Formation of analytical and synthetic activity. Formation of analytical and synthetic activity of a preschooler as a prerequisite for teaching literacy. (Consultation for teachers). The connection between thinking and speech

The processes of education and upbringing become more complicated as the student matures. Instead of the total perception of the explained, associated with the irradiation of excitation, there appears the ability to isolate in the perception of individual aspects of objects and phenomena, followed by an assessment of its integral state. Thereby mental activity the student goes from the particular to the general. The physiological mechanism of such changes is due to the analytical and synthetic activity of the cerebral cortex.

Analysis(analytical activity) is the ability of the body to decompose, dismember the stimuli acting on the body (images of the outside world) into the simplest constituent elements, properties and signs.

Synthesis(synthetic activity) is a process opposite to analysis, which consists in highlighting among the simplest elements, properties and features decomposed during the analysis, the most important, essential at the moment and combining them into complex complexes and systems.

The unity of the analytical-synthetic activity of the brain lies in the fact that the body, with the help of sensory systems, distinguishes (analyzes) all existing external and internal stimuli and, based on this analysis, forms an idea about them.

GNI is the analytical and synthetic activity of the cortex and the nearest subcortical formations of the GM, which manifests itself in the ability to isolate from environment its individual elements and combine them in combinations that exactly correspond to the biological significance of the phenomena of the surrounding world.

Physiological basis of synthesis make up the concentration of excitation, negative induction and dominant. In turn, synthetic activity is the physiological basis for the first stage in the formation of conditioned reflexes (the stage of generalization of conditioned reflexes, their generalization). The stage of generalization can be traced in the experiment if a conditioned reflex is formed to several similar conditioned signals. It is enough to strengthen the reaction to one such signal in order to be convinced of the appearance of a similar reaction to another, similar to it, although a reflex has not yet formed to it. This is explained by the fact that each new conditioned reflex always has a generalized character and allows a person to form only an approximate idea of ​​the phenomenon caused by it. Therefore, the stage of generalization is such a state of the formation of reflexes in which they appear not only under the action of reinforced, but also under the action of similar unreinforced conditioned signals. In humans, an example of generalization is the initial stage of the formation of new concepts. The first information about the subject or phenomenon being studied is always distinguished by a generalized and very superficial character. Only gradually does a relatively accurate and complete knowledge of the subject emerge from it. The physiological mechanism of generalization of the conditioned reflex consists in the formation of temporary connections of the reinforcing reflex with conditioned signals close to the main one. Generalization is of great biological importance, because. leads to a generalization of actions created by similar conditional signals. Such a generalization is useful, because it makes it possible to assess the general significance of the newly formed conditioned reflex, for the time being without regard to its particulars, the essence of which can be dealt with later.

The physiological basis of the analysis make up the irradiation of excitation and differential inhibition. In turn, analytical activity is the physiological basis for the second stage in the formation of conditioned reflexes (the stage of specialization of conditioned reflexes).

If we continue the formation of conditioned reflexes to the same similar stimuli with the help of which the generalization stage arose, then we can see that after a while conditioned reflexes appear only to the reinforced signal and do not appear on any of the ones similar to it. This means that the conditioned reflex has become specialized. The stage of specialization is characterized by the appearance of a conditioned reflex to only one main signal with the loss of the signal value of all other similar conditioned signals. The physiological mechanism of specialization consists in the extinction of all secondary conditional connections. The phenomenon of specialization underlies pedagogical process. The first impressions that a teacher creates about an object or phenomenon are always general and only gradually they are refined and detailed. Only that which corresponds to reality and turns out to be necessary is strengthened. Specialization, therefore, leads to a significant refinement of knowledge about the subject or phenomenon being studied.

§ 1. The criterion of contradiction in the analysis of research thinking

The next pair after the categories "objective" and "subjective", which has an equally fundamental meaning, is "identity" and "difference" ("unity" and "opposite"). It can be denoted by the concept of "contradiction". The latter is known to be central to dialectics. Even such extremely important concepts as “connection” and “development”, which are included in the widespread and universally recognized definitions of dialectics, must be explained through contradiction, otherwise the very essence of the dialectical approach to reality will not be grasped.

The attitude to the contradiction, the unity of different or many, the identity of opposites as to the fundamental categories of being and cognition comes to us from the depths of centuries. Thus, the Socratic method of cognition, his famous maieutics, is based on precisely contradiction - the conscious, purposeful creation of contradictions, their series, overcoming which the interlocutor of Socrates comes to the truth. “In order to come to the truth, it is necessary ... to pass through the gates of contradiction” (4, 127).

Over the centuries, the cognitive meaning of the contradiction, its function in relation to the truth, has changed, but at the same time its great importance as an instrument of knowledge has been preserved. It is impossible not to mention in this connection the teaching of Nicholas of Cusa about the coincidence of opposites. He managed to see the connection between contradiction and truth in a significantly different way than the great thinkers of antiquity. If "reason is to reason as God himself is to reason" (50, 198), then just due to the fact that the mind is able to comprehend the coincidence of opposites. This idea was developed especially profoundly and systematically by the great dialectician Hegel. He believed that “everything that is real contains opposing definitions and ... comprehension of an object in concepts just means cognition of it as a specific unity of opposing definitions” (16, vol. 1, 167).

It is interesting to consider how V. I. Lenin determines priorities in the system of dialectical categories - a man who succeeded in an unusually effective practical use of dialectics to achieve his political goal. Formulating the “elements of dialectics” in the most concise form, V. I. Lenin puts in the first place the principle associated with the categories “objective” and “subjective”, and the second and third - the principles based on the dialectical idea of ​​contradiction: “.. .2) inconsistency in the thing itself... contradictory forces and tendencies in every phenomenon; 3) combination of analysis and synthesis” (39, vol. 29, 202). Expanding further on this brief formulation already in sixteen paragraphs, in the first three he "places" again the principle objectivity, and in all subsequent ones, in essence, it develops, “explicates” the idea of ​​contradiction, directly using in most of them the concepts of the dialectical knot “contradiction” (especially in paragraphs 4) - 9)). Finally, completing a detailed enumeration of the elements of dialectics, he notes: “In short, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This will capture the core of dialectics...” (39, vol. 29, 203).

So, in the analysis of research thinking, there are enough grounds for singling out the concept of "contradiction" as a fundamental one, anticipating the numerous concepts of dialectics.

Indeed, the work of investigative thought is in some way reducible to such relatively simple operations as separation and connection, distinction and identification, analysis and synthesis. Whether the scientist compares different points of view, expresses his attitude to some theoretical position, explains some new concept, proves the truth of a certain thesis, substantiates the relevance, practical or theoretical significance of the ideas put forward and the results obtained, he in all these cases with Necessarily establishes certain relationships, connections between various provisions, statements, i.e., performs certain actions of an analytic-synthetic nature.

The connections are different. In addition to the fact that they belong to different spheres of reality, they differ in their own internal characteristics. For our further analysis, it is important to take into account the following circumstances: the number (two or more) interconnected positions, sides, elements, how exactly they are connected, mutually exclusive, condition each other, partially coincide, mutually transform, merge into a single whole, etc. P.; epistemological, categorical type of connection (spatial, temporal, essential, etc.).

The use of the dialectical concept of contradiction makes it possible to significantly clarify and streamline the vast variety of connections that are realized in the process of scientific thinking, because within the framework of this concept, various analytical and synthetic actions can be represented as moments (aspects, phases) of the deployment of cognitive contradiction, as certain points on the path of its development. development. Thanks to this, "many" becomes "single", "diverse" seems to line up in one line, is ordered and is relatively easy to see.

It must be said that today the concept of contradiction in dialectical theory has not been sufficiently developed for effective, at the level modern requirements, analysis of specific samples of scientific thinking. This statement may seem strange against the background of the abundance of works on contradictions and ways to resolve them. But at the same time, it is obvious that, at least, our philosophers today do not have the proper unity on this issue. Their views on the typology of the contradiction, the forms and methods of its resolution clearly do not coincide, and often turn out to be polar opposites.

Summing up the discussion on the problem of contradiction, V. A. Lektorsky writes: “If I am allowed to express an opinion on which aspects of the problem under discussion need especially detailed development, then ... I would single out the question about the ways and types of conflict resolution. As the reader knows, all participants in this discussion agree that the contradiction must be resolved. However, as regards the nature of this resolution, the relationship between the antinomy and the method of its resolution, not only a difference in approaches is revealed here, but in a number of cases the ambiguity of the author's position itself" (21, 340- 341),

It is quite obvious that such an unfavorable position at the very "heart" of dialectical theory cannot be tolerated. It is fraught with dire consequences. On the basis of such a strong methodological disagreement, it is hardly possible to effectively stimulate the development of the sciences and social knowledge. After all, if the same research results are evaluated this way, then that way, then as unforgivable mistakes, then as great achievements (and this has happened more than once with us), if “from above”, from the side of methodology, there are multidirectional, dramatically changing impulses , this does not contribute to the development of science. In this state of affairs, uncontrollable accidents, someone’s arbitrariness and whim, all kinds of incidental, “near-scientific” circumstances, etc., can acquire enormous significance.

But the complexity is not only in insufficient theoretical development of the problem of contradiction. In our opinion, it is also in the unsuitability or, in any case, in the weak adaptation of dialectical tools for a systematic and detailed analysis of research thinking, objective and adequate “weighing”, evaluation of specific manifestations and patterns of thinking (for example, in scientific texts). In other words, dialectics is still weakly connected to the implementation contemporary research, and in general - practical, life tasks, thus causing quite fair criticism. Is it possible to correct this situation?

Anyone who is at all familiar with the scientific-cognitive process recognizes the great role of contradiction as an essential, immanent factor in cognition, its stimulator. Not only philosophers-dialectics, but also many outstanding representatives of the particular sciences, in one way or another, in one form or another, consciously used Contradiction to stimulate their creative activity. Here, for example, is one of the descriptions of the features of N. Bora's work.

“We are talking about the well-known dialectical style of his thinking and work ... N. Bohr liked to work on the texts of articles not at his desk, but walking around the room, dictating them to one of his colleagues whom he persuaded to help himself as a stenographer, listener and criticism. At the same time, he constantly argued both with himself and with his partner, who by the end of the conversation was exhausted. Einstein, Heisenberg, Schrödinger and other physicists could not fail to notice that Bohr always seemed to be looking for contradictions, rushing at them with unprecedented energy and sharpening them to the maximum extent so that a pure substance could precipitate as a result of the discussion. By the way, there was something in common between Bohr's method of argumentation and the principle of complementarity itself - it was the ability to benefit from the confrontation of alternative positions" (81, 195-196).

But it is one thing - a full-blooded deployment, the "life" of contradiction in the very process knowledge and another - its presence in the completed product of research work, say, in the text of a scientific work. In the latter, in accordance with the norms of scientific writing, the procedural component of knowledge is eliminated as much as possible, and the main emphasis is on the finished, completed, “become” result. The living movement of cognition is resolutely dissected, often changing beyond recognition, and as a result, very little or almost nothing remains of the "locomotive" of the movement - contradiction. At best, the reader is presented only with separate, disparate phases of the unfolding of the contradiction, only a few fragments of the whole process.

And yet, in some texts or in separate parts of them, the real and natural contradiction of the cognitive process is manifested quite fully and clearly. Indicative in this regard are the arguments of A. Poincaré in his work “On the Nature of Mathematical Inference”: “The very possibility of mathematical knowledge seems to be an insoluble contradiction. If this science is deductive only in appearance, then where does it get that perfect rigor that no one dares to question? If, on the contrary, all the propositions it puts forward can be deduced from one another according to the rules of formal logic, then how is mathematics not reduced to an endless tautology? Syllogism cannot teach us anything essentially new, and if everything must follow from the law of identity, then everything must also be reduced to it. But is it really possible to admit that the presentation of all the theorems that fill so many volumes is nothing but a disguised trick to say that A is A! (59, 11). In subsequent reasoning, A. Poincaré seeks to resolve the contradiction he formulated. Thus, in his text - in full accordance with the dialectical theory - contradiction acts as an impulse for the movement of thought, a stimulator of its ascent to truth.

Note that the text about which in question, belongs to the great mathematician, but still it is not a proper mathematical text. In the latter, the idea of ​​contradiction realizes itself somewhat differently, in particular, when proving theorems in a very common way - "by contradiction".

As already mentioned, the movement of a "living" contradiction is far from always sufficiently vividly imprinted in the text of a scientific work. Often something rudimentary is preserved in it, only faint, hardly discernible traces of that rich, capacious, dramatic and intense thought process that preceded the text, gave rise to it, and now, in essence, remained outside it. But still a reflection of the living, contradictory movement of thought is saved. On it you can read a lot and, if necessary, restore. In other words, there is a real opportunity to carry out a useful analysis of research thought, using tools based on the dialectical concept of contradiction for this purpose.

We note that the analysis and evaluation of thinking using the dialectical criterion of inconsistency, generally speaking, has long been practiced in dialectics. Let us turn, for example, to the Marxian assessment of the reasoning of P. J. Proudhon: “Despite the greatest effort to climb to the top of the system of contradictions, Mr. Proudhon could never rise above the first two steps: a simple thesis and antithesis, and even here he got only two times, and of these two times, once he flew somersault ”(43, vol. 4, 132). It is interesting that K. Marx not only notes the viciousness, non-dialectical reasoning of P. J. Proudhon, but also in some way determines its measure, indicating which moments of dialectical thinking P. J. Proudhon “mastered” and to which he could not rise.

Indeed, the use of the criterion of contradiction in the analysis of thinking is a common thing in dialectical literature. E. V. Ilyenkov even has the following very categorical statement on this subject: “In general, the attitude towards contradiction is the most accurate criterion for the culture of the mind, the ability to think. Even just an indicator of its presence or absence” (24, 52).

But the main question is how to understand and practically use the named criterion in the analysis of thinking. For many people fully recognize that "attitude towards contradiction" is the criterion of the culture of the mind. Even those against whom the above statement of E.V. Ilyenkov is aimed will agree with this, only they will understand it in their own way.

