The Eastern question, which consisted in the struggle of European countries for control over Asia, for Russia included the struggle for the Black Sea area and the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. In addition, Russia, as the only Orthodox state in Europe, considered protecting the interests of fellow believers - the southern Slavs, subjects of Turkey - its sacred task.

The first military clashes of the XIX century. within the framework of the Eastern question took place during the Russian-Iranian war of 1804-1813. for dominance in the Transcaucasus and the Caspian. The cause of the conflict was the aggression of feudal Iran against Georgia and other lands of Transcaucasia, which were part of Russia at the beginning of the century. Iran and Turkey, incited by Great Britain and France, sought to subjugate the entire Transcaucasus, dividing the spheres of influence. Despite the fact that from 1801 to 1804, individual Georgian principalities voluntarily joined Russia, on May 23, 1804, Iran presented Russia with an ultimatum on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the entire Transcaucasus. Russia refused. Iran in June 1804 launched hostilities to capture Tiflis (Georgia). Russian troops (12 thousand people) moved towards the Iranian army (30 thousand people). Russian troops fought decisive battles near Gumry (now Gyumri, Armenia) and Erivan (now Yerevan, Armenia). The battles have been won. Then the fighting moved to the territory of Azerbaijan. The war went on with long interruptions and was complicated for Russia by parallel participation in other hostilities. However, in the war with Iran, Russian troops won. As a result, Russia expanded its territory in the Transcaucasus, adding Northern Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Dagestan.

The reason for the start of the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812, which Turkey unleashed with the support of Napoleon, was the violation by the Turks of the agreement on the free passage of Russian ships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. In response, Russia sent troops to the Danubian principalities - Moldavia and Wallachia, which were under the control of Turkey. Great Britain supported Russia in this war. The main battles were the combat operations of the squadron of Vice Admiral D.N. Senyavin. He won victories in the Dardanelles naval and Athos battles in 1807. Russia provided assistance to the insurgent Serbia. In the Balkan and Caucasian theaters of operations, Russian troops inflicted a number of defeats on the Turks. Before the war with Napoleon, M.I. became the head of the Russian army. Kutuzov (since March 1811). In the Ruschuk battle and in the battle of Slobodzeya in 1811 on the territory of Bulgaria, he forced the Turkish troops to capitulate. The war has been won. The result of the war was the annexation of Bessarabia, Abkhazia and part of Georgia to Russia and the recognition by Turkey of the right of self-government for Serbia. In Turkey, Napoleon lost an ally just before the start of the French invasion of Russia.

In 1817, Russia entered the protracted Caucasian War with the aim of conquering Chechnya, Mountainous Dagestan and the North-Western Caucasus. The main hostilities unfolded in the second quarter of the 19th century. during the reign of Nicholas I.

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The first military clashes of the XIX century. within the framework of the Eastern question took place during the Russian-Iranian war of 1804-1813. for dominance in the Transcaucasus and the Caspian. The cause of the conflict was the aggression of feudal Iran against Georgia and other lands of Transcaucasia, which were part of Russia at the beginning of the century. Iran and Turkey, incited by Great Britain and France, sought to subjugate the entire Transcaucasus, dividing the spheres of influence. Despite the fact that from 1801 to 1804, individual Georgian principalities voluntarily joined Russia, on May 23, 1804, Iran presented Russia with an ultimatum on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the entire Transcaucasus. Russia refused. Iran in June 1804 launched hostilities to capture Tiflis (Georgia). Russian troops (12 thousand people) moved towards the Iranian army (30 thousand people). Russian troops fought decisive battles near Gumry (now Gyumri, Armenia) and Erivan (now Yerevan, Armenia). The battles have been won. Then the fighting moved to the territory of Azerbaijan. The war went on with long interruptions and was complicated for Russia by parallel participation in other hostilities. However, in the war with Iran, Russian troops won. As a result, Russia expanded its territory in the Transcaucasus, adding Northern Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Dagestan.

The reason for the start of the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812, which Turkey unleashed with the support of Napoleon, was the violation by the Turks of the agreement on the free passage of Russian ships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. In response, Russia sent troops to the Danubian principalities - Moldavia and Wallachia, which were under the control of Turkey. Great Britain supported Russia in this war. The main battles were the combat operations of the squadron of Vice Admiral D.N. Senyavin. He won victories in the Dardanelles naval and Athos battles in 1807. Russia provided assistance to the insurgent Serbia. In the Balkan and Caucasian theaters of operations, Russian troops inflicted a number of defeats on the Turks. Before the war with Napoleon, M.I. became the head of the Russian army. Kutuzov (since March 1811). In the Ruschuk battle and in the battle of Slobodzeya in 1811 on the territory of Bulgaria, he forced the Turkish troops to capitulate. The war has been won. The result of the war was the annexation of Bessarabia, Abkhazia and part of Georgia to Russia and the recognition by Turkey of the right of self-government for Serbia. In Turkey, Napoleon lost an ally just before the start of the French invasion of Russia.

In 1817, Russia entered the protracted Caucasian War with the aim of conquering Chechnya, Mountainous Dagestan and the North-Western Caucasus. The main hostilities unfolded in the second quarter of the 19th century. during the reign of Nicholas I.

