Expulsion of invaders from the Far East. On the history of Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia. All

LAST BATTLES IN ZABAIKALYE AND PRIMORYE

In the Far East, the Red Army was opposed not by parts of the white movement and nationalist regimes defeated in 1919, but by the 175,000-strong Japanese army. Under these conditions, the Soviet government decided to create on April 6, 1920, a buffer democratic state - the Far Eastern Republic (FER), closely connected with the RSFSR. The FER includes the Trans-Baikal, Amur, Primorsk, Sakhalin, Kamchatka regions. G. X. Eikhe, who previously commanded the 5th Army, was appointed the head of the People's Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the Far East Soviet troops in Siberia. Parts of the NRA during 1920 fought with the troops of Ataman Semyonov and Kappel's detachments, which controlled a significant part of the territory of the Far Eastern Republic. It was only as a result of the third offensive on October 22, 1920 that NRA units took Chita with the support of partisans.

With the help of the Kappel and Semenovites who retreated from Transbaikalia, Japan strengthened its position in Primorye, where on May 26, 1921, the power of the Primorsky regional administration was overthrown and the pro-Japanese government of S.D.Merkulov was created. At the same time, units of RF Ungern invaded Transbaikalia from Mongolia. In this difficult situation, the Soviet government provided military, economic and financial assistance to the Far Eastern Republic. Eikhe was replaced by V.K.Blyukher as commander of the NRA DVR. In June Ungern retreated to Mongolia, where in August 1921 most of his troops were surrounded and destroyed by NRA units. In the fall of 1921, the situation escalated again, but ultimately as a result of fierce battles near Volochaevka (January-February 1922) in a 40-degree frost, NRA units turned the tide and returned the previously lost Khabarovsk. The further offensive of the NRA units (the new commander I. P. Uborevich) fell on October 1922.On October 25, the NRA troops entered Vladivostok, and on November 14, 1922, the People's Assembly of the Far East Republic announced the establishment of Soviet power in the Far East and the FER entered the composition of the RSFSR. Soviet power was established in all regions where civil war had previously flared up.

I.S. Ratkovsky, M.V. Khodyakov. History of Soviet Russia

"ON THE VALLEYS AND ON THE UNGORES": THE HISTORY OF A SONG

The biography of Peter Parfenov, which is closely connected with Siberia, is amazing. He managed to combine the talents of a poet, writer, historian, military leader, diplomat, head of a large Russian government department and party functionary.

Perhaps his name would have been forgotten long ago, if it had not been for the famous song "Along the valleys and over the hills" composed by him.

Pyotr Parfenov, in his article “The History of the Partisan Song,” recalled:

“The song“ Through the valleys, through the mountains ”has a long history. Its text was repeatedly revised by me. The song took its final form under the following circumstances.

After the liquidation of the Kolchak region and the liberation of Vladivostok, the political commissioner (as the military commissars were then called - A.M.) under the head of the Nikolsko-Ussuriysk garrison made a report on the political and moral state of the military units, pointed out complete absence good revolutionary songs.

“We have been standing for five months now, and our Red Army men are singing Kolchak's Canary, and we cannot offer them anything in return. It's a shame, comrades! ” - said the commissioner.

Taking advantage of the coming Sunday afternoon, when there was less operational work, I found my notebook with poems and, borrowing from it the melody, theme, form and a significant part of the text, wrote a new song "Partisan Hymn" in one evening:

Through the valleys, over the hills

Divisions went forward,

To take Primorye with a fight -

White army stronghold.

To drive out the invaders

Abroad of the native country.

And do not bend in front of their agent

Working your back.

We stood under the banner

Created a military camp

Remote squadrons

Priamurskih partisans.

These days glory will not cease

Will never be forgotten

How dashing is our lava

It occupied cities.

Will be preserved, as if in a fairy tale

Age-old like stumps

Assault nights of Spassk,

Nikolaev days.

How we drove the chieftains,

How we smashed the gentlemen.

And in the Pacific

They finished their hike. "

Later it turned out that the legendary "Partisan Song" had other predecessors. The researcher of Russian song history Yuri Biryukov revealed that in 1915 a collection of poems “The Year of War. Thoughts and songs ”by Vladimir Gilyarovsky - the famous Moscow reporter“ Uncle Gilyai ”. One of his poems "From the Taiga, Far Taiga" became a song that was sung in the Russian army. The song received the subtitle "Siberian Riflemen in 1914":

From taiga, dense taiga,

From the Amur, from the river,

Silently, a formidable cloud

The Siberians went to battle ...

And in recent years, the “March of the Drozdovsky Regiment” has been made public, which is considered the first double of the “Song of Siberian Riflemen”. The words of "Drozdovsky March" were composed by P. Batorin in memory of the 1200 versts long march of the 1st separate brigade Russian volunteers under the command of Colonel Drozdovsky from Romania, where they were found by the revolution, on the Don.

From Romania on a hike

The Drozdovsky glorious regiment was marching,

To save the people

I was carrying a heroic heavy duty.

Thus, two different songs were born on one motive: “red” and “white” (since later Drozdovsky's brigade fought with arms against the Bolsheviks), which often happened in those days of a tragic break in the life of Russia. The song of the Drozdovites also has pathos, but the people demand salvation in the name of Saint Russia:

The Drozdovites walked with a firm step,

The enemy fled under the onslaught:

Under the tricolor Russian flag

The regiment gained glory for itself!

Both songs remained in history, in songbooks, although the original source was forgotten for a long time. And the song of Pyotr Parfenov gained world fame, which became a kind of symbol of the era of the Civil War. The words from this song are minted on the monuments of partisan glory in Vladivostok, in Khabarovsk:

These days glory will not cease,

It will never fade.

Guerrilla units

Occupied cities ...

ICE EPILOGUE OF THE CIVIL WAR

While living in Harbin, General Pepelyaev in the spring of 1922 entered into relations with two delegates from the population of the Yakutsk region who had rebelled against the Bolsheviks: P.A.Kulikovsky and V.M. Popov, who arrived in Vladivostok to seek support from the government of S.D. Merkulov. This government, however, did not show an active interest in Yakut affairs, and the delegates then managed to interest General Pepelyaev in them, who, after long requests and insistence, agreed to help the people of Yakutia in their struggle against the communists. Having decided to organize a military expedition to this distant Siberian region, A. N. Pepelyaev moved to Vladivostok in the summer of 1922.

Individuals and institutions that had nothing to do with either the Japanese or the Merkulov government helped Kulikovsky and Pepelyaev to prepare food, uniforms and weapons for the expeditionary detachment. The recruitment gave the gene. Pepeliaev, up to 700 volunteers, mostly former soldiers of his Siberian army and Kapelevites.

On September 1, 1922, when the power in Primorye already belonged to General Dieterikhs, Pepeliaev's detachment was ready to leave Vladivostok. He received the name of the Siberian volunteer squad, but officially he was an expedition to protect the Okhotsk-Kamchatka coast.

Two steamers were chartered to send the detachment to the ports of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk.

Upon the arrival of the expedition, it turned out that the popular anti-Soviet movement in the Yakutsk region had already been liquidated by the Bolsheviks. According to the testimony of one of the participants in the campaign, the help of the Siberian volunteer squad was at least three months late.

General Pepelyaev was now faced with the question of whether to create a new anti-Bolshevik movement in Yakutia or to return immediately to Vladivostok. A meeting was arranged with local people, who assured Pepeliaev that it was easy to re-create a movement in the region, since there are still many partisan detachments in the taiga, and it would be enough for the squad to move forward, as it would quickly be strengthened by new volunteers.

Even before the arrival of General Vishnevsky in Ayan, gene. Pepeliaev with a detachment of 300 fighters went to Nelkan to take the local red garrison by surprise with its supplies of food and weapons and shipping facilities. The detachment had to cover a path of 240 versts through uninhabited terrain and cross the rugged Dzhukdzhur ridge on the way, which, during the autumn thaw, with insufficient transportation means, was extremely difficult.

Nevertheless, this path was passed, and the detachment reached Nelkan, but three defectors warned the Reds about the approach of the enemy, and they managed to sail on barges along the Mae River to Aldan.

Thus, the squad was forced to settle for the winter at two points: in Nelkan, with General Pepelyaev, and in Ayan, with General Vishnevsky ... On November 19, a detachment from the port of Ayana, led by gene. Vishnevsky, and now only the third battalion of the squad remained in Ayana.

Pepeliaev's squad stayed in Nelkan for about a month, organizing their own transport and collecting intelligence information. Information was received about the location in the area of ​​the red parts. It turned out that there were up to 350 red fighters in the Amga settlement, almost the same number in the villages of Petropavlovsky and Churapche. In the regional city of Yakutsk itself, the number of red fighters has not been clarified. It was assumed that their main forces were located here, led by the commander of all the red detachments in the Baikalov region ...

On January 22, 1923, a detachment was sent from Ust-Mili to take the village of Amga, under the command of Colonel Renengart with a force of up to 400 fighters with two machine guns ... days.

Amga was taken after a short resistance from the Reds ... It was the first success of the White, but further development the struggle brought them nothing but disappointment and dire calamities.

On February 12, information was received that the red garrison of the village of Petropavlovsky under the command of Strodt withdrew and went to Yakutsk. General Vishnevsky was sent to meet him with an instructor company and the 1st battalion, which was supposed to ambush and defeat the Reds while they were resting in one of the villages.

Strodt, however, learned of the proposed ambush and prepared to meet the enemy. On February 13, a battle began in the Yakut ulus (village) of Sigalsy ...

Strodt's detachment was surrounded; guards were posted around him in the forest. The Whites made an attempt to take Sigalsy by storm, but the Reds developed devastating machine-gun fire, and this attempt was unsuccessful.

In view of the impossibility of taking the enemy out of the battle, White decided not to lift the siege until the Reds surrendered themselves under the pressure of hunger. On February 25, information was received about the movement of the Churapchin red detachment to the rescue of Strodt. Gene. Pepeliaev sent part of his squad to meet this detachment, but again failed to destroy it.

Three days later, news came that a large detachment under the command of Baikalov himself had set out from Yakutsk. This detachment moved directly to Amga and on the morning of March 2 opened gun and machine-gun fire on it. The white defenders of Amga fired back from the red ones to the last bullet, then some of them retreated to Ust-Mili, some were captured by the enemy.

The situation has now changed dramatically, not in favor of whites.

March 3, gene. Pepelyaev gave the order for his squad to retreat back to the village of Peter and Paul, at the mouth of the Mai River. The order said, among other things:

Having experienced severe hardships on the road, the squad of the gene. Pepeliaeva in early April. 1923 reached Nelkan. In total, about 600 people remained in the squad after the campaign to Yakutsk, including 200 Yakuts.

After resting in Nelkan, the detachment then went to Ayan on the coast of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. It was already in the summer of 1923. Upon learning of the departure of General Pepelyaev's detachment to the sea, the Red authorities of Primorye sent a military expedition from Vladivostok on three steamers under the command of Vostretsov.

On the night of June 18, with a strong wind and storm at sea, the Reds landed near Ayan and unnoticed went to the port, surrounding Pepeliaev's headquarters and his combat units. Vostretsov suggested that Pepeliaev surrender without a fight, warning that otherwise his squad would be destroyed by force of arms.

There was no way out: Pepeliaev agreed to surrender ...

Pepeliaev and his main associates were taken to Siberia, where in the city of Chita their trial took place. The general himself and ten people taken prisoner with him were sentenced to death together, but this sentence was later commuted to ten years in prison ...