Today we have to somehow decide in such a difficult situation. Of course, the incompatibility of positions on the contradiction in the framework of modern methodology must be overcome. At the same time, of course, it is necessary to avoid an unprincipled, eclectic combination of different points of view, their mechanical, patchwork "gluing". And for the solution of this exceptionally complex task, it is hardly possible to point out any other way, except for that which is associated with a significant expansion, consolidation and modernization of the system itself. platforms, where there is a discussion about contradictions and ways to resolve them. This refers to a direct appeal to practice, which in a number of respects has noticeably overtaken theory and has ceased to "fit" into it. In this regard, it is necessary deep dive dialectical theory in the midst of empirical research research.

It is clear that philosophy as a general, fundamental methodology should not get bogged down in empirical particulars, submit to them without a trace and lose itself. And such self-preservation of the philosophical method when deepening it into practice is, in principle, quite possible. If philosophy, dialectics has retained itself, its integrity when immersed, for example, in rough economic matter (remember K. Marx's "Capital"), then why should it lose itself, being turned to a closer, related subject - to the existing forms and structures of research? thoughts?

On this path, the possibility of a direct and detailed correlation of the theoretical positions developed in dialectics and typical cognitive situations common in any science - simple, obvious, understandable already at the level of general scientific common sense - opens up. And this circumstance, that is, the possibility of correlating the "high" elements of dialectical theory and the prosaic situations of empiricism, allows them to control and correct, reinforce and enrich each other.

On the one hand, some theoretical (perhaps abstract- theoretical) judgments, viewed through the prism of empiricism, appear in a completely different light, lose their apparent significance, respectability and acquire their real weight. On the other hand, the vast and hard-to-perceived empirical material, many-sided to the point of chaos, illuminated by a mature dialectical theory, acquires a certain harmony, orderliness and visibility. Thanks to the combination of dialectical theory and scientific research empiricism, various, competing approaches to contradiction developed within the framework of the dialectical tradition, it seems to us, could be properly defined and take their place in explaining such a complex phenomenon as scientific research thinking.

Below we will try to outline the connection between the dialectical categories of the "contradiction" group and the mental (analytical-synthetic) operations distinguished at the empirical level. These operations, in turn, correspond to certain intellectual, exploratory results. Thus, there should be a connection between the most important dialectical categories (identity, difference, etc.) and the characteristic products of intellectual activity that can be isolated in scientific texts.

Such an analysis will at first be schematic, simplifying real situations. But it is important and necessary as a start. At subsequent stages, as other groups of categories are involved and the use of dialectical tools is expanded, the possibilities of analysis will increase significantly. And on its basis, it will become quite real to obtain sufficiently complete, adequate and undoubted assessments of the quality of thinking and its various products.

§ 2. Types of intellectual products according to the criterion of "contradiction phase"

Let us now try to show the possibility of evaluating thinking - the very acts of thought and its products - with the help of some means developed in dialectics. This task should not seem naive or too daring, given that other disciplines related to thinking have long been evaluating it in one way or another, and the results obtained are most directly practical use. In this regard, let us recall at least the measurement of the “intelligence quotient”.

Here we note one of the important advantages of the approach that opens up on the basis of the use of dialectics over many psychological methods of measurement. The latter presuppose that the individual is placed under artificial conditions determined by the relevant experiment or testing circumstances. This can lead to inadequate, distorted estimates. In life, in ordinary practical activity, a person often manifests himself, his intellectual, creative abilities in a different way - better or worse than in the artificial conditions of an experiment or test. And the approach proposed here makes it possible to evaluate the thinking of an individual as it manifests itself in ordinary, natural conditions, within the framework of his usual professional activity. A prepared report, a lecture, a written book, an article - what could be more natural, "more natural" than this kind of material for assessing the intellectual, creative abilities and capabilities of a person! And an objective assessment is really possible in this case due to the fact that in each of the cases listed, specific categorical features of the thought of a particular individual are fully traced. Based on them, you can get very interesting and important conclusions. Of course, this requires the presence of an appropriate concept and methodology.

It is known that the assessment of thinking and its products (more precisely, certain qualities or characteristics of a text) can also be carried out by means of formal logic. But its possibilities in this regard are still significantly limited. On its basis, it is really possible to detect some shortcomings of thinking: for example, violations of known principles and laws of formal logic. Fixing such violations, it is legitimate to assert that the thought in the corresponding place of the text allows some "failure" - it is inconsistent, illogical, incorrect. Of course, if there are a lot of such cases, then it is natural to doubt both its particular products and the general result. But individual formal-logical violations still do not give reason to believe that the intellectual product contained in the text is generally negative, of little value, not worthy of attention. And, more importantly, the usual formal-logical approach does not make it possible to properly assess positive aspect of the produced intellectual product, the measure of its value, significance, etc. It seems that, with appropriate use, this can be done by dialectics.

Let's try to demonstrate what has been said. For this, the key idea of ​​contradiction for dialectics will be used. It is often resorted to when trying to evaluate the "quality" of thinking. But the criterion of contradiction is both understood and applied in different ways. In this case, the development of an evaluation tool will be based on the well-known, practically generally accepted idea in dialectics, the idea of ​​a staging, or staging, of the deployment of a contradiction. Let us cite one of the typical statements in this connection.

“The process of emergence of differences and opposites has several stages. In the beginning... the contradiction appears as identityM. R.), containing an insignificant difference. The next stage is essential difference in identity: at common basis the object has essential properties, tendencies that do not correspond to each other. The essential difference becomes opposites(the greatest difference, polarity, antagonism), which, mutually denying each other, develop into a contradiction ... The existence of two mutually contradictory sides, their struggle and merger into the essence of the dialectical movement constitutes a new category" (72,523-524).

So, identity, difference, opposite, merging into a newcategory (i.e. synthesis). Let's use this scheme as a kind of scale for evaluating (measuring) an intellectual product. In particular, the research result that is recorded in the scientific work, in the text. Let's keep in mind that the tool that was obtained on the basis of the above scheme is only one of the vast set of dialectical tools that are potentially suitable for use in the evaluation function. And, therefore, by itself, taken separately and without connection with others, it does not make it possible to obtain a complete, versatile, in-depth assessment of the research result. Keeping this limitation in mind, we will stipulate, if necessary, that the assessment is carried out according to the “contradiction phase” criterion.

Phase of elementary identity. Intellectual product of zero type (Р 0)

If, in accordance with the foregoing, we accept that the initial stage (or phase) of a contradiction is “an identity containing an insignificant difference,” then it would be logical to attribute those results to it. research activities, in which there is no increment of scientific information. They only reproduce something already known, sometimes with insignificant variations, old truths are repeated, “common places” triumph, triviality prevails. Let's designate this scientifically zero result Р 0. It is characterized by reproduction, and only by her.

Here it is useful to bear in mind two important facts. Firstly, the product Р 0 is not yet the lowest of all possible ones, because one can speak not only of zero, but also of minus results, peculiar anti-results. Secondly, P 0 is also found in very valuable, original scientific papers. After all, reproducibility is a necessary property of exploratory thinking, although not sufficient. Possession of it alone means creative futility, therefore original, information-rich scientific work differ from the trivial ones not at all by the absence of Р 0, but by the presence of results of a different, higher quality.

Let us denote the research result closest to P 0 as P1. To create it, reproductive actions are not enough. It must be generated by a mental operation of a higher level. It is logical to correlate it with the next phase of the development of the contradiction after the identity, namely, with the one that in dialectics is denoted by the term "difference".

Obviously, acting in this way, in the end we will come to four types of research (intellectual) product. Each of them is determined by comparing a specific result created by some author - p a with a specific previously created scientific result - p p. complements r p, we get P,. In the case when ra contradicts p p, we have P 2. And, finally, when p a somehow synthesizes, generalizes p n, the intellectual product reaches the highest level P 3 according to this criterion. Symbolically, this can be represented as follows:

Ro:ra \u003d R „;

Pi:p.< p n ;

P 2: p a "<р„; Рз:р а>R"-

In the course of evaluating a research product according to the “phase of contradiction” criterion, certain difficulties and doubts arise. But, as will become clear from what follows, they are all completely solvable.

Let's move on to the next type of results after P 0.

phase of difference. Complementary intellectual product (R,)

Let us recall the corresponding fragment from the description of the phases, or stages, of the contradiction. “The next stage is the essential difference in the samestr; with a common basis, the object has essential properties, tendencies that do not correspond to each other.

How can you imagine R? It was noted above that P is achieved when the author produces a product p a, by its nature complementary some previously known - p n, i.e. there is some increment of scientific information. Within P 0, as we remember, this was not observed. There, ra only duplicated the previous, well-known product of pn. In dialectical terms, elementary identity dominated. Now, at the level of Rb, it begins to manifest itself significantly certain difference. What exactly? p 1 realizes in itself a difference that has not yet reached the degree of opposition. He hasn't confronted before known result, does not deny it, does not encroach on the role of its alternative.

In the case of P 1, p a, as it were, adjoins the previously created p p and this determines the measure of its difference from its “prototype”. It turns out that p a and p p are rather identical than different. They are identical in the main provisions, method, methods of construction and are different in details (albeit not unimportant), consequences. And yet, P 1 certainly exceeds P 0. After all, the latter is such that R a only is identical to p n, and in the case of P, already in something essential enough for science p a excellent from r p.

Let us pay attention to the quantitative side of the ratio of p a and p p. If we say that the first complements the second, adjoins it, then we can say that the new author's result is lower than the previous one, previously created, i.e. p a<р п- Это свойство характерно для R 1 and distinguishes it from products of higher types, where there is a different quantitative relationship between p a and p p. What is meant by the complementary character of products pi ?

This means that in the case of P, for example, some clarifications occur, a detailing of a previously expressed idea or a concretization of an already used mode of action. At the same time, the main provisions of p p are preserved, not rejected, i.e., identity prevails over difference. One can speak of R 1 when known principles are applied to a new area of ​​reality, where they have not been used before. And they turn out to be very effective, no special changes are required. Adapting these principles does not involve significant creative costs. In any case, the latter cannot be compared with the efforts that were required to develop the principles themselves.

Of course, here too, i.e., to obtain P 1, it is necessary to show a certain ingenuity and ability. In general, in order to "descend" from theory to practice, sometimes no less, but even more talent is required than in the "ascent" from empiricism to theory. But if things turn out in such a way that, adapting the known principles to a new sphere of reality, one has to significantly rework, transform them, then the research product p a already goes beyond P 1 It becomes a product not of a complementary, but of some other, higher type. .

It is logical to assume that an intellectual product of the complementary type surpasses the result of the zero level precisely because the first one is generated by a higher, more complex mental operation, which is richer in a categorical, dialectical-logical sense. Indeed, as we have seen, at Р 0 only the category of identity is realized in the intellectual act: the researcher only repeats, duplicates the known previous result. In the case of p 1, the intellectual operation is already based on the combination of two categories - identity and difference: for example, the researcher repeats the essence of the previous result, its main provisions (the moment of identity), but at the same time supplements, changes its details, individual consequences, etc. (moment of difference). The ability to combine identity and difference in this way means that the individual has certain creative potentials, such a measure of independence, independence of thinking, which allows him to generate at least some novelty within some area of ​​knowledge.

Perhaps someone will find an attempt to define intellectual products in the way described here, that is, by means of dialectical categories, too abstract and of little practical use. Before demonstrating the method of categorical analysis in a more detailed and convincing form (which will be done in Chapter 3), let us point out one of the areas of intellectual activity in which the categories we have named have long been used for the practical evaluation of human labor. This is invention and patenting. It is enough to look at the relevant sources (see, for example, (57; 26) to see that the key, fundamental concept here is the so-called “essential difference.” The latter, in its content, is in the most direct and indisputable relationship with the cognitive category “difference” Supplemented with a few more concepts (“useful effect”, etc.), it quite successfully performs the most complex evaluative function in the field of inventive activity.

Of course, due to difficulties similar to those that arise in science when determining novelty, originality, unfortunate misunderstandings, offensive, sometimes tragic mistakes occur here. But still, patent experts are not going to abandon the concept of "significant difference", perhaps, for someone's taste, not clear enough and flawless. This concept "works" and brings quite tangible benefits, and another, more successful, has not yet been invented. And as you know, "a titmouse in the hands is better than a crane in the sky."

However, it is possible that the crane is not so out of reach. As we will see below, the evaluation tools, the formation of which here began with the categories of "identity" and "difference", can be constantly improved using other, various categories from the rich arsenal of dialectics.

What is the share of p 1 in the total mass of research products? Apparently, among other creative results, it occurs most often. In the vast majority of scientific texts, it is only supplemented, detailed, clarified, clarified what is stated in a relatively small number of especially outstanding works.

At the same time, Pb should not be underestimated, because it captures the enormous, painstaking and really necessary work of many hundreds and thousands of researchers. Labor, without which the assimilation, dissemination, consolidation and application of the most valuable achievements of science would be impossible. Labor, without which the general cognitive progress would be unthinkable. It is the gradual, sometimes not very noticeable, changes in scientific knowledge that prepare the abrupt, radical transformations of the knowledge system. The greatest achievements and wonderful festivals of science are impossible without the everyday work of a huge army of its modest workers. And with sparkling originality, the achievements of geniuses only crown the cumulative gigantic work of their ordinary predecessors. Perhaps, this is not only a merit, but also luck, the happiness of the great ones, that they come at a time when, through the efforts of others, almost everything has already been prepared for triumph and a decisive last word. By the way, then it becomes the first and again begins to acquire complementary and developing results (Pi).

The opposite phase. Intellectual product of contradictory type (P 2)

In dialectics, the opposite is the highest degree of difference, the first naturally grows out of the second. The opposition phase corresponds to an intellectual product of a contradictory type (P 2). Here we come to the very core of the dialectical concept. The latter is primarily associated with bifurcation of a single for a deeper understanding of it. Such a view is characteristic, in particular, of Marxist philosophy and methodology. As V. I. Lenin noted, “the bifurcation of the single and the knowledge of its contradictory parts ... is essence(one of the "essences", one of the main, if not the main, features or features) of dialectics" (39, v. 29, 316).

