the combat qualities of their old T-III and T-IV tanks, equipping them with additional armored screens and installing an 88-mm cannon on many vehicles. By the beginning of the offensive, there were about 900 thousand people, 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars in the Wehrmacht strike groupings in the Kursk salient area by the beginning of the offensive. The strike forces of Army Group South, under the command of Manstein, which included General Goth's 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf Group, were concentrated on the southern wing of the salient. Troops of Army Group Center von Kluge operated on the northern wing; the core of the strike group here consisted of the forces of General Model's 9th Army. The southern German group was stronger than the northern one. Generals Goth and Kemf had about twice as many tanks as Model.

The headquarters of the Supreme Command decided not to go over first in the offensive, but to take a tough defense. The plan of the Soviet command was to first bleed the enemy's forces, knock out his new tanks, and only then, bringing in fresh reserves, launch a counteroffensive. I must say that this was a rather risky plan. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, his deputy Marshal Zhukov, and other representatives of the Soviet high command remembered well that never since the beginning of the war had the Red Army been able to organize its defense in such a way that the German offensive prepared in advance was exhausted at the stage of breaking through the Soviet positions (at the beginning of the war near Bialystok and Minsk, then in October 1941 near Vyazma, in the summer of 1942 on the Stalingrad direction).

However, Stalin agreed with the opinion of the generals, who advised not to rush into the start of the offensive. A deep echeloned defense was built near Kursk, which had several lines. It was specially created as an anti-tank one. In addition, in the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which occupied positions on the northern and southern sections of the Kursk salient, respectively, another was created - the Steppe Front, designed to become a reserve formation and join the battle at the moment the Red Army went over to the counteroffensive.

The country's military factories worked uninterruptedly on the production of tanks and self-propelled guns. The troops received both traditional "thirty-fours" and powerful self-propelled guns SU-152. The latter could already with great success fight the "Tigers" and "Panthers".

The organization of the Soviet defense near Kursk was based on the idea of ​​deep echeloning of the combat formations of troops and defensive positions. On the Central and Voronezh fronts, 5-6 defensive lines were erected. Along with this, a defensive line was created for the troops of the Steppe Military District, and on the left bank of the river. Don prepared state defense line. The total depth of the terrain engineering equipment reached 250-300 km.

In total, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops significantly outnumbered the enemy in both men and equipment. The Central and Voronezh fronts numbered about 1.3 million people, and the Steppe Front standing behind them had an additional 500 thousand people. All three fronts had up to 5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 28 thousand guns and mortars at their disposal. The advantage in aviation was also on the Soviet side - 2.6 thousand for us against about 2 thousand for the Germans.

PROCESS OF BATTLE. DEFENSE

The closer the start date of Operation Citadel approached, the more difficult it was to hide its preparations. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it would begin on July 5th. From intelligence reports it became known that the enemy offensive was scheduled for 3 o'clock. The headquarters of the Central (commander K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander N. Vatutin) fronts decided to carry out artillery counterpreparations on the night of July 5. It started at 1 o'clock. 10 min. After the rumble of the cannonade died down, the Germans could not come to their senses for a long time. As a result of the artillery counter-preparation carried out in advance in the areas of concentration of the enemy's strike groups, the German troops suffered losses and began the offensive 2.5-3 hours later than the planned time. Only after a while the German troops were able to begin their own artillery and aviation training. The attack by German tanks and infantry formations began at about half past five in the morning.

The German command pursued the goal of breaking through the defenses of the Soviet troops with a ram attack and reaching Kursk. In the zone of the Central Front, the troops of the 13th Army took the main blow of the enemy. On the very first day, the Germans brought up to 500 tanks into battle here. On the second day, the command of the troops of the Central Front launched a counterattack on the advancing grouping with part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd Panzer Armies and the 19th Panzer Corps. The German offensive was delayed here, and on July 10, it was finally thwarted. For six days of fighting, the enemy wedged into the defense of the Central Front by only 10-12 km.

The first surprise for the German command, both on the southern and northern wings of the Kursk salient, was that Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance of the new German Tiger and Panther tanks on the battlefield. Moreover, Soviet anti-tank artillery and tank guns buried in the ground opened effective fire on German armored vehicles. And yet, the thick armor of German tanks allowed them in some areas to break through the Soviet defenses and wedge into the battle formations of the Red Army units. However, there was no quick breakthrough. Having overcome the first defensive line, the German tank units were forced to turn to sappers for help: the entire space between the positions was densely mined, and the passages in the minefields were well covered by artillery. While the German tank crews were waiting for the sappers, their combat vehicles were subjected to massive fire. Soviet aviation was able to retain air supremacy. Increasingly, Soviet attack aircraft - the famous Il-2 - appeared over the battlefield.

During the first day of fighting alone, Model's group operating on the northern wing of the Kursk salient lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks that participated in the first strike. Soviet losses were also great: only two companies of German "Tigers", advancing against the forces of the Central Front, destroyed 111 T-34 tanks during the period from 5 to 6 July. By July 7, the Germans, having advanced several kilometers forward, approached the large settlement of Ponyri, where a powerful battle began between the shock units of the 20th, 2nd and 9th German tank divisions with the formations of the Soviet 2nd tank and 13th armies. The result of this battle was extremely unexpected for the German command. Having lost up to 50 thousand people and about 400 tanks, the northern strike group was forced to stop. Having moved forward only 10-15 km, Model eventually lost the striking power of its tank units and lost the opportunity to continue the offensive.