"GeRvents ~ k ~ b ~ 1922" ^

The border of the Far Eastern Republic in 1920-1922

Agreement at the Gongota station on the cessation of hostilities for

"Merkulov coup" C 21. 5.1921) - the establishment of counter-revolutionary power of the protégés of the Japanese imperialists ("black buffer")

/////// Territory liberated from interventionists and White Guards by April 1920

The main areas of the partisan movement Occupation of the CER by the interventionists and White Guards Provocative actions of the Japanese military on April 4-6, 1920 Actions of the Japanese interventionists and White Guards Actions of the Red partisans Actions of the People's Revolutionary Army = (> Actions of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary detachments

Western Transbaikal Front (15-7.1920) The line of the Amur Front by October 1920. (liquidation of the "Chita traffic jam") The line of the Eastern Front in February and October 1922

The defeat of the "White Insurgent Army" at Volo ^ aevka (February 5-12, 1922) and the Zemskaya army "near Spassk, October 7-9, 1922) © The defeat and capture of the oeloguards bands

The flight of the invaders from the Distant Voe oka

^ The governments of the troops of the RSFSR and the Far Eastern Republic entered the territory of Mongolia and, together with the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, liberated Urga on July 6, 1921.

The people's revolution won in Mongolia. However, due to special historical conditions, a limited monarchy was proclaimed here on July 11, 1921. The theocratic power of Bogdoghegen, the head of the Buddhist Church, was limited by the Provisional People's Government, led by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.

On November 5, 1921, an agreement was signed in Moscow for a meyad by representatives of the Soviet government and representatives of the People's Government of Mongolia. In a conversation with Sukhe-Bator, VI Lenin pointed out that due to the geographical position of Mongolia, the imperialists, in the event of a war, will strive to seize it and turn it into a staging area for an attack on Soviet Russia. “Therefore,” said V. I. Lenin to Sukhe-Bator, “the only correct way for every worker in your country is to fight for state and economic independence in alliance with the workers and peasants of the RSFSR” 54.

With the help of the Red Army, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1922 was completely cleared of the remnants of the White Guard gangs. Ungern was caught by the cavalry detachment of the 104th brigade and the detachment of Shchetinkin and by order of the revolutionary court he was shot. The liberated Mongolian people began the peaceful construction of an independent Mongolian People's Republic.

The defeat by the Red Army of Baron Ungern's units in Transbaikalia and Mongolia, the expulsion of the White Guard detachments of Kazantsev, Bakich and others from Siberia and Tuva (now the Tuva Autonomous Region) made it possible for the Tuvan people to proclaim the Tanna-Tuva People's Republic in August 1921. In the constitution of the young republic it was stated that Tannu-Tuvpnskaya grew up, the public is a free and independent state, which is in international affairs under the protection of Soviet Russia.

After the failure of Ungern's adventure, the imperialists of the United States and Japan did not stop trying to destroy the Far Eastern Republic.

However, their concerted actions were hampered by contradictions, the struggle for dominant influence in the countries of the Pacific basin.

In order to "settle" relations in the Pacific Ocean and the Far East, on November 12, 1921, at the initiative of the United States, the Washington Conference of the Nine Powers was convened, in which, in addition to the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy, China, Belgium, Holland and Portugal took part. At the center of the Washington conference were the question of the redistribution of spheres of influence in the Pacific Ocean and the Far East and the question of the balance of the naval forces of the main imperialist powers.

From the very beginning of the Washington Conference, its anti-Soviet orientation was revealed. The RSFSR government did not even receive an invitation to take part in the conference. A Soviet note dated July 19, 1921, sent before the start of the conference to the governments of Great Britain, France, the United States, Japan and China, emphasized that

“The Russian government protests against his exclusion from the conference, which directly concerns him, as well as against any intention of any power to make decisions concerning The Pacific, without the knowledge of Russia "55.

To the statement of the US State Department that in the absence of the ADRINO Russian government, the entire conference as a whole would "protect" Russia's interests, the Soviet government responded with a resolute protest.

“Russia,” stated in a note dated November 2, 1921, “in recent years has experienced enough the concerns of the great powers. Her interests are taken over by the same governments that have filled her with blood, sending tsarist generals against her, and strangled her with the ring of a merciless blockade ”56.

The sweat of the Soviet government was left unanswered. The Washington Conference began its work without the participation of Soviet Russia.

In December 1921, during the conference, a delegation from the FER arrived in Washington and demanded a peaceful resolution of the Far East issue and an end to the armed Japanese intervention. The FER's demands, however, were not met. The Washington Conference tacitly sanctioned Japan's actions in the Far East.

In turn, Japan, in order to strengthen its positions in the Far East, even before the start of the conference in Washington, tried to resort to negotiations with the FER government. For this purpose, the Dairen Conference was convened, which lasted from August 26, 1921 to April 16, 1922. A representative of the government of the RSFSR was unofficially present at the Dairenskoy conference. 10. Y. Markhlevsky. The FER delegation at the conference was headed by Deputy Prime Minister FN Petrov.

The FER government, agreeing to Japan's proposal for negotiations in Dairen, once again demonstrated its peaceful policy and sought to use the conference to expose the aggressive and aggressive policy of foreign, primarily Japanese, imperialists in the Far East. From the very first sessions of the Dairen Conference, the true intentions of the Japanese ruling circles were revealed. The Japanese rejected the proposal of the FER delegation to publish a joint declaration on the cessation of hostilities. The FER delegation introduced a draft treaty, the main requirement of which was Japan's commitment to evacuate its troops from the Far East. Japan rejected this proposal and submitted its counter-draft treaty, in which it presented the FER with demands: to tear down all the fortifications on the border with Korea and in the region of the Vladivostok fortress, to destroy the navy in the Pacific Ocean, to recognize the freedom of residence and movement of Japanese military officials in the FER, to equate Japanese subjects to the subjects of the FER in the field of trade, crafts and trades, to grant the Japanese subjects the right to own land, freedom of navigation to Japanese ships on the Amur and Sungari rivers, to lease Sakhalin Island to Japan for a period of 80 years, not to introduce the communist regime in the FER, etc. ...

The demands of the Japanese imperialists aimed at turning the Far East into a Japanese colony were categorically rejected by the FER delegation. The Dairen Conference ended in vain.

Simultaneously with the negotiations, the interventionists were preparing an attack on the FER by the forces of the White Guards of Primorye. Preparing for an attack on the FER, the White Guards intensified the persecution of the communists in Primorye. The Primorsk Bolshevik organization suffered two major failures during 1921, which undermined its fighting efficiency. The first failure of the party organization occurred at the time of preparations for the uprising against the Merkulovism in the summer of 1921. 13 the last moment before the speech, the provocateur gave the White Guards the whole plan of the uprising. Active participants in the preparation of the uprising led by the Communist II. V. Rukosuev-Ordynsky were arrested and many of them were killed without trial or investigation. The second time the underground organization was betrayed by a traitor in late December 1921. The failures of the Bolshevik organization weakened the party leadership of the partisan movement in Primorye and made it easier for the White Guards to carry out their plan of attack on the Far East Region.

In order to disguise an armed uprising against the FER, the Merkulov government renamed the Semyonov-Kappel troops into the "White Insurgent Army." General Molchanov, who was close to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, was appointed commander of this army.

Before launching a decisive offensive against the FER, the white command, in order to protect its rear and flanks, carried out wide operations in November 1921 against the partisan centers of Primorye - Suchan, Anuchino, Yakovlevka. Under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, offering them stubborn resistance, the partisans were forced to retreat in small detachments into the taiga and hills.

Having thus secured its rear and right flank, the Merkulov army, under the cover of Japanese troops, concentrated in the area of ​​the Shmakovka station. Having freely passed the neutral zone between the stations of Ussuri and Iman, on November 30, 1921, the White Guard troops launched an offensive against the Far Eastern Republic.

During December, minor garrisons of the People's Revolutionary Army, concentrated at the northern border of the neutral zone, fought intense battles with the White Guards. Yielding to the enemy in numbers and weapons, they were forced to retreat. On December 22, the White Guards captured Khabarovsk, crossed the Amur and occupied the Volochaevka railway station. While advancing on Khabarovsk along the railway line, the White Guard troops made an attempt to cut the path of retreat of the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army. For this, from the village of Kazakevpchevo, a cavalry group of General Sakharov, consisting of 1,500 sabers, was sent bypassing Khabarovsk. She was supposed to cross the Amur on the ice and, reaching the Volochaevka area, destroy the railway in the rear of the People's Revolutionary Army and defeat the revolutionary troops of the Khabarovsk direction.

The plan of the White Guard command was thwarted. Near Kazaksvichevo, Sakharov's group was detained by a small special-purpose detachment made up of communists and Komsomol members mobilized by the Amur and Amur regional committees of the RCP (b). This detachment of 200 people took a POSITION near Kazakevichsvo. After a fierce battle in a heroic squad surrounded by enemies, several soldiers survived. 28 wounded communists and Komsomol members were captured and tortured. Among the dead were the head of the agitation and propaganda department of the Amur regional committee of the RCP (b) Sedoikin (A. N. Borodkin), the post and telegraph commissar of the Amur region “JI. Koshuba, mill worker NI Pechkpn, Komsomol students M. Korolev, A. Rudykh and others. Thanks to the stubborn resistance shown to the White Guards at Kazakevichevo, units of the People's Revolutionary Army managed to retreat to the Ying station and take new positions.

The failures of units of the People's Revolutionary Army of the FER in the Khabarovsk direction were largely due to mistakes in the strategic plan of defense of the FER and the unsatisfactory leadership of the troops by the command and headquarters of the Amur Military District. The military command, as well as the party leadership of the FER, considered the Manchuria-Chita section to be the main threatening direction. The danger that arose in connection with the Merkulov coup in Primorye was underestimated by them. It was assumed that the whites could be paralyzed by the actions of partisan detachments, operationally subordinate to the headquarters of the Amur Military District.

At a meeting of the Dalburo on June 1, 1921, the issue "On the defense of the republic in connection with the performance of the White Guards in Primorye" was discussed. At this meeting, the Dalburo, taking into account the possibility of an open Japanese attack from the territory of Manchuria, as well as the launched offensive of Ungern from Mongolia, adopted a plan for the defense of the FER. The plan provided for the division of the territory of the Far Eastern Republic into three combat areas: Western - from the Selenga River to Manchuria and Argun, Amur - to Khabarovsk, Primorsky - partisan. The main armed forces of the FER, according to this plan, were concentrated in Transbaikalia - in the Manchurian direction.

This decision was based on the assumption of the possibility of using internal contradictions both among the White Guard counter-revolution in Primorye and between the American and Japanese imperialists. There was also an unfounded hope that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, using the Kappelevites, would be able to disintegrate Merkulov's army. Along with this, excessive importance was attached to the role of the partisan movement in Primorye to the detriment of strengthening the regular armed forces in the Khabarovsk sector. Therefore, the defense of the region from the Imana River in Primorye to Blagoveshchensk inclusively was provided by the forces of four incomplete regiments.

The People's Revolutionary Army, which consisted of partisan detachments and units of Kolchak troops who had gone over to the side of the revolution, numbered 90 thousand people by the summer of 1921 of different ages and service life. To bring the army into a combat-ready state, the Dalburo Central Committee of the RCP (b) on August 16, 1921, decided to reorganize the army and reduce its size, to demobilize the elderly and mobilize young people.

The manning of the units of the People's Revolutionary Army by the beginning of the White offensive had not yet been completed. The offensive of the Merkulovites began at a time when the older people's army was demobilized, and the youth drafted into the army had not yet arrived. As a result, the military units of the Amur District were only 40 percent staffed and were not adequately trained.

