Bukhara operation. Bukhara operation (1920) The political situation on the eve

Plan
Introduction
1 Political situation the day before
2 Armed forces, their deployment and plan of operation
2.1 Bukhara army
2.2 Red Army
2.3 Operation plan and Frunze's order of August 13, 1920.

3 Natural conditions and population
3.1 Natural conditions and difficulties of a military campaign
3.2 The population of the emirate, its social and National composition
3.3 Transport routes
3.4 Settlements
3.5 City of Old Bukhara and its fortifications

4 Course of hostilities
4.1 Order of the commander of the Turfront No. 3667 of August 25, 1920
4.2 Assault Old Bukhara, August 29 - September 2, 1920
4.3 Actions of the Kattakurgan and Samarkand detachments. Emir persecution.
4.4 Summary

Bibliography
Bukhara operation (1920)

Introduction

Bukhara operation 1920 - fighting units of the Red Army of the Turkestan Front, under the command of M.V. Frunze (about 9 thousand people) with the support of national formations representing the movement of the Young Bukharians and Bukhara communists (about 5 thousand people), with the aim of overthrowing the Emir of Bukhara on August 29. - 2 Sept. 1920 during the Civil War. The emir's army (16 thousand people) occupied the area of ​​Old Bukhara with the main forces and separate detachments - Khatyrchi and Kermine. In the area of ​​the Takhtakaracha pass, Shakhrisabz and Karshi, detachments of Bukhara beks (over 27 thousand people) operated. On August 23, the Young Bukharians and Bukhara communists started an uprising in the Chardzhui bekstvo and turned to the Turkestan Soviet Republic for help. The Bukhara operation began with the capture on August 29, by the Soviet troops, together with the rebels of Old Chardzhuy. The Revolutionary Committee, created in Chardzhui, appealed to the population of Bukhara to fight against the emirate. On September 2, Old Bukhara was taken by storm, and on October 8, 1920, the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic was proclaimed. The Bukhara operation under the command of Frunze M.V. in 1920 marked the beginning of a number of operations of the Red Army in Bukhara and in subsequent years. These operations were intended either to consolidate the initial success of the Bukhara operation, or to suppress local pockets of resistance. Complex natural conditions and national specifics gave these operations a long-term character.

1. Political situation the day before

By the spring of 1920, there was a turning point in the struggle for power in Central Asia. The connection of the Turkestan Republic with the main territory of Russia was restored. The 4th Army of the Turkestan Front eliminated pockets of resistance in the Transcaspian region. In the Fergana region, one of the most prominent leaders of the Basmachi movement, Madamin Bek, goes over to the side of the Bolsheviks. The relative pacification of the region was also facilitated by the change in the policy of the Bolsheviks in Turkestan, the active involvement of national personnel in the management. In the summer of 1920, the troops of the Red Army liquidated the Khiva Khanate, on the site of which the pro-Soviet Khorezmian People's Soviet Republic was formed. But peace was still very far away. In the Fergana Valley, the resistance of the Basmachi continued, peasant and Cossack uprisings continued in the Semirechye, which tied the forces of the 3rd Turkestan division in 1920, the constant danger of the Khorezmian Republic from the leader of the Turkmen Junaid Khan. In addition, the Red Army had the task of protecting the land borders of Soviet Turkestan for several thousand kilometers.

After an unsuccessful attempt by the leader of the Turkestan Bolsheviks, Kolesov, together with a detachment of the Young Bukharians to overthrow the government of the emir, a truce reigned between Bukhara and Tashkent. Behind the facade of which both sides were preparing for a decisive battle. The government of the Emir of Bukhara was comprehensively engaged in strengthening its own armed forces. Pro-Emir clerics increasingly called on parishioners to ghazavat. In February 1920, the emir's government carried out a mobilization campaign. At the court of the emir, former officers of the tsarist army and members of the White movement found refuge. The government of the Turkestan Republic, meanwhile, tried in every possible way to unite all anti-emisrky forces, which was partly successful. By 1920, the pro-Bukharian wing of the Young Bukharans, headed by Faizulla Khodzhaev, had noticeably strengthened. In August, in 1920, armed demonstrations took place in a number of cities of the Bukhara Khanate with appeals of the rebels for help to the government of Turkestan. Meanwhile, for the time being, both sides tried to maintain the appearance of neutrality.

