VOLUNTEER ARMY

In the autumn of 1917, Russia was slipping into a nationwide crisis: a peasant war broke out, the Russian army was decomposing. At this time, at the top of the military command, concerned about the outcome of the war with Germany, the idea arose to create an army of volunteers in the deep rear, which would support the collapsed front.

October 30, 1917 General Mikhail Vasilievich Alekseev, the former chief of staff of the supreme commander in chief (he was Tsar Nicholas II himself), the recognized leader of the "right non-party" generals, left Petrograd for the Don to form the armed forces to fight simultaneously with the Germans and the Bolsheviks.

general-l-t M.S. Pusovoitenko Nicholas II from infatheria M.V. Dlekseev

One of the first who began to organize the military to fight the Bolsheviks was General Mikhail Vasilievich Alekseev.

He was born on November 3 (15), 1857 in the Tver province in the family of a soldier who rose to the rank of officer. Mikhail Alekseev himself in 1873 entered the 2nd Rostov Grenadier Regiment as a volunteer. After graduating from the Tver classical gymnasium and the Moscow infantry cadet school in 1876, she was enrolled in the 64th Kazan Infantry Regiment with the rank of ensign. As part of this regiment, he participated in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, during the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905. already served in the rank of quartermaster general of the 3rd Manchurian army. the first world war he began as chief of staff of the armies of the Southwestern Front, in 1915 - commander of the Western Front, then chief of staff under the emperor, ended the war - Supreme Commander of the Russian Army (March 11, 1917 - May 21, 1917). It should be noted that Alekseev was among those who played an active role in the abdication of the emperor. He supported the Chairman of the State Duma Mikhail Vladimirovich Rodzianko and actually persuaded the commanders-in-chief of the fronts to support the idea of ​​the tsar's abdication.

Alekseev has come a long way from a soldier to the Supreme Commander. As Supreme Commander, he tried to stop the further collapse of the army, spoke out against the Soviets and the soldiers' committees in the armed forces, tried to save the soldiers from "agitators" and restore the system of one-man command. However, the destructive processes, to the launch of which he himself had a hand, could no longer be stopped. Alekseev was removed from the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief when he sharply spoke out against the "Declaration of the Rights of the Soldier", which he supported Alexander Fyodorovich Kerensky.

The Kornilov rebellion took place from 25 to 30 August 1917. Opponents were the supreme commander of the army General Kornilov and Prime Minister Kerensky. The events of those days raise more questions than answers. The official version says that General Kornilov rebelled and tried to seize power. He tried to concentrate power in his own hands in order to become the sole ruler of Russia, destroying the fruits of the February Revolution. After the suppression of the rebellion, many generals were arrested and imprisoned in the Bykhov prison.

A group of arrested generals and officers led by Kornilov during the period of Bykhov's confinement. By numbers: 1. L. G. Kornilov; 2. A. I. Denikin; 3. G. M. Vannovsky; 4. I. G. Erdeli; 5. E. F. Elsner; 6. A. S. Lukomsky; 7. V. N. Kislyakov; 8. I. P. Romanovsky; 9. S. L. Markov; 10. M. I. Orlov; 11. A. F. Alad'in; 12. A. P. Bragin; 13. V. M. Pronin; 14. Ensign S. F. Nikitin; 15. Ensign A. V. Ivanov; 16. I. V. Nikanorov (Nikonorov); 17. L. N. Novosiltsev; 18. G. L. Chunikhin; 19. I. A. Rodionov; 20. I. G. Soots; 21. V. V. Kletsanda. Autumn 1917

Leaving, Alekseev knew that the Cossacks themselves would not go to establish order in Russia, but would defend their territory from the Bolsheviks and thereby provide a base for the formation of a new army on the Don.

November 2, 1917 M. V. Alekseev arrived in Novocherkassk, and this day was subsequently marked by participants in the white movement, as birthday of the Volunteer Army.

Alexey Maksimovich Kaledin to Alekseev's call to "give shelter to Russian officers" he expressed "principled sympathy", but, pushed by the left, democratic wing of his associates, he hinted that it would be better to choose Stavropol or Kamyshin as the center of the new "Alekseev organization". Nevertheless, General Alekseev and his entourage remained in Novocherkassk, hiding behind the principle "no extradition from the Don."

The transfer of cadet schools from Kiev and Odessa began to the Don. The policy of the Soviet Power increased the influx of officers. The order of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee of October 25, 1917, stated that officers who "directly and openly" join the revolution should be immediately arrested "as enemies" after which many officers from Petrograd and Moscow went singly and in groups to the Don.

The arrivals settled down in Novocherkassk, in the infirmary No. 2 on the corner of Barochnaya and Platovsky prospect. During November it was possible to assemble a detachment of officers and a company of cadets, cadets and midshipmen who arrived from Petrograd and Moscow. The evacuated Konstantinovsky and Mikhailovsky artillery schools were reduced to one battery. In addition, the remnants of the St. George Regiment arrived under the command of Colonel Kiriyenko, who were consolidated into one St. George company.

Infantry company of the Volunteer Army, formed from guards officers. January 1918

When, at the end of November 1917, the performance of workers and Red Guards began in Rostov, supported by the landing of the Black Sea sailors, the Don ataman A. M. Kaledin could not oppose him with real forces: the Cossack and soldier regiments kept neutrality. The only combat-ready unit turned out to be the "Alekseevskaya organization" - a consolidated officer company (up to 200 people), a cadet battalion (over 150 people), a Mikhailovsko-Konstantinovskaya battery (up to 250 people) and a Georgievskaya company (up to 60 people). Colonel Prince Khovansky led these units and led the guards into battle. From November 26 to December 1, battles went on with varying success, until the Military Circle gathered and forced the Cossack units to suppress the performance in Rostov, which was done on December 2, 1917.

A new stage began when a general arrived on the Don on December 6, 1917 Lavr Georgievich Kornilov, very popular among officers.

The influx of volunteers has increased. General A. I. Denikin later wrote: "Everyone who really sympathized with the idea of ​​struggle and was able to endure its hardships went to our peculiar Zaporizhzhya Sich." Nevertheless, the social composition of the "volunteers" had its own characteristics. In 1921, M. Latsis described it: "Junkers, officers of the old time, teachers, students and all young students - after all, this is all, in its vast majority, a petty-bourgeois element, and it was they who made up the combat formations of our opponents, and it was from it that consisted of White Guard regiments. Especially important role officers played among these elements.

7. Officer of the Artillery General of the Drozdovsky Brigade
8. Officer of the 2nd Officer Rifle General Drozdovsky Regiment
9. Officer of the 2nd Cavalry General Drozdovsky Regiment
10. Non-commissioned officer of the 1st Cavalry General Drozdovsky Regiment
11. Officer of the Alekseevsky artillery division (1920)
12. Officer of the Partisan General Alekseev Infantry Regiment (1919)

1. Variants of the sleeve insignia of the Kornilov shock regiments and the Artillery General Kornilov brigade
2. Variants of the "national" chevron and the Kornilov "shock" chevron
3. Variants of sleeve insignia of the 2nd Cavalry General Drozdovsky Regiment (1919-1920)

Before the First World War, the Russian officer corps was all-class. There was no caste, but there was isolation. During the war, the officer corps grew about five times. By 1917, career officers occupied posts no lower than the commander of a regiment or battalion, all lower levels were occupied by wartime officers, the vast majority of whom were peasants. A number of contemporaries believed that the quality of officers had improved. “While the renegades of the secondary school used to come here, the war sent to schools a lawyer, an engineer, an agronomist, a student, a public teacher, an official, and even a former “lower rank” with St. George distinctions. The war united them all into one family, and the revolution gave breadth and scope to noble skills and sweeping, youthful energy. The specifics of the profession contributed to the selection of people with a protective, patriotic orientation for officer posts. Part of the officer corps, as you know, went over to the side of the Bolsheviks, but among those who rushed to the Don, 80% were monarchists in their political views. In general, by definition Anton Ivanovich Denikin, an independent "military-public movement" has matured and formed.

Formation was still slow. Calling front-line officers to leave the ranks of the old army for the sake of the Volunteer Army meant opening the front to the Germans. We had to rely on the rear, on vacationers, on the recovered wounded.

Meanwhile, in December 1917, the Kornilov shock regiment headed by Colonel M. O. Nezhentsev arrived from Kiev to the Don. The officers assembled in Novocherkassk were consolidated into the 1st Novocherkassk battalion. In Rostov, General Cherepov created the 2nd Rostov officer battalion from officers; here, Colonel Gerschelman formed a cavalry division.

Officially, the creation of the Volunteer Army and the opening of entry into it was announced on December 24, 1917. On December 25, L. G. Kornilov took command of the army.

Created its own artillery. It consisted of three batteries. One battery was “stolen” from the 39th Infantry Division at the Torgovaya station, 2 guns were taken from a warehouse in Novocherkassk to pay tribute to those who died in the battles for Rostov and lost, and one battery was bought from the Cossacks for 5 thousand rubles.

On January 14, 1918, due to the "left" of the Don government, the center for the formation of the Volunteer Army was moved to Rostov. Here, the formation of the 3rd Rostov officer battalion and the Rostov volunteer regiment, which consisted mainly of Rostov students, was already underway. The regiment was commanded by General Borovsky. In addition, the "death division" of the Caucasian cavalry division of Colonel Shiryaev and the cavalry detachment of Colonel Glazenap arrived.

Having not completed the formation, the army (if it could be called that) immediately after crossing into Rostov got involved in battles, covering the city from the west from the revolutionary units sent to suppress the "Kaledinshchina". The battles showed that "in the majority, highly valiant commanders crept up ..." and the rank and file were distinguished by stamina and ruthlessness.

In January-February 1918, it became clear that the Cossacks did not support the "volunteers" and were neutral at best. Local anti-Bolshevik detachments - "partisans" - consisted of Novocherkassk students, realists, high school students, seminarians and cadets. There were few Cossacks in them.

After the suicide of General A. M. Kaledin, the anti-Bolshevik forces on the Don were practically surrounded. Not having a specific plan of where to go, the army command slipped out of the ring by maneuver and withdrew the army.

In the village of Olginskaya, it was decided to move to the Kuban, where volunteer detachments were also being formed. The volunteer army moved into the legendary 1st Kuban or "Ice" campaign.

Before the start of the Kuban campaign, the losses of the Dobroarmia amounted to 1½ thousand people, including at least a third of those killed.

On February 22, 1918, under the onslaught of the Red troops, the Dobrarmia units left Rostov and moved to the Kuban. The famous "Ice March" (1st Kuban) of the Volunteer Army (3200 bayonets and sabers) began from Rostov-on-Don to Yekaterinodar with heavy fighting, surrounded by a 20,000-strong group of red troops under the command of Ivan Lukich Sorokin.

General M. Alekseev said before the campaign:

In the village of Shenzhiy, on March 26, 1918, a 3,000-strong detachment of the Kuban Rada joined the Volunteer Army under the command of General Victor Leonidovich Pokrovsky.

The total strength of the Volunteer Army increased to 6,000 soldiers.

March 27-31 (April 9-13) The Volunteer Army made an unsuccessful attempt to take the capital of the Kuban - Yekaterinodar, during which Commander-in-Chief General Kornilov was killed by a random grenade on March 31 (April 13), and the command of the army units in the most difficult conditions of complete encirclement by many times superior enemy forces was taken by General Denikin, who was able, in the conditions of incessant fighting on all sides, to withdraw the army from flank attacks and safely exit the encirclement to the Don.

This was largely due to the energetic actions of Lieutenant General S. L. Markov, commander of the Officer Regiment of the General Staff, who distinguished himself in battle on the night of April 2 (15) to April 3 (16), 1918 when crossing the Tsaritsyn-Tikhoretskaya railway.

The army was never able to deploy at least to the size of a full-blooded division. "The people's militia did not come out ...", wrote A. I. Denikin, lamenting that "the panels and cafes of Rostov and Novocherkassk were full of young and healthy officers who had not entered the army." There were a little more than 3800 bayonets and sabers. Three officer battalions were reduced to an officer regiment under the command of General Sergei Leonidovich Markov, "Georgievites" were poured into the Kornilov regiment, the unformed Rostov regiment - into the cadet battalion.

The Don partisans who joined the army formed a partisan regiment under the command of General A. . P. Bogaevsky.

Naturally, it was impossible to overthrow the Bolshevik regime with such forces, and the "volunteers" set themselves the task of holding back the pressure of Bolshevism, which was still unorganized, and thereby giving time "to strengthen a healthy public and people's self-consciousness." The insight that the "volunteers" hoped for - alas! - It didn't come...

Small in number, but orderly regiments went to the Zadonsk steppes. Ahead was a campaign, each battle in which was a bet on life or death. Ahead was a desperate and bloody Cossack uprising, which gave the "volunteers" massive support, ahead was a campaign against Moscow, and there was a retreat to the Black Sea.