It is not surprising that in dialectical methodology there is a certain tradition of evaluating thinking and its results primarily on the basis of the idea of ​​contradiction, more precisely, according to the criterion of dialectically interpreted inconsistency. & In the previous paragraph, the corresponding statements of K. Marx and E. V. Ilyenkov were already cited, but here is one of Hegel’s considerations widely quoted in dialectical literature and, perhaps, shocking the scientific public: “Contradiction is the criterion of truth, the absence of contradiction is the criterion of error” (13 , v. 1, 265). If you delve into its real meaning, it is unlikely to cause too active a negative reaction. Hegel's thought, being continued and concretized by modern followers of the dialectical doctrine, is realized in such, for example, provisions: "dialectical knowledge by its nature is such that: 1) as a result, the objective contradiction should be reflected in the final cognitive structure" (2, 332); 2) “not only its result turns out to be contradictory, but also its primary initial stage: it is connected with the identification of the antinomy-problem” (2, 333); 3) “the ways of solving problems ... are also contradictory. Opposite techniques (methods) are used in cognition: analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction...” (2, 334).

One could agree that the provisions listed and others similar to them characterize truly dialectical, creative thinking. But, unfortunately, they are quite difficult to use. Apparently, very general, traditionally formulated provisions (about contradiction as a criterion of truth, criteria for a high culture of thinking, etc.) need a certain “finishing”, concretization and, possibly, adjustment. In any case, it is well known that some works, once highly valued by the abstract criterion of dialectical inconsistency, in fact did not deserve a positive assessment. And, on the contrary, much of what was qualified as anti-scientific, harmful, was eventually recognized in science.

Obviously, bifurcation, opposition, formulation of a contradiction in the text does not always indicate the proper dialectic of thinking and, accordingly, the value of the produced intellectual product. It suffices to pay attention to the following two cases.

In one, the scientist, in contrast to the existing point of view, on one's own puts forward an original concept, citing serious arguments in its favor. In another, a certain author only repeats ready, by whom-then discovered and opposed positions and triumphantly exclaims: here it is, eternally complex and contradictory reality, such is it in its authenticity, final, absolute essence!

In the first case, science receives a certain increment of information, there is a kind of bifurcation of the object of knowledge, in the second case, there are only emotions. In the first case, we have before us a consequence of a complex, laborious mental activity, in the second - with the external, formal attributes of dialectics - only a shadow of someone else's creativity, a repetition of the known, and therefore a rather primitive mental action. In essence, in the first case, we have an intellectual product of a contradictory type Р 2, in the second - only Р 0.

Many research products of the P2 type are easily distinguishable and no special analysis is required to identify them. They, as it were, declare themselves, standing out sharply against the background of the previous knowledge, with which they enter into a decisive confrontation. All the brightest milestones in cognition are necessarily marked by a typical element of R 2 - inconsistency, paradoxicality, absurdity, if you look at them from the standpoint of previous ideas and theories. This is how the ideas about the incommensurability of segments and irrational numbers (the word “irrational” itself is eloquent here), the idea of ​​the Earth’s sphericity, the concept of heliocentrism, non-Euclidean geometries, Einstein’s theory of relativity, quantum mechanical positions and many other discoveries were met in due time.

The complexity of revealing, identifying intellectual products P2 is largely due to the fact that they have a diverse form of manifestation (as, indeed, all other types). It must be admitted that the division of all intellectual results into just four classes (P 0-P 3) simplifies and, in a certain sense, coarsens the real picture. Within each class (type), some types or forms can be distinguished. So, in fact, there is a whole sequence, a kind of spectrum of forms, due to which neighboring types of intellectual products smoothly transition into each other.

Thus, one can speak of the presence of an intellectual product P 2 not only when the characteristic “bifurcation of the single” is presented quite fully and clearly, but also when only a part, or one side, of the contradiction that has arisen in public knowledge has realized itself in a particular text. An example of the first case is Kant's description of antinomies in his "Critique of Pure Reason" (28, vol. 3), an example of the second is the development of the concept of the wave nature of light in those works where the opposite corpuscular theory is ignored.

Indeed, in this work by I. Kant, we have a clear bifurcation of the single and, therefore, the product P 2, since opposite, mutually contradictory statements are proved with equal force: the world is finite - and the world has no limits, there are indivisible particles - and those do not exist and etc. But why not include here those cases when an intellectual product (concept, theory, etc.) is created that contradicts what is already available, previously obtained? Of course, this last one is somewhat different from the previous one (Kantian antinomies), but both here and there there is a characteristic bifurcation of knowledge about the object, inconsistency, etc. Only in the first case is the bifurcation localized in one text, and in the other - within two and more. In one, the author of the created product is an individual, and in the other, a certain supra-individual subject, that is, two, a group or a community of individuals, perhaps not even knowing each other.

Dialectically thinking is usually recognized as one who is capable of bifurcation, splitting own thoughts who know how to contradict themselves in a certain sense, that is, to formulate different, opposite, incompatible judgments about the same object. It would seem, what does the one who "only" produced an intellectual product that contradicts someone else's previously known result have to do with all this? But you should pay attention to one interesting circumstance.

While working on a r and contradicting the previous, known rp, the researcher, although not always at the level of a conscious, typically dialectical bifurcation of a single object into opposites, is, of course, on the way to such a level of understanding and mastery of the object. For example, situations of an involuntary transition of research vatel from one position to another, opposite to the original, - a transition that occurs under the pressure of the inexorable objective circumstances of cognition and contrary to the initial aspirations of the individual.

Thus, non-Euclidean geometries began with stubborn attempts to prove and substantiate precisely Euclidean representations, and ended (for example, in N. I. Lobachevsky, J. Bolyai, and others) with the assertion of views that were essentially different from them. Moreover, the new result in this case was formed not “later”, not at the end of the cognitive path, but from its very beginning, in the course of purposeful proof and substantiation of previous ideas. The opposites, for all their remoteness, are so close to each other that when an individual consciously masters one of them, he thereby approaches the other to a certain extent, although he does not realize this, moreover, he believes that he is extremely far from her.

If a researcher develops a new result that contradicts the existing one, the bifurcation of the unified not only turns out to be the property of collective, social knowledge, but also, in a certain sense, is included in the consciousness of the individual subject. A cognitive product of the P2 type is invariably characterized by a bifurcation of the whole.

So there really is reason to talk about the diversity of types (forms) of intellectual products within the same type, in this case, within P 2. Some of these types bring P 2 closer to the previous type p 1, while others - to the subsequent and higher according to the criterion of inconsistency) P 3 The fact is that all products P 2 are characterized not only by the sign of bifurcation, opposition, antitheticity, but also other signs included in the dialectical contradiction. It's just that the first one here is dominant, acts as a categorical, dominant, and all the rest turn out to be subordinate, more or less weakened. The weakening of the dominant feature, i.e., bifurcation, antitheticality, strengthening other subordinate features, “translates” P 2 either into P 1 or into P 3

Intellectual products P 1 and P 2 are indeed in the closest genetic connection. The appearance of P l carrying additional information, some difference from what is already known in science, represents the beginning of a split view of scientists on the same object. Growing and accumulating, the products P 1, i.e., all kinds of p al p a2, etc., which complement and specify the previous product p p, at a certain moment can give rise to a completely new result, not only different from p p, but opposite him, not supplementing, but contradicting and denying him.

Characteristically, conservatively minded people are always highly suspicious of p 1 . It would seem that there is something dangerous for the old system of knowledge? After all, p 1 only supplements the old knowledge, without encroaching on its strength and inviolability. Rather, he reinforces it by repeating, preserving, keeping in himself its main provisions. As noted, in this case, the moment of identity dominates, and the moment of difference is subordinated, barely outlined. But the point is that in perspective identity gradually decreases, and difference increases. And behind the small, harmless difference, the conservative, not without reason, sees a significant one, threatening opposition and denial of the old knowledge.

Indeed, intellectual products of the P 1 type, containing information of a complementary nature, sooner or later are replaced by more noticeable results that are in the nature of opposites, alternatives, and a clear denial of previous knowledge. This is already P 2. The latter, apparently, can be recognized as higher, if we proceed from the most general dialectical considerations: the products of p 1 are generated by an intellectual operation, which is based on the category "difference", while P 2 are created through operation based on the category "opposite". And in dialectics, the opposite is considered the highest degree of difference.

But the point, of course, is not only and not so much in this general, rather abstract consideration. To get a correct, adequate idea of ​​the comparative level of R 1 and R 2, it is necessary to take into account the entire set of logical, mental means that serve as their support. It is necessary to take into account what a researcher has to do in order to correctly present to the strict judgment of his colleagues intellectual products of a complementary (P 1) and contradictory (P 2) type. Let's pay attention in in particular, the following.

Introducing the product R 1, it is possible not to use a particularly powerful system of evidence. After all, in this case, p a is not very different from p p, that is, from the previous product, the prototype. As noted, they are rather identical than different, and, therefore, almost all the argumentative power previously accumulated and supporting the old product p 1 extends to the new product p a. Due to the slight difference between p and p p, there is no need to build a new argument that is too extensive. The latter is not necessary from a psychological point of view: the products of ra, by virtue of their similarity to rp, seem to follow in their wake and do not meet with much resistance from consumers of information.

It is a different matter in the case of P 2. When creating p a, which contradicts or alternatives to the previous p p, which has already become widespread, the researcher is forced to substantiate it especially carefully (approximately in the same way as the previous result was substantiated). Otherwise, the new will not be able to establish itself in science. In a certain sense, we can talk about the relative equality of the new and previous results: p a \u003d P p (compare with P 1, where p a<р п).

Products R 2 in comparison with R 1 and are psychologically perceived as higher and more substantial. Acute contradiction, conflict, which arise in knowledge with their appearance, immediately and for a long time attract increased attention to themselves, excite thought, and have a strong stimulating effect on the cognitive process. Suffice it to recall the aporias of Zeno and the antinomies of Kant. Such results are “intolerant”, “unbearable” for consciousness, therefore everyone strives to immediately “resolve”, “overcome” the existing contradictory situation. And they do this sometimes over the centuries, sometimes achieving some success, sometimes suffering defeat, but often never reaching the end of the road.

If in the case of P 1 we have p a<р п, в случае Р 2 - р а»р„, то нетрудно себе представить следующий по уровню тип интеллектуальных продуктов. Очевидно, к нему должны быть"отнесены характеризующиеся соотношением р а>r p- The newly created result surpasses the previous one, its prototype. This will be the highest (according to the criterion of inconsistency) TYPE Rz.

Of course, P2 and P3 are closely interconnected, the latter, as it were, grow out of the former. And with a sufficiently careful look in R 2 you can find something more than a bifurcation of the one. In products of this type, it is true, in the embryonic state the idea of ​​connection, identification, synthesis of the bifurcated.

The mental operation corresponding to this moment in the case of R 2 is realized in the form of a peculiar, involuntary accounting by the author, who receives a new result, of some properties and characteristics of the previous result. After all, in order to create new knowledge that can resist the old one, compete with it, claim to replace it, it is necessary to substantiate it to no lesser extent than the previous knowledge was substantiated. And this is possible only if the author of the new one somehow takes into account, takes into account and uses the methods, methods and techniques of substantiating the latter. The new result, opposing the previous one, will be “by itself” in some way combined, united, identified with it. Otherwise, it cannot be attributed to the type R 2, since the characteristic, specific for R 2 relation p a = p n, which means comparability, approximate equal size of the new and previous results, is not realized.

Of course, products related to R 2 are at different distances from the level of R 3. As already mentioned, they can belong to different types within R 2. For example, it is one thing when an author puts forward in his work a position that objectively contradicts someone else's another, which he does not particularly take into account, and another - when he develops two opposite points of view, pushes them against each other, trying to get some conclusions, to get closer to the truth through the conscious use of the instrument of contradiction. In both the first and second cases, intellectual products belong to P 2, but in the second they are clearly closer to P 3.

Indeed, in the second case, there is not only division, bifurcation, opposition, i.e., typical features of P 2, but also some features of P 3. Namely: two opposites, consciously connect the same subject; they are “side by side”, that is, they are adjacent, linked together in one text; theses representing two opposite positions, almost identical in a symbolic, literal expression, the second is distinguished only by the particle “not” (apparently, nothing is so similar as that which is extremely different, opposite, and that is why the phase of opposition is closest to the phase of connection, synthesis and immediately precedes it). Finally, we can say that in the case of a conscious opposition of two approximately equally justified positions, they objectively turn out to be closely interconnected within the framework of a single idea - contradictions. Perhaps the latter not only and not so much divides as unites.

And yet it should be emphasized once again that the moment of unification, the identification of the different and the opposite in R 2 is manifested only in an embryonic, initial form. Here the preceding dialectical moment still dominates - bifurcation, opposition. And the researcher himself, who creates the product P2, may not notice the proper degree of unity and connection between the old and the new result. He does not yet set himself the task of uniting, conjugating the old and the new, including one into the other, etc. Such goals are already related to the next, higher type.

Phase connection (synthesis) of various. Synthetic type intelligent product (P 3)

This higher (according to the criterion used so far) level of cognitive products is generated by a more complex mental operation compared to the previous ones. It is with it, that is, with the intellectual work of a unifying, integrating, synthesizing nature, that the idea of ​​the most perfect, truly dialectical thinking is associated. Here is one of the typical judgments on this subject: “The usual idea embraces difference and contradiction, but not the transition from one to the other, and that's the most important"(39, v. 29, 128).

From the height of the synthetic stage in the movements of thought, the previous stage (bifurcation, opposition) looks limited and in a number of cases is not highly valued. So, E. V. Ilyenkov believed: “... The judgment according to which a product is, on the one hand, a consumer value, and on the other hand, a value for exchange, in itself still has nothing to do with the economist’s theoretical judgment regarding the nature of “value” "("values") in general. Here they are simply two “practically true” and “practically useful” abstractions, two abstract representations isolated from each other and not internally linked in any way. Nothing more" (23, 63).

The cognitive product P 3 corresponding to the synthetic mental operation is, in addition to the perception and reproduction of the already known (Po), in addition to the generation of difference (P 1) and opposition (P 2), also the perception of hidden connections between different or opposite, non-trivial, new identifying different, bridging over, it seemed. would be an insurmountable abyss of contradictions. Thanks to it, there is a kind of contraction, linking together more or less heterogeneous fragments of knowledge previously acquired by mankind. And then various, isolated and even contradictory cognitive products, embraced by a common idea, begin to mutually confirm and mutually reinforce each other in some way. And the idea that brought them together into a single whole receives as its justification and support all the diverse material on which these numerous particular results were previously based. Compare such an intellectual product with a contradictory novelty: there, on the contrary, the entire argumentative power of the rejected proposition is opposed to the new. For this reason alone, the synthesizing novelty P 3, as a rule, enters more easily and is more firmly established in knowledge.

