Part two. Operation "Commander Rumyantsev" (Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive

In carrying out this task, the formations of the 1st Guards Army for two days (February 8-9) had little progress. The enemy, reinforced by newly approaching units, put up stubborn resistance. On the Slavic and Artemov directions, the Germans repeatedly launched counterattacks, sometimes with the strength of up to two infantry regiments supported by tanks, artillery and aircraft.

In the area of ​​Slavyansk, the German command strained all its forces to drive out units of the 195th Infantry Division from the northeastern outskirts of the city. At the same time, a large number of tanks were transferred from Gorlovka to Artemovsk and Konstantinovka. The infantry units were also pulled up here. There was an unloading of the arrived military echelons in the areas between Barvenkovo ​​and Lozova, as well as in Krasnoarmeysk. The 35th Guards Rifle Division, advancing on the right flank of the army, interacting with neighboring units of the 6th Army, successfully moved forward and approached the city and the large railway junction of Lozovaya. Her forward detachment under the command of Captain V. Evlashev blew up the railway lines going from Lozovaya to Slavyansk, Pavlograd, Krasnograd and Kharkov. As a result, all evacuation routes for enemy units by rail were cut off.

On February 10, units of the 35th Guards Rifle Division broke into the northern outskirts of the city, and the next day, after stubborn street fighting, they cleared it of the enemy. The losses of the German side here were estimated at more than 300 soldiers and officers.

On February 12, the front commander, evaluating the data on the movement of the enemy from the Rostov region and the lower reaches of the Seversky Donets to the west as the intention of the Nazi command to withdraw its troops from the Donbass beyond the Dnieper, decided to force the offensive. This, in essence, was demanded of him by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. In its directive dated February 11, 1943, it was said that the general task of the front for the near future was to prevent the enemy from withdrawing towards Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye and take all measures to pinch his Donetsk grouping in the Crimea, close the passages through Perekop and Sivash and thus isolate it from the rest of the troops in Ukraine. Based on all this, the front commander ordered the 6th Army to continue the offensive in the general direction of Krasnograd and Pereshchepino and, by the end of February 17, reach the Karlovka line (20 km northwest of Krasnograd) - Novomoskovsk.

The troops of the 1st Guards Army were tasked with advancing with the main forces in the general direction of Sinelnikovo and reaching the Novomoskovsk-Pavlograd line by February 18. In the future, the troops should be ready to develop a strike on Zaporozhye. At the same time, the army was ordered to take part of the forces to capture Slavyansk and then advance on Artemovsk. On the left flank of the army, at the direction of the front commander, a slight regrouping of forces was carried out. So, the sector of the front in the Crimean region was transferred to the 3rd Guards Army. The formations of the 6th Guards Rifle Corps received the task of delivering the main blow to the southwest in the direction of Artemovsk.

The fighting in the offensive zone of the 1st Guards Army took on an increasingly fierce and protracted character. In the Slavyansk region, the Germans additionally transferred from the Kramatorsk region to an infantry regiment with 30 tanks and, with the support of aviation, launched a counterattack on February 13. The main blow came in parts of the 41st Guards Rifle Division, which had just approached the battle area. Her regiments showed great stubbornness in battle and with heavy losses held back this blow.

The offensive on the left flank of the army - in the direction of Artemovsk - did not develop. The enemy was strongly fortified in the positions he occupied, and units of the 6th Guards Rifle Corps could not break his resistance.

As a result of the fifteen-day offensive, the troops of the 1st Guards Army stretched from west to east along the line Lozovaya - Barvenkovo ​​- Slavyansk - Krymskaya front to the west, southwest and south. In all this vast area, only ten rifle divisions operated, moreover, the composition was weakened after heavy fighting. Meanwhile, the enemy was able to pull up considerable forces to the area of ​​Slavyansk, Konstantinovka and Artemovsk. In such an environment, the army command decided to concentrate most forces on its right flank, where the offensive developed more successfully. To this end, once again, a partial regrouping of troops was carried out. On February 15–16, the 41st Guards and 244th Rifle Divisions were transferred to the area of ​​Barvenkovo ​​and Lozova by a forced march around Slavyansk from the north. Thus, it was planned to build on the success of the 35th Guards Rifle Division advancing in the direction of Pavlograd. At the same time, preparations began for the assault on Slavyansk. To do this, the 38th Guards Rifle Division was transferred to this area, which, together with the 195th, 57th Guards Rifle Divisions operating there and the tank units of the front mobile group, was to drive the enemy out of the city.

Simultaneously with the 1st Guards Army on January 30, a mobile front group under the command of General M. M. Popov began hostilities. The group included:

3rd Panzer Corps;

4th Guards Kantemirovsky Tank Corps;

10th Panzer Corps;

18th Panzer Corps;

52nd Rifle Division;

57th Guards Rifle Division;

38th Guards Rifle Division, as well as reinforcements.

The group was tasked to strike from the Starobelsk area in the general direction to Krasnoarmeiskoye - Volnovakha - Mariupol and cut off the enemy's retreat from the Donbass. The tankers were given a virtually impossible task: to fight 300 km, encircle and destroy the enemy troops in Kramatorsk, Krasnoarmeysk, Konstantinovka, and thereby contribute to the rapid advance of the troops of the Southwestern Front. And all this had to be done in a snowy winter, off-road, in a short time (7-8 days).

At the same time, there were only 180 tanks in the combat composition of four tank corps. In addition, the Soviet units traveled hundreds of kilometers and fought long offensive battles. Moreover, at the beginning of the operation, on average, tanks had one refueling and up to two sets of ammunition.

Despite this, the mobile group of the front was brought into battle at the junction of the 6th and 1st Guards armies. On its right flank, the 3rd tank corps of Major General M.D. Sinenko operated. He received the task of entering the gap in the offensive zone of the 6th Army and by the end of February 4, part of the forces, in cooperation with the 57th Guards Rifle Division, to capture Slavyansk, and then, developing a strike to the south, in cooperation with the 4th Guards Tank Corps of General P. P. Poluboyarov to take Kramatorsk. Fulfilling the assigned task, the corps, reinforced by a fighter anti-tank artillery regiment, a separate guards mortar battalion and one artillery regiment, moved forward with battles. On the morning of February 4, with one of its brigade, together with the 57th Guards Rifle Division, the corps started fighting for the northern outskirts of Slavyansk, and with the main forces, developing the success of the offensive to the south, approached Kramatorsk from the north.

At the same time, the 4th Guards Tank Corps, with its 14th Guards Tank Brigade (the rest of the brigades, which had suffered serious losses in previous battles, had not yet received new tanks) was advancing from the Yampol region (20 km northeast of Slavyansk) to Kramatorsk from the east . At the same time, the guards repulsed several serious enemy counterattacks, during which seven tanks were destroyed. The brigade made its combat march on the night of February 4 in off-road conditions and large snow drifts. In the morning, unexpectedly for the enemy, the brigade broke into the eastern outskirts of Kramatorsk. The enemy, having no data on the number of Soviet troops, on February 5 preferred to withdraw from the city.

Here is what one of the liberators of the city P. Voitsekhovsky recalled:

“I especially remember this in the battles for Kramatorsk. Our company was on lead patrol. Fascist planes flew in. We were beaten hard. They moved by leaps and bounds. I caught up with a messenger and gave the order to move to the city of Kramatorsk. And so we went to the grader road to Kramatorsk. Here we were discovered by enemy artillerymen and began shelling. Lie down. Walk forward in short bursts. We went out to the last slope to Kramatorsk, the field was under corn, where we went, and went to the outskirts of the city. Our brigade (5th separate guards motorized rifle) took over the plant. You can’t even call it a factory, there were only metal frames. After taking the plant, our division was given the task of taking the mountain. She was white. We called her "Melova". Or maybe it was white clay.

Heavy fighting broke out among us on this very mountain. There was a heavily fortified area here. There were metal caps, pillboxes, pillboxes. But after good artillery preparation and the participation of tanks, they managed to knock out the enemy. Our unit was sent to the Red Army direction, and later transferred to Zaporizhzhya.

Pilots rendered great assistance to our ground troops in these battles. So, on February 5, in the Kramatorsk region, eight Yak-1 fighters met four Xe-111, three Yu-88 under the cover of four Me-109. A pair of Soviet fighters rapidly attacked the Junkers from above and behind. In the very first attack, Senior Lieutenant K. Ya. Lebedev shot down one Junkers. The second pair of our fighters, led by Junior Lieutenant N. S. Putko, attacked four Me-109s. From the very first minutes of the battle, the leader set fire to one Messerschmitt, and the remaining three, unable to withstand the bold and daring actions of our pilots, abandoned their bombers and disappeared. At the same time, the third pair, consisting of senior lieutenant A. I. Timoshenko and foreman K. P. Shkurin, rushed to four Heinkels and destroyed two aircraft from the first attack. The rest tried to leave, but were attacked by Major K. G. Obsharov and Sergeant F. S. Bessonov and shot down.

In another air battle, two La-5 fighters from the 5th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (207th Fighter Aviation Division, 3rd Mixed Aviation Corps, 17th Air Army), led by Guards Lieutenant I. G. Kildyushev and senior Sergeant Sytov, shot down a Xe-111 bomber at an altitude of 2000 m, which was trying to evade persecution. The plane of Lieutenant Kildyushev ran out of ammunition. But the Soviet pilot continued to pursue the enemy. Having used up ammunition, the pilot with the right wing of his fighter rammed the tail of the Heinkel. On the damaged plane, he landed at his airfield. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 14, 1943, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Unfortunately, the hero did not live to see Victory Day, dying on May 15, 1943, when during the battle near the village of Messerosh his plane was shot down and the pilot sent the burning plane to the enemy mechanized column.

The 10th tank corps of General V. G. Burkov, reinforced by a fighter anti-tank artillery regiment, a separate guards mortar battalion and an artillery regiment, received the task of entering the gap in the zone of the 1st Guards Army and, building on the success of rifle formations, on the first day of the offensive, take crossing the Seversky Donets, on the second day - to capture Artemovsk, then take Makeevka and approach Stalin from the north, and on the fifth day of the operation be in the Volnovakha area. Consequently, the average rate of advance for the corps was set very high - 45 km per day. Meanwhile, the roads along which he moved to the Seversky Donets (about 70 km) were in poor condition. In a number of sectors, the movement was made on virgin soil behind the tanks, clearing the way with squares, so the corps was moving extremely slowly. By the end of February 1, his brigades, together with the 52nd Infantry Division, crossed the Seversky Donets. Having beaten off numerous enemy counterattacks, they managed to develop an offensive to the south in the general direction of Artemovsk.

It was not easy for the fighters of the 18th tank corps of General B.S. Bakharov, who had the task of forcing the Seversky Donets in the offensive zone of the 1st Guards Army and capturing the city and station of Lisichansk with a further direction of the offensive to the southwest. Overcoming enemy resistance, the tankers, in cooperation with units of the 41st Guards Rifle Division, liberated Lisichansk and many other settlements. But further, in the direction of Artemovsk, they could not advance, since at the turn of 10 km south of the line of Lisichansk - Druzhkovka - Krasnoarmeysk, the Germans organized a strong defense with a front to the north. Relying on it, units of the 27th, 3rd and 7th Panzer Divisions put up strong resistance to our troops. The main method was counterattacks by large groups of tanks (50-60 pieces), supported by air strikes.

On February 7, according to the report of General M. M. Popov, 160-180 enemy tanks, motorized regiments of four tank divisions, acted in front of the group, while only 140 tanks remained in the group, operating on a front 70 km wide. The group commander asked to be given time to make the necessary regrouping of forces and resume the operation on February 10.

However, the front commander demanded that General M. M. Popov accelerate the advance of the group. Moreover, a deliberately impossible order was issued: by the morning of February 8, by the morning of February 8, defeat the enemy in the areas of Slavyansk and Konstantinovka with the forces of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Corps and, together with units of the 1st Guards Army, capture these points. According to him, by the end of February 8, it was required to liberate Krasnoarmeysk and further advance to the south, bypassing Stalino from the west. Apparently, the calculation of the Soviet command was that with the occupation of Krasnoarmeysk and Stalino, all enemy railway communications would be intercepted and its operational encirclement would be reached. Parts of the 18th and 10th tank corps, advancing to the south, by the morning of February 9, were to break the enemy's resistance and occupy Artemovsk.

The enemy, despite the losses suffered, did not stop trying to capture Kramatorsk again. On February 8, up to two infantry regiments, supported by tanks and bomber aircraft, counterattacked our units in Kramatorsk from the south. The artillery of the 4th Guards Tank Corps was able to repulse the first attack with fire. But soon the Germans changed tactics and struck simultaneously from two sides - from the north and east. Under the onslaught of superior forces, our troops retreated to the southern part of the city. And only the approach of another tank brigade of the 4th Guards Tank Corps made it possible to repel the enemy counterattack.

On February 10, the 4th Guards Tank Corps, exhausted in battles, received an order to transfer the defense of Kramatorsk to the 3rd Tank Corps, and by the most forced march by the morning of February 11, take Krasnoarmeysk, a major junction of railways and highways in the Donbass.

On the night of February 11, the tank corps, together with the 9th separate guards tank brigade, which arrived to reinforce the mobile front group, and the 7th ski-rifle brigade set out along the Kramatorsk-Krasnoarmeysky Rudnik-Krasnoarmeysk route. The 14th Guards Tank Brigade of the corps moved as an advanced detachment. Destroying small groups of the enemy, at 4:00 on February 11, she approached Grishin (5 km northwest of Krasnoarmeysk) and captured it. Building on the success achieved, the main forces of the corps broke into Krasnoarmeysk at 9 o'clock in the morning and, after a short battle, liberated the city.

Here is what a resident of the city F. Morgun recalled after the war:

“Our tanks and motorized infantry in American vehicles broke into the city at night. There were many German troops in Krasnoarmeyskoye, for them the approach of our troops was completely unexpected, they were taken by surprise and many were destroyed.<…>

At the station [Krasnoarmeysk], the guards captured rich trophies, including 3 echelons with vehicles, 8 warehouses with weapons, fuel, lubricants, winter uniforms and a huge amount of food. Here were the main warehouses of the Germans, supplying fuel, ammunition and food to all German troops that were at that time in the Donbass, on the Don and in the North Caucasus.<…>

To the proposals ... of elderly citizens ... to dig trenches to shelter tanks and soldiers, just in case to be ready for defense, the officers answered with laughter, arguing that the main forces of the Germans were defeated, the remnants were fleeing to the Dnieper.

By the way, E. Manstein least of all expected the appearance of Soviet tanks here: the area between Kazennyy Torets and Samara was considered impassable for tanks due to high altitude snow cover in beams. The railway through Krasnoarmeysk was, in fact, the only full-fledged supply artery. The direction Zaporozhye - Pologi - Volnovakha had a limited capacity - as already mentioned, the railway bridge across the Dnieper was destroyed by the retreating Soviet troops back in 1941, so it was necessary to reload cargo here, and the route Dnepropetrovsk - Chaplino - Pologi - Volnovakha was twice as long ( 293 km) than the main line (148 km), with single-track sections (at 76% of the length) and trains turning. The way with the reloading of equipment from wagons to vehicles and back to wagons, and then through the Mezhevaya - Selidovka and Demurino - Roya stations also had a limited capacity due to the insufficient number of working vehicles and a relatively large delivery distance (in the first case - 50 km on bad roads or in the second case - 100 km along a more or less tolerable highway). Such an unexpected turn of events forced E. Manstein to take tough retaliatory measures.

First of all, our units in Krasnoarmeysk began to be subjected to intense enemy air attack. Let us turn to the memoirs of F. Morgun: “And suddenly, in the early morning, a hail of bombs rained down on the tanks of tipsy, sleepy tankers and infantrymen. Planes ... from the Donetsk airfield bombed our tanks and troops located in the eastern and central part of Krasnoarmeysk. Bombers from Zaporozhye covered the southern part of the city, and from the Dnepropetrovsk airfield they hit the eastern and northern territories ... Most of our tanks ... were without fuel and ammunition ... "

And on the morning of February 12, the Germans launched a counterattack with large forces simultaneously from the south and east. Intense bloody battles ensued, during which the enemy managed to break into the outskirts of the city. The tankers, having taken up the defense, fought selflessly. But their situation worsened more and more. With a blow from the northwest, the Germans managed to recapture Grishino. As a result, the Soviet units in Krasnoarmeysk were squeezed from three sides. As a result of this, the communications of the 4th Guards Tank Corps were cut, and as a result, the supply of ammunition and fuel practically came to naught. Ammunition came to an end by 14 February. Under these conditions, Soviet soldiers and officers were forced to show miracles of courage. So, the commander of a platoon of anti-tank guns of the guard, Lieutenant V. I. Kleshchevnikov, used the tactics of wandering guns. Constantly changing firing positions, the gunners delivered surprise attacks on the enemy. Only one gun, from which the lieutenant personally fired (the entire crew of the gun was out of order), destroyed three enemy tanks, four vehicles and up to 100 Nazis.