With the coming to power of the SPD / FDP coalition, and, accordingly, Chancellor Willy Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, a turn towards greater realism and balance was indicated in the country's foreign policy. The new authorities took steps towards a genuine improvement in relations with the Soviet Union on the only possible basis - the recognition of the political and territorial realities that had developed in Europe after the Second World War. On October 28, 1969, W. Brandt made a government statement in which he placed the main accents in foreign policy orientation. A government statement noted: “Our national interests do not allow us to take a position between West and East. Our country needs cooperation and agreement with the West and mutual understanding with the East. The German people need peace in the full sense of the word, also with the peoples of the Soviet Union and all the peoples of Eastern Europe. The statement noted that "eastern politics" first of all, "... represented the provision of German interests and assumed a cautious expansion of the field of foreign policy activity of the Federal Republic" . The government of W. Brandt immediately began to look for ways to improve relations with the USSR, to normalize relations with the Eastern European states. The recognition of the GDR as a state was also important, which opened the way for the beginning of the normalization of relations with it. According to A.A. Novikova and N.V. Pavlova, new"Eastern policy" began to be understood as "practical steps to normalize relations between the FRG and the socialist countries on the basis of recognizing the territorial status quo in Europe and renouncing the use of force or the threat of its use, to overcome the inertia of the Cold War, to assert the Federal Republic on the world arena and its transformation into a full-fledged subject of international relations. In turn, as I.S. Kremer, "already the first government statement by W. Brandt in the Bundestag on October 28, 1969 testified that his cabinet intended to make a serious turn in policy towards the USSR and other socialist countries, including the GDR" .

The government of W. Brandt, imagining that the unification of Germany was impossible in the near future, set the task, on the basis of a policy of detente, to overcome the isolationism of the East and "through contacts between people to make the borders more transparent" . Thus, as a basis new"Eastern policy" of Germany, the concept of "Change through rapprochement" developed by W. Brandt and E. Bar was taken, which absorbed the ideas of the political and economic concept of convergence and the "magnet theory" of K. Schumacher. Thus, without abandoning the idea of ​​national reunification, the FRG shifted the achievement of this goal to a long-term perspective and, under the slogan "Change through rapprochement", focused on the tasks of the medium and short term. These tasks were: “improving relations with the Soviet Union, normalizing relations with the Eastern European states and maintaining the modus vivendi between both parts of Germany”, on the understanding that international legal recognition of the GDR was still undesirable for the FRG. The top leadership of West Germany made an attempt to make the borders between the two German states more transparent through contacts between people and giving a special status to relations between the FRG and the GDR.

On November 28, 1969, the government of W. Brandt signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was opposed by the previous governments of the FRG and the current opposition of the CDU. The signing of the Treaty, of course, signified Bonn's desire to follow in line with the global processes of detente. However, in their vision of the boundaries of a peaceful settlement, Chancellor W. Brandt and his closest assistant E. Bahr went even further. In their opinion, the basis for easing tension between East and West should have been broad practical disarmament measures, up to the creation of a common body coordinating the activities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Over time, the military blocs were supposed to be replaced by a single system of collective security through the conclusion of a number of bilateral agreements between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on the renunciation of the use of force and the reduction of armed forces. The USSR and the USA, not being members of the security system, should have acted as its guarantors. Thus, the results of detente in Europe would contribute to the arrival of both German states, in fact, to neutrality, which was repeatedly voiced by Moscow as a prerequisite for the unification of Germany. For a complete understanding of the new foreign policy course in the field of "Eastern policy", it is necessary to highlight the main goals on which the social-liberal government of W. Brandt and W. Scheel focused, designating the strengthening of the alliance of Western states as a prerequisite for overcoming the confrontation between East and West, concentrated its efforts :

1. Exchange of official statements on the renunciation of the use of force with the Soviet Union, as well as the strengthening of bilateral, especially economic, relations with the USSR.

2. The conclusion of an agreement with the Polish People's Republic, which settled the issue of post-war borders between the FRG and Poland.

3. Improving the situation around West Berlin. At the same time, the tasks of the FRG were to maintain the responsibility of the three powers for West Berlin, to provide transport guarantees for transport links with the city and its improvement, to strengthen ties between East and West Berlin, as well as between West Berlin and the GDR.

4. The conclusion of a set of agreements with the GDR - if possible with Soviet assistance - where special relations were proclaimed between the two German states, excluding the international legal recognition of the GDR. At the same time, special attention was paid to measures to make life easier for people in the neighboring GDR by expanding exchanges and trips, that is, by ensuring freedom of movement and residence of citizens, the exchange of information and opinions between them.

5. The conclusion of an agreement with the Czechoslovak Soviet Socialist Republic, which settled the issue of the Munich Agreement of 1938 and the issue of the Sudeten Germans.

6. Signing agreements with other Eastern European countries.

7. Participation of both German states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and in negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

The "New Eastern Policy" of the government of W. Brandt, reflected in the tasks assigned to it, was aimed at achieving two global goals: detente of international tension and the reunification of Germany. This formula was not an invention of the W. Brandt / W. Scheel cabinet - both reunification, and, to one degree or another, both the reduction of confrontation and a peaceful settlement, were among the priority political goals of the leadership of the FRG during 1949-1969. However, the main and very significant feature of the foreign policy concept of the government that came to power in 1969 in Bonn was that for the first time the reunification of Germany was completely subordinated to the process of detente. The rejection of the thesis “détente and normalization of relations with the socialist countries only after reunification” is the main feature of Willy Brandt’s “Ostpolitik”, which makes it possible to speak of it as a truly new “Ostpolitik” of the FRG.

Soviet-German relations in the context
implementation of the "new eastern policy" of Germany

