USSR: Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, Moldavian SSR, Lithuanian SSR, Latvian SSR, Estonian SSR; regions: Pskov, Smolensk, Kursk, Oryol, Leningrad, Belgorod.
	Aggression of Nazi Germany
	Tactical - the defeat of Soviet troops in border battles and retreat into the interior of the country with relatively small losses of the Wehrmacht and Germany's allies. The strategic outcome is the failure of the blitzkrieg of the Third Reich.
Opponents
Commanders
Joseph Stalin	Adolf Gitler
Semyon Tymoshenko	Walter von Brauchitsch
Georgy Zhukov	Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb
Fedor Kuznetsov	Fedor von Bock
Dmitry Pavlov	Gerd von Rundstedt
Mikhail Kirponos †	Ion Antonescu
Ivan Tyulenev	Carl Gustav Mannerheim
	Giovanni Messe
	Italo Gariboldi
	Miklos Horthy
	Joseph Tiso
Forces of the parties
2.74 million people + 619 thousand GC reserve (VSE) 13 981 tanks 9397 aircraft (7758 serviceable) 52,666 guns and mortars	4.05 million people + 0.85 million German allies 4215 tanks + 402 allied tanks 3909 aircraft + 964 Allied aircraft 43 812 guns and mortars + 6673 guns and mortars of allies
War losses
2 630 067 killed and taken prisoner 1 145 000 wounded and sick	Approximately 431,000 dead and 1 699,000 missing

(Directive No. 21. Plan "Barbarossa"; German. Weisung Nr. 21. Fall Barbarossa, in honor of Frederick I) - the plan of the German invasion of the USSR in the Eastern European theater of World War II and the military operation carried out in accordance with this plan at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War.

The development of the Barbarossa plan began on July 21, 1940. The plan, finally developed under the leadership of General F. Paulus, was approved on December 18, 1940 by the directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht No. 21. A lightning defeat of the main forces of the Red Army was envisaged to the west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers, further it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass with the subsequent exit to the line Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan.

The estimated duration of the main hostilities, calculated for 2-3 months, is the so-called Blitzkrieg strategy (German. Blitzkrieg).

Prerequisites

After Hitler came to power in Germany, revanchist sentiments also sharply increased in the country. Nazi propaganda convinced the Germans of the need for conquest in the East. Back in the mid-1930s, the German government declared that a war with the USSR was inevitable in the near future. Planning an attack on Poland with the possible entry of Great Britain and France into the war, the German government decided to protect itself from the east - in August 1939, a Non-Aggression Pact was signed between Germany and the USSR, dividing the spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland, as a result of which Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3. During the Polish campaign of the Red Army, the Soviet Union introduced troops and annexed the former possessions from Poland Russian Empire: Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. A common border appeared between Germany and the USSR.

In 1940 Germany captured Denmark and Norway (Danish-Norwegian operation); Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France during the French campaign. Thus, by June 1940, Germany managed to radically change the strategic situation in Europe, withdraw France from the war and expel the British army from the continent. The Wehrmacht's victories gave rise to hopes in Berlin for an early end to the war with Britain, which would allow Germany to throw all its forces to defeat the USSR, and this, in turn, would free her hands to fight the United States.

However, Germany failed to either force Great Britain to conclude peace, nor to defeat her. The war continued, fighting was fought at sea, in North Africa and the Balkans. In October 1940, Germany made attempts to attract Spain and Vichy France to an alliance against England, and also initiated negotiations with the USSR.

The Soviet-German negotiations in November 1940 showed that the USSR was considering the possibility of joining the Triple Pact, but the conditions it put forward were unacceptable for Germany, since they demanded her refusal to intervene in Finland and closed her possibility of moving to the Middle East through the Balkans.

However, despite these events of the fall, on the basis of Hitler's demands, put forward by him in early June 1940, OKH draws up rough plans for a campaign against the USSR, and on July 22, the development of an attack plan, codenamed "Barbarossa Plan", began. The decision to go to war with the USSR and the general plan for the future campaign were announced by Hitler shortly after the victory over France - on July 31, 1940.

England's Hope - Russia and America... If hopes for Russia collapse, America will also fall away from England, since the defeat of Russia will result in an incredible strengthening of Japan in East Asia. […] If Russia is defeated, England will lose her last hope. Then Germany will dominate Europe and the Balkans. Output: In accordance with this reasoning, Russia should be liquidated. The deadline is the spring of 1941. The sooner we smash Russia, the better. The operation will make sense only if we defeat the entire state with one swift blow. It is not enough just to seize some part of the territory. Stopping activities in winter is dangerous. Therefore, it is better to wait, but make a firm decision to destroy Russia. […] Beginning of the [military campaign] - May 1941. The duration of the operation is five months. It would be better to start already this year, but this is not suitable, since the operation must be carried out with one blow. The goal is destruction vitality Russia. The operation breaks down into: 1st strike: Kiev, exit to the Dnieper; aviation destroys ferries. Odessa. 2nd strike: Through the Baltic states to Moscow; in the future, a two-way strike - from the north and south; later - a private operation to capture the Baku region.

The Axis countries are notified of the Barbarossa plan.

Parties' plans

Germany

The overall strategic objective of the Barbarossa plan is “ defeat Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign even before the war against England is over". The idea was based on the idea “ split the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of the country, with fast and deep blows of powerful mobile groupings north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, destroy the scattered groupings of enemy troops". The plan provided for the destruction of the bulk of Soviet troops west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers, preventing them from retreating into the interior of the country.

In development of the Barbarossa plan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces on January 31, 1941 signed a directive on the concentration of troops.

On the eighth day, German troops were to reach the line of Kaunas, Baranovichi, Lvov, Mogilev-Podolsky. On the twentieth day of the war, they were supposed to seize territory and reach the line: the Dnieper (to the region south of Kiev), Mozyr, Rogachev, Orsha, Vitebsk, Velikiye Luki, south of Pskov, south of Pärnu. This was followed by a pause of twenty days, during which it was supposed to concentrate and regroup the formations, give rest to the troops and prepare a new supply base. On the fortieth day of the war, the second phase of the offensive was to begin. In the course of it, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass.

Particular importance was attached to the capture of Moscow: “ The capture of this city means both politically and economically a decisive success, not to mention the fact that the Russians will be deprived of the most important railway junction.". The Wehrmacht command believed that the Red Army would throw the last remaining forces to defend the capital, which would make it possible to defeat them in one operation.

The Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan line was indicated as the final line, but the German General Staff did not plan the operation so far.

The Barbarossa plan detailed the tasks of army and army groups, the procedure for interaction between them and with the Allied forces, as well as with the Air Force and the Navy, and the tasks of the latter. In addition to the OKH directive, a number of documents were developed, including an assessment of the Soviet Armed Forces, a directive on disinformation, timing for preparing an operation, special instructions, etc.