2. Armed forces, their deployment and plan of operation

Bukhara army

In the 10th of August, the emir gathers significant regular and irregular forces (about 30-35 thousand) to Bukhara. By August 20, 1920, the emir's armed forces consisted of parts of the regular army and an irregular militia. The forces of the regular army were determined in 8725 bayonets and 7580 sabers with 23 light guns and 12 machine guns. The irregular forces put up by the regional rulers (beks), according to a rough estimate, amounted to 27,000 bayonets and sabers with 2 machine guns and 32 guns. Most of the artillery consisted of obsolete models (for example, smooth-bore cast-iron cannons that fired iron or stone cannonballs). The combat quality, training of soldiers and commanders of the emir's army were at a low level. The army was staffed with mercenaries, and an attempt to replenish the army through compulsory conscription did not give the expected results. Recruitment to the army was carried out by forced apportionment in rural communities. The latter in many cases either got rid of an element that was undesirable for them in this way, or committed a number of abuses by appointing members of low-income families to the army, without regard to their family and financial situation.

By the time of decisive hostilities, the emir's main forces were concentrated in two places. The regular Bukhara army - in the capital of Old Bukhara and its immediate environs. Beks' troops in the Kitab-Shahrisyabz region, covering the Takhtakaracha pass. Through this pass passed the shortest and most convenient way from the city of Samarkand inland, through Guzar to Termez, adapted for wheel traffic along its entire length.

Red Army

The command of the Turkestan Front could provide for the operation 6000-7000 bayonets, 2300-2690 sabers, 35 light and 5 heavy guns, 8 armored vehicles, 5 armored trains and 11 aircraft. This count does not include national military formations on the territory of Turkestan and revolutionary-minded detachments of the Young Bukharians and Bukhara communists on the territory of Bukhara.

M. V. Frunze at the review of the Tatar brigade. Eastern front. 1919

Platoon of the Bukhara army. Photo by an unknown master, beg. 20th century

MV Frunze conducts a review of the troops in Kushka. Turkestan. 1920.

Military Band of the Emir of Bukhara. Postcard from an anonymous publisher, after 1909

The commander of the Turkestan Front, Frunze M.V., despite the passive resistance of a number of local councils to a possible war with Bukhara, begins active preparations for the overthrow of the emir. The main goal of the military operation was to be the densely populated valley of the river. Zeravshan with the political and administrative center of Bukhara and Shahrisyabz district with the center in the city of Guzar. The attack on Old Bukhara was also aimed at defeating the emir's main forces.

On August 13, 1920, Frunze, in an order to the troops of the Turkestan Front, indicated that the general political situation required the Red Army to be ready to act actively when the interests of the revolution required it. In anticipation of this performance, the Chardzhui group was concentrated in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe city of New Chardzhui, consisting of the 1st infantry regiment, one division of the Teke cavalry and the 1st division of light artillery. This detachment was reinforced, in addition, by a detachment of the Bukhara revolutionary troops of Kulmtskhametov; the Amu Darya flotilla and the red garrisons of the cities of Chardzhui, Kerki and Termez also came under the command of the head of the detachment.

The task of the detachment was to secure the immediate environs of Chardzhui and occupy the city of Karakul, which lay near the railway line halfway from Chardzhui to Old Bukhara. The special attention of the head of the detachment was entrusted with the railway line in his section. At the same time, the flotilla was supposed to carry cruising along the river. Amu Darya in the section from the fortification of Kerka to the fortification of Termez, not allowing any crossings on this section of the river in either direction. The Chardzhui group was operationally subordinate to the Samarkand group. This latter was divided into three separate groups: Kagan, consisting of all the units that made up the garrison of the city of New Bukhara (Kagan) (7 rifle regiments, 3 1/2 cavalry regiments, 40 light and 5 heavy guns, based on the materials of Comrade Rozhdestvensky) and Karshi city; the 4th Cavalry Regiment and the 1st East Muslim Rifle Regiment, arriving from Turkestan, were also to be included in this group; the task of this group was to include the capture of the city of Old Bukhara. The Katta-Kurgan group, consisting of the 2nd International Cavalry Regiment with an artillery platoon and a detachment of Bukhara revolutionary troops, was to concentrate in the city of Katta-Kurgan no later than August 15; expected in right time take Khatyrcha and Ziaetdin with it, and later - the city of Kermine. Finally, the Samarkand group itself, consisting of the 3rd Turkestan Rifle Regiment of the 1st Turkestan Cavalry Division, a separate Turkic cavalry brigade and an engineering company, was assigned, if necessary, to defeat the Bukhara troops in the Shakhrisyabz-Kitab direction and firmly occupy the area of ​​the river. Kashkadarya.