The command of the Amur military district turned out to be unprepared to repel the enemy offensive. The district headquarters did not have an operational plan in case of an attack by the White Guards from Primorye. At the moment the enemy offensive began, the command of the people's revolutionary troops of the Khabarovsk direction was confused and released the leadership from their hands. The defense of the Khabarovsk region was not secured. All these circumstances were the reason for the temporary success of the White Guards and the retreat of units of the People's Revolutionary Army beyond the Amur.

The Dalburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the government of the Far Eastern Republic took decisive measures to prepare for the defeat of the White Guard troops. At the end of December 1921, the Dalburo of the Central Committee of the RK11 (b) made a decision to concentrate all the forces of the People's Revolutionary Army on the Eastern Front, and during the period of concentration of forces to conduct an active defense in the area of ​​Ying station, using on a large scale partisan actions in the rear of the White Guards 57. In the Amur and Amur regions, six ages were drafted into the army, and in Transbaikalia - four ages. To strengthen the Eastern Front, units of the People's Revolutionary Army were transferred from Transbaikalia to Khabarovsk. At the request of the command of the People's Revolutionary Army, the 104th brigade of the Soviet 5th Army was moved to cover the Manchu direction in Transbaikalia.

By order of the main command of the People's Revolutionary Army at the end of December 1921, the headquarters of the Eastern Front was created. S. Seryshev was appointed commander of the front, P. Postyshev was appointed commissar. With the aim of organizing and strengthening the rear area of ​​the front and ensuring the successful mobilization of reinforcements for the People's Revolutionary Army, a logistics headquarters was created in Blagoveshchensk.

The party organizations of the Far Eastern Republic went over to martial law. The Amur party organization completely merged into the ranks of the army. The Amur Regional Committee of the RCP (b) in the very first days of the offensive of the White Guards mobilized and sent to the front one hundred communists and one hundred Komsomol members. The Annunciation Committee of the RCP (b) announced that all its members and candidates are considered mobilized and are in a state of war. Most of the Komsomol organizations are fully integrated into the military units... Volunteer youth detachments were created, for example, in Chita - a company named after S. Lazo, in Primorye - a youth detachment named after K. Liebknecht. In all cities and villages of the Far Eastern Republic, an extensive campaign was carried out to raise funds and provide assistance to the soldiers of the People's Revolutionary Army. In the center of the Far Eastern Republic and in the localities, committees for assistance to the front were created from representatives of state, party, Komsomol, trade union and other organizations. THESE committees were closely associated with the People's Revolutionary Army and provided great assistance to the front with food and uniforms. Workers and employees remained on overtime work, deducting part of their salaries to the army's FOVD. During the fighting on the outskirts of Khabarovsk, many members of the People's Assembly, as well as a number of members of the government, went to the front line to organize assistance to the front. The National Assembly adopted a law on an emergency military tax on the bourgeoisie in the amount of half a million gold rubles. Only the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks voted against. They systematically tried to disrupt the activities of the FER government both in the field of domestic and foreign policy, and hindered the work of the state apparatus. Moreover, their criminal role was established as accomplices and participants in the military adventure of the Merkulovites against the FER58. In order to cleanse the authorities of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in December 1921, the coalition with them in the Council of Ministers of the FER was liquidated 59.

Thanks to the measures taken, the People's Revolutionary Army was strengthened in a short time and a decisive turning point was achieved at the front.

The White Guard offensive from the east was stopped at the Pi station of the Amur railway, a hundred kilometers west of Khabarovsk. Even on the approaches to Ying station, the White Guards were weakened by the continuous counterattacks of the detachments of the People's Revolutionary Army and the attack of the partisans in the rear. The White Guard command made an attempt to continue the offensive, organizing on the night of December 28 an unexpected raid on the Ying station by General Sakharov's group of forces consisting of 1,000 bayonets and 200 sabers. But the battle ended in defeat for the enemy 60.

After the battle of Ins, the Merkulov "White Army" retreated to Volochaevka -? a small station of the Ussuriysk railway, 48 kilometers west of Khabarovsk. The commander of the White Guard forces, General Molchanov, decided to go over to active defense, firmly securing the Khabarovsk region. Colonel Argunov, who commanded the White Guard units in the Volochaevkp area, was ordered to urgently strengthen this area by creating a chain of fortifications in a narrow passage between the Amur and Tunguska rivers. Here the enemy decided to hold out until spring, accumulate forces, reorganize the army, clear its rear of the partisans, and with the beginning of spring go on the offensive. This plan of the enemy was revealed: in early January, one of the detachments of the people's troops raided the headquarters of the 1st corps of General Molchanov and seized operational documents.

It was impossible to hesitate. It was necessary to defeat the White Guards before the onset of spring.

During January and the first days of February 1922, the command of the People's Revolutionary Army gathered forces to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy at Volochaevka. For this, from the Trans-Baikal Military District, the Special Amur Regiment, the Troptskosavsky Cavalry Regiment and the Chita Rifle Brigade were transferred to the EAST Front. The transfer of these units was completed by January 31, 1922. The troops that arrived from Transbaikalia made up the Transbaikal group of forces of the Eastern Front. The rifle units located at the In station, the 5th, 6th and Special Amur regiments were brought together into the Consolidated Brigade and, together with the 4th cavalry regiment, two partisan detachments and the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment that arrived later, made up the 11n group of the front.

The activity of the partisans became especially active these days. In the rear of the White Guards, in Primorye, a Military Council of partisan detachments was created under the leadership of the communists KF Pshenitsyn and AK Flegontov. The region was divided into eight military districts, in which partisan detachments were deployed according to the general plan. GTartisan detachments provided great assistance to the People's Revolutionary Army and inflicted serious damage on the White Guards, who were forced to allocate significant forces to protect their rear.

On January 6, 1922, partisans of the Imanskaya Valley raided the Muravyov-Amursky station, where the White Guard artillery depot was located. The unexpected attack failed: the warehouse was heavily guarded. The partisans launched a bayonet attack three times, reached the warehouse and blew it up.

On the night of January 12, a partisan detachment raided Khabarovsk, where the headquarters of the 1st White Guard Corps of General Molchanov was located. The Whites repulsed the raid with heavy losses, but for this they had to pull back two regiments from Volochaevkp.

Before the start of the Volochaev operation, the balance of forces of the parties was as follows: units of the People's Revolutionary Army had about 6300 bayonets and 1300 sabers, 300 machine guns, 30 guns, 3 armored trains, 2 tanks; the White Guards at the front had about 4550 bayonets and sabers, 63 machine guns, 12 guns and 3 armored trains.

Volochaevka was the last stronghold of the enemy. The command of the "White Staple Army" was clearly aware of this. General Molchanov, obviously expecting the offensive of the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army, wrote in an address to his officers:

“The question of our very existence requires the full exertion of all forces to achieve victory. We live with victory - failure can deprive us of our very existence as an anti-Bolshevik organization ... " in any case it is impossible ”61.

Knowing that the White Guards stationed in Volochaevka would fiercely resist, the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army prepared for a stubborn battle. During the last two weeks of January, despite the severe frosts, sometimes reaching 35 degrees, the troops trained intensively. On January 28, instead of the field headquarters, the commander-in-chief of the People's Revolutionary Army V.K.Blyukher arrived at the Ying station, taking over the direct leadership of the upcoming operation. A parade of revolutionary units and a small meeting took place. The commanders and commissars addressed the soldiers with appeals: "Volochaevka must be ours!", "Khabarovsk must be red!" And in response in the frosty air there was a friendly, cheerful, rolling "hurray!"

VOLOCHAEVSKY LOY (From the painting by E O. Mashkevich.)

The plan of the offensive of the People's Revolutionary Army, adopted by the commander-in-chief, envisaged inflicting two successive blows on the enemy. As a result of the first blow, the revolutionary troops were to seize the area of ​​the Olgokhta station and create a bridgehead for a further offensive on Volochaevka. The second blow was designed to capture Volochasvka and defeat the White Guard troops.62 After the occupation of Olgokhta station and regrouping of forces, the Consolidated Brigade was to advance along the railway line and, with the assistance of partisan detachments, strike at the right flank of the White Guards. After the occupation of Volochaevka, this group was tasked with pursuing the enemy in the Khabarovsk direction. The Trans-Baikal group of forces was supposed to move from the Olgokhta station in the Amur direction, strike on the left flank of the White Guards and, going through Kazaksvichevo to the railway in the rear of the enemy, cut off his retreat in Primorye. Thus, the plan provided for the encirclement and destruction of the enemy in the Khabarovsk region 63.

Volochaev's positions were a serious knot of enemy resistance. During January 1922, the White Guards managed to build powerful fortifications in the Volochaevka station area. They began in the north at Tunguska and, passing through a series of hills and the western outskirts of the Volochaevka settlement, ended in the south with the fortified region of Verkhpe-Spasskoye on the Amur. The Volochaevka area was especially carefully fortified. The White Guards built here deep, human-sized trenches with ice ramparts, numerous, carefully hidden machine-gun nests and surrounded these "fortifications in several rows wire fences.

The tactical key of the enemy's defense was the Jun-Koran hill, dominating the terrain. This height, with well-equipped machine-gun and artillery positions and observation posts, gave the entrenched enemy enormous advantages. The troops of the People's Revolutionary Army were to conduct an offensive across a wide open plain, covered with deep loose snow up to a man's waist.

On February 4, V.K.Blyukher ordered the Trans-Baikal group of forces to drive the enemy out of Olgokhta and ensure the deployment of all units of the front for the transition to a general offensive.

The offensive began on February 5, 1922, the 2nd Regiment of the Chita Rifle Brigade, the Special Amur Regiment and armored train number 8. On February 5, they occupied the Olgokhta station. On February 7, the enemy launched a counterattack, trying to encircle the revolutionary troops. But the enemy ran into stubborn resistance. The artillerymen of the 3rd light battery behaved especially selflessly in this battle. Not fearing death, under the bullets of the enemy, they calmly fired at the White Guard chains and, letting the enemy at close range, mowed down with shells and buckshot

his ranks. The White Guards were forced to retreat. For the feat under the Olgokhta station, the battery was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

During February 8 and 9, units were concentrated at their initial positions on the Inskoy bridgehead, and on February 10, a general offensive by the troops of the Eastern Front began. The consolidated brigade under the command of Y. Z. Pokus and the partisan detachments of Petrov-Teterin and I.P. Shevchuk launched an assault on the Volocheyev fortifications, and the Trans-Baikal group of forces under the command of N.D. NizhneSpasskoye in the Amur direction with the aim of reaching the Ussuriysk railway and encircling the enemy in the Khabarovsk region.

Parts of the Consolidated Brigade went on the offensive at 12 noon. The 5th Infantry and 4th Cavalry Regiments went from the north, a battalion of the Special Amur Regiment and two tanks - in the center, to the June-Koran hill. 6th Infantry Regiment under the command of A. Zakharov attacked the White Guards from the south

A fierce battle broke out.

The 6th Infantry Regiment delivered the main blow to the Volochaev fortifications. The Korean company of this regiment was the first to reach the wire, but it was completely destroyed by fire from enemy armored trains. A foot team of scouts of the Special Amur Regiment, led by the assistant commander of the regiment Shimonin tatke, reached the wire, but, having lost 16 fighters, including Shimonin himself, who was wounded, was forced to retreat. The 6th company of the Special Amur Regiment, accompanied by two old Reio tanks, also moved onto the wire. On the way, one tank deteriorated, the other was hit a hundred meters from the wire by a shell of an enemy armored train. The driver of the tank, leaving the car, wanted to repair the damage, but was wounded. When the White Guards rushed to the tank, the driver blew himself up and the engine with a grenade. The company, having lost half of its composition, withdrew and buried itself in the snow.