In the directive No. 21 signed by Hitler, the date of May 15, 1941 was named as the earliest date for the attack on the USSR. Later, due to the diversion of part of the Wehrmacht forces to the Balkan campaign, the next date of the attack on the USSR was named June 22, 1941. The final order was given on June 17th.

the USSR

Soviet intelligence it was possible to obtain information that Hitler made some kind of decision related to Soviet-German relations, but its exact content remained unknown, like the code word "Barbarossa". And the information received about the possible start of the war in March 1941 after withdrawal from the war of England were unconditional disinformation, since in directive No. 21 the approximate deadline for the completion of military preparations was indicated - May 15, 1941 and it was emphasized that the USSR should be defeated " yet before that how the war against England will end».

Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership did not take any action to prepare a defense in the event of a German attack. In the operational-strategic headquarters game that took place in January 1941, the issue of repelling aggression from Germany was not even considered.

The configuration of the Red Army troops on the Soviet-German border was very vulnerable. In particular, the former chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov recalled: “ On the eve of the war, the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies of the Western District were located in the Bialystok ledge, concave towards the enemy, the 10th Army occupied the most disadvantageous location. Such an operational configuration of troops created a threat of deep coverage and encirclement from Grodno and Brest by striking under the flanks. Meanwhile, the deployment of the front's troops in the Grodno-Suvalkov and Brest axes was not deep and powerful enough to prevent a breakthrough and coverage of the Bialystok grouping here. This erroneous disposition of troops, committed in 1940, was not eliminated until the war itself ...»

Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership took certain actions, the meaning and purpose of which continues to be debated. In late May and early June 1941, a partial mobilization of troops was carried out under the guise of training reserve training, which made it possible to call in over 800 thousand people used to replenish divisions located mainly in the West; in mid-May, four armies (16th, 19th, 21st and 22nd) and one rifle corps began to move from the internal military districts to the line of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers. From mid-June, a covert regrouping of the formations of the western border districts began: under the guise of entering the camps, more than half of the divisions constituting the reserve of these districts were set in motion. From 14 to 19 June, the command of the western border districts received instructions to withdraw the front-line directorates to field command posts. Staff vacations were canceled from mid-June.

At the same time, the General Staff of the RKK army categorically suppressed any attempts by the commanders of the western border districts to strengthen the defense by occupying the foreground. Only on the night of June 22, the Soviet military districts received a directive to switch to combat readiness, but it reached many headquarters after the attack. Although, according to other sources, orders to withdraw troops from the border were issued to the commander of the western districts from 14 to 18 June.

In addition, most of the territories on the western border were incorporated into the USSR relatively recently. The Soviet army did not have powerful defensive lines on the border. The local population was quite hostile to the Soviet regime, and after the German invasion, many Baltic, Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalists actively helped the Germans.

The alignment of forces

Germany and the allies

Three army groups were created to attack the USSR.

• Army Group North (Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb) was deployed in East Prussia, on the front from Klaipeda to Goldap. It included the 16th Army, the 18th Army and the 4th Panzer Group - a total of 29 divisions (including 6 tank and motorized). The offensive was supported by the 1st Air Fleet, which had 1,070 combat aircraft. The task of Army Group North was to defeat Soviet troops in the Baltic States, capture Leningrad and ports on the Baltic Sea, including Tallinn and Kronstadt.

• Army Group Center (Field Marshal Fyodor von Bock) occupied the front from Goldap to Wlodawa. It consisted of the 4th Army, the 9th Army, the 2nd Panzer Group and the 3rd Panzer Group - a total of 50 divisions (including 15 tank and motorized ones) and 2 brigades. The offensive was supported by the 2nd Air Fleet, which had 1,680 combat aircraft. Army Group Center was tasked with cutting the strategic front of the Soviet defense, encircling and destroying the Red Army troops in Belarus and developing an offensive in the Moscow direction.

• Army Group South (Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt) occupied the front from Lublin to the mouth of the Danube. It consisted of the 6th Army, 11th Army, 17th Army, 3rd Romanian Army, 4th Romanian Army, 1st Panzer Group and a mobile Hungarian corps - 57 divisions in total (including 9 tank and motorized) and 13 brigades (including 2 tank and motorized). The offensive was supported by the 4th Air Fleet with 800 combat aircraft and the Romanian Air Force with 500 aircraft. Army Group South had the task of destroying Soviet troops in the Right-Bank Ukraine, reaching the Dnieper and subsequently developing an offensive east of the Dnieper.

the USSR

In the USSR, on the basis of military districts located on the western border, according to the decision of the Politburo of June 21, 1941, 4 fronts were created.

• The North-Western Front (commander F.I.Kuznetsov) was created in the Baltic States. It included the 8th Army, 11th Army and 27th Army - 34 divisions in total (of which 6 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the North-Western Front.
• The Western Front (commander D. G. Pavlov) was created in Belarus. It consisted of the 3rd Army, 4th Army, 10th Army and 13th Army - 45 divisions in total (of which 20 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Western Front.
• The Southwestern Front (commander MP Kirponos) was created in Western Ukraine. It consisted of the 5th Army, 6th Army, 12th Army and 26th Army - 45 divisions in total (of which 18 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Southwestern Front.
• The southern front (commander I. V. Tyulenev) was created in Moldova and southern Ukraine. It included the 9th Army and the 18th Army - a total of 26 divisions (of which 9 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Southern Front.
• The Baltic Fleet (commanded by V.F. Tributs) was located in the Baltic Sea. It included 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyer leaders, 19 destroyers, 65 submarines, 48 ​​torpedo boats and other ships, and 656 aircraft.
• The Black Sea Fleet (commanded by FS Oktyabrsky) was located in the Black Sea. It had 1 battleship, 5 light cruisers, 16 leaders and destroyers, 47 submarines, 2 brigades of torpedo boats, several battalions of minesweepers, patrol and anti-submarine boats, over 600 aircraft.

Development of the USSR Armed Forces since the signing of the non-aggression pact

By the early forties, the Soviet Union, as a result of the industrialization program, took third place after the United States and Germany in terms of the level of development of heavy industry. Also, by the beginning of the Second World War, the Soviet economy was largely focused on the production of military equipment.