Subsequently, the order indicated the distribution and timing of the concentration of technical units and aviation. Quite characteristic is the indication of the order on the order of concentration of the Kagan group. The units assigned to reinforce it were to appear in the city of Kagan quite unexpectedly for the enemy, passing through the territory of Bukhara in echelons during the night.

Thus, Frunze set himself two goals: he sought to do away with the political center of the Bukhara emirate and its most reliable support in the form of a regular army with one blow, choosing Old Bukhara as the object of his actions. On the other hand, he chooses as the goal of his actions a significant concentration of enemy forces formed in the Shakhrisyabz-Kitab region. It was not possible to leave him unattended or limit himself to putting up a barrier against him. However, given the already existing numerical inequality, for this it was necessary to further weaken the forces intended for operations against the capital. Fully aware of this, the front command balances the numerical inequality of forces with a grouping along the railway line. The latter was completely in the hands of the Red Army, which made it possible to concentrate strike forces in the right place and at the right time. In addition, the attention of the enemy and his forces are diverted to two opposite directions: to Samarkand and to Chardzhui. In the initial position created for both sides, the emir's army was already in a strategic encirclement even before the outbreak of hostilities, and the command of the Turkfront took all measures to quickly turn this strategic encirclement into a tactical one.

The spatiality of the theatre, its lack of roads, lack of water, difficult climatic conditions- all taken together should have influenced the duration and difficulty of operations, if the enemy was given time to use all these properties to his advantage. Characteristics the theater allowed the movements and actions of significant military units only in certain directions. These directions were sometimes significantly removed from each other. Hence the importance of the issue of communication and the difficulty of its organization and maintenance. Under such conditions, the administration could not have the character of precise regulation of the movement of troops by day, with the setting of certain tasks for each day. In the field of management, emphasis was placed on the manifestation of the commander's initiative, giving him the general idea of ​​​​the operation and providing a broad initiative in its implementation. If we evaluate all the orders of M.V. Frunze for the Bukhara operation from this angle, we will see that they fully corresponded to these characteristic conditions of the theater.

3. Natural conditions and population

Natural conditions and difficulties of a military campaign

The natural borders of the Emirate of Bukhara in the north were the Gissar Range, separating it from Turkestan, in the south - the river. The Amu Darya, serving for a considerable extent as its border with Afghanistan, in the east - an elevated and barren plateau turning into the Pamir mountain ranges and in the west - a sandy desert, passing into the borders of Khiva. To the west of Gusar, the country has a flat-steppe character, and to the west of the Zeravshan valley, the plain turns into a sandy desert, gradually advancing on Bukhara from Khiva and in those years annually winning back some space from culture. This flat character of the western part of the country does not change when a small massif of the Nur-Ata mountains is thrown into it separately from its northern part. Animal and plant life in the Emirate of Bukhara is concentrated near rivers in areas artificially irrigated with water diverted from these rivers. These oases in the desert were usually extremely densely populated, which determines the uneven distribution of the population.

The climate of the country is sharply continental. In summer the temperature reaches 55°. Low and swampy places, as well as rice plantations, are a hotbed of devastating tropical malaria, from which non-aclimatized troops suffered greatly.

The main water arteries: Zeravshan, Amudarya, Kashkadarya. These rivers formed, as it were, a frame within which the most decisive operations took place. The main difficulty for the movement and actions of troops in this theater in all directions arises not because of the nature of the terrain, but because of the lack of water in many areas. The lack of water also determines their desertity, and, consequently, the impossibility of relying on local funds for food for people and animals. Highest value in the course of the upcoming operations, they had right tributaries of the river. Amu Darya, crossing the main invasion routes to Eastern Bukhara. Their common characteristic feature is an extremely turbulent and fast current, rapid rises in water (every day) depending on the daily snowmelt on the Hissar Range, from where they all take their sources, changeable and inconsistent fords.