As early as September 22, 1969, in New York, W. Brandt, being Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of K.-G. Kizinger, held consultations on bilateral relations with his Soviet colleagues. And after the victory of the SPD / FDP bloc in the elections in October 1969, V. Scheel met with the Soviet ambassador S. Tsarapkin and agreed to resume negotiations on the refusal to use force. On November 15, 1969, the German Ambassador in Moscow, G. Allardt, handed over to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs a note from his government, which emphasized the desire to immediately begin negotiations with the Soviet government on mutual renunciation of the use of force. At the end of 1969, an intensive political dialogue began between representatives of the USSR and the FRG at a high level on the issues of normalizing relations. So, in December 1969, a meeting of the Soviet delegation headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and the delegation of Germany. In January 1970, E. Bahr, State Secretary of the Federal Chancellor's office, visited Moscow to negotiate an agreement on the non-use of force. In total, in order to develop the text of the treaty between the USSR and the FRG, A.A. Gromyko, E. Bar and V. Scheel conducted in 1969-1970. over 30 meetings. The first round of negotiations continued until May 22, 1970 and ended with the appearance of the so-called "Bahr document". These were the first strokes of completely new relations between the FRG and the USSR. In the Bar Document, the FRG pledged to "respect the inviolability" of the borders of all European states, in the present and future, including the border along the Oder and the Neisse and the border between the FRG and the GDR. In addition, the FRG undertook not to put forward any territorial claims ... For its part, the Soviet Union waived its rights to a military invasion, arising from the provision of the UN Charter on an “enemy state” ”. Having deliberately made this document public on July 1, 1970, W. Brandt, on the one hand, made serious concessions to the USSR regarding the official recognition of the border along the Oder and Neisse and the border between the FRG and the GDR, however, on the other hand, this agreement did not interfere the future unification of the two Germanys by peaceful means. It is also necessary to note the positive position of the United States in relation to the first steps taken by the FRG in the course of the process of normalizing relations with the USSR. "On the whole, Washington welcomed the new West German foreign policy, regarding it as a long-awaited cover for its own course of international détente." Chancellor W. Brandt subsequently assessed the position of the United States as follows: “... by and large, there could be no disagreements, since Nixon, on the advice of Kissinger, pursued the policy towards the Soviet Union, begun by Kennedy, under the slogan “cooperation instead of confrontation.” The US government knew that it was not even in our thoughts to evade cooperation with the West, which, by the way, was impossible to do. The practical result of the first round of negotiations was, first of all, the recognition of the existence of two German states by the FRG, and secondly, the conclusion of three agreements on the supply of Soviet natural gas for a period of 20 years in exchange for large-diameter pipes dated February 1, 1970 and consultations on closer technological cooperation . Thus, from the very beginning, the new "Eastern policy" of the FRG had not only a foreign policy character, but also manifested itself in the development of cooperation between the USSR and the FRG in the economic sphere. The second round of negotiations between the USSR and the FRG took place in Moscow from July 17 to August 12, 1970 between A.A. Gromyko and V. Sheel. During these negotiations, the German delegation made it clear to the Soviet side that "an agreement cannot be concluded with the USSR that can replace a peace treaty, cancel the rights of the allies, reduce the principle of renunciation of the use of force to the recognition of borders, ignore the situation in West Berlin and infringe on the interests of other states". At the same time, following the results of the second round of negotiations between Bonn and Moscow in August 1970, a German government delegation headed by Chancellor W. Brandt arrived in the USSR to sign the Soviet-West German treaty. August 12, 1970 W. Brandt and W. Scheel from the West German side and A.N. Kosygin and A.A. Gromyko from the Soviet side signed in Moscow an agreement between the USSR and the FRG.

The treaty emphasized the desire of both sides to promote the strengthening of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world, the improvement and expansion of mutual cooperation, including scientific, technical and cultural ties. The parties have committed themselves to “resolving their disputes exclusively by peaceful means; in matters affecting security in Europe and international security, as well as in their mutual relations, in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or use of force. Thus, an end was finally put to the policy pursued by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany until then "from a position of strength" in relation to the socialist countries. Both sides emphasized their desire to strengthen peace and security in Europe, as well as to "...improve and expand mutual cooperation, including scientific, technical and cultural ties." The most important provision of the Treaty was the recognition by the USSR and the FRG of the inviolability of the existing European state borders. This provision is fixed by Art. 3 of the Treaty: “... The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany are united in their recognition that peace in Europe can be maintained only if no one encroaches on modern borders. They undertake to scrupulously respect the territorial integrity of all states in Europe within their present borders. They state that they do not have any territorial claims against anyone and will not make such claims in the future. They regard as inviolable now and in the future the frontiers of all states in Europe, as they are on the day of signing this Treaty, including the Oder-Neisse line, which is the western frontier of the Polish People's Republic, and the frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic." .

The proclamation of the inviolability of all European borders opened up the possibility of building relations between the FRG and the socialist countries on the basis of trust and mutual understanding. The USSR and the FRG, after recognizing the territorial status quo, already considered each other not as opponents, but, on the contrary, as allies. As a result, the freedom of action of the parties in the foreign policy sphere has significantly increased, and greater weight has been gained in resolving international political issues. The governments of the USSR and the FRG also welcomed the plans to convene a conference on strengthening security and developing cooperation in Europe and declared that they would do everything in their power to prepare and successfully hold this conference. Further steps towards the development of the policy of detente were reflected in a separate document, also signed in Moscow, "Agreement on the intentions of the parties." In this document, the government of the FRG declared its readiness to conclude agreements with Czechoslovakia and Poland, as well as with the government of the GDR. The treaty with the GDR “will have a generally accepted binding force between states, just like other treaties that the FRG and the GDR conclude with third countries, ... build their relations with the GDR on the basis of complete equality, non-discrimination, respect for the independence and independence of each of of both States in matters relating to their internal competence, within their respective frontiers. It was declared the intention to take measures for the entry of both German states into the UN. There was a provision in the document that testified to the refusal of West Germany from claims to "the sole representation of all Germans." This document also speaks of the intention of both sides to promote the entry of the FRG and the GDR into the UN. Thus, the FRG actually had to abandon the long-standing practice of creating obstacles to the normalization of relations between all countries of the world with the GDR. The Treaty and the Understanding of the Parties' Intentions touched upon a number of cardinal issues in relations between Moscow and Bonn and in world politics as a whole. For the first time in documentary form, West Germany confirmed the territorial status quo in Europe, in particular, the Oder-Neisse border, and also recognized the fact of the existence of the GDR, its sovereignty. Having fixed the basic principles of Soviet-West German relations, the Moscow Treaty laid "the first stone in the foundation of the" new eastern policy "" of the FRG, became "the core of the policy of detente and peace pursued by W. Brandt" .