During enemy attacks on February 19, brigade commander V. Shibankov was killed, and on the 14th, brigade commander F. Likhachev was mortally wounded. The losses suffered, both among the payroll and in terms of materiel, forced P. Poluboyarov to demand immediate reinforcements from the higher command.

However, all that was scraped together was the 7th separate ski-rifle brigade, which approached Krasnoarmeysk from the north at an accelerated march. This improved the situation somewhat, but not drastically. Nevertheless, on February 15, our units pushed the enemy back. Conditions were created for the delivery of ammunition, fuel and lubricants, which were delivered at night. But German troops continuously counterattacked from the northwest and northeast.

The commander of the mobile group foresaw that the 4th Guards Tank Corps, which, along with the 9th Separate Guards Tank Brigade on February 10, had only 37 tanks, would find it difficult to overcome the enemy's increasing resistance day by day. Therefore, he ordered in advance the 10th Panzer Corps, which was advancing on Artemovsk, to transfer its sector to the 18th Panzer Corps, and to concentrate itself in the Mayakov area (10 km north of Slavyansk) and from there, moving south, take control of Krasnoarmeysky Rudnik, and then connect with 4th Guards Tank Corps. At this time, the mobile group was gradually replenished with a new material part. So, by February 11, the 11th separate tank brigade arrived in its composition.

On the night of February 12, the 10th Tank Corps, together with the 11th Separate Tank Brigade, which came under the operational subordination of the corps commander, began to carry out a combat mission. The 407th anti-tank artillery and 606th anti-aircraft artillery regiments attached to the corps were concentrated in the Mayakov area due to the complete lack of fuel. Tankers moved slowly, 2-3 km per hour, as wheeled vehicles kept getting stuck in deep snow. This created ideal conditions for enemy ambush operations. On February 12, in the afternoon, in the area of ​​​​Cherkasskaya (10 km west of Slavyansk), up to 30 German tanks with numerous infantry in armored personnel carriers suddenly attacked the 11th separate tank brigade. It is clear that with 11 tanks the brigade could not hold its position and the Germans managed to gain a foothold in the eastern part of the settlement.

When approaching the area of ​​Krasnoarmeysky Rudnik from the north-east, the tankers of the 183rd brigade of the 10th tank corps received information from local partisans that an enemy infantry column with tanks and artillery was moving here from the north and that part of its forces was already in 1-1, 5 km. The brigade immediately entered the battle, captured a number of settlements and firmly held them. On the morning of February 15, the enemy launched a counterattack. Our units steadfastly repelled his onslaught. At the same time, they were greatly assisted by partisans from local residents, who, together with the tankers, entered the battle. This was very important for the brigade, since there was no attached infantry with it.

By the morning of February 16, the main forces of the 10th Panzer Corps approached the Krasnoarmeisky Mine area. From that moment, his joint actions began with the 4th Guards Tank Corps to repel enemy counterattacks in the Krasnoarmeysk region.

The 18th Panzer Corps, after unsuccessful attempts to break through the enemy defenses in the Artemovsky direction, received an order from the group commander to transfer its sector to units of the 52nd Infantry Division on the night of February 14 and forcefully march to the Krasnoarmeysk area. By the end of February 19, the tankers were faced with the task of concentrating in the area 20 km northwest of Krasnoarmeysk and being ready to strike from the rear, in cooperation with the 10th Panzer Corps, to destroy the enemy in the Grishin area.

Here, in the region of Krasnoarmeysk, the 3rd Panzer Corps was hastily transferred. He was ordered to hand over the area of ​​Kramatorsk to rifle formations, and by February 20 to concentrate in the area of ​​​​Udachnaya station (20 km southwest of Krasnoarmeysk). The 5th and 10th ski and rifle brigades, placed at the disposal of the commander of the mobile group, also continued to move south, in the general direction to Krasnoarmeysk.

At the same time, the German command was concentrating all available reserves in the Krasnoarmeysk region. So, units of the 6th, 7th, 11th Panzer Divisions, the 76th Infantry Division, as well as the Viking SS Motorized Division were transferred here. The task of the group was to stop the further advance to the south towards Stalin of our tank formations, and as a maximum task, to strike back at them.

Here is what Ernulf Bjornstad, a Norwegian volunteer in the SS Viking division, recalled about those battles:

“I returned to my unit, stationed at that time in the Kalmyk steppe in Ukraine. It was terribly cold there. It was very difficult to fight in such conditions not only for us, but also for our opponents - the gun grease hardened both in our country and in theirs. More precisely, our mortars were more or less in order, but the machine guns were just a disaster. We constantly had to run to the nearest hut to warm up the machine guns. But with warm clothes that winter, fortunately, there were no problems anymore. We all had winter overalls, fur hats, warm mittens and boots. And still there were cases of frostbite.

We were no longer on the defensive. We were ordered to advance non-stop until contact with the enemy and attack him in order to eliminate the threat posed by the forces of M. M. Popov, who was trying to wedge between us and the grouping of Italian and Romanian troops.

Although we were considered a motorized unit, the engines of our cars kept stalling in the cold. We had to drop them if they didn't start for a long time, and then stuff ourselves like herring in a barrel or sprats in a can into the few cars that remained on the move, and drive them at full speed on icy roads. Here's your motorized infantry!

Coming to the banks of the Donets, we dug in one place. Directly in front of us on the other bank were the positions of the Reds. But on their side the country was wooded, so we hardly saw them. Our reconnaissance groups were sent out several times, but the Germans, frankly, unlike us - the Norwegians - are useless scouts. In any case, those who served in our regiment. There were no hunters among them, and they did not know how to move silently.

Among the prisoners taken by us were four Tatars who volunteered to become our "voluntary helpers". The Germans took them on allowance, and they dug trenches for us. It's normal, it's happened before. Our prisoners even worked as drivers, cooks and mechanics. But with these Tatars, everything turned out differently. They slept in the same dugout as the Wehrmacht soldiers from the artillery battalion next to us. So these fools, when they went to bed, calmly hung their loaded machine guns over their heads - so that in case of emergency they were at hand. So what do you think? At night, the Tatars took possession of the artillerymen's machine guns, shot down everyone who slept that night in the dugout, and fled to their own. Since then, we have been strictly forbidden to keep prisoners of war on the front lines. All prisoners were sent to the rear, and all the work had to be done by ourselves. Since then, I somehow disliked the Tatars ...

The front line of our defense was located right in front of the forest, patrolled day and night by the Red Army. There were minefields in front of the enemy positions. We intended to attack in a western direction, but first we had to deal with these Ivans. Their command post and headquarters were in a small village nearby. A new commander had just been sent to us, transferred from the Westland regiment. He ordered an immediate attack.

Having started the attack, we were surprised at how weakly the Bolsheviks resisted. It seemed that they were armed only with light artillery. And only having approached them at 100-200 meters, we realized what was the matter. They transferred almost all their available forces to our left flank. At least a dozen Soviet tanks roared towards where our 2nd Company was positioned to our left. Our comrades had no chance. Tanks passed them all. I don't think any of them survived. My company survived only because it was a hidden dell on our right flank. Our commander spotted the attack through binoculars and immediately our 8 8mm guns opened fire.

Artillerymen knocked out almost all Soviet tanks right through the towers.

At 11 o'clock on February 18, after strong artillery preparation, the Germans launched an offensive on the northern and northeastern outskirts of Krasnoarmeysk. In a short time, the Germans managed to break through the defenses of the 4th Guards Tank Corps and reach the city center. The stubborn and tense battle lasted about eight hours. The 12th Guards Tank Brigade, having suffered significant losses in personnel and equipment, continued to stubbornly hold the western part of the city.

For urgent "patching holes" the commanders of the 4th Guards and 10th Tank Corps created a consolidated group under the command of the commander of the 183rd Tank Brigade, Colonel G. Ya. Andryushchenko. It included units of the 12th Guards, 183rd, 11th, 9th Tank Brigades, the 14th Motorized Rifle Brigade, and the 7th Separate Ski and Rifle Brigade. The group was given the task of driving the enemy out of Krasnoarmeysk and organizing all-round defense there. On the morning of February 19, our units went on the attack and made their way to the city center. Having then cleared Krasnoarmeysk of the Germans, nevertheless, they immediately had to go on the defensive.

Thus, having been drawn into fierce battles for Krasnoarmeisk, the front-line mobile group did not have the opportunity to develop its offensive further south, to Volnovakha.

In accordance with the directive of the commander of the Southwestern Front of February 12, the troops of the 6th Army were to advance in the general direction towards Krasnograd and Pereshchepino.

By decision of the army commander, the main blow was delivered on the right flank by the forces of the 15th rifle corps (350, 172, 6th rifle divisions), supported by the 115th tank brigade, the 212th tank regiment, and two anti-tank artillery regiments. Parts of the corps were ordered to advance in the direction of Krasnograd and, by the end of February 18, reach the line of the Orchik River (20 km west of Krasnograd).

To the left, the 106th Rifle Brigade was advancing with the task of reaching the line 40 km southwest of Krasnograd by the same time. The 267th Rifle Division secured the army's left flank and advanced in the direction of Pereshchepin.

On the morning of February 14, the 350th Rifle Division repulsed enemy counterattacks and drove them out of several large settlements. Developing success, on February 16 she broke into Zmiev and freed him. The 172nd and 6th rifle divisions successfully advanced. By the end of February 19, parts of the corps reached the area 10–15 km east and southeast of Krasnograd.

On the left flank of the army, the 267th Rifle Division captured a large regional center and the Pereshchepino railway station. Building on her success, by the morning of February 20 she reached the area northwest of Novomoskovsk. Parts of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps, which by this time had been transferred to the 6th Army from the neighboring 1st Guards Army, were also approaching with battles. At the same time, the 25th Tank Corps, also included from the front reserve under the command of the commander of the 6th Army, together with the 41st Guards Rifle Division started fighting for Sinelnikovo.

At this time, units of the 35th Guards Rifle Division broke into Pavlograd. By February 17, the city was liberated.

On the same day, formations of the 1st Guards Army liberated Slavyansk after a decisive assault. The liberation of the city was facilitated by the fact that the German troops themselves began to retreat and only a few pockets of German resistance remained in the city area. There was no shelling, no bombing, no prolonged fighting on the outskirts - only an insignificant machine-gun firefight.

On February 17, a rally was held in the center of the city, the executive committee and city committee of the Komsomol, a military registration and enlistment office were opened in the city. However, the euphoria of the first day did not last long, the inhabitants of the city did not have a firm confidence in the reliability of the troops that liberated the city - not a single tank was visible, there was no artillery, there were practically no vehicles. There was only light small arms, and drag sleds pulled by dogs were used to transport goods. Although through Slavyansk Soviet troops and advanced in the direction of Kramatorsk, however, the townspeople could not help but notice the artillery explosions on the western and southern outskirts of the city, and to the question they asked the military: “Where is the equipment?” - the answer was invariably the same: "Technique will do." However, events took a different turn.

On the same day, enemy infantry and tanks launched a strong counterattack. Some of our units, having suffered heavy losses, were forced to retreat. Enemy tanks broke through to the area of ​​the village of Semyonovka Mostovaya, located 2-3 km east of Slavyansk, where the firing positions of the 212th howitzer artillery regiment of the 9th artillery division were located.

As a result, by February 24, 1943, as a result of the German counteroffensive, the city was almost completely surrounded by the enemy. Soviet soldiers from the 57th Guards Rifle Division, located in the Slavyansky Kurort area, a large part of which at that time was replenished from local natives, after three days of fighting managed to break out and retreat beyond the Seversky Donets. They departed at night, hiding. Those who were not covered from the German offensive by a strip of Slavic salt lakes, it was much worse. Until the very last moment, no attention was paid to artillery fire southwest of the city, considering it familiar and not expecting a German counterattack. The enemy entered the city on the night of February 25, suddenly, without a fight, and when people woke up in the morning, they were taken by surprise. Together with the Germans, Muslim formations entered the city, and according to eyewitnesses, it was they who massacred the streets of the city, preying on those men who, on the morning of February 25, without suspecting anything, were going to the military registration and enlistment office on subpoenas. Even an ordinary army duffel bag behind a man’s back could serve as a basis for execution on the spot. A few days later, the Muslim formations were withdrawn from the city, and the Germans remained in the city until the very end of the occupation (and throughout the war, Italians, Romanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Russians, and Ukrainian Wehrmacht formations were seen in Slavyansk).

Speaking about those mobilized over the seven days of February, it should be noted that during this time about 20 thousand Slavs were mobilized, 18 thousand of them died during the war years (in total - about 22 thousand).

On February 17, the commander of the 1st Guards Army received a directive from the front, which proposed part of the forces of the 57th Guards Rifle Division to firmly gain a foothold in Slavyansk, and the main forces of this division, on the morning of February 18, go on the offensive to the south, in the direction of Konstantinovka - Artemovsk. The 6th Guards Rifle Corps, consisting of the 58th, 44th Guards and 195th Rifle Divisions with reinforcements, was to surrender its sector to the units defending on the left flank of the army, and then forced march westward along the route Slavyansk - Barvenkovo - Lozovaya by March 1, go to the Petrikovka area (40 km west of Novomoskovsk).

At the same time, units of the 6th Guards Rifle Corps experienced all the difficulties of a winter march and movement only at night.

Simultaneously with the troops of the 1st Guards Army and the mobile front group, the 3rd Guards Army under the command of General D. D. Lelyushenko went on the offensive in the Voroshilovgrad direction. It advanced in a strip of 100 km and included ten rifle divisions, one rifle brigade, three tank, one mechanized and one cavalry corps. The plan of the army operation provided for the capture of Voroshilovgrad as soon as possible, since the enemy's holding the city in his hands created a threatening situation for a further offensive.

On February 4, the commanders of the formations were assigned the following tasks: the 59th Guards Rifle Division, having covered itself with part of its forces in the sector from Novaya Kievka to Skubria, with the main forces, at dawn on February 5, attacked from the Naplavnaya Dacha, Bolotnenny front in the general direction to a height of 175.0 with the application of strike from height 158.6 on Voroshilovka and, in cooperation with units of the 2nd Guards, Tank Corps and 279th Division, encircle and destroy the enemy in the area of ​​Voroshilovka, Valeevka and Novo-Svetlovka. In the future, the division was to advance on the eastern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad, linking its actions with the 58th division of the 1st Guards Army. 2nd Guards Tank Corps with 5th Guards motorized rifle brigade was supposed to, having covered himself at the turn of heights 175.8, 181.4 and 172.6, with the main forces on the morning of February 5, attack in the general direction through Pavlovka to a height with a mark of 151.3 with a strike on Voroshilovka, having the immediate task, in cooperation with the 59th Guards Rifle Division, to close the ring encirclement and destroy the enemy in the area of ​​Novo-Svetlovka; in the future, the corps would have to advance on the southern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad and by the end of February 5, in cooperation with the 59th Guards Rifle Division and the 279th Rifle Division advancing to the left, capture the city. The 279th Rifle Division, operating to the left of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, was to advance from the Lysy, Orlovka front in a westerly direction. Having mastered the Novo-Annovka, (claim.) Red line, the division, together with part of the forces of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, was to develop success in the north-west direction and strike at Voroshilovgrad from the south and south-west with the task in cooperation with the 58- 1st Rifle Division (1st Guards Army), 59th Guards Rifle Division and 2nd Guards Tank Corps by the end of February 5, having surrounded and destroyed the Voroshilovgrad group of Germans, capture Voroshilovgrad.

Thus, the general plan to defeat the enemy grouping and capture Voroshilovgrad was to deliver an enveloping concentric strike.

The 14th and 61st Guards Rifle Divisions (14th Rifle Corps) were supposed to ensure the actions of the army's shock group from the southwest with access to the front of Georgievskoye, Orekhovka, Semeykino. The troops of the central sector of the army (the group of General Pushkin), operating on the front of Samsonov, Podgornoye (on the Seversky Donets), received the task of capturing the settlements of Samsonov, Vodyanoy, Maly Sukhodol, Belenky farm, destroying the enemy units that opposed them and developing an offensive to the south.

Major General Monakhov's group was to capture Kamensk and then advance on the Pleshakovo station. The 8th cavalry corps, which was at the disposal of the army commander, concentrated in the Ulyashkin, Verkhnyaya Stanitsa region, was ordered to be ready to develop the success of the troops of the central sector of the army in the general direction of Yasny.

The 243rd Rifle Division was moving up to the front and concentrating in the area of ​​Mosta, Sadki, Zelenovka. The 223rd separate rifle brigade was to concentrate in the Plotina and Oak area. Both of these formations constituted the reserve of the army commander.

