Barbarossa Army Group Plan. What was Barbarossa's plan? Development of the USSR Armed Forces since the signing of the non-aggression pact

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Basis of the plan.

Plan Barbarossa(Directive No. 21. Plan "Barbarossa"; German. Weisung Nr. 21. Fall Barbarossa, presumably after the name of the King of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa) - the code name of the plan for the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR developed in 1940-1941, the implementation of which was subsequently undertaken in the form of the eponymous Operation Barbarossa. The main task - “to defeat Soviet Russia in one short-term campaign”, using the experience of applying the “blitzkrieg” strategy in Europe. The economic subsection of the plan related to the exploitation of the territory of the USSR was called the Oldenburg Plan (Goering's Green Folder).

Military-political situation

In 1940, Germany captured Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and defeated France. Thus, by June 1940, Germany managed to radically change the strategic situation in Europe, remove France from the war and expel the British army from the continent. The victories of the Wehrmacht gave rise to hopes in Berlin for a quick end to the war with England, which would allow Germany to devote all its strength to the defeat of the USSR, and this, in turn, would free its hands to fight the United States. However, Germany failed to force Britain to make peace. The war continued, with fighting taking place at sea, in North Africa and in the Balkans. In June 1940, preparations began for the implementation of a plan for an amphibious operation to land a combined assault force on the English coast called Sea Lion. During the planning, however, it gradually became clear to the Wehrmacht command that a throw across the English Channel could turn into an operation with an uncertain result, associated with heavy losses.

In October 1940, preparations for the Sea Lion were curtailed until the spring of 1941. Germany made attempts to attract Spain and France to an alliance against England, and also initiated negotiations with the USSR. At the Soviet-German negotiations in November 1940, Germany invited the USSR to join the Tripartite Pact and “divide the inheritance of England,” but the USSR, formally recognizing the possibility of such a step, set conditions that were clearly unacceptable to Germany.

Start of development

First data

The work of Karl Klee mentions that “On June 2, 1940, after the end of the first phase of the French campaign, Hitler visited the headquarters of Army Group A at Charleville.”. A. N. Yakovlev further quotes K. Klee:

Before the meeting began, he walked... with the commander of Army Group A (von Rundstedt) and the group's chief of staff (von Sodenstern). As if conducting a personal conversation, Hitler said that if, as he expected, France “falls away” and is ready to conclude a reasonable peace, then he will finally have a free hand to carry out his real task - to get rid of Bolshevism. The question is - as Hitler said verbatim - how “I will tell my child about this.”

Collection 1941. Book. 1, doc. No. 3, M.: MF "Democracy", 1998

In the future, G. von Rundstedt and G. von Sodenstern will take part both in the development of the plan for the “Eastern Campaign” and its implementation in 1941.

On June 22, 1940, on the day the Compiegne Armistice was signed and exactly a year before the start of the “Eastern Campaign,” F. Halder suggested in his military diary: “The near future will show whether our successes will force England to take the path of prudence or whether she will try to continue the war alone.”. And already on June 25, the Chief of the OKH General Staff mentioned the discussion of the creation of strike groups (in Poland, a kind of "Springboard in the East"): “new emphasis: striking force in the East (15 infantry, 6 tanks, 3 motorized vehicles)”.

"English" and "Eastern Problems"

On June 30, 1940, F. Halder writes about “a conversation with Weizsäcker, who reported Hitler’s opinion”: “The main focus is on the East”. Ernst von Weizsäcker quoted the Fuhrer:

We will probably have to demonstrate our strength once more to England before she stops fighting and will untie our hands in the East.

F. Halder War diary. Section June 1940

Based on the results of these negotiations with State Secretary von Weizsäcker, the Chief of the General Staff “I considered it necessary to make a note for myself - to analyze the possibilities and prospects of a military campaign against the Soviet Union”. On July 3, after a discussion with the chief of the operational department of the OKH General Staff, G. von Greifenberg, he already appears "the first specific entry in Halder's diary relating to the preparation of aggression against the Soviet Union" :

At present, the English problem, which should be developed separately, and the Eastern problem are in the foreground. The main content of the latter: a method of delivering a decisive blow to Russia in order to force it to recognize the dominant role of Germany in Europe

F. Halder War diary. Section July 1940

Thus, at the beginning of July, “Hitler’s main military-political decision” in the diary of the Chief of the General Staff “was written down in such a categorical form.” The military leadership then set itself two strategic goals simultaneously: “English problem” and “Eastern problem”. According to the decision of the first - “related to the operation against England”; on the same day, they discussed “the creation of a working group at the General Staff headed by Greifenberg” and the drawing up in the near future of a draft operational plan for a landing on the British Isles.

On the “Eastern problem” on July 4, Halder talked with the commander of the 18th Army, the “conqueror of Paris,” General G. von Küchler and Chief of Staff E. Marx: "I briefed them on the 18th Army's missions relating to operational problems in the East." Also noted was the report of the head of the “Foreign Armies - East” department, Colonel Eberhard Kinzel, “on the grouping of Russian troops,” which served as the basis for all subsequent calculations in the development of the Barbarossa plan. A characteristic feature of the materials presented by Kinzel was an underestimation of the forces located near the border of the 1st strategic echelon, and especially the reserves of the Red Army.

The USSR as the last barrier to German domination in Europe

Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1971-070-61, Hitler mit Generalälen bei Lagebesprechung

The decision to war with the USSR and the general plan for the future campaign were announced by Hitler at a meeting with the high military command on July 31, 1940, shortly after the victory over France. In his diary of the Chief of the General Staff, Franz Halder quotes Hitler's statement:

England's Hope - Russia and America. If hopes for Russia collapse, America will also fall away from England, since the defeat of Russia will result in the incredible strengthening of Japan in East Asia. […]

If Russia is defeated, England will lose its last hope. Then Germany will dominate Europe and the Balkans. Conclusion: According to this reasoning, Russia must be liquidated. Deadline: spring 1941.

The sooner we defeat Russia, the better. The operation will only make sense if we defeat the entire state with one swift blow. Just capturing some part of the territory is not enough. Stopping action in winter is dangerous. Therefore, it is better to wait, but make a firm decision to destroy Russia.

