A subdivision of the 3rd Belorussian Front is crossing the Luchesa River.
June 1944

This year marks 70 years since the Red Army carried out one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War- Operation Bagration. In the course of it, the Red Army not only liberated the people of Belarus from the occupation, but also significantly undermined the forces of the enemy, brought the collapse of fascism closer - our Victory.

Unmatched in terms of spatial scope, Belarusian offensive is considered to be the greatest achievement of Russian military art. As a result, the most powerful group of the Wehrmacht was defeated. This became possible thanks to the unparalleled courage, heroism of determination and self-sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers and partisans of Belarus, many of whom died a heroic death on Belarusian soil in the name of Victory over the enemy.

Map of the Belarusian operation

After the onset of the winter of 1943-1944. the front line in Belarus formed a huge ledge with an area of ​​about 250 thousand square meters. km, the top facing east. It penetrated deeply into the disposition of Soviet troops and was of great operational and strategic importance for both sides. The elimination of this ledge and the liberation of Belarus opened the shortest path for the Red Army to Poland and Germany, and threatened the flank attacks of the enemy army groups "North" and "Northern Ukraine".

In the central direction, the Soviet troops were opposed by Army Group Center (3rd Panzer, 4th, 9th and 2nd armies) under the command of Field Marshal E. Bush. It was supported by the aviation of the 6th and partially the 1st and 4th air fleets. In total, the enemy grouping consisted of 63 divisions and 3 infantry brigades, which numbered 800 thousand people, 7.6 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns, and more than 1300 combat aircraft. In the reserve of Army Group Center there were 11 divisions, most of which were involved in the fight against the partisans.

During the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the Supreme Command Headquarters planned to conduct a strategic operation for the final liberation of Belarus, in which the troops of 4 fronts were supposed to act in concert. The troops of the 1st Baltic (commanded by General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan), 3rd (commanded by Colonel-General I.D. Chernyakhovsky), 2nd (commanded by Colonel-General G.F. Zakharov) and 1st Belorussian fronts (commanded by General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky), Long-Range Aviation, the Dnieper military flotilla, as well as a large number of formations and detachments of Belarusian partisans.

Commander of the 1st Baltic Front General of the Army
THEIR. Baghramyan and the chief of staff of the front, lieutenant general
V.V. Kurasov during the Belarusian operation

The fronts included 20 combined arms, 2 tank and 5 air armies. In total, the group consisted of 178 rifle divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps and 21 brigades. Air support and cover of the front troops was provided by 5 air armies.

The idea of ​​the operation provided for deep blows from 4 fronts to break through the enemy's defenses in 6 directions, encircle and destroy enemy groupings on the flanks of the Belarusian salient - in the regions of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, after which, advancing in converging directions to Minsk, encircle and eliminate east of the Belarusian capital the main forces of Army Group Center. In the future, increasing the force of the blow, reach the line Kaunas - Bialystok - Lublin.

When choosing the direction of the main attack, the idea of ​​concentrating forces on the Minsk direction was clearly expressed. The simultaneous breakthrough of the front in 6 sectors led to the dissection of enemy forces, making it difficult for him to use reserves when repelling the offensive of our troops.

To strengthen the grouping, the Stavka in the spring and summer of 1944 replenished the fronts with four combined-arms, two tank armies, four artillery breakthrough divisions, two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, and four engineer brigades. In the 1.5 months preceding the operation, the strength of the grouping of Soviet troops in Belarus increased by more than 4 times in tanks, almost 2 times in artillery, and by two-thirds in aircraft.

The enemy, not expecting large-scale actions in this direction, hoped to repel a private offensive of Soviet troops with the forces and means of Army Group Center, located in one echelon, mainly only in the tactical defense zone, which consisted of 2 defensive zones with a depth of 8 to 12 km ... At the same time, using the terrain favorable for defense, he created a multi-lane, in-depth defense, consisting of several lines, with a total depth of up to 250 km. Defense lines were built along the western banks of the rivers. The cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Borisov, Minsk were turned into powerful defense centers.

By the beginning of the operation, the attacking troops numbered 1.2 million people, 34 thousand guns and mortars, 4070 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, about 5 thousand combat aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in manpower by 1.5 times, guns and mortars by 4.4 times, tanks and self-propelled artillery installations by 4.5 times, and by aircraft by 3.6 times.

In none of the previous offensive operations did the Red Army have such a number of artillery, tanks and combat aircraft, and such superiority in forces, as in the Belorussian one.

By the Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the tasks for the fronts were determined as follows:

The troops of the 1st Baltic Front to break through the enemy's defenses north-west of Vitebsk, capture the Beshenkovichi region, and part of the forces, in cooperation with the right-flank army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, surround and destroy the enemy in the Vitebsk region. Subsequently, develop an offensive against Lepel;

The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front, defeat the enemy's Vitebsk-Orsha grouping and reach the Berezina. To accomplish this task, the front had to strike in two directions (with the forces of 2 armies on each): on Senno, and along the Minsk highway to Borisov, and part of the forces to Orsha. The main forces of the front must develop an offensive towards the Berezina River;

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 3rd and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian fronts, defeat the Mogilev grouping, liberate Mogilev and reach the Berezina River;

The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front to crush the enemy's Bobruisk grouping. To this end, the front was to deliver two strikes: one from the Rogachev area in the direction of Bobruisk, Osipovichi, the second from the area of ​​the lower course of the Berezina to Starye Dorogi and Slutsk. At the same time, the troops of the right wing of the front were to assist the 2nd Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Mogilev grouping;

After the defeat of the enemy's flank groupings, the troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian fronts were to develop an offensive in converging directions to Minsk and, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front and partisans, encircle its main forces east of Minsk.

The partisans were also tasked with disrupting the work of the enemy's rear, disrupting the supply of reserves, capturing important lines, river crossings and bridgeheads, and holding them until the approach of the advancing troops. The first detonation of the rails should be carried out on the night of June 20.

Great attention was paid to concentrating aviation efforts on the direction of the main strikes of the fronts and maintaining air supremacy. Just on the eve of the offensive, aviation made 2,700 sorties and conducted powerful air training in the front breakthrough sectors.

The duration of the artillery preparation was planned from 2 hours to 2 hours and 20 minutes. Support for the attack was planned using the methods of a barrage, consistent concentration of fire, and also a combination of both methods. In the offensive zones of the 1st Belorussian Front's 2 armies, operating in the direction of the main attack, the infantry and tank attacks were supported for the first time by the method of a double barrage.

At the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. The chief of staff, Colonel-General M.S. Malinin, far left - front commander, Army General K.K. Rokossovsky. Bobruisk area. Summer 1944

The coordination of the actions of the front troops was entrusted to the representatives of the Headquarters - the Chief of the General Staff of the Marshal Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov. For the same purpose, the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, General S.M. Shtemenko. The actions of the air armies were coordinated by the Chief Marshal of Aviation A.A. Novikov and Air Marshal F.Ya. Falaleev. Marshal of artillery N.D. Yakovlev and Colonel-General of Artillery M.N. Chistyakov.

The operation required 400 thousand tons of ammunition, about 300 thousand tons of fuel, over 500 thousand tons of food and fodder, which were supplied in a timely manner.

By the nature of the hostilities and the content of the tasks, Operation Bagration is divided into two stages: the first - from June 23 to July 4, 1944, during which 5 front-line operations were carried out: Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk, and the second - from July 5 to August 29, 1944, which included 5 more front-line operations: Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok and Lublin-Brest.