The significance of the Moscow Treaty was determined not only by the specific content of its articles, but also by the fact that it opened the door wide for a whole series of subsequent agreements and accords, and hence for noticeable changes in the general European situation. However, it is impossible not to say what meaning each of the signatory parties put into the Moscow Treaty. The signing of the Treaty allowed the Soviet Union to declare the final consolidation of the post-war status quo in Europe, focusing on the recognition by West Germany of the inviolability of the existing borders, incl. border between Germany and the GDR. Characteristic on this occasion is the statement of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev: "These political documents are entirely based on the recognition of the political and territorial realities that developed after the Second World War, and fix the inviolability of the existing European borders, including the border between the GDR and the FRG and the western border of the Polish People's Republic." In turn, the Government of Germany focused on the articles that spoke about the refusal to use force or the threat of its use. As before, the position of the FRG on the question of striving for the future reunification of Germany remained reserved. Thus, Bonn specified that the Treaty did not close the way for the FRG to restore the unity of the nation by peaceful means. Chancellor W. Brandt, speaking on August 14, 1970 in Bonn at a press conference with a statement following his visit to Moscow, emphasized: “When signing the Treaty, we proceeded from the fact that the borders of states in Europe, as they exist today, - regardless of whether we like them or not, and on what legal basis they are established, they cannot be changed by force ... This clear and firm position does not contradict the goal of fighting by peaceful means for the unity of the German nation.

The treaty between the USSR and the FRG became a significant event in the post-war history of international relations. It became a significant contribution of the two states to strengthening peace in Europe. A new basis was created for the development of cooperation between the FRG and the USSR in the political, economic and cultural fields. The Moscow Treaty was the first and most important agreement between the FRG and a socialist state. Having opened the way for cooperation between the FRG and the USSR in various fields, the Treaty thus created the conditions for the normalization of relations between the FRG and other socialist states, laying the foundation for a truly "new Ostpolitik" of the FRG.

The signing of the treaty evoked a positive reaction in the international community as well. Its signing was welcomed in a joint statement by the Warsaw Pact member states, UN Secretary General U Thant, French President J. Pompidou, and leaders of many other countries and organizations. Thus, the Moscow Treaty, having settled the problems existing between the USSR and the FRG, opened the way for the FRG to normalize relations with the Eastern bloc and the GDR. A year after the signing of the Moscow Treaty, negotiations between V. Brandt and L.I. Brezhnev at a meeting in the Crimea (September 16-18, 1971). Issues related to the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, the preparation of a pan-European security conference with the participation of the United States and Canada, as well as the prospects for both German states to join the UN were discussed in Crimea. At the same time, the Soviet leader made the entry into force of the agreement on West Berlin dependent on the early ratification of the "Eastern Treaties" by the Bundestag.

The meeting in Crimea demonstrated the increased role of the FRG in the process of détente between East and West, marked a milestone from which the Federal Republic began to independently participate in the formation of policy relating to relations between East and West. In November 1971, an agreement on air communication was signed between the FRG and the USSR, and an official visit to the Soviet Union was made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRG, W. Scheel. By signing the "Moscow Treaty", as well as a series of "Eastern Treaties", the government of W. Brandt as a whole solved two of the three tasks set: 1) the solution of the most pressing issues between the Federal Republic of Germany and the socialist countries (recognition of the Munich Agreement as "insignificant from the outset", recognition of the borders along the Oder and Neisse, payment of reparations to the Poles who suffered as a result of Hitler's aggression, etc.); 2) recognition and consolidation in a treaty form of the principle of the inviolability of borders in Europe and the principle of refusing to use or threaten to use force in the future. When, shortly after the ratification of the Moscow Treaty, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev, was the first of the leaders of the USSR to visit the FRG in May 1973, the Federal Republic had already become the most preferred partner for the Soviet Union among the countries of Western Europe. At the same time, the USSR was already pursuing a new goal - to achieve an intensification of economic cooperation and to receive support from the FRG for the early convening of a European conference on security. Bonn, on the other hand, tried to use the Soviet interest in economic cooperation to resolve problems that remained unresolved after the signing of the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin.

Conclusion

Changes in Soviet foreign policy, American initiatives in the field of détente, and an internal political consensus among the new leadership of the FRG became the main prerequisite for the development and implementation of a new concept of "Ostpolitik". Its main principles were practical steps to normalize relations between the FRG and the socialist countries on the basis of the territorial status quo in Europe and to renounce the use of force or the threat of its use, to create a climate of trust between negotiating partners, to assert the Federal Republic on the world stage and transform it into a full-fledged subject of international relations. The first practical act of implementing the new foreign policy concept of the FRG" was the signing between the governments of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic in August 1970 of the "Moscow Treaty", which confirmed the inviolability of the post-war borders in Europe and contained a renunciation of the use of force to resolve disputed issues. Then a similar treaty was concluded by the FRG with Poland, treaties were concluded on the foundations of relations between the FRG and the GDR and on the normalization of relations with Czechoslovakia.

The FRG's "New Ostpolitik" gave a powerful impetus to the deepening and further development of cooperation between the FRG and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe in the economic and cultural spheres. Throughout 1972-1973. negotiations were held on the establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of embassies between the FRG and a number of socialist countries. In 1970–1972 West Germany signed agreements on trade and economic cooperation with the USSR, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. The volume of trade and economic turnover has increased significantly. Germany's "New Ostpolitik", having contributed to overcoming the inertia of the "cold war", was an integral part of the process of detente of international tension, and in fact "became its synonym". As the historian N.V. Pavlov, “... if there hadn’t been a “new Eastern policy”, there would have been no Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ... “Eastern Policy” entered the international lexicon as a German term and became synonymous with the policy of detente” .