Novorossiysk, Crimea, Tavria, emigration ... Ahead was " white legend"and that ordinary march, when the column of the Officers' Regiment fell under the rain, and then under the icy wind and suddenly appeared before the comrades-in-arms clad in ice armor, which shone dazzlingly under the rays of the unexpectedly peeping sun ...

How the Volunteer Army was created

100 years ago, on January 7, 1918, the Volunteer Army was created in Novocherkassk to fight the Bolsheviks. Trouble in Russia was gaining momentum. Reds, whites, nationalists formed their troops, with might and main they were in charge of various gangs. The West was preparing for the dismemberment of the murdered Russian Empire.

The army received its official name Volunteer. This decision was made at the suggestion of General Lavr Kornilov, who became its first commander in chief. Political and financial leadership was entrusted to General Mikhail Alekseev. The army headquarters was headed by General Alexander Sergeevich Lukomsky.

The official appeal of the headquarters, published two days later, said: “The first immediate goal of the Volunteer Army is to resist an armed attack on the south and southeast of Russia. Hand in hand with the valiant Cossacks, at the first call of his Circle, his government and military ataman, in alliance with the regions and peoples of Russia who rebelled against the German-Bolshevik yoke - all Russian people gathered in the south from all over our Motherland will defend to the last drop of blood, the independence of the regions that gave them shelter and are the last stronghold of Russian independence. At the first stage, about 3 thousand people signed up for the Volunteer Army, more than half of them were officers.

From the history

In conditions complete decomposition of the old army, General Mikhail Alekseev decided to try to form new units outside the composition of the former army on a voluntary basis.

100 years ago, the Volunteer Army was created, which focused on the fight against the Bolsheviks and Russia's allies in the Entente. The demobilization of the Russian army led to the fact that millions of soldiers and about 400 thousand officers were released from service. It is clear that this event could not remain without consequences. There should have been people who would try to organize the military in their own interests. Fortunately, there was no shortage of military leaders with vast organizational and combat experience.

Top: Kornilov, Denikin, Kolchak, Wrangel Bottom: Kappel, Markov, Shkuro, Krasnov

Top: Drozdovsky, Yudenich, Miller Bottom: Dieterix, Keller, Kutepov

One of the first who began to organize the military to fight the Bolsheviks was General Mikhail Vasilyevich Alekseev. He was born on November 3 (15), 1857 in the Tver province in the family of a soldier who rose to the rank of officer. Mikhail Alekseev himself in 1873 entered the 2nd Rostov Grenadier Regiment as a volunteer. After graduating from the Tver Classical Gymnasium and the Moscow Infantry Cadet School in 1876, she was enrolled in the 64th Kazan Infantry Regiment with the rank of ensign. As part of this regiment, he participated in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, during the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905. already served in the rank of quartermaster general of the 3rd Manchurian army. He began the First World War as chief of staff of the armies of the Southwestern Front, in 1915 - commander of the Western Front, then chief of staff under the emperor, ended the war - Supreme Commander of the Russian Army (March 11, 1917 - May 21, 1917). It should be noted that Alekseev was among those who played an active role in the abdication of the emperor. He supported the chairman of the State Duma, M. V. Rodzianko, and in fact persuaded the commanders-in-chief of the fronts to support the idea of ​​the tsar's abdication.
Alekseev has come a long way from a soldier to the Supreme Commander. As Supreme Commander, he tried to stop the further collapse of the army, spoke out against the Soviets and the soldiers' committees in the armed forces, tried to save the soldiers from "agitators" and restore the system of one-man command. However, the destructive processes, to the launch of which he himself had a hand, could no longer be stopped. Alekseev was removed from the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief when he spoke out sharply against the "Declaration of the Rights of the Soldier", which was supported by Kerensky.

Before the October Revolution, Alekseev lived in Petrograd, organizing the core of the new army - the "Alekseevsky organization", which was supposed to resist the "impending anarchy and the German-Bolshevik invasion." After the fall of the Provisional Government, Alekseev, fearing arrest, left for Rostov-on-Don. On the Don, under the cover of the Cossacks, while a neutral force, he planned to organize the core of the army to fight the Bolsheviks. At this time, the government of the Don Army, headed by General A. M. Kaledin, in connection with the news of an armed uprising in Petrograd, introduced martial law on the Don, assumed full power and liquidated all the Soviets in the cities of the Don region.

Alekseev was the largest military figure in Russia: during the Russo-Japanese War - Quartermaster General of the 3rd Manchurian Army; during the First World War - Chief of Staff of the armies of the Southwestern Front, Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the North-Western Front, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander. During the February Revolution of 1917, he advocated the abdication of Nicholas II from the throne and by his actions largely contributed to the fall of the autocracy.

That is, he was a prominent February revolutionary, and was responsible for the subsequent collapse of the army, the country and the beginning of unrest and civil war.
The right wing of the Februaryists-Westerners, having destroyed the "old Russia" - hoped to create a "new Russia" - the creation of a "democratic", bourgeois-liberal Russia with the dominance of the class of owners, capitalists, the bourgeoisie and large landowners - that is, development along the Western matrix. They wanted to make Russia a part of an "enlightened Europe", similar to Holland, France or England. However, hopes for this quickly collapsed. The Februaryists themselves opened Pandora's box, destroying all the bonds (the autocracy, the army, the police, the old legislative, judicial and punitive system) that held back the contradictions and rifts that had been building up in Russia for a long time. Events begin to develop according to a poorly predictable scenario of spontaneous rebellion, Russian unrest, with the strengthening of radical left forces demanding a new development project and fundamental changes. Then the Februaryists relied on a "firm hand" - a military dictatorship.

However, the rebellion of General Kornilov failed. And the Kerensky regime finally buried all hopes for stabilization, in fact, doing everything so that the Bolsheviks simply took power, almost without resistance. However, the class of owners, the bourgeoisie, the capitalists, their political parties - the Cadets, the Octobrists, were not going to give up. They began to create their own armed forces in order to return power by force and "calm down" Russia. At the same time, they hoped for the help of the Entente - France, England, the USA, Japan, etc.
Part of the generals, who had previously strongly opposed the regime of Nicholas II and the autocracy (Alekseev, Kornilov, Kolchak, etc.), and hoped to take leading positions in the “new Russia”, was used to create the so-called. The White Army, which was supposed to return power to the former "masters of life."

As a result, whites, separatist nationalists and interventionists ignited a terrible civil war in Russia that claimed millions of lives. Owners, the bourgeoisie, capitalists, landowners, their political superstructure - liberal-democratic, bourgeois parties and movements (only a few percent, together with the entourage and servants of the population of Russia) became "white". It is clear that the well-groomed rich, industrialists, bankers, lawyers and politicians themselves did not know how to fight and did not want to. They wanted to return "old Russia", without a tsar, but with their power - a rich and contented caste ("crunch of French rolls") over the poor and illiterate masses of the people.

Professional military men signed up to fight - officers who, after the collapse of the old army, wandered around the cities in masses doing nothing, Cossacks, simple-minded young men - cadets, cadets, students. After the expansion of the scale of the war, the forcible mobilization of former soldiers, workers, townspeople, and peasants has already begun.
There were also high hopes that "the West would help." And the masters of the West really "helped" - to kindle a terrible and bloody civil war in which Russians killed Russians. They actively threw "firewood" into the fire of a fratricidal war - made promises to the leaders of the white armies and governments, supplied weapons, ammunition and ammunition, provided advisers, etc.

They themselves had already divided the skin of the “Russian bear” into spheres of influence and colonies, and soon began to divide Russia, simultaneously carrying out its total plunder.

On December 10 (23), 1917, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of War of France, Georges Benjamin Clemenceau, and Deputy Foreign Minister of Great Britain Robert Cecil, at a meeting in Paris, concluded a secret agreement on the division of Russia into spheres of influence. London and Paris agreed that from now on they would consider Russia not as an ally in the Entente, but as a territory for the implementation of their expansionist plans. The areas of alleged military operations were named. The English sphere of influence included the Caucasus, the Cossack regions of the Don and Kuban, and the French - Ukraine, Bessarabia and Crimea. Representatives of the United States did not formally participate in the meeting, but they were kept informed of the negotiations, while in the administration of President Thomas Woodrow Wilson, at the same time, a plan was ripe for expansion to the Far East and Eastern Siberia.

The leaders of the West rejoiced - Russia was dead, the "Russian question" was resolved once and for all! The West has got rid of a thousand-year-old enemy that prevents it from establishing full control over the planet. True, our enemies will once again miscalculate, Russia will survive and be able to recover. The Russian communists will win and eventually create a new Russian empire - the USSR. They are implementing an alternative globalization project - the Soviet (Russian), once again challenging the West and giving hope to humanity for a just world order.

Alekseevskaya organization

The right wing of the Western-Febralists (future Whites) and part of the generals decided to create a new army. It was supposed to create such an organization that, as an "organized military force ... could resist the impending anarchy and the German-Bolshevik invasion." Initially, they tried to create the core of such an organization in the capital. General Alekseev arrived in Petrograd on October 7, 1917 and began to prepare the creation of an organization in which it was supposed to unite officers of the spare parts, military schools and those who simply found themselves in the capital. At the right moment, the general planned to organize combat units from them.
According to V. V. Shulgin, who happened to be in Petrograd in October, he attended the meeting that took place at the apartment of Prince V. M. Volkonsky. In addition to the host and Shulgin, M. V. Rodzianko, P. B. Struve, D. N. Likhachev, N. N. Lvov, V. N. Kokovtsev, and V. M. Purishkevich were present. That is, prominent Februaryists who previously participated in the overthrow of Nicholas II and the destruction of the autocracy.

The main issue in the business started rested on the complete lack of funds. Alekseev was “morally supported”, they sympathized with his cause, but they were in no hurry to share the money. By the time of the October Revolution, Alekseev's organization was supported by several thousand officers who either lived in Petrograd or ended up in the capital for one reason or another. But almost no one dared to give battle to the Bolsheviks in Petrograd.

Seeing that things were not going well in the capital and that the Bolsheviks could soon cover the organization, Alekseev on October 30 (November 12) ordered the transfer to the Don of “those who wanted to continue the fight”, supplying them with fake documents and money for travel. The general appealed to all officers and junkers with a call to fight in Novocherkassk, where he arrived on November 2 (15), 1917. Alekseev (and the forces behind him) planned to create statehood and an army on part of the territory of Russia that would be able to resist Soviet power .

General of Infantry M. V. Alekseev

Alekseev went to the Ataman Palace to the hero of Brusilovsky, General A. M. Kaledin. In the summer of 1917, the Great Military Circle of the Donskoy Cossack army Aleksey Kaledin was elected Ataman of the Don. Kaledin became the first elected chieftain of the Don Cossacks after Peter I abolished the election in 1709. Kaledin was in conflict with the Provisional Government, as he opposed the collapse of the army. On September 1, Minister of War Verkhovsky even ordered the arrest of Kaledin, but the Military Government refused to comply with the order. On September 4, Kerensky canceled it on the condition that the Military Government would "guarantee" Kaledin.
The situation on the Don during this period was extremely difficult. The main cities were dominated by the "alien" population, alien to the indigenous Cossack population of the Don, both in terms of their composition, features of life, and political preferences. In Rostov and Taganrog, socialist parties, hostile to the Cossack authorities, dominated. The working population of the Taganrog district supported the Bolsheviks. In the northern part of the Taganrog district there were coal mines and mines of the southern ledge of Donbass. Rostov became the center of resistance to "Cossack dominance".

Red Army enters Rostov

At the same time, the left could count on the support of spare military units. The "out-of-town" peasantry was not satisfied with the concessions made to it (wide admission to the Cossacks, participation in stanitsa self-government, transfer of part of the landowners' lands), demanding a radical land reform. The Cossack front-line soldiers themselves were tired of the war and hated the "old regime". As a result, the Don regiments, which were returning from the front, did not want to go to a new war and defend the Don region from the Bolsheviks. The Cossacks went home. Many regiments handed over their weapons without resistance at the request of small red detachments, which stood as barriers on the railway lines leading to the Don region. Masses of ordinary Cossacks supported the first decrees of the Soviet government. Among the Cossacks-front-line soldiers, the idea of ​​\u200b\u200b"neutrality" in relation to the Soviet government was widely adopted.

In turn, the Bolsheviks sought to win the "labor Cossacks" over to their side.

Kaledin called the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks criminal and declared that until the restoration of legitimate power in Russia, the military government assumes full power in the Don region.