The first stage of Operation Bagration included breaking through the enemy's defenses to the entire tactical depth, expanding the breakthrough to the sides of the flanks and routing the nearest operational reserves and capturing a number of cities, incl. liberation of the capital of Belarus - Minsk; 2nd stage - development of success in depth, overcoming intermediate defensive lines, routing the main operational reserves of the enemy, capturing important lines and bridgeheads on the river. Vistula. Specific tasks for the fronts were determined to a depth of 160 km.

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts began on 23 June. A day later, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front joined the battle. The offensive was preceded by reconnaissance in force.

The actions of the troops during Operation Bagration, like in no other operation of the Soviet troops before that, almost exactly corresponded to its intention and the tasks received. In 12 days of intense fighting in the first stage of the operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were defeated.

German prisoners of war of army group "Center" are carried out in Moscow.
July 17, 1944

The troops, having advanced 225-280 km at an average daily rate of 20-25 km, liberated most of Belarus. In the regions of Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Minsk, a total of about 30 German divisions were surrounded and defeated. The enemy front in the central direction was crushed. The results achieved created the conditions for the subsequent offensive in the Shauliai, Vilnius, Grodno and Brest directions, as well as for the transition to active operations in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

Soldier, free your Belarus. Poster by V. Koretsky. 1944 g.

The goals set for the fronts were fully achieved. The Stavka promptly used the success of the Byelorussian operation for decisive actions in other sectors of the Soviet-German front. On July 13, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. The general front of the offensive expanded from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians. Soviet troops crossed the state border of the Soviet Union with Poland on July 17-18. By August 29, they reached the line - Jelgava, Dobele, Augustow and the Narew and Vistula rivers.

Vistula river. Crossing tanks. 1944 g.

The further development of the offensive with an acute shortage of ammunition and fatigue of the Soviet troops would not have succeeded, and they went on the defensive on the orders of the Headquarters.

2nd Belorussian Front: Front Commander Army General
G.F. Zakharov, member of the Military Council, Lieutenant General N.E. Subbotin and Colonel General K.A. Vershinin are discussing a plan for an air strike against the enemy. August 1944

As a result of the Belarusian operation, favorable conditions were created not only for delivering new powerful strikes against enemy groupings operating on the Soviet-German front in the Baltic, East Prussia and Poland, in the Warsaw-Berlin direction, but also for deploying offensive operations by Anglo-American troops, landed in Normandy.

The Belarusian offensive operation of the group of fronts, which lasted 68 days, is one of the outstanding operations not only of the Great Patriotic War, but of the entire Second World War. Its distinctive feature is its enormous spatial scope and impressive operational and strategic results.

Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front. From left to right: Front Chief of Staff Colonel-General A.P. Pokrovsky, member of the Front Military Council, Lieutenant General V.E. Makarov, commander of the front forces, General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky. September 1944

Having launched an offensive on June 23 on a front of 700 km, Red Army troops had advanced 550 - 600 km to the west by the end of August, expanding the front of hostilities to 1,100 km. The vast territory of Belarus and a significant part of eastern Poland were cleared of the German invaders. Soviet troops reached the Vistula, on the approaches to Warsaw and to the border with East Prussia.

The battalion commander of the 297th Infantry Regiment of the 184th Division of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Captain G.N. Gubkin (right) with officers on reconnaissance. On August 17, 1944, his battalion was the first in the Red Army to break through to the border of East Prussia

During the operation, the largest German group suffered a crushing defeat. Of the 179 divisions and 5 brigades of the Wehrmacht, then operating on the Soviet-German front, 17 divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed in Belarus, and 50 divisions, having lost more than 50% of their personnel, lost their combat effectiveness. German troops lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers.

Operation Bagration showed vivid examples of the high skill of Soviet commanders and military leaders. She made significant contributions to the development of strategy, operational art and tactics; enriched the art of war with the experience of encircling and destroying large enemy groupings in a short time and in the most varied conditions of the situation. The task of breaking through the enemy's powerful defenses was successfully solved, as well as the rapid development of success in the operational depth due to the skillful use of large tank formations and formations.

In the struggle for the liberation of Belarus, Soviet soldiers displayed massive heroism and high combat skill. 1,500 of its participants became Heroes of the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. Among the Heroes of the Soviet Union and those awarded were soldiers of all nationalities of the USSR.

Exclusively important role partisan formations played in the liberation of Belarus.

Partisan brigade parade after liberation
the capital of Belarus - Minsk

Solving tasks in close cooperation with the troops of the Red Army, they destroyed over 15 thousand and captured more than 17 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The Motherland highly appreciated the feat of the partisans and underground fighters. Many of them were awarded orders and medals, and 87 who distinguished themselves became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

But the victory came at a high price. At the same time, the high intensity of hostilities, the early transition of the enemy to the defensive, the difficult conditions of the wooded and swampy terrain, the need to overcome large water barriers and other natural obstacles led to large casualties. In the course of the offensive, the troops of the four fronts lost 765,815 people killed, wounded, missing and disappearing due to illness, which is almost 50% of their total number by the beginning of the operation. And the irrecoverable losses amounted to 178,507 people. Our troops also suffered heavy losses in armament.

The world community appreciated the events in the central sector of the Soviet-German front. Western political and military leaders, diplomats and journalists celebrated them significant influence on the further course of the Second World War. "The swiftness of the offensive of your armies is amazing," wrote the President of the United States of America F. Roosevelt on July 21, 1944 I.V. Stalin. In the telegram chapter Soviet government of July 24, British Prime Minister W. Churchill called the events in Belarus "victories of great importance." On July 9, one of the Turkish newspapers stated: "If the advance of the Russians develops at the same pace, the Russian troops will enter Berlin faster than the Allied troops will finish operations in Normandy."

A professor at the University of Edinburgh, a well-known English expert on military-strategic problems, J. Erickson, in his book The Road to Berlin, emphasized: “The defeat of Army Group Center by the Soviet troops was their greatest success achieved ... as a result of one operation. For the German army ... it was a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions, greater than Stalingrad. "

Operation Bagration was the first major offensive by the Red Army during the period when the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain began hostilities in Western Europe... However, 70% of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht continued to fight on the Soviet-German front. The catastrophe in Belarus forced the German command to transfer large strategic reserves here from the west, which, of course, created favorable conditions for offensive operations of the allies after the landing of their troops in Normandy and the conduct of a coalition war in Europe.

The successful offensive of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts in the western direction in the summer of 1944 radically changed the situation on the entire Soviet-German front, led to a sharp weakening of the combat potential of the Wehrmacht. Having eliminated the Belarusian ledge, they eliminated the threat of flank attacks from the north for the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which were attacking in Lvov and Rava-Russian directions. The capture and retention of bridgeheads on the Vistula by Soviet troops in the Pulawy and Magnushev areas opened up prospects for new operations to defeat the enemy with the aim of completely liberating Poland and attacking the German capital.

Memorial Complex"Mound of Glory".

Sculptors A. Bembel and A. Artimovich, architects O. Stakhovich and L. Mitskevich, engineer B. Laptsevich. The total height of the memorial is 70.6 m. An earthen mound 35 m high is crowned with a sculptural composition of four bayonets faced with titanium, each 35.6 m high. Bayonets symbolize the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts that liberated Belarus. Their base is surrounded by a ring with bas-relief images of Soviet soldiers and partisans. On inside the ring, made in the mosaic technique, is repulsed with the text: "Glory to the Soviet Army, the Liberator Army!"