First phase. Invasion. Border battles (June 22 - July 10, 1941)

The beginning of the invasion

Early in the morning at 4 o'clock on June 22, 1941, the German invasion of the USSR began. On the same day, Italy (Italian troops began hostilities on July 20, 1941) and Romania declared war on the USSR, Slovakia on June 23, and Hungary on June 27. The German invasion caught Soviet troops by surprise; on the very first day, a significant part of ammunition, fuel and military equipment was destroyed; the Germans managed to ensure complete air supremacy (about 1200 aircraft were disabled). German aviation struck at the naval bases: Kronstadt, Libava, Vindava, Sevastopol. On the sea lanes of the Baltic and Black Seas, submarines were deployed and minefields were laid. On land, after a strong artillery preparation, the advance units went over to the offensive, and then the main forces of the Wehrmacht. However, the Soviet command could not soberly assess the position of their troops. On the evening of June 22, the Main Military Council sent directives to the Military Councils of the fronts demanding that decisive counterattacks be launched against the enemy groupings that had broken through on the morning of June 23. As a result of the failed counterattacks, the already difficult situation of the Soviet troops worsened even more. Finnish troops did not cross the front line, waiting for the development of events, but giving the German aviation the opportunity to refuel.

The Soviet command launched bombing strikes on Finnish territory on June 25. Finland declared war on the USSR and German and Finnish troops invaded Karelia and the Arctic, increasing the front line and endangering Leningrad and the Murmansk railway. The hostilities soon turned into trench warfare and did not affect the general state of affairs on the Soviet-German front. In historiography, they are usually singled out in separate campaigns: the Soviet-Finnish War (1941-1944) and the Defense of the Arctic.

North direction

At first, not one, but two tank groups acted against the Soviet North-Western Front:

• Army Group North operated in the Leningrad direction, and its main striking force, the 4th Panzer Group, was advancing on Daugavpils.
• The 3rd Panzer Group of Army Group Center was advancing in the Vilnius direction.

The attempt of the command of the North-Western Front to inflict a counterattack with the forces of two mechanized corps (almost 1000 tanks) near the town of Raseiniai ended in complete failure, and on June 25 it was decided to withdraw troops to the line of the Western Dvina.

But already on June 26, the German 4th tank group crossed the Western Dvina near Daugavpils (56th motorized corps by E. von Manstein), on 2 July - at Jekabpils (41st motorized corps by G. Reinhard). Infantry divisions advanced in the wake of the motorized corps. On June 27, Red Army units left Liepaja. On July 1, the German 18th Army occupied Riga and entered southern Estonia.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Panzer Group of Army Group Center, having overcome the resistance of the Soviet troops near Alytus, took Vilnius on June 24, turned southeast and went into the rear of the Soviet Western Front.

Central direction

A difficult situation has developed on the Western Front. On the very first day, the flank armies of the Western Front (the 3rd Army in the Grodno region and the 4th Army in the Brest region) suffered heavy losses. Counterattacks by the mechanized corps of the Western Front on June 23-25 ​​ended in failure. The German 3rd Panzer Group, overcoming the resistance of Soviet troops in Lithuania and developing an offensive in the Vilnius direction, bypassed the 3rd and 10th armies from the north, and the 2nd Panzer Group, leaving the Brest Fortress in the rear, broke through to Baranovichi and bypassed them from the south. On June 28, the Germans took the capital of Belarus and closed the encirclement ring, in which the main forces of the Western Front found themselves.

On June 30, 1941, the commander of the Soviet Western Front, General of the Army D. G. Pavlov, was removed from command; later, by decision of a military tribunal, he, along with other generals and officers of the headquarters of the Western Front, was shot. The troops of the Western Front were led first by Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko (June 30), then the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Timoshenko (appointed on July 2, took office on July 4). Due to the fact that the main forces of the Western Front were defeated in the Bialystok-Minsk battle, on July 2, the troops of the Second Strategic Echelon were transferred to the Western Front.

In early July, the motorized corps of the Wehrmacht overcame the Soviet defensive line on the Berezina River and rushed to the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, but unexpectedly ran into the troops of the restored Western Front (in the first echelon of the 22nd, 20th and 21st Armies). On July 6, 1941, the Soviet command launched an offensive in the Lepel direction (see Lepel counterattack). During the flared up tank battle on July 6-9 between Orsha and Vitebsk, in which more than 1600 tanks participated from the Soviet side, and up to 700 units from the German side, German troops defeated the Soviet troops and took Vitebsk on July 9. The surviving Soviet units withdrew to the area between Vitebsk and Orsha. German troops took up their initial positions for the subsequent offensive in the area of ​​Polotsk, Vitebsk, south of Orsha, as well as north and south of Mogilev.

South direction

The military operations of the Wehrmacht in the south, where the most powerful group of the Red Army was located, were not so successful. June 23-25 ​​aviation Black Sea Fleet bombed the Romanian cities of Sulina and Constanta; On June 26, Constanta was struck by ships of the Black Sea Fleet together with aviation. In an effort to stop the advance of the 1st Panzer Group, the command of the Southwestern Front launched a counterattack with the forces of six mechanized corps (about 2,500 tanks). During a major tank battle in the Dubno-Lutsk-Brody area, Soviet troops could not defeat the enemy and suffered heavy losses, but they prevented the Germans from making a strategic breakthrough and cutting off the Lvov grouping (6th and 26th Armies) from the rest of the forces. By July 1, the troops of the Southwestern Front withdrew to the fortified line Korosten-Novograd-Volynsky-Proskurov. In early July, the Germans broke through the right wing of the front near Novograd-Volynsky and captured Berdichev and Zhitomir, but thanks to the counterattacks of the Soviet troops, their further advance was stopped.

At the junction of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts, on July 2, German-Romanian troops crossed the Prut and rushed to Mogilev-Podolsky. By July 10, they reached the Dniester.

Results of border battles

As a result of border battles, the Wehrmacht inflicted a heavy defeat on the Red Army.

Summing up the results of the first phase of Operation Barbarossa, on July 3, 1941, the chief of the German General Staff F. Halder wrote in his diary:

« In general, we can already say that the task of defeating the main forces of the Russian ground army in front of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper has been completed ... Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia was won within 14 days. Of course, it's not finished yet. The enormous extent of the territory and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, using all means, will shackle our forces for many weeks to come. ... When we cross the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, it will not be so much about defeating the enemy's armed forces as about taking away the enemy's industrial areas and preventing him from using the enormous power of his industry and inexhaustible human resources to create new armed strength. As soon as the war in the east passes from the phase of the defeat of the enemy's armed forces to the phase of economic suppression of the enemy, the further tasks of the war against England will again come to the fore ...»

Second phase. German offensive along the entire front (July 10 - August 1941)

North direction

On July 2, Army Group North continued its offensive, its German 4th Panzer Group advancing in the direction of Rezekne, Ostrov, Pskov. On July 4, the 41st motorized corps occupied Ostrov, on July 9 - Pskov.

On July 10, Army Group North continued its offensive in the Leningrad (4th Panzer Group) and Tallinn (18th Army) axes. However, the German 56th motorized corps was stopped by a counterattack by the Soviet 11th Army near Soltsy. Under these conditions, the German command on July 19 suspended the offensive of the 4th Panzer Group for almost three weeks until the formation of the 18th and 16th armies approached. Only at the end of July did the Germans reach the border of the Narva, Luga and Mshaga rivers.