Kaledin from Novocherkassk introduced martial law in the coal-mining region of the region, deployed troops in a number of places, began the defeat of the Soviets and established contacts with the Cossacks of Orenburg, Kuban, Astrakhan and Terek. On October 27 (November 9), 1917, Kaledin declared martial law throughout the Region and invited members of the Provisional Government and the Provisional Council of the Russian Republic to Novocherkassk to organize the fight against the Bolsheviks. On October 31 (November 13), the delegates of the Don, who were returning from the Second Congress of Soviets, were arrested. During the following month, the Soviets in the cities of the Don region were liquidated.

Thus, Kaledin opposed the Soviet regime. The Don region became one of the centers of resistance. However, Kaledin, in conditions when the masses of ordinary Cossacks did not want to fight, wanted peace, and at first sympathized with the ideas of the Bolsheviks, could not decisively oppose the Soviet government. Therefore, he warmly received Alekseev as an old comrade-in-arms, but refused the request to “give shelter to the Russian officers”, that is, to take the future anti-Bolshevik army for the maintenance of the Don military government. He even asked Alekseev to remain incognito, “not to stay in Novocherkassk for more than a week” and to transfer the Alekseev formation outside the Don region.

Despite such a cold reception, Alekseev immediately began to take practical steps. Already on November 2 (15), he published an appeal to the officers, urging them to "save the Motherland." On November 4 (17), a whole party of 45 people arrived, headed by staff captain V. D. Parfenov. On this day, General Alekseev laid the foundation for the first military unit - the Consolidated Officer Company. Staff Captain Parfenov became the commander. On November 15 (28), it was deployed to an officer company of 150-200 people under the command of Staff Captain Nekrashevich.
Alekseev, using his old connections with the Stavka generals, contacted the Stavka in Mogilev. He passed Mikhail Kkonstantinovich Diterichs an order to send officers and loyal units to the Don under the guise of their redeployment for further staffing, with the issuance of money for the officers to travel.

He also asked to remove the decomposed "Sovietized" military units from the Don region by disbanding or sending them to the front without weapons. The question was raised about negotiations with the Czechoslovak corps, which, according to Alekseev, should have willingly joined the struggle for the "salvation of Russia." In addition, he asked to send shipments of weapons and uniforms to the Don under the guise of creating army stores here, to give orders to the main artillery department to send up to 30 thousand rifles to the Novocherkassk artillery depot, and in general to use every opportunity to transfer military equipment to the Don. However, the imminent fall of the Stavka and the general collapse of the railway transport prevented all these plans. As a result, weapons, ammunition and ammunition were bad at the beginning.
When the organization already had 600 volunteers, there were about a hundred rifles for everyone, and there were no machine guns at all. The military depots on the territory of the Don Army were full of weapons, but the Don authorities refused to issue them to volunteers, fearing the wrath of the front-line Cossacks. Weapons had to be obtained both by cunning and by force. Thus, on the outskirts of Novocherkassk, Khotunok, the 272nd and 373rd reserve regiments were quartered, which had already completely decomposed and were hostile to the Don authorities. Alekseev suggested using the forces of volunteers to disarm them. On the night of November 22, volunteers surrounded the regiments and disarmed them without firing a shot. The selected weapons went to volunteers. Artillery was also mined, as it turned out - one cannon was "borrowed" in the Donskoy reserve artillery division for the solemn funeral of one of the dead junker volunteers, and they "forgot" to return it after the funeral. Two more guns were taken away: completely decomposed units of the 39th Infantry Division arrived in the neighboring Stavropol province from the Caucasian front. Volunteers became aware that an artillery battery was located near the village of Lezhanka. It was decided to capture her guns. Under the command of naval officer E. N. Gerasimov, a detachment of 25 officers and cadets set off for Lezhanka. During the night, the detachment disarmed the sentries and stole two guns and four ammunition boxes. Four more guns and a supply of shells were bought for 5 thousand rubles from Don artillery units that returned from the front. All this shows the highest degree of decomposition of the then Russia, weapons, up to machine guns and guns, can be obtained or “acquired” in one way or another.

By November 15 (28), the Junker company was formed, which included cadets, cadets and students under the command of staff captain V. D. Parfenov. The 1st platoon consisted of cadets from infantry schools (mainly Pavlovsky), the 2nd from artillery, the 3rd from naval, and the 4th from cadets and students. By mid-November, the entire senior year of the Konstantinovsky Artillery School and several dozen cadets of Mikhailovsky, led by staff captain N. A. Shokoli, were able to get through from Petrograd in small groups. On November 19, after the arrival of the first 100 cadets, the 2nd platoon of the Junker company was deployed into a separate unit - the Consolidated Mikhailovsko-Konstantinovskaya battery (which served as the core of the future Markov battery and artillery brigade). The Junker Company itself turned into a battalion (two Junker and "Cadet" companies).
Thus, in the second half of November, the Alekseevskaya organization consisted of three formations: 1) a consolidated officer company (up to 200 people); 2) Junker battalion (over 150 people); 3) Consolidated Mikhailovsko-Konstantinovskaya battery (up to 250 people) under the command of Captain N. A. Shokoli). The Georgievsky company (50-60 people) was in the formation stage, and there was an entry into the student squad. The officers made up a third of the organization and 50% of the cadets (that is, the same element). Cadets, students of secular and religious schools made up 10%.

In November, Kaledin nevertheless decided to give the officers arriving to Alekseev a roof over their heads: in one of the infirmaries of the Don branch of the All-Russian Union of Cities, under the fictitious pretext that a "weak team, recovering, requiring care" would be placed here, volunteers were placed. As a result, a small infirmary No. 2 in house No. 36 on the outskirts of Barochnaya Street, which was a disguised hostel, became the cradle of the future Volunteer Army. Immediately after finding shelter, Alekseev sent conditional telegrams to loyal officers, meaning that the formation on the Don had begun and it was necessary to start sending volunteers here without delay. On November 15 (28), volunteer officers arrived from Mogilev, sent by the Headquarters. In the last days of November, the number of generals, officers, cadets and cadets who entered the Alekseevsky organization exceeded 500 people, and the "infirmary" on Barochnaya Street was overcrowded. Volunteers again, with the approval of Kaledin, was rescued by the Union of Cities by transferring Alekseev infirmary No. 23 on Grushevskaya Street. On December 6 (19), General L. G. Kornilov also reached Novocherkassk.

The big problem was the collection of funds for the core of the future army. One of the sources was the personal contribution of the participants in the movement. In particular, the first contribution to the "army cash desk" was 10 thousand rubles, brought by Alekseev with him from Petrograd. Kaledin allocated personal funds. Alekseev counted on the financial assistance of Moscow industrialists and bankers, who promised him support at one time, but they were very reluctant to respond to the requests of the general's couriers, and for all the time 360 ​​thousand rubles were received from Moscow. By agreement with the Don government, in December, a subscription was held in Rostov and Novocherkassk, the funds from which were supposed to be divided equally between the Don and Volunteer armies (DA). About 8.5 million rubles were collected, but, contrary to the agreements, 2 million were transferred to YES. Some volunteers were quite wealthy people. Under their personal guarantees, loans totaling 350 thousand rubles were received in the Rostov branch of the Russian-Asian Bank. An informal agreement was concluded with the bank's management that the debt would not be collected, and the loan would be counted as a gratuitous donation to the army (the bankers would later try to return the money). Alekseev hoped for the support of the Entente countries. But during this period, they still had doubts. Only at the beginning of 1918, after the armistice concluded by the Bolsheviks on Eastern Front, from the military representative of France in Kiev, 305 thousand rubles were received in three steps. In December, the Don government decided to leave 25% of the state fees collected in the region for the needs of the region. Half of the money collected in this way, about 12 million rubles, was placed at the disposal of the newly created DA.

By the beginning of 1919, the volunteer army included: 5 infantry divisions, 4 plastun brigades, 6 cavalry divisions, 2 detached. con. brigades, an army artillery group, spare, technical units and garrisons of cities. The size of the army extended up to 40 thousand bayonets and sabers, with 193 guns, 621 machine guns, 8 armor. cars, 7 armored trains, and 29 airplanes.

The main mass of the troops was reduced to five corps: I, II and III army, Crimean-Azov and I cavalry (generals Kazanovich, May-Maevsky, Lyakhov, Borovsky and Baron Wrangel), later, in February, the II Cube was formed. Corps of Gen. Laying down. In February, the I and II Corps included units of the former Astrakhan and Southern armies transferred by the Don ataman, on which so many hopes were placed by German circles and which, unfortunately, were then already in the stage of complete collapse.

At the beginning of December 1918, the Volunteer Army was located in four main groups: 1. The Caucasian group (I, III, I kont., Later II kon. Corps with attached units) with forces of 25,000 and 75 guns was located between Manych and the Caucasian foothills at Mineralnye Vody. She had common goal- the final liberation of the North Caucasus to the Caucasus Range, the mastery west coast the Caspian Sea and the lower reaches of the Volga, which made it possible to get in touch with the British at Anzeli and with the Urals at Guryev and cut off Soviet Russia from Baku and Grozny oil.

2. Donetsk detachment (gen. May-Maevsky) with a force of 2.5–3.5 thousand and 13 guns. in the Yuzovka region, it covered the Donetsk coal region and the Rostov direction.

3. Crimean detachment of gene. Baron Bode (later Borovsky), initially only 1.5-2 thousand and 5-10 guns, covered Perekop and Crimea, bases and parking Black Sea Fleet; he was supposed to serve as a frame for the formation of the Crimean Corps on the site.

4. Tuapse detachment of gene. Cherepov (2nd division with attached units) with a force of 3000 and 4 guns. had the task of covering our main base - Novorossiysk - from Georgia.

Thus, we had 32,34 thousand of all active forces and about 100 guns, of which 76% were concentrated in the main theater.

The enemy had the following forces against us: 1. In the North Caucasus theater - XI and XII (forming) Soviet armies, numbering up to 72 thousand and about 100 guns.

2. In the Rostov and Crimean directions, during December, the united gangs of the “father” Makhno operated with a force of 5-6 thousand and in the lower reaches of the Dnieper - 2-3 thousand Petlyura ataman Grigoriev transferred to the side of the Soviets. In addition, the entire northern Tavria was flooded with unorganized, "apolitical" gangs engaged in robbery and robbery. Only from the end of December, after capturing Kharkov, did the Bolsheviks send the first regular divisions from the Kozhevnikov group through Lozovaya to the southeast, against Mai-Maevsky, and to the south, in the direction of Aleksandrovsk.

3. On the Sochi direction stood, echeloning from Lazarevka to Sukhumi, three to four thousand Georgian troops, under the command of the gene. Koniev.

In total, therefore, on the fronts of the Volunteer Army in contact with us, there were about 80 thousand Soviet troops and 3-4 thousand Georgians.

When on December 26, 1918, the unification of the Volunteer and Don armies took place, and the theater of war expanded with new vast territories, it became necessary to separate the Volunteer Army and create a unifying headquarters body under me. I accepted the title of "Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia", the former army headquarters became the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, and for the Volunteer Army, the formation of a new headquarters was started.

There was a very important question about the appointment of the commander of the Volunteer Army. I considered the most worthy candidate for this post - in terms of the breadth of military outlook and personal prowess - a participant in the Volunteer Movement from the very first steps of his general Romanovsky. Once, after another report, I offered him a choice - the army or the headquarters of the commander in chief. I did not hide the fact that his departure would be difficult for me: there is no suitable deputy, I will have to appoint a random person, and I will remain alone in my big work and in my experiences. On the other hand (before our eyes we had the example of the unforgettable Markov), I had no doubt that Romanovsky, once in service, would emerge from the suffocating atmosphere of politics, quickly acquire the recognition of the troops, deploy his combat abilities and cover himself and the army with glory. Ivan Pavlovich thought for a day and the next morning he said that he would stay with me ... He sacrificed his future to our friendship.

The paths of the Lord are veiled from our eyes with an impenetrable veil. Who knows how the fate of the army and Romanovsky would have developed then ... Whether it would have carried him to the crest of a wave or buried him in the abyss ... We know only one thing: this decision cost him his life later.

Having discussed the question of the commander with the chief of staff, they settled on the gene. Baron Wrangel. He was younger than other corps commanders and had only recently joined the Volunteer Army - this should have caused resentment. But in the last glorious battles in Urup, Kuban, near Stavropol, he showed great energy, impulse and the art of maneuver. The appointment of Baron Wrangel took place. One of the worthy corps commanders, pioneer, gene. Kazanovich resigned because of this, others grumbled but complied. The army chief of staff was Gen. Yuzefovich.

In view of the subsequent deployment of the Crimean-Azov Corps into the army, troops subordinate to Gen. Wrangel, received the name of the Caucasian Volunteer Army. From December 27 to January 10, to allow the gene to finish. Wrangel operation I con. corps on the tracks from Petrovsky to the line of the Holy Cross - Mineralnye Vody, the army was temporarily commanded by the gene. Romanovsky.