But its value does not end there. Its most important advantage is that it can significantly save the cognitive efforts of society. Numerous disparate results, which previously could be obtained and understood only through equally numerous and strenuous efforts, are now, as it were, generated by themselves by the discovered common basis for them (results).

Combining on this basis various, loosely related or not at all related products of knowledge, the scientist ensures their consolidation and compression. Disordered fragments of knowledge scattered in the information environment line up in a compact, harmonious system, all parts of which are easily visible. Due to this, a significant amount of cognitive energy is released, which is used for further penetration into the unknown. It is known from the history of science that an idea, which for the first time unites and explains in a new way many previously obtained results, at the same time makes it possible to foresee a number of new results, suggests interesting directions for searching, pushes for setting up unexpected experiments, in a word, turns out to be a powerful stimulator for the expansion of knowledge. Thus, synthesizing results are of particular value. The previous types, or stages of the new, are not.

Complementary novelty (P 1), by the very meaning of this concept, seems to be add something to already existing knowledge, but it is able to perform this function only up to a certain time: in the conditions of an information crisis and an abundance of information that no one perceives and comprehends, it is difficult to say whether universal knowledge is growing, developing or, on the contrary, disintegrating: “falling apart” from the appearance of more and more results of complementary type.

Contradictory novelty (R 2) performs a different, in some way opposite, function: it rather leads to a reduction in the mass of knowledge than to its increase, because sometimes it discards a great many wrong ideas that have taken root in the mind. E. Yu. Solovyov explained this very intelligibly and expressively (71, 197-207). Novelty of this type does not so much expand knowledge as it clears the way and prepares the ground for the future, more thorough and reliable development of knowledge.

Only synthesizing novelty (P 3) simultaneously adds something essential to the old knowledge, and discards, displaces a large number of its already unnecessary elements. After all, what she contributes is a generalized idea that links into one whole and harmonizes various cognitive products. In this way the many become one. And the one easily and naturally gives rise to the many, which logically follows from it as various particular consequences. And this, of course, is the most rational "packaging" of scientific information material.

The appearance of synthesizing intellectual products R 3 is always useful for science, at any moment of its development. During the period of the information “boom”, especially intensive accumulation of information (it would seem that it is mainly favorable for the production of complementary novelty), synthesizing results turn out to be very useful: by densely and economically “stacking” the accumulated, they make it possible to further accelerate the expansion of knowledge. In moments of crisis overproduction of information in conditions when contradictory novelty is required to reduce and discard all erroneous and useless, synthesizing the new again turns out to be very useful: it also reduces information, but does it as carefully and carefully as possible in relation to past work and efforts, spent by predecessors.

The ability to generate generalizing, synthesizing ideas in science is inherent primarily in those few who pave new paths in knowledge and found entire trends and schools. “... The greatest contribution of typical discoverers of problems,” writes G. Selye, “is synthesis: an intuitive comprehension of connections between seemingly disparate facts” (67, 100). If we talk about someone specifically, then, for example, how one can imagine the scientific contribution of K. Shannon, one of the founders of cybernetics: “Shannon did not invent anything in the literal sense, he only skillfully developed the existing ideas. But his main merit was that he brought together everything that had been scattered before him, connected everything with his own clear concept and showed in which direction the applications of this concept should be developed ... And what he did is undoubtedly a discovery » (74, 9).

And one more example of a synthetic, at the level P3, cognitive activity of a scientist: “The theory of relativity arose on the verge between Newton's mechanics and Maxwell's electromagnetic theory as a result of Einstein's persistent attempts to eliminate the deep logical contradictions that arose between these two basic scientific concepts in the 19th century. Within the framework of the theory of relativity, in fact, these sections of physical knowledge, seemingly so different in their approaches, were united. For Einstein, this was a natural consequence of his conviction in the unity of the material world, his belief in a deep internal interconnection and conditionality of all phenomena of the reality around us "(6, 67).

Intellectual products of the P3 type, generalizing and embracing previous cognitive results, thereby surpass them in a certain sense (p a > p p). Thus, the scientific products referred to P 3, if we have in mind the quantitative ratio between the newly produced p a and the old p p, knowledge, really differ from products of lower types (Р 0, R 1, R 2) "quantity" brought novelty, the relative value of the contribution.

But this assessment should by no means be taken as absolute. It is easy to see that the products of R 3, in which the synthetic ability of the mind is realized, may not be found in the highest and socially significant cognitive results. Consequently, the criterion of syntheticity, in the form in which it is presented above, does not yet make it possible to distinguish in cognition what is more valuable from what is less valuable.

And yet it is quite obvious that any independent (non-borrowed) consciously synthetic action of the intellect, generating some new result, means not so little. Even if objectively, as a phenomenon of science, it is rather insignificant, it can at least be considered a prerequisite, a prologue to larger and more noticeable synthetic achievements, a sign of the creative ability of thinking. And vice versa, the absence of the necessary synthesis, at least in a small way, shows that a “great synthesis”, an effective result, should hardly be expected. It is difficult to expect anything significant from a thinking that is unable to go beyond distinction and opposition to reach a synthesis (albeit not on the scale of a whole concept) and rationally overcome contradictions. Such thinking can only accept some ready-made point of view, and then select additional arguments in its favor. Or look for weak, insignificant arguments against other people's judgments. One-sidedness, prejudice severely limit, if not completely exclude the possibility of genuine creativity. To obtain a new and valuable result, maximum consideration and use of "different", "forked", "opposite", their full assimilation, assimilation in the final cognitive product is required.

Constantly and without much difficulty to move between different (opposite), to accept, when it is dictated by the interests of knowledge, the side of one's opponent, to abandon one's own point of view if it does not stand up to a severe test - not just moral requirements, but purely professional, essential features of research mind.

It is easy to see that in many cases, without reaching the level P 3, one cannot effectively refute someone's position. Imagine that someone is trying to refute some concept. If he gives a number of arguments in favor of his point of view, even if very weighty, and only on this basis intends to reject the opposite or different from it, then one cannot but doubt his correctness: after all, the position he rejects is based on something and can be no less justified. And how do you know without comparison whose argument is stronger? This means that the critic must seriously and thoroughly (in his own text!) study not only his own, but also the opposite point of view, not only his own arguments, but also the arguments of his opponent. Hegel is certainly right in stating: “True refutation must delve into what constitutes the strong side of the opponent, and place oneself in the sphere of action of this force; to attack him and gain the upper hand over him where he is not, does not help the cause ”(15, vol. 3, 14).

Having somewhat developed this idea, we will come to the conclusion that the refutation is the more impeccable and thorough, the stronger the arguments of the opponent are taken into consideration, the more fully and objectively all his arguments are presented in the course of critical analysis. Apparently, by observing the nature of the relationship of some author to others, to their positions, one can get a fairly complete picture of the level of thinking and the type of cognitive result that is achieved in a particular fragment of the text. When someone judges others, there is an excellent basis for an objective judgment of himself. A distinctly expressed synthetic activity of thinking and the product P 3 generated by it turn out to be necessary not only for refutation, but also for constructing a positive part of the proof, for asserting a certain position. Let's turn to the history of science.

In the third century BC. e. in the ancient world, during the period of increased mathematical activity, this science becomes characterized by “a new attitude towards the reader, as to a possible opponent who is ready to seize on any inaccuracy in the presentation. For the scientist, it was important, with the help of a chain of syllogisms, to force the reader - whether he wants it or not - to admit that the solution offered to him is the only possible and correct one. Hence the elements of rhetoric in the presentation of such an armchair science as geometry. Hence ... the striking connection between the method of argumentation of mathematicians and the practice of criminal justice” (56, 95). »

Please note: in order to get someone to recognize your decision as “the only possible and correct one”, you need to seriously delve into all conceivable objections of your opponent. To force another, you first have to yourself, as it were obey his will and go with him all his way to the end. And having convinced himself of the falsity of such a path, he himself will turn to the truth. In many cases, this is the only reliable way to convince another, to prove one's case. A typical example is the diagram of the action of a mathematician when proving by contradiction, with the help of "reducing to the absurd". Here is how S. Ya. Lurie writes about this: “I,” he says (mathematician - M.R.), - I say that the value of A is equal to B. Of course, you do not believe me and think that A is greater or less than B. Let us assume for a moment that A is greater than B argumentum a contrario (proof by contradiction). Having made such an assumption, we draw a chain of logical conclusions from it and as a result we come to the impossible ... Now I admit that A is less than B. This assumption also leads to absurdity. These absurd conclusions could only come about because the assumption made is wrong. Hence, A can be neither greater than B nor less than B. So, one conclusion remains that A is equal to B, which was required to prove (56, 95).

In this case, the synthetic nature of the mind is manifested in its ability to embrace and compare different, opposite, mutually exclusive, to provide thoughts with freedom of movement in all directions, to come as a result of this to a single, obvious foundation. As a result, false alternatives are justifiably discarded and the situation is preserved that corresponds to the synthetic basis - acceptable to all and reconciling to all.

It is known that proof by contradiction, with the help of reduction to absurdity in one or another modification, is successfully used in scientific reasoning to this day. And this means that there is a dialectic there. It must be admitted that it is precisely this kind of dialectical reasoning that makes it conclusive and convincing. After all, when a researcher, in front of a potential opponent, objectively and unbiasedly considers points of view that are opposite to his own and also claim to be true, his positions are strengthened, gain credibility and evidence, for at least two reasons. First, the more options are rejected after careful and unprejudiced consideration, the more likely the truth of the solution that is proposed in the end. Secondly, the more options that diverge from his own, the researcher considers it necessary to analyze, the more confidence in his objectivity, scientific conscientiousness, caution, and hence in the loyalty of his position (the moment is largely psychological).

The regularity that is revealed in the analysis of texts is indicative. The more reliable the position of the author, the stronger the opponent he allows on the pages of his text, and vice versa, the more vulnerable the position, the weaker the opponent that the author can afford. Everyone "chooses" an opponent in a certain sense "in his own image and likeness." To achieve this, in many cases the authors artificially weaken the opponent's position, simplifying and coarsening it. Apparently, manifestations of this kind should be taken into account and used in assessing the quality of thinking and the product it produces.

A mental operation of a synthetic nature can proceed with various psychological "accompaniments". So, one researcher seems to be able to accept an alternative point of view, but he does it not freely, overcoming terrible internal resistance. The other is able to truly appreciate a different from his own, alien, but interesting view of things, to accept it as an undoubted help in obtaining the truth. For a dialectically thinking researcher, the enemy eventually "works" for him. This happens for the simple reason that he himself works only for the truth, and its comprehension, as a rule, is impossible without going through the controversial, contradictory. voe, doubtful, even erroneous and false. Let us cite one remark by Hegel: “There may be a desire not to bother with the negative as false, and directly grasp the truth. Why bother with the false... Ideas about this, mainly, hinder access to the truth" (12, 17).

The synthetic stage of thinking and, accordingly, R 3 presuppose not only the ability to take the opposite position, but also the ability to independently put forward various kinds of arguments directed against one's own point of view. In this case, the researcher is able to act for the opponent, and even for many opponents, because he can not only put forward powerful counterarguments regarding his own judgments, but also create them in sufficient quantity and assortment. Some of the most important contradictions that contribute to the process of cognition then turn out to be provided not from the outside, but in a certain sense due to the internal activity of this researcher. This is the manifestation of the high synthetic ability of the mind.

Without dwelling in detail on the issue of identifying intellectual products of the P3 type, we will name only some of the indicators that indicate their presence in a particular text: adequate representation of the position and argumentation of the opponent in it; detailed and respectful consideration of it; its constructive use in building your own concept, the inclusion of its valuable elements in a new, own concept.

Obviously, the absence of products of the P3 type and, possibly, the inability to produce them are indicated by the following actions of the authors: voluntary or involuntary distortion of the opponent's point of view, hushing up of its essential and strong sides; radical negativism in relation to someone's position without proper justification, etc.

Thus, the idea of ​​a certain superiority of intellectual products of the P3 type and, in general, of the P0-P3 typology is based, as has been shown, on various arguments. It seems that this typology may well be used in evaluating the results of research work. At the same time, the real value of the intellectual contribution made cannot be determined by a single criterion (in this case, the phase of contradiction). It is not enough to correlate the result obtained with the typology P 0-P 3, one should take into account the entire cognitive context in which it is “inscribed”. Indeed, if, for example, in one case we have a product P 2 - a new position in science, contradicting some previous private position, and in the other - the product P 1 supplementing and clarifying some theory, then one can hardly conclude that P 2 is more significant, more valuable than p 1 Most likely the opposite. Again, context is important, immediate and distant.

This implies the need to go to other "sections" of the dialectical system, beyond its "core" - the idea of ​​contradiction. But before proceeding to their consideration, it makes sense once again to return to the P 3 stage of synthesis and resolution of the contradiction. It is necessary to realize that all the variety of situations related to R 3 is a kind of single space. This approach allows not only to distinguish research solutions (or results) of a certain class, but also to see distance between them, and even measure it. It is easy to see how important this is for developing a complete and accurate evaluation of a smart product.

§ 3. Combination of different (opposite): the space of possible situations

Identification, association, conjugation of different (opposite) is very diverse. Hence arises the well-known indeterminacy of the very concept of dialectical synthesis. “The synthesis of opposites,” writes M. A. Kissel, “cannot be considered at all as an immutable, automatically operating law. Thus, for example, the overcoming of antagonistic contradictions does not occur according to this formula, and in general the unity of opposites rather means their mutual conditioning, rather than merging into something third and, moreover, necessarily higher. Of course, when one of the sides of the contradiction gains the upper hand, the character of the whole phenomenon changes, and, consequently, we will no longer find the former opposites in the new phenomenon. But what is the connection of a new phenomenon with the one from the development of which it arose, it is necessary to investigate anew in each case” (31, 71).