October 20, 1971 W. Brandt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The West German chancellor became the first German to receive the Peace Prize after World War II "for a policy of reconciliation between old images of the enemy" and in recognition of "concrete initiatives that led to the easing of tension" between East and West. Delivering a solemn speech during the presentation of the prize, W. Brandt gave an excellent description of the new Eastern policy of the FRG: “We began, also pursuing our national interest, to build our relations with Eastern Europe in a new way ... The transition from the classical policy of power to a constructive policy of peace, which we are carrying out, should be understood as a change of goals and methods - from the implementation of our interests to their alignment. As Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs F. Steinmeier noted on December 10, 2008 in his speech on a pan-European partnership, "a direct road leads from Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik to the fall of the Berlin Wall, to overcoming the division of Germany and Europe" . W. Brandt's "New Eastern Policy" had a significant impact on the Soviet foreign policy course. As the first President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev, “the new Eastern policy also had an impact on the Soviet public, contributed to reflection on the role of democracy for the future of their own country, and stimulated critically thinking forces, inspired at the time by the 20th Congress of the CPSU. However, it was only years later that we in the Soviet Union truly appreciated the enormous opportunities inherent in Eastern policy and began a real movement towards them. Summing up, we note that the importance of the "new Eastern policy" pursued by the government of Chancellor W. Brandt for the development of Russian-German relations is beyond doubt. In fact, it was at this stage that the foundations of the current strategic partnership between Russia and the FRG were laid.

Notes

1. 1. Alekseev R.F. USSR-FRG: a new stage of relations. M., 1973.

2. 2. Brandt, V. Memoirs. Translation from him. M.: News, 1991.

3. 3. Germany. Facts / Ed. K. Lanterman. Berlin, 2003.

4. 4. Gorbachev M.S. How it happened: the unification of Germany. M., 1999.

5. 5. Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany (together with the “Understanding of Intentions of the Parties”). Signed in Moscow on August 12, 1970 / Collection of existing treaties, agreements and conventions concluded by the USSR with foreign states. Issue. XXVII. M., 1974.

6. 6. Kremer I.S. Germany: stages of "Ostpolitik". M., 1986.

7. 7. Labetskaya E., Lukyanov F., Slobodin A., Shpakov Yu. Pipe to infinity. Chronicle of the biggest deal in Russian-German history // Vremya Novostei, No. 169, November 17, 2000.

8. 8. Exchange of notes between the Embassy of the USSR in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany on an agreement on consular activities. Held on July 22, 1971 / Collection of existing treaties, agreements and conventions concluded by the USSR with foreign states. Issue. XXVII. M., 1974.

9. 9. Essays on the history of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia / Ed. I.S. Ivanova, A.Yu. Meshkova, V.M. Grinin and others. In 3 vols. T. 3. M., 2002.

10. 10. Pavlov N.V. German foreign policy in the post-bipolar world. M., 2005.

11. 11. Pavlov N.V., Novikov A.A. German foreign policy: from Adenauer to Schroeder. M .: CJSC Moscow textbooks - SiDiPress, 2005.

12. 12.Politics of the world in our time. Lecture by Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt December 11, 1971 in connection with the award of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1971. / Willy Brandt. democratic socialism. Articles and speeches. Per. with him. / Ed. G.A. Bagaturyan. M., 1992.

13. 13. Popov V.I. Modern diplomacy. Theory and practice. M., 2004.

14. 14. Teleappeal of Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt to the West German population in connection with the signing of the Treaty between the USSR and the FRG. Moscow, 12.08.1970 / Eastern policy of the FRG under crossfire. Digest of articles. Per. with him. M.: 1972.

15. 15. Hakke K. Great power involuntarily. Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany / Per. with him. M.: Booklet, 1995.

16. 16. Willi Brandt Regierungserklaerung vom 28 Oktober 1969 // Die Welt, 10/29/1969.

17. 17. http://www.bundestag.de/service/glossar/W/wahlergebnisse.html.

18. 18.http://www.germania-online.ru (Willy Brandt is the creator of the "Eastern policy" // http://www.germania-online.ru/publikacii/swp/swp-detail/datum/2011/ 12/12/).

The Eastern question is the so-called oral designation of a number of international contradictions that arose in the late 18th and early 20th centuries. It was directly...

By Masterweb

03.04.2018 16:01

The Eastern question is the so-called oral designation of a number of international contradictions that arose in the late 18th and early 20th centuries. It was directly connected with the attempts of the Balkan peoples to free themselves from the Ottoman yoke. The situation was aggravated in connection with the impending collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Many great powers, including Russia, Great Britain, Prussia, Austria-Hungary, sought to fight for the division of Turkish possessions.

background

The Eastern question initially arose due to the fact that the Ottoman Turks, who settled in Europe, formed a fairly powerful European state. As a result, the situation on the Balkan Peninsula has changed dramatically, between Christians and Muslims there has been a confrontation.

As a result, it was the Ottoman state that became one of the key factors in international European political life. On the one hand, they were afraid of her, on the other hand, they were looking for an ally in her face.

France was one of the first to establish diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire.

In 1528, the first alliance between France and the Ottoman Empire was concluded, which was based on mutual hostility to the Austrian Empire, which at that time was personified by Charles V.

Over time, religious components were added to the political ones. King Francis I of France wanted one of the churches in Jerusalem to be returned to Christians. The Sultan was against it, but promised to support all Christian churches that would be founded in Turkey.

Since 1535, the French and all other foreigners have been allowed to freely visit the Holy Places under the auspices of France. Thus, for a long time, France remained the only Western European country in the Turkish world.

Decline of the Ottoman Empire

The decline in the Ottoman Empire began in the 17th century. The Turkish army was defeated by the Poles and Austrians near Vienna in 1683. Thus, the advance of the Turks into Europe was stopped.