On January 1, 1919, I gave the order: “Fourteen months of hard struggle. Fourteen months of high feat of the Volunteer Army. Having started the struggle alone - when the statehood was collapsing and everything around, powerless, weak-willed, hid and gave up, a handful of brave people challenged the destroyers of their native land. Since then, blood has been shed, leaders and ordinary Volunteers are dying, dotting the fields of Stavropol, Don and Kuban with their graves.

But through the horrors of the war, through the malice and distrust of their secret enemies who had not learned anything, the Army brought the pure and unsullied idea of ​​a United Great Power Russia. The exploits of the Army are immeasurable. And I, who shared with her long, hard days and sorrow and joy, am proud that I stood at her head.

I do not have the opportunity now to directly lead the Volunteer Army, but until the end of my days it will remain dear and close to my heart. I sincerely thank all my dear comrades-in-arms, whose unparalleled deeds live and strengthen the hope for the salvation of Russia.

The name "volunteer" - the army was retained only by tradition. For the correct mobilization was started in the Kuban Cossack units in the spring, and in the regular ones - from August 2, 1918. Three consecutive mobilizations of this year raised ten age classes in the North Caucasus (draft age 1910-1920), in the Azov Territory - so far two (1917, 1918 and partly 1915, 1916), in the Crimea one (1918 - 1918). ). In view of the fact that the revolution had smashed the accounting departments everywhere, my headquarters could not establish the exact percentage of those who evaded. According to his approximate calculations, this figure for the North Caucasus was determined at 20-30%. The mobilized entered the spare parts, where they underwent a brief training, or - due to the arbitrariness of the military units - in large numbers directly into their ranks. The number of those who passed through the army receiver in 1918 was determined at 33 thousand people. By the end of 1918, a widely different source of replenishment was used - captured Red Army soldiers, who had already begun to enter the army in many thousands in both of these ways.

All this new element, pouring into the Volunteer cadres, gave them both strength and weakness. The ranks increased, but the appearance dimmed and the monolithic ranks of the old Volunteering stratified. The feverish pace of events in the midst of the unceasing conflagration of a general civil war, if it allowed superficial education, then ruled out the possibility of education. The mass of reserve battalions mobilized during their stay in the rear, in a peaceful environment, was completely passive and obedient. During the second half of 1918, about 5% deserted from the reserve battalions. But, having gone to the front, they found themselves in an extremely difficult psychological situation: fighting in the ranks of the Volunteers, they had against them their fellow villagers, fathers and brothers, who were also taken by the mobilization of the Red Army; military happiness changed, their villages passed from hand to hand, changing their mood along with the authorities. And desertion at the front increased significantly. Nevertheless, the main Volunteer units were able to melt all the heterogeneous elements in the crucible of their combat traditions, and, according to the general opinion of the commanders, the mobilized soldiers outside their provinces for the most part fought valiantly.

As for the Kuban Cossacks, they bore much greater burdens: they put up ten age classes in the army and during the struggle on the territory of the Kuban, almost without exception became garrisons of the villages and separate, partisan-type detachments. Natural horsemen - Kuban reluctantly went to the plastun battalions; their infantry was therefore weak and small in number, but the cavalry divisions still made up the entire mass of the Volunteer cavalry, providing invaluable services to the army.

With regard to the old Volunteers, we were still formally bound by a four-month "contract". The first period for the main mass ended in May, the second in September, the third ended in December. Back in August, I wanted to put an end to this relic of the early days of Volunteerism, but the bosses concluded that psychologically it was premature ... It seems to me that even then they were already mistaken. On October 25, I ordered the conscription of all officers under 40 years of age, giving those of them who were released from the army either to leave its territory within seven days, or to undergo a mandatory conscription again ... And a month and a half later, an order was issued to cancel four-month terms of service, which became finally obligatory. To the credit of our Volunteer Officers, it must be said that these orders not only did not meet with any protest, but did not even attract attention in the army - the conviction of the necessity and obligation of service was so firmly established.

So, from the end of 1918, the institution of volunteerism finally receded into the realm of history, and the volunteer armies of the South became popular, since the intellectual predominance of the Cossack and service officer elements did not leave an outwardly class imprint on them.

From January 1919, a department was established at the headquarters that was in charge of the formations. Troops of special types of weapons were usually organized in the rear and were ready to go to the front; it was the same with the Kuban regiments, which were recruited territorially in their districts. With the formation of the infantry, the situation was different: it was unusually difficult to supply the material part of the regiments with the help of our feeble army commissariat, and the headquarters put up with the formations at the front, where the chiefs, who were directly interested in their strengthening, found the opportunity, with a sin in half, to put on shoes, dress, arm and equip new parts.

But the battles were in full swing, the front, due to the great disparity of forces, always needed reinforcements, there were no reserves in the rear, and new units rushed into battle long before they were ready. The enemy did not give us time to organize. We did not have such a protective curtain, which for Ukraine was represented by the German cordon, for Siberia - the front of the People's Army, for Georgia - the Volunteer Army. Volunteer units were formed, armed, studied, educated, melted away and replenished again under fire, in incessant battles. Nevertheless, military units born and raised at the front in such a situation, sometimes due to the weakening of cadre regiments, were more combat-ready than rear formations.

Another major evil in the organization of the army was the spontaneous desire for formations - under the slogan of "the revival of the historical parts of the Russian army." The "cells" of the old regiments, especially in the cavalry, arose, became isolated, strove for separation, turning the combat unit - the regiment - into a mosaic collective of dozens of old regiments, weakening its ranks, unity and strength. Such formations also arose in the rear, existed behind the scenes for whole months, extracting private funds or taking advantage of the connivance of authorities of various ranks, weakening the front and sometimes turning the ideological slogan “under native standards” into a cover for selfishness.

Also great was the desire of the chiefs to form "special purpose" units. Such, for example, are the "Flying Special Forces of the Caucasian Volunteer Army" (under General Wrangel), led by Captain Baranov, which had a rather obscure purpose - to fight sedition ... "Wolf Hundreds" gene. Shkuro - his personal guard, gradually losing its combat value, burdened with booty ... "Punitive detachments", formed by the Stavropol military governor, General. Glazenap, turned into life guards of wealthy local sheep breeders, etc. ...

We struggled with all these everyday phenomena, but, obviously, not severely enough, since, changing external forms, they continued to exist.

By the time the Allies arrived, the remnants of our Black Sea Fleet, which had survived the Novorossiysk disaster, were on the Sevastopol roadstead. Among them are the battleship (dreadnought) Volia, the cruiser Cahul, more than a dozen destroyers, several submarines, old battleships and many small auxiliary vessels. Most of the warships required major repairs.

As I already said, with the arrival in Sevastopol, the Allies raised their flags on our ships and occupied them with their teams. Only on the Kagul, three destroyers under repair and on the old battleships, Russian flags still remained.

It was necessary for someone to take over the protection of the Andreevsky flag and homeless Russian property. The centers of attraction were only the Ukrainian State and the Volunteer Army. The first substantiated its right to the Russian inheritance by the "historical borders of the Great Ukraine", which included the entire northern Black Sea coast, and the promise of the Germans to transfer the entire Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine by November. The second acted as the all-Russian military center of the South. The foundations of Ukraine by that time were so odious in the eyes of the Russian public and naval officers that the issue of subordinating the fleet was a foregone conclusion and did not require the slightest struggle.

The whole difficulty lay in choosing a person who could lead the fleet and successfully lead the cause of its revival. I had absolutely no acquaintances in sea circles and was forced to be guided by the opinion of the sailors who were in contact with the headquarters. The result was a picture of complete desolation. They told me only two names: one - Rear Admiral Prince Cherkassky, who remained somewhere in Soviet Russia and which we never managed to find; the other is Vice Admiral Sablin; the activity of the latter as commander of the Soviet fleet before the Novorossiysk catastrophe still required clarification, and he himself lived then abroad. I had to stop at Admiral Kanin, who enjoyed a certain popularity in the marine environment and authority in maritime matters, but did not differ in the quality of a military leader ...

On November 13, I gave the order to appoint Adm. Kanina i.d. commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Kanin, under the influence of the "Ukrainian" admirals Pokrovsky, Klochkovsky and others, hesitated for some time, then took office, and the accession of the Black Sea Fleet to the Volunteer Army was automatic and painless. Accession is nominal, since there was a command staff, but there were no combat ships at his disposal. A long, absurd and deeply offensive struggle began with the allied naval command for the right to exist for the Russian fleet.

Only at the beginning of January, the then senior French Admiral Amet offered Kanin to equip two destroyers that were still under repair; at the same time, the allied command gave permission to prepare the cruiser "Cahul" for shipment to Novorossiysk in order to ... raise the flooded steamer "Elborus".

Meanwhile, battles soon began along the coast of the Black and Azov Seas, and the help of the fleet became necessary. Again, as in the early days of Volunteerism - in the days of wooden armored trains and stolen cannons, young officers equipped old steamships and barges, with a quiet move and the wrong mechanism, armed them with guns and walked along the coast, engaging in battle with the Bolsheviks, risking hourly becoming a victim of the elements or fall into enemy hands. And our warships at that time were languishing in captivity from the allies ...

Meanwhile, the staff of naval institutions grew exorbitantly, the naval officers gathered in large numbers in Sevastopol languished in idleness, and the combat readiness of even an insignificant number of ships that was provided to us was moving poorly. In March, Sablin arrived and replaced Kanin. Sablin already had to get into the wave of the first evacuation of the Crimea and be a witness to a difficult picture of how the allies, in a general panic mood, sank our best submarines, blew up the cylinders of cars on ships left in Sevastopol, drowned and took away supplies. It was unspeakably painful to see how the synodic of the remnants of the Russian fleet, which escaped death at the hands of the Germans, the Bolsheviks and the sailor oprichnina, grew ...

"Cahul", the submarine "Seal" and 5 more destroyers and 2 submarines in tugboats managed with great difficulty to take out to Novorossiysk, where they began to repair, arm and equip them. Our resolute protests, the indignation with which the Russian public reacted to the fact of the inactivity of the Allied troops and fleet in the tragic Odessa and Crimean events, and perhaps the increased confidence in the forces of the South, forced the Allies to stop counteraction: in the summer of 1919 during the operation on the secondary mastering the Crimea and Novorossia, the fleet already included 1 cruiser, 5 destroyers, 4 submarines and a dozen two armed steamers, boats and barges. By autumn, the allies returned to us all the other captured ships, including the Volya dreadnought, which received the name General Alekseev.

The supply of the armies was in the hands of the chief chief of supplies, directly subordinate to the chief of the military administration. Until February 1919, the main source of supply was the Bolshevik stocks we seized. At the same time, the troops, not trusting the requisition commissions, tried to use the captured for their own needs without a plan and system. Part of the stock was obtained from the former Romanian front. All this was accidental and extremely insufficient. In November, by the time the Allies arrived, the official report of the headquarters painted the following picture of our supply:

The lack of rifle cartridges took on catastrophic proportions more than once. “There were periods when several tens of thousands of cartridges remained for the entire Army, and if a machine gun had 2-3 belts at the beginning of the battle, then this was considered very, very prosperous” ... The same situation was with artillery cartridges: “By November 1 the entire stock of the army warehouse consisted of 7200 light, 1520 mountain, 2770 howitzer and 220 heavy shells. Outfit only cast-offs”… Sanitary supply… “may be considered non-existent. No medicines, no dressings, no underwear. There are only doctors who are powerless to fight diseases. There are no individual packages at all. There are often cases when the complete absence of dressings forced the use of dirty linen by the wounded themselves ... "The threatening of our situation was all the greater because by spring, thanks to continuous bloody battles and epidemics, the number of wounded and sick in medical institutions of the armies reached 25 thousand .

From the beginning of 1919, after the Germans left the Transcaucasus, we managed to get several transports of artillery and engineering supplies from the warehouses of Batum, Kars, Trebizond. And in February, the delivery of English supplies began. Since then, we have rarely experienced a lack of combat supplies. The sanitary facilities have improved. Uniforms and equipment, although they came in large sizes, but far from satisfying the needs of the fronts. In addition, it was gradually plundered at the base, despite the establishment of the death penalty "for the theft of items" captured weapons and uniforms. It melted along the way and, having finally arrived at the front, disappeared in abundance, carried away by the sick, wounded, prisoners, deserters ...

It is remarkable that any kind of theft of military property and its sale to the side met in society with an indifferent, often patronizing attitude. The market has its own laws: its ultimate contraction evokes opposition that is alien to moral motives. The uniforms that came to the Don, after distribution to the Cossacks, were usually sent to the villages and hid at the bottom of the Cossack hides that were still not empty.