Sergey Lipatov,
Researcher of the Research
institute military history Military academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces
Russian Federation

By June 1944, the Red Army had liberated almost the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR. It was there, on Ukrainian soil, that the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses. However, by the spring of the penultimate year of the war, the offensive of the Soviet troops slowed down: the enemy constantly transferred fresh forces from the western front, which, imposing protracted battles, were able to stop the advance of the Red Army.

The Supreme Command headquarters could not put up with this state of affairs. At the same time, Headquarters was well aware that it was impossible to throw an army into battle without careful planning of operations. That is why the General Staff and Headquarters made the only correct decision in such a situation - to change the direction of the main strikes.

By that time, the front line ran along the Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin line. On operational maps, it looked like a wedge, the tip of which was turned into the depths of the Soviet Union. The area of ​​the "balcony", as the ledge was called, was almost 250 thousand square kilometers.

In Berlin, the offensive of the Red Army in Belarus was not expected: the military leadership of the Third Reich was confident that an offensive should be expected north of Leningrad or in the direction of "Southern Poland - Balkans".

The headquarters of the Supreme Command, on the contrary, considered the complete liberation of Belarus to be the primary task of the summer-autumn campaign.

It was assumed that four Soviet fronts - 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky, G.F. Zakharova and I.D. Chernyakhovsky and the 1st Baltic Front under the command of I.Kh. Baghramyan, - inflicting deep blows in six directions at once, they will first break through the defenses, surround and destroy the enemy groupings on the flanks, eliminate the main forces of Army Group Center and reach the Kaunas-Bialystok-Lublin line.

In total, under the command of four commanders of 27 armies: 20 combined arms, two tank and five air.

With the choice of the direction of the main attack, they quickly decided - the Minsk direction.

A rather difficult task was to break through the front in six sectors: however, the implementation of this particular decision could lead to a rapid dissection of enemy forces and would complicate the use of reserves.

On May 30, 1944, the Supreme Command Headquarters approves the final plan of the Belarusian offensive operation, which received the code name "Bagration".

Until the start of the operation, the Stavka replenished the fronts that were supposed to take part in the offensive: every day more than 100 trains with manpower, fuel, ammunition, and equipment were sent to the front. The result was an almost fourfold advantage of the Red Army in tanks and guns, threefold in aircraft and one and a half times in manpower: before that, in any offensive operation, Soviet troops had such superiority.

At the same time, the enemy, who still did not expect a large-scale offensive in the Minsk direction, was confident that any local offensive by Soviet troops would be calmly repelled by the main forces of Army Group Center. At the same time, the German command placed great hope on a multi-lane, in-depth defense.

During three years Belarus was under the yoke of the enemy. The invaders plundered the territory of the republic: cities were ruined, more than a million buildings in the countryside were burned, 7 thousand schools were turned into ruins. The Nazis killed more than two million prisoners of war and civilians. In fact, there was no family in the Byelorussian SSR that did not suffer from the Nazis. Belaya Rus was one of the most affected territories of the Union. But people did not lose heart and resisted. Knowing that in the East, the Red Army repelled the enemy's onslaught on Moscow, Stalingrad and the Caucasus, defeated the Nazis by Kursk Bulge, liberates the regions of Ukraine, the Belarusian partisans were preparing for decisive action. By the summer of 1944, about 140 thousand partisans were operating on the territory of Belarus. The general leadership of the partisans was carried out by the underground organizations of the Communist Party of the BSSR, headed by Panteleimon Kondratyevich Ponomarenko, who was also the head of the Central Headquarters of the USSR partisan movement. It should be noted that his contemporaries noted his amazing honesty, responsibility and deep analytical skills. Stalin highly valued Ponomarenko; some researchers believe that the leader wanted to make him his successor.

A few days before the start of the operation to liberate Belarus, partisan detachments dealt a number of sensitive blows to the Germans. The partisans destroyed their transport infrastructure, communication lines, practically paralyzed the rear of the enemy at the most crucial moment. During the operation, the partisans struck at individual enemy units and attacked the rear structures of the Germans.

Preparation of the operation

The operational plan of the Belarusian operation began to be developed back in April. The general plan of the General Staff was to crush the flanks of the German Army Group Center, encircle its main forces east of the capital of the BSSR and completely liberate Belarus. It was a very ambitious and large-scale plan; the simultaneous destruction of an entire group of enemy armies was planned very rarely during the Second World War. It was one of the largest operations in the entire military of humanity.

By the summer of 1944, the Red Army had achieved impressive successes in Ukraine - the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses, the Soviet forces conducted a number of successful offensive operations, liberating most of the territory of the republic. But in the Belarusian direction, things were worse: the front line approached the Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin line, forming a huge ledge that turned into the depths of the USSR, the so-called. "Belarusian balcony".

In July 1944, German industry reached the highest point of its development in this war - in the first half of the year, Reich factories produced more than 16 thousand aircraft, 8.3 thousand, assault guns. Berlin carried out several mobilizations, and its number armed forces was 324 divisions and 5 brigades. Army Group Center, which defended Belarus, had 850-900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1350 aircraft. In addition, at the second stage of the battle, Army Group Center was supported by formations of the right flank of Army Group North and the left flank of Army Group Northern Ukraine, as well as reserves from the Western Front and various sectors. Eastern Front... Army Group Center consisted of 4 armies: the 2nd Field Army, which held the Pinsk and Pripyat region (commander Walter Weiss); 9th Field Army, it defended the area on both sides of the Berezina southeast of Bobruisk (Hans Jordan, after June 27 - Nikolaus von Formann); The 4th Field Army (Kurt von Tippelskirch, after June 30, the army was commanded by Vincenz Müller) and the 3rd Panzer Army (Georg Reinhardt), which occupied the interfluve of the Berezina and the Dnieper, as well as the bridgehead from Bykhov to the region northeast of Orsha. In addition, the formations of the 3rd Panzer Army occupied the Vitebsk region. The commander of Army Group Center was Field Marshal Ernst Busch (on June 28, Busch was replaced by Walter Model). Its chief of staff was Hans Krebs.

If the command of the Red Army was well aware of the German grouping in the area of ​​the future offensive, then the command of Army Group Center and the headquarters of the Reich ground forces had a completely wrong idea of ​​Moscow's plans for the 1944 summer campaign. Adolf Hitler and the High Command of the Wehrmacht believed that a major Soviet offensive should still be expected in Ukraine, north or south of the Carpathians (most likely north). It was believed that from the area south of Kovel, Soviet troops would strike towards the Baltic Sea, trying to cut off Army Groups Center and North from Germany. Large forces were allocated to fend off a possible threat. Thus, Army Group Northern Ukraine had seven tank divisions, two tank-grenadier divisions, and four battalions of Tiger heavy tanks. And Army Group Center had one tank, two tank-grenadier divisions and one battalion of heavy tanks. In addition, they feared a blow to Romania - to the oil fields of Ploiesti. In April, the command of Army Group Center presented to the top leadership a proposal to reduce the front line and withdraw troops to better positions beyond the Berezina. But this plan was rejected, Army Group Center was ordered to defend itself in its previous positions. Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk were declared "fortresses" and fortified with the expectation of an all-round defense, a possible fight in encirclement. Forced labor of local residents was widely used for engineering work. , radio intelligence and German agents could not reveal the preparations by the Soviet command of a major operation in Belarus. Army Groups Center and North were predicted to have a "calm summer", the situation inspired so little concern that Field Marshal Bush went on vacation three days before the start of the Red Army operation. But, it should be noted that the front in Belarus stood still for a long time, and the Nazis managed to create a developed defense system. It included "fortress" cities, numerous field fortifications, bunkers, dugouts, interchangeable positions for artillery and machine guns. The Germans assigned a large role to natural obstacles - wooded and swampy terrain, many rivers and streams.