The leaders of the national liberation movement in the Balkans took advantage of the weakened empire. These were Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins, Vlachs, mostly Orthodox.

At the same time, in the 17th century, the economic and political positions of Great Britain and France were increasingly strengthening in the Ottoman Empire, which dreamed of maintaining their own influence, while trying to interfere with the territorial claims of other powers. First of all, Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The main enemy of the Ottoman Empire

In the middle of the 18th century, the main enemy of the Ottoman Empire changed. Russia replaces Austria-Hungary. The situation in the Black Sea region changed radically after the victory in the war of 1768-1774.

Based on its results, the Kuchuk-Kaynardzhi Treaty was concluded, which formalized the first Russian intervention in the affairs of Turkey.

At that time, Catherine II had a plan for the final expulsion of all Turks from Europe and the restoration of the Greek Empire, on the throne of which she predicted her grandson Konstantin Pavlovich. At the same time, the Ottoman government expected to take revenge for the defeat in the Russian-Turkish war. Great Britain and France continued to play an important role in the Eastern Question, and the Turks counted on their support.

As a result, in 1787 Turkey launched another war against Russia. In 1788, the British and French, through diplomatic tricks, forced Sweden to enter the war on their side, which attacked Russia. But within the coalition, everything ended in failure. First, Sweden withdrew from the war, and then Turkey agreed to another peace treaty, which pushed its border to the Dniester. The government of the Ottoman Empire renounced its claims to Georgia.

Aggravation of the situation

As a result, it was decided that the existence of the Turkish Empire would ultimately prove more beneficial to Russia. At the same time, Russia's sole protectorate over Turkish Christians was not supported by other European states. For example, in 1815, at a congress in Vienna, Emperor Alexander I believed that the Eastern Question deserved the attention of all world powers. Soon after this, a Greek uprising broke out, followed by the terrible barbarism of the Turks, all this forced Russia, along with other powers, to intervene in this war.

After that, relations between Russia and Turkey remained tense. Noting what are the reasons for the aggravation of the Eastern Question, it is necessary to emphasize that the Russian rulers regularly examined the possibility of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. So, in 1829, Nicholas I ordered to study the position of Turkey in the event of collapse.

In particular, it was proposed to justify five minor states instead of Turkey. The Kingdom of Macedonia, Serbia, Epirus, the Kingdom of Greece and the Principality of Dacia. Now it should be clear to you what are the reasons for the aggravation of the Eastern Question.

Expulsion of the Turks from Europe

The plan for the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, conceived by Catherine II, was also tried by Nicholas I. But as a result, he abandoned this idea, deciding, on the contrary, to support and protect its existence.

For example, after the successful uprising of the Egyptian pasha Megmet Ali, after which Turkey was almost completely crushed, Russia in 1833 entered into a defensive alliance, sending its fleet to the aid of the Sultan.

Enmity in the East

The enmity continued not only with the Ottoman Empire, but also between the Christians themselves. In the east, the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches competed. They competed for various privileges, advantages for visiting Holy places.

By 1740, France had succeeded in securing certain privileges for the Latin Church at the expense of the Orthodox. The followers of the Greek religion obtained from the Sultan the restoration of ancient rights.

Understanding the causes of the Eastern Question, one must turn to 1850, when French envoys sought the return of individual Holy places located in Jerusalem to the French government. Russia was categorically against it. As a result, a whole coalition of European states came out against Russia in the Eastern Question.

Crimean War

Turkey was in no hurry to accept a favorable decree for Russia. As a result, in 1853 relations worsened again, the solution of the Eastern Question was again postponed. Soon after, relations with European states went wrong, all this led to the Crimean War, which ended only in 1856.

The essence of the Eastern Question was the struggle for influence in the Middle East and the Balkan Peninsula. For several decades, he remained one of the key in Russia's foreign policy, she confirmed this over and over again. Russia's policy in the Eastern Question was the need to establish its influence in this region, which was opposed by many European powers. All this resulted in the Crimean War, in which each of the participants pursued their own selfish interests. Now you have figured out what the Eastern question was.

Massacre in Syria

In 1860, the European powers again had to intervene in the situation in the Ottoman Empire, after a terrible massacre against Christians in Syria. The French army went east.

Regular uprisings soon began. First in Herzegovina in 1875, and then in Serbia in 1876. Russia in Herzegovina immediately declared the need to alleviate the suffering of Christians and finally put an end to the bloodshed.

In 1877, a new war broke out, Russian troops reached Constantinople, Romania, Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria gained independence. At the same time, the Turkish government insisted on observing the principles of religious freedom. At the same time, the Russian military-political leadership continued to develop plans for a landing on the Bosphorus at the end of the 19th century.

The situation at the beginning of the 20th century

By the beginning of the 20th century, the expansion of Turkey continued to progress. In many ways, this was facilitated by the rule of the reactionary Abdul-Hamid. Italy, Austria and the Balkan states took advantage of the crisis in Turkey to wrest their territories from her.

As a result, in 1908 Bosnia and Herzegovina was ceded to Austria, the Tripoli region was annexed to Italy, in 1912 four minor Balkan countries started a war with Turkey.

The situation was aggravated due to the genocide of the Greek and Armenian people in 1915-1917. At the same time, the Entente allies made it clear to Russia that in the event of a triumph, the Black Sea straits and Constantinople could go to Russia. In 1918, Turkey capitulated in the First World War. But the situation in the region has changed dramatically once again, which was facilitated by the fall of the monarchy in Russia, the national-bourgeois revolution in Turkey.

In the war of 1919-1922, the Kemalists led by Ataturk won, and the new borders of Turkey, as well as the countries of the former Entente, were approved at the Lausanne Conference. Ataturk himself became the first president of the Turkish Republic, the founder of the modern Turkish state in the form we know.