With their own care, our supply agencies prepared an absolutely insignificant part of the needs. There are many reasons. There were also general ones arising from the financial difficulties of the army, the insufficient industrial development of the North Caucasus, the general collapse of trade and industry; there were also private ones - the templates of a normal war and a normal field situation, our lack of system and creativity, imperiously required by the situation, completely different and exceptional; finally - the general demoralization of morals.

One of the prominent army commissaries wrote at that time about the persecution raised by society and the press against the commissariat: “Industry is destroyed; there are no raw materials in the army, there are almost no technical and transport means; there are few experienced specialists, the market situation, which is not regulated by any financial and industrial bodies, willfully aspires to boundless heights. The rear, the supply agencies must strain all their creative, administrative and inventive abilities in order to give the army at least the little that is necessary under such conditions. Working conditions are immeasurably more difficult than during the Austro-German war, and require exceptional special knowledge, experience and energy.

Meanwhile, instead of competent workers, specialists, school and extensive experience prepared for the work of supplying the army, who are well acquainted with the organization of supply, the industrial world and the market, the supply business is in the hands of exclusively officers of the General Staff, who are unfamiliar with either the market or trade. -the industrial world, neither with political economy, nor with the qualification of its goods and products.

Laws and norms are behind the times, and new ones have not yet been created. Each active purveyor is compelled at his own risk and fear to exceed many times the rights that are given to him by law. Events happen with incredible speed, and life does not tolerate delay. In order to keep up with life, one has to throw aside all paper norms and break all sorts of laws, which requires competent, honest performers, freedom of action and complete trust.

“Honest performers, complete trust”, of course, this is the fundamental basis for the success of the work. But where to get them! When on the Don, in the Kuban, panama hats came to light one after another... When for several months the chief commissariat of the armed forces was under the influence of Tagantsev's senatorial revision appointed by me... small violators of the law, but did not know how to find the sins of the system, did not know how and could not change the general conditions that nourished crime.

In this regard, we saw little help from the public, which so unanimously responded to the needs of the army in 1916: the military-industrial committee, the Zemgor, the Red Cross were destroyed and were just beginning to show their activity. From "democracy"? One of Schrader's organs, Rodnaya Zemlya, describing the crying needs of the army, said: “Would the army need anything if it were surrounded by the ardent and loving solicitude of Russian democracy? Of course not: the Russian people know how to selflessly give their last shirt, their last piece of bread to someone they trust, in whom they see a fighter for the bright and just cause of the people. Obviously, there is something in the atmosphere surrounding the Volunteer Army that dampens our democracy ... ". The Russian people and Mr. Schrader's democracy are far from being the same thing. The people rejected this "democracy" on the Volga, in the East, in the South, throughout Russia. But he also did not adopt in his parental love either the red or the white army: he did not voluntarily sacrifice either his wealth or his life to them.

The notorious private trading apparatus apparently underwent a serious rebirth with the revolution: I do not remember the major transactions of our supply agencies with reputable trading firms, but on the other hand, the types of predatory speculators who corrupted the administration, robbed the population and the treasury and made millions were vividly imprinted in my memory: M - in the Kuban, Ch. - on the Don and in the Crimea, T. Sh. - in the Black Sea region, etc., and so on. But they were all partisans, born of timelessness and alien to the traditions of the industrial class.

A large commercial and industrial nobility appeared on the territory of the Army, mainly after the fall of Odessa and Kharkov in early 1919. Many people from its ranks managed to take out part of their wealth from the conflagration of the Russian temple, still retained credit, and most importantly, organizational experience on a wide state scale. We expected help from them, and above all with regard to the armies. This help was really offered, but in such a peculiar form that it is worth dwelling on it ...

On September 14, 1919, between the Don government, represented by the head of the department of trade and industry, Bondyrev, and the Mopit Partnership, an agreement was concluded for the supply of the Don army and the population of foreign manufactory. "Mopit" was a commission agent of the treasury, taking upon himself "with the fullest assistance of the Don troops" on the territory of the Don and, without the knowledge of the command, on the territory of the Volunteer Army (§ 2) - buying up raw materials, sending and selling them abroad, buying them there and delivering them to Don Manufactory. Fixed capital for turnover, in general up to a billion rubles, was to be issued by the Don treasury in parts in advance; absolutely all expenses, somehow: transportation, storage, duties, etc., fell on the treasury. "Mopit" for the service of the Don army took 19% as "organizational expenses" and entrepreneurial profit for the purchase of raw materials and 18% for the operation with manufactory. The whole contract was full of ambiguities and omissions, which allowed, if desired, to significantly expand the size of profits. But the strangest thing was that the articles of the agreement made its fulfillment dependent on the goodwill of Mopita, provided him with the opportunity to take advantage of all the benefits of the sale of precious Don raw materials, bought at a relatively low price.

Article 9 read: “If the advances received by the partnership for the export of raw materials abroad and its sale are covered by the supply of goods or the currency proceeds from the sale of raw materials within the stipulated period, then the Partnership undertakes to return to the army the advances received, with interest accrued from the date of delay in the amount of collected by the State Bank for the accounting of promissory notes... And nothing more.

I got acquainted with this agreement from the newspapers. I did not have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the sovereign Don, but since all exports were regulated by the Special Conference and the supply to the Don Army was not guaranteed by the contract, I ordered the Partnership to stop issuing permission to export raw materials and grain abroad. The Special Commission then considered the agreement and, after clarifying its articles by the founders and modifying it, the Special Conference found it possible to allow the activity of Mopit.

A. V. Krivoshein, explaining his participation in Mopiga, complained to me about “newspaper insinuations” and claimed that its founders pursued exclusively state goals, and he personally “got acquainted with the contents of the ill-fated agreement for the first time, when the newspaper campaign had already begun.” “The founders of Mopit,” he wrote, “an extensive group of Muscovites who have long enjoyed respect and all-Russian fame turned to me with a proposal to elect me chairman of the council, attaching political importance to this as an extra opportunity to unite them on a common platform now and especially in view of the upcoming arrival in Moscow. The idea - to establish here a major Moscow business and, thus, to unite the black earth south with industrial Moscow more closely - seemed correct and timely "...

But the society, excited by this case, saw in it only commerce, not politics. Part of the press extremely sharply took up arms against the “Mopitians”, whom the most moderate in their conclusions “Priazovsky Kray” defined as guilty in the following words: “... There are no elements of deliberate deception or deliberate introduction into a disadvantageous deal in the contract ... Its difficult side lies in the fact that eminent Muscovites are also among the many who profit from the army, in the civil war "...

Be that as it may, the press, society, and the army gradually came to the same conclusion. No more Minins! And the army fought in difficult conditions and grumbled only when the enemy overcame and had to retreat.

Our treasury was still empty, and therefore the content of the Volunteers was positively beggarly. Established in February 1918, it amounted to 30 rubles per month for soldiers (mobilized), for officers from ensign to commander-in-chief, in the range from 270 to 1000 rubles. In order to imagine the real value of these figures, one must take into account that the subsistence minimum for a worker in November 1918 was determined by the council of the Yekaterinodar trade unions at 660-780 rubles.

Twice later, at the end of 1918 and at the end of 1919, by means of extreme tension, the scale of the basic officer content was raised, respectively, by 450-3000 rubles. and 700-5000 rubles, never reaching a match with the rapidly growing high cost of living. Each time an order was given to increase the content, the next day the market responded with a price increase that absorbed all the increase.

A lone officer and soldier at the front ate from a common cauldron and, although poorly, were dressed. Nevertheless, officer families and a large part of the non-front-line officers of headquarters and institutions were in poverty. A number of orders established increases for the family and high cost, but all these were only palliatives. The only radical means of helping the families and thereby raising the morale of their heads at the front would be a transition to subsistence allowance. But what the Soviet government could do with the Bolshevik methods of socialization, surplus appropriation and wholesale requisitions was impossible for us, especially in autonomous regions.

Only in May 1919 was it possible to provide pensions to the ranks of the military department and the families of the dead and killed officers and soldiers. Prior to this, only an insignificant lump-sum allowance of 1.5 thousand . rubles ... From the allies, contrary to the established opinion, we did not receive a penny.

The wealthy Kuban and Don, who owned a printing press, were in slightly better conditions. “For political reasons”, without any contact with the high command, they always established the maintenance of their servicemen at a higher standard than ours, thereby causing displeasure in the Volunteers. Moreover, the Donets and Kuban were at home, connected with him by a thousand threads - blood, moral, material, economic. Russian Volunteers, leaving the limits of Soviet reach, in the majority became homeless and destitute.

In addition to the garrisons of cities, spare, training and emerging units, which in general amounted to another 13-14 thousand.

In the autumn of 1917, Russia was slipping into a nationwide crisis: a peasant war broke out, the Russian army was decomposing. At this time, at the top of the military command, concerned about the outcome of the war with Germany, the idea arose to create an army of volunteers in the deep rear, which would support the collapsed front. On October 30, 1917, General M.V. Alekseev, the former Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Tsar Nicholas II himself), the recognized leader of the "right non-party" generals, left Petrograd for the Don to form armed forces to fight simultaneously with the Germans and the Bolsheviks. Leaving, Alekseev knew that the Cossacks themselves would not go to restore order in Russia, but they would defend their territory from the Bolsheviks and thereby provide a base for the formation of a new army on the Don. On November 2, 1917, M. V. Alekseev arrived in Novocherkassk, and this day was subsequently marked by members of the white movement as the birthday of the Volunteer Army.

A. M. Kaledin, in response to Alekseev’s call to “give shelter to Russian officers,” expressed “principled sympathy,” but, prompted by the left, democratic wing of his associates, he hinted that it would be better to choose Stavropol or Kamyshin as the center of the new “Alekseev organization”. Nevertheless, General Alekseev and his entourage remained in Novocherkassk, hiding behind the principle "no extradition from the Don."

The transfer of cadet schools from Kiev and Odessa began to the Don. The policy of the Soviet Power increased the influx of officers. The order of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee of October 25, 1917, stated that officers who "directly and openly" de join the revolution should be immediately arrested "as enemies", after which many officers from Petrograd and Moscow, singly and in groups, went to the Don .

The arrivals settled down in Novocherkassk, in the infirmary No. 2 on the corner of Barochnaya and Platovsky prospect. During November it was possible to assemble a detachment of officers and a company of cadets, cadets and midshipmen who arrived from Petrograd and Moscow. The evacuated Konstantinovsky and Mikhailovsky artillery schools were reduced to one battery. In addition, the remnants of the St. George Regiment arrived under the command of Colonel Kiriyenko, who were consolidated into one St. George company.

When, at the end of November 1917, the performance of workers and Red Guards began in Rostov, supported by the landing of the Black Sea sailors, the Don ataman A. M. Kaledin could not oppose him with real forces: the Cossack and soldier regiments kept neutrality. The only combat-ready unit turned out to be the "Alekseevskaya organization" - a consolidated officer company (up to 200 people), a cadet battalion (over 150 people), a Mikhailovsko-Konstantinovskaya battery (up to 250 people) and a Georgievskaya company (up to 60 people). Colonel Prince Khovansky led these units and led the guards into battle. From November 26 to December 1, battles went on with varying success, until the Military Circle gathered and forced the Cossack units to suppress the performance in Rostov, which was done on December 2, 1917.

A new stage began when General L. G. Kornilov, very popular among the officers, arrived on the Don on December 6, 1917. The influx of volunteers has increased. General A. I. Denikin later wrote: "Everyone who really sympathized with the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bstruggle and was able to endure its hardships went to our peculiar Zaporizhzhya Sich." Nevertheless, the social composition of the "volunteers" had its own characteristics. In 1921, M. Latsis described him: “Junkers, officers of the old time, teachers, students and all young students - after all, this is all, in its vast majority, a petty-bourgeois element, and it was they who made up the combat formations of our opponents, and it was from it that consisted of White Guard regiments. Officers played a particularly important role among these elements.

Before the First World War, the Russian officer corps was all-class. There was no caste, but there was isolation. During the war, the officer corps grew about five times. By 1917, career officers occupied posts no lower than the commander of a regiment or battalion, all lower levels were occupied by wartime officers, the vast majority of whom were peasants. A number of contemporaries believed that the quality of officers had improved. “While renegades from the secondary school used to come here, the war sent to schools a lawyer, an engineer, an agronomist, a student, a public teacher, an official, and even a former “lower rank” with St. George distinctions. The war united them all into one family, and the revolution gave breadth and scope to noble skills and sweeping, youthful energy. The specifics of the profession contributed to the selection of people with a protective, patriotic orientation for officer posts. Part of the officer corps, as you know, went over to the side of the Bolsheviks, but among those who rushed to the Don, 80% were monarchists in their political views. In general, according to the definition of A. I. Denikin, an independent "military-social movement" has matured and formed.