F. Halder also notes that Hitler initially determined “the beginning [of the military campaign] is May 1941, the duration of the operation is five months”. The operation itself breaks down into:

1st hit: Kyiv, exit to the Dnieper; aviation destroys crossings. Odessa. 2nd strike: Through the Baltic states to Moscow; in the future, a two-pronged attack - from the north and south; later - a private operation to capture the Baku region.

War planning by OKH and OKW headquarters

The leading place in planning Germany's war against the USSR was taken by the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces (OKH), led by its chief, Colonel General F. Halder. Along with the General Staff of the Ground Forces, an active role in planning the “eastern campaign” was played by the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW), led by General A. Jodl, who received instructions directly from Hitler

OKH plan

On July 22, 1940, Halder set the first specific tasks for developing plans for a war against the USSR to the head of the operational department of the OKH General Staff, Colonel H. Greifenberg. The head of the department of foreign armies of the East, Lieutenant Colonel E. Kinzel, and, from July 24, the military-geographical department of the General Staff were also involved in this work. To speed up the development of the plan for the “eastern campaign,” Halder ordered the involvement of General E. Marx, who had been considered the best specialist on Russia since the First World War.

At the beginning of August, Marx presented his project for Operation Ost, which took into account all the data available at the General Staff on the armed forces and economy of the USSR, on the characteristics of the terrain, climate and the condition of the roads of the future theater of military operations. In accordance with Marx’s development, for the war against the USSR it was planned to deploy 147 divisions. To deliver the main blow, it was planned to create a strike group north of the Pripyat marshes. The second strike was planned to be delivered south of Pripyat. The outcome of the entire campaign against the USSR, it was emphasized in the development, would largely depend on the effectiveness of attacks by tank and motorized formations. The total duration of the “eastern campaign” was determined by Marx in 9-17 weeks. During this time, German troops were supposed to reach the Rostov-Gorky-Arkhangelsk line.

At the beginning of September, General Marx, on the instructions of Halder, handed over all the prepared materials on planning the “eastern campaign” to General F. Paulus, who had just been appointed to the post of first chief quartermaster and permanent deputy chief of the general staff. Under his leadership, members of the General Staff continued to develop proposals for the creation of a group of troops for the war against the USSR, their strategic concentration and deployment. On October 29, a memorandum was presented to Halder "Original sketch of the OKH General Staff regarding the operational principles for waging war against the Soviet Union". It noted the advantage of German troops over Soviet troops in combat experience and, as a consequence, the possibility of their successful actions in conditions of a maneuverable, fleeting war.

Paulus proceeded from the assumption that the Soviet forces deployed against Germany would amount to approximately 125 rifle divisions, 50 tank and mechanized brigades. The arrival of reserves was determined by the following schedule: 3 were expected before the third month of the war 0-40 Russian divisions, until the sixth month - still 100 divisions. However, German intelligence was unable to discover the creation of a second strategic echelon, the appearance of which in July 1941 would be an unpleasant surprise for the command of the ground forces.

Paulus believed that decisive superiority in forces and means could be achieved through a surprise attack. To achieve this, it was proposed to develop a set of measures to disinformation the Soviet leadership. Like Marx, Paulus considered it necessary to deprive the Red Army troops of the opportunity to retreat into the interior of the country and conduct a mobile defense. The German groups were given the task envelop, encircle and destroy enemy troops, preventing them from retreating .

OKW plan

At the same time, at the headquarters of the OKW operational leadership, at the direction of General Jodl, the development of its own version of the “eastern campaign” was underway. Based on the Fuhrer’s instructions, Jodl ordered Lieutenant Colonel B. Lossberg from the national defense department (operational) to prepare a draft directive for the “eastern campaign” and conduct research related to the involvement of Finland, Turkey and Romania in the war against the USSR. Lossberg completed his development on September 15, 1940. In contrast to the version of the OKH General Staff, they envisaged the creation of three strategic groupings: two north of the Pripyat swamps and one south of them. The main blow was supposed to be delivered by the central group in the area between the Dnieper and the Western Dvina in order to cut through the Soviet forces in the Minsk region, and then advance in the general direction of Moscow. According to this project, the northern group was supposed to advance from East Prussia to the line of the Western Dvina with the goal of capturing the Baltic states, and then Leningrad. The southern group would strike on both flanks with the task of encircling and destroying Soviet troops on the territory of Western Ukraine, and during the subsequent offensive to cross the Dnieper, capture the rest of Ukraine, while establishing direct contact with the central group. In the future, it was planned to combine the actions of three strategic groupings to reach the line Arkhangelsk - Gorky - Volga (to Stalingrad) - Don before it flows into the Sea of ​​Azov.

Final revision and approval

In November-December 1940, the OKH General Staff continued to clarify and map out developments on actions in the main strategic directions, on the distribution of forces and means for the offensive, and also coordinated the results of this work with the OKW operational leadership headquarters. In the course of clarifying the plan of the campaign, they came to the conclusion that it was necessary to divide the Soviet defense front into separate sections, where they would try to blockade the Soviet troops, depriving them of the opportunity to retreat. It was considered most expedient to create three strike groups, of which the northern one would advance on Leningrad, the central one - through Minsk to Smolensk, the southern one - on Kyiv, and the strongest was to be the central one. In total, it was planned to use 105 infantry, 32 tank and motorized divisions in the “eastern campaign”.

In the first half of December, the OKW operational headquarters began putting together the options for the “eastern campaign” plan and preparing a draft directive from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. On December 17, Jodl reported the prepared draft directive to Hitler. Hitler made a number of comments. In his opinion, it was very important to ensure a breakthrough of the Soviet defense and the rapid advance of motorized forces both north and south of the Pripyat marshes, after which they should turn to the north and south in order to encircle and destroy the Red Army troops in the Baltic states and the Ukraine. Hitler believed that an attack on Moscow would be possible only after the capture of the Baltic states and Ukraine, which would isolate the Soviet Union from the Baltic and Black Seas. He also stressed that all problems associated with the war in Europe must be resolved in 1941, since in 1942 the United States would be in a position to enter the war.