The fighters had no scissors, no axes, no explosive bombs, and they were powerless against the wire. In addition, the armored trains of the People's Revolutionary Army could not support them with their fire: the destroyed bridges had not yet been restored, and the artillery had lagged behind. Therefore, enemy armored trains could move with impunity on the railroad and shoot fighters from the flank with almost direct fire. The advancing infantry, finding themselves without artillery support, falling under the hurricane fire of an enemy armored train, could not overcome the barbed wire.

By evening, the battle had subsided. On the night of February 11, units of the People's Revolutionary Army retreated several hundred steps from the barbed wire and lay in the snow in chains around Volochaevka.

Taking advantage of the respite, the medical teams ferried the wounded and frostbitten to the rear. In semi-barracks No. 3, a few kilometers from the front line, where the commander-in-chief, his field headquarters and the headquarters of the Consolidated Brigade were located, a small room was allocated for the medical unit. It accommodated the most seriously wounded and frostbitten. For forty kilometers around lay a white snowy desert, and only here and there on it were the remains of rare buildings burned down by the White Guards.

By nightfall, the frost intensified, a storm arose, covering the soldiers lying in front of Volochaevka with snow. All night and all day on February 11, the people's army lay in the open sky in the snow, receiving no hot food. They ate salted chum salmon and bread, hard as a stone. With great difficulty, it was possible to withdraw the soldiers in groups one or two kilometers to the rear, to the fires. But even there they could not get warm enough. They were shod and dressed in a lot. Many wore leather boots, greatcoats, jackets and undercoats, only a few had ichigi and felt boots, quilted jackets and short fur coats. To warm the legs, we received sacks filled with hay and straw. This device, inconvenient for walking, nevertheless saved from frostbite. Overworked after tremendous stress, the soldiers fell asleep in the snow, despite the frost. By order of the front headquarters, the commanders walked along the chains and woke up those who were asleep.

Despite the failure, the battle of 10 February at Volochaevka allowed the command of the People's Revolutionary Army to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy. It was found that the Volochaevka fortifications could be bypassed from the south. All day on February 11, preparations were underway for a decisive assault.

By the evening of February 11, the railway bridges and tracks were repaired. Armored trains No. 8 and No. 9 approached the front line. The front command, having pulled up some units from the reserve, reinforced the 6th regiment, which was responsible for the main task. The command of the group was entrusted to the commander of the 6th regiment, Zakharov, and his assistant Malyshenko led the 6th regiment.

By this time, units of the Chita brigade under the command of Tomina, having passed about 30 kilometers through the snowy lands in frost and blizzard, after fierce battles occupied the villages of Verkhne-Spasskoye and Nizhne-Spasskoye. Parts of the White Guard General Nikitin, covering the Amur direction, were forced to retreat. The Troitsk Savings Cavalry Regiment, which was part of the Chita Brigade, pursued the enemy. On the night of February 12, a group of Gultsgof was sent to bypass Volochaevka from the south, consisting of the 3rd battalion of the 6th regiment, foot reconnaissance of the 6th and 3rd regiments and a squadron of the Amur regiment with two guns. By the morning of February 12, the group reached the Volochaevka - Nizhne-Spasskoye road, where it joined up with the Troitskosavsky regiment and headed for an exit to the rear of the Volochaevka fortifications.

At 7 o'clock in the morning on February 12, when everything was ready for the offensive, three shots of a 120-mm Vickers cannon from armored train No. 9 were fired. This was a conditional signal for an assault, i

Artillery preparation began. An hour later, in the gray predawn fog, all units of the NRA in front of Volochaevka went on the offensive.

Each fighter walked with one thought - to win or die. The White Guards showered them with bullets and buckshot. The frost did not let me breathe, blinded my eyes. Every now and then, falling into the sveg, firing on the move, the soldiers uncontrollably rushed forward. They chopped barriers with sabers, tore the wire with rifle butts, broke it with numb hands, fell on it, struck down by a deadly downpour, and the living ran over their bodies.

The first companies of the advancing enemy armored train cut off with machine gun fire, and forced the rest to lie down. Armored train number 8 entered into single combat with the enemy's armored train. Its commander decided either to shoot the enemy's mobile fortress with direct fire from guns or to ram it. Enemy shells broke the control platform, the side of the machine-gun platform was torn apart, one of the shells hit the locomotive. But the commander of armored train number 8 gave the command: "Forward!" - and went to rapprochement with the enemy. The front gun of the White Guard armored train was smashed by a direct hit. The enemy retreated. Armored train number 8, pursuing the enemy, rushed after him into the location of the enemy units.

By this time, Gultsgof's group and the Troitskosavsky regiment had reached the railway line east of Volochaevka and set fire to several bridges. General Molchanov was forced to withdraw part of his troops to fight this column.

When the assault units became aware of the victory of the armored train number 8 and the exit of the Gultsgof column to the rear of the enemy, they again rushed to the attack.

Heavy foggy haze and icy wind, bullets and wire - everything was against them. Death tore from their ranks one by one.

Overgrown with hoarfrost, covered with snow, chilled to the bone, the soldiers of the People's Revolutionary Army fiercely fought in a bayonet battle. The White Guards could not stand it. They, firing back, began to retreat, and then fled. At eleven o'clock in the afternoon on February 12, Volochaevka was taken.

Presentation of awards to the soldiers of the People's Revolutionary Army, DIFFERENT IN the battle at Volochaevka. (Photo.)

The battle at Volochaevka in terms of the heroism displayed by the revolutionary troops can only be compared with the assault on Perekop. The usually restrained commander-in-chief Blucher, a participant in the Perekop battle, said that he found it difficult to single out the valor of any particular unit: everyone fought heroically and looked selflessly into the face of death. Even the enemy spoke with admiration of the extraordinary heroism of the soldiers of the People's Revolutionary Army. Colonel Argunov, who led the defense of Volochaevka, said that he would give all the participants in the assault on the St. George's cross. For courage and heroism in the Volochaev battle, the 6th Infantry Regiment, in the ranks of which international companies of Koreans and Chinese fought, and armored train No. 8, as the most distinguished, were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. The 6th Infantry Regiment was later renamed the 4th Order of the Red Banner Volochaevsky Infantry Regiment. The Order of the Red Banner was also received by 67 commanders and soldiers of the People's Revolutionary Army. A monument was erected to the heroes of the Volochaev assault who fell in battle on the June-Koran hill. A bronze soldier of the People's Revolutionary Army with a rifle in his hand is standing over the mass grave of the fallen heroes. The glory of the heroes is sung in folk songs and legends.

With the victory of a unit of the People's Revolutionary Army at Volochaevka, the workers and peasants of the Far East wrote another heroic page in the history of the struggle against the White Guards and interventionists for the freedom and independence of the Soviet Motherland.

The battle at Volochaevka was a turning point. After Volochaevka, the White Insurgent Army could no longer recover. True, the initial plan of the commander-in-chief - to encircle and completely defeat the troops of General Molchanov near Khabarovsk - was not implemented. The Trans-Baikal group of troops, pursuing the enemy in the Amur direction, was unable to connect in time with the Pokus brigade. On February 14, 1922, the People's Revolutionary Army liberated Khabarovsk. The White Guards retreated southward.

The enemy tried to detain units of the People's Revolutionary Army at the Bikin station, but after a stubborn battle on February 28, he was shot down from this position. Suffering heavy losses, the White Guards fled to the city of Iman, within the neutral zone. When units of the People's Revolutionary Army, pursuing the enemy, entered this zone, the Japanese opened military operations against them. The troops of the People's Revolutionary Army, obeying the directives of the FER government not to clash with Japanese troops, suspended the offensive and took up positions in the Iman River valley. The fighting has temporarily ceased. The working people of the Far Eastern Republic, led by Bolshevik organizations, launched a preparation of forces for the complete expulsion of the invaders. HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE USSR.

In recent years, many publications have appeared in which attempts are made to reveal little-known pages of history, to find new approaches to the study of the events of 1917-1923. But, at the same time, often, one tendentiousness is replaced by another. There is a desire to change the prevailing assessments of foreign intervention, to present it as a positive phenomenon. This tendency is noticeable both outside Russia and within Russia itself. The tendency to justify the intervention makes itself felt on the grounds that in the course of this event its organizers and participants, allegedly in earnest, sought to provide material and moral assistance to the local Russian population.

However, changing one bias for another, it is impossible to objectively assess such a complex phenomenon as civil war and intervention. Rejecting a narrow approach in its coverage, one cannot at the same time take the point of view of the opposite side and reduce everything to accusation or condemnation of either side.

The situation in the Far East on the eve of the intervention. Preparing the intervention

The Far East was one of the least developed regions of the Russian Empire. It was geographically distant from the main economic and political centers of the country. Being vast in territory, it had a poorly developed network of communication routes and therefore was poorly connected with other parts of the country. One of the few routes connecting the Far East with the rest of Russia was the Trans-Siberian Railway, the construction of which was completed shortly before the events described in the course work. The population density of the region was very low. The number of settlements was small. The only large industrial center was Vladivostok. Far Eastern industry was poorly developed, so the number of workers, the main support of Soviet power, was much lower here than in the center. The bulk of the population was made up of the peasantry, which was divided into the indigenous wealthy and representatives of resettlement elements - "new settlers", whose financial situation was much worse. An important feature of the region was also the fact that here the privileged Cossacks fully preserved their military organization, the wealthy part of which rented out most of their land. There was also a significant stratum of the urban trading bourgeoisie, tsarist officials and officers. imperial army... Wealthy peasants, the city trading bourgeoisie, officers of the imperial army, tsarist officials and the leadership of the Cossacks later made up a significant part of the cadres of the anti-Bolshevik forces of the region.

The military forces of Russia in this region were few, and the transfer of additional forces in the event of the outbreak of hostilities was difficult. Russo-Japanese War 1904 - 1905 clearly demonstrated the weakness of Russia's positions in the Far East. On August 23 (September 5), 1905, an armistice was signed in Portsmouth (USA). Russia recognized Korea as a sphere of influence of Japan, ceded to it South Sakhalin, the rights to the Liaodong Peninsula with Port Arthur and Dalny, the South Manchurian Railway. The defeat forced Russia to reorient its foreign policy priorities from the Far East to the European vector.

But the confrontation did not end there. Japan was simply biding its time to seize the entire Far East from Russia. Although for a short time, it seemed that some "warming" arose in Russian-Japanese relations: during the First World War, Japan and Russia became formal allies. However, Japan came out in the war on the side of the Entente with the sole purpose of gaining control over the German sphere of influence in China and its colonies in the Pacific Ocean. After their capture in the fall of 1914, Japan's active participation in the war ended. To the appeal of the Western allies, with a request to send a Japanese expeditionary force to Europe, the Japanese government replied that "its climate is not suitable for Japanese soldiers."

On July 11, 1916, a secret agreement was concluded between Russia and Japan on the division of spheres of influence in China, where there was a clause declaring a military alliance between the two countries: the ally's demand must come to the rescue. " The Japanese hinted that they were ready to go for more if Northern Sakhalin was ceded to them, but the Russian delegation refused to even discuss such an option. As for the attitude of the public and the army to the "ally", it was quite definite: the memories of the Russian-Japanese war were still alive, and everyone understood that they would have to fight with Japan, and in the not too distant future. The temporary and unnatural nature of the alliance between Russia and Japan was obvious to Russian public consciousness, especially since the Japanese did not hide their territorial claims and were preparing to implement them at the first opportunity.