Meanwhile, on the southern wing of the Kursk salient, events developed according to a different scenario. By July 8, the shock units of the German motorized formations "Great Germany", "Reich", "Death's Head", the Leibstandard "Adolf Hitler", several tank divisions of the 4th Panzer Army of Gotha and the "Kempf" group managed to penetrate the Soviet defenses up to 20 and more km. The offensive initially went in the direction of the village of Oboyan, but then, due to strong opposition from the Soviet 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army and other formations in this sector, the commander of Army Group South von Manstein decided to strike eastward - in the direction of Prokhorovka ... It was at this settlement that the largest tank battle of the Second World War began, in which up to TWO THOUSAND TANKS and self-propelled guns took part on both sides.

The Battle of Prokhorovka is a largely collective concept. The fate of the opposing sides was decided not in one day and not on the same field. The theater of operations for Soviet and German tank formations represented an area of ​​more than 100 square meters. km. Nevertheless, it was this battle that largely determined the entire subsequent course of not only the Battle of Kursk, but also the entire summer campaign on the Eastern Front.

On June 9, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. Rotmistrov from the Steppe Front to help the troops of the Voronezh Front, who was tasked to deliver a counterattack on the wedged enemy tank units and force them to retreat to their original positions. It was emphasized that it was necessary to try to enter close combat with German tanks in order to limit their advantages in armor resistance and firepower of turret guns.

Concentrating in the Prokhorovka area, on the morning of July 10, Soviet tanks moved into the attack. In quantitative terms, they outnumbered the enemy in a ratio of about 3: 2, but the fighting qualities of German tanks allowed them to destroy many "thirty-fours" on the way to their positions. The fighting continued here from morning until evening. The Soviet tanks that had broken through forward met the German ones practically armor to armor. But this was exactly what the command of the 5th Guards Army was trying to achieve. Moreover, soon the battle formations of the opponents were mixed so much that the "tigers" and "panthers" began to expose their side armor, which was not as strong as the frontal armor, under the fire of Soviet guns. When the battle finally began to subside by the end of July 13, it was time to count the casualties. And they were truly gigantic. The 5th Guards Tank Army practically lost its combat striking power. But German losses also did not allow them to further develop the offensive in the Prokhorov direction: the Germans had only up to 250 serviceable combat vehicles in service.

The Soviet command hastily deployed new forces to Prokhorovka. The battles that continued in this area on July 13 and 14 did not lead to a decisive victory for one side or the other. However, the enemy gradually began to fizzle out. The Germans had the 24th Panzer Corps in reserve, but sending it into battle meant losing the last reserve. The potential of the Soviet side was immeasurably great. On July 15, the Stavka decided to introduce the forces of the Steppe Front of General I. Konev on the southern wing of the Kursk salient - the 27th and 53rd armies with the support of the 4th Guards Tank and 1st Mechanized Corps. Soviet tanks in a hurry were concentrated northeast of Prokhorovka and were ordered on July 17 to go on the offensive. But the Soviet tankers no longer had to participate in a new oncoming battle. German units began to gradually move away from Prokhorovka to their original positions. What's the matter?

Back on July 13, Hitler invited von Manstein and von Kluge to his headquarters for a meeting. On that day, he ordered to continue Operation Citadel and not to reduce the intensity of the fighting. Success at Kursk seemed to be just around the corner. However, just two days later, Hitler suffered a new disappointment. His plans collapsed. On July 12, the troops of Bryansk went on the offensive, and then, from July 15, the Central and left wings of the Western Fronts in the general direction of Orel (Operation Kutuzov). The German defense broke down here and creaked at the seams. Moreover, some territorial successes on the southern wing of the Kursk salient were nullified after the battle at Prokhorovka.

At a meeting at the Fuehrer's headquarters on July 13, Manstein tried to convince Hitler not to interrupt Operation Citadel. The Fuehrer did not object to the continuation of attacks on the southern wing of the Kursk salient (although this was no longer possible on the northern wing of the salient). But the new efforts of Manstein's grouping did not lead to decisive success. As a result, on July 17, 1943, the command of the German ground forces ordered the withdrawal of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps from Army Group South. Manstein had no choice but to retreat.

PROCESS OF BATTLE. The offensive

In mid-July 1943, the second phase of the gigantic battle of Kursk began. On July 12-15, the Bryansk, Central and Western Fronts went on the offensive, and on August 3, after the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts threw the enemy back to their original positions on the southern wing of the Kursk salient, they began the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev "). The fighting in all sectors continued to be extremely difficult and fierce. The situation was further complicated by the fact that in the offensive zone of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts (in the south), as well as in the zone of the Central Front (in the north), the main blows of our troops were delivered not against the weak, but against the strong sector of the enemy defense. This decision was made in order to shorten as much as possible the preparation time for offensive actions, to catch the enemy by surprise, that is, at the very moment when he was already exhausted, but had not yet taken up a solid defense. The breakthrough was carried out by powerful strike groups in narrow sectors of the front, using a large number of tanks, artillery and aviation.

The courage of Soviet soldiers, the increased skill of their commanders, the competent use of military equipment in battles could not but lead to positive results. Already on August 5, Soviet troops liberated Oryol and Belgorod. On this day, for the first time since the beginning of the war, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow in honor of the valiant formations of the Red Army who won such a brilliant victory. By August 23, units of the Red Army threw the enemy back to the west by 140-150 km and liberated Kharkov for the second time.

The Wehrmacht lost 30 elite divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 armored ones; about 500 thousand soldiers killed, wounded and missing; 1.5 thousand tanks; more than 3 thousand aircraft; 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops were even greater: 860 thousand people; over 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns; 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, the balance of forces at the front changed in favor of the Red Army. It had at its disposal an incomparably greater amount of fresh reserves than the Wehrmacht.