There is no doubt that in a number of cognitive situations, the “ideal”, “classical” form of synthesis, known in dialectics, clearly manifests itself. Separate aspects of one and the same object, which previously seemed disparate or opposite, then, with a deeper look, appear as organically merged, naturally transitioning, “flowing” into each other. For example: “The theoretical ... understanding of “value” (“value”) is that the use value of a thing that functions as a commodity on the market is nothing but a way or form of discovering its own opposite - its value for exchange , its exchange value or, more precisely, simply "value", simply "value".

This is precisely the transition from the "abstract" (directly from two equally abstract representations) to the "concrete" (to the unity concepts - to the concept"values" or "values")" (23, 63).

Note that this form of combining different, or synthesis (we will call it "classical"), has ancient origins. Thus, Hegel, objecting to Kant's understanding of morality, which presupposes "... the enslavement of the individual by the universal" (the subordination of an individual inclination to moral duty, an external law), opposes this to a different understanding - the removal of these two opposites through their union "(20, 12). With such an understanding, instead of separated and contradictory "inclination" (singular) and "law" (universal), a new, more perfect, according to Hegel, content arises. This refers to the tendency to act as one should according to the true precepts of the law. The coincidence of inclination with the law reaches such a degree that they cease to differ from each other.

Let us note that with such an understanding of the synthesis, opposites do not simply connect, interact, mutually condition, grow together in some of their parts, etc., but, in fact, merge completely, “grow” into each other so much that they become one and the same, coincide in their entirety, are absolutely identified.

This way of resolving contradictions seems to have become a model, a model in dialectics, and many authors began to focus exclusively or mainly on it. Meanwhile, all other forms and methods, especially those that are noticeably different from the Hegelian described, are either not recognized or are considered as lower, imperfect, at best, as preparatory steps for this "genuine" synthesis. Let us carefully read, for example, the following statement by E. V. Ilyenkov.

“Conflicts between theories, ideas and concepts became more intense. Kant's "dialectic", in fact, indicated no way out, no way to resolve ideological conflicts(hereinafter it is highlighted by me.- M. R.). She simply stated in a general way that the conflict of ideas is the natural state of science, and advised ideological opponents everywhere to seek one form or another of compromise according to the rule - live and let others live, hold on to your rightness, but respect the rightness of the other, because in the end both of you are in captivity of subjective interests, and the objective, common truth for all is still inaccessible to you ... "(25, 78-79). Obviously, the author of the statement in this case does not consider compromise as a way to resolve conflicts. That is why Kant's "dialectic" is put in quotation marks, because it focuses only on a compromise: "hold on to your rightness, but respect the rightness of another."

At the same time, it is known how widespread and important compromise is as a way out of conflict situations (for example, in the spheres of economics and politics). This means that it would be imprudent and short-sighted to regard compromise as something that has nothing to do with dialectics. On the contrary, it deserves the closest attention of methodologists as one of the ways to overcome conflict situations.

But let us first dwell on those methods of "handling" the contradiction, which can hardly arouse objections even on the part of purist-minded dialecticians.

Let us pay attention to such a synthesis of alternative or mutually contradictory provisions, in which in the final link of the ascent from the previous links, only something valuable, and everything else is discarded. This way of synthesizing manifests itself, for example, in the development of society, technology, science. We have here a typical scheme for implementing the principle of continuity between the old and the new. It is not difficult to distinguish this case from the "ideal" synthesis, in which all or Almost all the content of the original, one-sidedly abstract propositions is included in the higher as its moments. Is it possible to doubt the legitimacy and methodological significance of such a “non-ideal” way of resolving contradictions, if both nature and history often “act” in this way, “resolve” their contradictions, ruthlessly discarding many obsolete elements, signs, forms, and do they really go back to higher forms?

But as soon as we allowed the possibility partial discarding the original opposing positions, greater or lesser loss of their content, it is logical to agree with the possibility maximum discarding the content of the original positions. Special variants of cognitive ascent are situations when at its final stage there are fully get rid of one or both initial opposing positions (hypotheses, theories) as false, useless, etc.

It is known that human knowledge has repeatedly in its history been occupied with questions that turned out to be pseudo-questions. Suffice it to recall in this connection alchemy or astrology. The contradiction over which the human mind struggled was sometimes resolved by such a result that lay already beyond the limits of the original opposites, outside initial "problem conditions", aside from those goals and means that the researchers dealt with at the origins of their search. Here, the initial contradictions served only as an external impetus, a catalyst for cognitive movement.

Is synthesis carried out in such cases in the process of cognition? Generally speaking, yes. But it is of a completely different kind than in the classical dialectical model. Synthesis is no longer a combination of those positions (oppositions) from which the ascent to the cognitive result began. Therefore, it is more appropriate here to speak not about the synthesis of opposites, but simply about overcoming contradictions.

If we compare this situation with the classical, “ideal” synthesis, then it is easy to see that we have typical antipodes: in one case, the initial opposites merge, coincide in the final result, are included in it, in the other they are completely excluded. Note that these two forms are abstractions, idealizations. In reality (in practice, in a real cognitive process), some cases of resolving and overcoming contradictions can only to one degree or another approach the two indicated limits. In general, the most common are various forms of resolving a contradiction with an incomplete, partial synthesis of its sides, linking, coordinating, conjugating opposites. It is curious that even in a case that seems ideal - let us recall the Hegelian (biblical?) example, when an individual moral feeling (individual) completely merges with the requirements of the law (universal), the synthesis still leaves at least some moments of the original opposites. Indeed, outside the new, higher state, the following should remain: 1) the violent, “external” nature of the requirements of the law, the alienation of the law to the individual (this is exactly what this opposite was before the merger); 2) the egocentrism of the former moral feeling, the negative attitude of the individual to some requirements of the law.

With the opposite "non-synthetic" resolution of the contradiction, with the complete "rejection" of the original opposites, in fact, some "disappearing small" elements are still preserved. Let us repeat: both extreme forms of overcoming contradictions are mere abstractions, idealizations.

By the way, one should hardly give special preference for one of them. Synthesis is, of course, wonderful, but in some cases it can turn out to be an unfortunate mistake. Everything depends on the circumstances, which will be discussed below, mainly in Chap. 3, when presenting the concept of polycontextual analysis. In the meantime, let's try to present a variety of forms and ways of overcoming contradictions (or connecting the opposite, different, alternative) in the form of a diagram (figure). Of course, in this case, some coarsening, simplification of the actual state of things is inevitable.

So, if the two extreme cases of overcoming contradictions are the complete preservation of the original opposites or differences and their complete rejection, and the other two are the complete loss of one ("left") opposite while maintaining the other ("right"), then it is not difficult to imagine a "space" covering all the variety of situations of overcoming contradictions.

The measure of inclusion in the final cognitive result of the content of the original opposites

Obviously, if at point A both sides of the contradiction are preserved, and at point C they are discarded, then at point O, located in the middle of AC, we have a characteristic compromise case with an equal, half loss of the content of opposites. Note that we will arrive at the same result at point O by interpolating situations B and D. Apparently, each of the infinite set of points located on the sides and inside the square ABCD is unique in its content (ie, in the ratio of both sides of the contradiction).

But the main thing, of course, is not in this elementary "geometry". By itself, it is unlikely to attract the close attention of philosophers and methodologists. On the other hand, some new possibilities for qualifying and diagnosing intelligence, which open up with the purposeful use of the above-described resolution (overcoming) of contradictions, may be of interest to the latter.

The following circumstances must be kept in mind here.

1. Each subject of cognition is distinguished by certain inclinations in resolving or overcoming contradictions, i.e., prefers certain forms and methods of activity in contradictory situations. This feature is a very important detail of the "intellectual portrait" of the subject. And it can be quite clearly and visually expressed graphically - by indicating specific areas, "loci" in space. ABCD . So, some subjects gravitate towards “syntheticity” (point A), others - to the rejection of opposites, someone else's position (point D), others - to compromise (point O), etc.
2. No form of contradiction resolution (no single point of space ABCD) can be singled out as absolutely preferred. For example, point A (“the pole of syntheticity”), under certain conditions, is far from the best solution, and its antipode, the extremely “asynthetic” point C, is more suitable. Again, it all depends on the specific circumstances, context, that “whole” , which goes far beyond the scope of a single resolvable contradiction.

What has been said is not intended to negate a certain epistemological advantage of synthetic forms of solution. It is no coincidence that classical dialectics attaches special importance to them. After all, the correct intellectual activity of the subject in the vicinity of point A (“the pole of synthesis”) already indicates considerable constructive, creative potential, primarily the ability to discover and build connection between two very different polar opposites.

True, such abilities still do not guarantee effective intellectual activity in a number of other situations, which also require a certain “syntheticity”, unifying and ordering the work of the mind, but of a different nature. We are talking about those cases when it is necessary to link, harmonize, pair not two, but a large number of different entities, the relations between which are very diverse.

Here is just one example of this kind: “Each person plays different roles in society and has different needs. He is a producer, worker, consumer, local resident and participant in cultural life. As a resident of the area, he will want to eliminate the polluting factory, and as a worker he will be afraid of losing his job or reducing his income as a result of the increase in the cost of environmental protection. At the same time, he will demand better working conditions, fearing for his health. He will demand cheap books or concert tickets, but he would not want to pay the high taxes that are the only way to keep the Philharmonic going. He, of course, wants cheap food, and therefore is opposed to high customs duties on imported products, but if local agricultural producers cannot compete with foreign ones, then he will also have to pay the cost of bankruptcy of a large number of farms in the country in the same way as the cost of peasant open spaces" (11, 199).

It is easy to see that this situation is much more complicated than the previous one, and here the synthetic activity of the mind necessarily implies the possession of significantly different forms of solving contradictions, in other words, the use of different, far from each other, sections of the ABCD space.

3. Positive, useful properties of the intellect, which make it possible in each particular case to reach a solution that is close to optimal, are:

• a) value scatter areas within ABCD, usually used by a particular subject in his cognitive actions;
• b) latitude of total area the decision space available to the subject (ideally, it is equal to the area of ​​ABCD).

As a rule, only one way of solving (which corresponds to one point in the space ABCD) turns out to be the most suitable. And it may seem that finding it depends on chance, and not on the specified properties. But. this is certainly not the case, the latter are really necessary prerequisites for the optimality of the solution, because their presence means the richness of the instrumental arsenal of the cognizing subject, and it is they that create the maximum freedom to choose the appropriate solution. The one that is determined by the entire cognitive context. .

Before grounding the above idea of ​​space solutions, i.e., to apply our theoretical model to some particular example from the history of scientific knowledge, I would like to return once again to the question of the idealization of the classical synthetic form of overcoming contradictions. This prejudice is already deeply rooted in the minds of many methodologists who call themselves dialecticians. And this circumstance causes considerable damage to the methodology of scientific knowledge.

The noted prejudice is connected with the allocation of the so-called "dialectical" contradictions into a special category, with their excessive, unjustified opposition to some other, for example, formal-logical contradictions. A typical sign of the former is that when they are resolved, the opposites are not discarded, but are preserved, connecting, synthesizing into a single whole. In the case of a “non-dialectical”, formal-logical contradiction, the solution consists in excluding (at least) one of the opposites, which in the course of the analysis was recognized as an error, delusion, etc.

It is believed that dialectical contradictions have a strong and indisputable objective basis (i.e., associated with duality in reality itself), while the formal-logical ones are due exclusively subjective reasons, confusion in someone's thoughts, misunderstanding. It is believed that in order to resolve formal-logical contradictions, with the rejection of one of the opposites, ordinary, rational intellect is sufficient, and for synthetic solutions that preserve both sides of the contradiction, special, dialectical thinking is necessary.

Such an approach, in turn, is determined by an excessively categorical separation of the objective and the subjective, a refusal to see connections, transitions, mutual transformations of both. Thus, paradoxically as it may seem, it is precisely those methodologists who insist on a special singling out of dialectical (“genuinely dialectical,” etc.) contradictions whose thinking is insufficiently dialectical at some points.

If we consider the process of cognition broadly enough, then the following will become clear. Far from always, the opposites that are completely discarded at this stage can be considered an accidental, subjectivist delusion of the past, which does not have a serious objective basis. At the same time, it is by no means excluded that those opposites that are now united in the form of an ideal synthesis will in the future undergo (together with their syntheses) a deep and radical negation. Synthesis in itself is not yet a guarantee of truth. It can be the same false course of knowledge as any other operation. Everything is determined by a broader cognitive context.

It happens that in the course of resolving a contradiction, a certain point of view is rejected as unconditionally erroneous, determined by subjective circumstances. But even in this case, if you look closely, it has some objective causes. And in order to achieve a complete, in a certain sense, final refutation of such an erroneous point of view, it is necessary to expose, deeply understand its objective sources and roots. We must agree that everything subjective and random is not absolutely subjective and random. And in a number of cases, the complete rejection of one of the competing points of view before us are examples of a genuine dialectical movement of thought, and not just the elimination of a formal-logical contradiction or overcoming some kind of confusion.

On the other hand, when resolving “real”, so to speak, “purely dialectical” contradictions, it turns out that each of the opposite sides at the moment of their collision (at the “thesis-antithesis” stage) was not quite true, was somewhat limited and wrong. And, therefore, only at the final stage, raised to the level of synthesis and transformed, remelted in it, the two sides of the contradiction can be considered true and objective. And, again, relatively true and relatively objective, if we keep in mind that cognition continues and further refinement and development of concepts is to be done.

How then do so-called "dialectical" contradictions differ from "non-dialectical" ones? Based on the above, only degree inclusion of the content of the initial opposites in the final result of the cognitive process.

But it follows from this that a sufficiently complete dialectical theory should cover all the variety of contradictions encountered in scientific knowledge and ways to overcome them. This is precisely what the concept of the solution space is focused on. All kinds of contradictions and forms of their resolution - if real science recognizes them as legitimate - must find their place in a rich, comprehensive and effective theory of dialectics. To miss something in this regard means to lose some strokes, nuances of real thinking and, consequently, to impoverish dialectics.

It is known that many scientific discoveries are perceived very difficult, with great resistance. And not only a "man from the street" and not only representatives of the relevant sciences, but also philosophers, methodologists. Years, sometimes decades, pass before the latter assimilate something radically new. The methodology is simply not prepared, theoretically not "tuned" to the perception of certain ideas. But, it would seem, it is natural for her not only to perceive and understand someone received new, but also to forestall, prepare, bring it to life.