The population of the emirate, its social and national composition

The tribal composition of the population, approximately determined by the total number of 4-5 million people, was quite diverse. The predominant nationality predominantly in the western part of the country and dominating throughout its space were the Uzbeks. The left, and in some places the right bank of the Amu Darya River was inhabited by Turkmens. Eastern Bukhara is dominated by Tajiks; a separate oasis in their midst in the upper reaches of the river. Kashkadarya is interspersed with a mountain warlike tribe of Lokais (of Uzbek origin). In the region of Kulyab and Baldzhuan, there are nomad camps of the Kirghiz. In large trading centers, these main tribes are mixed with Persians, Jews, Russians, especially numerous in the city of Bukhara and in cities along the river. Amu Darya.

Socially, Bukhara was characterized as a predominantly small-peasant country. AT cultural areas the predominant occupation of the mass of the rural population is agriculture; in the steppes - cattle breeding. The urban proletariat was in its infancy. The petty and middle commercial bourgeoisie is also concentrated in large centers. The native intelligentsia was not numerous. The estate of the clergy, on the contrary, was numerous and had influence among the masses; among the young clergy there was a noticeable number of supporters of the Young Bukharians, who to some extent were ready to participate in the overthrow of the emir.

The cultural level of the population, from the point of view of the Europeans, was low and fell as they moved to the east, where the population had not yet fully acquired the habit of settled life and easily abandoned the latter.

Transport routes

In Western Bukhara, wheeled roads prevailed, in Eastern - almost exclusively pack roads. The latter in mountainous regions in many places were arranged in the form of cornices, molded along the edges of sheer cliffs and hanging over abysses. When advancing along such cornices, one had to be afraid that the enemy would not destroy them in front and behind the detachment moving along them and thus trap him.

The railway network of the country was exhausted by a section of the Central Asian Trans-Caspian Railway, cutting through Western Bukhara in the section from Chardzhuy to Zerabulak station, and a branch of this main highway to the city of Karshi. Other railway lines, which had just been completed by the Russian government at Guzar-Shakhrisyabz-Kerki-Termez by the end of the World War, were thoroughly destroyed by the local population during the great anti-Russian movement of 1918.

Settlements

Large settlements in Bukhara were not numerous. Political and administrative importance belonged to the years. Old Bukhara (capital), Karshi, Guzar, Baysun, Dushambe, Kulyab. All cities were of the usual Asian type. To a greater or lesser extent, all the cities of Bukhara, in their type and nature of fortifications, approached the capital.

Of strategic importance were the railway stations in the cities of Chardzhui Karshi - a junction of tracks lying at the shortest distance between Afghanistan and Turkestan, Kerki, the terminal station of the railway, the fortification of which closed the path along the left bank of the river. Amu Darya from Afghanistan to Chardzhuy, p. Derbent at the foot of the Ak-Kutal pass in the fork of the roads to Eastern Bukhara and Termez. The last fortification closed a convenient crossing from Bukhara to Afghanistan. In Eastern Bukhara, the city of Kulyab was a significant junction of local routes.

City of Old Bukhara and its fortifications

The city of Old Bukhara, as the capital, was the most heavily fortified. The fortifications of Bukhara consisted of a massive battlement wall up to 10 m high and up to 5 m thick at the base. Although the wall was made of clay with a small addition of stone and brick, but from time to time it hardened to a very significant fortress and could easily withstand field artillery fire. Inside, the city was a narrow and intricate labyrinth of streets, lanes and dead ends, interrupted by even more intricate and roofed bazaars. All these streets and lanes led to a small open space in the center of the city. A solid citadel of a quadrangular outline with several very high and massive towers rose on this space, locally called "Ark". The Ark towers and a number of high minarets built in the past centuries, rising significantly above the general mass of adobe, low buildings of the city, gave the enemy a number of good observation points. In the outer wall of the city there were several gates in the form of narrow passages blocked from above, which led into the city. For several kilometers in a circle, the capital was surrounded by gardens, country houses, emir's summer palaces with their parks and ponds, huge cemeteries and adobe walls, which made the nature of the surrounding area closed and rugged. Kagan (or New Bukhara), which was a suburb of the capital and lay 12 km from it, was a small town of the European type, connected to the capital by a railway line and a bad stone highway.