On August 7, German troops broke through the defenses of the 8th Army and reached the coast of the Gulf of Finland in the Kunda region. The 8th Army was dismembered into two parts: the 11th rifle corps withdrew to Narva, and the 10th rifle corps to Tallinn, where, together with the sailors of the Baltic Fleet, they defended the city until August 28.

On August 8, the offensive of Army Group North against Leningrad in the direction of Krasnogvardeisk resumed, on August 10 - in the Luga area and in the Novgorod-Chudovsky direction. On August 12, the Soviet command launched a counterattack near Staraya Russa, but on August 19 the enemy struck back and defeated the Soviet troops.

On August 19, German troops occupied Novgorod, on August 20, Chudovo. On 23 August, battles for Oranienbaum began; the Germans were stopped southeast of Koporye (Voronka River).

The attack on Leningrad

To reinforce Army Group North, the 3rd Panzer Group of G. Gotha (39th and 57th Motorized Corps) and the 8th Air Corps of V. von Richthofen were transferred to it.

At the end of August, German troops launched a new offensive against Leningrad. On August 25, the 39th motorized corps took Lyuban, on August 30, went to the Neva and cut off the railway connection with the city, on September 8, took Shlisselburg and closed the blockade ring around Leningrad.

However, having made the decision to conduct Operation Typhoon, A. Hitler ordered the release of most of the mobile formations and the 8th Air Corps, which were called upon to participate in the last offensive on Moscow, no later than September 15, 1941.

On September 9, the decisive assault on Leningrad began. However, the Germans failed to break the resistance of the Soviet troops within the specified time frame. On September 12, 1941, Hitler gave the order to stop the assault on the city. (For further hostilities in the Leningrad direction, see the Blockade of Leningrad.)

On November 7, the Germans continue their offensive in the northern direction. The railways, which supply food to Leningrad through Lake Ladoga, have been cut. German troops occupied Tikhvin. There was a threat of a breakthrough by German troops into the rear and encirclement of the 7th Separate Army, which was defending the borders on the Svir River. However, already on November 11, the 52nd Army inflicted a counterattack on fascist troops occupying Malaya Vishera. In the course of the unfolding battles, the Malovishra group of German troops suffered a serious defeat. Her troops were driven back from the city across the Bolshaya Vishera River.

Central direction

On July 10-12, 1941, Army Group Center launched a new offensive in the Moscow direction. The 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper south of Orsha, and the 3rd Panzer Group struck from the direction of Vitebsk. On July 16, German troops entered Smolensk, while three Soviet armies (19th, 20th and 16th) were surrounded. By August 5, the fighting in the Smolensk "cauldron" ended, the remnants of the 16th and 20th armies crossed the Dnieper; 310 thousand people were captured.

On the northern flank of the Soviet Western Front, German troops captured Nevel (July 16), but then fought for Velikiye Luki for a whole month. Big problems for the enemy also arose on the southern flank of the central sector of the Soviet-German front: here the Soviet troops of the 21st Army launched an offensive in the Bobruisk direction. Despite the fact that the Soviet troops failed to capture Bobruisk, they pinned down a significant number of divisions of the German 2nd Field Army and a third of the 2nd Panzer Group.

Thus, given the two large groupings of Soviet troops on the flanks and the incessant attacks on the front, the German Army Group Center could not resume the offensive against Moscow. On July 30, she went over to the defensive with the main forces and focused on solving problems on the flanks. At the end of August 1941, German troops managed to defeat Soviet troops in the Velikiye Luki region and on August 29 captured Toropets.

On August 8-12, the advance of the 2nd Panzer Group and the 2nd Field Army began in the southern direction. As a result of operations, the Soviet Central Front was defeated, and Gomel fell on August 19. The large-scale offensive of the Soviet fronts of the Western direction (Western, Reserve and Bryansk), begun on August 30 - September 1, was not crowned with success, the Soviet troops suffered heavy losses and on September 10 went on the defensive. The only success was the liberation of Yelnya on September 6.

South direction

In Moldova, the attempt of the command of the Southern Front to stop the Romanian offensive with a counterattack of two mechanized corps (770 tanks) was unsuccessful. On July 16, the 4th Romanian Army took Chisinau, and in early August pushed the Separate Primorsky Army back to Odessa. The defense of Odessa bound the forces of the Romanian troops for almost two and a half months. Soviet troops left the city only in the first half of October.

Meanwhile, at the end of July, German troops launched an offensive in the Belaya Tserkov area. On August 2, they cut off the 6th and 12th Soviet armies from the Dnieper and surrounded them near Uman; 103 thousand people were taken prisoner, including both army commanders. But although German troops, as a result of a new offensive, broke through to the Dnieper and created several bridgeheads on the eastern bank, they did not succeed in taking Kiev on the move.

Thus, Army Group South was unable to independently solve the tasks assigned to it by the Barbarossa plan. From early August to early October, the Red Army carried out a series of attacks near Voronezh.

Battle of Kiev

Following Hitler's orders, the southern flank of Army Group Center launched an offensive in support of Army Group South.

After the occupation of Gomel, the German 2nd Army of Army Group Center advanced on the connection with the 6th Army of Army Group South; On September 9, both German armies united in eastern Polesie. By September 13, the front of the Soviet 5th Army of the Southwestern Front and the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front was completely hacked, both armies went over to a mobile defense.

At the same time, the German 2nd Panzer Group, repelling the blow of the Soviet Bryansk Front near Trubchevsk, entered the operational space. On September 9, V. Model's 3rd Panzer Division broke through to the south and on September 10 captured Romny.

Meanwhile, the 1st Panzer Group on September 12 launched an offensive from the Kremenchug bridgehead in the northern direction. On September 15, the 1st and 2nd tank groups merged at Lokhvitsa. In the gigantic Kiev "cauldron" were the main forces of the Soviet Southwestern Front; the number of prisoners was 665 thousand people. The administration of the Southwestern Front was defeated; the front commander, Colonel-General MP Kirponos was killed.

As a result, the left-bank Ukraine was in the hands of the enemy, the way to Donbass was opened, Soviet troops in Crimea were cut off from the main forces. (For further hostilities in the Donbass direction, see Donbass operation). In mid-September, the Germans reached the approaches to the Crimea.

Crimea was of strategic importance as one of the routes to the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus (through the Kerch Strait and Taman). In addition, the Crimea was important as a base for aviation. With the loss of Crimea, Soviet aviation would have lost the ability to raid the Romanian oil fields, and the Germans would have been able to strike at targets in the Caucasus. The Soviet command understood the importance of holding the peninsula and concentrated efforts on this, abandoning the defense of Odessa. On October 16, Odessa fell.