Red Army. Stalin made the final decision on the summer campaign, including the Belarusian operation, at the end of April. Deputy Chief of the General Staff A. I. Antonov was instructed to organize the work of planning operations in the General Staff. The plan for the liberation of Belarus was codenamed - Operation Bagration. On May 20, 1944, the General Staff completed the development of a plan for an offensive operation. A.M. Vasilevsky, A.I. Antonov, and G.K. Zhukov were summoned to the Headquarters. On May 22, the commanders of the fronts I. Kh. Bagramyan, I. D. Chernyakhovsky, K. K. Rokossovsky were received at Headquarters to hear their views on the operation. The coordination of the front troops was entrusted to Vasilevsky and Zhukov, they left for the troops in early June.

The rate provided for the delivery of three powerful blows. The 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts advanced in the general direction of Vilnius. The troops of the two fronts were to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk grouping, develop an offensive to the west and cover the left-flank grouping of the Borisov-Minsk group of German forces. The 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to crush the Bobruisk grouping of the Germans. Then develop the offensive in the direction of Slutsk-Baranovichi and cover the Minsk group of German troops from the south and southwest. The 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left-flank grouping of the 3rd Belorussian and the right flank of the 1st Belorussian fronts, was to move in the general direction of Minsk.

On the Soviet side, about 1 million 200 thousand people took part in the operation as part of four fronts: the 1st Baltic Front (General of the Army Ivan Khristoforovich Baghramyan); 3rd Belorussian Front (Colonel General Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky); 2nd Belorussian Front (Colonel General Georgy Fedorovich Zakharov); 1st Belorussian Front (General of the Army Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky). The coordinator of the actions of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts was Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, and the coordinator of the actions of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts was Chief of the General Staff Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky. The Dnieper military also took part in the operation.


Preparation of the Belarusian operation (from left to right) Varennikov I. S., Zhukov G. K., Kazakov V. I., Rokossovsky K. K. 1st Belorussian Front. 1944 g.

Operation Bagration was supposed to solve several important tasks:

Completely clear the Moscow direction of German troops, since the front edge of the "Belorussian salient" was located 80 kilometers from Smolensk. The configuration of the front line in the BSSR was a huge arc stretched to the east with an area of ​​almost 250 thousand square kilometers. The arc stretched from Vitebsk in the north and Pinsk in the south to the Smolensk and Gomel regions, hanging over the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The German high command attached great importance to this territory - it defended the distant approaches to Poland and East Prussia. In addition, Hitler still cherished plans for a victorious war if a "miracle" was created, or major geopolitical changes took place. From the bridgehead in Belarus, it was possible to strike again at Moscow.

Complete the liberation of the entire Belarusian territory, parts of Lithuania and Poland.

To reach the Baltic coast and to the borders of East Prussia, which made it possible to cut the German front at the junctions of Army Groups Center and North and isolate these German groupings from each other.

To create favorable operational and tactical prerequisites for subsequent offensive operations in the Baltic States, in Western Ukraine, in the Warsaw and East Prussian directions.

Operational milestones

The operation was carried out in two stages. At the first stage (June 23 - July 4, 1944), the following were carried out: Vitebsk-Orshansk, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk front-line offensive operations. At the second stage of Operation Bagration (July 5 - August 29, 1944), the following were carried out: Vilnius, Shauliai, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest, Kaunas and Osovets front-line offensive operations.

The first stage of the operation

The offensive began on the morning of June 23, 1944. Near Vitebsk, the Red Army successfully broke through the German defenses and already on June 25 surrounded five enemy divisions west of the city. The liquidation of the Vitebsk "cauldron" was completed by the morning of June 27, on the same day Orsha was released. With the destruction of the Vitebsk grouping of the Germans, the key position on the left flank of the defense of Army Group Center was captured. The northern flank of Army Group Center was virtually destroyed, more than 40 thousand Germans were killed and 17 thousand people were captured. In the Orsha direction, after breaking through the German defense, the Soviet command brought the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle. Having successfully crossed the Berezina, Rotmistrov's tankmen cleared Borisov of the Nazis. The withdrawal of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front to the Borisov area led to significant operational success: the 3rd Panzer Army of Army Group Center was cut off from the 4th Field Army. The formations of the 2nd Belorussian Front advancing on the Mogilev direction pierced the powerful and deeply echeloned German defenses, which the enemy had prepared along the Pronya, Basya and Dnieper rivers. On June 28 they liberated Mogilev. The retreat of the 4th German army lost its organization, the enemy lost up to 33 thousand killed and prisoners.

The Bobruisk offensive operation was supposed to create the southern "claw" of the huge encirclement conceived by the Soviet Headquarters. This operation was carried out entirely by the most powerful of the fronts - 1st Belorussian under the command of K. K. Rokossovsky. The 9th Army of the Wehrmacht opposed the offensive of the Red Army. They had to advance over very difficult terrain - swamps. The blow was struck on June 24: from the southeast to the northwest, gradually turning to the north, Batov's 65th army (reinforced by the 1st Don Tank Corps) moved, from the east to the west Gorbatov's 3rd Army advanced with the 9th tank body. For a quick breakthrough in the Slutsk direction, the 28th Army of Luchinsky and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps of Pliev were used. The armies of Batov and Luchinsky quickly broke through the defenses of the stunned enemy (the Russians made their way through the swamp, which was considered impassable). But the 3rd army of Gorbatov had to literally bite into the orders of the Germans. The commander of the 9th Army, Hans Jordan, threw his main reserve against it - the 20th Panzer Division. But soon he had to redirect his reserve to the southern flank of the defense. The 20th Panzer Division was unable to plug the breakthrough. On June 27, the main forces of the 9th Field Army fell into the "cauldron". General Jordan was replaced by von Foreman, but this could not save the situation. Attempts to release the blockade from outside and from within have failed. In the encircled Bobruisk, panic reigned, and on the 27th its assault began. By the morning of June 29, Bobruisk was completely liberated. The Germans lost 74 thousand people killed and captured. As a result of the defeat of the 9th Army, both flanks of Army Group Center were opened, and the road to Minsk was free from the northeast and southeast.

On June 29, the 1st Baltic Front attacked Polotsk. Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army and Beloborodov's 43rd Army bypassed the city from the south (the 6th Army guards also bypassed Polotsk from the west), Malyshev's 4th Shock Army - from the north. Butkov's 1st Panzer Corps liberated the town of Ushachi south of Polotsk and advanced far to the west. Then the tankers with a surprise attack seized a bridgehead on the western bank of the Dvina. But it did not work to take the Germans into the "ring" - the commander of the garrison of the city, Karl Hilpert, left the "fortress" without permission, without waiting for the escape routes to be cut by the Russian troops. Polotsk was occupied on 4 July. As a result of the Polotsk operation, the German command lost a strong stronghold and a railway junction. In addition, the flank threat to the 1st Baltic Front was eliminated, the positions of the German Army Group North were bypassed from the south and were under the threat of a flank attack.

German command, trying to rectify the situation, changed the commander of Army Group Center Bush to Field Marshal Walter Model. He was considered a master of defensive operations. Reserve units were sent to Belarus, including the 4th, 5th and 12th tank divisions.

The 4th German Army, facing the threat of imminent encirclement, retreated across the Berezina River. The situation was extremely difficult: the flanks were open, the retreating columns were subjected to constant attacks by Soviet aviation and attacks by partisans. The pressure from the 2nd Belorussian Front, which was located directly in front of the 4th Army front, was not strong, since the plans of the Soviet command did not include the expulsion of German troops from the future "cauldron".