4. The course of hostilities

Events in the Emirate of Bukhara developed rapidly, already on August 25, the front command issued its order No. 3667, which determined the active assistance of the Red Army with the armed forces that had begun an uprising inside the emirate. The political goal of the operation was defined by Comrade Frunze as "revolutionary fraternal assistance to the Bukhara people in their struggle against the despotism of the Bukhara autocrat." The start of the operation was scheduled for the night of August 28-29. The Chardzhui group was supposed to assist the Bukhara rebels in capturing the city of Old Chardzhui, and then had to throw their cavalry at the Naryzym and Burdalyk crossings across the river. Amu Darya to intercept all the fugitives, including the emir and members of the government, if they tried to flee along these routes to Afghanistan. For the same purpose, it was necessary to capture the city of Karakul and the Yakki-tut railway station. Along with these actions of the detachment, the establishment of revolutionary power along the Amu Darya from the Khorezm border to Termez inclusive was achieved. The head of the Kagan group, Comrade Belov, upon receiving the first information about the revolutionary coup in Old Chardzhui, was supposed to move his units to the capital and the emir's country palace of Sitor Mahi Khasa (Makhasa), 5 km northeast of Bukhara, where "with a decisive and crushing blow destroy all the military forces of the old Bukhara government and not allow the enemy to organize new resistance. AT special task included the capture of the emir and his government. Other groups and parties were to carry out the tasks specified in the directive of August 12. The task of the Samarkand Otrada was expanded in the sense that the 7th Rifle Regiment, which came at the disposal of this Otrada, after the defeat of the enemy grouping in the Shakhrisyabz-Kitab area, had to capture the Karshi-Guzar region in order to prevent the remnants of the Shakhrisyabz Bek's troops from leaving for Sharabad in the eastern mountain beks.

Further events began to develop within the time frame stipulated by this order. On the night of August 28, the concentration of all the forces of the Kagan Otrad ended. At the same time, the Bukhara revolutionaries captured the city of Old Chardzhui, and parts of the Chardzhui detachment of Comrade Nikitin moved to the crossings through the Amu Darya, Narazym and Burdalyk and captured them on August 31. At the same time, a special consolation consisting of the 5th Infantry Regiment, the consolidated company of the 8th Infantry Regiment and the division of the 16th Cavalry Regiment was moved from the city of Novy Chardzhuy to the city of Karakul.

The Kagan group went on the offensive between 6 and 7 am on 29 August. She advanced in two columns. The right (eastern) included the 10th and 12th Tatar rifle regiments, the 1st cavalry regiment, four guns, the 53rd armored detachment, armored train No. 28. This column advanced from the city of Kagan along the highway and railway line to the southeastern part of the city wall, where the Karshi gates were located.

The left column (western) consisting of the 1st East Muslim Rifle Regiment, rifle and cavalry regiments was a special-purpose joy with two light guns, having landed 14 km west of the station. Kagan, advanced on the southwestern Karakul city gates. Thus, the offensive was carried out simultaneously on two opposite points, which cannot be considered correct, given the overall small number of Red Army forces. The artillery group, which consisted of a platoon of fortress 152-mm cannons on platforms and a 122-mm battery, was supposed to support the advance of the right column.

However, on the first day of the offensive, she was located at the maximum distance, so her fire had little effect. For the defense of each of the gates with adjacent sections of the city wall, the enemy had forces of up to 2000-3000 fighters and, in addition, a mobile reserve outside the city, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bSitor Mahi Khasa (Mahasa), in the amount of up to 6000-8000 fighters. The columns slowly advanced over rough terrain, met by enemy fire and counterattacks, and on the first day of the offensive they only managed to get closer to the city fortifications, but could not capture them. In the same situation, the day of August 30 passed.

On August 31, the Karakul detachment and the 2nd Infantry Regiment with two batteries approached the region of Old Bukhara. On this day, the leadership of the actions of all forces over Bukhara was united in the hands of the commander of the 1st Army, Zinoviev G.V. closer to the city. During August 31, the command of the group concentrated against the Karshi Gates, near which at that time a breach had already been made, almost all of their forces, leaving in the left column only the rifle regiment (1st Eastern Muslim), the consolidated company of the 8th rifle regiment and the cavalry regiment special forces squad.