Thus, in the current situation, when, on the one hand, the troops of the central sector of the army were involved in heavy battles with the enemy, and on the other hand, speed of action was of paramount importance, it was impossible to think of any significant, maybe even necessary, rearrangements. Only a minor castling of the 59th Guards Rifle Division was carried out in the Naplavnaya Dacha, Bolotnenny area in order to win the flank in the Nikolaevka area.

Otherwise, the troops of the 3rd Guards Army were forced to act in the grouping that was created as a result of intense fighting for a bridgehead on the right bank of the Seversky Donets River.

The strike group consisted of five rifle divisions, tank and mechanized corps, reinforced with seven RGK artillery regiments, four anti-aircraft artillery regiments, two mortar regiments, six rocket-propelled mortar divisions and two anti-tank rifle battalions. Rifle formations were to break through the enemy defenses and in the middle of the first day of the offensive to ensure the entry of mobile troops into the battle. With two left-flank rifle divisions, reinforced by three artillery regiments, a division of rocket-propelled mortars and an anti-tank missile battalion, the commander decided to firmly hold the left bank of the Seversky Donets and bridgeheads on the right bank of the river and be ready, in cooperation with units of the 5th tank army, to destroy the enemy grouping in the Kamensk area. The army reserve included one rifle division and one rifle brigade.

Units of the 302nd, 335th and 304th Infantry, 6th, 7th Panzer Divisions and the SS Reich Panzer Division, as well as several separate regiments and marching battalions, operated in front of the army front. In total, the enemy had up to 4–5 infantry divisions and up to 150 tanks. By the beginning of the Soviet offensive, the German defense consisted of separate strongholds and centers of resistance, created mainly on roads, heights and in settlements. Field-type bunkers were built between the strongholds, thanks to which the enemy created a continuous screen of fire from infantry weapons.

The 3rd Guards Army had to overcome enormous difficulties. Its troops had already been fighting offensive battles for two months and, as a result of the losses suffered, were thoroughly weakened. The terrain on which our tanks were to operate was rugged and helped the enemy in organizing ambushes for them. And the Seversky Donets River was a natural anti-tank obstacle.

At 8 o'clock in the morning on January 30, the army troops, after a short artillery preparation, went on the offensive. The enemy resisted with continuous infantry counterattacks supported by tanks and aviation. During the first four hours of the battle, rifle formations advanced somewhat, but they could not break through the enemy defenses. The army commander was forced to bring into battle a reserve - the 2nd Guards and 2nd Tank Corps.

Parts of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, commanded by General V. M. Badanov, acted on the right flank of the army together with the 59th Guards Rifle Division with the task of attacking in the direction of Debaltsevo.

Tankers, having crossed the Seversky Donets, started stubborn battles with enemy tanks and infantry at heights of 10 km west of the river. Enemy aircraft in groups of 10-20 aircraft continuously bombed the battle formations of our units. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, together with rifle units, approached the settlement of Novo-Svetlovka (15 km southeast of Voroshilovgrad) and could not advance further.

The 2nd Panzer Corps under the command of General A.F. Popov, advancing in the direction of Makeyevka, crossed the Seversky Donets under the cover of aviation and within three days advanced 30-35 km, cut the highway along which the enemy tried to withdraw his troops to the north -west to Voroshilovgrad. With the approach of the formations of the 14th Guards Rifle Corps (14th, 50th and 61st Guards Rifle Divisions), the tankers handed over their combat area to them, and they themselves received an order, together with the 279th Rifle Division, to advance on the southern and southwestern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad.

By February 4, the troops of the 3rd Guards Army reached the approaches to Voroshilovgrad. The city itself was covered by three defensive lines. The first of them ran from north to south 20-30 km east and south-east of Voroshilovgrad, the second - about 10-15 km from the first along the Luganchik River (a tributary of the Seversky Donets) and the third - on the outskirts of the city. German command believed that the approaches to the city were reliably equipped and covered by troops, and that with the help of reserves continuously thrown up from the depths, he would be able not only to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops, but also to throw them back beyond the Seversky Donets.

As already noted, the army commander decided to use three rifle divisions and two tank corps to launch an enveloping concentric strike in the Voroshilovgrad area, surround and destroy the enemy and liberate the city. To this end, the 59th Guards Rifle Division was ordered to advance on the eastern outskirts of the city, linking its actions with the neighboring 58th Guards Rifle Division of the 1st Guards Army, advancing on the city from the north; The 243rd Rifle Division struck from the southeast, and the 279th from the south. Together with these formations, the 2nd Guards and 2nd Tank Corps advanced. Parts of the 14th, 61st, and 50th Guards Rifle Divisions supported the operations of these forces from the southwest. The troops located in the center of the army's battle formation (1st Guards Mechanized Corps and 266th Rifle Division) were given the task of developing an offensive to the south, and the troops of the army's left flank (60th Guards and 203rd Rifle Divisions) were to in cooperation with the troops of the 5th Panzer Army, capture Kamensk and then advance to the southwest.

On the night of February 5, in order to achieve surprise, our formations resumed the offensive without artillery preparation. Unexpectedly for the enemy, units of the 279th Rifle Division broke through its defenses and, making extensive use of maneuver, in the first half of February 6, started fighting 500-700 meters from the southern outskirts of the city. By evening, the advanced units of the 2nd Panzer Corps approached there. However, units of the 59th Guards, 243rd Rifle Divisions and the 2nd Tank Corps were unable to support the success of the 279th Rifle Division, as they met stubborn resistance at the turn of the Luganchik River and continued to wage intense battles there. On the night of February 8, up to 60 tanks and armored personnel carriers and up to a battalion of German infantry were able to recapture a number of settlements and thus finally cut off the communications of the units operating near Voroshilovgrad.

Three days apart from the main forces of the army, the 279th rifle division fought. To help her, the commander brought the 8th cavalry corps into battle, giving it a battery of an anti-tank regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment and a separate guards mortar battalion. He was given the task of capturing Voroshilovgrad in cooperation with infantry and tank formations. In the future, the corps was supposed to operate behind enemy lines in the direction of Debaltsev.

Only by February 10, after six days of intense fighting on the second defensive line of the enemy, did the 59th Guards Rifle Division approach the city. She fought on the northeastern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad. At the same time, units of the 8th Cavalry Corps came to the city. During the day, they, together with the 279th Infantry Division, launched several attacks on the southern and southwestern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad. But all their attempts to take over the city were unsuccessful. The enemy stubbornly resisted, repeatedly turning into decisive counterattacks. Under these conditions, the army commander ordered the 8th Cavalry Corps to advance in a southwestern direction and by the end of February 12, capture the city of Debaltseve, connect with the troops of the 1st Guards Army and cut off the most important communications of the German troops in the Donbass.

On February 12, the front commander ordered the troops of the 3rd Guards Army to continue the offensive in the general direction of Stalino. The enemy put up stubborn resistance to our units and tried at all costs to prevent them from entering the center of Donbass. The German command attached particular importance to the retention of Voroshilovgrad. Therefore, the most fierce battles broke out in this area.

The city was defended by the "battle group Crazing", named after its commander, Major General Hans. Crazing, commander of the 3rd Mountain Jaeger Division. The division was formed in 1938 from parts of the Austrian army, took an active part in the Polish campaign. Then parts of the division played a key role in the operation "Teachings on the Weser" - sea and air landing in Norway, with its subsequent capture. In 1940, a blue shield became the division's symbol, on which a white edelweiss (a symbol of mountain rangers), an anchor and a propeller (as symbols of naval and airborne assault forces in Norway) were closely intertwined. In June 1941, the division advanced in the Soviet Arctic, suffered serious losses, and at the beginning of 1942 was withdrawn to Germany for replenishment and resupply. After a short rest, the division was transferred by sea, through Norway, to Leningrad.

The "Voroshilovgrad" episode in the history of this division began in the fall of 1942. It was then that the command of the Wehrmacht decided that the offensive capabilities of the German troops in the Caucasus and in Stalingrad had dried up and that a new big offensive could only be undertaken next summer, in 1943. The Russians, it was believed, would no longer be able to do anything serious, and all that remained was to spend the winter. But for the upcoming victorious campaigns of 1943, it was necessary to start preparing well in advance.

And then the mountain rangers were fatally and decisively unlucky. It was during these days, when the division was loaded into echelons and set off from the northern swamps to the southern mountains, that the great offensive of the Soviet armies began on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. As a result of the rapid offensive, units of the Red Army reached the strategically important railway in the Velikiye Luki region. As a result, the huntsmen were torn in half: a smaller part of the division with its headquarters managed to slip through and headed further south, and most of it unloaded and entered into protracted battles.

But the troubles for the rangers did not end there: after arriving in Millerovo, the division (or rather, in its smaller part - one infantry regiment with auxiliary units, led by the division commander and part of the headquarters, but without divisional artillery) learned the news about the Russian offensive under Stalingrad. In his diary on this December day, the staff officer of the 3rd Division wrote with restraint on this occasion: "Apparently, our advance to the Caucasus is being postponed." How could any of them then assume that a meeting with the Caucasus was postponed forever ...

Then the hell of continuous fighting began. In December, the front of the Italian and Hungarian troops on the Don collapsed, and, pursued by the Soviet armies, they fled to the west. A few German units tried to stop the flight of their allies and somehow resist the pressure of the Soviet troops, which were rapidly rushing to the southwest, to Tatsinskaya. One of these islands of stable defense in the ocean of disorderly flight was the 3rd Mountain Jaeger Division. Major General Crazing took strict leadership of all units located in Millerovo and managed to organize an effective defense system in a short time; it was then that the name “Crazing group” arose. The main and most combat-ready part of the group was precisely the mountain rangers. The group held out in encirclement for three weeks, after which in mid-January it broke through the ring and, fighting off the Soviet pursuing troops, withdrew in an organized manner to Chebotovka.

Continuing to retreat to the east, the Crazing group left Chebotovka, crossed the Seversky Donets, and at the end of January 1943 approached Voroshilovgrad. But even here, having barely escaped from the encirclement, instead of the expected rest and replenishment, the group received a new task - to defend the near approaches to Voroshilovgrad. For this task, the group was given one reserve regiment (as it soon turned out, with a very low combat capability) and several improvised battalions made up of rear guards, reinforcements, stragglers and convalescent soldiers, who managed to be “scraped together” in the rear and in marching columns. In addition to this, more than a modest reinforcement, the group could only rely on its battered forces, while the entire multi-kilometer front from Raevka to Novo-Kievka had to be defended. In heavy fighting on the near approaches to the city, they went through the entire end of January and the beginning of February 1943.

Meanwhile, according to the operational plan of the Soviet command, units of the 60th Guards Rifle Division, replacing the 58th Guards Rifle Division of the 1st Guards Army, advanced north of the city, cutting off the enemy’s retreat from Voroshilovgrad to the west. Troops of the 18th Rifle Corps (279th, 243rd and 59th Guards Divisions) were intensively preparing to storm the city. In units, assault groups were created, artillery and mortars were brought up, a significant number of which advanced directly into battle formations, sappers worked hard, preparing passages in minefields.

Meanwhile, the Germans, realizing the futility of defending the city itself, began to prepare for withdrawal. At 2 am on February 13, German sappers begin to blow up industrial buildings and railway tracks throughout the city, a few hours later, orders are sent to all commanders of the German units, in which the order of withdrawal from the city is scheduled, starting in the evening and on the night of February 14.

The attack began at dawn on February 14 after a short artillery preparation. The 59th Guards Rifle Division launched an offensive against the city from the east. At the same time, the 279th Rifle Division with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps attacked the enemy from the south and southwest.

And on the morning of February 14, a German staff officer dispassionately writes in his diary: “The city has been completely abandoned by us. Everything of value has been blown up, and in many places it is engulfed in fire. The new line of defense is occupied by us without incident, the Russians are very cautiously entering the city in small reconnaissance groups so far.

The main forces of the 243rd Infantry Division easily shot down the weak guards left on the southwestern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad. At the same time, units of the 279th Infantry Division were especially active. The rifle battalion of this division, led by Lieutenant V. A. Ponosov, was the first to break through to the central square of the city and forced the enemy to retreat to the northwestern outskirts.

Thus, the city of Voroshilovgrad became the first regional center of Ukraine, liberated during the war.

This was the version of the battles near Voroshilovgrad officially adopted in Soviet times, but in fact, as noted above, the Germans already began a planned withdrawal on February 12, and the blow fell, as they say, on an empty place. On this day, the commander of the 30th German Army Corps, Maximilian Fretter-Pico, considered the situation in the south and in his rear too difficult to afford the luxury of continuing to hold a huge ledge north of Voroshilovgrad (Veselaya Gora, Oboznoye, Raevka, Krasny Yar). Leaving this ledge and retreating to positions to the west and along the Olkhovka River allowed the Germans to release several battalions at once and significantly condense the defense, thereby facilitating the fight both with our advancing troops from the front and with the 8th cavalry corps in their rear.

The German command decided to completely clear the city during February 13 and withdraw with the main forces to new positions. The guards covering this withdrawal must leave the city and retreat to new positions by dawn on February 14. The Germans outplayed the Soviet command, leading them by only one day, which turned out to be enough.

Despite this turn of events, the Soviet troops suffered quite significant losses during the liberation of Voroshilovgrad. It is worth noting the heavy losses in the command staff of the 2nd tank corps.

The sad list was opened on February 1 by Colonel Semyon Alekseevich Kabakov, deputy corps commander for political affairs, who died in the battle for the village of Popovka, Novosvetlovsky district. A few days later, in heavy fighting south of the city (Novo-Annovka and the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe modern airport), the 169th tank brigade lost its command: on the same day, February 6, the commander of this brigade, Colonel Alexander Petrovich Kodenets, and his deputy for political affairs, Major Alexei Ilyich Denisov, were killed. A week later, on February 13, the corps command suffered a heavy loss. A pair of "Messerschmitts" noticed on a snowy road so inopportunely stalled the headquarters "Willis", which was in a hurry to the 169th tank brigade. Having dived, German fighters shot down a defenseless car, as a result of which the chief of staff of the corps, Colonel Semyon Petrovich Maltsev, and the deputy commander of the corps for technical matters, Colonel I.S. Kabakov, who were in it, were killed. The next day, February 14, following the 169th, the 99th Tank Brigade named after the Stalingrad Proletariat was beheaded: its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Moisei Isaakovich Gorodetsky, and his deputy for political affairs, Major N. M. Baranov, were killed.

Not so numerous, but no less bitter losses were suffered by other compounds. The most serious loss was the death on February 25 of the commander of the 259th Infantry Division, Colonel Miron Lazarevich Porkhovnikov (buried in Voroshilovgrad). In the battles in the Luhansk region of February - March 1943, many commanders of rifle regiments also died or were out of action: on February 8, having crossed the Seversky Donets, in the battles for the villages of Nizhne and Toshkovka, which is not far from Pervomaisk, Major Kuzma Sidorovich Shurko, commander of the 133rd regiment of the 44th Guards Rifle Division. The next day, February 9, the commander of the 1010th regiment of the 266th division, Ivan Mikhailovich Dzyuba, was seriously wounded and out of action. A week later, on February 15, after the capture of Voroshilovgrad, Mikhail Ivanovich Aleksandrov, commander of the 1001st regiment of the 279th rifle division, who had fought so hard for the city, died in the battles for the skyscrapers to the west of it. A week later, on March 2, the commander of the 178th regiment of the 58th Guards Rifle Division, Fedor Fedorovich Soldatenkov, also dies.

German losses, based on the logic of the development of events, were an order of magnitude lower. Of the commanders of the divisional-regimental level, one can only speak of Colonel Ring, the commander of the regimental combat group, made up of vacationers, anti-aircraft gunners and aviation personnel. He went missing on January 20 somewhere in the Nizhneteply region. Quite sensitive losses among the rangers suffered a battalion unit: on February 4, in the battle near Veselenkaya, Lieutenant Count von Bulien, commander of the 3rd battalion of the 144th Mountain Jaeger Regiment, was wounded and died the next day, and on February 15 - in battles for skyscrapers along the Olkhovka River, the commander of the first battalion, Captain Hoffman, and Oberleutnant Knepfler, who replaced him, were seriously wounded and evacuated, and the battalion itself suffered such heavy losses by the end of the day that it had to be disbanded (this day turned out to be equally difficult for our side. In particular, in approximately the same area, the commander of the 1001st Infantry Regiment, M.I. Alexandrov, died).

After the liberation of Voroshilovgrad, the 18th Rifle Corps repulsed a number of strong enemy counterattacks during February 15-16 and, continuing to move forward, captured several important strongholds. To the south of it, units of the 14th Guards Rifle Corps were advancing. The German 304th and 302nd Infantry Divisions, which were defending in front of it, and the 17th Panzer Division, which had newly arrived here from another sector of the front, put up stubborn resistance, trying to stop the advance of our troops. On the left flank of the army, the German units could not withstand the onslaught of our formations and began to retreat in a southwestern direction. Parts of the Soviet 266th, 203rd rifle divisions and the 23rd tank corps began to pursue. Between February 14 and 16, they advanced more than 100 km, liberated many settlements, including Krasnodon, and approached the Rovenki area (35 km southwest of Krasnodon). Here, by order of the front commander, the 23rd tank corps, the 266th and 203rd rifle divisions were transferred to the 5th tank army.