It is hardly worth sounding the alarm about the fact that sometimes the living practice of science overtakes methodology, if, in general, the latter quite successfully fulfills its function. This is as normal as the fact that sometimes the experiment overtakes the natural science theory. Let's recall from the book "Physicists are joking": the further the experiment is from theory, the closer it is to the Nobel Prize. And yet the task of philosophy, methodology is to minimize, and if possible to exclude, those cases when the achievements of experience, empiricism and particular sciences take it by surprise. And this can be achieved only with a special openness and susceptibility to everything new, accumulated within the framework of specific scientific disciplines, with the most prompt inclusion in the treasury of dialectics of the most important methodological acquisitions of private sciences.

In this regard, V. A. Fok rightly noted: “The resolution of contradictions achieved in quantum mechanics between the wave and corpuscular nature of an electron, between probability and causality, between the quantum description of an atomic object and the classical description of a device, and finally, between the properties of an individual object and their statistical manifestations gives a number of vivid examples of the practical application of dialectics to questions of natural science. This remains a fact whether the dialectical method was applied consciously or not. The achievements of quantum mechanics should be a powerful stimulus for the development of dialectical materialism" (79, 474).

Note that the method of overcoming contradictions in modern quantum mechanics, in particular within the framework of the so-called Copenhagen interpretation, is rather difficult to reconcile with the classical dialectical understanding. And many of our philosophers, decades after the appearance of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanical phenomena, perceived it either as anti-dialectical, or as a surrogate for a truly dialectical solution of the issue, or as a forced and only temporary solution (see about this; (1, 194 -252).

Such judgments are hardly valid. Of course, it is not at all excluded and even quite likely that with the development of science new interpretations and explanations of the phenomena of the microworld will appear. They will be more complete and perfect than the current ones. But the same can be said about any other theory or concept. So, on this basis, it is impossible to attribute to modern quantum mechanical explanations some kind of discriminating insufficiency and inferiority.

It is indicative that N. Bohr, who resolved the listed contradictions in a peculiar way in quantum mechanics, considered the principle of complementarity specially developed for this purpose as the most adequate in the current situation. application of dialectics:“The complementary mode of description does not really mean an arbitrary rejection of the usual requirements for any explanation, on the contrary, it aims appropriate dialectic expression(emphasis mine.- M.R.) actual conditions of analysis and synthesis in atomic physics” (9, 397).

How are contradictions resolved on the basis of the idea of ​​complementarity? A. R. Pozner believes that in this case elements of the mechanistic and dialectical approaches are combined. “The former were expressed in emphasizing the absolute mutual exclusivity of opposing properties of micro-objects; the second, in an attempt to establish some connection between these opposites in the form of relations of complementarity. The author supports this statement with the following statement by W. Heisenberg: “Both pictures (wave and corpuscular.- A.P.), naturally, they exclude each other, since a certain object cannot at the same time be both a particle ... and a wave ... But both pictures complement each other ”(55, 89).

A. R. Pozner does not recognize such a method of resolving contradictions as completely dialectical. It contains only elements dialectical approach (“in an attempt to establish some kind of connection between ... opposites”). And these dialectical moments are intertwined with mechanistic ones - with the recognition of "the absolute mutual exclusivity of opposite properties of micro-objects."

Apparently, every philosopher, whose thinking is formed on the classical models of dialectics, intuitively feels that N. Bohr's explanation of the phenomena of the microworld, due to some of its features, does not fit into the traditional dialectical norm. But let us ask ourselves: on what basis does the classical dialectical intuition reject the Copenhagen interpretation, and is this reason sufficient? After all, it would seem that the most important features of a new, unusual explanation correspond to the characteristic dialectical requirements: the opposites in N. Bohr exclude each other, but at the same time in a certain way connected together. Perhaps these opposites "too strongly" exclude each other and are "too weakly" interconnected (i.e., the moment of separation is excessively hypertrophied, and the synthetic moment is too weakened)? Well, this is the real situation in this case, it imperiously dictates its special relationship between the two necessary dialectical moments of contradiction - difference and identity (unity), analysis and synthesis. So why should we always insist on the analytic-sithetic “balance” of contradiction that impresses us, if reality is not always like this, if it is sufficiently diverse?

In the end, it is precisely from the dialectical-materialist point of view that the decisive criteria for the truth and justification of any approach in cognition should be recognized as its adequacy to reality and practical effectiveness. And just here the same N. Bohr managed to achieve a lot. On what basis, then, should one deny the dialectical nature of his explanations of quantum mechanical processes? Just because they are not fully consistent with the traditional scheme and our intuition? But the dialectical theory must undoubtedly change with the development of knowledge, with each new major step in science. Otherwise, it will lose the right to claim the role of the latter's methodology.

The traditional dialectical idea of ​​the relationship, the unity of opposites implies simultaneous the presence and interaction of contradictory aspects of the object, their actual, rather than potential, coexistence in the same object at every moment of time. But in the microcosm, objects are not like that. Of course, here we can also say that the same particle has both corpuscular and wave properties. However, it does not manifest them simultaneously, and if at some point one of the properties is actualized, then the other is completely excluded for this time. This circumstance made it necessary to supplement the scheme of connection of opposites known in dialectics with new unusual, hard-to-perceived forms.

However, even in the microcosm, the traditional, habitual dialectical form of the combination of opposites is more or less applicable: “There are also such conditions when the wave and corpuscular properties of an electron manifest themselves simultaneously, then these properties are expressed unsharply. For example, for an electron bound in an atom...” (55, 89).

But, as we see, if the opposite properties of an object appear simultaneously, they are not expressed sharply. Is the traditional dialectical notion of the exclusivity of a single form of interconnection of opposites saved in this case? Hardly, because the “unsharp expression” of opposites is already a certain inferiority in the ratio obtained, the price for simultaneity, unattainable in the microcosm, and yet achieved, simultaneity, “simultaneity” of the manifestation of opposites. Quantum mechanics has its own "golden rule": achieving simultaneity we lose in certainty and clarity manifestations of opposites and, on the contrary, getting distinctly expressed opposite properties, we lose the possibility of their simultaneous fixation. Something similar is inherent in many areas of reality.

In the light of what has been said, the well-known equality two types of interconnection of opposites: the latter appear simultaneously, albeit blurred, incomplete, etc.; they are absolutely incompatible at the same moment of time and, therefore, "coexist" in the same object only in different time intervals (but they manifest themselves in all their fullness and distinctness). So why, in fact, does the first type belong to dialectics, and the second to mechanism and metaphysics?

In connection with what has been said, let us once again recall the classical pattern of connecting opposites and resolving contradictions in dialectics: “... The fact that one body continuously falls on another and continuously moves away from the latter is a contradiction. Ellipsis is one of the forms of movement in which this contradiction is both realized and resolved" (43, 23, 114). K. Marx gives this example to illustrate "... the method by which real contradictions are resolved" (43, 113- 114). Let us note that in this case, the opposite tendencies that are simultaneously inherent in the same body - falling and moving away - are expressed in minimum degree. The body is both falling and receding at the same time, but falling in such a way that it never falls below a certain point (“perigee”), and is removed in the same limited way - never exceeding the “apogee” and without leaving the orbit. Isn't the above case with the simultaneous but indistinct manifestation of opposite properties of an object similar to the situation in Marx's example? Indeed, in both - the simultaneity and incompleteness of the manifestation of opposites.

Thus, both ways of connecting opposites are quite legitimate, dialectical. Equally legitimate are other previously considered methods included in the space of solutions ABCD (despite the fact that many of them have not yet received their proper place in the dialectical theory, are not assimilated by it). All various forms of overcoming contradictions, as soon as they are tested and recognized by science and practice, should have the right to exist as individual elements unified methodological tools of scientific knowledge. None of these elements should be treated as deliberately untenable, false, etc. We can only talk about inadequacy of use certain methodological means in specific cognitive situations. Blind iltuitive attachment to one or a few forms of conflict resolution, their fetishization, is methodologically flawed.

First, it turns into losses in those very numerous situations when the preferred forms of solution, due to the immaturity of the accumulated cognitive material temporarily not applicable. In these cases, the contradiction that has arisen can and must be resolved by means of more accessible, simple, preliminary, intermediate forms. And not only because “a tit in the hands is better than a crane in the sky”, but also in order to have real chances to reach this very “crane” someday. The point is that the developing social knowledge is distributed in a special way in time, that is, it goes through a series of stages. It is necessary, as a rule, to stand for some time, to get used to lower steps to be able to reach the higher ones. It is unreasonable to neglect the lower levels - the forms in which the accumulation and maturation of knowledge takes place, its preparation for subsequent transformations. Naive maximalism, unreasonable attempts to immediately jump over a series of steps (“great leaps”) are dangerous and disastrous not only in economics, politics, but also in knowledge.

Secondly, the disadvantage of focusing on only one, "exclusive" form of conflict resolution is due to the fact that in many situations this form is not only temporarily not applicable, but at all, basically inappropriate. Other methods of solution, which for some reason are neglected, may turn out to be more adequate. But methodological inertia prompts some authors to dogmatically squeeze many different cognitive situations into the Procrustean bed of one (or a few) forms. It is clear that knowledge bears great losses in this case.

Thirdly, the absolutization of one or a few forms averts methodology from a careful study of the whole variety of ways to resolve and overcome contradictions. They are either rejected altogether or ignored instead of being subjected to a detailed "inventory", ordering, understanding and then effectively used in the practice of cognition.

Only under the influence of narrowly subjective, overly idealized ideas, some researchers allow themselves to abstract too much from the various circumstances, place, time, specific conditions of action and single out one of its forms as the only “correct” resolution of contradictions. Consistently adhering to an unbiased, practical point of view, it is important, firstly, to identify, classify, typify as many different ways (forms) of resolving and overcoming contradictions as possible; secondly, to flexibly and promptly use all this diversity in cognitive and practical activities; not absolutizing (and not ignoring) any of the forms and selecting for immediate use each time the one that is most adequate to the situation, most effective in cognitive and practical terms.

Analysis and synthesis. New thoughts and images arise on the basis of what was already in the mind, thanks to mental operations - analysis and synthesis. Ultimately, all processes of imagination and thinking consist in mental decomposition of initial thoughts and ideas into constituent parts (analysis) and their subsequent combination in new combinations (synthesis). These mental operations, opposite in content, are inseparably united.

“... Thinking,” wrote F. Engels in his work “Anti-Dühring,” consists as much in the decomposition of objects of consciousness into their elements as in the unification of elements connected with each other into a certain unity. Without analysis, there is no synthesis."

Let us analyze from this point of view how well-known fairy-tale images were created - a mermaid, a centaur, a sphinx, a hut on chicken legs, etc. They are, as it were, glued together, molded from parts of real-life objects. This approach is called agglutination. In order to carry out this synthetic operation, it was first necessary to mentally dismember ideas about real beings and objects. The great Renaissance artist Leonardo da Vinci directly advised the artist: “If you want to make a fictional animal seem natural - let it be, say, a snake - then take for its head the head of a shepherd dog or a cop dog, attaching cat eyes, ears of an owl, the nose of a greyhound, the eyebrows of a lion, the temples of an old rooster, and the neck of a water turtle” (see second flyleaf).

It was this thought process that led designers to create the trolley bus, snowmobile, seaplane, etc.

Another technique for creating fabulous images can be considered an analytical process - emphasis. Here, some part of the object or part of the body of an animal or person is distinguished and changes in size. This is how friendly cartoons and caricatures are created. They help to emphasize the most essential, the most important in this particular image. The talker is depicted with a long tongue, the glutton is endowed with a voluminous belly, etc.

Analysis and. synthesis as mental operations arose from practical actions - from the real decomposition of objects into parts and their connection. This long historical path of transformation of an external operation into an internal one can be observed in an abbreviated form by studying the development of thinking in children. When a small child first removes ring after ring from the pyramid, and then puts the rings back on, he, without suspecting it, is already carrying out analysis and synthesis in practice. No wonder the first stage of the development of mental activity is called visual action thinking. Later it is replaced by concrete-figurative thinking- the child operates not only with objects, but

and their images, and, finally, there is an "adult" - verbal-logical thinking. But visual-effective and concrete-figurative thinking is also present in the "adult", developed verbal-logical mental activity, is woven into its fabric.

There are two main types of analytic-synthetic operations: firstly, you can mentally decompose (and combine) the object itself, the phenomenon into its component parts, and secondly, you can mentally single out certain signs, properties, qualities. So, we study a literary work in parts, we single out the root, trunk, leaves in the plant. Similarly, we analyze chemicals, alloys - these are all examples of analysis of the first kind. When we examine the style of a work, its composition, a different analysis is carried out.

Analysis and synthesis as the main thought processes are inherent in any person, but different people have a tendency to crush or combine the phenomena of the surrounding reality may be different. So, already at the level of perception, some tend to notice individual details, in particular, sometimes not being able to grasp the whole. They say about such people that they cannot see the forest for the trees. Others, on the contrary, quickly grasp the whole, they have a general impression of the subject, which is sometimes superficial - they do not see the trees behind the forest. Among your acquaintances, there will certainly be representatives of both types: and analytical, And synthetic, although most, of course, are mixed, analytic-synthetic type. To determine what type a person belongs to, sometimes it is enough to listen to his story about an event. Another starts a story, for example, about a new movie, from afar: he tells how he got the idea to go to the cinema, what the weather was like that day, what mode of transport he got to the cinema; a prominent place in the story will be taken by the description of the neighbors in turn - who was wearing what, who said what, how the public reacted to the attempt of the “one with the mustache” to skip the line, etc. You can hardly force yourself to listen to the end. The other gets straight to the point, but expresses it too broadly:

- "Hamlet"? Watched. They killed each other there. Remarkable Soviet psychologist B. M. Teploe in his work “The Mind of a Commander”, he considered the peculiarities of thinking of great commanders and noted that a true military genius is always both “the genius of the whole” and “the genius of details”. That was the genius of Napoleon. Historians emphasized Napoleon's ability, when undertaking the most grandiose and most difficult operations, to keep a sharp eye on all the little things and at the same time not to get confused or lost in them at all - to simultaneously see both the trees and the forest, and almost every bough on every tree. The military talent of the great Russian generals - Peter the Great and A.V. Suvorov - was distinguished by the same feature.

The balance between analysis and synthesis is very important in any complex human activity, and it is important for every person to cultivate it.