On October 17, the Donbass is occupied (Taganrog fell). Kharkov was captured on October 25. November 2 - Crimea is occupied and Sevastopol is blocked. November 30 - The forces of Army Group South secured a foothold on the line of the Mius Front.

Turn from Moscow

At the end of July 1941, the German command was still full of optimism and believed that the goals set by the Barbarossa plan would be achieved in the near future. The dates for achieving these goals were indicated: Moscow and Leningrad - 25 August; the Volga border - early October; Baku and Batumi - early November.

On July 25, at a meeting of the chiefs of staff of the Eastern Front of the Wehrmacht, it was said about the implementation of Operation Barbarossa in time:

• Army Group North: Operations were proceeding almost exactly as planned.
• Army Group Center: Before the beginning of the Battle of Smolensk, operations developed according to plans, then the development slowed down.
• Army Group South: Operations have progressed slower in time than anticipated.

However, Hitler became more and more inclined to postpone the attack on Moscow. At a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group South on 4 August, he stated: “ First, Leningrad must be captured, for this the troops of the Gotha group are used. In the second stage, the seizure of the eastern part of Ukraine is carried out ... And only in the last turn will an offensive be undertaken with the aim of capturing Moscow».

The next day, F. Halder asked A. Jodl for the opinion of the Fuehrer: What are our main goals: do we want to defeat the enemy or are we pursuing economic goals (the capture of Ukraine and the Caucasus)? Jodl replied that the Fuehrer believed that both goals could be achieved simultaneously. To the question: Moscow or Ukraine or Moscow and Ukraine, you should answer - both Moscow and Ukraine... We must do this, because otherwise we will not be able to defeat the enemy before the onset of autumn.

On August 21, 1941, Hitler issued a new directive stating: “ The most important task before the onset of winter is not the seizure of Moscow, but the seizure of the Crimea, industrial and coal regions on the Donets River and blocking the routes of the Russians supplying oil from the Caucasus. In the north, such a task is the encirclement of Leningrad and the connection with the Finnish troops.».

Evaluation of Hitler's decision

Hitler's decision to abandon an immediate offensive on Moscow and turn the 2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Group to help Army Group South caused controversial assessments among the German command.

The commander of the 3rd Panzer Group G. Goth wrote in his memoirs: “ There was one strong operational argument against continuing the offensive against Moscow at that time. If in the center the defeat of the enemy troops in Belarus was unexpectedly quick and complete, then in other directions the successes were not so great. For example, it was not possible to push back the enemy operating south of Pripyat and west of the Dnieper to the south. An attempt to throw the Baltic group into the sea was also unsuccessful. Thus, both flanks of Army Group Center, while advancing to Moscow, were in danger of being hit, in the south this danger was already making itself felt ...»

The commander of the German 2nd Panzer Group G. Guderian wrote: “ The battles for Kiev undoubtedly meant a major tactical success. However, the question of whether this tactical success was also of major strategic importance remains in doubt. Now everything depended on whether the Germans would be able to achieve decisive results even before the onset of winter, perhaps even before the onset of the autumn thaw.».

Only on September 30, German troops, pulling up their reserves, went on the offensive against Moscow. However, after the start of the offensive, the stubborn resistance of Soviet troops, difficult weather conditions in late autumn led to a halt in the offensive on Moscow and the failure of Operation Barbarossa as a whole. (For further hostilities in the Moscow direction, see the Moscow battle)

Results of Operation Barbarossa

The ultimate goal of Operation Barbarossa remained unfulfilled. Despite the impressive successes of the Wehrmacht, the attempt to defeat the USSR in one campaign failed.

The main reasons can be attributed to the general underestimation of the Red Army. Despite the fact that before the war the total number and composition of Soviet troops was determined by the German command quite correctly, the wrong assessment of the Soviet armored forces should be attributed to the major miscalculations of the Abwehr.

Another serious miscalculation was the underestimation of the mobilization capabilities of the USSR. By the third month of the war, no more than 40 new Red Army divisions were expected to meet. In fact, the Soviet leadership sent 324 divisions to the front only in the summer (taking into account the previously deployed 222 divisions), that is, German intelligence was very much mistaken in this matter. Already in the course of the staff games held by the German General Staff, it became clear that the available forces were insufficient. The situation was especially difficult with the reserves. In fact, the "Eastern campaign" was to be won with one echelon of troops. Thus, it was established that with the successful development of operations in the theater of operations, "which is expanding to the east like a funnel," the German forces "will be insufficient if it is not possible to inflict a decisive defeat on the Russians up to the line Kiev-Minsk-Lake Peipsi."

Meanwhile, on the line of the Dnieper-Western Dvina rivers, the Wehrmacht was waiting for the Second Strategic Echelon of Soviet troops. The Third Strategic Echelon was concentrating behind him. An important stage in the disruption of the Barbarossa plan was the Battle of Smolensk, in which Soviet troops, despite heavy losses, stopped the enemy's eastward advance.

In addition, due to the fact that the army groups struck in divergent directions to Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev, it was difficult to maintain interaction between them. The German command had to carry out private operations to protect the flanks of the central attacking group. These operations, while successful, resulted in a waste of time and resources for the motorized troops.

In addition, already in August, the question of the priority of goals arose: Leningrad, Moscow or Rostov-on-Don. When these goals came into conflict with each other, a command crisis arose.

Army Group North was unable to capture Leningrad.

Army Group South was unable to deeply envelop its left flank (6.17 A and 1 Tgr.) And destroy the main enemy troops on the right-bank Ukraine in the scheduled time, and as a result, the troops of the South-Western and Southern fronts were able to withdraw to the Dnieper and gain a foothold ...

Subsequently, the turn of the main forces of Army Group Center from Moscow led to a loss of time and strategic initiative.

In the fall of 1941, the German command tried to find a way out of the crisis in Operation Typhoon (battle for Moscow).

The 1941 campaign ended with the defeat of German troops in the central sector of the Soviet-German front near Moscow, near Tikhvin on the northern flank and under

Directive No. 21. Plan "Barbarossa"

Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Operational management headquarters
Country Defense Department
33408/40. Sov. secretly

Fuehrer's headquarters 12/18/40
9 copies

The German armed forces must be ready to defeat Soviet Russia in a short campaign even before the end of the war against England (the "Barbarossa" plan).

The ground forces must use for this purpose all the formations at their disposal, with the exception of those that are necessary to protect the occupied territories from any surprises.

The task of the air force is to free up such forces to support the ground forces during the Eastern campaign, so that it can count on the rapid completion of ground operations and at the same time limit the destruction of the eastern regions of Germany by enemy aircraft to a minimum. However, this concentration of air force efforts in the East should be limited by the requirement that all theaters of operations and areas where our military industry is located should be reliably covered from enemy air raids and that offensive actions against England, especially against her sea lanes, should not be weakened at all.