Meanwhile, the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps was fighting hard in the Debaltsevo area. On February 16, the German command brought large infantry forces and up to 50 tanks to this area. On the morning of February 17, the enemy went on the offensive.

The corps commander, General M. D. Borisov, decided to take up an all-round defense. He reported to the army headquarters: "The corps, fighting around the clock, is subjected to continuous attacks ... The situation is serious ... We will fight to the last." The army commander took a number of measures to help the corps units. However, due to lack of strength, it was not possible to break through to them. Therefore, on the evening of February 18, the army commander radioed an order to the cavalrymen to leave the encirclement. They were given the task of breaking through to the east and joining forces with the army. It was practically impossible, and the fate of the corps was tragic. When trying to break through to their own on February 23, the corps headquarters was cut off and destroyed, most of its employees died or went missing, as did many soldiers and commanders. The corps commander, Major General Mikhail Dmitrievich Borisov, was captured, and his deputy, Major General Stepan Ivanovich Dudko, and the commander of the 112th Cavalry Division, Major General Mingali Mingazovich Shaimuratov, died on the battlefield. During the fighting on the way out of the encirclement, the following were also killed: the chief of staff of the corps, Colonel I. D. Saburov, the head of the political department of the corps, Colonel A. A. Karpushenko, the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the corps, Lieutenant Colonel G. S. Nadashkevich and his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Kh. Gulenkov, the head of intelligence corps lieutenant colonel D. V. Kulemin and his assistant captain F. A. Terentyev, deputy commander of the 55th cavalry division, colonel V. M. Gorbatenko, chief of staff of the 55th cavalry division, major S. A. Strizhak, head of the political department of the 55th cavalry division, lieutenant colonel G. S. Kuznetsov, head of reconnaissance of the 112th cavalry division, captain M. I. Gulov, commander of the 78th cavalry regiment, major I. G. Tolpinsky, deputy commander of the 78th cavalry regiment, major I. V. Boyko, deputy commander of the 294th cavalry regiment L G. Gafarov and many, many others. Some of the missing were captured, most of the rest died on February 23-24 near the villages of Yulino and Shirokoye, when the corps column was attacked from several sides by enemy tanks and infantry. Few managed to survive in partisan detachments and abandoned mines: for example, in April 1944, the former commander of the artillery division, Senior Lieutenant A. A. Badalov, fled from the concentration camp, who then fought in the French Resistance and was awarded two French orders. A group of forty fighters took refuge in the Delta-2 mine, where they held out for some time thanks to the locals, and then broke through to their own. For others, luck did not smile: for example, Lieutenant I.A. In March, Khrobust organized a partisan detachment that operated in the Ivanovka farm until July 1943, when, due to betrayal, it was discovered and its fighters were executed.

Over the next few days, the troops of the 3rd Guards Army continued to conduct offensive operations, but in fact it was agony - they did not have the necessary forces to break the increased resistance of the enemy. As a result, parts of the army began to consolidate on the achieved line.

Summing up the results of the offensive, we note that in total the 3rd Guards Army fought about 100 km and liberated more than 200 settlements and the large industrial center Voroshilovgrad on the territory of Donbass. The offensive operation in February was carried out in difficult conditions. There were several reasons:

The troops of the army over the past three months have been continuously fighting stubborn battles, as a result of which they were significantly weakened;

Due to the lack of transport and the stretching of communications, units and formations often experienced an acute shortage of ammunition, fuel and other types of allowances;

The operation was carried out on sharply rough terrain, with a large number of settlements, which the enemy, as a rule, turned into strongholds and centers of resistance;

The command had to carry out frequent regroupings of troops;

Tank corps felt a lack of materiel.

The 5th tank army of General I. T. Shlemin, which included three rifle divisions, from January 18 to February 8, took up defensive positions along the left bank of the Seversky Donets and prepared for a further offensive to liberate Donbass.

Units of the 304th, 306th Infantry and 22nd Tank Divisions, as well as several marching and engineer battalions, defended in front of its front. In total, there were up to 20 infantry battalions, 20-23 artillery and up to 18 mortar batteries, 40-50 anti-tank defense guns, 40-45 tanks and up to 30 armored vehicles.

On February 5, in separate sectors of the front, the enemy began to retreat to the west, hiding behind rearguard battles.

The army commander decided to vigorously pursue the enemy with simultaneous actions, go to his rear, and not give him the opportunity to gain a foothold on tactically advantageous lines.

By the end of February 12, the 321st Rifle Division, operating in the center of the army, approached the Likhaya railway station (20 km south of Kamensk). The enemy met our troops with strong artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire. The regiments of the division, which had previously moved in columns, were forced to turn around for the offensive. Supported by the fire of our artillery, they resolutely attacked the enemy, knocked him out of pre-prepared positions, and on the night of February 13, they liberated the Likhaya railway junction.

At the same time, units of the 47th Guards Rifle Division broke through to the Krasny Sulin area. The Germans, fortified here at numerous heights, put up strong fire resistance. The 140th Guards Rifle Regiment circled these heights from the north and by the morning of February 14 approached Krasny Sulin from the north and northwest. Stunned by the suddenness of the blow, the enemy hastily began to retreat. By 11 o'clock in the morning the city was liberated. Continuing to move forward, by February 16, the 47th Guards Rifle Division reached the Astakhov region (30 km west of Krasny Sulin). Here she folded into one column and, pushing the 137th Infantry Regiment into the vanguard, continued to pursue the retreating enemy.

The 333rd Rifle Division fought on the right flank of the army. In cooperation with the left-flank units of the 3rd Guards Army, on the night of February 13, she captured Kamensk. At the same time, large trophies were captured: 46 tanks, 230 trucks, 21 steam locomotives, 150 railway cars, warehouses with ammunition, engineering equipment and military equipment.

From February 13, parts of the division moved in the general direction to Sverdlovsk, and on the night of February 16 broke into the eastern outskirts of the city. By the morning of the next day, Sverdlovsk was completely liberated.

Relentlessly pursuing the retreating enemy, the 333rd Rifle Division on the same day, together with the 203rd Rifle Division, liberated the city of Rovenki.

Continuing the offensive, the troops of the army on February 17 began to go to the Mius. Parts of the 47th Guards Rifle Division crossed the river by the end of February 18, but could not build on their success. Here, on the right bank of the Mius, since 1942 there was a well-prepared defensive line. The German command withdrew its troops to these positions and decided to keep them at all costs. The enemy managed to pull up large forces here. Repeated attempts by our units to break through the enemy defenses were unsuccessful. Exhausted by long offensive battles, units of the 5th Panzer Army went over to the defensive along the left bank of the Mius.

During the 12 days of the offensive, the army troops marched 150 km from the Seversky Donets to the Mius, while freeing hundreds of settlements in the eastern part of the Donbass. On average, they moved 12 km per day. Such a pace, when pursuing the retreating enemy, demanded from the Soviet soldiers a great strain of physical and moral strength.

As a result of two weeks of offensive battles, the troops of the Southwestern Front advanced on the right wing of the front from the Starobelsk region to the west by almost 300 km and on the left wing from the Seversky Donets to Mius by 120-150 km. By the end of February 18, the 6th, 1st Guards Armies and the front mobile group with their advanced units reached the Zmiev, Krasnograd, Novomoskovsk, Sinelnikovo, Krasnoarmeysk, Kramatorsk, Slavyansk line, and the 3rd Guards and 5th Tank Armies - on line Rodakovo, Dyakovo (10 km north-east of Kuibyshev).

By this time, the troops of the Voronezh Front had liberated Kursk and Kharkov and continued to advance to the west. The main efforts of this front were concentrated on the left wing. The formations operating here advanced simultaneously with the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front in the general direction of Poltava.

In the course of the offensive, formations of the right wing of the Southwestern Front advanced deeply into the rear of the Donbass grouping of the enemy and created a clear threat to complete its encirclement.

The German command, in an effort to delay the further advance of the troops of the 1st Guards Army and the mobile group, organized a strong defense at the line of Lisichansk, Krasnoarmeysk, using divisions transferred from the lower reaches of the Don and from France for this.

While the troops of the Southwestern Front bypassed the Donbass from the northeast and north, the troops of the Southern Front attacked the southern part of the enemy's Donbass grouping.

By the beginning of the operation, the formation of the front in continuous battles in difficult winter conditions had gone from the Volga to the lower reaches of the Don. At the end of January and early February, they reached the approaches to the Donbass - at the line of the lower reaches of the Seversky Donets - Novobataysk (25 km south of Bataysk). Only on February 5 did the troops of the Southern Front join the Donbass operation.

Their position at this time was as follows. The 5th shock army operated on the right wing of the front. In the second half of January, she went to the left bank of the Seversky Donets and temporarily went on the defensive here. To the left of it, the 2nd Guards Army conducted offensive operations on the outskirts of Rostov and Novocherkassk. The 51st Army advanced in the center of the front, and to the left of it the 28th Army approached Bataysk. On January 25, 1943, the 44th Army and a mechanized cavalry group were transferred to the Southern Front from the North Caucasian Front, which were approaching Azov in early February. From the air, the troops of the front were supported by the 8th Air Army.

Units of the 4th Panzer Army from the Don Army Group were operating in front of the front. As of February 1, 1943, it included 10 divisions, including 4 tank, 2 motorized and 4 infantry. The enemy withdrew behind the Don, conducting restraining rearguard battles. On the right bank of the Don, he decided to delay the offensive of our troops with a hastily organized defense and thereby ensure the withdrawal of his main forces behind the Mius and deep into the Donbass.

The commander of the Southern Front, Lieutenant-General R. Ya. Malinovsky, in accordance with the general plan of the Donbass offensive operation, decided to break the enemy’s resistance, liberate Rostov, Novocherkassk, Shakhty and develop the offensive in a westerly direction along the coast of the Sea of ​​Azov. The main blow was delivered on the right wing of the front by the forces of the 5th shock and 2nd guards armies. The offensive unfolded simultaneously on a front up to 180 km wide. The operational formation of the front troops was in one echelon, the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps was in the reserve of the front commander.

On February 5, the commander of the 5th shock army, General V. D. Tsvetaev, received an order to prepare the army troops for the offensive. They were given the task of firmly holding their positions on the right flank, from the morning of February 7, to strike in a section 9 km wide in the general direction of Shakhty and, by the end of February 10, reach the line of the Kerchik River (35–40 km west of the Seversky Donets). The formations of the army had to cross the Seversky Donets in the lower reaches and overcome the enemy’s pre-prepared defenses on the right bank of the river. Units of the 62nd, 336th and 384th Infantry Divisions defended in front of the army in the first line.

The army consisted of only four rifle divisions and one cavalry corps. This required the command of a skillful maneuver with the available forces in order to create a sufficiently strong grouping in the direction of the main attack. On the morning of February 7, the formations of the army, after a 30-minute artillery preparation, went on the offensive. Throughout the day, they fought stubborn battles, reaching hand-to-hand combat. Parts of only one 40th Guards Rifle Division repulsed six counterattacks. The next day, the army continued to conduct offensive operations and, having crossed the Seversky Donets, slowly moved forward.

On February 9, the fascist German command began to withdraw its troops from the lower reaches of the Seversky Donets and Don across the Mius River. At the same time, it was regrouping tank and motorized divisions from the Rostov region to the Krasnoarmeysk region, preparing to strike back at the formations of the right wing of the Southwestern Front. The troops of the Southern Front proceeded to pursue the retreating enemy. They were given the task of using the bold and daring actions of the forward detachments to get in the way of his retreat, to prevent him from occupying tactically advantageous lines, and to destroy the enemy in parts.

However, the 5th shock army did not have a sufficient number of vehicles, and therefore mobile forward detachments were not created here. Moreover, by the end of February 9, the troops were short of fuel, as a result of which mechanically driven artillery began to lag behind. There was also a shortage of ammunition. By this time, the supply of them in most divisions was only 0.7 combat kit for all weapons.

By the end of February 11, the army had liberated dozens of settlements and with its advanced units reached the approaches to the city of Shakhty. Here, at the turn of the Kadamovka River, the enemy increased resistance. The army commander decided to bypass the Mines from the north and south, encircle and destroy the enemy grouping defending here, and liberate the city. To do this, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was tasked with advancing from the north in the direction of Novoshakhtinsk, the 315th Rifle Division was to block the city from the north and northwest, units of the 258th Rifle Division attacked from the east, and the 40th Guards the rifle division was supposed to block the Mines from the south and southwest. The 4th Guards Rifle Division, which secured the left flank of the army, was given the task of preventing enemy counterattacks from the south.

Early in the morning of February 12, the army went on the offensive. Parts of the 315th Rifle Division, having broken the resistance of the enemy, broke through to the northern outskirts of Shakhty. At the same time, the 40th Guards Rifle Division was approaching the southern and southwestern outskirts of the city. Parts of the 258th Infantry Division, advancing from the east, were the first to enter Shakhty.

In the southwestern part of the city, the 40th Guards Rifle Division started fighting. The German units tried to make a breakthrough here, but after they received a serious rebuff, they retreated to the northern and northwestern outskirts of the city. Units of the 315th Rifle Division were supposed to advance in this direction, but due to inconsistency in actions, they did not have time to approach here at the same time as their neighbors. The Germans were able to retreat along this corridor in an organized manner.

On February 13, the Red Army liberated Novoshakhtinsk and over 20 other settlements. But the closer she got to Mius, the more resistance intensified. The main task of the German command was to delay the advance of our units in order to enable the main forces to freely reach the right bank of the river and gain a foothold there.

On February 18 and 19, rifle and cavalry formations of the army with the main forces reached the left bank of the Mius on the Kuibyshevo-Yasinovsky front (12 km south of Kuibyshev). Along with them came horse-drawn artillery. Due to the lack of fuel, mechanically powered artillery units lagged behind the troops. The rear of the army was even more stretched out. In view of this, the troops experienced an acute shortage of ammunition, fuel, and food. All attempts by army units to break through to the right bank of the Mius, to break through the defenses prepared in advance there, were unsuccessful. In early March, by order of the front commander, they stopped offensive operations and went on the defensive along the left bank of the river.

To the left of the 5th Shock Army and interacting with it, the 2nd Guards Army under the command of General Ya. G. Kreizer advanced. In its composition, it had seven rifle divisions and one mechanized corps, which operated in a strip 70 km wide and in extremely difficult terrain - in the lower reaches of the Don.

During the night of February 13, units of the 98th Infantry Division started fighting on the northern outskirts of Novocherkassk. At the same time, the 33rd Guards Rifle Division broke through to the southern outskirts of the city. By 10 am on February 13, Novocherkassk was liberated. The Germans, hiding behind strong rearguards, tried in every possible way to delay the advance of our units and thereby ensure the withdrawal of their Shakhty grouping. At this time, the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps greatly contributed to the success of the army units. Being operationally subordinate to the commander of the 5th shock army, the corps for some time entered the offensive zone of the 2nd guards army and quickly advanced towards the Mius. Following the tanks of the corps, the rifle units of the 2nd Guards Army advanced.

Despite the rather high pace of the offensive, continuous intense battles made themselves felt. In addition, the thaw came and the roads became less and less passable for vehicles and artillery. Due to the lack of fuel, the rear and artillery on mechanical traction lagged behind, the troops felt a great shortage of ammunition and food. But the strategic situation required not only not to slow down, but even more to increase the pace of advancement.

On February 18, the commander of the Southern Front created a motorized mechanized group consisting of the 4th and 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps under the command of General T.I. on the morning of February 20 - by the Telmanov area and in the future to advance on Mariupol, where to connect with the mobile troops of the South-Western Front. By the same order, the 2nd Guards Army was given the task of using the success of the mechanized corps to reach the Anastasievka line and 10 km to the north of it by the end of February 19.

Parts of the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps, crossing the Mius, fought their way in the direction of Anastasievka and on the afternoon of February 18 captured this settlement on the move. However, the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps and rifle formations of the 2nd Guards Army could not keep up with the pace of the offensive. Having reached the left bank of the Mius, they could not advance further. The enemy managed to bring up additional forces and close the gap made in his defense by the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps.

In the area of ​​​​Anastasievka, our tankers, in anticipation of the approach of the rest of the troops of the front, took up all-round defense. For several days they fought hard battles.

On the night of February 22, the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps received an order from the commander to break through to connect with the troops of the 2nd Guards Army, under whose operational subordination he entered at that time. Knocking down enemy barriers on their way, our units moved east. On February 23, they reached the left bank of the Mius.