Comparison. Analysis and synthesis underlie such an important mental operation as comparison. No wonder they say: “Everything is known in comparison”, but about something amazing, out of the ordinary: “Incomparably!” "Comparison," wrote K. D. Ushin-sky, is the basis of all understanding and all thinking.

We learn everything in the world only through comparison, and if some new object presented itself to us, which we could not equate to anything and distinguish from nothing ... then we could not make up a single one about this object. thoughts and could not say a single word about him. I. M. Sechenov considered the ability to compare the most precious mental treasure of man.

Comparing objects and phenomena, it is necessary to carry out an analysis at the first stage, and then a synthesis. For example, you were given the task to compare the psychological appearance of Tatiana and Olga Larin. To do this, you first of all highlight their individual properties, qualities, features: appearance, character (he himself is divided into separate features, which we will discuss later), relationships with other heroes of the novel, etc.

In other words, dismemberment, analysis is carried out. At the next stage, as if mentally applying (this operation in other cases can be effective, practical!) Homogeneous features to each other, combine, synthesize them. In this case, it is necessary to observe an important rule - comparison should be based on the same basis. You can’t, for example, comparing Pushkin’s heroines, say: “Tatyana loved the Russian winter, and Olga had a round, ruddy face” ... (In connection with this rule, pay attention to how people conduct discussions: quite often comparisons are made here for various reasons, so that the very subject of the dispute is gradually lost.)

Comparing objects and phenomena, we find in them similar and different.

The subtlety of thinking and the richness of imagination are manifested in the ability to find differences in seemingly similar phenomena and similarities in the most seemingly remote. These qualities are especially clearly manifested in the thinking and fantasy of the great masters of the word. As you know, comparison is used in literature as a special means of artistic expression.

At the same time, comparison helps us not only brightly imagine, but also deeply understand the side of reality that the author describes. As always, thought and image are inseparable. Let us recall the comparison of Vladimir Lensky with Eugene Onegin:

They agreed. Wave and stone, Poetry and prose, ice and fire Not so different from each other.

Here, the comparison is aimed at identifying differences. But in the lines of the great Soviet poet N. Zabolotsky, the charm of a beautiful female face (the portrait of Struyskaya by the Russian artist F. S. Rokotov is described) is conveyed through an unexpected convergence of opposites:

Her eyes are like two fogs, A combination of two riddles,

Half smile, half cry, half delight, half fright,

Her eyes are like two deceptions, A fit of insane tenderness,

Covered in mist of failures. The anticipation of death torments.

You probably remembered that we have already talked about poetry. Quite right. In the chapter on memory about associations. And you, of course, have already understood that comparisons with them are inextricably linked. (By the way, have you forgotten that in the psyche everything is inextricably linked?)

Comparison of concepts that are close in meaning is a very good technique for developing thinking. In the Three C's we will give appropriate tasks, like this: "Compare curiosity And curiosity".

Now close the book and reflect. Offer this mental task to your friends. Probably, many will point out a common feature: both curiosity and curiosity are intellectual properties of a person that manifest themselves in the desire to learn something new. Differences here both in the motives of knowledge and in its depth. Curiosity is a disinterested thirst for knowledge, a desire to penetrate the essence of objects and phenomena. Her character was well conveyed by the poet B. Pasternak:

In everything I want to reach the essence of the past days,

To the very essence: To their cause,

In work, in search of a way, To the foundations, to the roots,

In heartbreak. To the core.

Curiosity, on the other hand, manifests itself in an aimless desire to accumulate disparate facts, “to touch everything lightly”, in sliding “on top” of phenomena. If curiosity is a sign of a deep mind, then curiosity leads to the formation of a personality with a superficial, frivolous mind. As pointed out K. D. Ushinsky,“curiosity can develop in curiosity and can remain only curiosity... At first, a person is only curious; but when independent work begins in his soul, and as a result, independent interests, then he ceases to be curious about everything indifferently, but only to what may be in any connection with his spiritual interests. In other words, curiosity grows into curiosity.

Of course, it is immediately difficult to make a comparison with sufficient completeness and accuracy. But these difficulties are gradually being overcome. Especially if you are a person... inquisitive.

Abstraction, generalization, concept. Analytical-synthetic processes also include such complex mental operations as abstraction (abstraction) and generalization. They play a special role in thinking. No wonder this cognitive process is called a generalized reflection of reality and its abstract nature is emphasized. To better understand the essence of these processes, let's take a look at ... a music store. What is not here: the copper of a huge pipe sparkles, the big drum swelled with importance, tiny flutes modestly hid on the shelves, but the battery of strings - violins, cellos, double basses. Guitars, mandolins, balalaika... Nothing like solemn harps. Stop! Nothing similar? Why are they in this store? This means that there is some similarity between all these objects, and, probably, a very significant one. Their common feature - the ability to produce musical sounds - allows us to attribute all these - large and small, copper, plastic and wood, black, brown, red and yellow, round, oblong and polygonal, old and new, electronic, etc. etc. n - objects to one concept:"musical instruments".

How are concepts formed? Here again, it all starts with analysis. Specific objects, objects are mentally divided into signs and properties. Next, some specific essential feature is highlighted (in our case, the ability to produce musical sounds) and the abstraction: we get distracted from all other signs, as if for a while we forget about them and consider objects and phenomena only from the point of view that interests us.

If now compare among themselves those dissimilar "at first glance objects, it turns out that in fact they are not without reason called by one word: they can be unite into one general group. Thus, after the analytical operation - abstraction, a synthetic one occurs - a mental generalization of objects and phenomena, which is fixed in the concept. In the concept (it is always expressed word) The general and essential features of objects and phenomena are reflected. Each science is a certain system of concepts. Thanks to them, a person learns more deeply the world around him in its essential connections and relationships.

Abstraction and generalization are important not only in scientific thinking, but also in artistic creativity. Already “in the simplest generalization,” V. I. Lenin pointed out, “in the most elementary general idea (“table” in general) eat famous piece fantasies" 14 .

Thanks to the selection of important, essential features and generalization in the thinking of a writer, poet, artist, images arise that embody the features of a whole generation - or a whole

class of people. This is exactly what A. M. Gorky spoke about in one of his conversations with readers: “How are types built in literature? They are built, of course, not in portraiture, they do not definitely take any person, but take thirty to fifty people of one line, one row, one mood, and from them they create Oblomov, Onegin, Faust, Hamlet, Othello, etc. All this - generic types. And one more thing: “... if you describe a shopkeeper, it is necessary to make sure that thirty shopkeepers are described in one shopkeeper, thirty priests are described in one priest, so that if this thing is read in Kherson, they see a Kherson priest, but they read it in Arzamas - Arzamas priest ...

All great works are always generalizations. "Don Quixote", "Faust", "Hamlet" - all these are generalizations.

Artistic generalizations, which Gorky spoke about, unlike abstract concepts, do not lose their individual originality and uniqueness. In Russian literature of the 19th century, as you know, a special artistic type was created - the image of an “extra person” (we will talk about some psychological characteristics of people of this type in connection with problems of will and character). All "superfluous people" are somewhat similar to each other, but at the same time, each of them is a living person with his own "face is not a common expression."

Concepts, especially abstract concepts, have, as it were, lost this connection with visual images, although here, too, some kind of reliance on concrete representations is possible. Ask someone what they imagine when they hear words-concepts: “progress”, “truth”, “freedom”, etc. One will say: “I don’t imagine anything, progress is a forward movement, progressive development”; another: "A rocket that rushes to the distant worlds"; third: “I see a May Day demonstration on Red Square, people marching with banners ...”

Thanks to abstraction, human thought embraces phenomena that cannot be visualized: the speed of light, infinitely small and large quantities, the relativity of space and time, etc. Such concepts have been developed by science throughout the history of mankind. They crystallize both practical experience and its theoretical understanding. Each new generation already finds systems of these concepts, assimilates them and adds something of its own to their content. As a matter of fact, at school, studying this or that subject, you master scientific concepts in this area. Now, when you read this chapter, the concepts of “thinking”, “fantasy”, “analysis”, “synthesis” and ... the concept of concepts are being mastered.

The process of assimilation of concepts is an active creative mental activity. Here is how, for example, the concept of “fetus” is formed among primary school students.

On the teacher's table are objects well known to the children: a tomato, a cucumber, a poppy head, etc. The teacher draws the attention of the students to their appearance.

The tomato is red and round!

Cucumber - green and oblong!

Poppy is light brown and looks like a cup!

And they taste different!

It turns out, - says the teacher, - these objects are not at all similar to each other?

Looks like the guys do not agree.

You can eat them! They are tasty!

But sweets are delicious too.

No, it has grown. These are plant parts.

That's right, - the teacher picks up, - a tomato, and a cucumber, and a cup of poppy are parts of plants. But the leaves are also part of the plant... What else do our objects have in common?

The guys are having a hard time. But the question is raised, the thought works. We need to give her a new impetus. The teacher takes a knife and cuts cucumber, tomato and poppy seeds in front of the children.

I guessed, exclaims the smartest one. (However, perhaps the most decisive and fastest?) - They all have bones!

Right. How can you call it?

This is the part of the plant that contains the seeds.

Remember folks, the part of the plant that contains the seeds is called fetus. Then the teacher shows the children various fruits and other parts of plants,

which are easily confused with a fruit, such as a carrot. There is a practical consolidation of the newly learned concept.

Doesn't this process resemble the general way of human cognition of objective reality, indicated in the well-known formula of V. I. Lenin? Indeed, in our example, all the main stages are present: “live contemplation” - the guys carefully studied the appearance of different fruits; "abstract thinking" - all the main mental operations took place: analysis, synthesis, comparison, abstraction; the main common feature was singled out - “contains seeds”; generalization in the form of the concept of "fruit" and, finally, practice - the students practiced with new objects - they found fruits in other plants.

Here we have seen the traditional way of assimilation of new knowledge, new concepts - from the particular to the general. Soviet psychologists D. B. Elkonin And V. V. Davydov proved that already first-graders are able to master new concepts, going from the general to the particular. Lessons in the 1st grade on experimental programs look unusual. According to the developed course, tells V. V. Davydov, children in the first half of the first grade do not “meet” numbers at all. All this time, they master information about the quantity in some detail: they distinguish it in physical objects, get acquainted with its main properties. Working with real objects, children distinguish volume, area, length, etc. in them, establish the equality or inequality of these features, and write down the relationship with signs, and then with a letter formula, for example: a-b, a>b, a<Ь. It turned out that already in the third month of training, first-graders learn to compose and write down equations of the type: “If but<Ь, then a-(-x=b or a=b-X", and then define X as a function of other formula elements. Language programs are based on the same principles.

Research D. B. Elkonina And V. V. Davydova showed that younger students have much greater opportunities for the development of thinking than it seemed with traditional methods of teaching. And one more conclusion can be drawn: even in such well-established areas of human activity as the education of young children, such discoveries and inventions are possible, the consequences of which can have a huge impact on the development of all areas of science, culture and production.

Try to trace for yourself how the assimilation of concepts takes place already at the level of senior classes. Pay attention to the role of your own creative activity in the process of cognition. No wonder we more and more often recall the ancient saying: "A student is not a vessel that needs to be filled, but a torch that needs to be lit." The creative fire ignites from the joint efforts of the teacher and the student.

moral concepts. The concepts that form the basis of scientific knowledge are developed, as we have already said, in the process of painstaking research work, and are acquired through special training. The development and assimilation of a special class of concepts, which are called moral(or ethical). In such concepts as "pride", "honor", "kindness", "perseverance", "duty" and many, many others, the experience of relations between people is generalized, ideas about the basic principles of moral behavior, about the duties of a person for attitude towards oneself, society, work. Moral concepts are most often acquired in everyday life, in the practice of communicating with other people, in the course of analyzing one's own behavior and the actions of other people, reading works of art, etc.

Soviet psychologist V. A. Krutetsky, who specifically studied the problem of assimilation of moral concepts by schoolchildren, gives an interesting reasoning of one ninth grader about the ways in which these concepts are formed in him.

Some of them, the young man says, “have been created in me quite imperceptibly, gradually, probably over the course of my entire conscious life. I didn’t notice any “milestones” on this path ... You say that I understand well and correctly what perseverance and determination are, but I can’t explain where and how I learned this ... I think it’s so imperceptibly, as imperceptibly for himself, a child learns to speak ... And so most of the concepts ... Well, but the concept of a sense of duty appeared to me, I remember when. Or rather, I had it before, but it was completely wrong. I understood it for a long time, something like this: it is the ability of a person to obey an unpleasant order, to do something very unpleasant, because the elder orders - if you don’t want it, you do it, otherwise it will fall, but you yourself don’t know what it is for. .. -I remember that the German language teacher always asked a lot of homework and always to the tedious accompaniment of conversations about a sense of duty. Even the word itself evoked some kind of unpleasant feeling in me ... But I read the book “The Young Guard” about 4 and somehow immediately understood what a sense of duty was: the boys and girls from Krasnodon could not help starting a fight against the Nazis. no one forced them, they were driven by a sense of duty, and this feeling gave them great joy and satisfaction.

Probably each of you guys can say about yourself about the same: everyone has moral concepts, but are they correct? It is often the wrong, distorted understanding of one's duty, norms and principles of behavior that leads to unseemly actions.

Another great Russian thinker N. A. Dobrolyubov wrote that the efforts of many educators to act on the heart of the child, without inspiring him with sound concepts, are completely in vain ... One can resolutely assert that only that kindness and nobility of feelings are completely reliable and can be truly useful, which are based on a firm conviction, on a thoughts.

Here, the connection between thinking and the moral character of a person is emphasized (by the way, don’t you guys think that we haven’t remembered the integrity of the psyche for a long time?). It is moral concepts that underlie the consciousness of behavior, beliefs personality. Of course, mere knowledge of moral norms and exact definitions does not yet ensure true upbringing. Still needed desire, aspiration act in accordance with these concepts, skill And habit behave accordingly. In this regard, I recall such a case. In the trolley bus, an old woman stopped near the pioneer, who was conveniently located on the seat.

Are you, brother, not giving up your seat to the elder? one of the passengers remarked reproachfully. “Don’t they teach you this at school?”