The offensive of the Red Army, after the introduction of new formations into battle, continued to increase its pace. In the central sector of the front, the troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts began to advance towards Smolensk. This old Russian city, which has been considered since the 17th century. gate to Moscow, was released on 25 September. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, units of the Red Army in October 1943 reached the Dnieper near Kiev. Having seized several bridgeheads on the right bank of the river on the move, Soviet troops carried out an operation to liberate the Soviet capital. On November 6, a red flag flew over Kiev.

It would be wrong to assert that after the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the further offensive of the Red Army developed unhindered. Everything was much more complicated. So, after the liberation of Kiev, the enemy managed to inflict a powerful counterattack in the area of ​​Fastov and Zhitomir against the forward formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front and inflict considerable damage on us, halting the advance of the Red Army on the territory of the right-bank Ukraine. The situation was even more tense in Eastern Belarus. After the liberation of the Smolensk and Bryansk regions, by November 1943, Soviet troops reached the regions east of Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. However, the subsequent attacks of the Western and Bryansk fronts against the German Army Group Center, which had occupied a tough defense, did not lead to any significant results. It took time to concentrate additional forces on the Minsk direction, to give rest to the formations exhausted in previous battles and, most importantly, to develop a detailed plan for a new operation to liberate Belarus. All this happened in the summer of 1944.

And in 1943, victories at Kursk and then in the battle for the Dnieper completed a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht suffered a final collapse. By the end of 1943, 37 countries were at war with the Axis powers. The disintegration of the fascist bloc began. Among the notable acts of that time was the establishment in 1943 of soldier and commander's awards - the Orders of Glory I, II, and III degrees and the Order of "Victory", as well as as a sign of the liberation of Ukraine - the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky 1, 2 and 3 degrees. A long and bloody struggle still lay ahead, but a radical change had already taken place.

In order to raise the prestige and morale of its troops, to keep the fascist bloc from collapse, the leadership of Nazi Germany in the summer of 1943 decided to launch a new offensive, this time on the Kursk salient. Here the German command concentrated over 900 thousand soldiers and officers, about 2,700 tanks, more than 2 thousand aircraft and about 10 thousand guns and mortars. Hitler pinned great hopes on the new heavy tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", assault guns "Ferdinand", aircraft "Focke-Wulf" FV-190A and "Heinkel" He-129.

The German command planned to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops in two counter strikes from the north and south to Kursk, and then move to the rear of the South-Western Front and defeat them there. After that, an onslaught on the rear of the central grouping of the Red Army was being prepared, which would allow the German troops to launch an offensive on Moscow.

The operation was carefully prepared. The German military-political leadership was confident of success. However, this time too, the aggressors miscalculated. The enemy's plan was unraveled in a timely manner. The Soviet command decided, through a defensive operation, to wear out, weaken the enemy's strike groups, and then go on the offensive along the entire southern sector of the front.

To coordinate the actions of the fronts, the Stavka sent its representatives to the Kursk Bulge area: Marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.
July 5, 1943 the Germans went on the offensive. A battle unprecedented in cruelty and scope unfolded on land and in the air. About 5 thousand aircraft were involved on both sides. It happened that about 300 German bombers and over 100 fighters were simultaneously in the combat area. From July 12 to August 23 alone, Soviet aviation carried out almost 90 thousand sorties (for comparison: during the Battle of Stalingrad, about 36 thousand sorties were made in two months). In air battles, the Belarusian pilot A.K. Gorovets especially distinguished himself.

Suffering huge losses, by July 11, 1943, the enemy had deepened in some sectors of the front by 30-40 km, but did not reach the main goal.

On July 12, the troops of the Voronezh Front launched a counteroffensive. A major tank battle took place in the Prokhorovka area, in which more than 1,100 tanks and self-propelled guns took part. Both sides suffered heavy casualties. On this day, a turning point came in the Battle of Kursk.

The Central Front launched a counteroffensive on 15 July. The troops of the Voronezh Front and the armies of the Steppe Front, which were brought into battle on 18 July, went over to pursuit the enemy. The German offensive on the Kursk Bulge completely failed.

The fascist German command strove to hold their positions to the last soldier. However, it was not possible to stabilize the front. 5 August 1943 Soviet troops liberated Oryol and Belgorod. In commemoration of this victory, the first salute during the war was given in Moscow.

23 August 1943 troops of the Steppe Front liberated Kharkov. The second period of the Battle of Kursk ended - the counteroffensive of the Red Army.

The victory of the Soviet troops at Kursk and their exit to the Dnieper River marked the end of a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War. Germany and her allies were forced to go over to the defensive in all theaters of war.

British Prime Minister W. Churchill, assessing the results of the summer battles in the Kursk salient, noted: "Three great battles for Kursk, Oryol and Kharkov, carried out over two months, marked the collapse of the German army on the Eastern Front."

On August 23, Russia annually celebrates the Day of the defeat of the Nazi German troops by Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk. This is the Day of Military Glory of the Russian Federation, it is celebrated in accordance with the law "On Days of Military Glory and Memorable Dates of Russia" signed by President Boris Yeltsin on March 13, 1995.

74 years ago, on August 23, 1943, Soviet troops liberated Kharkov from the Nazi invaders, completing the last stage of the Battle of the Kursk Bulge.

The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, became one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Soviet and Russian historiography divides the battle into the Kursk defensive (July 5–23), Orel (July 12 – August 18), and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3–23) offensive operations.

Front on the eve of the battle

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west - the so-called Kursk Bulge (or ledge). The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient.

For this, a military operation codenamed Zitadelle ("Citadel") was developed and approved in April 1943.

To carry it out, the most combat-ready formations were involved - a total of 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized ones, as well as a large number of separate units included in the 9th and 2nd field armies of Army Group Center, in 4- Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf of Army Group South.

The grouping of German troops numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft. By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts numbered more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, about 2.9 thousand aircraft.