Directive No. 21 "Plan Barbarossa"

Variant "Barbarossa"

On December 18, 1940, after making some clarifications to the project, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, which received the code name “Barbarossa Option” and became the main guiding document in the war against the USSR. The German armed forces were given the task of “defeating Soviet Russia in one short-term campaign,” for which it was supposed to use all ground forces with the exception of those that performed occupation functions in Europe, as well as approximately two-thirds of the air force and a small part of the navy. With rapid operations with deep and rapid advance of tank wedges, the German army was supposed to destroy the Soviet troops located in the western part of the USSR and prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready units into the interior of the country. Subsequently, quickly pursuing the enemy, German troops had to reach a line from where Soviet aviation would not be able to carry out raids on the Third Reich. The ultimate goal of the campaign is to reach the Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line, creating there, if necessary, conditions for the German Air Force to “influence Soviet industrial centers in the Urals.”

The immediate strategic goal of the war against the USSR was the defeat and destruction of Soviet troops in the Baltic states, Belarus and Right-Bank Ukraine. It was assumed that during these operations the Wehrmacht would reach Kyiv with fortifications east of the Dnieper, Smolensk and the area south and west of Lake Ilmen. The further goal was to timely occupy the militarily and economically important Donetsk coal basin, and in the north to quickly reach Moscow. The directive required operations to capture Moscow to begin only after the destruction of Soviet troops in the Baltic states and the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt.

The task of the German Air Force was to disrupt the opposition of Soviet aviation and support its own ground forces in decisive directions. The naval forces were required to ensure the defense of their coast, preventing the Soviet fleet from breaking through from the Baltic Sea. After the neutralization of the Soviet fleet, they had to provide German maritime transport in the Baltic and supply the northern flank of the ground forces by sea.

The invasion was scheduled to begin at May 15, 1941. The estimated duration of the main hostilities was 4-5 months according to plan.

Operational and strategic planning

With the completion of the development of the general plan for Germany's war against the USSR, operational-strategic planning was transferred to the headquarters of the branches of the armed forces and formations of troops, where more specific plans were developed, tasks for the troops were clarified and detailed, and measures were determined to prepare the armed forces, the economy, and the future theater of military operations for war. actions.

Under the leadership of Paulus, the OKH General Staff spent more than a month preparing a directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops, taking into account Hitler's instructions made at a meeting of the Wehrmacht leadership at Berghof on January 9, 1941. Speaking at the meeting, the Fuhrer emphasized that the armed forces of the USSR should not be underestimated, although they represent a “clay colossus without a head.” He demanded that the best forces be allocated and operations carried out in such a way as to cut off Soviet troops in the Baltic states as quickly as possible and not to gradually oust them along the entire front.

OKH Directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of the Wehrmacht

In January 1941, a number of games were held on maps, and the basics of the actions of German troops in each of the operational directions were formulated. As a result, a meeting was held in Berlin on January 31, 1941, at which Field Marshal von Brauchitsch informed that the German plan was based on the assumption of a Red Army battle west of the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper. A.V. Isaev notes that “regarding the last remark, von Bock noted skeptically in his diary”:

When I asked Halder if he had any definite information that the Russians would hold the territory in front of the mentioned rivers, he thought for a moment and said: “This may well be the case.”

Isaev A.V. Unknown 1941. The stopped blitzkrieg.

According to Isaev, “German planning from the very beginning proceeded from a certain assumption based on general reasoning”, because “the actions of the enemy, that is, the Red Army, could differ from those assumed by the German high command”.

However, on January 31, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal W. von Brauchitsch, signed OKH Directive No. 050/41 on the strategic concentration and deployment of the Wehrmacht, and on February 3, together with Halder, reported it to Hitler. The directive, which developed and concretized the principles of the war against the USSR, set out in Directive No. 21, defined specific tasks for all army groups, armies and tank groups to a depth that ensured the achievement of the immediate strategic goal: the destruction of the Red Army troops west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina. Measures were envisaged for the interaction of ground forces with the Air Force and Navy, cooperation with allied states, transfer of troops, etc.

The main task, according to the directive, was to “ carry out extensive preparatory measures that would make it possible to defeat Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign even before the war against England was over" It was planned to achieve this by delivering quick and deep strikes by powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps with the goal of disuniting and destroying the main forces of the Soviet troops in the western part of the USSR, preventing the retreat of their combat-ready units into the vast interior regions of the country. The fulfillment of this plan, the directive said, would be facilitated by attempts by large formations of Soviet troops to “stop the German offensive on the line of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers.”

The German leadership proceeded from the need to ensure the defeat of Soviet troops along the entire front line. As a result of the planned grandiose “border battle,” the USSR should have had nothing left except 30-40 reserve divisions. This goal was supposed to be achieved by an offensive along the entire front. The Moscow and Kiev directions were recognized as the main operational lines. They were provided by army groups “Center” (48 divisions were concentrated on a 500 km front) and “South” (40 German divisions and significant Allied forces were concentrated on a 1250 km front). Army Group North (29 divisions on a 290 km front) had the task of securing the northern flank of Group Center, capturing the Baltic states and establishing contact with Finnish troops. The total number of divisions of the first strategic echelon, taking into account the Finnish, Hungarian and Romanian troops, was 157 divisions, of which 17 tank and 13 motorized, and 18 brigades.

On the eighth day, German troops were supposed to reach the line Kaunas - Baranovichi - Lvov - Mogilev-Podolsky. On the twentieth day of the war, they were supposed to capture territory and reach the line: Dnieper (to the area south of Kyiv) - Mozyr - Rogachev - Orsha - Vitebsk - Velikiye Luki - south of Pskov - south of Pärnu. This was followed by a pause of twenty days, during which it was planned to concentrate and regroup formations, give rest to the troops and prepare a new supply base. On the fortieth day of the war, the second phase of the offensive was to begin. During it, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass.

Particular importance was attached to the capture of Moscow: “ The capture of this city means a decisive success both politically and economically, not to mention the fact that the Russians will lose their most important railway junction" The Wehrmacht command believed that the Red Army would throw its last remaining forces to defend the capital, which would make it possible to defeat them in one operation.

The Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line was indicated as the final line, but the German General Staff did not plan the operation that far.

After the report to Hitler, OKH Directive No. 050/41 was sent to the headquarters of the army groups, air force and naval forces. On the recommendation of the General Staff, bilateral command and staff games were held in army groups. After discussing their results at meetings of the main command of the ground forces with representatives of the army groups, the headquarters of the army groups developed operational plans for their formations, which were reviewed on February 20 at the OKH General Staff.