The 3rd Belorussian Front advanced in two main directions: to the southwest (towards Minsk) and west (towards Vileika). The 1st Belorussian Front advanced on Slutsk, Nesvizh and Minsk. German resistance was weak, the main forces were defeated. On June 30, Slutsk was taken, and on July 2 Nesvizh, the Germans were cut off their escape routes to the southwest. By July 2, tank units of the 1st Belorussian Front approached Minsk. The advancing units of the 3rd Belorussian Front had to endure a fierce battle with the 5th German tank division (reinforced by a battalion of heavy tanks), which arrived in the Borisov area on June 26-28. This division was full-blooded, for several months it did not participate in hostilities. During several bloody battles, the last one took place on July 1-2 north-west of Minsk, the tank division lost almost all its tanks and was thrown back. On July 3, Burdeyny's 2nd Panzer Corps broke into Minsk from the northwestern direction. At the same time, the advanced units of Rokossovsky approached the city from the southern direction. The German garrison was not numerous and did not last long, Minsk was liberated by lunchtime. As a result, parts of the 4th Army and the units of other armies that joined it were surrounded by an encirclement. The Red Army actually avenged the 1941 "boilers". The encircled could not organize long-term resistance - the encirclement area was shot through with artillery fire, it was constantly bombed, the ammunition ran out, there was no outside help. The Germans fought until July 8-9, made several desperate attempts to break through, but were defeated everywhere. July 8 and. O. army commander, commander of the XII army corps Vincenz Müller signed the surrender. Even before July 12, there was a "cleansing" operation, the Germans lost 72 thousand killed and more than 35 thousand were taken prisoner.




The poverty of the road network in Belarus and the swampy-wooded area led to the fact that many kilometers of columns of German troops huddled on only two large highways - Zhlobinsky and Rogachevsky, where they were subjected to massive attacks by the Soviet 16th Air Army. Some German units were practically destroyed on the Zhlobin highway.



Photo of destroyed German equipment from the area of ​​the bridge over the Berezina.

The second stage of the operation

The Germans tried to stabilize the situation. The head of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Kurt Zeitzler, proposed transferring Army Group North to the south in order to build a new front with the help of its troops. But this plan was rejected by Hitler for political reasons (relations with the Finns). In addition, the naval command opposed - the withdrawal from the Baltic worsened communications with the same Finland and Sweden, led to the loss of a number of naval bases and strongholds in the Baltic. As a result, Zeitzler resigned and was replaced by Heinz Guderian. The model, for his part, tried to erect a new defensive line, which ran from Vilnius through Lida and Baranovichi, in order to close a hole in the front about 400 km wide. But for this he had only one whole army - the 2nd and the remnants of other armies. Therefore, the German command had to transfer significant forces to Belarus from other sectors of the Soviet-German front and from the West. Until July 16, 46 divisions were sent to Belarus, but these troops did not enter the battle immediately, in parts, often "from the wheels", and therefore they could not quickly turn the tide.

From 5 to 20 July 1944, the forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky carried out the Vilnius operation. The Germans did not have a continuous front of defense in the Vilnius direction. On July 7, units of Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army and Obukhov's 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps reached the city and began to grip it. An attempt to take the city on the move failed. On the night of July 8, new German forces were brought up to Vilnius. On July 8-9, the city was completely surrounded and an assault was launched. Attempts by the Germans to unblock the city from the western direction were repulsed. The last pockets of resistance were suppressed in Vilnius on 13 July. Up to 8 thousand Germans were destroyed, 5 thousand people were taken prisoner. On July 15, units of the front occupied several bridgeheads on the western bank of the Neman. Until the 20th, there were battles for bridgeheads.

On July 28, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front launched a new offensive - they were aimed at Kaunas and Suwalki. On July 30, the German defenses along the Neman were broken through; on August 1, the Germans left Kaunas in order not to get encircled. Then the Germans received reinforcements and launched a counteroffensive - the battles went on with varying success until the end of August. The front did not reach several kilometers to the border of East Prussia.

The 1st Baltic Front of Baghramyan received the task of reaching the sea in order to cut off the "North" group. In the Dvina direction, the Germans were initially able to hold back the offensive, since the front was regrouping its forces and was waiting for reserves. Dvinsk was cleared in cooperation with the troops advancing to the right of the 2nd Baltic Front only on July 27. On the same day, they took Shauliai. By July 30, the front managed to separate the two enemy army groups from each other - the advanced units of the Red Army cut the last railroad between East Prussia and the Baltic States in the Tukums region. Jelgava was captured on July 31st. The 1st Baltic Front reached the sea. The Germans began to try to reestablish the connection with Army Group North. The fighting went on with varying success, and at the end of August there was a break in the battles.

The 2nd Belorussian Front advanced to the west - to Novogrudok, and then Grodno and Bialystok. Grishin's 49th army and Boldin's 50th army took part in the destruction of the Minsk "cauldron", so on July 5 only one army went on the offensive - the 33rd. The 33rd Army advanced without encountering much resistance, covering 120-125 km in five days. On July 8, Novogrudok was liberated; on the 9th, the army reached the Neman River. On July 10, the 50th Army joined the offensive and the troops crossed the Neman. On July 16, Grodno was liberated, the Germans already showed fierce resistance, a series of counterattacks was repulsed. The German command tried to stop the Soviet troops, but for this they did not have enough strength. On July 27, Bialystok was recaptured. Soviet soldiers reached the pre-war border of the Soviet Union. The front was unable to conduct significant encirclements, since it did not have large mobile units (tank, mechanized, cavalry corps) in its composition. On August 14, Osovets and the bridgehead beyond the Narew were occupied.

The 1st Belorussian Front was advancing in the direction of Baranovichi-Brest. Almost immediately, the advancing units collided with German reserves: the 4th Panzer Division, the 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division, the 28th Light Infantry Division, and other formations went. On July 5-6, a fierce battle was going on. Gradually, the German forces were ground, they were inferior in number. In addition, the Soviet front was supported by powerful Air Force formations, which dealt strong blows to the Germans. On July 6, Kovel was released. On July 8, after a fierce battle, Baranovichi was taken. On July 14 they took Pinsk, on the 20th Kobrin. On July 20, units of Rokossovsky crossed the Bug on the move. The Germans did not manage to create a line of defense along it. On July 25, a "cauldron" was created near Brest, but on the 28th the remnants of the encircled German group broke through from it (the Germans lost 7 thousand people killed). It should be noted that the battles were fierce, there were few prisoners, but a lot of Germans were killed.

On July 22, units of the 2nd Panzer Army (which was attached to the front during the second phase of the operation) reached Lublin. On July 23, the assault on the city began, but due to the lack of infantry, it dragged on, the city was finally taken by the morning of the 25th. In late July - early August, Rokossovsky's front captured two large bridgeheads beyond the Vistula.

Operation results

As a result of the two-month offensive of the Red Army, Belaya Rus was completely cleared of the Nazis, part of the Baltic States and the eastern regions of Poland were liberated. In general, the advance of troops to a depth of 600 km was achieved on a front of 1,100 kilometers.

This was a major defeat for the Wehrmacht. There is even an opinion that it was the largest defeat of the German armed forces in the Second World War. Army Group Center was defeated, Army Group North was threatened with defeat. The powerful line of defense in Belarus, protected by natural barriers (swamps, rivers), has been broken. German reserves were depleted, which had to be thrown into battle to close the "hole".