At 5 a.m. on September 1, the right column moved to storm the Karshi Gates, which this time ended in success: after a stubborn street battle, by 5 p.m. of the same day, Old Bukhara passed entirely into the hands of the Soviet troops. However, the emir was no longer in the city. On the night of August 31, he left his capital under the protection of a detachment of 1000 people. and headed in a northeasterly direction to the city of Gydzh-Duvan. On September 2, M. V. Frunze sent a telegram to V. I. Lenin, which stated:

“The fortress of Old Bukhara was taken by storm today by the combined efforts of the red Bukhara and our units. The last stronghold of Bukhara obscurantism and the Black Hundreds fell. Over the Registan, the red banner of the world revolution victoriously flutters.

Actions of the Kattakurgan and Samarkand detachments. Emir persecution.

At the same time, the Kattakurgan and Samarkand detachments successfully coped with the tasks assigned to them in accordance with the directive of August 12. Further operations were reduced to the organization of the pursuit of the emir and his entourage (This task was initially taken over by the commander of the 1st Army, G. V. Zinoviev: he chased the emir to the city of Karshi with a cavalry detachment.). However, they managed to slip between the red detachments pursuing them and find temporary shelter in Eastern Bukhara. The capture of Bukhara and the flight of the emir marked the victory of the Bukhara revolution. The first step of the revolution that won in Bukhara was the proclamation of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic, similar to what was done in Khorezm.

Results

The operation to eliminate the power of the emir took no more than a week, and the main goal of the operation was fully achieved. The speed and energy with which the operation was carried out, and its success, were the result of careful preparatory work, which distinguished Frunze as a commander. The Bukhara counter-revolution received a decisive blow. All subsequent operations of the Red Army in Bukhara amounted to the liquidation of the remnants of this counter-revolution. The spatiality of the theater and its difficult conditions left their mark on these operations in the sense that they were greatly delayed in time. In order to finally expel the former emir from Bukhara, who settled with a group of adherents first in Baysun, and then in Dushanbe, and the Sovietization of Eastern Bukhara Soviet troops, overcoming all obstacles and adverse conditions of terrain and climate, in 1921 in the so-called Hissar expedition advanced deep into Eastern Bukhara and finally ousted the emir's supporters from the borders of the Bukhara People's Republic.

However, this expedition, undertaken in the form of a raid by one cavalry division with small infantry units attached to it, did not give lasting results due to the lack of systematic work on the political and administrative consolidation of the rear. Our columns, having made several distant trips to the most remote places of Eastern Bukhara, by the onset of autumn were forced to retreat to winter quarters closer to their bases, since, due to poor provision and organization of the rear, they began to be threatened with strategic exhaustion. It was not possible to consolidate Soviet power in Eastern Bukhara, which was used by the local opponents of the revolution the following year.

In 1922, the local counter-revolution, taking advantage of the split in the ranks of the forces that had made the revolution, again tried to start active resistance. Enver Pasha, one of the former members of the Young Turk Party, took over the leadership of this resistance. Appearing in Eastern Bukhara in the early spring of 1922, Enver Pasha tried to captivate the masses with the slogans of pan-Islamism and resistance to the Bolsheviks. This attempt was initially successful. The counter-revolutionary activities of Enver Pasha in Eastern Bukhara were stopped by a new campaign of the Red Army there. In several battles, Enver Pasha was defeated, and in one of the skirmishes he was killed.

Bibliography:

M. V. Frunze on the fronts civil war: Collection of documents. M., 1941, p. 330.

Plan Introduction 1 Political situation the day before 2 Armed forces, their deployment and plan of operation 2.1 Bukhara army 2.2 Red Army 2.3 Operation plan and Frunze's order of August 13, 1920. 3 Natural conditions and population 3.1 Natural conditions and difficulties of a military campaign 3.2 The population of the emirate, its social and national composition 3.3 Transport routes 3.4 Settlements 3.5 City of Old Bukhara and its fortifications 4 Course of hostilities 4.1 Order of the commander of the Turfront No. 3667 of August 25, 1920 4.2 Storming of Old Bukhara, August 29 - September 2, 1920 4.3 Actions of the Kattakurgan and Samarkand detachments. Emir persecution. 4.4 Summary Bibliography Bukhara operation (1920)