The troops of the Central Front under the command of General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky defended the northern face (the sector facing the enemy) of the Kursk salient, and the troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin defended the southern one. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front as part of a rifle, three tank, three motorized and three cavalry corps (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev).

The actions of the fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

The course of the battle

On July 5, 1943, German shock groups launched an offensive against Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod regions. During the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk on July 12, the largest tank battle in the history of the war took place on the Prokhorov field.

Up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns participated in it on both sides at the same time. In fierce battles, the Wehrmacht troops lost up to 400 tanks and assault guns, went over to the defensive, and on July 16 began to withdraw their forces. On July 12, the next stage of the Battle of Kursk began - the Soviet counteroffensive.

On August 5, as a result of operations "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev", Oryol and Belgorod were liberated, in the evening of the same day in Moscow in honor of this event, for the first time during the war years, an artillery salute was fired.

On August 23, Kharkov was liberated. Soviet troops advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern directions and took an advantageous position for the transition to a general offensive to liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine and reach the Dnieper. The Soviet army finally consolidated its strategic initiative, the German command was forced to go over to the defensive on the entire front.

In one of the largest battles in the history of World War II, more than 4 million people took part on both sides, about 70 thousand guns and mortars, over 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, about 12 thousand combat aircraft were involved.

Results of the battle

During this battle, Soviet troops defeated 30 German divisions (including 7 tank divisions).

The enemy's losses amounted to 500 thousand killed, wounded and captured (according to the Big Russian Encyclopedia, 2010).

The losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR amounted to more than 860 thousand people, 255 thousand of them were killed and went missing.

For exploits in the Battle of Kursk, more than 180 soldiers and officers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, over 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals.

About 130 formations and units received the rank of guards, more than 20 were - honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov.

For its contribution to the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the Kursk region was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the city of Kursk was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree.

On April 27, 2007, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, Kursk was awarded the honorary title of the Russian Federation - City of Military Glory.

In 1983, the feat of Soviet soldiers on the Kursk Bulge was immortalized in Kursk - on May 9, a memorial to those who died during the Great Patriotic War was opened. On May 9, 2000, in honor of the 55th anniversary of victory in the battle, the Kursk Bulge memorial complex was opened.

On August 23, 1943, Kharkov was occupied by Soviet troops - 10 rifle divisions and 1 tank brigade of the 69th, 7th Guards and 53rd armies.

By 12 o'clock on August 23, Kharkov was completely cleared of fascist troops. Most of the German group defending the city was destroyed. The remnants of it retreated, pursued by Soviet troops, beyond the rivers Merefa and Mzha. The enemy threw a lot of military equipment in the city.

In four battles for Kharkov and during its two-time occupation, the USSR and Germany lost more people than anywhere else in WWII history, including Stalingrad and Berlin. Historians argue that Kharkov did not become a hero city because Stalin considered the liberation of Kharkov to be a shame for the Red Army only on the third attempt.

Memorial complex "Height of Marshal Konev" near Kharkov

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Battles for Kharkov (1941, 1942, 1943)

By the beginning of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1941 - Kharkov was the fourth largest city in the USSR (after Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev), large industrial (production of tanks, steam locomotives, tractors), transport, administrative (until 1934 - the capital of Soviet Ukraine) , scientific, cultural center.

During the German-Soviet war, it was four battles for Kharkov - in October 1941, in May 1942, in February-March 1943, in August 1943.

October 1941

By October 15, 1941, units of the German 55th Army Corps broke through to a distance of about 50 km from Kharkov, overcoming the defenses of the Soviet 38th Army. In the evening of this day, the command of the Soviet South-Western Front received a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme Command - to begin on October 17 the withdrawal to the Oskol River line (about 150 km east of Kharkov).

By order of the command of the Southwestern Front, the 38th Army was supposed to hold positions 30-40 km west of Kharkov until October 23 in order to ensure the evacuation of the products of Kharkov industrial enterprises, as well as the destruction or mining of industrial, transport and other facilities in the city.

However, already on October 20, parts of the German 55th corps reached the outskirts of Kharkov, on October 23, German troops ( 57th Infantry Division, commander - Major General Anton Dostler) began to capture the city. They were opposed by the Soviet 216th Rifle Division, the 57th Rifle Brigade of the NKVD, a militia regiment, a tank battalion (47 tanks) - up to 20 thousand people in total, 120 artillery pieces and mortars, under the command of Major General Marshalkov. After two days of street fighting, by the end of October 24, 1941, Kharkov was taken by the Germans.

May 1942

On March 22, 1942, the command of the Southwestern direction (commander-in-chief - Marshal Timoshenko, chief of staff - Lieutenant General Baghramyan, Commissioner - Khrushchev) appealed to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command with a proposal to conduct a grandiose offensive operation (by the forces of the Bryansk, Southwestern and Southern fronts, reinforced reserves of the Headquarters) on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front - in order to defeat the German troops there and the Soviet troops to enter the Gomel - Kiev - Cherkassy - Pervomaisk - Nikolaev line, that isadvance of about 500 km on a front about 900 km wide.

However, the Headquarters on March 29 rejected this bold initiative and instructed Marshal Tymoshenko to develop a plan to defeat only the Kharkov group of Germans and the liberation of Kharkov (and a further attack on Dnepropetrovsk).

According to the plan developed by April 10, 1942 by Lieutenant General Baghramyan and approved by Marshal Timoshenko, the troops of the Soviet South-Western Front were to deliver two converging strikes against the Kharkov group of Germans: from the north-east - by forces of the 21st, 28th, 38th 1st armies, and from the southeast (from the northern face of the Barvenkovsky ledge) - by the forces of the 6th army and the army group of General Bobkin.