An excellent reserve has been created for a future offensive into Poland and further into Germany. Thus, the 1st Belorussian Front captured two large bridgeheads beyond the Vistula south of the capital of Poland (Magnushevsky and Pulawsky). In addition, during the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, the 1st Ukrainian Front took a bridgehead at Sandomierz.

Operation Bagration was a triumph of Soviet military art. The Red Army "answered" for the "boilers" of 1941.

Soviet army lost up to 178.5 thousand dead, missing and prisoners, as well as 587.3 thousand wounded and sick. The total losses of the Germans are about 400 thousand people (according to other sources, more than 500 thousand).

In the late spring of 1944, a relative calm reigned on the Soviet-German front. The Germans, having suffered major defeats during the winter-spring battles, strengthened their defenses, while the Red Army rested and gathered its forces for the next strike.

Looking at the map of the fighting of that time, you can see on it two extensive protrusions of the front line. The first is on the territory of Ukraine, south of the Pripyat River. The second, far outward to the east, is in Belarus, with the border in the cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Zhlobin. This ledge was called the "Belarusian balcony", and after a discussion held at the end of April 1944 at the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, it was decided to attack with all the might of the Red Army troops. The operation to liberate Belarus was codenamed "Bagration".

The German command did not foresee such a turn. The area in Belarus was wooded and swampy, with a large number of lakes and rivers and a rather poorly developed road network. The use of large tank and mechanized formations here, from the point of view of the Hitlerite generals, was difficult. Therefore, the Wehrmacht was preparing to repel the Soviet offensive on the territory of Ukraine, concentrating much more impressive forces there than in Belarus. So, in the subordination of Army Group "Northern Ukraine" were seven tank divisions and four battalions of Tiger tanks. And in the subordination of the Army Group "Center" - only one tank, two panzer-grenadier divisions and one battalion of "Tigers". In total, Ernst Busch, who commanded the Central Army Group, had 1.2 million people, 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 9,500 guns and mortars, and 1,350 aircraft of the 6th Air Fleet.

The Germans created a fairly powerful and echeloned defense in Belarus. Since 1943, fortified positions were being built, often based on natural obstacles: rivers, lakes, swamps, hills. Some cities at the most important communication junctions were declared fortresses. These included, in particular, Orsha, Vitebsk, Mogilev, etc. The defensive lines were equipped with bunkers, dugouts, replaceable artillery and machine-gun positions.

According to the operational plan of the Soviet high command, the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts, as well as the 1st Baltic Front, were to defeat the enemy forces in Belarus. The total number of Soviet troops in the operation was approximately 2.4 million people, more than 5,000 tanks, about 36,000 guns and mortars. Air support was provided by the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 16th air armies (over 5,000 aircraft). Thus, the Red Army achieved a significant, and in many respects overwhelming superiority over the enemy troops.

To keep the preparation of the offensive in secret, the command of the Red Army prepared and carried out a tremendous amount of work to ensure the secrecy of the movement of forces and to mislead the enemy. The units moved to their original positions at night, observing radio silence. During daylight hours, the troops stopped, stationed themselves in the forests and carefully camouflaged themselves. At the same time, a false concentration of troops was carried out in the Chisinau direction, reconnaissance in force was carried out in the areas of responsibility of the fronts that did not take part in Operation Bagration, whole echelons with mock-ups of military equipment were taken from Belarus to the rear. In general, the measures achieved their goal, although it was not possible to completely hide the preparations for the offensive of the Red Army. So, prisoners captured in the zone of operation of the 3rd Belorussian Front, said that the command of the German troops noted the strengthening of the Soviet units and expected from the Red Army active action... But the time of the beginning of the operation, the number of Soviet troops and the exact direction of the strike remained unsolved.

Before the start of the operation, the Belarusian partisans became more active, having committed a large number of sabotages on the communications of the Nazis. Over 40,000 rails were blown up in the period from 20 to 23 July alone. In general, the actions of the partisans created a number of difficulties for the Germans, but they did not cause critical damage to the railway network, which was directly stated even by such an authority in intelligence and sabotage business as I. G. Starinov.

Operation Bagration began on June 23, 1944 and was carried out in two stages. The first stage included the Vitebsk-Orshansk, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk operations.

The Vitebsk-Orsha operation was carried out by the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts. The 1st Baltic Front of Army General I. Baghramyan, with the forces of the 6th Guards and 43rd Armies, hit the junction of Army Groups "North" and "Center" in the general direction of Beshenkovichi. The 4th Shock Army was supposed to attack Polotsk.

The 3rd Belorussian Front of Colonel General I. Chernyakhovsky struck at Bogushevsk and Senno with the forces of the 39th and 5th armies, and at Borisov with units of the 11th Guards and 31st armies. For the development of the operational success of the front, the mechanized cavalry group of N. Oslikovsky (3rd Guards Mechanized and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps) and the 5th Guards Tank Army of P. Rotmistrov were intended.

After artillery preparation on June 23, the front troops went over to the offensive. During the first day, the forces of the 1st Baltic Front managed to advance 16 kilometers into the depth of the enemy defense, with the exception of the Polotsk direction, where the 4th Shock Army met fierce resistance and did not have much success. The width of the breakthrough of the Soviet troops in the direction of the main attack was about 50 kilometers.

The 3rd Belorussian Front achieved significant successes in the Bogushevsky direction, breaking through the German defense line more than 50 kilometers wide and capturing three serviceable bridges across the Luchyosu River. For the Vitebsk group of the Nazis, there was a threat of the formation of a "cauldron". The commander of the German troops requested permission to withdraw, but the Wehrmacht command considered Vitebsk a fortress, and the retreat was not allowed.

During June 24-26, Soviet troops surrounded the enemy troops near Vitebsk and completely destroyed the German division that covered the city. Four more divisions tried to break through to the west, however, with the exception of a small number of disorganized units, they failed to do so. On June 27, the surrounded Germans surrendered. About 10 thousand Nazi soldiers and officers were taken prisoner.

On June 27, Orsha was also liberated. The forces of the Red Army entered the Orsha-Minsk highway. Lepel was released on June 28. In total, at the first stage, parts of the two fronts advanced 80 to 150 km.

The Mogilev operation began on June 23. It was conducted by the 2nd Belorussian Front of Colonel-General Zakharov. During the first two days, Soviet troops advanced approximately 30 kilometers. Then the Germans began to retreat to the western bank of the Dnieper. Their pursuit was led by the 33rd and 50th armies. On June 27, Soviet forces crossed the Dnieper, and on June 28 they liberated Mogilev. The German 12th Infantry Division defending the city was destroyed. A large number of prisoners and trophies were captured. The German units retreated to Minsk under the attacks of the front assault aviation. Soviet troops were moving towards the Berezina River.

The Bobruisk operation was carried out by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, commanded by General of the Army K. Rokossovsky. As conceived by the front commander, the blow was delivered in converging directions from Rogachev and Parichi with a general direction to Bobruisk with the aim of encircling and destroying the German grouping in this city. After the capture of Bobruisk, the development of the offensive on Pukhovichi and Slutsk was envisaged. From the air, the advancing troops were supported by about 2,000 aircraft.

The offensive was carried out in a rugged wooded and swampy area, crossed by numerous rivers. The troops had to undergo training in order to learn how to walk on bogshoes, overcome water obstacles with improvised means, and also erect gatis. On June 24, after a powerful artillery preparation, Soviet troops launched an attack and by the middle of the day broke through the enemy defenses to a depth of 5-6 kilometers. The timely introduction of mechanized units into battle made it possible to reach a breakthrough depth of up to 20 km in some areas.