Formation was still slow. Calling front-line officers to leave the ranks of the old army for the sake of the Volunteer Army meant opening the front to the Germans. We had to rely on the rear, on vacationers, on the recovered wounded.

Meanwhile, in December 1917, the Kornilov shock regiment headed by Colonel M. O. Nezhentsev arrived from Kiev to the Don. The officers assembled in Novocherkassk were consolidated into the 1st Novocherkassk battalion. In Rostov, General Cherepov created the 2nd Rostov officer battalion from officers; here, Colonel Gerschelman formed a cavalry division.

Officially, the creation of the Volunteer Army and the opening of entry into it was announced on December 24, 1917. On December 25, L. G. Kornilov took command of the army.

Created its own artillery. It consisted of three batteries. One battery was "stolen" from the 39th Infantry Division at the Torgovaya station, 2 guns were taken from a warehouse in Novocherkassk to pay tribute to those who died in the battles for Rostov and lost, and one battery was bought from the Cossacks for 5 thousand rubles ".

On January 14, 1918, due to the "left" of the Don government, the center for the formation of the Volunteer Army was moved to Rostov. Here, the formation of the 3rd Rostov officer battalion and the Rostov volunteer regiment, which consisted mainly of Rostov students, was already underway. The regiment was commanded by General Borovsky. In addition, the "death division" of the Caucasian cavalry division of Colonel Shiryaev and the cavalry detachment of Colonel Glazenap arrived.

Having not completed the formation, the army (if it could be called that) immediately after crossing into Rostov got involved in battles, covering the city from the west from the revolutionary units sent to suppress the "Kaledinshchina". The battles showed that "in the majority, highly valiant commanders crept up ...", and the rank and file was distinguished by stamina and ruthlessness.

In January-February 1918, it became clear that the Cossacks did not support the "volunteers" and were neutral at best. Local anti-Bolshevik detachments - "partisans" - consisted of Novocherkassk students, realists, high school students, seminarians and cadets. There were few Cossacks in them.

After the suicide of General A. M. Kaledin, the anti-Bolshevik forces on the Don were practically surrounded. Not having a specific plan of where to go, the army command slipped out of the ring by maneuver and withdrew the army.

In the village of Olginskaya, it was decided to move to the Kuban, where volunteer detachments were also being formed. Volunteer army moved to the legendary 1st Kuban or "Ice" campaign.

The army was never able to deploy at least to the size of a full-blooded division. "The people's militia did not come out ...", wrote A. I. Denikin, complaining that "the panels and cafes of Rostov and Novocherkassk were full of young and healthy officers who had not entered the army." There were a little more than 3800 bayonets and sabers. Three officer battalions were brought into an officer regiment under the command of General S. M. Markov, the "Georgievites" were poured into the Kornilov regiment, the unformed Rostov regiment into the cadet battalion. The Don partisans who joined the army formed a partisan regiment under the command of General A.P. Bogaevsky.

Naturally, it was impossible to overthrow the Bolshevik regime with such forces, and the "volunteers" set themselves the task of holding back the pressure of Bolshevism, which was still unorganized, and thereby giving time "to strengthen a healthy public and people's self-consciousness." The insight that the "volunteers" hoped for - alas! - It didn't come...

Small in number, but orderly regiments went to the Zadonsk steppes. Ahead was a campaign, each battle in which was a bet on life or death. Ahead was a desperate and bloody Cossack uprising, which gave the "volunteers" massive support, ahead was a campaign against Moscow, and there was a retreat to the Black Sea. Novorossiysk, Crimea, Tavria, emigration ... Ahead was the "white legend" and that ordinary march, when the column of the Officers' Regiment fell under the rain, and then under the icy wind and suddenly appeared before the comrades-in-arms clad in ice armor, which dazzlingly shone under the rays unexpectedly peeping sun...

LITERATURE

1. Russia on Golgotha ​​// Military History Journal - 1993. - No. 8. - P. 65
2. Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles. - M., 1991. - T. 2. - S. 362
3. Kavtaradze A. G. Military specialists in the service of the Republic of Soviets (1917-1920). - M., 1988. - S. 34-35
4. Civil war and military intervention in the USSR: Encyclopedia. - M., 1983. - S. 31
5. Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles. - T. 2. - S. 205.
6. The triumph of accursed days (dialogue in quotes) / Publ. E. Atyakina, I. Khurina // Youth. - 1990. - No. 10. - S. 3
7. Russian officers // Voen.-ist. magazine - 1994. - No. 1. - S. 51
8. Isaev E. Junker (in memory of the dead) // Priazov. edge. - 1917. - 23 Nov.
9. Ioffe G. Z. White business: General Kornilov. - M.: Nauka, 1989. - S. 232
10. Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles. - T. 2. - S. 196
11. Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles. - T. 2. - S. 201
12. Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles. - T. 2. - S. 204

One of the largest military formations of the white movement in southern Russia. After the October Revolution of 1917, General M. Alekseev on November 2, 1917

arrived in the Don, controlled by the troops of A. Kaledin, to organize with his supporters ("Alekseevskaya organization") an armed struggle against the Soviet regime. On December 2, 1917, the Kaledinians and Alekseyevites took Rostov. On December 6, General L. Kornilov also arrived on the Don. The Volunteer Army was proclaimed on December 25, 1917. Alekseev became the supreme leader of the army, Kornilov became the commander, A.

Lukomsky. The 1st combined officer regiment of the army was commanded by General S. Markov. The goals of the army at this stage were set out in the declaration of December 27, 1917 and the January (1918) program of the commander L. Kornilov (which, however, was not published due to fears of other leaders that the specification of the requirements of the white movement could lead to his split). After the victory over the Bolsheviks, it was supposed to convene the Constituent Assembly, which was supposed to determine the form of government and resolve the land issue.

At the end of January 1918, the resistance of the Kaledints and the Volunteer Army was broken by the Reds.

On February 23-25, 1918, the Reds occupied Novocherkassk and Rostov. A volunteer army of about 4,000 fighters (more than half - officers, cadets and cadets) retreated into the steppe. The Volunteer Army could not start a large-scale civil war due to the weakness of its social base. Despite the accession to it of the forces of the Kuban Rada, which doubled the size of the White army, until May 1918.

the army operated in a limited area, retreating under the onslaught of the Reds to the Kuban. A small army of whites walked across snow-covered fields, wade across rivers with icy water.

Many died not in battles, but from cold and disease.

Are you sure you're human?

The most difficult conditions of the campaign in terms of weather were in March (“Ice Campaign”). After the death of General L. Kornilov on April 13, 1918 during the assault on Yekaterinodar in 1918,

the demoralized white army was forced to retreat. The volunteer army was headed by A. Denikin. She managed to recover from defeat. In May 1918, the German occupiers allowed a detachment of M. Drozdovsky to join the Volunteer Army. On June 23, the Volunteer Army, with the assistance of the Don Army of P. Krasnov, launched an offensive in the Kuban. In August, mobilization into the army began, which already in September brought its number to more than 30 thousand soldiers, but began to change its composition, reducing the proportion of officers.

On August 17, 1918, the Whites occupied Ekaterinodar, defeated the 11th Red Army, and by the end of the year established control over the flat part of the North Caucasus.

On December 27, 1918, officers of the 8th Corps of Hetman P. Skoropadsky's army, led by General I. Vasilchenko, declared themselves part of the Volunteer Army, went to the Crimea, where they entrenched themselves.

The Volunteer Army, the forces of the All-Great Don Army, the Kuban Rada and other anti-Bolshevik formations united into the Armed Forces of the South of Russia (VSYUR), headed by Denikin. The Volunteer Army was renamed the Caucasian Volunteer Army (commander P. Wrangel) and on May 22 was divided into the Caucasian and Volunteer Army (commander V.

May-Maevsky).

The VSYUR received the support of the Entente, the army was re-equipped, well-equipped and launched an offensive of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia in 1919 against Moscow, which ended in the defeat of the Whites. The remnants of the Volunteer Army withdrew to the Kuban, at the beginning of 1920 they were reduced to a corps under the command of A. Kutepov. On March 26-27, 1920, the corps was evacuated through Novorossiysk to the Crimea and became part of Wrangel's Russian Army.

Historical sources:

Archive of the Russian Revolution.

Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles: The Armed Forces of the South of Russia. Minsk, 2002;

Wrangel P.N. Memories. In 2 volumes. M., 1992;

Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army (1917-1922). In 4 volumes. M., 1971;

Kakurin N.E., Vatsetis I.I. Civil War 1918-1921 St. Petersburg, 2002;

Literature

• Volkov S.V.

  The tragedy of Russian officers. M., 2002

• Grebenkin I.N. Volunteers and the Volunteer Army: on the Don and in the Ice Campaign. Ryazan, 2005
• Kirmel N.S.

  White guard special services in the Civil War 1918-1922. M., 2008

• Trukan G.A. Anti-Bolshevik governments in Russia. M., 2000

Article posted by

Shubin Alexander Vladlenovich

Doctor of Historical Sciences, Head of the Center for the History of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Volunteer army of the White movement on the Don

On December 26, the armed forces of the Alekseevskaya organization were officially renamed the Volunteer Army. On December 25, 1917, by secret order, General L. G. Kornilov was appointed commander of the Volunteer Army. At Christmas, a secret order was announced for the entry of the gene. Kornilov in command of the army, which from that day became officially known as the Volunteer. In an appeal (published in the newspaper on December 27), her political program was made public for the first time.

The Alekseevskaya Organization ceased to exist and became the basis of the Volunteer Army.

The role of the Entente countries and the United States in the emergence and development of the Volunteer Army deserves a separate study, let's dwell on some of its points.

L. G. Kornilov

After October in Petrograd, Russia's allies in World War I expected that the Soviet government would support the military obligations of tsarist Russia and continue the war against Germany and its allies.

But their expectations were not met. The Soviet government, relying in its policy on the thesis "peace without annexations and indemnities", turned to to the German command with peace proposals.

Therefore, the allies could not recognize the new government in Russia due to its revolutionary origin and unwillingness to continue the war. The beginning of negotiations with the Germans intensified the anti-Soviet activity of the allies. They began to search for forces capable of continuing the war until victory. Initially, the main stake was placed on the Cossacks. But already in December 1917, the allies realized the futility of trying to raise the Cossacks to fight the Soviets and concentrated their activities in the center, subsidizing B.

V. Savinkov and at the same time studying the situation on the ground.

The Whites, on the other hand, pinned the most optimistic hopes on the allies. General Alekseev and P. N. Milyukov, who communicated a lot at that time with each other, the main calculations after the "disappointment" in the Cossacks were made to help the allies. M. V. Alekseev proposed to the governments of the Entente countries “to finance a program for organizing an army that, after the defeat of the Bolsheviks, would continue the fight against Kaiser Germany.

And they got that funding.

General M. V. Alekseev did not hide the fact that the Volunteer Army receives money from the allies. His financial income documents indicate that funds were received from the French military mission for the needs of the Volunteer Army. On January 2, 1918, 25 thousand rubles were received, on January 3 - 100 thousand rubles, on January 19 - 180 thousand rubles. According to one of the Bolshevik leaders, Don A.

A. Frenkel, the Volunteer Army received 30 million rubles from the Americans.

“Later, we definitely established from the documents that ended up with us in Novocherkassk and the interrogation of the successor of Kaledin Nazarov,” Frenkel confirmed. At the same time, the associate of A.

I. Denikin, General B. I. Kazanovich argued that "only half a million was received from the allies before the speech from Rostov." It is possible that the amounts mentioned were deliberately either exaggerated or underestimated, depending on who announced them and for what purpose. This was done, most likely, for propaganda purposes in order to show the degree of dependence or, conversely, the degree of independence from the allies.

As a result of disagreements between the Volunteer Army and the Don, the army had to leave Novocherkassk, which was hostile to it.

At that time, there were no more than 4,000 people in it. The army headquarters was located in the fashionable palace of the Rostov industrialist N. E. Paramonov, and all reports and encrypted telegrams from the places of deployment of volunteer units were sent there.

According to V. Pronin, at the end of December 1917 - the beginning of January 1918, volunteers were formed: an officer battalion, a cavalry division, an engineering company and other units.

The Caucasian consolidated division consisted mainly of Kuban, Terek and Don Cossacks.

According to the memoirs of General Lukomsky, the organization of the army by that time was as follows: “By the end of December (beginning of January), the Kornilov regiment was replenished, which was transferred to the Don from the southwestern front by the regiment commander, captain Nezhentsev.

An officer, cadet and St. George battalions, four artillery batteries, an engineering company, an officer squadron and a company of guards officers were formed.

In mid-January, a small (only about five thousand people), but morally very strong Volunteer Army, turned out.

On February 22, 1918, units of the Red Army reached Rostov. The main forces of the Volunteer Army concentrated in the Lazaretny town. The headquarters of L. G. Kornilov was also transferred there. Since the promised help from Ataman A. M. Nazarov did not follow, it was decided to leave the city.