Adjusting attack plans

In connection with Hitler's decision to expand the scale of Operation Marita (attack on Greece), which required the involvement of additional forces, in mid-March 1941, changes were made to the war plan against the USSR, mainly concerning actions on the southern flank of the German group. The 12th Army, which was supposed to operate here, was, by order of Hitler, fully committed to Greece and was left there after the end of the Balkan campaign. In this regard, it was considered possible, at the first stage of the war against the USSR, to limit the actions of the German-Romanian troops on the eastern border of Romania, for the leadership of which a new army command was formed on the territory of Romania - the 11th, which was to be completely redeployed there by mid-May .

Hitler's instructions to change the plan for Operation Barbarossa were reflected in Brauchitsch's Directive No. 644/41 of April 7, 1941. It indicated that the allocation of additional forces for the Balkan campaign required postponing the start of the operation to a later date - four to six weeks. All preparatory measures, including the transfer of mobile formations necessary for the offensive in the first operational echelon, were required by the directive to be completed approximately by 22nd of June .

V.I. Dashichev noted that at a meeting on April 30, 1941, where Hitler announced the start date of the war against the USSR - June 22 - OKH Commander-in-Chief von Brauchitsch gave the following forecast of military operations on the Eastern Front: “ Supposedly major border battles lasting up to 4 weeks. Only minor resistance should be expected in the future».

In order to maintain secrecy, the armed forces of Romania, Hungary and Finland received specific tasks just before the start of the war.

Military-political, economic and ideological goals of Operation Barbarossa

The plan for the attack on the USSR also included the use of resources from the occupied territories, determined by the Oldenburg plan, developed under the leadership of Reichsmarschall Goering and approved by Hitler on April 29, 1941. This document provided for the seizure and placement at the service of the Reich of all reserves of raw materials and large industrial enterprises in the territory between the Vistula and the Urals. The most valuable industrial equipment was supposed to be sent to the Reich, and that which could not be useful to Germany was to be destroyed. It was planned to decentralize the territory of the European part of the USSR economically and make it an agricultural and raw materials appendage of Germany. It was proposed to divide the territory of the European part of the USSR into four economic inspectorates (Leningrad, Moscow, Kyiv, Baku) and 23 economic commandant’s offices, as well as 12 bureaus. Later it was planned to divide this territory into seven states economically dependent on Germany.

On May 9, 1941, Alfred Rosenberg made a report to the Fuhrer on the plan to dismember the USSR and create local government bodies. On the territory of the USSR it was planned to create five Reichskommissariats, divided into general commissariats and, further, into districts. The plan was adopted with a number of amendments.

The military-political and ideological goals of Operation Barbarossa are evidenced by a number of statements by Hitler.

As follows from the words of the chief of staff of the operational leadership of the OKW, General A. Jodl (entry dated March 3, 1941), Hitler stated the following:

The upcoming war will be not only an armed struggle, but also at the same time a struggle between two worldviews. To win this war in conditions where the enemy has a huge territory, it is not enough to defeat his armed forces, this territory should be divided into several states, headed by their own governments, with which we could conclude peace treaties ...

Every large-scale revolution brings to life phenomena that cannot simply be cast aside. It is no longer possible to eradicate socialist ideas in today's Russia. These ideas can serve as an internal political basis for the creation of new states and governments. The Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia, which represents the oppressor of the people, must be removed from the scene. The former bourgeois-aristocratic intelligentsia, if it still exists, primarily among emigrants, should also not be allowed to come to power. It will not be accepted by the Russian people and, moreover, it is hostile towards the German nation. This is especially noticeable in the former Baltic states. Moreover, we must under no circumstances allow the Bolshevik state to be replaced by a nationalist Russia, which will ultimately (as history shows) once again confront Germany.

The Great Patriotic War

German attack plan on the USSR

Adolf Hitler studying a map of Russia

The Soviet-Finnish war served as a harsh lesson for the country's leadership, showing that our army, weakened by mass repressions, was not ready for a modern war. Stalin made the necessary conclusions and began to take measures to reorganize and re-equip the army. In the upper echelons of power there was complete confidence in the inevitability of war, and the task was to have time to prepare for it.

Hitler also understood our unpreparedness. In his inner circle, he said shortly before the attack that Germany had made a revolution in military affairs, ahead of other countries by three to four years; but all countries are catching up, and Germany may soon lose this advantage, and therefore it is necessary to solve the military problems on the continent in a year or two. Despite the fact that Germany and the USSR made peace in 1939, Hitler still decided to attack the Soviet Union, as it was a necessary step towards world domination by Germany and the “Third Reich”. German intelligence officers came to the conclusion that the Soviet army was in many ways inferior to the German one - it was less organized, less prepared and, most importantly, the technical equipment of Russian soldiers left much to be desired. It should be emphasized that the British intelligence service MI6 also played a role in inciting Hitler against the USSR. Before the war, the British managed to acquire the German Enigma encryption machine and thanks to this they read all the encrypted correspondence of the Germans. From Wehrmacht encryption they knew the exact timing of the attack on the USSR. But before Churchill sent a warning to Stalin, British intelligence tried to use the information they received to spark a German-Soviet conflict. She also owns a fake that was distributed in the United States - supposedly the Soviet Union, having received information about Hitler's impending attack, decided to get ahead of him and was itself preparing a preemptive strike on Germany. This disinformation was intercepted by Soviet intelligence and reported to Stalin. The widespread practice of fakes caused him to distrust all information about the imminent Nazi attack.

Plan Barbarossa

In June 1940, Hitler instructed Generals Marx and Paulus to develop a plan for an attack on the USSR. On December 18, 1940, the plan, codenamed Plan Barbarossa, was ready. The document was produced in only nine copies, of which three were presented to the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces, air force and navy, and six were hidden in the safes of the Wehrmacht command. Directive No. 21 contained only a general plan and initial instructions on waging war against the USSR.

The essence of the Barbarossa plan was to attack the USSR, taking advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness, defeat the Red Army and occupy the Soviet Union. Hitler placed the main emphasis on modern military equipment that belonged to Germany and the effect of surprise. The attack on the USSR was planned in the spring-summer of 1941, the final date of the attack was made dependent on the success of the German army in the Balkans. Setting a deadline for aggression, Hitler said: “I will not make the same mistake as Napoleon; when I go to Moscow, I will set out early enough to reach it before winter.” The generals convinced him that a victorious war would last no more than 4-6 weeks.