During the First World War, Russia's attention was completely diverted to the events taking place in Europe. Japan at this time was part of the Entente, that is, it was objectively an ally of Russia. Therefore, during this period, the Russian government did not maintain large military forces in the Far East. There were only small military detachments needed to maintain communications. During the First World War, about 40 thousand soldiers, sailors and Cossacks accumulated in Vladivostok (despite the fact that the city's population was 25 thousand), as well as a large amount of military equipment and weapons brought here by the Allies in the Entente for transfer to the west along the Trans-Siberian Railway.

After the victory of the October Revolution, the governments of the United States, Japan, and the Entente countries began to develop plans to overthrow Soviet power. Great importance was attached to the capture of Siberia and the Far East as a springboard for the fight against the Soviet Republic. In preparation for the intervention, the governments of the Entente countries and the United States not only sought to save Russia from the Bolsheviks, but also wanted to solve their own selfish interests. For example, the United States for a long time persistently prepared for the seizure of Russian territories in Siberia and the Far East, like Japan, waiting only for an opportunity to carry out its plans.

The revolutionary events of 1917 created chaos of power in the Far East. The Provisional Government, the Cossack atamans Semyonov and Kalmykov, the Soviets (Bolsheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Socialist-Revolutionaries), the government of autonomous Siberia, and even the director of the CER, General Horvat, claimed the leadership of Vladivostok.

Russian anti-Bolshevik forces helped unleash foreign intervention, hoping to overthrow Soviet power with the help of foreign troops. Thus, the Black Hundred Cadet newspaper "Voice of Primorya" published on March 20, 1918 a message on English language, about the beating of 10 thousand residents in Blagoveshchensk, about the mass executions of citizens of the Amur region by Soviet authorities. It is not known how reliable this information was, but, undoubtedly, this message was calculated to involve Japan in the conflict in the region. Indeed, it was precisely this kind of testimony about "unrest and anarchy in Russia," and besides, coming from the "Russian leaders" themselves, gave rise to Japan and other countries to begin intervention. "

By all means supported the anti-Bolshevik resistance, and France was preparing for military intervention, striving to create a "cordon sanitaire" around Soviet Russia, and then, through an economic blockade, to overthrow the power of the Bolsheviks. The governments of the United States and France were the direct organizers of the anti-Bolshevik rebellion of the Czechoslovak corps. It was the governments of these states that financed the resistance to the Bolsheviks.

Preparations for an armed intervention in the Far East ended in the early spring of 1918. By this time, the Allied powers had finally agreed to provide the initiative to Japan, to use the Czechoslovak corps for a counterrevolutionary insurrection, and to supply the White Guards with everything they needed. And although there was a strong "rivalry between Japan and America", as well as between other states, fear of the Bolshevik government forced them to unite and conduct a joint armed intervention.

By agreement of the governments of the United States and Japan, the latter was given freedom of action in the Far East. The Japanese troops were supposed to play the role of the main striking force that participated in the intervention of the states. The US government provoked Japan to march, in every possible way encouraged the Japanese military elite to engage in armed aggression and at the same time sought concerted actions from its ally, which in reality meant US control. The anti-Soviet orientation of the US policy was perfectly understood and fully taken into account by the militarists of Japan. They were quite satisfied with the American plan of recognizing the need to use the Japanese army in the intervention. The Japanese government justified the need to fight against Russia on the Asian mainland with its traditional policy, which was allegedly caused by the country's historical development. The essence of Japanese imperialism's foreign policy concept was that Japan should have a foothold on the mainland.

The beginning of the intervention

On April 4, 1918, two Japanese were killed in Vladivostok, and on April 5, Japanese and British landings landed in the port of Vladivostok (the British landed 50 marines, the Japanese - 250 soldiers) under the pretext of protecting their citizens. However, the indignation at the unmotivated action was so great that after three weeks the interventionists nevertheless got out of the streets of Vladivostok, to their ships.

For armed struggle in Siberia and the Far East, the interventionists decided to use the Czechoslovak corps, formed in the summer of 1917 with the permission of the Provisional Government from prisoners of war of the Austro-Hungarian army. The Soviet government allowed the evacuation of the corps from the country. Initially, it was assumed that the Czechoslovakians would leave Russia for France through Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. But due to the change in the situation on the Western Front, it was decided to evacuate the corps through Vladivostok. The drama of the situation was that the first echelons arrived in Vladivostok on April 25, 1918, while the rest stretched along the entire length of the Trans-Siberian Railway up to the Urals, the number of the corps exceeded 30 thousand people.

In June 1918, the allied landings in Vladivostok several times resisted by force the Council's attempts to export strategic reserves from Vladivostok to the west of Russia: ammunition depots and copper. Therefore, on June 29, the commander of the Czechoslovak troops in Vladivostok, Russian Major General Dieterichs, presented an ultimatum to the Vladivostok council: disarm his troops in half an hour. The ultimatum was prompted by information that the exported property was being used to arm the captured Magyars and Germans - several hundred of them were located near Vladivostok, as part of the Red Guard units. The Czechs, with shooting, quickly occupied the building of the council and proceeded to forcibly disarm the units of the city Red Guard.

In May - June 1918, corps troops, with the support of underground anti-Bolshevik organizations, overthrew Soviet power in Siberia. On the night of June 29, a mutiny of the Czechoslovak corps took place in Vladivostok, almost the entire composition of the Vladivostok Soviet was arrested. After the capture of Vladivostok, the Czechs continued their offensive against the "northern" detachments of the Primorye Bolsheviks, and took Ussuriisk on July 5. According to the memoirs of the Bolshevik Uvarov, in total, during the coup, 149 Red Guards were killed by the Czechs in the region, 17 communists and 30 "red" Czechs were arrested and brought to court-martial. It was the June performance of the Czechoslovak corps in Vladivostok that became the reason for the joint intervention of the allies. At a meeting at the White House on July 6, 1918, it was decided that the United States and Japan should land 7,000 soldiers each in the Russian Far East.

On July 16, 1918, numerous invaders landed in the city, and the allied command in Vladivostok declared the city "under international control." The purpose of the intervention was to provide assistance to the Czechs in their struggle against German and Austrian prisoners of war on the territory of Russia, as well as to assist the Czechoslovak corps in its advance from the Far East to France, and then to their homeland. On August 23, 1918, a united detachment of interventionists came out against the Soviet units in the area of ​​the Kraevsky crossing. The Soviet troops were forced, after stubborn battles, to retreat to Khabarovsk.

The threat to Soviet power in the Far East was impending not only from Vladivostok. The western group of Czechoslovakians and White Guards fought their way to the east. On August 25-28, 1918, the 5th Congress of the Soviets of the Far East took place in Khabarovsk. In connection with the breakthrough of the Ussuriysk front, the question of further tactics of struggle was discussed at the congress. By a majority vote, it was decided to end the front-line struggle and disband the Red Guard detachments in order to then organize a partisan struggle. The extraordinary V Congress of Soviets of the Far East decided to end the struggle on the Ussuri front and go on to partisan struggle. The functions of the organs of Soviet power began to be carried out by the headquarters of partisan detachments.

On September 12, 1918, Japanese and American troops entered Khabarovsk and handed over power to Ataman Kalmykov. Soviet power was overthrown in the Amur Region, on September 18, Blagoveshchensk fell. General Horvat was appointed Supreme Plenipotentiary of the Provisional Siberian Government for the Far East, with the rights of a governor; his military assistant was General Ivanov-Rinov, who was an active participant in secret military organizations preparing the counter-revolutionary coup in Siberia. In Blagoveshchensk, on September 20, the so-called government of the Amur Region was formed, headed by the Socialist-Revolutionary Alekseevsky. One of the first measures taken by this government was to order the return, under pain of severe repression, of all the nationalized mines to their former private owners.

But this government did not last long. In connection with the appointment of Croat as the supreme commissioner for the Far East, the Amur government of Alekseevsky self-abolished two months later, and transferred power to the Amur regional zemstvo council. In November 1918, the government of Admiral A.V. Kolchak. General D.L. was appointed Kolchak's commissioner in the Far East. Croat.

By the end of 1918, the number of invaders in the Far East reached 150 thousand people, including the Japanese - over 70 thousand, Americans - about 11 thousand, Czechs - 40 thousand (including Siberia), as well as small contingents of the British and French , Italians, Romanians, Poles, Serbs and Chinese. This figure does not include the numerous White Guard formations that operated entirely thanks to the support of foreign states.

The main command of the occupation forces in the Far East, according to the agreement between the United States and Japan, was carried out by the Japanese General Otani and his staff, and then by General Ooi. The USA, Japan, England, France and Italy, making an intervention in the Far East, acted in concert. But the joint actions of these powers against Soviet power did not mean that the contradictions between the United States and Japan had diminished. On the contrary, their mutual distrust and suspicion increased. The United States made efforts to use Japan, at the same time limit the predatory appetites of its partner and seize as much as possible. However, Japan persistently sought a dominant position in the Far East and tried to occupy all the strategic points of the region.

Relying on the bayonets of the invaders, the temporarily victorious anti-Bolshevik forces settled in the cities of the region. At first, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who found themselves in power here and there, tried to play the role of democratic forces, called upon to unite all strata of the population to fight Bolshevism. But as the forces of the interventionists grew, any semblance of even such a "democracy" quickly disappeared. These parties, under the control of the interventionists, became the agents of militant anti-Bolshevism.

In an effort to extend his power to the Far East, Kolchak, as mentioned above, appointed his officials there. However, Japan opposed this in every possible way and put forward its protégés. After capturing the Amur Region, the Japanese interventionists imprisoned in Blagoveshchensk first ataman Gamov, after him Colonel Shemelin, and then ataman Kuznetsov. In Khabarovsk, with the help of American and Japanese troops, the ataman Kalmykov settled, who declared himself the head of the garrison. He subdued all the civil and military departments that were part of the Amur Military District. In Chita and Transbaikalia, the Japanese put ataman Semyonov in power. In the Sakhalin Region, the Provisional Siberian Government appointed in October 1918 the former vice-governor of Sakhalin von Bige, who was removed from office after the February Revolution, as its commissar.

The Japanese invaders, carrying out their plan of conquering dominance in Asia, despite the joint intervention with the Americans, themselves intended to seize the Far East and Siberia. The United States, in turn, did everything to get positions in the Far East from which it would be possible to control Japan and subordinate its actions to American interests. Both the American and Japanese invaders, seeking to capture as much of the prey as possible, watched each other closely with the alertness of predators.

The objectives of the invaders. The relationship between the interventionists and anti-Bolshevik governments

The first object of interest of all the invaders who invaded the Far Eastern Territory were the railway lines of communication. The United States of America, covering up its plans with references to the need for economic assistance, even under Kerensky tried to get the Sino-Eastern and Siberian railways. Kerensky's government, in the form of compensation for the loans provided to him, gave these railways under American control, which was, in essence, a hidden form of selling them to American companies. Already in the summer and autumn of 1917, a mission of American engineers of 300 people, led by John Stevens, launched its activities in the Far East and Siberia. The mission pursued two goals: an active struggle against the Soviets and the strengthening of the economic positions of American capital in Russia.

The Soviet government canceled all agreements between the Western countries with the imperial and Provisional governments, but the United States continued to keep the railroad under its control. The seizure of the railways was viewed by the American ruling circles as the most reliable means of ensuring their domination in the Far East and Siberia. However, as a result of the energetic demands of Japan, they had to make forced concessions. After lengthy negotiations, an agreement was reached on organizing inter-allied control over the Chinese-Eastern and Siberian railways.