According to this plan, during the first week, Soviet troops were to break through the German defenses, and by the end of the second week - to encircle and destroy the German grouping in the Kharkov region. Then an offensive was planned with the aim of capturing Dnepropetrovsk.

The number of Soviet troops involved at the beginning of this operation was about 400 thousand people (27 rifle divisions, 20 tank brigades, 9 cavalry divisions, 3 motorized rifle brigades).

The number of German troops in the area of ​​operation is about 250 thousand people (8th, 17th, 29th, 51st corps, in total - 13 infantry and 2 tank divisions).

The Soviet offensive on Kharkov began on the morning of May 12, 1942. In three days of heavy fighting, Soviet troops managed to advance 20-25 km (about half the way to Kharkov). By the end of May 14, German troops stopped the Soviet troops and began to deliver counterstrikes.

On the morning of May 17, German troops (army group "von Kleist" - 3 corps (of which one is Romanian), a total of 12 infantry divisions (of which 4 are Romanian), 2 tank and 1 motorized divisions; about 200 thousand people) struck on the southern face of the Barvenkovsky ledge, which was defended by the Soviet 9th and 57th armies of the Southern Front (13 rifle divisions, 4 tank brigades, 3 cavalry divisions; about 170 thousand human).

During the day of May 17, German troops (44th Army and 3rd Motorized Corps) pushed back the troops of the Soviet 9th Army by about 20 km. The Soviet 57th Army managed to hold its positions (the Romanian corps acted against it).

On May 18, German troops pushed back the Soviet 9th Army by another 20-25 km, occupied Barvenkovo ​​and came close to Izyum.

On May 19, the advance of German troops from the southern face of the Barvenkovsky ledge created a threat to encircle the Soviet troops in this ledge - the 6th, 9th, 57th armies and Bobkin's army group. Marshal Timoshenko ordered an end to the attack on Kharkov and focus on repulsing the offensive of the German army group "von Kleist". Soviet 21st, 28th, 38th armies - withdrew to the positions that they occupied before the start of the offensive on May 12.

On May 22, German troops cut off the Barvenkovo ​​ledge. The Soviet 6th and 57th armies and the army group of Kostenko (formerly Bobkin) were surrounded. In total - 16 rifle divisions, 12 tank brigades, 2 motorized rifle brigades, 6 cavalry divisions; only about 150 thousand people. They were kept in a ring of encirclement by 10 German divisions (including 2 tank and 1 motorized), 4 Romanian divisions and 1 Hungarian division.

In the following days, German troops tightened the encirclement, destroying or capturing Soviet units. On May 28, Commissar Gurov, Chief of Staff of the 6th Army Major General Batyunya, and the remnants of units of the 6th Army were able to break through to the east from the encirclement. In the encirclement, the deputy commander of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant General Kostenko, the commander of the 6th Army, Lieutenant General Gorodnyansky, the commander of the 57th Army, Lieutenant General Podlas, the commander of the army group, Major General Bobkin, and several other Soviet generals were killed. A large number of commanders and Red Army men were also killed, many were taken prisoner. The Barvenkovsky ledge was eliminated.

In total, during this operation, the Red Army lost irrevocably (killed and missing) - 170 thousand people, and wounded - 106 thousand ( according to Colonel General Krivosheev).

In addition to human losses, material losses of only the 6th, 9th, 57th armies and the Bobkin army group amounted to 143 thousand rifles, 9 thousand machine guns, 3.6 thousand machine guns, 552 tanks, 1.564 guns, 3.278 mortars, 57.6 thousand horses.

For the failure of this operation, the chief of staff of the South-Western direction, Lieutenant General Baghramyan, was punished - by Stalin's order he was demoted to chief of staff of the 28th Army.

February-March 1943

On January 21, 1943, the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Vasilevsky and the commander of the Voronezh Front, Colonel-General Golikov, presented to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin a plan of the operation to liberate Kharkov. On January 23, this plan was approved by Stalin, with the naming - Operation Star.

On February 2, 1943, the troops of the Voronezh Front began an operation - the 3rd Panzer Army (2 tank corps, 5 rifle divisions, 2 tank brigades, 2 cavalry divisions) attacked from the east to Kharkov, from the north-east - the 69th army (4 rifle divisions) and the 40th Army (1 tank corps, 6 rifle divisions, 3 tank brigades; via Belgorod). To the north, the 38th Army advanced on Oboyan, the 60th Army - on Kursk.

The troops of the Voronezh Front were opposed by the German 2nd Army (7 German infantry divisions against the Soviet 38th and 60th armies) and the Army Detachment Lanz (4 German infantry divisions against the Soviet 3rd Panzer, 69th and 40th armies).

Soviet troops advancing on Kharkov totaled up to 200 thousand human. The German army unit "Lanz" (Armee- Abteilung Lanz ) - counted up to 40 thousand human. This detachment was formed on February 1 from 4 infantry divisions (three divisions were previously part of the Italian 8th Army and were battered in battles, another division arrived in January from the coast of the English Channel).

On the northern flank, the troops of the Voronezh Front captured Kursk on February 8, the 40th Army occupied Belgorod on February 9. However, the advance of the Soviet 3rd Panzer Army to Kharkov was stopped on February 5 by the SS Reich Panzer-Grenadier Division, 45 km east of Kharkov. This division was transferred from France, followed by the SS Panzer-Grenadier Division "Adolf Hitler" from France to the Kharkov region.

On February 15, the troops of the Soviet 3rd Tank Army, the 40th and 69th Armies (a total of 8 tank brigades, 13 rifle divisions) began an assault on Kharkov from three directions. The Soviet troops were opposed by two German SS divisions - "Reich" and "Adolf Hitler". On February 16, these two divisions withdrew from Kharkov, and thus the city was successfully liberated by Soviet troops.