On the night of March 10, 1943, the army troops, on the basis of the directive of the front, handed over their sector and went to the front reserve for replenishment.

During the offensive, the 51st Army, commanded by General N.I. Trufanov, reached a line 15–20 km southeast of Rostov in early February. At that time, only units of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps and the 87th Rifle Division were conducting active combat operations in the army. The rest of the formations, having suffered significant losses in previous battles, concentrated in their areas and were understaffed.

The army received the task of delivering a blow in the general direction to Aksaiskaya (20 km northeast of Rostov) and, assisting the 28th Army in capturing Rostov, by the end of February 10, go out with the main forces to the Bolshiye Sal region (30 km west of Novocherkassk).

For several days, units of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps and the 87th Infantry Division fought for the capture of the village of Aksayskaya. Having freed her, they cut the Rostov-Novocherkassk railroad and thereby deprived the enemy of the opportunity to maneuver their troops on this sector of the front. And this was very important for the neighbor on the right - the 2nd Guards Army, advancing on Novocherkassk, and for the neighbor on the left - the 28th Army, advancing on Rostov. The German command, taking this into account, took all measures to keep the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Aksaiskaya. It continuously threw the units defending here into counterattacks, supporting them with air strikes.

To the left of the 51st Army, the 28th Army operated under the command of General V.F. Gerasimenko, advancing directly on Rostov. In early February, its two rifle divisions and seven rifle brigades, overcoming enemy resistance, captured a number of important strongholds on the outskirts of the city. By the end of February 8, the 152nd and 156th separate rifle brigades made their way to the southern outskirts of Rostov, and the soldiers of the 159th separate rifle brigade occupied the station and the station square.

As the onslaught of our troops increased, so did the resistance of the enemy. At the same time, he showed the highest activity in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe station, where the 2nd separate rifle battalion of senior lieutenant G.K. Madoyan operated.

They were greatly assisted by the approaching units of the 1st and 4th separate rifle battalions of the same brigade. When repelling one of the most powerful counterattacks, the commanders of these battalions were seriously wounded. Then Madoyan took command of all three battalions, which by this time were surrounded by the enemy. He organized all-round defense, skillfully and courageously managed the battle, and inspired fighters and commanders by personal example. During the period from February 8 to 14, the soldiers under the command of senior lieutenant Madoyan repelled 43 attacks of enemy tanks and infantry, destroyed up to 300 of his soldiers and officers. For the valor and courage shown in this battle, many were awarded orders and medals, and the battalion commander G.K. Madoyan was awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In order to speed up the defeat of the Rostov grouping of German troops, the front command decided with the forces of the 44th Army of General V. A. Khomenko (consisting of five rifle divisions) to strike around Rostov from the south. To do this, the formations of the army, advancing north, had to pass through a wide ice field through the mouth of the Don southwest of Rostov, then through the estuaries and backwaters, which were under heavy enemy fire, and go to the area 20-25 km west of Rostov to cut off the paths withdrawal of the Rostov enemy grouping and, in cooperation with the 28th Army, defeat it.

On February 8, the army troops went on the offensive. It was clear frosty weather. On a solid white field, stretching from south to north for more than 20 km, the battle formations of our units stood out sharply.

The enemy bombed them from the air, opened heavy artillery and mortar fire on them. The advancing troops now and then were forced to stop. The enemy understood that the blow of our troops to the rear of the Rostov group created a serious threat for it, and therefore tried to hold its positions at any cost.

For three days, Soviet soldiers made numerous attempts to break the enemy's resistance. They spent three days on the ice, in the cold, without being able to warm themselves. On February 11, the army troops received an order to temporarily go on the defensive and actively tie down the enemy forces here.

At the same time, the army commander decided to clarify the strength of the enemy and the system of his defense in Taganrog. To this end, on the night of February 11, a combined reconnaissance group of the 416th Infantry Division consisting of 60 people was sent from the Azov region across the ice of the Taganrog Bay under the command of Captain A.P. Baid, assistant chief of the reconnaissance department of the army. The scouts walked 45 km across the ice and early in the morning, suddenly for the enemy, broke into the southeastern outskirts of the city. In the ensuing battle, Soviet soldiers destroyed up to 70 enemy soldiers. However, the success was short-lived, the enemy was able to bring up reinforcements, and the scouts were forced to retreat across the ice back to the Azov region. Nevertheless, the group completed its task, delivering valuable information about the enemy to the army command.

After the 2nd Guards Army occupied Novocherkassk in the early morning of February 13, on the night of February 14, the enemy began to withdraw from Rostov. In order to prevent him from retreating to the west in an organized manner, the front command demanded that the armies operating on the left wing go on a decisive offensive on February 14 and, in cooperation with the armies of the right wing, destroy the enemy's Rostov grouping.

Troops of the 28th Army liberated Rostov on February 14 after bloody street fighting. Now the retreat of the German Rostov group was inevitable. The 28th Army received the task of continuing the offensive and reaching the Mius River by the end of February 17th.

On the night of February 14, units of the 51st Army liberated the village of Aksayskaya and also received an order to reach the line of the Mius River by the end of February 17.

During February 15-17, the Germans repeatedly launched counterattacks in order to slow down the pace of our units' advance. They had a serious success, and the 87th Rifle Division, together with the 7th Mechanized Brigade of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps, reached the left bank of the Mius only on February 18th.

The situation in front of the front of the 44th Army was somewhat different these days. Here the enemy, in order to ensure the withdrawal of the main forces of the Rostov grouping to the west, intensified his actions even more. With strong fire and continuous counterattacks by tanks and motorized infantry, he tried to prevent army units from advancing from the south to the area west of Rostov. However, despite all this, the troops of the army on the night of February 16, after some regrouping of their forces, broke through the enemy defenses. The horse-mechanized group of General N. Ya. Kirichenko, who had previously been in the reserve of the front commander, also entered the battle.

When units of the 271st Rifle Division occupied the heavily fortified stronghold of Semernikovo (5 km southwest of Rostov), ​​the enemy threw tanks and aircraft against them, landed assault troops from an armored train, and continuously fired artillery and mortar fire. On February 12, the enemy dealt a particularly strong blow to the 865th Infantry Regiment, which directly operated in Semernikovo.

Moving forward, the troops of the 44th Army, together with parts of the cavalry-mechanized group, by the end of February 18, reached the Sambek River. This line, prepared for defensive actions in advance, could not be broken through on the move by the forces available in the army. On February 22, the 44th Army was ordered to go on the defensive.

The cavalry-mechanized group (4th Guards Kuban and 5th Guards Donskoy Cavalry Corps) became part of the 51st Army, which at that time continued to wage heavy battles on the Mius.

In Soviet historiography, it was believed that during the Donbass offensive operation in February 1943, the troops of the Southern Front inflicted a major defeat on the German troops.

However, in fact, the command of Army Group South left Rostov-on-Don, withdrawing the Rostov group of its troops to the Mius Front, where, having taken up a tough defense, it stopped the offensive of the Southern Front, freeing up part of the forces for a counterattack.

Therefore, it is not surprising that after reaching the line of the Mius River, the offensive of the units of the Southern Front actually stalled. It is believed that this happened due to the fact that “after continuous three-month offensive battles, the formations of the Southern Front suffered heavy losses and were very tired. By this time, the rear lagged behind, as a result of which the units were insufficiently provided with ammunition, fuel and food. The railways connecting this section of the front with the rear of the country were destroyed by the invaders during their retreat to the west. And although the restoration work went relatively quickly, they still could not keep up with the advancing troops.

Nevertheless, the combat operations of our troops on the Mius played a large positive role. Connections and parts of the 5th shock, 2nd. The Guards and 51st Armies, with their continuous attacks, pinned down significant enemy forces on this sector of the front, which were intended for the counteroffensive he was preparing against the troops of the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts.

In the second half of February 1943, the troops of the Southwestern Front continued their offensive. They were opposed by formations of Army Group South, commanded by Field Marshal Manstein. It consisted of Task Force Hollidt, the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies, and Task Force Lanz. It consisted of 31 divisions, of which 16 opposed the Southwestern Front. On the right wing of the front, in front of the 6th and 1st Guards armies and the mobile group, the enemy did not have a solid defense. Its 400-kilometer section from Zmiev to Slavyansk was covered by only six divisions (four tank, one motorized and one infantry). Here, our troops, having reached the approaches to Dnepropetrovsk and the Krasnoarmeysk region, created a real threat of encirclement of the Donbas grouping of the enemy.

Thus, the situation that developed in the second half of February on the Southwestern Front, and above all on its right wing, seemed to favor the further offensive of our troops.

However, the command of the Southwestern Front still believed that the enemy decided to leave the Donbass and withdraw his troops beyond the Dnieper. It made such a conclusion on the basis of aerial reconnaissance data on a significant movement of Nazi troops from the lower reaches of the Don and the Seversky Donets in a westerly direction. The commander demanded to speed up the offensive, intercept the enemy's withdrawal routes and defeat him before the onset of spring thaw. The beginning of the concentration of large tank groups in the areas of Krasnoarmeysk and Krasnograd, from where the enemy was preparing to launch a counteroffensive, was considered by the Soviet generals as an intention to strike at the Soviet troops in order to eliminate their breakthrough, clear communications from them and thereby create more favorable conditions for the withdrawal of the Donbass groupings for the Dnieper.

The actions of the enemy were also assessed by the command of the neighboring Voronezh Front. It considered the withdrawal of the SS Panzer Corps from the Kharkov region and its concentration in the Krasnograd region as a retreat in the general direction to Poltava. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command also mistakenly believed that the enemy was leaving the Donbass.

Indeed, the position of German troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front was deteriorating throughout the first half of February. The issue of holding the Donbass acquired exceptional importance for the German command during this period. Manstein admits that on February 4 and 5, the situation of his troops at the front became aggravated and became threatening. In this regard, on February 6, Hitler personally arrived in Zaporozhye. He persistently demanded to keep the Donbass at all costs, because without him, he said, it would be difficult to continue the war.

During the discussion of the issue of restoring the position of the German troops in the Donbass, Manstein described the situation that had developed on his sector of the front as threatening. At the same time, he stated that “on the southern flank, the fate of Eastern Front". At the same time, the commander of the Army Group "South" outlined his views on the further conduct of hostilities by his troops. For example, he believed that the newly formed SS Panzer Corps, arriving from Germany in the Kharkov region, would not be able to prevent a deep bypass by Soviet troops from the north of the army group formations between the Seversky Donets and the Dnieper by its own counterattack. In order to eliminate the impending threat, Manstein proposed, following the transfer of divisions of the 1st Panzer Army from Rostov to the middle reaches of the Seversky Donets, to send part of the divisions of the 4th Panzer Army there. In this regard, the question was raised about the withdrawal of German troops from the areas of the lower reaches of the Don and partly of the Seversky Donets to the Mius. In this case, it was necessary to leave the eastern part of the Donbass to the Mius in order to shorten the front line and thereby free up 4–5 divisions to fight the Soviet troops that had broken through into the Donbass. With such a plan of action, Hitler was forced to agree.

On February 7, Manstein issued an order to transfer the divisions of the 4th Panzer Army to the left flank of the army group in the zone of operations of the 1st Panzer Army and to withdraw the formations of the Hollidt task force to the Mius. By February 10, the 3rd, 11th and 17th Panzer Divisions, the Viking motorized division and the headquarters of the 40th Panzer Corps arrived in the 1st Panzer Army from the 4th Panzer Army.

Meanwhile, on February 8 and 9, the troops of the Voronezh Front, advancing towards Kharkov, captured Kursk and Belgorod.

At the same time, formations of the 6th Army and mobile formations of the Southwestern Front were increasingly hanging over the Donbass grouping from the north. Manstein sounded the alarm again. In his memoirs, he writes that on February 9 he sent a telegram addressed to the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Zeitzler, which indicated the need to “concentrate a new army with a force of at least 5-6 divisions within two weeks in the area north of Dnepropetrovsk, as well as concentration of another army behind the front of the 2nd army, that is, in the area west of Kursk, to strike south. Zeitzler promised him to do this by transferring six divisions from the front of Army Groups Center and North. On the night of February 13, Manstein's headquarters received instructions from the High Command of the Ground Forces to deploy two armies: one at the turn of Poltava, Dnepropetrovsk, the other behind the southern flank of the 2nd German Army - and to prepare a counteroffensive against the troops of the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts. However, the German command could not create two fresh armies due to a lack of forces. Instead, on February 13, Army Group South was subordinated to the newly formed, but already involved in the battles near Kharkov, the Lanz task force, which included the command of the SS Panzer Corps, the 167th, 168th and 320th Infantry Divisions, SS Panzer Divisions " Reich", "Dead Head", "Adolf Hitler" and the motorized division "Grossdeutschland".

This group received strict orders from Hitler to hold Kharkov under all circumstances. But as a result of the rapid offensive of the troops of the Voronezh Front, the SS tank corps could not resist. The threat of encirclement loomed over him. To avoid the boiler, the SS corps, contrary to the order of the commander of the task force, retreated.

On February 16, Soviet troops liberated Kharkov and continued to move in the general direction towards Poltava. Hitler removed General Lanz and instead appointed General Kempf as commander of the operational group, respectively, the Lanz group was now called the Kempf group.

The troops of the right wing of the South-Western Front developed an offensive on Pavlograd, to the crossings across the Dnieper at Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk, making their way further and further to the rear of the Donbass grouping.

The German command was well aware that in the event of Soviet troops reaching the Dnieper, the Eastern Front would split, and danger loomed over the entire Left-Bank Ukraine.

The German generals hoped to save the situation by means of a powerful counteroffensive and were preparing for it. And long and carefully. Taking measures to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops in the Donbass and prevent the encirclement of Army Group South, the German command at the same time created strong strike groups to go on the counteroffensive.

To this end, throughout the first half of February, Western Europe transferred its reserves to the Eastern Front and at the same time regrouped the troops operating on the Soviet-German front.

One of the elite units arrived in the Kharkov region - the SS Panzer Corps as part of the Adolf Hitler, Totenkopf and Reich Panzer Divisions. Between 5 and 20 February, the 15th, 167th, and 333rd Infantry Divisions arrived from France and Holland. At the same time, the 48th Tank Corps was transferred from the line of the Seversky Donets River to the Stalin area. On February 17, the 4th Panzer Army transferred its remaining divisions (a total of six divisions and the command of the 29th Army Corps) to the Hollidt Task Force. The Army Command was transferred to the reserve of Army Group South, and the band of the 4th Panzer Army was taken over by the Hollidt Group.

The 4th Panzer Army of the new composition was created, to which the troops were transferred, concentrated to participate in the counteroffensive in the regions of Krasnograd and southwest of Krasnoarmeysk - the 15th Infantry Division, which arrived from France, the SS Panzer Divisions "Reich" and "Dead Head", management SS Panzer Corps - from the Kempf task force, the 6th and 17th Panzer divisions and the command of the 48th Panzer Corps - from the 1st Panzer Army, the command of the 57th Panzer Corps - from the reserve of Army Group South. On February 21, the army occupied a new strip between the Kempf task force and the 1st Panzer Army.

In total, three strike groups were created to carry out the counteroffensive: one in the Krasnograd region, the second in the region south of Krasnoarmeysk, and the third in the Mezhevaya-Chaplino region. They consisted of 12 divisions, including 7 armored and one motorized, in which there were at least 800 tanks. From the air, these troops were provided with aviation - over 750 aircraft.

In the period of February 17-19, when Hitler was at the headquarters of Army Group South near Zaporozhye, the final decision was made on the counteroffensive, to which the German command attached great political and strategic importance. According to his calculations, as a result of the counter-offensive, the German army would wrest the initiative of action from the hands of the Soviet troops and eliminate their successes achieved in the winter campaign.

The plan of the counteroffensive was as follows: the SS Panzer Corps from the Krasnograd region and the 48th Panzer Corps from the Chaplino-Mezhevaya region were to advance in converging directions to Pavlograd and link up here. Then they were to deliver a joint blow to Lozovaya and defeat our 6th Army. The 40th Panzer Corps (from the 1st Panzer Army) was to strike from the Krasnoarmeysk region and develop an offensive on Barvenkovo ​​in order to destroy the mobile group of the Southwestern Front operating in this direction. The enemy strike groups had the task of pushing our units behind the Seversky Donets and restoring the communications of Army Group South.

After completing this task, the fascist German command planned to regroup forces in the area southwest of Kharkov and from there strike at the formations of the Voronezh Front. In the future, the Germans were going, if the situation allowed, to act in the direction of Kursk towards the 2nd Panzer Army, which at that time was to advance on Kursk from the area south of Orel. Here, in the Kursk region, the enemy intended to encircle and destroy the troops of the Central Front. In front of the right wing of the Southwestern Front, the fascist German command created a twofold superiority in manpower, almost sevenfold in tanks (medium) and more than threefold in aviation.