For this, in March 1919, an inter-union committee and a union council for military transport were created. The practical guidance of road maintenance and management was entrusted to a technical council led by Stevens. In April 1919, all the railways were distributed between the troops of the interventionists as follows: America had to control a part of the Ussuriysk railway (from Vladivostok to Nikolsk-Ussuriysk), the Suchanskaya branch and part of the Transbaikal railway (from Verkhneudinsk to Baikal). Japan took control of the Amur railway and part of the Ussuriyskaya (from Nikolsk-Ussuriysky to Spassk and from the Guberovo station to the Karymskaya station), a part of the Transbaikal railway (from the Manchuria station to Verkhneudinsk). China formally gained control over the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) and part of the Ussuri Railway (from Ussuri station to Guberovo station), but in fact the CER was ruled by a technical council headed by American representative Stevens. Subsequently, the Americans occupied the Verkhneudinsk - st. Cape; Russian White Guards were allocated a section of Art. Mysovaya - Irkutsk; to the Czechoslovak rebels - Irkutsk - Novo-Nikolaevsk (Novosibirsk); further to the west and the Altai railway were to be guarded by Polish legionnaires.

Thus, the American troops, having taken control of the most important sections of the Siberian Railway, could control the transportation of the Japanese both from Vladivostok to Khabarovsk and the Amur, and from Transbaikalia to Siberia. At the same time, the American invaders settled in the most important strategic points. A brigade under the command of Colonel Moore was stationed in Khabarovsk; in Verkhneudinsk and Transbaikalia - a detachment of American troops under the command of Colonel Morrow; in Vladivostok - the main base of all interventionists - there was a headquarters headed by General Grevs. An American naval squadron under the command of Admiral Knight blockaded the Far East coast. The American interventionists, not content with the Far East, wanted to extend their influence throughout Siberia and pave the way to the central regions of the Soviet Republic. To this end, the American Ambassador to Japan Morris, who was also the "High Commissioner" of the United States in Siberia, General Greves and Admiral Knight in September 1918, developed a plan for the further expansion of American intervention.

Under the pretext of helping the Czechoslovak rebels who were defeated by the Red Army on the Volga, it was envisaged to transfer a significant part of the American troops to Omsk. Here it was planned to create a base for the US occupation forces, on which the American interventionists, together with the Japanese and British interventionists and the Czechoslovak rebels, planned to begin operations against the Red Army beyond the Urals. The implementation of this plan, according to the plan of its drafters, was supposed not only to ensure the retention of the Volga line in the hands of the Czechoslovak troops and White Guards, but also to place the Siberian Railway under more firm American control. The plan was approved by US President Wilson, but feuds between the interventionists prevented its implementation. None of the participants in the intervention wanted to suffer the fate of the Czechoslovak rebels, who were defeated on the Eastern Front, for the sake of their partner.

After the defeat of Germany, the ruling circles of the Entente began to organize a general campaign against the Soviet Republic. Then they made their main bet on the Siberian dictator Kolchak, who was nominated by them as the "all-Russian ruler" who was supposed to unite all internal anti-Bolshevik forces to fight the Soviet regime. Japan, on the other hand, believed that America would benefit primarily from Kolchak's support in the Far East, which already, in fact, had already taken control of the Chinese-Eastern and Siberian railways.

The Japanese interventionists opposed the desire of the American imperialists to establish their economic domination with the military occupation of the region, striving with the help of armed force, which it was easier for them to deliver than the United States, to occupy a dominant position in the Far East. Refusing military assistance to Kolchak, they nominated their henchmen - atamans Semenov, Kalmykov, and others.

In November 1918, a few days after the establishment of Kolchak's dictatorship in Siberia, the Japanese Foreign Minister telegraphed Semyonov: "Japanese public opinion does not approve of Kolchak. You protest against him." Fulfilling Japanese instructions, Semyonov refused to recognize Kolchak as the supreme ruler and put forward his own candidates for this post - Horvat, Denikin, ataman Dutov; Semyonov declared himself the "marching chieftain" of the entire Far Eastern Cossack army. In every possible way opposing the spread of Kolchak's power to the east of Irkutsk, the Semenovites served as a kind of barrier, which the Japanese imperialists wanted to fence off and isolate the Far Eastern region from Kolchak's, i.e. American, influence.

As for the further relationship between Kolchak and Semyonov, it should be said that Kolchak, thoroughly battered by the Red Army, despite the help of America, England and France, had to finally compromise with Semyonov. After the defeat in the spring of 1919 in the Ufa-Samara direction, Kolchak began to seek help from Japan. To do this, he had to appoint Semyonov assistant commander of the troops of the Amur Military District, although Semenov actually continued to disobey the Omsk government and remained in Chita. After that, Japan provided assistance to Kolchak, however, not with manpower, which Kolchak sought, but with weapons and uniforms.

On July 17, 1919, the ambassador to Japan, Krupensky, telegraphed Sukin, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kolchak government, that the Japanese government had agreed to supply 10 million cartridges and 50 thousand rifles, but asked to inform shortest, payment will be made. " What payment the Japanese were talking about is quite eloquently evidenced by the report of General Romanovsky, specially sent to Japan to negotiate aid, to the chief of Kolchak's headquarters, General Lebedev. General Romanovsky reported that Japan intends to make the following claims as compensation for the assistance provided:

1) Vladivostok is a free port;

2) free trade and navigation along the Sungari and Amur;

3) control over the Siberian Railway and the transfer of the Changchun-Harbin section to Japan;

4) the right to fish in the entire Far East;

5) the sale of northern Sakhalin to Japan.

The policy of the American and Japanese interventionists was understandable to the White Guards as well. Admiral Kolchak, even before he was declared the supreme ruler, assessing the policy of Western states in the Russian Far East, noted in a conversation with General Boldyrev (at that time the commander-in-chief of the White Guard Siberian army): "America's claims are very large, and Japan does not disdain anything ". In a letter to Denikin dated October 1, 1918, Kolchak also expressed a very pessimistic view of the situation in the Far East: "I think," he wrote, "it (the Far East) is lost to us, if not forever, then for a certain period of time."

American interventionists, not wanting to get involved in the civil war, usually entrusted punitive work to the White Guards and Japanese troops. But sometimes they themselves took part in the massacres of the civilian population. In Primorye, they still remember the atrocities committed by the American invaders during the years of intervention. One of the participants guerrilla warfare in the Far East A.Ya. Yatsenko in his memoirs tells about the massacre of American and Japanese invaders over the inhabitants of the village of Stepanovka. As soon as the partisans left the village, American and Japanese soldiers rushed into it.

“Having forbidden anyone to go outside, they closed the doors of all houses outside, propping them up with stakes and planks. Then they set fire to six houses so that the wind would throw the flames on all the other huts. Frightened residents began to jump out of the windows, but here the invaders took them on bayonets. All over the village, in smoke and flames, American and Japanese soldiers prowled, trying not to let anyone out alive. A terrible picture of the defeat appeared before our eyes in Stepanovka, when we returned to it: from the huts remained heaps of charred wood , and everywhere in the streets, in the kitchen gardens, the bodies of slaughtered and shot old men, women and children lay. "

Another participant in the partisan struggle, the commander of the partisan detachment A.D. Borisov talks about how the American invaders fired at the village of Annenki from an armored train. "Approaching the excavation (railway - S. Sh.), They opened fire on the village. They fired at the peasant houses for a long time and methodically, causing great damage to the inhabitants. Many innocent peasants were wounded."

The growth of the partisan movement was a consequence of the atrocities perpetrated by the interventionists and the White Guards.

Victory of the partisan movement in the Far East

The guerrilla-insurrectionary movement throughout the Far East, by January 1920, acquired a huge scale. The power of the interventionists and White Guards actually extended only to the large cities of the region and a narrow strip along the railway, a significant part of which was completely paralyzed. The partisans disorganized the enemy's rear, distracted and fettered a significant part of his forces. All foreign troops were tied to the protection of communications and could not be moved to the front to provide assistance to Kolchak. In turn, the victories of the Red Army created favorable conditions for an even wider deployment of the partisan movement.

Thanks to the crushing blows of the partisans, and the work of underground communist organizations, the living force of the enemy quickly melted and lost its combat effectiveness. The soldiers of the White Guard units, a significant part of whom were forcibly mobilized, not only in every possible way avoided participating in punitive expeditions and sending them to the front, but they themselves rebelled, and with weapons in their hands went over to the side of the partisans. The revolutionary ferment also affected foreign troops. First of all, it touched the Czechoslovak troops, which at the beginning of the intervention were the main striking force of America, England and France.

On November 20, 1919, the plenipotentiary representatives of the Czechs Pavel and Girsa wrote to the representatives of the allied powers "about the moral and tragic situation in which the Czechoslovak army found itself," and asked for advice on "how it could ensure its own security and a free return to its homeland", and The Czechoslovak minister Stefanik stated directly in Paris that the Czechoslovak troops must be immediately evacuated from Russia, otherwise the Siberian political conditions could very soon make them Bolsheviks.

The anti-Kolchak sentiments of the Czechs were expressed in an open attempt to carry out a coup. On November 17-18, 1919, the former commander of Kolchak's 1st Siberian Army, the Czech General Gaida, together with a group of Social Revolutionaries who called themselves the "regional Siberian government", raised an uprising in Vladivostok, under the slogans of "democratizing the regime" and "convening an All-Siberian Constituent Assembly ". In the area of ​​the station, fierce battles began between Kolchak's adherents - the troops of General Rozanov and the rebels, among whom were many former white soldiers and loader workers.

Although Rozanov, with the assistance of the rest of the interventionists, mainly the Japanese and the Americans, succeeded in suppressing this uprising, it was no longer possible to stop the disintegration that had begun. The mood of the Czech soldiers became so threatening that General Janin was forced to give the order to evacuate them in the first place. Moving along the Siberian railway to the east, the Czechs did not allow the Kolchak units running under the onslaught of the Soviet Army to reach it, they detained the government echelons of the Whites, including the train of the "supreme ruler" himself.

Semenov, trying to shield himself from the advancing units of the Red Army, appealed to the Czechs for help, and tried to slow down their evacuation. At the behest of the Japanese invaders, he cut off communications with the Far East. General Janin and members of foreign military missions at Kolchak, realizing the loss of the last opportunity to retreat, ordered the Czechs to disarm the Semenovites who had advanced to the Lake Baikal region and open the way to the east. To top it all off, the Czechs, in order to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the working masses, on January 14 extradited Kolchak, with the approval of General Zhanen, to the Irkutsk "Political Center". On February 7, 1920, by order of the Irkutsk Revolutionary Committee, which took power into its own hands, Kolchak, along with his prime minister, General Pepelyaev, was shot. Only the remnants of the 2nd and 3rd Kolchak armies, totaling up to 20 thousand bayonets and sabers, led by General Kappel, and after his death by General Voitsekhovsky, managed to retreat east to Verkhneudinsk and further to Chita. They were pursued on the heels of units of the 5th Red Banner Army and detachments of East Siberian and Baikal partisans.