Until March 1, the troops of the Voronezh Front advanced, stopping about 30 km from Poltava. The advance of the front troops in 27 days was 150-250 km.

On March 4, German troops launched an offensive against Kharkov from a southern direction. The SS Panzer Corps (3 divisions) and the 48th Panzer Corps (2 Panzer and 1 Motorized Divisions) attacked the Soviet 3rd Panzer Army. On March 7, Soviet troops began to retreat to Kharkov.

On March 10, German troops approached the northern and southern outskirts of Kharkov; on March 12, street battles began. On March 14, the city and the Soviet 3rd Panzer Army were completely surrounded. On March 15, units of the 3rd TA went to a breakthrough, Kharkov was occupied by German troops.

At the same time, the German offensive on Kursk and Belgorod was underway. Belgorod was occupied by the Germans on March 18, Kursk was held. The troops of the Voronezh Front from 4 to 25 March retreated 100-150 km. The Kursk ledge was formed, it is also the Kursk Bulge, where the famous battle took place in July 1943.

Following the results of the battle for Kharkov, the commander of the Voronezh Front, Colonel-General Golikov, was removed from his post on March 22 (he was appointed head of the personnel department of the People's Commissariat of Defense).

August 1943

On August 3, 1943, Soviet troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts launched an offensive on Kharkov (Operation Rumyantsev). The Soviet troops included 8 tank corps, 3 mechanized corps, 5 separate tank brigades, 50 rifle divisions (in total - 980 thousand people, 2.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 12 thousand guns and mortars). They were opposed by German 4 tank and 14 infantry divisions (up to 300 thousand people, up to 600 tanks and self-propelled guns, 3 thousand guns).

On August 5, Soviet troops took Belgorod. On August 11, the Soviet 53rd, 69th, 7th Guards, 57th armies approached Kharkov from the north and from the east, at a distance of 10-15 km. On the same day, 3 SS Panzer Divisions (Reich, Totenkopf and Viking, urgently transferred from another sector of the front) struck west of Kharkov on the Soviet 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies, which were ordered to On August 12, cut off Kharkov from the south (in the Merefa area). However, three German tank divisions held back two Soviet tank armies for 6 days (and later Merefa was not taken by Soviet troops, until September 5). Perhaps it was one of the most significant tank battles in the Second World War, similar to the battle of Prokhorovka (July 1943) or the battle of Tirgu Frumos (May 1944).

By August 18, Soviet troops broke through to the outskirts of Kharkov. In the afternoon of August 22, German troops began to leave the city. On August 23, Kharkov was occupied by Soviet troops - 10 rifle divisions and 1 tank brigade of the 69th, 7th Guards and 53rd armies.

During Belgorod-Kharkov operations (August 3-23, 1943), Soviet troops lost 71.6 thousand people killed and missing, 184 thousand wounded. 1,864 tanks and self-propelled guns were also lost. The advance of the Soviet troops by the end of the operation was 80-100 km.

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It is not Ivan Konev who should own the laurels of the liberation of Kharkov, say members of the Altruist public search and research journalistic organization.

“The liberation would have been impossible without the feat of the soldiers of two armies: the 1st Tank Army under the command of General Katukov and the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of General Rotmistrov,” says a member of Altruist, front-line soldier Ivan Karasev.

"Altruist" has been studying previously classified military archives for several years, first of all, combat documents of units and formations that took part in the battles for Kharkov. The researchers concluded that the main laurels of the liberator of Kharkov should belong not to Colonel General Ivan Konev, who commanded the Steppe Front, but to Marshal Georgy Zhukov. At that time, he was a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for the Voronezh and Steppe fronts.

It was Zhukov, according to Altruist, who gave the order to move the 1st tank and 5th guards tank armies to the Bogodukhov area in order to repel the impending attack on the flank and rear of the troops of the Steppe Front, liberating Kharkov.

“Only one 1st Tank Army lost 706 tanks in that operation and was actually completely bled,” says Ivan Karasev. - But thanks to the feat of the tankers, the operation to liberate Kharkov did not fail.

Not without major defeats. According to Ivan Karasev, if the headquarters of the Steppe Front had fulfilled Zhukov's order (of August 20, 1943) on the transfer of the 5th Guards Tank Army to the Korotich area in time, the 18th Panzer Corps of the Red Army would not have been surrounded by German troops and destroyed ...

And one more fact. Adolf Hitler personally blessed Field Marshal Manstein to strike near Kharkov - according to the plans of the Wehrmacht, it was near Kharkov that the Germans had to get even with the Red Army for the defeat at the Kursk Bulge. Therefore, the losses suffered by the Red Army near Kharkov were more significant than near Kursk.

But Hitler's plans were thwarted.

Troop operations August-September 1943
on the territory of Kharkiv region

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, August 3-23, 1943

The goal is to defeat the Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping and create conditions for the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine.

The Soviet troops were opposed by the fascist German 4th TA, operative. the "Kempf" group, which were part of the "South" Army Group (General Field Officer E. Manstein) and the aviation of the 4th Air Fleet (a total of about 300 thousand people, over 3 thousand guns and mortars, about 600 tanks and assault guns and over 1000 aircraft).

The intention of the Soviet command was to strike at the enemy with the troops of the adjacent wings of the Voronezh (Army General N.F. Vatutin) and Stepnoy (Regiment General I.S. and, part of the forces of the 69th A, 5th Guards and 1st TA, one tank and one mechanized corps) from the area north-west of Belgorod in the general direction to Bogodukhov, Valki, Nov. Vodolaga, split the enemy grouping into parts and intercept its escape routes from Kharkov to the west and south-west. At the same time, it was planned to deliver the 2nd blow to the 40th and 27th A and 3rd tank. corps in the general direction of Akhtyrka with the task of providing the main forces from the west and isolating the Kharkov region from the enemy's reserves. The joint with the Central Front was provided by the 38th Army. 57th Army South-West. fr. (during the operation transferred to the Steppe Front) advanced southeast of Kharkov with the task of cutting off the enemy's escape routes to the south. The Belgorod-Kharkov operation was planned in 2 stages at the 1st stage - to defeat the enemy north, east and south of Kharkov, at the 2nd stage - to liberate the city. The preparation for the operation was carried out on a tight schedule. The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts numbered over 980 thousand people, over 12 thousand guns and mortars (excluding anti-aircraft artillery and 50-mm mortars), 2.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and about 1300 combat aircraft.