The main forces of the navy must, during the Eastern campaign, of course, be directed against England.

If necessary, I will issue the order for the strategic deployment of the armed forces against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the scheduled start of operations.

Preparations that require a longer time, if they have not yet begun, should be started now and finished by 15.5.41.

It is critical to ensure that no one divines the intention to carry out the attack.

The preparatory activities of the highest command authorities should be carried out on the basis of the following basic provisions.

I. General plan

The main forces of the Russian ground forces stationed in western Russia must be destroyed in bold operations through the deep, rapid extension of the tank wings. The retreat of the enemy's combat-ready troops into the vast expanses of Russian territory must be prevented.

By rapid pursuit, a line must be reached from which the Russian air force would be unable to raid the territory of the German Reich. The ultimate goal of the operation is to create a barrage against the Asian part of Russia along the common Volga-Arkhangelsk line. Thus, if necessary, the last industrial region remaining with Russia in the Urals can be paralyzed with the help of aviation.

In the course of these operations, the Russian Baltic Fleet will quickly lose its bases and will thus be unable to continue the fight.

Effective actions of the Russian air force must be prevented by our powerful strikes at the very beginning of the operation.

II. Supposed allies and their tasks

1. In the war against Soviet Russia on the flanks of our front, we can count on the active participation of Romania and Finland.

The Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces will at the appropriate time agree and establish in what form the armed forces of both countries, when they enter the war, will be subordinated to the German command.

2. The task of Romania will be to support the offensive of the German troops on the southern flank, at least at the beginning of it, with its selected forces, to pin down the enemy forces where they have not been put into action. german troops, and otherwise carry out support service in the rear areas.

3. Finland should cover the concentration and deployment of a separate German northern group of forces (units of the 21st Army), coming from Norway, and conduct combat operations with them. In addition, Finland will be responsible for the capture of the Hanko Peninsula.

A) Ground Forces (expressing agreement with the operational plans reported to me)

The theater of military operations is divided by the Pripyat bogs into northern and southern parts. The direction of the main attack must be prepared north of the Pripyat bogs. Two army groups should be concentrated here.

The southern of these groups, which is the center of the common front, has the task of advancing with especially strong tank and motorized formations from the Warsaw region and north of it and crushing the enemy forces in Belarus. Thus, the prerequisites will be created for the turn of powerful units of mobile forces to the north, so that in cooperation with the northern group of armies advancing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, destroy the enemy forces operating in the Baltic. Only after securing the fulfillment of this urgent task, which should be followed by the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, should the operations begin to capture Moscow as an important center of communications and the military industry.

Only the unexpectedly rapid failure of the Russian resistance could justify the formulation and implementation of both tasks simultaneously.

The most important task of the 21st Army during the Eastern Campaign remains the defense of Norway. The forces available in addition (the mountain corps) should be used in the North primarily for the defense of the Petsamo (Pechenga) regions and its ore mines, as well as the Arctic Ocean route. Then these forces must, together with Finnish troops, advance to the Murmansk railway in order to paralyze the supply of the Murmansk region through land communications.

Whether such an operation will be carried out by larger forces of German troops (two or three divisions) from the Rovaniemi area and to the south of it depends on Sweden's readiness to place its railways at our disposal for the transfer of troops.

The main forces of the Finnish army will be tasked with pinning down as many Russian troops as possible in accordance with the advance of the German northern flank, advancing west or on both sides of Lake Ladoga and capturing the Hanko Peninsula.

The armies operating south of the Pripyat swamps should be even west of the Dnieper in the course of a district operation and, with the help of strong flanks, completely defeat the Russian forces located in the Ukraine. To this end, it is necessary to concentrate the main direction of the attack from the Lublin region in a general direction to Kiev, while the forces in Romania form a defensive flank separated by a large distance across the lower course of the Prut. The Romanian army is assigned the task of pinning down the Russian forces between them.

At the end of the battles south and north of the Pripyat swamps, launch the pursuit of the enemy and ensure the achievement of the following goals:

In the south, in a timely manner to occupy the important militarily and economically Donetsk basin,

In the north, quickly reach Moscow.

The capture of this city means not only a decisive political and economic success, but also the loss of an important railway junction.

B) Air Force

Their task will be to paralyze and neutralize the opposition of the Russian air force as much as possible and to support the ground forces in their operations in decisive directions. This will be primarily necessary in the direction of the central army group and on the main wing of the southern army group. Russian railways and communication routes, depending on their importance for the operation, must be cut or disabled by capturing the most important objects located close to the combat area (river crossings!) By bold actions of the airborne troops.

In order to concentrate all forces for the fight against enemy aviation and for direct support of the ground forces, during the operation, objects of the military industry should not be attacked. Such attacks, and above all in the direction of the Urals, will be on the agenda only after the end of maneuvering operations.

C) Navy

In the war against Soviet Russia, the navy is assigned the task of securing the defense of its coastline and preventing the enemy's navy from breaking through from the Baltic Sea. Considering that after reaching Leningrad the Russian Baltic Fleet will lose its last stronghold and find itself in a hopeless position, major operations at sea should be avoided until that moment.

After the neutralization of the Russian fleet, the task will be to ensure complete freedom of maritime communications in the Baltic Sea, in particular, the supply by sea to the northern flank of the ground forces (minesweeping!).

All orders that will be given by the commanders-in-chief on the basis of this directive must most definitely proceed from the fact that it comes about precautions in case Russia changes its current position in relation to us. The number of officers involved in the initial preparations should be as limited as possible. The rest of the employees, whose participation is necessary, should be involved in work as late as possible and should be introduced to the tasks only to the extent that is necessary for the performance of official duties by each of them individually. Otherwise, there is a danger of the most serious political and military complications as a result of the disclosure of our preparations, the timing of which has not yet been determined.

I am awaiting oral reports from the Messrs. Commanders-in-Chief on their further intentions, based on this directive.

Report to me on the planned preparatory measures for all branches of the armed forces and on the progress of their implementation through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

A. Hitler

Translated from German: L. Bönnemann. Translation revision: L. Antipova

Barbarossa Fall "), the code name for the plan for the war of Germany against the USSR (named after the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa).

1940 after the defeat of the French army, the moment came that Hitler and his associates considered convenient for the implementation of their aggressive plans in the East. On July 22, 1940, on the day of France's surrender, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Franz Halder, received instructions from Hitler and the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Walter von Brauchitsch to develop a plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union. The command of the ground forces (OKH) in July-December developed several options simultaneously, each independently. One of the options was developed in the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) under the leadership of Alfred Jodl and his deputy General Walter Warlimont and was codenamed "Etude Lossberg". It was completed by September 15 and differed from the other option - General Marx - in that the main attack in it was determined on the northern sector of the front. In making the final decision, Hitler agreed with Jodl's considerations. By the time the work on the variants of the plan was completed, General Friedrich Paulus was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff, who was entrusted with bringing all the plans together and taking into account the remarks made by the Fuhrer. Under the leadership of General Paulus, in mid-December 1940, staff games and meetings of the military and Nazi leadership were held, where the final version of the Barbarossa plan was worked out. Paulus wrote in his memoirs: “The preparatory game for Operation Barbarossa was conducted under my leadership in mid-December 1940 for two days at the headquarters of the ground forces in Zossen.