Various anti-Bolshevik forces hastily set about constructing a new political structure in the Far East. The idea of ​​creating a buffer state was actively discussed among the entourage of American President Wilson, the Japanese ruling circles, and the right-wing socialists. The most active activities during this period were developed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. They did their best to find allies for themselves, to bring the retreating white armies under their control. The right-wing socialists took it upon themselves to create a buffer in the Far East. In accordance with the decision adopted in November 1919 by the All-Siberian Regional Committee of the AKP, the SRs called for the creation of a "homogeneous socialist power" with the participation of SRs, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. They declared the primary task of their party "to restore the political and economic unity of the country", which could be realized only as a result of the restoration of Russia as a federal democratic republic, through the efforts of the working people themselves. The Mensheviks expressed solidarity with the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Counting on the support of American, Anglo-French, Czech allies, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks set about creating a leading center for "organizing social forces on the anti-Kolchak platform." The Americans were clearly impressed by the Socialist-Revolutionary program, which was a mixture of right-wing socialist and liberal views. In November 1919, the All-Siberian conference of zemstvos and cities secretly met in Irkutsk. On it, the Political Center was created from representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Zemstvo workers and cooperators. It included the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, non-party cooperators and Zemstvo workers. The political center embraced with its influence the provinces of Tomsk, Yenisei, Irkutsk, as well as Yakutia, Transbaikalia, Primorye. In January 1920, a branch of the Political Center was established in Vladivostok.

The successes of the Red Army and the partisans were able to change the international situation. On December 10, 1919, the British Prime Minister Lloyd George was forced to make a statement at a parliamentary session that the "Russian question" would be revised. On December 16, a meeting of five allied states - participants in the intervention - decided to stop further assistance to the anti-Bolshevik Russian governments, leaving the United States and Japan to act in accordance with their interests. In January 1920 England, France and Italy decided to end the blockade of Soviet Russia. On December 23, 1919, US Secretary of State Lansing, in a letter to President Wilson, requested that the withdrawal of American troops from Siberia be expedited. An open clash with the Red Army was not in the interests of the United States. On January 5, the government of the United States of America was forced to make a decision to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Russian Far East, and ordered General Grevs to begin concentrating them in Vladivostok, to be sent to America no later than April 1, 1920. In a note sent on January 10 In Japan, the US government stated "that it regrets the need to make this decision, because this decision ... defines the end ... of the joint efforts of Japan and the United States to help the Russian people."

Since the American calculations, on Kolchak, did not come true, but the United States was not going to give up its interests in the Russian Far East, it was counted on the continuation of the intervention by Japanese troops. In early 1920, in San Francisco, it was decided to organize an American-Japanese syndicate to exploit natural resources in the Russian Far East. The draft charter of this organization stated that the syndicate intends to take over the extraction of minerals both in Central Siberia and in coastal regions, the construction of railways in Siberia, Manchuria, the equipment of power plants, etc. The American monopolies hoped to subjugate Japan to their economic influence in order to make it easier to reap the benefits of Japanese expansion. America's ruling circles acted in the same direction, encouraging the Japanese militarists to continue their intervention. On January 30, 1920, the US government announced that "it is not going to oppose measures that the Japanese government finds necessary to achieve the goals for which the American and Japanese governments began to cooperate in Siberia."

On the same day, at a secret meeting of the heads of missions and representatives of the military command of the interventionists who were in Vladivostok, it was decided: in connection with the withdrawal of the American, British, French and Czechoslovak troops, to entrust Japan with the representation and protection of the interests of the allies in the Russian Far East.

The uprising against the White Guards and interventionists in Primorye

Meanwhile, the underground organizations of the Bolsheviks, relying on the success of the partisan-insurrectionary movement that swept the entire region, launched an active preparation for the overthrow of the White Guard authorities. The underground party conference held in December 1919 in Vladivostok decided to begin extensive preparatory work for an armed uprising against the Kolchak regime in the Primorsky region. To this end, the military department of the regional party committee was reorganized into the military-revolutionary headquarters of the communists, headed by Sergei Lazo. The headquarters was tasked with developing a plan for the uprising, creating combat detachments, establishing strong ties with the partisans, and also involving the well-known Kolchak units in the uprising.

Despite the difficulties associated with the fact that Vladivostok was occupied by the invaders, the military-revolutionary headquarters successfully coped with the task. He managed to establish contact with several Kolchak units, and create combat groups of pro-Bolshevik-minded soldiers in them. The headquarters enlisted the support of sailors and even some military schools on the Russian island. Due to difficult international conditions, the uprising was to be held not under Soviet slogans, but under the slogan of a temporary transfer of power to the regional zemstvo council.

In January, the Joint Operational Revolutionary Headquarters was created, which included representatives of military revolutionary organizations. The leading role in it remained with the communists. The uprising was scheduled by the regional party committee for January 31st. On the same day, a general strike of Vladivostok workers began. According to the plan, "the military units of the Russian Island, who joined the uprising, were to cross the Amur Bay on the ice and, reaching Egersheld, knock out the Kolchak people from the headquarters of the fortress and the Vladivostok station. The detachments advancing from the Rotten Corner area were supposed to surround the People's House, disarm Rozanov's personal guard, occupy this room and, moving on, occupy a telegraph office, a bank and other state institutions. From the side of the First River, it was proposed to motorized units and the Latvian national regiment in the direction of the fortress headquarters. ... At the same time, partisan detachments were drawn to the city. Thus, the plan provided for the delivery of concentrated strikes on the most important targets - the headquarters of the fortress and the residence of the Kolchak Governor-General Rozanov, the seizure of which immediately gave the insurgents a dominant position.

On January 31, partisan detachments of the Nikolsk-Ussuriysky region, under the command of Andreev, occupied the Nikolsk-Ussuriysky station with the assistance of the rebel garrison. The garrison of St. Oceanic, which renamed itself the 3rd partisan regiment. In Vladivostok, the uprising began at 3:00 on January 31. Careful preparation of the uprising yielded positive results. By 12 o'clock the city was already in the hands of the rebels and partisans. The invaders, bound by forced neutrality, and fearing to openly side with the White Guards, nevertheless helped Rozanov escape and take refuge in Japan. After the coup, the interim government of the Primorsk Regional Zemstvo Council rose to power, which announced a list of its immediate tasks, among which was the adoption of measures to end the intervention.

The overthrow of the power of the White Guards in Vladivostok, to a large extent, contributed to the success of the movement in other cities of the region. On the tenth of February, partisan detachments of the Amur region surrounded Khabarovsk. Kalmykov, seeing the inevitable loss of the city, shot over 40 people suspected of Bolshevism, seized more than 36 poods of gold, and on February 13 fled with his detachment to Chinese territory. On February 16, the partisans, together with an expeditionary detachment sent from Vladivostok, occupied Khabarovsk. Power in Khabarovsk passed into the hands of the city zemstvo council.

In the lower reaches of the Amur, partisan detachments, at the end of January, approached the Chnyrrakh fortress, which covered the approaches to Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, and sent envoys to the Japanese command with a proposal to start peace negotiations on the transfer of the city without a fight. This proposal arose in connection with the statement of the commander of the Japanese troops in the Amur region, General Shiroodzu, on February 4, about neutrality. The Japanese invaders killed the envoys. Then the partisans launched an offensive. Under cover of a snowstorm, on February 10, skiers of the 1st Sakhalin Insurgent Regiment broke into the fortress and captured its forts. Attempts by the Japanese to push back the partisans were unsuccessful. On February 12, the fortress finally passed into the hands of the partisans. The partisans began a siege of the city. After repeated proposals for an armistice, in response to which the Japanese opened gunfire, guerrilla artillery was deployed. Seeing the hopelessness of the situation, the Japanese command accepted the terms of the armistice. On February 28, partisan detachments entered Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. In the Amur Region, by the end of January 1920, the White Guards and interventionists were pushed back to the railway and held out only in cities and at the largest stations.

Seeing that the defeat was inevitable, the commander of the Japanese forces, General Shiroodzu (commander of the 14th Japanese Infantry Division), requested the main headquarters of the occupation forces in Vladivostok to send help or permission to evacuate. But the Japanese commander-in-chief, General Ooi, could not help Shiroozu. The only way out of this situation was to declare neutrality, which Shirozu did on February 4, 1920.

A different situation has developed in the Trans-Baikal region. Having suffered defeat in Primorye and on the Amur, the Japanese invaders made every effort to retain their positions in Transbaikalia. They wanted to create here a solid barrier against the Red Army moving from Siberia, and for this purpose, despite the declared neutrality, they continued to provide Semyonov with the most active support.

In addition to the 5th Infantry Division, whose headquarters were transferred to Verkhneudinsk, in the Chita region, new Japanese units began to appear in early 1920. A significant part of the 14th Infantry Division was also transferred here from the Amur Region. The Semyonovsk troops were reorganized according to the Japanese model, and reinforced by new Buryat-Mongol formations. Using Kolchak's decree, on granting the authority to "form government bodies within the limits of the spread of his fullness of power," Semyonov on January 16, 1920, constructed his "government of the Russian eastern outskirts" headed by the cadet Taskin.

In this regard, the commander of the Japanese occupation forces in Transbaikalia, the commander of the Japanese 5th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Suzuki, issued a special order: Bolsheviks. I ask peaceful citizens of villages and cities not to believe harmful rumors about a change in the policy of the Japanese imperial government, and about the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Trans-Baikal region. " Despite all his efforts, Semenov failed to consolidate his position. But militarily, in view of the strengthening of the Japanese troops in Transbaikalia, he received a certain support. An important role was played by the remnants of Kappel's units, which reached Chita in the second half of February 1920. Of these, Semenov formed two corps. Already in mid-March, one corps was moved to the Sretensk region, against the East Baikal partisans. There was even formed the Eastern Front, led by General Voitsekhovsky, to whom Semyonov transferred a total of up to 15 thousand bayonets and sabers and set the task of defeating the partisans and clearing them from the areas east of Chita. These measures had a temporary effect. Red partisan regiments tried three times to capture Sretensk, but were forced to retreat, suffering heavy losses; many members of the partisan command personnel were killed. This was due to the competent actions of the Semyonov units, the convenience of their position and, more importantly, the support of the Kappel and Japanese units that came to the aid of the Semyonovites.

The offensive of the partisans on Verkhneudinsk

In other sectors of the front, the partisans acted more successfully. At the end of February 1920, the Baikal partisans captured Troitskosavsk and, having established contact with the Transbaikal group of troops of the Irkutsk Revolutionary Committee, began preparations for an offensive on Verkhneudinsk. In Verkhneudinsk and its suburbs, a cavalry regiment, a Special Brigade, a Rossianov detachment, a local battalion of White Guards, and one regiment of the 5th Japanese Infantry Division were located. Czechoslovak trains were stationed at the station.

On February 24, the Trans-Baikal group of troops approached the city. The offensive plan called for a simultaneous strike from the north and west. The Baikal partisans were to advance from the south across the Selenga River. After the first clashes, the Semenovites retreated to the city and to the railway, under the cover of Japanese troops. But the Japanese command, in view of the unfavorable situation for it and the hostile position taken by the Czechs, did not dare to openly engage in battle. In an effort to gain time, it turned to the command of the Trans-Baikal group, with a request to postpone the entry of partisan units into Verkhneudinsk.

On the night of March 2, fierce street battles took place, in which the White Guards were completely defeated. Leaving a large number of weapons and prisoners, they were forced to hastily retreat to the east. Some of them took refuge in the location of the Japanese garrison. As it turned out later, the Japanese troops, using the darkness of the night, tried to help the Semenovites. Japanese machine gunners fired on partisan lines advancing from the Selenga River, but they could not prevent the defeat of the White Guards. On March 2, 1920, Verkhneudinsk was completely occupied by partisans, and three days later - on March 5 - the Provisional Zemstvo Government was created here, which also included the Communists.

From the very first days of its existence, the government categorically demanded that the Japanese command withdraw its troops from Transbaikalia. But only on March 9, in view of the approach of units of the 5th Red Banner Army and the 1st Irkutsk Division, created by the Irkutsk Revolutionary Committee, Japanese troops began to withdraw from Verkhneudinsk towards Chita. After them, partisan detachments of Western Transbaikalia immediately moved.