During the offensive that began on August 3, the troops of the fronts inflicted a major defeat on the enemy in the Tomarovka and Borisovka regions and on August 5. liberated Belgorod. Having transferred 4 tank divisions from Donbass, the enemy tried to stop the Soviet troops, but to no avail.

On August 5, on the right wing of the Voronezh Front, the 40th and 27th A.

On August 11, the troops of this front cut the railway. the village of Kharkov - Poltava, and the troops of the Steppe Front approached the Kharkov defenses. bypass. Fearing the coverage of his group, the enemy struck counterstrikes first from the region south of Bogodukhov with the forces of 3 tank divisions against the 1st TA (August 11-17), and then from the Akhtyrka region by the forces of the 3rd TD and the 2nd motorized divisions against the 27th A (August 18-20). Both attacks delayed the offensive of the Voronezh Front for some time, but the enemy did not achieve the set goal. An important role in repelling enemy counterattacks was played by aviation and the 4th Guards brought into battle in the region north and northeast of Akhtyrka (from the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters). and 47th A.

The troops of the Steppe Front, continuing the offensive, broke through the outer defensive bypass of Kharkov by August 13 and began fighting on its outskirts on August 17.

On August 23, troops of the Steppe Front, with the assistance of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts, liberated Kharkov. During the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, 15 enemy divisions were defeated, including 4 tank divisions. Soviet troops advanced in the southern and southwestern directions up to 140 km, expanding the offensive front up to 300 km. Conditions were created for the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine.

In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive when the enemy was exhausted and had not yet taken up a solid defense. To shorten the preparation time for the operation (to exclude a large regrouping), the main strikes were delivered by the fronts not at a weak, but at a strong place of enemy defense. The breakthrough of the enemy's defense was carried out by powerful strike groups in narrow sectors of the front with a density of up to 230 guns and mortars and 70 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of the front. For the courage and courage shown during the liberation of Kharkov, 10 rifle divisions of the Steppe Front were named "Kharkov", 2 rifle divisions and an air regiment for the liberation of Belgorod - "Belgorodskie".

Lit .: Boev M., "In the battles for Belgorod", Voronezh, 1973, Managarov IF, "In the battle for Kharkov", 3rd ed., Kharkov, 1983, Makarenko DG, Oleinik LP, "By the ways of feats" Guide , lane with ukr, Kharkov, 1973.

The offensive operation of the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts, carried out from August 13 to September 22 with the aim of completing the liberation of Donbass.

After the defeat of the Nazi troops at Stalingrad, the troops of the Southwestern (General of the Army R. Ya. Malinovsky) and Southern (General-Colonel, from September 21, General of the Army F.I.Tolbukhin) fronts by mid-February 1943 liberated the eastern part of Donbass and reached the border of the Seversky Donets, north-west of Voroshilovgrad, further along the river. Mius and east of Taganrog. The fascist German command, trying to keep the Donbass, created a powerful defense with a leading edge along pp. Seversky Donets and Mius. In the depths of the defense, defensive lines were erected along pp. Krynka, Kalmius and Samara.

Numerous cities, towns, villages and command heights were equipped as defense centers and strongholds. The line along the river was especially strongly fortified. Mius ("Mius-front"), By the beginning of the Donbass operation, the enemy group defending Donbass (1st TA and 6th A of Army Group "South", Field General E. Manstein) included 22 divisions, including 2 tank. and 1 motor vehicles. (about 540 thousand people, 5400 guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns, about 1100 aircraft). Troops of the South-West (1st Guards, 6th, 12th, 3rd Guards, 46th, 8th Guards. A, 17th VA, 23rd Tank. And 1st Guards. mechanized corps) and Southern (51st, 5th Shock, 2nd Guards, 28th and 44th A, 8th VA, 4th and 2nd Guards mechanized. and 4- 1st Guards Cavalry Corps) of the fronts numbered 1,053 thousand people, about 21 thousand guns and mortars, 1257 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 1400 aircraft.

The headquarters of the Supreme Command set the task of the troops of the Southwestern Front to deliver the main blow from the bridgehead on the river. Seversky Donets in the direction of Barvenkovo, Pavlograd, Orekhov, crush the enemy and, advancing on Zaporozhye, cut off the withdrawal route to the west of the Donbass grouping, the troops of the Southern Front to deliver the main blow from the Kuibyshevo region to Stalino, break through the enemy defenses on the river. Mius, in cooperation with the troops of the South-Western Front, destroy the enemy in the South of Donbass and further advance in the direction of the Crimea and the lower reaches of the Dnieper. The actions of the fronts were coordinated by the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters Marshal Sov. Union A.M. Vasilevsky.

The troops of the right wing of the Southwestern Front were the first to go over to the offensive on August 13, and the main strike group in the center on August 16. The fighting immediately became fierce. The enemy tried to hold the occupied line of defense with strong counterattacks.