The main target was Moscow. To achieve this goal and eliminate the threat from the north, Russian troops in the Baltic republics had to be destroyed. Then it was supposed to take Leningrad and Kronstadt, and the Russian Baltic Fleet to deprive it of its base. In the south, the first target was Ukraine with the Donbass, and later - the Caucasus with its oil sources. Particular importance in the plans of the OKW was attached to the capture of Moscow. However, the capture of Moscow was to be preceded by the capture of Leningrad. The capture of Leningrad pursued several military goals: the elimination of the main bases of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the disabling of the military industry of this city and the elimination of Leningrad as a point of concentration for a counteroffensive against German troops advancing on Moscow. When I say that a decision was made, I do not mean to say that there was complete unity in the opinions of the responsible commanders and staff officers.

On the other hand, although little was said about this, the opinion was expressed that a quick collapse of the Soviet resistance should be expected as a consequence of internal political difficulties, organizational and material weaknesses of the so-called "colossus with feet of clay .."

"The entire territory in which operations will take place is divided by the Pripyat bogs into northern and southern halves. The latter has a poor road network. The best highways and railways are located on the Warsaw-Moscow line. Therefore, the northern half presents more favorable conditions for the use of a large number of troops. In addition, a significant concentration of troops is planned in the Russian grouping in the direction of the Russian-German demarcation line.It should be assumed that immediately beyond the former Russian-Polish border there is a Russian supply base, covered by field fortifications. the easternmost line, where the Russians will be forced to fight.

If they retreat further, they will no longer be able to defend their industrial areas. As a consequence, our plan should be to prevent the Russians from creating a continuous defensive front west of these two rivers with the help of tank wedges. An especially large strike group should advance from the Warsaw region towards Moscow. Of the envisaged three army groups, the northern one will need to be directed to Leningrad, and the southern forces will deliver the main blow in the direction of Kiev. The ultimate goal of the operation is the Volga and the Arkhangelsk region. A total of 105 infantry, 32 tank and motorized divisions should be used, of which large forces (two armies) will first follow in the second echelon. "

"We moved through the frozen swamps, often the ice cracked, and the icy water got into my boots. My gloves were soaked through, I had to take them off and wrap my numb hands with a towel. I wanted to howl in pain." From a letter German soldier, a participant in the Russian campaign of 1941-42.

"The most important goal is not to allow the Russians to withdraw, while maintaining the integrity of the front. The offensive should be carried out so far to the east that Russian aviation cannot raid the territory of the German Reich and so that, on the other hand, German aviation can launch air strikes against the Russians. military-industrial areas. For this it is necessary to defeat the Russian armed forces and prevent their re-creation. Already the first strikes must be delivered in such units that it was possible to destroy large enemy forces. Therefore, mobile troops should be used on the adjacent flanks of both northern army groups, where it will be the main blow is delivered.

In the north, it is necessary to achieve the encirclement of the enemy forces located in the Baltic countries. To do this, the army group that will attack Moscow must have enough troops to be able to turn a significant part of its forces to the north. The army group advancing south of the Pripyat swamps must move out later and achieve the encirclement of large enemy forces in Ukraine by performing an enveloping maneuver from the north ... The number of troops in 130-140 divisions provided for the entire operation is sufficient. "

The final version of the plan is set out in the directive of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) ´21 of December 18, 1940 (see.

Directive 21) and the "Directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops" OKH of January 31, 1941. The "Barbarossa" plan called "to defeat Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign even before the war against England was over." The plan was "to split the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with fast and deep blows of powerful mobile groupings north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, to destroy the scattered groupings of enemy troops." At the same time, the main forces of the Soviet army were supposed to be destroyed west of the Dnieper, Western Dvina line, preventing them from retreating into the interior of the country. In the future, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and reach the line of Astrakhan, Volga, Arkhangelsk (see "A-A"). The Barbarossa plan detailed the tasks of army and army groups, the procedure for interaction between them, the tasks of the Air Force and the Navy, issues of cooperation with allied states, etc.

Its implementation was supposed to begin in May 1941, but in connection with operations against Yugoslavia and Greece, this period was postponed. In April 1941, the final order was given on the day of the attack - June 22.

A number of additional documents were developed to the OKV and OKH directives, incl.

including the directive on disinformation, which required to present "the strategic deployment of forces for Operation Barbarossa in the form of the greatest disinformation maneuver in the history of war, designed to divert attention from the latest preparations for the invasion of England."

In accordance with the Barbarossa plan, by June 22, 1941, 190 divisions (including 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions) of Germany and its allies were concentrated near the borders of the USSR. They were supported by 4 air fleets, as well as Finnish and Romanian aviation. The troops concentrated for the offensive numbered 5.5 million.

people, about 4300 tanks, over 47 thousand field guns and mortars, about 5000 combat aircraft. Army groups were deployed: "North", consisting of 29 divisions (all German) - in the strip from Memel (Klaipeda) to Goldap; "Center" consisting of 50 divisions and 2 brigades (all German) - in the strip from Goldap to the Pripyat bogs; "South" consisting of 57 divisions and 13 brigades (including 13 Romanian divisions, 9 Romanian and 4 Hungarian brigades) - in the strip from the Pripyat swamps to the Black Sea. The army groups had the task of advancing, respectively, in the general directions of Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. In Finland and Norway, the German army "Norway" and 2 Finnish armies were concentrated - a total of 21 divisions and 3 brigades, supported by the 5th Air Fleet and Finnish aviation.

They were tasked with reaching Murmansk and Leningrad. The OKH reserve had 24 divisions.

Despite the initial significant successes of the German forces, the Barbarossa plan was untenable, since it was based on the false assumption of weakness Soviet Union and his armed forces.

Excellent definition

Incomplete definition ↓

The collapse of the Barbarossa plan. Volume II [Disrupted Blitzkrieg] Glantz David M

Objectives of Operation Barbarossa

Objectives of Operation Barbarossa

According to the plans of Hitler and his generals, during the implementation of the "Barbarossa" plan they had conceived, Smolensk was by no means assigned the role of a cemetery for armies; the ancient Russian city of Smolensk was to become only a milestone on the way to Moscow and a quick victory. The German plan Barbarossa called for the invasion of the Soviet Union by three army groups of over 3 million men, led by an armada of four panzer groups of 19 panzer and 15 motorized divisions and approximately 3,350 tanks. Suddenly attacking with the support of the Luftwaffe, consisting of 2,770 fighters and bombers, these forces had to "destroy the main forces of the Russian ground forces in Western Russia with bold actions of tank wedges penetrating far into enemy territory, preventing the withdrawal of combat-ready enemy troops into the interior of the country." In other words, to defeat most of the Red Army west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers.