At this time, the troops of the Southwestern Front continued to advance. The 6th Army, which delivered the main blow, received as reinforcement two tank (25th and 1st Guards) and one cavalry (1st Guards) corps, which made up the army's mobile group. The 4th Guards Rifle Corps from the 1st Guards Army was also transferred to the same army.

On February 19, the enemy struck the first blow from the Krasnograd region. The formations of the SS Panzer Corps launched a counteroffensive against the divisions of the 6th Army. The main forces of the corps (panzer divisions "Reich" and "Dead Head") advanced south in the direction of Novomoskovsk and Pavlograd, and part of the forces - to the southeast in the direction of Lozovaya - Barvenkovo. At the same time, from south to north in the direction of Barvenkovo, the 40th Panzer Corps struck against the formations of the mobile front group. From the air, the ground troops were actively supported by the aircraft of the 4th Air Fleet.

From the very beginning of the enemy counteroffensive, an extremely difficult situation arose on the right wing of the Southwestern Front. The 6th Army and the mobile group of the front started heavy battles with enemy tanks and motorized infantry. During the fighting, the 350th, 172nd and 6th rifle divisions of the 15th rifle corps suffered heavy losses. As a result, already on the second day, a gap over 30 km wide formed in the side of the rifle corps, which the German generals did not fail to take advantage of. Having passed through the rear of the 6th Army, the Reich Panzer Division reached the Novomoskovsk area by the end of February 20th. The units of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps operating here disorganized withdrew to the northeast.

On the left flank of the 6th Army, our units were advancing in the Sinelnikov area. Here, in addition, from the Dnepropetrovsk region, the German command transferred the fresh 15th Infantry Division. The fighting flared up with renewed vigor.

On February 21, the “Dead Head” tank division entered the Popasny area (30-40 km northeast of Novomoskovsk), as a result of which the 106th Rifle Brigade and the 267th Rifle Division were surrounded. The same thing happened with the 16th Guards Tank Brigade of the 1st Guards Tank Corps operating here.

At the same time, the Reich tank division, developing its success from Novomoskovsk to the east, along the railway and highways, started fighting for Pavlograd, where they were opposed by units of the 1st Guards Tank and 4th Guards Rifle Corps.

On February 22, the 48th Panzer Corps joined the counteroffensive. His strike from the area west of Krasnoarmeisky was aimed at Pavlograd, towards the SS Panzer Corps. In Soviet documents, an increase in the activity of enemy aviation was noted: for example, only during February 21, up to 1,000 sorties were noted, and on February 22, already 1,500.

In the areas of Pavlograd and Sinelnikov, units of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps, 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and the 17th Guards Tank Brigade of the 1st Guards Tank Corps were defending.

In conditions when most of the units went on the defensive, only the tank corps of General P.P. Pavlov moved east of Sinelnikov to the south along the rear of the advancing German troops and by the end of February 22, the main forces reached Slavgorod (20 km south of Sinelnikov). At the same time, his 111th tank brigade approached the city of Chervonoarmeiskoye, located 20 km northeast of Zaporozhye. There were only a few kilometers to the Dnieper. But, having advanced to a great depth into the enemy's position, the 25th Panzer Corps broke away almost 100 km from the units of the 6th Army and moved further away from the supply bases. As a result, stocks of fuel, ammunition and food were not replenished. The position of our tankers became more and more difficult. The tankers suffered especially heavy losses from the actions of aviation. The political department of the 3rd tank brigade reported: “During the day the brigade was subjected to intensive bombing from the air. Disabled 7 tanks and a large number of personnel.

On February 23, two tank corps of the enemy, delivering counter strikes, joined in Pavlograd and then began to develop an offensive against Lozovaya from the southwest. Part of the tanks of the SS corps broke through the front of our units and advanced on Lozovaya from the northeast. In order to alleviate the position of the neighboring 6th Army, the commander of the Voronezh Front, Colonel-General F.I. against the troops of the right wing of the Southwestern Front. But the German generals were able to foresee such a development of events and during February 21-23 they transferred additional forces to the junction of the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts, in particular the motorized division "Grossdeutschland". As a result, the planned counter-offensive of the Soviet troops bogged down.

The 25th Panzer Corps found itself in the most difficult situation. During the day he repulsed several enemy attacks from the north, east and south and used up the entire supply of fuel and ammunition. The army commander ordered him to break through to the north, to connect with parts of the front.

In the meantime, units of the 6th Guards Rifle Corps of the 1st Guards Army were approaching the areas of Barvenkovo ​​and Lozovaya. The army commander ordered the 58th Guards Rifle Division to take up all-round defense in the Lozovaya area and at the same time conduct deep reconnaissance in the northwestern, western and southern directions. Two rifle divisions (195th and 44th Guards), together with formations of the mobile front group that had withdrawn to Barvenkovo, were supposed to hold the Lozovaya-Slavyansk railway.

On February 24, the front commander decided to stop further offensive operations on the right wing of the front and go on the defensive here. The next day, the Stavka approved this decision. By this time, the troops of the right wing of the front were at the line of Okhochee - Lozovaya - Barvenkovo ​​- Kramatorsk.

Fierce fighting unfolded in the central sector of the front, and above all in the region of Krasnoarmeysk. The combined group of Colonel G. Ya. Andryushchenko, created on February 18 to fight the enemy who had broken through, was defending in the city. The enemy continuously accumulated forces in this area and on the morning of February 19, 25 tanks and 18 self-propelled guns with motorized infantry again attacked our units and pushed them to the northwestern outskirts of the city.

As a result of the hardest fighting, only 300 fighters, 12 tanks, of which half needed repair, and not a single gun, because they were all out of order, remained in the combined group.

On February 19, the 18th Tank Corps began to arrive in the area 15 km north of Krasnoarmeysk, which received an order to change units of the 4th Guards Tank Corps in the Krasnoarmeysk area.

By order of the commander of the mobile front group, the 4th Guards Kantemirovsky Tank Corps was withdrawn from the battle, and by the end of February 21, it had concentrated in the Barvenkov area.

By this time, in the area of ​​Krasnoarmeisky Rudnik, having taken up all-round defense, the 10th Panzer Corps, which had only 17 tanks, continued to operate. Somewhat to the south, the 18th Panzer Corps was defending. 30 km north of Krasnoarmeysky Rudnik, in the area of ​​​​Andreevka, only the 3rd tank corps, which arrived from Kramatorsk, was concentrated, which included 12 tanks, 12 armored vehicles and 18 armored personnel carriers.

And the enemy stepped up the pressure. During February 21, he struck at parts of the 18th Panzer Corps, which were forced to retreat to the northeast. In this regard, the situation in the sector of the 10th Panzer Corps deteriorated sharply. Krasnoarmeysky Rudnik changed hands several times until, with the approach of new forces, the Germans were able to take control of this settlement on the morning of February 22.

During February 25–28, units of the 18th Panzer Corps retreated to the Seversky Donets and by March 1 concentrated on the left bank of the river in the area southeast of Izyum. The 10th Panzer Corps retreated to Barvenkov. Almost immediately, the corps was reinforced by the 13th Guards Tank Brigade of the 4th Guards Tank Corps, which had come up here, previously replenished with 9 T-34 tanks and 2 T-70 tanks. In view of the fact that the corps did not have its own infantry, it was decided to form a two-company rifle battalion from the outgoing groups (120 people in total).

On the morning of February 26, enemy tanks and motorized infantry, supported by strong artillery and mortar fire, went over to the attack. Scattered Soviet units suffered heavy losses and, by the end of February 27, they retreated to the Seversky Donets. Panzer divisions of the German 40th Panzer Corps made their way to the Barvenkov area from the south and southwest. The units of the 44th and 58th Guards and 52nd Rifle Divisions, units of the 3rd Tank Corps and the 10th Ski Rifle Brigade, which were defending here, offered stubborn resistance to the enemy. But their forces were not enough to withstand the huge number of tanks and infantry. They fought back to the Seversky Donets in the general direction of Izyum. On February 28, our troops left Slavyansk.

Here is what Boris Ivanishchenko, a private of the 57th Infantry Division, a participant in the battles for Slavyansk, writes in his memoirs: “In broad daylight, it was already February 28, a massive Nazi air raid began on the city, the streets of which were crowded with retreating. The Junkers made a large circle in the sky and, one by one, began to drop their deadly cargo onto the city streets filled with people and convoys. Rumble, dust, smoke, screams, neighing of mad horses, brutalized faces of drivers and riders who are unable to move forward in this mess. And from above, over and over again, more and more planes came to the bombardment, diving and pouring machine-gun fire on the human mess ... Together with the shaft of military and civilians striving for space, among the explosions of bombs and the low clicks of pistol shots, with which the officers tried to restore order, in the screaming mass panic-stricken people, our group was finally on the outskirts. There were only 15 of us with the lieutenant.

At the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the troops of the 6th and 1st Guards Armies (the formations of the mobile front group became part of the 1st Guards Army) during February 28 - March 3 retreated with battles in the direction of the Seversky Donets River.

The withdrawal of units of the right wing of the Southwestern Front behind the Seversky Donets created an extremely unfavorable situation for the neighboring formations of the Voronezh Front. The left wing of this front was open. The German command was able to inflict a strong flank blow here. To this end, it left insignificant forces against the troops of the right wing of the Southwestern Front, and transferred the bulk of the troops to the Kharkov region. Having concentrated the 48th, 40th and 57th Panzer Corps and the SS Panzer Corps there (12 divisions in total), the enemy, using their numerical superiority, forced the troops of the Voronezh Front to withdraw beyond the Seversky Donets. Kharkov and Belgorod were again captured.

Thus, the first offensive operation in the Donbass turned out to be incomplete. First of all, this was the result of a strategic mistake by the Headquarters and the General Staff, who believed that the German troops, who had suffered a heavy defeat on the Volga, Don and in the North Caucasus, would be forced to leave the Donbass beyond the Dnieper in order to gain a foothold there and stop the further offensive of the Red Army, and therefore, they demanded that the troops of the Voronezh, South-Western and Southern fronts pursue the enemy and, before the start of the spring thaw, reach the Dnieper on a wide front. In reality, the German command was preparing its troops for a counteroffensive.

Finishing the story about Operation Leap, I would like to step aside a little from the historical narrative and turn to the currently popular “what if…” genre. So, what would have happened if the Leap operation had succeeded ... An article with the same name by well-known military historians Alexander Zablotsky and Roman Larintsev, which they kindly provided to the author specifically for this book, can answer this question quite fully.

However, we still ask ourselves the question: what would happen if? ..

But first, let's establish a framework within which alternative scenarios can be discussed, so as not to slide from the science of history to writing irresponsible fantasy fiction. In our opinion, there can be three such “framework” options.

The most successful option for us, that is, the "maximum option" (let's call it "A"). In this case, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps does not have time to withdraw from Kharkov, gets surrounded, breaks through to the west, but incurs losses that deprive it of the opportunity to conduct active offensive operations. The armies of the Voronezh Front, not having a solid line of enemy defense in front of them, continue to move to the southwest. The end result of the winter campaign in this direction would be the middle reaches of the Dnieper and Desna. Somewhat to the north, units of the Central Front would also come out to the Desna.

The German tank divisions of the 1st and 4th tank armies operating in the Krasnoarmeisk-Grishino area fought on equal terms with the corps of the mobile group of Lieutenant General M. M. Popov and could hardly count on decisive success without the support of Hausser's tankers from the north. In addition, more successful than in reality, the actions of the troops of the Southern Front could play their role. A successful breakthrough by the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps of the Mius Front line near Matveyev Kurgan and the exit of our tanks to the Sea of ​​Azov between Taganrog and Mariupol would certainly force the Germans to withdraw units from near Krasnoarmeysk to parry this crisis, thereby “pulling apart” their southern strike force at the most inopportune moment.

But even a local failure of the Soviet troops in the Donbass (withdrawal of units of the 4th Guards and 10th Tank Corps from the Krasnoarmeysk-Grishino region) would only have resulted in a slowdown in the pace of the Soviet offensive. The likelihood that the communications of the southern flank of the German Eastern Front would be interrupted (for example, by the capture of Sinelnikov) remained quite high in this case. In this situation, Manstein did not have the strength to hold the front between the Seversky Donets and the Dnieper (at the latitude of Dnepropetrovsk).

Now let's consider the "average" scenario for both opposing sides (option "B"). Here we can assume the following.

Popov's mobile group holds Grishino and Krasnoarmeysk or retreats, maintaining combat effectiveness and thereby tying up the strike force of the right wing of Army Group South.

Our tank brigades, having broken through to the Dnieper crossings, do not pay attention to the raid of the units of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps on their rear and interrupt the enemy's last communication. The situation with the supply of the German group, primarily with fuel, which had already been on the verge of collapse, was becoming simply catastrophic. This fact, as well as the approaching rifle divisions of the 6th Army, forced the SS units to stop the counteroffensive and retreat to their original positions, and the command of Army Group South began to withdraw troops beyond the Dnieper.

Since during this time the armies of the Voronezh Front had not yet begun to look in the direction of their open flanks, then, continuing the offensive, they went to the rear of Manstein's northern shock group and also pushed it back beyond the Dnieper.

The Central Front, which went over to the offensive in the face of the collapse of the offensive plans of the command of Army Group South, is advancing towards Novgorod-Seversky and downstream of the Desna. Having no enemy from the south, Rokossovsky's troops with a high degree of probability hold the northern face of the penetration into German defense against suitable formations of Army Group Center.

And finally, the most unfortunate minimum option for our side (option "B").

The Southwestern Front is losing the battle in the Donbass and is completing the operation by the beginning of March with the results that the parties actually achieved. Here it should be emphasized that for the German side the battle on the outskirts of the Dnieper also did not end brilliantly. Most of the tank divisions of the 1st and 4th tank armies ran out of steam in the last, albeit victorious, thrust. If at the first stage of the counteroffensive, Manstein had, in addition to the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, six more tank and one motorized divisions, then already in the Kharkov region, in addition to the Hausser formations, only the 6th and 11th tank divisions were operating. The rest were busy trying, I must say, not always successful, to clear the right bank of the Seversky Donets from the Soviet units entrenched in the bridgeheads.

The formations of the Voronezh Front, in this version, hold the front line, which actually took shape by March 5, 1943, and repel the German attempts to break through to Kharkov. Accordingly, the armies of the right wing of the Voronezh Front, not forced to retreat by the enemy's enveloping maneuver, are holding the lines reached by that time.

Having decided on the historical framework, let us now consider the alternative results of the battles in Ukraine in the spring of 1943.

The military consequences of options "A" and "B" would most likely differ in the degree of defeat of the formations of the 1st and 4th tank armies of the Wehrmacht and, consequently, the depth of the advance of Soviet troops in Northern Tavria. It can be assumed that the front would have stabilized on the Molochnaya River, as it actually happened in the autumn of 1943. The presence of a large number of stable and maneuverable tank divisions among the Germans and at the same time the absence of large reserves in our operational rear, primarily tank and mechanized (especially taking into account the expenditure of forces to repulse the German counterattack), made the achievement of the maximum task (access to Perekop) unlikely . At the same time, there is no doubt that in the absence of a railway connection and a shortage of fuel, the enemy would have to abandon or destroy most of the military equipment and rear depots when retreating from the Donbass.

Further consequences would be:

Complete liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine, with the exception of a large foothold in the lower reaches of the Dnieper and small bridgeheads;

Stabilization of the front of the Army Group "Center" at the turn of the Desna River from the mouth to Novgorod-Seversky and further north to Maloarkhangelsk;

Urgent evacuation of the 17th field army of the Wehrmacht from the Kuban bridgehead to the Crimea, as well as to “patching holes” in Northern Tavria and on the Dnieper Eastern Wall.

At the same time, the territory liberated by the Red Army would be in an incomparably better economic condition than it was in reality, due to the impossibility for the Germans to carry out a systematic evacuation and destruction of industrial facilities.

Given the configuration of the front line (plus the psychological effect of the failure of Manstein's counterattacks), the Wehrmacht would not have had a clearly defined point from which to apply its efforts. Without being able to apply its “brand” technique anywhere (that is, by “cutting off” the ledge to achieve a radical change in forces on a limited sector of the front, for the further development of operational success into a strategic one), the German high command would most likely adopt a purely defensive concept of summer campaigns of 1943. As a consequence, in this case, the Kursk Bulge would certainly be absent from history, and the summer campaign would obviously begin with the battle for the Dnieper. Note that the actual experience of the third year of the war, no longer “virtual”, but the actual experience of the third year of the war showed that the Germans were no longer able to restrain the offensive of the Red Army.

We have considered the purely military results of the successful outcome of operations in the Donbass and Sloboda Ukraine so far. However, we venture to suggest that these successes would have been multiplied by the political consequences of the UNCONDITIONAL defeat of the southern wing of the Eastern Front of Germany.