Rostov was occupied by the Red Army detachment of R. F. Sievers after a battle with volunteers on its outskirts only on February 23.

The next day, stopping at the village of Olginskaya, General Kornilov carried out the reorganization of the Volunteer Army, by reducing many small units into larger units. The composition of the army at that time was as follows:

- Officer regiment, under the command of General S. L. Markov

- from three officer battalions, the Caucasian division and a marine company;

- Junker battalion, under the command of General A.

A. Borovsky - from the former cadet battalion and the Rostov regiment;

- Kornilov shock regiment, under the command of Colonel Nezhentsev. The regiment included units of the former St. George Regiment and the partisan detachment of Colonel Simanovsky;

- Partisan regiment, under the command of General A.P. Bogaevsky - from foot soldiers of partisan detachments;

- Artillery battalion, under the command of Colonel Ikishev - out of four batteries, two guns each.

Commanders: Mionchinsky, Schmidt, Erogin, Tretyakov;

- Czechoslovak engineering battalion, under the "management" of civilian engineer Kral and under the command of Captain Nemetchik;

- Horse detachments: a) Colonel P.V. Glazenap - from the Don partisan detachments; b) Colonel Gerschelman - regular; c) Colonel Kornilov - from former units colonel V.

M. Chernetsova.

The Don partisan detachments of Krasnyansky, Bokov, Lazarev and other partisans joined the army in the village of Olginskaya.

The composition of the headquarters of the Volunteer Army remained practically unchanged: L. G. Kornilov - commander in chief; General A. I. Denikin - "assistant commander of the army", Kornilov's successor in case of his death; general m.

V. Alekseev - chief treasurer of the army and head of its external relations; Lieutenant General A.

Test No. 1 The formation of the White Guard volunteer army began

S. Lukomsky - chief of staff of the army.

According to estimates, the strength of the Volunteer Army on February 9, 1918 was about 3,700 people. “Including approximately 2350 officers. Of this number, 500 were career officers, including 36 generals and 242 staff officers (24 of them were General Staff officers). And 1848 - wartime officers (not counting the captains, who until 1918 belonged to the personnel): staff captains - 251, lieutenants - 394, second lieutenants - 535, and ensigns - 668 (including those promoted to this rank from junkers) " .

Almost with this composition, the Volunteer Army moved to the Kuban, having been defeated in the battles for Yekaterinodar, returned to the Don.

The most significant event for the army was its connection with the Kuban detachment in March 1918. On March 17, representatives of the Kuban arrived at the disposal of the Volunteer Army (village of Kaluzhskaya) for a meeting on the connection of the armies. They were: chieftain Colonel A.P. Filimonov, commander of the Kuban detachment Colonel V.L. Pokrovsky, chairman of the legislative council N.

S. Ryabovol, comrade (deputy - V.K.) of the Chairman of the Sultan-Shahim-Girey and Chairman of the Government of Kuban L.L. Bych. During difficult negotiations, the following minutes of the meeting were adopted: “1. In view of the arrival of the Volunteer Army in the Kuban region and the implementation of the same tasks that were assigned to the Kuban government detachment, in order to combine all forces and means, it is recognized as necessary to transfer the Kuban government detachment to the complete subordination of General Kornilov, who is given the right to reorganize the detachment, as it is deemed necessary ... ".

After the disbandment of several units and the connection with the Kuban detachment, the army included: 1st brigade (General S.

L. Markov) 2nd Brigade (General A.P. Bogaevsky) Cavalry Brigade (General I.G. Erdeli) Circassian Regiment. The total strength of the army increased to 6,000 fighters. This was the first significant event that united the efforts of the two White Guard principles in the common cause of the fight against the Bolsheviks, the first step towards the creation of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia.

In the future, the organizational and staff structure of the army was improved.

For example, on July 1, 1919, the Volunteer Army included the following types of troops: infantry, artillery, cavalry, armored trains, armored cars, tanks, air units, engineering units, separate telegraph units, spare parts, radio units. The army consisted of the following units, formations and associations:

- 1st Army Corps (Major General A.P. Kutepov),

- 2nd Army Corps (Lieutenant General M. N. Promtov),

- 3rd Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General A.

G. Shkuro),

- 2nd Terek plastun brigade,

- Taganrog garrison,

- Rostov garrison.

The Volunteer Army did not have a permanent staff. Depending on the tasks assigned, the army was strengthened by units that came under operational subordination to it for the period of combat missions. Technical units, artillery, tanks, armored trains and aviation reinforced the strike force and were used centrally.

Such a structure of troops made it possible to effectively carry out the assigned tasks, this was one of the reasons for the military successes of the white movement in the initial period.

Thus, the Volunteer Army did not have a permanent staff structure, units and formations were attached for the duration of combat missions.

Later, with the supply of equipment and weapons by the allies, an increase in the size of the army, technical units, armored train artillery and aviation strengthened the strike force and were used centrally.

The role of officers was great. The volunteer officers fought with exceptional courage and stubbornness, which those of their opponents who had to face them directly in battle were forced to fully admit.

The White movement was largely based on officer self-sacrifice. This factor mainly explains the fact that for three years the small Volunteer Army was able to withstand the pressure of the Red troops many times superior in numbers and weapons and even win brilliant victories over them, until this superiority became absolutely overwhelming.

The tragedy of the White Struggle was that, taking on the main blow, the officer units also suffered the greatest losses, which were difficult to make up for with equivalent material. They needed to be preserved, but, on the other hand, they were necessary in battle, and this fatal contradiction could not be overcome until the end of the civil war.

In general, the history of the Volunteer Army in the South of Russia can be divided into several stages, each of which, as a rule, corresponded to an organizational one: 1) the origin and first battles in the Don and Kuban, 2) the 1st Kuban campaign, 3) the 2nd Kuban campaign, 4) autumn-winter battles of 1918 in the Stavropol province and the liberation of the North Caucasus, 5) battles in the Coal Basin in the winter-spring of 1919, from the attack on Moscow to the evacuation of Novorossiysk (summer 1919 - March 1920), 6) struggle in Crimea.

Both its total number and the proportion of officers in its composition at each of these stages. naturally differed.

Volunteer army
Formed:
Disbanded:	March 1920 (renamed the Separate Volunteer Corps)
Type of army:	Ground troops
Composed of:
Average population:	3348 people (February 1918) ≈8500-9000 people (June 1918)
Location:	South of Russia
Participated in:	Russian Civil War

Volunteer army- operational-strategic association of the White Guard troops in the South of Russia in 1917-1920. during the Civil War.

Story

It began to form on November 2 (15), 1917 in Novocherkassk of the General Staff by Infantry General M. V. Alekseev under the name "Alekseevskaya Organization". From the beginning of December, Infantry General L. G. Kornilov, who arrived at the Don of the General Staff, joined in the creation of the army. At first, the Volunteer Army was staffed exclusively by volunteers. Up to 50% of those who signed up for the army were chief officers and up to 15% were staff officers, there were also cadets, cadets, students, high school students (more than 10%). Cossacks were about 4%, soldiers - 1%. From the end of 1918 and in 1919 - through the mobilization of peasants, the officer cadre loses its numerical predominance, in 1920 recruitment was carried out at the expense of mobilized, as well as captured Red Army soldiers, who together make up the bulk military units army.

By the end of December 1917, 3 thousand people signed up for the army as volunteers. By mid-January 1918, there were already 5 thousand of them, by the beginning of February - about 6 thousand. At the same time, the combat element of the Dobroarmiya did not exceed 4½ thousand people.

December 25, 1917 (January 7, 1918) received the official name "Volunteer Army". The army received this name at the insistence of Kornilov, who was in a state of conflict with Alekseev and dissatisfied with the forced compromise with the head of the former "Alekseevskaya organization": the division of spheres of influence, as a result of which, when Kornilov assumed full military power, Alekseev still left political leadership and finances .

General of Infantry Alekseev became the supreme leader of the army, General of Infantry Kornilov became commander-in-chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General A. S. Lukomsky became chief of staff of the General Staff, Lieutenant General A. I. Denikin became chief of the 1st division of the General Staff . If Generals Alekseev, Kornilov and Denikin were the organizers and ideological inspirers of the young army, then the person remembered by the pioneers as a commander capable of leading the first volunteers directly on the battlefield was the “sword of General Kornilov” of the General Staff, Lieutenant General S. L Markov, who first served as chief of staff of the Commander-in-Chief, then chief of staff of the 1st division and commander of the 1st Officer Regiment, formed by him and received his personal patronage after Markov's death.

The leadership of the army initially focused on Russia's allies in the Entente.

Immediately after the creation of the Volunteer Army, numbering about 4 thousand people, entered into hostilities against the Red Army. In early January 1918, she acted on the Don together with units under the command of General A. M. Kaledin.

Before the start of the Kuban campaign, the losses of the Dobroarmiya amounted to 1½ thousand people, including at least a third of those killed.

On February 22, 1918, under the onslaught of the Red troops, the Dobrarmia units left Rostov and moved to the Kuban. The famous "Ice March" (1st Kuban) of the Volunteer Army (3200 bayonets and sabers) began from Rostov-on-Don to Yekaterinodar with heavy fighting, surrounded by a 20,000-strong group of red troops under whom. Sorokin.

General M. Alekseev said before the campaign:

In the village of Shenzhiy, on March 26, 1918, a 3,000-strong detachment of the Kuban Rada under the command of General V. L. Pokrovsky joined the Volunteer Army. The total strength of the Volunteer Army increased to 6,000 soldiers.

On March 27-31 (April 9-13), the Volunteer Army made an unsuccessful attempt to take the capital of the Kuban - Yekaterinodar, during which the Commander-in-Chief General Kornilov was killed by a random grenade on March 31 (April 13), and the command of the army units in the most difficult conditions of complete encirclement by many times superior forces the enemy was received by General Denikin, who, in the conditions of incessant fighting on all sides, was able to withdraw the army from flank attacks and safely exit the encirclement on the Don. This was largely due to the energetic actions of Lieutenant General S. L. Markov, commander of the Officer Regiment of the General Staff, who distinguished himself in battle on the night of April 2 (15) to April 3 (16), 1918 when crossing the Tsaritsyn-Tikhoretskaya railway.

According to the memoirs of contemporaries, events developed as follows:

At about 4 o'clock in the morning parts of Markov began to cross the railroad tracks. Markov, having captured the railway gatehouse at the crossing, deployed infantry units, sent scouts to the village to attack the enemy, hastily began crossing the wounded, the convoy and artillery. Suddenly, the armored train of the Reds separated from the station and went to the crossing, where the headquarters was already located along with Generals Alekseev and Denikin. There were a few meters left before the crossing - and then Markov, showering the armored train with merciless words, remaining true to himself: “Stop! Such-rasta! Bastard! You will suppress your own!”, rushed on the way. When he really stopped, Markov jumped back (according to other sources, he immediately threw a grenade), and immediately two three-inch guns fired grenades point-blank at the cylinders and wheels of the locomotive. A heated battle ensued with the crew of the armored train, which was killed as a result, and the armored train itself was burned.

In May 1918, after completing his campaign from the Romanian front to the Don, a 3,000-strong detachment of the General Staff of Colonel M. G. Drozdovsky joined the Volunteer Army. About 3000 volunteer fighters came with Drozdovsky, perfectly armed, equipped and uniformed, with significant artillery (six light guns, four mountain guns, two 48-line guns, one 6-inch and 14 charging boxes), machine guns (about 70 pieces of various systems) , two armored cars ("Verny" and "Volunteer"), airplanes, cars, with a telegraph, an orchestra, significant stocks of artillery shells (about 800), rifle and machine-gun cartridges (200 thousand), spare rifles (more than a thousand). The detachment had an equipped sanitary unit and a convoy in excellent condition. The detachment consisted of 70% front-line officers.

On the night of June 22-23, 1918, the Volunteer Army (numbering 8-9 thousand), with the assistance of the Don Army under the command of Ataman P.N. Ekaterinodar. The basis of the Volunteer Army was made up of "colored" units - the Kornilov, Markovsky, Drozdovsky and Alekseevsky regiments, subsequently deployed during the attack on Moscow in the summer and autumn of 1919 in the division.

On August 15, 1918, the first mobilization was announced in the Volunteer Army, which was the first step towards turning it into a regular army. According to the Kornilov officer Alexander Trushnovich, the first mobilized - the Stavropol peasants were poured into the Kornilov shock regiment in June 1918 during the fighting near the village of Medvezhye.