And now we're on vacation! - calmly answered the student. He certainly knew how to behave, but habits

and he had no desire to act accordingly. Quite often it happens that a person behaves precisely in accordance with his moral concepts, but these concepts are poorly assimilated, if not completely wrong. If any student thinks V. A. Krutetsky, sincerely convinced that stubbornness is “principled perseverance”, that sensitivity is “a property of weak and weak-willed people”, and modesty is “a property of the timid and downtrodden”, that acting decisively means “doing without thinking, without reflecting”, then the possible direction of his behavior will become quite obvious to us.

Moral Concepts differ from other concepts in that they change from one historical period to another, that they are of a class nature. If, for example, the law of Archimedes, discovered back in the slave-owning era, has not changed its content to the present day and is unlikely to ever change, then the concepts of good and evil, happiness and justice, etc. during this period of time filled with a whole new meaning. Today, representatives of the bourgeoisie and Soviet people or conscious fighters for the freedom of the people in capitalist countries also have different moral concepts.

SOLUTION OF THINKING PROBLEMS AND CREATIVE ACTIVITY OF A PERSON

Problem situation and task. Mental activity arose in man in the process of evolution as a way of overcoming the difficulties that he encountered in the struggle with nature. And even today everyone constantly finds himself in one or another difficult situation, when the usual methods of activity can no longer ensure success. Such situations that necessitate the search for new solutions to achieve practical or theoretical goals are called problematic. A problem situation is perceived and understood by a person as a task, requiring a response to a specific question. For thinking, awareness of the issue is, as it were, a signal to the beginning of active mental activity. Not without reason, when a child begins the process of active development of thinking, he becomes a "why-why". Here you will probably remember some of the stories of B. Zhitkov, and the book K. I. Chukovsky"From two to five." One of the sections of this wonderful book, which no psychologist, teacher, linguist, writer, and indeed any inquisitive person can do without, is called “One Hundred Thousand Whys”.

Chukovsky cites, for example, a recording of questions asked at machine-gun speed by one four-year-old boy to his father for two and a half minutes:

Where is the smoke going?

Do bears wear brooches?

And who shakes the trees?

Is it possible to get such a large newspaper to wrap a live camel?

Does an octopus hatch from eggs or is it milk-sucking?

Do chickens go without galoshes?

Questions have arisen - thinking has earned. By the way, another four-year-old boy was quite right when he proved to his mother the need to pay attention to his questions in the following way:

If you don't answer me, I'll be stupid; and if you do not refuse to explain to me, then, mother, I will be smarter and smarter ...

English psychologist D. Selly wrote that if he were asked to depict a child in his typical state of mind, he would probably draw the straightened figure of a little boy who, with wide eyes, looks at some new miracle or listens to his mother tell him something new about the surrounding world.

Probably, scientists, inventors, rationalizers, and indeed creative people in all areas of life become adults who have retained this inquisitiveness, curiosity, desire for something new. A sad sight is a man who... has no questions. I had to

to observe an adult man whose intellectual capabilities were sharply reduced due to a severe brain disease: he could not at one time study in a public school and barely learned to read and write and four arithmetic operations. It is characteristic that his favorite expression was: “Clearly, clearly!”

So, awareness of the issue- this first problem solving stage. No wonder they say: "A well-posed question is half the answer."

On the second stage is clarification conditions tasks, taking into account what is known to solve it. Our wonderful aircraft designer A. N. Tupolev in a conversation with a Soviet psychologist P. M. Yakobson This is how he described the initial stages of his work:

When you start to think over a question, you are engaged in searches, then you critically look at what was done by you. You realize, you have the feeling that it is not good, it seems unpleasant, sometimes even physiologically disgusting. There is a desire to move away from those decisions that were, I want to approach from some new, unusual side, to look from a new point of view.

We will see later that the words underlined in Tupolev's statement are very important for understanding the essence of creativity. Indeed, can any mental activity be called creative? Creative activity is considered to be such an activity that gives new socially valuable results. This novelty can be objective: for example, a designer has created a new machine, a scientist has formulated a previously unknown law of nature, a composer has composed a new symphony, etc. But a person can, as a result of mental activity, also discover what was already discovered before him, but was not he knows. This discovery, so to speak, subjectively new, new for me is also a creative process. From this point of view, teaching, as we have already said, can be a creative mental activity, and its basic laws are common to a fifth grader who enthusiastically solves a new problem for himself, and a scientist who first came up with this problem.

Here the question is formulated, the conditions are clarified, and here begins the often painful thinking stage, nurturing, or, as is sometimes said, "incubating" an idea. At first, the possible solution is still vague, vague. At this stage, a very important role is played by hypothesis, assumption.

In order to study the internal patterns of creative thinking, psychologists ask subjects a particular task, introduce them to a problem situation and ask them to “think. aloud". One of these tasks is already well known to you from the famous book by M. Twain “The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn”. Remember, Huckleberry Finn is going to reconnaissance and disguise

puts on a woman’s dress: “I put on a straw bonnet, tied ribbons under my chin, and then it was not so easy to look into my face - sort of like a chimney. Jim said that now it is unlikely that anyone will recognize me even during the day.

But everything turned out quite differently. The woman Huckleberry got to was very observant and quick-witted and ... However, it’s better for us to do otherwise now. Let's try to repeat the experiment of the famous researcher of thinking K. Dunker. Find someone who has not read a book by M. Twain (this task in itself is not an easy one!), and pose this problem to him: once Huckleberry Finn left his island to find out how things were going in his native village. To do this, he changed into a girl's dress. He went into the first hut he met, the owner of which suspected that he was a boy in disguise. Imagine yourself in this woman's place. She, of course, wants to know who is in front of her: a boy or a girl. What does she need to do for this?

Here's what some of the respondents said K. Dunker.

Let the mouse in to cause a piercing cry from the "girl".

Make him act quickly and without hesitation.

You need to do something that would make the boy blush.

Make me wash the dishes!

As you can see, these are all hypotheses, options for paths that could lead to a solution. The woman, you remember, acted as if the subjects had told her Dunker. She drew attention to how Huckleberry threads a needle, then made him throw a piece of lead at a rat, but the most accurate and witty test was this: "And she immediately threw the lead at me, I moved my knees and caught it." "...Behind! remember, - this woman detective later told him, - when they throw something on a girl's knees, she arranges them, and does not move them together, as you moved when you caught lead.

It was not by chance that I called this woman a detective: now, when you read stories about investigators, scouts, etc., pay attention to the course of the mental activity of the main characters.

In the course of mental activity, various versions are tested - hypotheses, until, finally, one of them turns out to be true. You know from experience that this period of reflection can be long and difficult. Often, habitual ways, preconceived thoughts, which, like a barrier, prevent us from approaching the correct solution, do not give a correct solution to the problem. To overcome such barriers, according to A. N. Tupolev, it is necessary to look through the eyes of others, to approach them in a new way, breaking out of the usual, familiar circle.

Offer your comrades a puzzle: from six matches, make four equilateral triangles, the sides of which are equal to the length of the match. Of course, first try closing the book and solving the problem yourself. Hard? Many will say that this is not feasible at all; not enough matches. What's the matter? The barrier is to blame, it makes your thought rush in circles and prevents it from moving forward. What is the barrier? More on this a little later.

And now one more task - four points are given. Decide for yourself and invite your comrades to draw three straight lines through these points (like the tops of a square), without lifting the pencil from the paper, so that the pencil returns to its starting point. Do you have paper or pencil? We started. Does not exceed? You are not alone: ​​once in an experiment of six hundred participants, no one could solve the problem on their own. And again, the barrier is to blame for everything. In this task, it lies in the fact that the decisive to himself /\ to himself imposes additional

/ \ condition: lines must be

/ \ scold inside designated dot-

*y. kami square. But it costs 86*-

/ \ tear from a closed plane -

/ \ and problem solved! Conclude in-

& 1-L _____® \\ circle of a square these points in tri-

square. Like this (see fig.). Maybe someone has already figured out how to solve the problem with matches? This time you need to break out of the plane into three-dimensional space: make a three-sided pyramid of matches, and you will get four equilateral triangles. Barriers lie in wait for us at every step and arise instantly. Ask someone to solve the problem:

The mute entered the hardware store. How should he explain to the seller that he wants to buy a hammer?

Your subject expressively taps his fist "on the counter."

Right.

And how should a blind man ask for scissors?

Should be instant and silent answer: the characteristic shearing movement of the middle and index fingers.

But he can just say!

Just think about it! One task and already a barrier: everyone is explained by gestures.

And here is a very simple "trap": what was the name of Vera Pavlovna's father from Chernyshevsky's novel "What to do?" Not everyone will always answer: “Of course, Pavel!” Where is it from here

5 Order 199 \ 90

barrier? Probably out of conviction: such easy questions are not asked; If you ask, then you need to think.

The development of analytical and synthetic skills is of great importance for the entire process of education, as it underlies any educational activity. Well-developed analytical and synthetic skills will help the child in middle school education and in subsequent professional activities. This is due to the fact that we live in the age of information technology, students are constantly faced with an abundance of various information in which they need to navigate, find significant features, and highlight connections.

The significance and necessity of the formation of analytical and synthetic skills of younger schoolchildren is laid down in the Federal State Educational Standard of the IEO. So, one of the meta-subject results of mastering the main educational program is "mastering the logical actions of comparison, analysis, synthesis, generalization, classification according to generic characteristics, establishing analogies and cause-and-effect relationships, constructing reasoning, referring to known concepts."

The formation of logical actions is considered in the works of A.G. Asmolova, N.F. Talyzina, N.B. Istomina and others. Educational robotics provides interesting opportunities for the development of logical actions.

Robotics has great educational potential and creates an attractive learning environment for children. Knowledge of the laws of robotics will allow the child to meet the demands of the time. During robotics classes, children themselves discover new knowledge, explore models that they themselves have built, program, modernize them and create their own projects.

Analysis and synthesis are two universal, but oppositely directed operations of thinking that are interconnected.

In modern education, analytical skills are understood as a complex of special mental actions aimed at identifying, evaluating and generalizing the acquired knowledge, analyzing and transferring them to a qualitative state.

N.B. Istomina writes that analytical and synthetic activity is expressed not only in the ability to single out the elements of the object under study, its features and combine the elements into a single whole, but also in the ability to include them in new connections, to see their new functions.

Analysis and synthesis are constantly mutually passing into each other, thereby ensuring the constant movement of thought towards a deeper knowledge of the essence of the phenomena being studied. The action of cognition always begins with the primary synthesis - the perception of an undivided whole (phenomenon or situation). Further, on the basis of the analysis, a secondary synthesis is carried out. New knowledge about this whole appears, which again is the basis for further in-depth analysis, etc.

Most scientists agree that the development of analytical and synthetic skills is more effective when solving intellectual, research and creative problems. In solving such problems, analysis and synthesis are built in as necessary stages of work.

It is robotics that allows solving intellectual, research and creative tasks in an attractive way for students. A bright, moving model, and the main one assembled by the children themselves will definitely not leave them indifferent.

Over the past decades, many robotic designers have been released, for younger students, Lego WeDo constructors are the most suitable.

An analysis of robotics programs showed that in most developments there is no emphasis on the formation of skills, robotics classes exist for the sake of assembly, the development of fine motor skills, obtaining the final attractive result and attracting children to technical professions.

Thanks to the analysis of theoretical and methodological literature, we have identified the analytical and synthetic skills of first-graders.

Figure 1. Analytical and synthetic skills of first graders

After analyzing the theoretical and methodological literature, we organized work on the development of analytical and synthetic skills in children 7-8 years old using robotics. The study was conducted in three stages.

1) ascertaining experiment;

2) formative experiment;

3) control experiment.

In order to identify the level of development of analytical and synthetic skills, a number of diagnostics were carried out.

Figure 2. Diagnostic results at the ascertaining stage (in %)

The results of the diagnostics showed that the level of analytical and synthetic skills in the experimental and control classes is at a fairly high level and corresponds to the development of first-graders.

At the formative stage of the study, we developed and conducted 8 lessons in the experimental class. At each lesson, techniques and tasks aimed at developing analytical and synthetic skills were used.

Here are some examples of the techniques used:

1. "Name what details." Students need to analyze the assembled model and name the details of which it consists.
2. "How similar?" Children compare the model with a real object from the environment, for example, the Drummer Monkey model with pictures of real monkeys of different species. To begin with, children look at photos of monkeys of different species in order to highlight common features, then check whether the identified features can be applied to the model.
3. Assembly Diagrams. We can offer several options for using this technique, but they all rely on the establishment of a logical sequence. For example, lay out cards depicting assembly steps in order or draw an assembly diagram on paper.
4. "Programmers". The tasks of this technique affect the development of such analytical and synthetic skills as the establishment of cause-and-effect relationships and the establishment of a logical sequence. For example, name blocks of action and correlate them with the movements of the model; drawing up a program according to the task, the task comes up with another group.
5. Model Passport. This technique can be applied at the stage of model improvement or during reflection. Students need to analyze the information of the entire lesson and come up with a name for the model, talk about the habitat (if we are talking about animals), and also talk about signs, behavioral patterns, and nutrition.

To identify the effectiveness of classes on the development of analytical and synthetic skills, diagnostics were carried out.

Figure 3. Dynamics of the development of analytical and synthetic skills in the experimental group (in %)

Analyzing the data obtained, we note that the level of development of analytical and synthetic skills in the experimental class increased by 20%, in the control group by 4%. It should be noted that during the diagnostics in the experimental class, the students completed the tasks in a shorter period of time than the control class.

Analyzing the research experience, we can conclude that the development of analytical and synthetic skills is most effective when using techniques aimed at development: the ability to analyze in order to highlight features, the ability to separate essential features from non-essential ones, compiling a whole from parts, drawing up a plan for studying an object , establishing cause-and-effect relationships, establishing a logical sequence.

Bibliography:

1. Istomina N.B. Activation of students in mathematics lessons in primary classes / N.B. Istomina: Teacher's Manual - M .: Education, 1985. - 64 p.
2. Solomonova, T.P. Formation of analytical skills of students / T.P. Solomonova // Vocational education. - M.: Capital, 2009. - No5. - P.22-23.
3. Federal State Educational Standard for Primary General Education: amended text. and additional For 2011 and 2012 / Ministry of Education and Science Ros. Federation. - M.: Education, 2014.