At the same time, Germany used the memorandum of November 25, 1940 to put pressure on those countries whose interests were affected by it, and primarily on Bulgaria, which in March 1941 joined the fascist coalition. Soviet-German relations continued to deteriorate throughout the spring of 1941, especially with the invasion of Yugoslavia by German troops hours after the signing of the Soviet-Yugoslav Friendship Treaty. The USSR did not react to this aggression, as well as to the attack on Greece. At the same time, Soviet diplomacy managed to achieve a major success by signing a non-aggression pact with Japan on April 13, which significantly reduced tension on the Far Eastern borders of the USSR.

Tank group

Despite the alarming course of events, the USSR, until the very beginning of the war with Germany, could not believe in the inevitability of a German attack. Soviet supplies to Germany increased significantly due to the renewal of the 1940 economic agreements on January 11, 1941. In order to demonstrate its “trust” to Germany, the Soviet government refused to take into account the numerous reports received since the beginning of 1941 about an attack on the USSR being prepared and did not take the necessary measures on its western borders. Germany was still viewed by the Soviet Union "as a great friendly power."

According to the “Barbarossa Plan,” 153 German divisions were involved in aggression against the USSR. In addition, Finland, Italy, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary intended to participate in the upcoming war. Together they fielded another 37 divisions. The invasion force consisted of about 5 million soldiers, 4,275 aircraft, 3,700 tanks. The troops of Germany and its allies were united into 3 army groups: “North”, “Center”, “South”. Each group included 2-4 armies, 1-2 tank groups, and from the air German troops were supposed to cover 4 air fleets.

The most numerous was the army group "South" (Field Marshal von Rundstedt), consisting of German and Romanian soldiers. This group was tasked with defeating Soviet troops in Ukraine and Crimea and occupying these territories. Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Bock) was supposed to defeat Soviet troops in Belarus and advance to Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow. Army Group North (Field Marshal von Leeb), with the support of Finnish troops, was to capture the Baltic states, Leningrad, and the Russian North.

Discussion of the OST plan

The final goal of the “Barbaros plan” was the destruction of the Red Army, access to the Ural ridge and the occupation of the European part of the Soviet Union. The basis of German tactics was tank breakthroughs and encirclements. The Russian company was supposed to become a blitzkrieg - a lightning war. Only 2-3 weeks were allotted to defeat the Soviet troops located in the western regions of the USSR. General Jodl told Hitler: “In three weeks this house of cards will fall apart.” The entire campaign was planned to be carried out in 2 months.

German troops received instructions to carry out a policy of genocide towards the Slavic and Jewish populations. According to the OST plan, the Nazis intended to destroy 30 million Slavs, and the rest were to be converted into slaves. The Crimean Tatars and the peoples of the Caucasus were considered as possible allies. The enemy army was an almost perfect military mechanism. The German soldier was rightfully considered the best in the world, the officers and generals were excellently trained, the troops had a wealth of experience in combat operations. The most significant drawback of the German army was the underestimation of the enemy’s forces - German generals considered it possible to wage war in several theaters at once: in Western Europe, in Eastern Europe, in Africa. Later, already during the Great Patriotic War, such miscalculations as lack of fuel and unpreparedness for combat operations in winter conditions would take their toll.

Gabriel Tsobekhia

Plan Barbarossa, or Directive 21, was developed with the utmost care. Much attention was paid to the flow of disinformation designed to hide intentions to attack the Soviet Union. But difficulties arose during Operation Barbarossa. The reason and details of the failure of the blitzkrieg in the USSR.

Adolf Hitler getting acquainted with the map of the Barbarossa plan, on the left by Field Marshal Keitel, 1940.

By 1940, things were looking up for Hitler. Left behind is the political struggle with opponents. Power was already completely concentrated in his hands. Plans to capture Europe were carried out practically without a hitch. The new blitzkrieg tactics fully justified the hopes placed on it. However, Hitler understood that in order to dominate the conquered states, he needed to provide the people with agricultural and industrial resources. But the German economy was already working at full capacity, and it was unrealistic to squeeze anything more out of it. The time has come to begin a new chapter of German history. The chapter to which Adolf Hitler decided to give the code name “Barbarossa” plan.

The German Fuhrer dreamed of building a great empire that would dictate its will to the whole world. In the first half of the 19th century, German foreign policy brought a number of independent states to their knees. Hitler managed to subjugate Austria, Czechoslovakia, part of Lithuania, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Luxembourg, Belgium and France. Moreover, just over a year has passed since the beginning of World War II. The most obvious and problematic enemy for Germany at that time was England. Despite the official non-aggression pact signed between Germany and the Soviet Union, no one had any illusions on this score. Even Stalin understood that an attack from the Wehrmacht was just a matter of time. But he felt calm while the confrontation between Germany and England was going on. The experience gained in the First World War gave him such confidence. The Russian Generalissimo was firmly convinced that Hitler would never start a war on two fronts.

Contents of Operation Barbarossa. Hitler's plans

According to the Lebensraum policy in the East, the Third Reich needed a territory rich in natural resources and large enough to comfortably accommodate a master race. Today, the phrase “living space” will mean little to a non-specialist. But since the late thirties, it was as familiar to any German as today, for example, the phrase “integration into Europe.” There was an official term "Lebensraum im Osten". Such ideological preparation was also important for the implementation of Operation Barbarossa, the plan for which at that time was in the development stage.

Barbarossa Plan Map

On December 17, 1940, Hitler was presented with a document detailing the operation to capture the Soviet Union. The ultimate goal was to push the Russians back beyond the Urals and create a barrier along the line from the Volga to Arkhangelsk. This would cut off the army from strategically important military bases, functioning factories and oil reserves. In the original version, it was supposed to achieve all goals in one push.

Hitler was generally pleased with the development, but made some adjustments, the most significant of which was the division of the campaign into two stages. First it was necessary to capture Leningrad, Kyiv and Moscow. This was followed by a strategic pause, during which the winning army received rest, strengthened morally and increased its strength using the resources of the defeated enemy. And only then should the final victorious breakthrough take place. However, this did not cancel the blitzkrieg technique. The entire operation took two, maximum three months.