Markov artillery officer E.N. Giatsintov testified to the state of the material part of the Army during this period:

It's funny for me to watch films in which the White Army is depicted - having fun, ladies in ball gowns, officers in uniforms with epaulettes, with aiguillettes, brilliant! In fact, the Volunteer Army at that time was a rather sad, but heroic phenomenon. We were dressed in any way. For example, I was in harem pants, in boots, instead of an overcoat I was wearing a jacket of a railway engineer, which the owner of the house where my mother lived, Mr. Lanko, gave me in view of the late autumn. In the past, he was the head of the section between Ekaterinodar and some other station. This is how we flaunted. Soon the sole of the boot on my right foot fell off, and I had to tie it with a rope. These are the "balls" and what "epaulettes" we had at that time! Instead of balls, there were constant battles. All the time we were pressed by the Red Army, very numerous. I think we were one against a hundred! And we somehow fired back, fought back, and even at times went over to the offensive and pushed the enemy back.

By September 1918, the strength of the Volunteer Army had increased to 30-35 thousand, mainly due to the influx of Kuban Cossacks and opponents of Bolshevism who had fled to the North Caucasus.

After the end of the First World War in November 1918, the governments of Great Britain and France increased the material and technical assistance to the Volunteer Army. Believing that this is in the interests of Russia, on June 12, 1919, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia, General A.I. Denikin, announced his submission to Admiral A.V. Kolchak, as the Supreme Ruler of the Russian State and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies.

On January 8, 1919, the Volunteer Army became part of armed forces South of Russia (VSYUR), becoming their main striking force, and its commander, General Denikin, headed the VSYUR.

In late 1918 - early 1919, Denikin's units defeated the 11th Soviet Army and occupied the North Caucasus. On January 23, 1919, the army was renamed the Caucasian Volunteer Army. On May 22, 1919, the Caucasian Volunteer Army was divided into 2 armies: the Caucasian, advancing on Tsaritsyn-Saratov, and the Volunteer Army itself, advancing on Kursk-Orel.

In the summer - autumn of 1919, the Volunteer Army (40 thousand people) under the command of General V.Z. Mai-Maevsky became the main force in Denikin's campaign against Moscow (for more details, see Denikin's campaign against Moscow).

In combat terms, some units and formations of the Volunteer Army had high fighting qualities, since it included a large number of officers who had significant combat experience and were sincerely devoted to the idea of ​​the White movement, but since the summer of 1919 its combat effectiveness has decreased due to heavy losses and inclusion in its composition of mobilized peasants and captured Red Army soldiers.

After an unsuccessful attack on Moscow in the summer and autumn of 1919, the Volunteer Army, under pressure from the Red Army, retreated to the Kuban, where in early 1920 it was reduced to a Separate Volunteer Corps under the command of General A.P. Kutepov.

On March 26-27, 1920, the remnants of the Volunteer Army were evacuated from Novorossiysk to the Crimea, where they became part of the Russian Army of General Baron P. N. Wrangel.

Commanders of the Volunteer Army

• General Staff General of Infantry L. G. Kornilov (December 1917 - March 31 (April 13), 1918)
• General Staff Lieutenant General A. I. Denikin (April 1918 - January 1919)
• Lieutenant General Baron P. N. Wrangel (January - May 1919, December 1919 - January 1920)
• Lieutenant General V.Z. Mai-Maevsky (May - November 1919).

Composition of the Volunteer Army

I AM A VOLUNTEER

1) I AM A VOLUNTEER, because I gave my youth and shed my blood for the power of the United Indivisible Russia.

2) I AM A VOLUNTEER I stand for the convocation of the National Assembly, elected by the whole people, because I believe that it will give happiness, peace and freedom to everyone: both left and right, and the Cossack, and the peasant, and the worker.

3) I AM A VOLUNTEER I give land to all peasants - real workers, and in such a way that each peasant will be the complete and eternal owner of his piece and therefore will work it with great love.

4) I AM A VOLUNTEER I stand for the restoration of factories and factories, for the workers to come to an agreement with their masters and organize labor, so that no master can offend the worker, so that the worker can have his own unions to protect his interests. And whoever is an enemy to the worker and will do him harm, than will interfere with the restoration of industry, that enemy is also me, a volunteer. Where I am, there is fresh meat, and bread costs 1-2 rubles. lb.

5) I AM A VOLUNTEER, I leave it to everyone to believe in their God and pray as they wish, and most of all, as a Russian, I love my Orthodox faith.

6) I AM A VOLUNTEER, I love even those with whom I am now at war - on the orders of my leader, General Denikin, I do not shoot, but take prisoner and bring justice, which is terrible only for enemies of the people - commissars, communists.

7) I AM A VOLUNTEER and so I say:

May peace be restored in desecrated and tormented Russia!

No domination of one class over another!

Free and quiet work for everyone!

No violence against civilians, no murders, no extrajudicial executions!

Down with the predators who oppress Russia! Down with the commune!

Long live the United Great Indivisible Russia!

Leaflet

By the beginning of the 1st Kuban campaign

• 1st Officer Regiment (Gen. Markov) - from 3 officer battalions, the Caucasian division and the naval company.
• Junker battalion (Gen. Borovsky) - from the former Junker battalion and the Rostov regiment.
• Kornilov shock regiment (Regiment. Nezhentsev) - parts of b. Georgievsky regiment and partisan detachment regiment. Simanovsky
• Artillery battalion (Regiment Ikishev) - from four batteries, two guns each. Commanders Mionchinsky, Schmidt, Erogin, Tretyakov
• Czech-Slovak engineering battalion - under the "management" of a civilian engineer Kral and under the command of Captain Nemetchik.
• Mounted units
• Regiment. Glazenapa - from the Don partisan detachments
• Regiment. Gerschelman - regular
• Lieutenant colonel Kornilov - from b. parts of Chernetsov.

Total: 3200 fighters and 148 medical staff, 8 guns, 600 shells, 200 rounds of ammunition per person.

By the beginning of the 2nd Kuban campaign

• 1st Division (General Markov)
• 1st Officer Infantry Regiment
• 1st Kuban Rifle Regiment
• 1st Cavalry Regiment
• 1st independent light battery (3 guns)
• 1st Engineering Company
• 2nd Division (General Borovsky)
• Kornilov shock regiment
• Partisan Infantry Regiment
• Ulagaevsky plastunsky battalion
• 4th Consolidated Kuban Regiment
• 2nd independent light battery (3 guns)
• 2nd Engineering Company
• 3rd Division (Colonel Drozdovsky)
• 2nd Officer Rifle Regiment
• 2nd Cavalry Regiment
• 2nd independent light battery (6 guns)
• Horse-mountain battery (4 guns)
• Mortar battery (2 mortars)
• 3rd Engineering Company
• 1st Cavalry Division (General Erdeli)
• 1st Kuban Cossack Regiment
• 1st Circassian Cavalry Regiment
• 1st Caucasian Cossack Regiment
• 1st Black Sea Cossack Regiment
• 1st Kuban Cossack Brigade (General Pokrovsky)
• 2nd Kuban Cossack Regiment
• 3rd Kuban Cossack Regiment
• Artillery platoon (2 guns)

In addition: the Plastunsky battalion, one howitzer and armored vehicles "Verny", "Kornilovets" and "Volunteer".

In total, the army consisted of 5 infantry regiments, 8 cavalry regiments, 5 and a half batteries, with a total number of 8500 - 9000 bayonets and sabers and 21 guns.

Volunteer Army at the end of 1918

In November 1918, the tactical and strategic deployment of the army began - the 1st, 2nd and 3rd army corps and the 1st cavalry corps were formed. In December, the Caucasian group, Donetsk, Crimean and Tuapse detachments were created as part of the army. In the Crimea, from the end of 1918, the 4th Infantry Division was also formed. In December 1918, the army consisted of three army corps (1-3), the Crimean-Azov and the 1st cavalry corps. In February 1919, the 2nd Kuban corps was created. and the 1st and 2nd army corps included units of the former Astrakhan and Southern armies transferred by the Don ataman. On January 10, 1919, with the formation of the Crimean-Azov Volunteer Army on the basis of the Crimean-Azov Corps, it received the name of the Caucasian Volunteer Army, and on May 2, 1919 it was divided into the Volunteer (as part of the All-Russian Union of Youth Union) and the Caucasian Army.

Army strength

The army (having lost several thousand people during the period from November 1917 to February 1918) entered the 1st Kuban campaign in the number (according to various sources) of 2.5-4 thousand, the Kuban units that joined it numbered 2-3 thousand ., about 5 thousand returned from the campaign, the Drozdovsky detachment at the time of connection with the army numbered up to 3 thousand. As a result, in the spring of 1918 the army numbered about 8 thousand people. In early June, it grew by another thousand people. By September 1918, there were 35-40 thousand units in the army. and sab., in December there were 32-34 thousand in the active troops and 13-14 thousand in reserve, emerging units and garrisons of cities, i.e. only about 48 thousand people. By the beginning of 1919, it numbered up to 40 thousand units. and sab., 60% of which were Kuban Cossacks.

Losses in personnel

The army suffered the heaviest (relative to its strength) losses during 1918, i.e. it was precisely when the officers made up a particularly significant part of it. Since the beginning of formation, more than 6000 people entered the army, and when leaving Rostov the number of fighters did not exceed 2500, we can assume that it lost at least 3500 people. About 400 people died in the 1st Kuban campaign. and taken out about 1500 wounded. After leaving Yekaterinodar to the north, about 300 people. was left in Art. Elizavetinskaya (all finished off by the pursuers) and 200 more - in Dyadkovskaya. The army suffered no less heavy losses in the 2nd Kuban campaign (in some battles, for example, during the capture of Tikhoretskaya, losses reached 25% of the composition), and in the battles near Stavropol. In individual battles, losses amounted to hundreds and sometimes even thousands of dead.

Volunteer Army as a part of V.S.Yu.R. "Trip to Moscow"

It was formed on May 8, 1919 as a result of the division of the Caucasian Volunteer Army. By mid-June 1919 it included the 1st Army and 3rd Kuban Corps, the 2nd Kuban Plastun Brigade. At the end of July, the Group of Gen. Promtov and the newly formed 5th Cavalry Corps. By September 15, 1919, the 2nd Army Corps was formed from the 5th and 7th Infantry Divisions. On October 14, 1919, another 1st separate infantry brigade was formed.

However, during the "camp on Moscow" the army included only two corps - the 1st army from the "colored units": the 1st and 3rd infantry divisions deployed in mid-October into four divisions - Kornilov, Markov, Drozdov and Alekseevskaya, also in the army was the 5th cavalry corps of two non-Cossack, but regular cavalry divisions: the 1st and 2nd cavalry. In addition, the army included: Consolidated regiment of the 1st separate cavalry brigade, 2nd and 3rd separate heavy howitzer divisions, Separate heavy cannon tractor division, 2nd radio-telegraph division, 2nd, 5th , the 6th separate telegraph company, the 1st and 2nd tank divisions and the 5th automobile battalion. The army was also attached to the 1st aviation division (2nd and 6th air detachments and the 1st air base), armored vehicles: the 1st division, 1st, 3rd and 4th detachments. The 2nd Army Corps (commander Ya. A. Slashchev) was thrown against Makhno, who broke through the White front in September.

Having reached the maximum number due to mobilizations in the occupied provinces of the modern. Ukraine and the south of Russia and the enrollment of surrendered Red Army soldiers D.A. by mid-October 1919, it occupied a vast area along the line of Chernigov-Khutor Mikhailovsky-Sevsk-Dmitrovsk-Kromy-Naryshkino-Orel-Novosil-Borki-Kostornoye. leave all previously occupied areas, retreating to the Don by December 1919. On January 6, 1920, it was reduced to the Volunteer Corps (due to huge losses and a catastrophic decrease in the number of personnel - 5000 people at the time of the Novorossiysk evacuation). However, the Volunteer Corps survived as a combat unit and was not destroyed. With continuous fighting, the corps retreated in March 1920 to the port of Novorossiysk. There, the Volunteer Corps is a priority, thanks to the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the All-Union Socialist League, General Lieutenant. A.I. Denikin and the iron restraint of his commander, Lieutenant General A.P. Kutepov, boarded the ships and arrived in the Crimea, which remained white thanks to the successfully organized defense of its isthmuses by the troops of Major General Ya. A. Slashchev. The volunteer corps in the Crimea formed the powerful backbone of the Russian Army, the successor of General Denikin as white commander-in-chief, Baron Wrangel.

Army strength

By mid-June 1919, the army numbered 20 thousand units. and 5.5 thousand sab., at the end of July - 33 thousand pieces. and 6.5 thousand sab., as of October 5 - 17791 pcs. and 2664 sub. at 451 pools. and 65 op. At the beginning of December 1919, there were 3,600 units in the Volunteer Army. and 4700 sub. In total, the army, including rear and emerging units, by July 5, 1919, there were 57,725 people. (including 3884 officers, 40963 combatants, 6270 auxiliary and 6608 non-combatant lower ranks).