The results of the Eastern Question was the establishment of borders in Europe close to modern ones. It was also possible to resolve many issues related, for example, to the exchange of population. Ultimately, this led to the final legal elimination of the very concept of the Eastern Question in modern international relations.

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The Eastern question is the question of the fate of Turkey, the fate of the peoples in the Balkans, Africa and Asia that were enslaved by it and fought for their national independence, as well as the attitude of the European powers towards these fates and the international contradictions that arose in this.

By the end of the 16th century, the Turkish Empire had reached its greatest power, based on territorial conquests and feudal robbery of enslaved peoples. However, already at the beginning of the 17th century, the process of losing the conquered lands by Turkey and the fall of its power began.

The reasons for this process lay in the growth of the economic influence of large feudal landowners in connection with the development of commodity-money relations in Turkey; this led to a weakening of the military power of the Turkish state, to feudal fragmentation and to intensified exploitation of the working masses of the enslaved peoples.

The emergence of capitalism in Turkey in the middle of the 18th century only accelerated this process. The peoples enslaved by Turkey began to form into nations and began to struggle for their national liberation; the unbearable exploitation of the working masses of the Turkish Empire retarded the capitalist development of the peoples subject to Turkey and strengthened their desire for national liberation.

Economic stagnation and degradation, the inability to overcome feudal fragmentation and create a centralized state, the national liberation struggle of the peoples subject to Turkey, the aggravation of internal social contradictions led the Turkish empire to disintegration and weakening of its international positions.

The ever-increasing weakening of Turkey fanned the predatory appetites of the major European powers. Turkey was a profitable market and source of raw materials; in addition, it was of great strategic importance, being located at the junction of routes between Europe, Asia and Africa. Therefore, each of the "great" European powers sought to grab more for itself from the legacy of the "sick man" (this is how Turkey began to be called from 1839).

The struggle of the Western European powers for economic and political dominance in the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire began in the 17th century and continued into the 18th and 19th centuries.

By the end of the third quarter of the 19th century, a new struggle began between the European powers, which was called the "Eastern Crisis".

The Eastern crisis arose as a result of the armed uprising of the Slavic population of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1875-1876) against the Turkish oppressors. This uprising, which had an anti-feudal character, was a progressive national liberation struggle of the Slavic people against the backward and wild Turkish feudalism.

What was the position of the main European powers during the Eastern crisis?

Germany hoped to use the Eastern crisis to weaken Russia and gain freedom of action against France. Defeated in 1871 by Prussia, it quickly recovered and revanchist sentiments grew in it. Bourgeois-Junker Germany looked anxiously at the revival of the might of France and made plans for her new defeat. For Germany, this was possible only on the condition that no European power would intervene in a new Franco-German war on the side of France; in this respect, it could fear most of all the unfavorable intervention of Russia. The German Chancellor Bismarck hoped to weaken Russia by drawing her into a war with Turkey; at the same time, Bismarck sought to push Russia in the Balkans against Austria-Hungary and thereby finally bind Russia, deprive her of the opportunity to support France.

In Austria-Hungary, the military-clerical German party, headed by Emperor Franz Joseph, hoped to use the Bosno-Herzegovina uprising to seize Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which it was secretly urged by Germany. The capture was conceived as an amicable deal with the Russian tsar, since at that time Austria-Hungary did not consider it possible for itself to fight with Russia. At the beginning of the Eastern crisis, the Austro-Hungarian government circles even believed that it was necessary to put out the uprising and thereby eliminate the crisis.

Russia, weakened by the Crimean War and not yet fully recovered from its consequences, at the beginning of the Eastern crisis was forced to limit itself, caring only about maintaining its positions in the Balkans and maintaining its prestige among the Balkan Slavs. The tsarist government tried to help the rebels, but did not want to get involved in any actions that could involve Russia in the war. This led to the fact that the Russian government was ready to take the initiative to help the rebels, but only in agreement with other powers.

The British government, headed by Prime Minister Disraeli, sought to take advantage of Russia's difficult situation in order to further weaken it. Disraeli understood that only weakness forced the Russian government to limit itself in its predatory goals in relation to Turkey and that the tsarist government considered such a restriction as a temporary measure.

To deprive Russia of the opportunity to pursue an active policy in the Balkans, Disraeli adopted a plan to push Russia into a war with Turkey, and, if possible, with Austria-Hungary. According to Disraeli, such a war would weaken all its participants, which would give England freedom of action to carry out aggressive plans in Turkey, would eliminate any threat to England from Russia in Central Asia, where Russia was already approaching the borders of India, and in the Balkans, where England feared the seizure of the Black Sea straits by Russia. Disraeli began to unleash a war between Russia and Turkey under the hypocritical slogan of non-interference in Balkan affairs.

Such was the international alignment of forces of the European powers at the beginning of the Eastern crisis.

The first steps of the European powers still gave hope for a peaceful settlement of the Eastern crisis. On December 30, 1875, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrássy, on the initiative of Russia and according to a project agreed with her, handed over a note to all major European powers. Its essence was to eliminate the uprising with the help of modest administrative reforms for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The powers agreed with the proposals of the note and, through their ambassadors, began to seek from Turkey the implementation of the demands proposed by the note. In February 1876, Sultan Abdulaziz agreed to the demands of the note. It would seem that the Eastern crisis, having barely begun, ends.

But then English diplomacy entered the scene. The peaceful resolution of the Eastern crisis did not suit her.

The closest obstacle to deepening the crisis was Sultan Abdulaziz himself and his Russophile cabinet headed by Mahmud Nedim Pasha. As a result of a palace coup organized by the English ambassador to Turkey, Elliot, Murad V was elevated to the Sultan's throne.

In the meantime, the heroic struggle of the Bosnians and Herzegovinians hastened the open action of Serbia and Montenegro. At the end of June 1876, Serbia declared war on Turkey. The successful struggle of 13-14 thousand Bosno-Herzegovina rebels against the 35 thousand Turkish troops gave hope for a successful outcome of the Serbo-Turkish war. In order to be ready to meet any outcome of this war and not be drawn into it itself, the Russian government decided in advance to agree with Austria-Hungary on all possible occasions.