What was Barbarossa's plan?

The essence of the approved Barbarossa plan, which the Fuhrer signed in December 1940, was a lightning-fast breakthrough across the Soviet border, the rapid defeat of the main armed forces and pushing the demoralized remnant away from points strategically important for defense. Hitler personally chose the code name for the German command. The operation was called Plan Barbarossa or Directive 21. The ultimate goal was to completely defeat the Soviet Union in one short-term campaign.

The main forces of the Red Army were concentrated on the western border. Previous military campaigns have proven the effectiveness of using tank divisions. And the concentration of the Red Army soldiers was to the advantage of the Wehrmacht. Tank wedges cut into the enemy ranks like a knife through butter, spreading death and panic. The remnants of the enemy were surrounded, falling into the so-called cauldrons. The soldiers were either forced to surrender or finished off on the spot. Hitler was going to advance the offensive on a broad front in three directions at once - southern, central and northern.

Surprise, speed of advance, and reliable detailed data on the disposition of Soviet troops were extremely important for the successful execution of the plan. Therefore, the start of the war was postponed until the end of spring 1941.

Number of troops to implement the plan

In order to successfully launch Operation Barbarossa, the plan involved secretly gathering Wehrmacht forces to the country's borders. But the movement of 190 divisions had to be somehow motivated. Since World War II was in full swing, Hitler devoted all his efforts to convincing Stalin that the seizure of England was a priority. And all troop movements were explained by redeployment to wage war with the West. Germany had 7.6 million people at its disposal. Of these, 5 million had to be delivered to the border.

The general balance of forces on the eve of the war is shown in the table “The balance of forces of Germany and the USSR at the beginning of the Second World War.”

The balance of forces between Germany and the USSR at the beginning of the Second World War:

From the table above it is clear that the superiority in the number of equipment was clearly on the side of the Soviet Union. However, this does not reflect the real picture. The fact is that the economic development of Russia at the beginning of the century was significantly slowed down by the civil war. This affected, among other things, the state of military equipment. Compared to German weapons, it was already outdated, but the worst thing is that a very large part of it was physically unusable. She was only conditionally combat-ready and very often needed repairs.

Moreover, the Red Army was not equipped for wartime. There was a catastrophic shortage of personnel. But what’s even worse is that even among the available fighters, a significant part were untrained recruits. And on the German side were veterans who had gone through real military campaigns. Taking this into account, it becomes clear that on Germany's part the attack on the Soviet Union and the opening of a second front was not such a self-confident action.

Hitler took into account the development of Russia at the beginning of the century, the state of its weapons, and the deployment of troops. His plan to cut deep into the Soviet army and redraw the political map of Eastern Europe to suit himself looked quite feasible.

Direction of the main attack

Germany's attack on the Soviet Union was not like a targeted spear strike at one point. The attack came in three directions at once. They are listed in the table “Offensive Objectives of the German Army.” This was the Barbarossa plan, which marked the beginning of the Great Patriotic War for Soviet citizens. The largest army, led by Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt, moved south. Under his command were 44 German divisions, 13 Romanian divisions, 9 Romanian brigades and 4 Hungarian brigades. Their task was to capture all of Ukraine and provide access to the Caucasus.

In the central direction, an army of 50 German divisions and 2 German brigades was led by Field Marshal Moritz von Bock. He had at his disposal the most trained and powerful tank groups. He was supposed to capture Minsk. And after that, according to the approved scheme, through Smolensk, move to Moscow.

The northward advance of 29 German divisions and Army Norway was led by Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb. His task was to occupy the Baltic states, establish control over the sea outlets, take Leningrad and move to Murmansk through Arkhangelsk. Thus, these three armies were eventually to reach the Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line.

Goals of the German army's attack:

Direction	South	Center	North
Commanding	Karl von Rundstedt	Moritz von Bock	Wilhelm von Leeb
Army size	57 divisions	50 divisions 2 brigades	29 divisions Army "Norway"
Goals	Ukraine Caucasus (exit)	Minsk Smolensk	Baltics Leningrad Arkhangelsk Murmansk

Neither the Fuhrer, nor the field marshals, nor ordinary German soldiers doubted the quick and inevitable victory over the USSR. This is evidenced not only by official documents, but also by the personal diaries of military commanders, as well as letters sent from ordinary soldiers from the front. Everyone was euphoric from previous military campaigns and anticipated a quick victory on the eastern front.

Implementation of the plan

The outbreak of war with the Soviet Union only strengthened Germany's belief in a quick victory. The German advanced divisions managed to easily crush the resistance and enter the territory of the USSR. The field marshals acted strictly as the secret document instructed them. Plan Barbarossa began to come to fruition. The results of the first three weeks of the war for the Soviet Union were extremely discouraging. During this time, 28 divisions were completely disabled. The text of Russian reports indicates that only 43% of the army remained combat-ready (from the number at the beginning of hostilities). Seventy divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.

The first German attack on the USSR was on June 22, 1941. And by July 11, the main part of the Baltic states was occupied, and the approach to Leningrad was cleared. In the center, the German army advanced at an average speed of 30 km per day. Von Bock's divisions reached Smolensk without much difficulty. In the south they also made a breakthrough, which was planned to be done at the first stage, and the main forces were already in sight of the Ukrainian capital. The next step was to take Kyiv.

There were objective reasons for such dizzying successes. The tactical factor of surprise disorientated not only Soviet soldiers on the ground. Large losses in the first days of the war were suffered due to poor coordination of actions in defense. It should not be forgotten that the Germans followed a clear and carefully planned plan. And the formation of the Russian defensive resistance was almost spontaneous. Often commanders simply did not receive reliable messages about what was happening in time, so they could not react accordingly.

Among the reasons why Soviet Russia suffered such significant losses at the beginning of the war, Candidate of Military Sciences, Professor G.F. Krivosheev identifies the following:

• The suddenness of the blow.
• Significant numerical superiority of the enemy at the points of contact.
• Preemption in the deployment of troops.
• The real combat experience of German soldiers, contrasted with the large number of untrained recruits in the first echelon.
• Echelon deployment of troops (the Soviet army was gradually drawn up to the border).