On August 18, the front's troops captured the city of Zmiev, which complicated the enemy's position in the Kharkov region. However, the offensive did not develop in the center. On August 18, the troops of the Southern Front, 2nd Guards, went over to the offensive. and 5th Shock A on the same day wedged into the enemy's defenses on the river. Mius up to 10 km. 4th guard. MK, advancing in the zone of the 5th Shock A, by the end of the second day advanced in a westerly direction up to 20 km, crossed the river. Krynka and seized a foothold on her rights. shore. Developing an offensive on Amvrosievka, the troops of the Southern Front dismembered the 6th German fasc. And in two parts, and then attacked the south, and on August 30, with the active assistance of the Azov military flotilla (Rear Adm. SG Gorshkov), they defeated the Taganrog enemy grouping and liberated Taganrog. A large gap was made at the Miussky line, which the enemy could no longer eliminate.

On September 1, the Nazi command began the withdrawal to the west of the 6th A and part of the forces of the 1st TA. Increasing the pace of the offensive, the Soviet troops delivered a number of new strong blows against the retreating enemy forces. On September 8, the city of Stalino was released. The troops of the Southwestern Front threw back the enemy beyond the Dnieper south of Dnepropetrovsk by September 22 and advanced towards Zaporozhye, the troops of the Southern Front reached the line of the r. Dairy. Partisans and underground fighters rendered great assistance to the Soviet troops.
As a result of the Donbass operation, Soviet troops advanced up to 300 km, completed the liberation of Donbass, defeated 13 enemy divisions (including 2 tank divisions). An important coal and metallurgical region was returned to the Soviet country. The exit of Soviet troops to the line of the Dnieper and the river. Dairy created favorable conditions for the liberation of Northern Tavria, Right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea. About 40 formations and units that distinguished themselves most in battles received the honorary names "Artyomovskie", "Gorlovskie", "Mariupol", "Slavyanskie", "Taganrog" and others. the fireworks did take place. A little later, after the successful actions of the Red Army in the Battle of the Kursk Bulge, every significant victory of the Soviet troops began to be celebrated with salutes. And by the end of the war, cannon salvos, loaded with blank shells, died down more than three hundred times. During all the fireworks held, a whole ceremony was developed, in which the fireworks were divided into three categories, each of which corresponded to the significance of the event. At times it also happened that during one evening several salute volleys could sound in honor of several victories at once.

The main venue for the fireworks at that time was Vorobyovy Gory. This traditional place for carrying out fireworks has survived to this day, with the only difference that during the war, guns assembled from different parts were fired, and only by the sixty-seventh year of the last century a special platoon of fireworks installations was specially created. A little later, this platoon was transformed into a battery, and today the battery has already become a special fireworks division, which has no analogues anywhere in the world. At the moment, the division consists of two hundred people, and this is almost three artillery batteries.

The cannons, which to this day provide military salutes during the celebration of the next anniversary of the Great Victory, although they look like new, are in fact examples of weapons created in the forties of the last century. But despite this they are in excellent condition. Although now salutes are held not only on military holidays, it is worth noting that the first traditions of Russian military salute were laid down precisely in 1943.

Late in the evening of August 5, 1943, the voice of the announcer sounded on all radio stations in the country, reading the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In the concluding part it was noted: "Today, on August 5, at 24 o'clock, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, will salute our valiant troops that liberated Oryol and Belgorod with twelve artillery volleys from 124 guns."

Exactly at midnight from 5 to 6 August 1943, artillery thunder struck in the sky of Moscow - the first salute in the Great Patriotic War - in honor of the end of the Battle of Kursk, one of the most outstanding events in the history of the Great Patriotic War, since more forces than in the Moscow and Stalingrad battles combined.

When the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin gathered members of the Headquarters and the General Staff, he addressed them with the following words:

“... Even in ancient times, when the troops were victorious, all the bells were buzzing in honor of the commanders and their troops. And it would be nice for us to somehow celebrate victories more tangibly, and not only with congratulatory orders. We think - he nodded his head at those sitting at the table - to give artillery salutes in honor of the distinguished troops and the commanders who lead them. And to create some kind of illumination ... ".

Commander of the Moscow Air Defense Front, General D.A. Zhuravlev was urgently summoned to the State Defense Committee (GKO) and informed the order of the Headquarters: to solemnly celebrate the liberation of the Soviet cities of Oryol and Belgorod with a salute.

Zhuravlev immediately had a question: where to get the guns and blank shells. He turned to the commandant of the Kremlin. He had only 24 mountain guns. Another 100 guns were recruited from various air defense artillery batteries in such a way as not to violate Moscow's air defense. It turned out to be more difficult to find blank shells, which were found a little over a thousand pieces. And then it was reported to the State Defense Committee that the salute would be fired by 12 artillery volleys from 124 guns. Thus, the number of volleys was borrowed from old Russian traditions, but 124 guns could then be distinguished so as not to disrupt the air defense of the capital.

Two days after the first fireworks, "Pravda" published poems dedicated to him by Alexander TWARDOVSKY.

Soon it was decided to salute all the victorious military operations of the Soviet army on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. In total, before the end of the war, 355 salutes were fired in Moscow, but on May 9, 1945, the most jubilant salute sounded - 30 artillery volleys from 1000 guns.

After the first victorious salute with 12 volleys from 124 guns, the artillery victorious salutes were divided into three categories. The first - 24 salvoes from 324 guns (the number of guns of the first salute plus 200). This salute marked the victories of the Soviet army in the liberation of the capitals of the union republics, the capitals of other states, as well as for the successful completion of especially important military operations on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Such a salute was first produced in November 1943 - in honor of the liberation of the capital of Ukraine, Kiev. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, 23 salutes of the first category were produced. The second category of fireworks - 20 salvoes from 224 guns (the number of guns of the first salute plus 100) ... The first salute of the second category was fired for the first time in Moscow on 23 August 1943 in honor of the liberators of the city of Kharkov. The third category of salutes is 12 volleys from 124 guns.