On this basis, the Reichstadt Agreement was born, concluded on July 8, 1876 between Alexander II and the Russian Chancellor Gorchakov, on the one hand, Franz Joseph and Andrassy, ​​on the other.

The first option, calculated on the defeat of Serbia, provided only for the implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina of the reforms outlined by Andrássy's note. The second option, calculated on the victory of Serbia, provided for the increase in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro and some annexations for Austria-Hungary at the expense of Bosnia and Herzegovina; According to this option, Russia received Batumi; the part of Bessarabia that was torn away after the Crimean War was returned to it. The third version of the agreement, designed for the complete collapse of Turkey and ousting it from Europe, provided, in addition to measures under the second version, also the creation of an autonomous or independent Bulgaria, some strengthening of Greece and, presumably, the declaration of Constantinople as a free city.

Meanwhile, hopes for a successful outcome of the war for Serbia did not come true. The Serbian army suffered a number of setbacks, and already on August 26, the Serbian prince Milan asked the powers for mediation in order to end the war. The Powers agreed and turned to Turkey with a request to inform them under what conditions peace could be granted to Serbia; Officially, England also took part in this, while unofficially it prompted Turkey to present conditions to Serbia that were completely unacceptable for the latter.

In response, the powers instructed England to obtain a month-long truce from Turkey. Disraeli could not openly refuse to carry out this assignment. Gladstone, who led the opposition in England against Disraeli's policy, developed a hypocritical campaign in England against the arbitrariness prevailing in Turkey and wild Turkish atrocities, and managed to amass political capital on this basis - to set public opinion in England against Disraeli. In order to calm the minds and reconcile the British public with Turkey, Disraeli came up with a new move: he decided to make Turkey at least fictitiously constitutional.

At the behest of the English ambassador, a new palace coup was organized, Murad V was overthrown and a new sultan Abdul-Hamid, who was a supporter of England and formally did not object to the proclamation of the constitution, was installed in his place.

Following this, Disraeli, who had already received the title of Lord and was called Beaconsfield, fulfilling the order of the powers, officially proposed to Turkey to conclude peace with Serbia on the basis of the situation that existed before the war; at the same time, British diplomats conveyed to the new sultan a secret "friendly advice" to do away with Serbia.

Abdul-Hamid followed this advice. Under Dyunish, the ill-prepared Serbian army was defeated. She was threatened with death.

In this situation, the tsarist government could not but speak out in favor of Serbia, without risking forever losing its influence in the Balkans. On October 31, Russia issued an ultimatum to Turkey to declare a truce with Serbia within 48 hours. The Sultan was not prepared by his English prompters for such a move, he was confused and on November 2 accepted the demand for an ultimatum.

Beaconsfield rattled his weapons, delivered a warlike speech. All this sounded menacing, but in essence England was not ready for a land war. The Russian government understood this and did not back down. Moreover, Alexander II, incited by the militant court party, headed by his brother Nikolai Nikolaevich and son Alexander Alexandrovich, on November 13 ordered the mobilization of twenty infantry and seven cavalry divisions. After that, Russia, without losing prestige, could no longer abandon its demands on Turkey, even if even the latter did not fulfill them.

In order to surely drag Russia into a war with Turkey, Beaconsfield proposed to convene the ambassadors of the six powers in Constantinople and once again try to agree on a "peaceful" settlement of the Eastern crisis, on peace between Serbia and Turkey, and on reforms for the Balkan Slavs.

The conference of ambassadors worked out the conditions for ending the eastern crisis and on December 23 had to present these conditions to the sultan.

However, on December 23, a representative of the Sultan's government, to the thunder of cannon salutes, announced at the conference that the Sultan had granted a constitution to all his citizens and that in connection with this all the conditions worked out by the conference were becoming redundant.

This statement of the Sultan's minister, inspired by British diplomats, clearly provoked Russia to go to war with Turkey. For the majority in the Russian government, it became increasingly clear that war was inevitable. By that time, a new agreement had been concluded with Austria-Hungary in Budapest, now in case of a war between Russia and Turkey. This agreement was less beneficial for Russia than the Reichstadt. Russia was forced to agree to the occupation by Austria-Hungary of almost all of Bosnia and Herzegovina and promised not to create a strong Slavic state in the Balkans. In return for this, tsarism received only the "friendly" and unreliable neutrality of Austria-Hungary.

Although on February 28, 1877, Turkey made peace with Serbia, the war with Montenegro continued. The threat of defeat hung over her. This circumstance, together with the failure of the Constantinople Conference, pushed tsarist Russia to war with Turkey; however, the disadvantage of the Budapest Convention was so obvious that there were fluctuations in the tsarist government; there were even opinions about the need to make concessions to Turkey and demobilize the army.

In the end, a decision was made: not to demobilize the army and make another attempt to negotiate with the Western European powers for joint influence on Turkey.

As a result of this attempt, the so-called "London" proposals were born, demanding from Turkey even more curtailed reforms for the Slavic peoples than before.

On April 11, these proposals, at the instigation of Beaconsfield, were rejected, and on April 24, 1877, Russia declared war on Turkey.

Thus, the British government succeeded in achieving its immediate goal in exploiting the Eastern crisis: to drag Russia into a war with Turkey. Germany also achieved its immediate goal by forcing Austria-Hungary to take a direct part in resolving the Eastern Question; in the future, there was a possible clash between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans.

It would be completely wrong to attribute the entire success of the British and German foreign policy in fomenting the Eastern crisis to Beaconsfield and Bismarck alone. Of course, they played an important role, but the main reason for the success of England and Germany was the economic and political backwardness of tsarist Russia.