Germany's failures in the north

After the vigorous capture of the Baltic states, the time has come to sweep away Leningrad. The Army “North” was entrusted with an important strategic task - it was supposed to provide the Army “Center” with freedom of maneuver during the capture of Moscow, and the Army “South” the ability to carry out operational-strategic tasks.

But this time the Barbarossa plan failed. On August 23, the newly formed Leningrad Front of the Red Army managed to stop the Wehrmacht forces near Koporye. On August 30, after heavy fighting, the Germans were able to reach the Neva and cut off railway communications to Leningrad. On September 8th they occupied Shlisselburg. Thus, the northern historical capital found itself enclosed in a blockade ring.

Blitzkrieg clearly failed. A lightning-fast takeover, as was the case with the conquered European states, did not work out. On September 26, the advance of Army North towards Leningrad was stopped by Red Army soldiers under the command of Zhukov. A long blockade of the city began.

The situation in Leningrad was very difficult. But for the German army this time was not in vain. We had to think about supplies, which were actively hampered by the activities of the partisans along the entire length of the route. The joyful euphoria from the rapid advance into the interior of the country also subsided. The German command planned to reach the extreme lines in three months. Now, headquarters were increasingly openly recognizing the Barbarossa plan as a failure. And the soldiers were exhausted from the protracted, endless battles.

Failures of the Army "Center"

While Army North was trying to conquer Leningrad, Field Marshal Moritz von Bock led his men to Smolensk. He clearly understood the importance of the task assigned to him. Smolensk was the last step before Moscow. And the fall of the capital, according to the plans of German military strategists, should have completely demoralized the Soviet people. After this, the conquerors would only have to trample individual scattered pockets of resistance.

Although by the time the Germans approached Smolensk, Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb, the commander of Army North, was unable to ensure the possibility of unimpeded deployment of troops towards the upcoming main attack, for Army Center everything was still going well. They reached the city with a vigorous march and, ultimately, Smolensk was taken. During the defense of the city, three Soviet armies were surrounded and defeated, and 310 thousand people were captured. But the fighting continued from July 10 to August 5. The German army was again losing momentum in its advance. In addition, von Bock could not count on support from the troops of the northern direction (as was supposed to be done if necessary), since they themselves were stuck in one place, maintaining the cordon around Leningrad.

It took almost a month to capture Smolensk. And for another whole month there were fierce battles for the city of Velikiye Luki. It was not strategically important, but the battles delayed the advance of the German army. And this, in turn, gave time to prepare for the defense of Moscow. Therefore, from a tactical point of view, it was important to hold the line for as long as possible. And the Red Army men fought furiously, despite the losses. They not only defended themselves, but also raided the enemy’s flanks, thereby further dispersing their forces.

Battle for Moscow

While the German army was held at Smolensk, the Soviet people managed to thoroughly prepare for defense. For the most part, defensive structures were erected by the hands of women and children. An entire layered defense system has grown up around Moscow. We managed to complete the people's militia.

The attack on Moscow began on September 30. It had to consist of a rapid, one-time breakthrough. But instead, the Germans, although they moved forward, did so slowly and painfully. Step by step they overcame the defense of the capital. Only by November 25 did the German army reach Krasnaya Polyana. There were 20 km left to Moscow. Nobody believed in the Barbarossa plan anymore.

The Germans never got further than these lines. And already at the beginning of January 1942, the Red Army pushed them back 150 kilometers from the city. A counteroffensive began, as a result of which the front line was pushed back by 400 km. Moscow was out of danger.

Failures of the Army "South"

Army “South” met resistance all the way through the territory of Ukraine. The forces of the Romanian divisions were pinned down by Odessa. They could not support the attack on the capital and serve as reinforcements for Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt. However, the Wehrmacht forces reached Kyiv relatively quickly. It took only 3.5 weeks to reach the city. But in the battles for Kyiv itself, the German army got bogged down, as in other directions. The delay was so significant that Hitler decided to send reinforcements from Army Center units. The Red Army soldiers suffered huge losses. Five armies were surrounded. Only 665 thousand people were captured. But Germany was wasting time.

Each delay delayed the moment of impact on the main forces of Moscow. Each day won gave more time to the Soviet army and militia forces to prepare for defense. Every extra day meant the need to bring supplies to German soldiers who were far away in the territory of a hostile country. It was necessary to deliver ammunition and fuel. But the worst thing is that the attempt to continue to adhere to the Barbarossa plan approved by the Fuhrer triggered the reasons for its failure.

Firstly, the plan was thought out and calculated really well. But only under the condition of blitzkrieg. As soon as the pace of advance across enemy territory began to slow down, his objectives became untenable. Secondly, the German command, in an attempt to patch up its crumbling brainchild, sent many additional directives, which often directly contradicted one another.

Map of the German advance plan

When examining the plan for the advance of German troops on the map, it is clear that it was developed holistically and thoughtfully. For months, German intelligence officers meticulously collected information and photographed the territory. The wave of a prepared German army was supposed to sweep away everything in its path and free up fertile and rich lands for the German people.

The map shows that the first blow had to be delivered in a concentrated manner. Having destroyed the main military forces, the Wehrmacht expanded across the territory of the Soviet Union. From the Baltics to Ukraine. This made it possible to continue to disperse enemy forces, encircle them and destroy them in small portions.

Already on the twentieth day after the first strike, the Barbarossa plan prescribed occupying the line Pskov - Smolensk - Kyiv (with cities inclusive). Next, a short rest was planned for the victorious German army. And already on the fortieth day after the start of the war (by the beginning of August 1941), Leningrad, Moscow and Kharkov were supposed to submit.

After this, it remained to drive the remnants of the defeated enemy beyond the Astrakhan-Stalingrad-Saratov-Kazan line and finish it off on the other side. Thus, space was made available for a new Germany, spreading throughout central and eastern Europe.

Why Germany's blitzkrieg failed

Hitler himself stated that the failure of the operation to capture the Soviet Union was due to false premises based on incorrect intelligence. The German Fuhrer even claimed that, given the correct information, he would not have approved the start of the offensive.

According to the data available to the German command, there were only 170 divisions available in the Soviet Union. Moreover, they were all concentrated on the border. There was no information about reserves or additional lines of defense. If this were really the case, Barbarossa's plan would have every chance of being brilliantly executed.