First, the allies of Germany, who began an intensive search for the most acceptable way out of the war for themselves after the Battle of Stalingrad, would probably have sharply increased this activity if Manstein's counteroffensive had been unsuccessful. At the same time, the researchers of this issue almost unanimously note that the activity of the satellite countries in separate negotiations directly depended on the situation on the Soviet-German front. Even Finland, which was not directly affected by Stalingrad, experienced a serious crisis in relations with the Third Reich, which was overcome only after the stabilization of the situation in Ukraine. What is there to say about the Romanian dictator Antonescu or the Tsar of Bulgaria Boris III, before whom the prospect of seeing Soviet tanks at the borders of their states in the summer of 1943 would have clearly loomed.

Secondly, the success of the Red Army at Stalingrad (in the broad sense of the word) gave rise to fears in the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain that their Russian ally would win too soon. Accordingly, the Rankin plan, which provided for the rapid occupation of Western Europe in the event of a military collapse of Germany, began to hastily be developed in the American and British headquarters. Therefore, it is possible that due to the heavy defeat of the Wehrmacht in the south, the plan for the invasion of Europe would have been adjusted, and the landing in France would have occurred a year earlier.

It is impossible not to notice that such a variant of Operation Overlord could, in geopolitical terms, turn out to be much less beneficial for the Soviet Union than the actual development of events. But shortening the war for at least half a year would save several million soldiers' lives, which, of course, was an absolute value and, in our opinion, outweighed all territorial and political gains.

The least successful option "B" would ultimately lead to an enlarged "edition" Kursk Bulge. AT historical literature it would probably be called Kharkovskaya. Most likely, in the summer the Germans would strike along the Kharkov-Kursk-Orel line. Since the depth of the operation would be greater, then the time for its implementation would increase accordingly, so it is unlikely that the chances for the success of the new Citadel would increase. In addition, a different configuration of the ledge, more elongated from north to south, might have prompted the Soviet Headquarters to preempt the Germans by launching the offensive first. And in this case, even with those shortcomings that were really inherent in our offensive operations in the summer of 1943, access to the Dnieper line would have cost much fewer victims.

Summing up the alternative reconstruction of the events of February - March 1943 on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, it should be regretted that for us it was a time of missed opportunities. This is especially unfortunate, since the original idea of ​​Operation Leap was good, and moreover, it was determined by the very strategic situation that had developed by that time in the south. It was only necessary to competently bring it to life, while making as few mistakes as possible. Unfortunately, at the operational level (army - corps), we made many more mistakes than the enemy. The matter was decided by the high German organization, the great perseverance and will shown by the German commanders in solving the tasks assigned to them. We should also pay tribute to the art of generalship of the commander of the German Army Group "South" E. von Manstein, who in this situation managed to outplay his "vis-a-vis" from the Soviet side. Manstein was not only able to finish the battle according to the most unfavorable option for the Red Army "B", but in reality significantly "improve" it by adding Kharkov, again occupied by German troops, as a "consolation prize".

Shtemenko S. M. General Staff during the war. M., 1968. S. 101.

TsAMO. F. 229. Op. 590. D. 297. L. 207.

TsAMO. F. 229. Op. 590. D. 150. L. 152–153.

TsAMO. F. 251. Op. 612. D. 60. L. 146.

There. F. 229. Op. 590. D. 297. L. 45.

TsAMO. F. 229. op. 590. D. 218. l. 68; D. 214. L. 3.

Morgan F. Stalin-Hitler genocide of the Ukrainian people: facts and consequences. Poltava, 2007.

TsAMO. F. 251. Op. 612. D. 58. L. 206.

Shibankov Vasily Ivanovich (01/01/1910, the village of Belyanitsyno, Yuryev-Polsky district of the Vladimir region - 02/19/1943, Krasnoarmeysk). Born into a peasant family. Graduated from 10 classes. He worked as the chairman of the collective farm, then the chairman of the village council. In the Red Army since 1932. He graduated from the Oryol armored school in 1933. He participated in the battles near Lake Khasan in 1938 and on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939. From 1940 he studied at the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze. On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War from February 1942, he fought on the Bryansk, Voronezh, South-Western fronts. He was deputy commander of a tank brigade and commander of the 174th (from January 3, 1943 - 14th Guards) tank brigade. He participated in the battles in the Donbass, including the liberation of the cities of Starobelsk, Kramatorsk, Krasnoarmeysk - in 1943. He died heroically on February 19, 1943 during the defense of Krasnoarmeysk. He was buried in a mass grave in the city of Krasnoarmeysk. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 31, 1943, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Shibankov Vasily Ivanovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously).

TsAMO. F. 229. Op. 590. D. 233. L. 1.

TsAMO. F. 229. Op. 590. D. 214. L. 12.

There. F. 251. Op. 612. D. 58. L. 208.

TsAMO. F. 229. op. 590. D. 223. L. 2–3.

Cit. on: Akunov V. SS Division "Viking". History of the Fifth SS Panzer Division. 1941–1945 M., 2006.

Andryushchenko Grigory Yakovlevich (1905-1943). In May 1920 he voluntarily joined the Red Army. He served in various units. In 1929, he was appointed commander of an armored division under the Directorate of the Border Guard and Troops of the OGPU of Central Asia, and in 1932 - head of the armored department of the Directorate of the Border Troops of the Central Asian District. In October 1939, he was appointed to the post of chief of the armored forces of the 8th army, in which he participated in the Soviet-Finnish war. In the battles of the Great Patriotic War from June 1941, he took an active part in the battles in the Baltic states and near Leningrad. From October 1941 to April 1942 - head of the armored department of the 8th army. From October 16, 1942 - commander of the 183rd tank brigade of the 10th tank corps. On July 18, 1943, on the Kursk Bulge, he was seriously wounded and went to the hospital for treatment. After recovery, he was appointed deputy commander of the 6th Guards Tank Corps. Upon returning to service, he distinguished himself when crossing the Dnieper south of Kyiv. On October 14, 1943, he died in battle on the Bukrinsky bridgehead near the village of Grigorovka. He was buried in the park of the city of Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky, Kyiv region.

TsAMO, F. 229. Op. 590. D. 297. L. 95.

TsAMO. F. 229. Op. 590. D. 297. L. 120.

Collection of materials on the study of the experience of war. Issue No. 9. M., 1944.

Badanov Vasily Mikhailovich (December 26 (14), 1895, the village of Verkhnyaya Yakushka, now the Novomalyklinsky district of the Ulyanovsk region - April 1, 1971, Moscow) - lieutenant general of tank troops (1942). Member of the First World War. In the Red Army since 1919. Graduated from Chuguevskoe military school(1916), academic courses at the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army (1934), higher academic courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff (1950). During the Civil War - company commander, chief of staff of a rifle brigade. From December 1937 he was the head of the Poltava military automobile technical school, and from March 1941 he was the commander of the 55th tank division, with which he entered the Great Patriotic War. Then he commanded the 12th Tank Brigade (1941–1942), the 24th (later the 2nd Guards) Corps (1942–1943). From 1943 to 1944 he commanded the 4th Panzer Army. He was the first in the Soviet army to be awarded the Order of Suvorov II degree (1943). In 1944 he was seriously wounded and shell-shocked. Since August 1944 - head of department military educational institutions and combat training of armored and mechanized troops of the Soviet army. Since May 1950 - head of the department of military educational institutions of the armored and mechanical troops of the SA. Reserved since June 1953.

The 279th number was assigned to rifle divisions three times. The first 279th division was formed in the Moscow military district back in July 1941, fought on the Bryansk front in the summer and autumn, near Tula, along with other formations of the 50th army, was surrounded, where it practically disappeared. Only the remnants of the division came to their own, which had to be disbanded in November 1941. The second 279th division began to form in February 1942 in Bashkiria, but a month later it was disbanded, never getting to the front. For the third time, the 279th Rifle Division was formed in June 1942 in the Balakhna District of the Gorky Region on the basis of the 59th Rifle Brigade, a veteran of the battles on the Volkhov near Leningrad.

Crazing Hans (August 17, 1890 - April 14, 1969) - German general of the mountain troops, participant in the First and Second World Wars, holder of the Knight's Cross with oak leaves and swords. In World War I - on the Western Front, from April 1915 - commander of a machine gun company, senior lieutenant. In May 1916, he was seriously wounded near Verdun, in the hospital until October 1918. After the end of the First World War, he served in the Reichswehr. Participated in the Polish campaign. From October 1940 - Commander of the 3rd Mountain Jaeger Division in Norway (Major General). From June 1941 - in the battles in the Murmansk direction. In July 1942, Crazing was promoted to lieutenant general. Since October 1942, the division was transferred to Leningrad, since December 1942, it has been participating in the battles on the Don. From November 1943 - commander of the 17th Army Corps. Fighting on the Dnieper, in Moldova, the Carpathians. From December 1944 - Commander of the 8th Army. Fighting in Hungary, then in Austria. After the capitulation of the German armed forces on May 8, 1945, Crazing managed to make his way to Germany, where in June 1945 he was taken prisoner by British troops. Released from captivity in 1948.

Voylov P. Liberation of Voroshilovgrad // Our newspaper. 2009. No. 17. P. 12.

This is the former 197th rifle division of the second formation (the 197th division of the first formation died in the summer of 1941 in a cauldron near Uman), which, for successful operations on the Don, on the northern flank of the Battle of Stalingrad, was transformed into a guards division. It was commanded by Colonel Georgy Petrovich Karamyshev (by the way, he permanently commanded this division in the future, until 1945).

On February 14, the 8th Cavalry Corps was reorganized into the 7th Guards, and the 21st, 55th, and 112th Cavalry Divisions were respectively reorganized into the 14th, 15th, and 16th Guards Cavalry Divisions.

TsAMO. F. 229. Op. 590. D. 161. L. 112.

Borisov Mikhail Dmitrievich (1900–1987) - major general, commander of the 8th cavalry corps, captured, being "wounded in the leg with five more wounded officers in open battle", reinstated in the army after a special check. Discharged in 1958 due to illness.

Shaimuratov Mingali Mingazovich (1899–1943). Born in the family of a laborer in Bashkiria. Member of the Civil War - fought against Kolchak in the 270th Beloretsk Rifle Regiment. In 1931–1934 - student of the Military Academy named after M. V. Frunze. After graduating from the academy, he was sent to China. In 1941, Colonel M. M. Shaimuratov was appointed assistant chief of the department of the General Staff of the Red Army and commander of the Kremlin guard unit. Soon, part of it was sent to the front as part of the corps of General L. M. Dovator. He was appointed commander of the 112th Bashkir Cavalry Division. For courage and heroism in battle, for the successful completion of important operational tasks, the 112th Bashkir Cavalry Division was transformed on February 14, 1943 into the 16th Guards Division. On February 23, 1943, he died near the village of Yulino-2. He was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star.

TsAMO. F. 229. Op. 590. D. 202. L. 2.

Tsvetaev Vyacheslav Dmitrievich (01/17/1893, Maloarkhangelsk, now the Oryol region - 08/11/1950, Moscow). Born in the family of a railway worker. Member of the First World War, commander of a company, then a battalion, lieutenant. After the revolution he joined the Red Army. During the Civil War he commanded a company, battalion, regiment, brigade, division. After the war - the commander of a rifle brigade, then a division. Since 1931 - senior lecturer at the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze. In 1938 he was arrested on suspicion of "espionage". He was subjected to pressure from the investigation, but he pleaded not guilty. In 1939 he was released. In 1941–1942 - Commander of the operational group of troops of the 7th Army, deputy commander of the 4th Army, commander of the 10th Reserve Army. From December 1942 to May 1944 - commander of the 5th shock army. From May to September 1944 - Deputy Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front. In September 1944 - Commander of the 6th Army. From September 1944 until the end of the war - commander of the 33rd Army. In 1945, Colonel General Tsvetaev V.D. was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

TsAMO. F. 228. Op. 505. D. 30. L. 26–28.

TsAMO. F. 228. Op. 505. D. 101. L. 66.

Ershov A. G. Liberation of Donbass. M., 1973. S. 73.

TsAMO. F. 229. Op. 590. D. 223. L. 4.

Slavyansk. Memory for the ages. Donetsk, 2007. P. 61.

It is given in abbreviation.

It is interesting to note that as soon as the interests of Western democracies were threatened, the weather in the English Channel "suddenly" turned out to be quite acceptable for landings. And the shortage of landing craft immediately became "insignificant."

Donbass operation(August 13 - September 22, 1943) - a strategic military operation of the armed forces of the USSR against the troops of the Third Reich in order to liberate the Donets Basin.

background

Operation progress

The Donbass operation began on August 13, 1943 with the offensive of the right wing of the Southwestern Front. These troops crossed the Seversky Donets and, advancing along the right bank of the river, helped the Steppe Front in the liberation of Kharkov. The offensive launched on August 16 in the center of the front was not developed. The Soviet troops were stopped on the Mius River, where the Germans built a heavily fortified defensive line.

On August 16, the troops of the Southern Front went on the offensive and broke through the German defenses. On August 30, with the assistance of an amphibious assault, Taganrog was liberated. In the area of ​​​​the city, the 29th German corps was surrounded and destroyed. . On September 4, 1943, during the Donbass operation, Soviet troops liberated Kalinovka, a suburb of Gorlovka. On September 5, 1943, the city was completely liberated from the fascist occupation, and at the same time, the shock units of the Southern Front liberated Artemovsk, and on September 8, the capital of Donbass, Stalino (now Donetsk).

After the threat of dismemberment and destruction loomed over Army Group South, Hitler allowed its units to withdraw beyond the Dnieper. The withdrawal of the German units was notable for the extremely heavy losses of the Wehrmacht. Manstein noted:

He further reports that among the difficulties were the need to evacuate 200,000 wounded, the inability to take out a three-month supply of materiel, which led to an artillery shortage, and the absence of intermediate defensive lines. Also, an obstacle to a systematic withdrawal was the actions of Soviet partisans, who inflicted numerous strikes on railways and bridges in the rear of the German army in Right-Bank Ukraine, reducing the throughput of communications to a minimum.

During the retreat, the German army used the tactics of scorched earth. The main goal of creating "desert zones" was to reduce the pace of the Soviet offensive and buy time to create a powerful defensive line on the river. Dnieper, while maintaining large footholds on the Left Bank of the Dnieper. Despite the fact that the retreating German troops hijacked all persons of military age, took out more than 2,500 items of property, burned most of the villages and towns, the German troops failed to complete this task. Manstein in his book Lost Victories states the following:

The English tribunal did not appreciate Manstein's philanthropy. In 1949, for crimes in Ukraine, he was sentenced to 18 years in prison. However, already in 1953 he was released.

On September 1, German troops began to retreat along the entire front in the Donbass. On September 8, Soviet troops liberated the center of Donbass - Stalino. Pursuing the enemy, the troops of the Southwestern Front on September 22 threw him back across the Dnieper in the Dnepropetrovsk-Zaporozhye section. The troops of the Southern Front on the same day reached the Molochnaya River. This ended the Donbass operation.

Results

As a result of the operation, the Donets Basin was completely liberated. In connection with the retreat in the Left-Bank Ukraine, the German army was forced to leave the Kuban, evacuating the 17th Army to the Crimea, where it was not taking part in the autumn-winter campaign of 1943-44, until April-May 1944, when it was completely destroyed . During the operation, Soviet troops advanced 300 km and reached the Dnepropetrovsk-Melitopol line. The loss of the Donetsk coal basin dealt a big blow to the German economy, the Soviet Union, on the contrary, received 21.1 million tons of coal in 1944. By the beginning of 1945, coal mining was established in 3/4 of the mines. Already in 1943, a full metallurgical cycle was restored at the Enakievsky Metallurgical Plant, just 30 days after the liberation, the generators of the Zuevskaya CHPP and the Rudchenskaya HPP gave current. By September 1944, the output of engineering products in the south of Ukraine reached 30% of the pre-war level. . Agriculture returned millions of hectares of sown areas in Ukraine and Kuban.