On June 27, the Bobruisk group of the Germans was completely surrounded. In the ring were about 40 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. Leaving part of its forces to destroy the enemy, the front began to develop an offensive towards Osipovichi and Slutsk. The encircled units attempted to break through in a northern direction. In the area of ​​the village of Titovka, a fierce battle took place, during which the Nazis, under the cover of artillery, regardless of losses, tried to break through the Soviet front. To contain the onslaught, it was decided to use bombers. More than 500 aircraft continuously bombed the German army for an hour and a half. Having abandoned their equipment, the Germans tried to break through to Bobruisk, but were unsuccessful. On June 28, the remnants of the German forces surrendered.

By this time it was clear that Army Group Center was on the verge of defeat. German troops suffered huge losses in killed and captured, a large amount of equipment was destroyed and captured by Soviet forces. The depth of advance of the Soviet troops ranged from 80 to 150 kilometers. Conditions were created to encircle the main forces of Army Group Center. On June 28, Commander Ernst Busch was removed from his post and was replaced by Field Marshal Walter Model.

Troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front reached the Berezina River. In accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, they were ordered to force the river and, bypassing the strongholds of the Nazis, develop a swift attack on the capital of the BSSR.

On June 29, the forward detachments of the Red Army captured bridgeheads on the western bank of the Berezina and, in some areas, deepened into the enemy's defenses by 5-10 kilometers. On June 30, the main forces of the front crossed the river. On the night of July 1, the 11th Guards Army from the south and southwest broke into the city of Borisov, liberating it by 15:00. On the same day, Begoml and Pleschenitsy were released.

On July 2, Soviet troops cut off most of the retreat routes for the enemy's Minsk grouping. The cities of Vileika, Zhodino, Logoisk, Smolevichi, Krasnoe were taken. Thus, the Germans were cut off from all major communications.

On the night of July 3, 1944, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General of the Army I. Chernyakhovsky, ordered the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army P. Rotmistrov, in cooperation with the 31st Army and the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, to attack Minsk from the north and north-western direction and by the end of the day on July 3rd, completely capture the city.

On July 3, at 9 o'clock in the morning, Soviet troops broke into Minsk. The battles for the city were fought by the 71st and 36th rifle corps of the 31st army, the 5th Guards Tank Army and tankmen of the Guards Tatsinsky Corps. From the southern and southeastern outskirts, the offensive on the Belarusian capital was supported by units of the 1st Don Tank Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front. By 13:00 the city was liberated.

As mentioned above, Polotsk became a big obstacle for the Soviet troops. The Germans turned it into a powerful defense center and concentrated six infantry divisions near the city. The 1st Baltic Front with the forces of the 6th Guards and 4th Shock Armies in converging directions from the south and northeast was supposed to surround and destroy the German troops.

The Polotsk operation began on June 29. By the evening of July 1, Soviet units managed to cover the flanks of the German grouping and reach the outskirts of Polotsk. Violent street fighting ensued and continued until 4 July. On this day, the city was liberated. The forces of the left wing of the front, in pursuit of the retreating German units, went to the west for another 110 kilometers, reaching the Lithuanian border.

The first stage of Operation Bagration brought Army Group Center to the brink of disaster. The total advance of the Red Army in 12 days was 225-280 kilometers. In the German defense, a gap about 400 kilometers wide was formed, which was already very difficult to fully cover. Nevertheless, the Germans tried to stabilize the situation, relying on separate counterattacks on key areas... In parallel, Model was building a new line of defense, including at the expense of units transferred from other sectors of the Soviet-German front. But even those 46 divisions that were sent to the "disaster zone" did not significantly affect the state of affairs.

On July 5, the Vilnius operation of the 3rd Belorussian Front began. On July 7, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps were on the outskirts of the city and began to cover it. On July 8, the Germans pulled up reinforcements to Vilnius. To break through the encirclement, about 150 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated. A significant contribution to the fact that all these attempts failed was made by the aviation of the 1st Air Army, which actively bombed the main centers of resistance of the Germans. On July 13, Vilnius was taken, and the encircled group was destroyed.

The 2nd Belorussian Front was developing an offensive against Bialystok. As a reinforcement to the front, the 3rd Army of General Gorbatov was transferred. During the five days of the offensive, Soviet troops, without experiencing strong resistance, advanced 150 kilometers, liberating the city of Novogrudok on July 8. Near Grodno, the Germans had already gathered their strength, the Red Army formations had to repel a number of counterattacks, but on July 16 this Belarusian city was also cleared of enemy troops. By July 27, the Red Army liberated Bialystok and reached the pre-war border of the USSR.

The 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to defeat the enemy near Brest and Lublin and reach the Vistula River with strikes, bypassing the Brest fortified region. On July 6, the Red Army took Kovel and broke through the German defensive line near Siedlce. Having traveled more than 70 kilometers before July 20, Soviet troops crossed the Western Bug and entered Poland. On July 25, a cauldron was formed near Brest, but the Soviet fighters failed to completely destroy the enemy: part of the Nazi forces was able to break through. By early August, the forces of the Red Army took Lublin and captured bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula.

Operation Bagration was a grandiose victory for the Soviet troops. For two months of the offensive, Belarus, part of the Baltic States and Poland was liberated. During the operation, German troops lost about 400 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. 22 German generals were captured alive, 10 more were killed. Army Group Center was defeated.

/ Corr. BELTA /. Preparations for the Belarusian offensive operation began in the spring of 1944. Based on the military-political situation and the proposals of the military councils of the fronts, the General Staff developed a plan for it. After its comprehensive discussion at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on May 22-23, the final decision was made to conduct a strategic offensive operation. Its preliminary stage symbolically began on the third anniversary of the German attack on the USSR - June 22, 1944.

On this date, a front with a length of over 1100 km in Belarus passed along the line of Lake Nescherdo, east of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Zhlobin, along the Pripyat River, forming a huge ledge. Here the troops of Army Group Center were defended, which had a well-developed network of railways and highways for extensive maneuver along internal lines. German fascist troops occupied a previously prepared, deeply echeloned (250-270 km) defense, which was based on a developed system of field fortifications and natural boundaries. The defensive lines, as a rule, ran along the western banks of numerous rivers with wide swampy floodplains.

The Belarusian offensive operation, codenamed "Bagration", began on 23 June and ended on 29 August 1944. Its idea was to break through the enemy's defenses, dismember his troops and smash them in parts with simultaneous deep blows in six sectors. In the future, it was supposed to strike in converging directions to Minsk with the aim of encircling and destroying the main forces of the enemy east of the capital of Belarus. Then the offensive was planned to continue towards the borders of Poland and East Prussia.

Outstanding Soviet military leaders took part in the preparation and implementation of Operation Bagration. Its plan was developed by General of the Army A.I. Antonov. The troops of the fronts, whose forces the operation was carried out, were commanded by Generals of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky, I.Kh. Baghramyan, Colonel-Generals I.D. Chernyakhovsky and G.F. Zakharov. The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

The 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian fronts took part in the battles - a total of 17 armies, including 1 tank and 3 air, 4 tank and 2 Caucasian corps, a mechanized cavalry group, the Dnieper military flotilla , 1st Army of the Polish Army and Belarusian partisans. In the course of the operation, the partisans cut off the enemy's escape routes, seized and built new bridges and crossings for the Red Army, liberated a number of regional centers on their own, and participated in the liquidation of encircled enemy groupings.

The operation consisted of two stages. On the first (June 23 - July 4), the Vitebsk-Orshansk, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk, Minsk operations were carried out. As a result of the 1st stage of the Belarusian operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were defeated. At the second stage (July 5 - August 29), the Vilnius, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest, Siauliai and Kaunas operations were carried out.