After completing this task, the Wehrmacht had to destroy the remnants of the Red Army in the course of a rapid advance, capture cities such as Leningrad and Kiev, the granary of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, as well as the capital of the Stalinist Soviet Union, Moscow. The Barbarossa plan did not contain a timetable for the advance of the troops, but ordered an exit to the line, "because of which the Russian Air Force would not be able to carry out raids on objects on the territory of the German Reich," that is, to the foothills of the Urals to the east of Moscow. Although the completed plan allowed the tank forces to turn north ("For example, the conditions for a turn to the north must be created for strong mobile units"), if necessary, the capture of Moscow, the version of the operation presented by Hitler to the generals on December 5, 1940, provided that " the decision whether to attack Moscow or not, or to the territories east of Moscow, cannot be made until the final defeat of the Soviet forces trapped in the alleged Northern and Southern cauldrons. " Hitler also stressed that "the Russians cannot be allowed to create a line of defense" 2.

Thus, the key premises on which the Barbarossa plan was built were as follows:

- the main forces of the Russian ground forces should be defeated to the west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers;

- the Luftwaffe destroy the Red Air Force on the ground or in the air with surprise strikes in the first days after the start of the operation;

- not to allow the Russian troops to retreat and create rear lines of defense;

- The Wehrmacht does not launch an offensive on Moscow until the complete defeat of the Russian forces in the alleged Northern and Southern cauldrons [but in the final version of Hitler's plan it was only about the Northern Cauldron].

Other important prerequisites that did not find clear formulations in the plan:

- judging by the failures of the Soviet-Finnish war and actions during the occupation of Eastern Poland, the Red Army, although numerous, is extremely clumsy;

- due to the Stalinist purges of 1937-1938. the command cadres of the Red Army are inexperienced, strongly "politicized" and lacking in initiative;

- The Red Army consists of 190 divisions and numerous tank brigades capable of conducting active hostilities, and in the event of a general mobilization is announced, it is capable of recruiting human potential into its ranks, allowing it to staff more than 300 divisions;

- the undeveloped communications network of the Soviet Union does not allow for prompt mobilization, therefore, the cadre army must be defeated even before, as a result of mobilization, the enemy will be able to bring the army to the previous level or increase the size of the army;

- the Slavs, unlike the Germans, in principle are not capable of conducting effective military operations;

- national minorities of the Soviet Union (Ukrainians, Belarusians, peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia) were and remain disloyal to the existing state structure and will not fight for Stalin's communist regime.

Thus, Germany, having invaded the Soviet Union, was unshakably confident of an early victory. And in accordance with the plan on June 22, the German Luftwaffe really destroyed most of the Red Army air force on the ground, and its armies and tank groups, breaking into the Russian defenses, rushed into the depths of the Soviet Union. Although the Germans were quite surprised by the fact that the Russians had a large number of tanks and armored vehicles that were in no way inferior to modern German vehicles and even superior to the German ones (for example, the KV and T-34 tanks), the German troops were able to destroy and encircle many of the Soviet armies that defended border areas. With the exception of Ukraine, where huge Soviet tank and mechanized forces slowed down the advance of Army Group South. As for the armies and tank groups of Army Group Center and Army Group North, they managed to defeat three Soviet armies in Belarus and two in the Baltic, forcing them to indiscriminately retreat.

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The fascist aggression against the Soviet Union, named after the Roman emperor "the Barbarossa plan", was a fleeting military campaign pursuing one single goal: to crush and destroy the USSR. The final date for the end of hostilities was supposed to be the fall of 1941.

A year before in December 1941, late in the evening, the Fuhrer signed a directive under serial number 21. It was printed in nine copies and was kept in the strictest confidence.

The directive received a code name - the Barbarossa plan. It provided for the end of the campaign of defeating the USSR even before the end of the war against Great Britain.

What was this document and what goals was pursued by the Barbarossa Plan - this is a carefully designed aggression directed against the Soviet Union. With the help of him, Hitler, intending to achieve world domination, had to remove one of the main obstacles to his imperial goals.

The main strategic targets were Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and the Central Industrial Region. At the same time, the capital was given a special place, its capture was considered decisive for the victorious outcome of this war.

For the destruction of the USSR, Hitler planned to use all German ground forces, with the exception of only those that were supposed to remain in the occupied territories.

Barbarossa's plan called for the release of the forces of the fascist air force to assist the ground forces of this eastern operation, so that the ground part of the campaign could be completed as quickly as possible. At the same time, the directive ordered by any means to minimize the destruction of eastern Germany by enemy aircraft.

Naval combat operations against the Northern, Black Sea and Baltic Soviet fleets were to be carried out by ships of the Reich Navy together with the naval forces of Romania and Finland.

For a lightning-fast attack on the USSR, the Barbarossa plan considered the participation of 152 divisions, including tank and motorized, two brigades. Romania and Finland intended to deploy 16 brigades and 29 ground divisions in this campaign.

The armed forces of the satellite countries of the Reich were to operate under a single German command. Finland's task was to cover the northern forces, which were to attack from Norwegian territory, as well as the destruction of Soviet troops on the Hanko Peninsula. At the same time, Romania was supposed to link the actions of the Soviet troops, helping the Germans from the rear areas.

The Barbarossa plan set specific goals based on pronounced class contradictions. It was the idea of ​​starting a war, which turned into the destruction of entire nations with the unlimited use of methods of violence.

Unlike the military incursions into France, Poland and the Balkans, the blitz campaign against the Soviet Union was prepared very scrupulously. The Hitlerite leadership spent enough time and effort to develop the Barbarossa plan, so defeat was ruled out.

But the creators could not accurately assess the strength and strength of the Soviet state, and proceeding from the exaggeration of the economic, political and military potential of the fascist empire, they underestimated the power of the USSR, the fighting efficiency and morale of its people.

Hitler's "machine" was gaining momentum for a victory that seemed very easy and close to the leaders from the Reich. That is why the fighting was supposed to be a blitzkrieg, and the offensive was a continuous advance deep into the USSR, and at a very high speed. Short breaks were provided only for pulling up the rear.

At the same time, the Barbarossa plan completely ruled out any delays due to resistance Soviet army... The reason for the failure of this seemingly victorious plan was excessive confidence in one's own strength, which, as history has shown, ruined the plans of the fascist generals.