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An excerpt characterizing the Donbass operation (1943)

Napoleon enters Moscow after a brilliant victory de la Moskowa; there can be no doubt about victory, since the battlefield remains with the French. The Russians retreat and give up the capital. Moscow, filled with provisions, weapons, shells and untold riches, is in the hands of Napoleon. The Russian army, twice as weak as the French, does not make a single attempt to attack for a month. Napoleon's position is the most brilliant. In order to fall on the remnants of the Russian army with double strength and exterminate it, in order to negotiate a favorable peace or, in case of refusal, to make a threatening movement on Petersburg, in order even, in case of failure, to return to Smolensk or Vilna , or stay in Moscow - in order, in a word, to keep the brilliant position in which the French army was at that time, it would seem that no special genius is needed. To do this, it was necessary to do the simplest and easiest thing: to prevent the troops from plundering, to prepare winter clothes, which would be enough in Moscow for the entire army, and to correctly collect provisions for the entire army that were in Moscow for more than six months (according to French historians). Napoleon, the most brilliant of geniuses and having the power to direct the army, historians say, did nothing of the sort.
Not only did he not do any of this, but, on the contrary, he used his power to choose from all the paths of activity presented to him that which was most stupid and pernicious of all. Of all that Napoleon could do: spend the winter in Moscow, go to St. Petersburg, go to Nizhny Novgorod, go back, north or south, the way that Kutuzov went later - well, whatever you think up is more stupid and more pernicious than what he did Napoleon, that is, to remain in Moscow until October, leaving the troops to rob the city, then, hesitating whether to leave or not to leave the garrison, leave Moscow, approach Kutuzov, do not start a battle, go to the right, reach Maly Yaroslavets, again without experiencing the chance to break through , to go not along the road along which Kutuzov went, but to go back to Mozhaisk and along the devastated Smolensk road - nothing could be more stupid than this, more detrimental to the army, as the consequences showed. Let the most skillful strategists come up with, imagining that Napoleon's goal was to destroy his army, come up with another series of actions that would, with the same certainty and independence from everything that the Russian troops undertake, would completely destroy the whole French army, like what Napoleon did.

The troops of the Southwestern (General of the Army R.Ya. Malinovsky) and the Southern (Colonel General, from September 21, Army General F.I. Tolbukhin) fronts liberated the eastern part of the Donbass by mid-February 1943 and reached the line along the Seversky Donets River , northwest of Voroshilovgrad, further along the Mius River and east of Taganrog. The German command, in an effort to keep the Donbass, created a strong defense, the front line of which ran along the Seversky Donets and Mius rivers. In the depths of the defense, defensive lines were created along the rivers Krynka, Kalmius and Samara, the line along the Mius River was especially strongly fortified. A lot of wood-earth and reinforced concrete structures were built on the front line and in the depths of the defense.

On August 11, 1943, Hitler gave an additional order to speed up the construction of a strategic defense line, the so-called "Eastern Wall", from the Utl Yuksky estuary through Lake Molochnaya and further along the Molochnaya River, the middle reaches of the Dnieper, the Sozh River, through Orsha, Vitebsk, Pskov, along the river Narva.

The Nazi command entrusted the defense of the Donbass region to the 1st Tank and 6th Field Armies, part of the forces of the Kempf task force (from August 16 transformed into the 8th Army) and the 4th Air Fleet, which were part of the Army Group " South "under the command of General Field Marshal E. Manstein. These troops had about 540 thousand people, 5.4 thousand guns and mortars, 300 tanks and assault guns, more than 1 thousand aircraft.

By the beginning of the Donbass operation, the Southwestern Front included the 1st, 3rd and 8th guards, 6th, 12th, 46th combined arms and 17th air armies, 23rd tank, 1st guards mechanized and 1 - 1st Guards Cavalry Corps; as part of the Southern Front - 2nd Guards. 5th shock, 28th, 44th, 51st combined arms and 8th air armies. 2.4th Guards Mechanized and 4th Guards Cavalry Corps. In total, both fronts numbered up to 1 million 53 thousand people, about 21 thousand guns and mortars. 1.25 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 1.4 thousand aircraft.

The plan for the Donbass operation, developed by the command of the fronts with the participation of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, on August 10 was approved by the Headquarters. On August 12, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command clarified its task for the Southwestern Front: to deliver the main blow from the Izyum region to Barvenkovo. Pavlograd, Orekhov, defeat the enemy and, having reached the Zaporozhye, Pologi region, cut off the escape routes to the west of his Donbas grouping. The troops of the Southern Front, in accordance with the operation plan, delivered the main blow from the Kuibyshevo region to Stalino (Donetsk) in order to break through the enemy’s defenses along the Mius River and, in cooperation with the troops of the Southwestern Front, defeat the German grouping in the south of Donbass, then advance in the direction of the Crimea and the lower reaches Dnieper. The coordination of the actions of the two fronts was entrusted to A.M. Vasilevsky.

Commander of the Southwestern Front, General of the Army R.Ya. Malinovsky decided to strike the main blow with the forces of the 6th and 12th combined arms armies, the 23rd tank, 1st guards cavalry corps with the support of the 17th air army in the direction of Barvenkovo, Pavlograd, Orekhov and cut off the escape routes for the troops of the German 1st tank army to the west. On the right wing of the front, the 1st Guards Army struck, with the task of turning the enemy's defenses south along the right bank of the Seversky Donets River. The 3rd Guards Army, advancing on the left wing of the front, took possession of Lisichansk and subsequently advanced on Slavyansk, Kramatorsk. The armies that made up the second echelon of the front were to develop success: the 8th Guards - in the zone of the 6th and 12th armies, advancing on Pavlograd; 46th Army - to operate in the center of the right wing of the front. The reserve of the front (23rd Tank and 1st Guards Mechanized Corps) was planned to be introduced into the gap in the bands of the 6th and 12th armies in order to develop success in operational depth.

Commander of the Southern Front F.I. Tolbukhin decided to strike the main blow with the forces of the 5th shock, 2nd guards and 28th combined arms armies in the direction of Kuibyshevo, Novoekaterinovka, encircle and destroy the Taganrog grouping of the German 6th army, reach the Kuteynikovo line, the Kalmius River, the coast of the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov, further advance on Melitopol, in the direction of the Crimea and the lower reaches of the Dnieper. The 51st Army on the right wing and the 44th Army on the left wing of the front were to actively fetter the enemy's initiative. The reserve of the front (2nd Guards, 4th Guards Mechanized and 4th Guards Cavalry Corps) was supposed to be used to develop success.

In the directions of the main attacks of the fronts, superiority over the enemy was created: in people - in times, in guns and mortars - almost 5 times, in tanks - 2-3 times.

On August 13, from the area south of the city of Zmiev, the 1st Guards Army, Colonel General K.I. Kuznetsova. On August 16, the main group of the Southwestern Front, the 6th (Lieutenant General I.T. Shlemin) and 12th (Major General A.I. Danilov) armies, began an offensive from the Izyum region, which by the end of the day advanced to 2.5-3.5 km. From the very first days of the offensive, the battles took on a tense, bloody character. On August 18, the 1st Guards Army captured the city of Zmiev. However, at this time, the neutral grouping of the Southwestern Front failed to develop success.

On August 18, the Southern Front also went on the offensive. The breakthrough of enemy defenses on the Mius River was carried out in a narrow area by the 5th shock (Lieutenant General V.D. Tsvetaev) and the 2nd Guards (Lieutenant General G.F. Zakharov) armies. After a powerful artillery and aviation preparation, by the end of the day they wedged into the enemy defenses for 10 km. The 4th Guards Mechanized Corps, introduced into the battle in the zone of the 5th Shock Army, advanced westward up to 20 km by the end of August 19, crossed the Krynka River and captured a bridgehead on the right bank. All attempts by the enemy to eliminate the gap in the defense ended in failure. Developing the offensive against Amvrosievka and repulsing enemy counterattacks, the troops of the front divided the German 6th Army into two parts. These successful actions created a real threat of defeating the enemy on the southern wing of the Southern Front.

The mobile front group (4th Guards Mechanized Corps and 4th Guards Cavalry Corps) struck a blow from the Amvrosisvka area to the south. to cut off the escape routes of the Taganrog grouping of the enemy. On August 30, the 130th and 416th Rifle Divisions of the 44th Army (Lieutenant General V.A. Khomenko) with the assistance of the Azov Flotilla (Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov) liberated Taganrog.

The offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front was very slow, despite the fact that on August 22 the 8th Guards Army of Lieutenant General V.I. Chuikov with the 23rd Tank Corps and the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps. On August 28, the 8th Guards, 6th and 12th armies entrenched themselves on the occupied lines.

On August 26, in the zone of the 1st Guards Army from the second echelon of the front, the 46th Army of Major General V.V. Glagolev, which struck at Taranovka and advanced 10 km in four days. But on August 30, she also received an order to gain a foothold on the reached line. The most successful offensive was the 3rd Guards Army of Lieutenant General D.D. Lelyushenko: On September 5, she liberated Artyomovsk and by the end of September 8, she had advanced 150-180 km.

The advancing formations and units experienced enormous difficulties. Due to the rapid advance of the troops, communications stretched out, there were not enough vehicles, and railways were destroyed almost everywhere. In this difficult situation, the workers of Donbass rendered great assistance to the troops.

In the struggle for the liberation of the most important industrial region of the country, along with the Red Army, partisans, many residents of Donetsk cities and villages, actively joined. Hundreds of thousands of citizens liberated from the German occupation helped restore roads and communications, repair military equipment, care for the wounded, deliver ammunition and other means of material support for the troops. Therefore, despite the difficulties, the pace of the advance of troops in the Donbass increased.

For the reason that. that the position of the 1st Panzer and 6th German armies was deteriorating every day, Hitler allowed the commander of Army Group South to begin their systematic withdrawal to the rear lines. Having discovered the retreat of the enemy, the troops of the Southwestern Front began his pursuit. By September 22, they reached the Novomoskovsk line, east of Zaporozhye, and the main forces of the strike force reached the Dnieper.

On September 3, formations of the 51st Army (Lieutenant General Ya.G. Kreizer) of the Southern Front liberated Debaltseve, and on September 4, a division of the 5th Shock Army took Gorlovka. On September 8, the center of Donbass, the city of Stalino, was liberated. The troops of the front, pursuing the enemy, by September 22 reached the area west of Orekhov, the Molochnaya River. Melitopol and completed the liberation of Donbass in their zone. The partisans and underground fighters, as well as the landings landed by the Azov military flotilla in the regions of Taganrog, Mariupol and Osipenko (Berdyansk), played a big role in this.

During the Donbass operation, Soviet troops advanced to a depth of 300 km and defeated 13 enemy divisions. An important economic region was liberated and favorable conditions were created for the liberation of Northern Tavria, Right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea.

The defeat of the enemy grouping in the Donbass was achieved by delivering frontal strikes in the center, followed by the development of success towards the flanks, with the extensive use of mobile troops for maneuvering in the operational depth of the enemy’s defense. However, during the operation, the troops of the Southern Front failed to encircle and destroy the enemy's Taganrog grouping. The mobile group of the front entered the path of its withdrawal, but was unable to tightly close a section about 60 km wide, which allowed the enemy to withdraw the remnants of his forces from the blow. The losses of the Soviet troops in the operation amounted to: irretrievable - over 66 thousand people, sanitary - over 207 thousand people. For military skill, mass heroism, courage and bravery; manifested during the operation, over 40 formations and units were awarded the honorary titles of Artyomovsky, Oryol, Slavic.

The liberation of Donbass from the Nazi invaders was preceded by long and bloody battles. The fertile Donbas region, rich in coal and metal, was under Nazi occupation for two years and all this time was the scene of fierce battles and heroic resistance to the invaders.

The feat of the Young Guard underground Komsomol organization operating in Krasnodon and the underground workers from Avdotyino and Budenovka, led by S.G. Matekin, raids by Slavic partisans of the M.I. Karnaukhov and the feat of five underground girls from Rutchenkovo ​​and Stalino (Donetsk), who were executed by the Nazis for the release of Soviet prisoners of war from a concentration camp.

Successfully developing after the defeat of the German invaders near Stalingrad, the offensive of the Red Army in February 1943 led to the liberation of part of the northern and eastern Donbass. In particular, the Soviet troops managed to liberate Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk), Lisichansk, Krasny Lyman, Kramatorsk, Slavyansk, Krasnoarmeysk.

However, as a result of a counterattack by the SS Panzer Divisions "Das Reich" and "Totenkopf" attached to the commander of Army Group "South" Manstein, all these settlements, with the exception of Voroshilovgrad and Krasny Liman, were again abandoned.

In March 1943, the front line in the Donbass actually ran along the Seversky Donets and Mius rivers. At the turn of the Mius River, the Germans created a defense in depth that covered the approaches to Stalino and Taganrog. The defensive line of the Nazis was called the "Mius Front" and was considered very reliable. Numerous pillboxes and bunkers connected by trenches, minefields, anti-tank ditches blocked the Red Army's path to the center of Donbass.

How "Mius-Front" allowed to win the Battle of Kursk

The main events of the summer of 1943 unfolded several hundred kilometers north of the Mius Front, in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. It was there, near Belgorod, that the main forces of the Army Group "South" were concentrated, which on July 5 launched an offensive against Kursk. At the cost of heroic efforts, the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts managed to stop the onslaught of the German "Citadel", however, a decisive victory in the Battle of Kursk was ensured, among other things, thanks to the troops of the seemingly secondary Southern Front, commanded by Colonel General F.I. Tolbukhin.

On July 17, 1943, at the height of the battle near Kursk, Tolbukhin's troops launched the Mius offensive operation, making the first serious attempt to break through the Mius Front. Having made a breakthrough in the enemy defenses in the Dmitrovka area, they reached Hill 277.9, better known as Saur-Mogila, which was an important enemy defense node. Stormed the height of the 315th Infantry Division D.S. Kuropatenko, but the first attempts to master it were unsuccessful.

The capture of the bridgehead on the western bank of the Mius endangered the entire right flank of Army Group South. Its commander, Manstein, was forced to remove Hausser's 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which was operating in the Prokhorovka area, from the Kursk direction. He was promptly transferred to the area of ​​Snezhnoye and Chistyakovo (Torez). As a result of the counterattack inflicted by the Germans, by August 1-2, Soviet troops retreated from the Miussky bridgehead to their original lines.

The liberation of Donbass was delayed for a month, however, the Germans did not have enough troops sent to the "Mius Front" on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge, where on August 3 the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts began the offensive operation "Commander Rumyantsev", as a result of which Belgorod was liberated on August 5 .

Battle of Kursk, 1943. Newsreel TASS

Breakthrough of the "Mius-Front" and the long-awaited release

The decisive offensive of the troops of the Southern Front began on August 18, 1943. Within a few days, the Mius Front was broken through. On August 24, Soviet troops liberated Amvrosievka, on August 30 - Taganrog, on August 31, after several days of stubborn fighting, Saur-Mogila was taken. The way to the capital of Donbass was open.

The offensive also developed successfully in the north of Donbass, where the troops of the Southwestern Front R.Ya. Malinovsky, advancing from the line of the Seversky Donets River, liberated Artemovsk, Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Krasnoarmeysk and forced the enemy to retreat beyond the Dnieper.

On September 8, 1943, the troops of the 5th shock army, Lieutenant General V.D. Tsvetaeva, after heavy and stubborn fighting, liberated the city of Stalino (Donetsk). Soldiers of the 50th Guards Rifle Division of Colonel Vladychansky hoisted a combat red banner over the building of the regional party committee (now the administration of the Voroshilovsky district of Donetsk) on Artem Street.

On the same day, a festive salute was given in Moscow with twenty volleys from 224 guns in honor of the liberators of Donbass.

No less heroic efforts were made to restore the mines and industrial enterprises of the Donetsk region, which suffered significant damage during the Nazi occupation. So, the Donetsk Metallurgical Plant (DMZ) already in February 1944 began to give the country steel and thereby bring great victory over Nazi Germany.

09/08/1943. Workers of the Kramatorsk Machine-Building Plant tear down the signs of the German capitalist Krupp from the factory building. Photo: I. Yushko / Newsreel TASS

Donbass will stand and win!

Seven decades later, as a result of the coming to power in Ukraine of the ideological heirs of the German Fuhrer, who declared Russia their main enemy, and the population of the former south-east of the country who did not want to give up their Russian identity, Donbass again found itself in a war zone. A significant part of it has been under the heel of the Zhovto-Blakit occupier for three years now. Like the German Nazis, Ukrainian punishers brought death, grief and destruction to the mining region.

One can draw amazing parallels, but in conversations with the soldiers of the DPR army, the author of the article has repeatedly heard that they occupied or are occupying positions on the same lines where the positions of the Soviet troops were in 1941-1943.

Often, when digging trenches and building new defensive structures, the defenders of Donbass managed to find the remains of the missing Red Army soldiers, who were then solemnly reburied with all honors in mass graves.

And, of course, one cannot help but recall Saur-Mogila, which in the summer of 2014 again found itself at the epicenter of the battle for Donbass. Destroyed by Ukrainian artillery and now being restored, the memorial complex to the heroes of the Great Patriotic War is now adjacent to the graves of the fallen militiamen and a chapel dedicated to the memory of the fallen heroes of the past and present.

"Donbass has not been forced to its knees, and no one can be forced to kneel!" These lines, written by the poet Pavel the Merciless, have long become a catch phrase and sound not only as a reminder, but also as a formidable warning to those who dared to bring to the Donetsk region new war. And this war, despite all its hardships and hardships, will certainly end with the victory of those who were forced to take up arms in order to protect their children and their families. small motherland from the new Bandera barbarians. After all, whoever comes to us with a sword will die by the sword. On that stood and will stand the Russian land!