On the first day of the strategic offensive operation "Bagration" on June 23, 1944, the troops of the Red Army liberated the Sirotinsky region (since 1961 - Shumilinsky). The troops of the 1st Baltic Front, together with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, went on the offensive on June 23, surrounded 5 enemy divisions west of Vitebsk by June 25 and eliminated them by June 27, the main forces of the front captured Lepel on June 28. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, successfully developing the offensive, liberated Borisov on July 1. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, after breaking through the enemy's defenses along the Pronya, Basya and Dnepr rivers, liberated Mogilev on June 28. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front by June 27 surrounded 6 German divisions in the Bobruisk region and by June 29 had eliminated them. At the same time, the front's troops reached the Svisloch, Osipovichi, Starye Dorogi line.

As a result of the Minsk operation, Minsk was liberated on July 3, to the east of which the formations of the 4th and 9th German armies (over 100 thousand people) were surrounded. During the Polotsk operation, the 1st Baltic Front liberated Polotsk and launched an offensive on Siauliai. In 12 days, Soviet troops advanced 225-280 km at an average daily pace of 20-25 km, liberated most of Belarus. Army Group Center suffered a catastrophic defeat, its main forces were surrounded and defeated.

With the exit of Soviet troops to the line Polotsk, lake. Naroch, Molodechno, west of Nesvizh in the enemy's strategic front, a gap of 400 km was formed. The attempts of the fascist German command to close it down with separate divisions, which were hastily transferred from other directions, could not give any significant results. The Soviet troops had the opportunity to begin relentless pursuit of the remnants of the defeated enemy troops. After the successful completion of the 1st stage of the operation, the Stavka gave the fronts new directives, according to which they were to continue their decisive offensive to the west.

As a result of hostilities during the Belarusian operation, 17 divisions and 3 enemy brigades were completely destroyed, 50 divisions lost more than half of their composition. The Nazis lost about half a million people killed, wounded, captured. During Operation Bagration, Soviet troops completed the liberation of Belarus, liberated parts of Lithuania and Latvia, entered Poland on July 20 and approached the borders of East Prussia on August 17. By August 29, they reached the Vistula River and organized a defense at this line.

The Belarusian operation created the conditions for the further offensive of the Red Army into German territory. For participation in it, more than 1,500 soldiers and commanders were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, more than 400 thousand soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals, 662 formations and units received honorary names according to the names of the cities and areas they liberated.


Northwest and southeast of the city of Vitebsk, our troops went on the offensive. Hundreds of Soviet guns of various calibers and mortars rained powerful fire on the enemy. Artillery and air preparation of the offensive lasted several hours. Numerous German fortifications were destroyed. Then, following the barrage of fire, the Soviet infantry moved into the attack. Suppressing the remaining enemy firing points, our soldiers broke through the heavily fortified defenses in both sectors of the offensive. Soviet troops advancing southeast of the city of Vitebsk cut the Vitebsk-Orsha railway and thus deprived the enemy's Vitebsk group of the last railway line connecting it with the rear. The enemy is suffering huge losses. German trenches and places of battles are littered with the corpses of the Nazis, broken weapons and equipment. Our troops captured trophies and prisoners.

In the Mogilev direction, our troops, after heavy artillery shelling and bombardment of enemy positions from the air, went on the offensive. The Soviet infantry quickly crossed the Pronya River. The enemy built a defensive line on the western bank of this river, consisting of numerous bunkers and several lines of full-profile trenches. Soviet troops with a powerful blow broke through the enemy's defenses and, building on their success, advanced up to 20 kilometers. There are many enemy corpses left in the trenches and message trenches. Only in one small area, 600 killed Nazis were counted.

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A partisan detachment named after Hero of the Soviet Union Zaslonov attacked a German garrison in one settlement of the Vitebsk region. In a fierce hand-to-hand combat, the partisans exterminated 40 Nazis and captured large trophies. Partisan detachment "Groza" in one day derailed 3 German military echelons. 3 steam locomotives, 16 wagons and platforms with military cargo were destroyed.

They liberated Belarus

Petr Filippovich Gavrilov was born on October 14, 1914 in the Tomsk region in a peasant family. In the army since December 1942. 34th Guards Company tank brigade The 6th Guards Army of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of the guard of Senior Lieutenant Pyotr Gavrilov on June 23, 1944, when breaking through the defense in the area of ​​the village of Sirotino, Shumilinsky District, Vitebsk Region, destroyed two bunkers, scattered and destroyed up to a battalion of the Nazis. Pursuing the Nazis, on June 24, 1944, the company reached the Zapadnaya Dvina River near the village of Ulla, captured a bridgehead on its western bank and held it until our infantry and artillery approached. For their courage and courage in breaking through the defenses and successfully crossing the Western Dvina River, the Guard Senior Lieutenant Petr Filippovich Gavrilov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war he lived and worked in Sverdlovsk (since 1991 - Yekaterinburg). He died in 1968.
Abdulla Zhanzakov was born on February 22, 1918 in the Kazakh village of Akrab. Since 1941, in the active army on the fronts of the war. The machine gunner of the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment (67th Guards Rifle Division, 6th Guards Army, 1st Baltic Front) of the Guard Corporal Abdulla Zhanzakov distinguished himself in the Belarusian strategic offensive operation. In the battle on June 23, 1944, he took part in the assault on the enemy stronghold near the village of Sirotinovka (Shumilinsky district). He secretly made his way to the German bunker and threw grenades at it. On June 24, he distinguished himself when crossing the Western Dvina River near the village of Bui (Beshenkovichi district). In the battle during the liberation of the city of Lepel on June 28, 1944, he was the first to break through to the high embankment of the railway track, took an advantageous position on it and suppressed several enemy firing points with automatic fire, ensuring the success of the advance of his platoon. In battle on June 30, 1944, he died while crossing the Ushacha River near the city of Polotsk. Guard corporal Zhanzakov Abdulla was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.

Nikolay Efimovich Soloviev was born on May 19, 1918 in the Tver region into a peasant family. During the Great Patriotic War in the army since 1941. Particularly distinguished himself during the Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation. In a battle on June 23, 1944, during a breakthrough of the enemy's defenses in the area of ​​the village of Medved in the Sirotinsky (now Shumilinsky) region, under fire, he ensured communication between the division commander and the regiments. On June 24, when crossing the Zapadnaya Dvina River at night near the village of Sharipino (Beshenkovichi district), he established a wire connection across the river. For the courage and heroism shown during the crossing of the Western Dvina, Nikolai Efimovich Solovyov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war he lived and worked in the Tver region. He died in 1993.

Alexander Kuzmich Fedyunin was born on September 15, 1911 in the Ryazan region into a peasant family. During the Great Patriotic War in the army since 1941. Particularly distinguished himself during the liberation of Belarus. The battalion under the command of A.K. Fedyunin was the first to break into the Sirotino railway station (Vitebsk region) on June 23, 1944, destroyed up to 70 enemy soldiers, captured 2 guns, 2 warehouses with ammunition and military equipment. On June 24, soldiers led by the battalion commander, using improvised means, crossed the Zapadnaya Dvina river near the village of Dvorishche (Beshenkovichi district, Vitebsk region), brought down the enemy's outposts and entrenched themselves on the bridgehead, which ensured the crossing of the river by other divisions of the regiment. For the skillful command of the unit, courage and heroism shown during the liberation of Belarus, Fedyunin Alexander Kuzmich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After the end of the war, he continued to serve in the Armed Forces, lived and worked in the city of Shakhty, Rostov Region. Died 1975.-0-

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