Twenty-eight divisions of the Red Army were completely destroyed during the first breakthrough of the Wehrmacht. In 70 divisions, approximately half of all equipment was disabled, and personnel losses amounted to 50% or more. 1,200 planes were destroyed, which did not even have time to take off.

The offensive really crushed and divided the main enemy forces with one powerful blow. But Germany did not count on powerful reinforcements or the incessant resistance that followed. After all, having captured the main strategic points, the German army really could have dealt with the remnants of scattered units of the Red Army in just a month.

Reasons for failure

There were other objective factors why the blitzkrieg failed. The Germans did not particularly hide their intentions regarding the destruction of the Slavs. Therefore, they offered desperate resistance. Even in conditions of complete cutoff, shortage of ammunition and food, the Red Army soldiers continued to fight literally until their last breath. They understood that death could not be avoided, so they sold their lives dearly.

Difficult terrain, poor condition of roads, swamps and swamps, which were not always mapped in detail, also added headaches to German commanders. At the same time, this area and its features were well known to the Soviet people and they made full use of this knowledge.

The huge losses suffered by the Red Army were greater than among German soldiers. But the Wehrmacht could not do without killed and wounded. None of the European campaigns had such significant losses as on the eastern front. This also did not fit into the blitzkrieg tactics.

The spreading front line, like a wave, looks quite nice on paper. But in reality, this meant dispersal of units, which, in turn, added difficulties for the convoy and supply units. In addition, the possibility of a massive strike on points of stubborn resistance was lost.

The activity of partisan groups also distracted the Germans. They were counting on some help from the local population. After all, Hitler assured that ordinary citizens, oppressed by the Bolshevik infection, would gladly stand under the banners of the arriving liberators. But this did not happen. There were very few defectors.

Numerous orders and directives that began to pour in after the main headquarters recognized the failure of the blitzkrieg, along with open competition between the generals of the advancing army, also contributed to the deterioration of the Wehrmacht's position. At that time, few people realized that the failure of Operation Barbarossa marked the beginning of the end of the Third Reich.

PLAN “BARBAROSSA” is the code name for the plan of attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, approved by Hitler in secret directive No. 21 of December 18, 1940. Named after the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa.

The destruction of the USSR was central to a series of German war plans based on the concept of lightning war. By attacking the USSR, the Nazi leadership after the surrender of France hoped to remove the last obstacle to the establishment of German domination over Europe and provide favorable preconditions for continuing the war for world domination. Already on July 3, 1940, the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces took up the question of “how to deliver a decisive blow to Russia in order to force it to recognize Germany’s dominant role in Europe.”

Based on the initial calculations of this headquarters, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal General V. Brauchitsch, on July 21, 1940, at a meeting at Hitler’s headquarters, expressed his readiness to launch a campaign against the USSR even before the end of the current year. However, on July 31, 1940, Hitler decided to attack the USSR around mid-May 1941 in order to give the Wehrmacht the opportunity to better prepare for “the destruction of the life force of Russia” within five months. By that time, the transfer of German troops from Western Europe to the borders of the USSR and the careful development of a plan for its defeat had already begun. On August 9, 1940, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) issued the Aufbau Ost directive on the equipment of areas of strategic concentration and deployment of a group of German troops in the east, intended to attack the USSR.

The main role in developing the plan for the Wehrmacht’s “eastern campaign” was played by the General Staff of the Ground Forces. Its first options, presented by the operational department, provided for the offensive of a strike group of German troops, first in the direction of Kyiv, and then striking from Ukraine to the north with the aim of capturing the capital of the USSR. The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces proposed to deliver the main blow in the direction of Moscow and only after its capture to launch strikes from the north against the rear of the Soviet troops in Ukraine. In accordance with his instructions, Major General E. Marx prepared the “Operational Plan East” on August 5, 1940. It was based on the idea of ​​an offensive by the main German forces north of the Pripyat marshes in the Moscow direction. After capturing Moscow, they had to turn south in order to, in cooperation with another group of German troops advancing south of the Pripyat marshes, occupy Ukraine. Another group was supposed to advance in the Leningrad direction and cover the northern flank of the main group during its breakthrough to Moscow.

On September 3, 1940, further development of the Wehrmacht’s “eastern campaign” plan was entrusted to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, 1st Oberquartermaster, Lieutenant General F. Paulus. Under his leadership, the plan for an attack on the USSR was refined and approved by Hitler on December 18, 1940.

From intelligence reports and other sources of information, the Soviet Union knew about the existence of the plan, but Stalin refused to believe in the possibility of a German attack on the USSR. The general idea of ​​the plan was to split the front of the main forces of the Russian army concentrated in the western part of Russia and defeat them even before reaching the Dnieper-Western Dvina line through deep, rapid advances of tank wedges. Then develop an offensive in the direction of Leningrad (Army Group North), Moscow (Army Group Center) and Kyiv (Army Group South). The main blow was delivered in the zone from the Baltic Sea to the Pripyat marshes by the forces of Army Groups “North” and “Center”. The most numerous and powerful Army Group Center was supposed to destroy Soviet troops in Belarus, assist Army Group North and Finnish troops in capturing Leningrad, and then capture Moscow. The capture of the capital of the USSR, as was believed by the General Staff, was supposed to bring decisive success to the entire eastern campaign of the Wehrmacht. Army Group South, reinforced by Romanian troops, was supposed to defeat Soviet troops in Right Bank Ukraine and capture Kiev and the Donetsk basin. It was assumed that with the entry of German troops to the Astrakhan-Volga-Arkhangelsk line, the war would be ended victoriously. However, soon after Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the Barbarossa plan began to fail. Despite the rapid advance into the interior of the USSR, the Wehrmacht was unable to achieve decisive success in any sector of the Soviet-German front until the winter of 1941-1942, and in the Battle of Moscow suffered its first major defeat since the beginning of World War II.

When developing the Barbarossa plan, Hitler and his generals overestimated their capabilities and underestimated the strength of the Soviet Union, the dedication of Soviet soldiers and officers, and their ability to improve their military skills during the battles and battles imposed by the invader.

Historical sources:

Dashichev V.I. Hitler's strategy. The path to disaster 1933 - 1945: historical essays, documents and materials: in 4 volumes. T.3. The bankruptcy of the offensive strategy in the war against the USSR. 1941 - 1943. M., 2005

Halder F. War diary. Per. with him. T. 2. M., 1969.