The armed forces of the Soviet regime in the Far East consisted of partisan detachments undergoing reorganization and former Kolchak garrisons. Communists from the Military Council of Primorye, under the leadership of Sergei Lazo, worked actively to bring these forces into a single harmonious military organization. They established contact with the command of the Red Army in Siberia through the Dalburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). In March 1920, according to Lazo's report, the Far Eastern Regional Party Committee adopted a number of important decisions on military development. All the armed forces were united in three armies: the Far Eastern, Amur and Transbaikal. Lazo was appointed commander-in-chief. The partisan detachments were reorganized into nine divisions and two separate brigades.

The Far Eastern Army was supposed to include the 1st Primorskaya division with a deployment in the Vladivostok, Shkotovo, Suchan area, the 2nd Nikolsko-Ussuriysk, the 3rd Imanskaya, the 4th Khabarovsk divisions, the Shevchenko brigade with the location in Grodekovo and the Tryapo partisan brigade, quartered in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur.

The Amur army was made up of the 5th and 6th Amur divisions, the Transbaikal - the 7th, 8th and 9th Transbaikal divisions. The division commanders were supposed to be at the same time the chiefs of the military areas in which these divisions were located. The headquarters of the commander-in-chief and the Military Council were supposed to be transferred from Vladivostok to Khabarovsk by April 10.

This number of formations was deployed because the Japanese troops numbered about nine divisions in the Far East. In addition, the Japanese had an advantage in the quality and quantity of military equipment, and their warships were stationed in the Vladivostok roadstead. Ultimately, however, the guerrilla forces had the advantage that they were supported by the majority of the population and that they fought for their homeland. The main difficulty in carrying out military measures was that they had to be carried out in front of the Japanese interventionists, who not only did not intend to leave Soviet territory, but also continued to build up their military presence in the Far East.

Far Eastern newspapers of the time reported that an agreement had been reached between the governments of the United States and Japan, according to which Japan should strengthen its troops in Siberia in order to resist the advance of the Soviet Army into the Far East. Given the complexity of the situation, the 4th Far Eastern Party Conference, held in Nikolsk-Ussuriisk from March 16 to 19, 1920, adopted a special resolution on setting up military affairs. The resolution stated: "Every soldier, every partisan must remember that there is no victory yet, that a formidable danger hangs over all of us. Not a single soldier, not a single partisan of our Far Eastern Red Army can leave the ranks of the troops, not a single rifle should be put until the intervention is stopped and the Far East is not reunited with Soviet Russia. Soldiers and partisans must avoid any conflicts, any aggravation of relations with the Japanese. Observe restraint and calmness, do not give a reason for clashes. Do not enter into a clash first, even if you will be called for it. Everyone should remember what will come of it if we are the first to cause a war. "

Along with the creation regular army, the Far Eastern organizations of the Bolshevik Party were faced with an equally urgent task - to unite all regions liberated from the White Guards and interventionists. Several pro-Bolshevik governments were formed on the territory of the Far Eastern Territory. Soviet power was restored in the Amur Region. The executive committees of the Soviets were also created in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur and Aleksandrovsk-on-Sakhalin. In Primorye, the Provisional Government of the Regional Zemstvo Council was in power. In Western Transbaikalia, power belonged to the Provisional Verkhneudinsk Zemstvo government. The 4th Far Eastern Party Conference made a decision to consider it necessary to unite the entire Far East as soon as possible under the rule of a single Soviet body.

It seemed that one more blow - and the entire Far East would be under Soviet control. However, subsequent events dramatically changed the situation.

Nikolaev incident and its consequences

Observing how quickly the armed forces of the Far East grew and became stronger, the Japanese invaders prepared a new attack. Acting in accordance with the plans of the organizers of the third campaign of the Entente, they simultaneously wanted to use the attack on the Soviet Republic of Poland and Wrangel in order to strike a surprise blow at the vital centers of the Far Eastern Territory and establish their complete control over it. The Japanese militarists have been preparing for this for a long time. Under the pretext of replacing "tired units" they brought in new units. In general, to capture the Soviet Far Eastern lands, Japan sent in 1920 11 infantry divisions, numbering about 175 thousand people from among the 21 divisions that Japan had at that time, as well as large warships and marines. The Japanese troops occupied the most advantageous points in the operational and tactical respect, carried out military maneuvers. In order to lull the vigilance of the Military Council of Primorye and the revolutionary troops, all these measures were covered by external loyalty. But at the same time, the Japanese command was preparing a major provocation. Such a provocation was the performance of the Japanese interventionists in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur on March 12-15, 1920. Prior to that, the local command of the Japanese troops had assured the partisans of their sympathy for Soviet Russia. The Japanese officers visited the partisan headquarters as "guests" and started conversations with the partisans. They managed to gain confidence in the partisan command and achieve the right to carry out guard duty in the location of their troops and institutions (a right that the Japanese were deprived of under the armistice agreement).

On March 12, a regional congress of Soviets opened in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. After the opening, a solemn funeral was to take place for the victims of the intervention and the White Guard terror. On the night of March 12, significant detachments of Japanese troops suddenly appeared in front of the partisan headquarters, in front of the building where the revolutionary units and artillery were stationed. The headquarters was immediately surrounded by three chains. The sentries were killed. Japanese troops opened machine-gun fire, threw hand grenades at the windows and set the building on fire. At the same time, other premises occupied by partisan units were fired upon and set on fire. Almost all Japanese subjects were also armed and fired from the windows of their houses. The plan of the Japanese command was to destroy the entire command staff of the partisan units with a surprise blow.

But the Japanese calculation was not justified. The partisans, despite the surprise of the attack and significant losses, entered the battle. Gradually, they managed to unite into groups, establish a connection. By the middle of the day on March 12, the resistance of the partisans had taken on an organized character. Street fighting unfolded. Under the onslaught of the partisans, the enemy began to lose one point after another. By the end of the day, the main forces were grouped in the premises of the Japanese consulate, in the stone barracks and in the building of the garrison assembly. The fighting, which was of an extremely fierce nature, lasted for two days. The guerrillas stormed not only the streets, but also the private homes of Japanese residents. By the evening of March 14, the Japanese were defeated. Only one group of the enemy, entrenched in the stone barracks, continued to resist. At this time, the commander of the Japanese troops of the Khabarovsk region, General Yamada, frightened by the defeat of his troops, ordered the chief of the Japanese garrison in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur to stop hostilities and conclude an armistice. On March 15, at 12 o'clock, the last group of Japanese in the barracks hung out a white flag and surrendered their weapons. Thus, the provocative attack of the Japanese interventionists was eliminated thanks to the courage and resilience of the partisans. In street fighting, Japanese troops suffered heavy losses.

The invaders tried to use this incident to their advantage. They reported about "the attack of the Reds on peaceful Japanese citizens and about the bloody atrocities of the Bolsheviks" in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. In Japan, even a special "mourning day in memory of the victims of the Bolshevik terror" was held, and Japanese newspapers demanded the abandonment of Japanese troops in the Far East, ostensibly in order "to protect the civilian population from total extermination." American anti-Soviet propaganda also spread theories about the "disappeared city" burned down by the Bolshevik partisans. On March 18, 1920, the Japanese government, which had previously left unanswered all inquiries regarding the evacuation of Japanese troops, announced that Japan did not recognize the possibility of withdrawing its expeditionary forces at the present time and would leave them until "a firm calm position is established and the threat to Manchuria and Korea will disappear when the lives and property of Japanese subjects in Siberia are safe and freedom of movement and communication is ensured. "

In early April, the newly arrived Japanese units began to occupy a number of advantageous heights and objects in the vicinity of Vladivostok, and in the city itself. The Japanese flag appears on Mount Tiger, which dominates the station area; machine guns are installed in the attics of buildings. On April 3, Japanese troops occupy the radio station of the naval department on the Russian island. At the same time, the Japanese command is conducting maneuvers in order to train the troops in actions to capture the city. In Vladivostok itself and its region, assembly points are planned for the civilian Japanese population in case of alarm.

The preparations of the Japanese interventionists did not go unnoticed by the Military Council of Primorye. On April 1, 1920, Lazo wrote to the command of the 5th Red Banner Army in Irkutsk that the Japanese were preparing to present an ultimatum with a number of demands. The report went on to say that if the Japanese did not go to open confrontation, they were ready to go to the creation of incidents, to the occupation of a number of points in order to get more at the conclusion of peace. At the same time, the possibility of an open attack by Japanese troops was not ruled out. Regarding the assessment of the actions of the United States of America, the 4th Far Eastern Conference of the RCP (b) in its resolution on the current moment noted that "America's policy can be defined as a wait-and-see policy, as giving Japan freedom of action without binding itself with any obligations." As for Japan's policy, the resolution reads about it: "Japanese imperialism is striving for territorial conquests in the Far East. We are facing the danger of Japanese occupation."

In view of the impending threat, the Military Council outlined a number of measures for redeploying units, warships and warehouses to the Khabarovsk region. Lazo attached particular importance to preparations for repulsing the Japanese from the Amur Region, which was to be the main base of the revolutionary troops. In one of the telegrams to the head of the Khabarovsk region, dating back to March 20, 1920, he insisted on the immediate supply of medicines, cartridges, shells to Khabarovsk and pointed out the decision of the Military Council to create a cartridge plant in Blagoveshchensk. At the same time, the Military Council sent more than 300 wagons with cargo from the military warehouses of Vladivostok to Khabarovsk, and also evacuated the gold reserve to the Amur Region. However, not all of the planned activities were implemented.

In early April 1920, the commander of the Japanese expeditionary forces, General Ooi, presented an ultimatum to the Provisional Government of the Primorsky Zemstvo Council demanding "to provide Japanese troops with apartments, food, communication routes, to recognize all previous transactions concluded between the Japanese command and the Russian authorities (i.e. ), do not hamper the freedom of those Russians who serve the Japanese command, stop all hostile actions, no matter who they come from, threatening the safety of Japanese troops, as well as peace and tranquility in Korea and Manchuria. to make every effort to unconditionally ensure life, property and other rights of Japanese subjects living in the Far East region. "

The Provisional Government of the Primorsk Zemstvo Council sent a special delegation to negotiate the ultimatum, which protested against the Japanese demands. At the same time, the Military Council issued a secret order to bring the units into combat readiness. But the balance of power was clearly not in our favor. The number of partisan troops was no more than 19 thousand people, while the Japanese had up to 70 thousand people and a military squadron by this time. In addition, their strength continued to increase continuously.

The actions of the Japanese troops in April - May 1920

To avoid an armed conflict, the Soviet delegation made concessions. On April 4, an agreement was reached. It only remained to issue it on April 5 with the appropriate signatures. But, as it turned out, "pliability" was just another diversionary maneuver of the Japanese invaders. The whole ceremony of negotiations was carried out by them according to a previously developed plan. This was later announced in his notes "History of the Siberian Expedition" by Major General Nishikava. Describing the actions of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Russian Far East, he revealed the true meaning of the negotiations. From his notes it is clear that the headquarters of the Japanese expeditionary forces at the end of March 1920 issued a secret order to disarm the revolutionary units of Primorye.

“It was decided,” writes Nishikawa, “to hold this disarmament in two terms: to start peace talks on this matter in early April and, depending on the circumstances, the second - in early May. clashes with the Bolsheviks, it was necessary to take all the preparatory measures in time, and I immediately left for the zone of the location of the Japanese troops to get acquainted with the situation of the Bolshevik troops and draw up an operational plan of actions for the Japanese security forces. " Further citing the notification of the commander of the expeditionary forces, General Ooi, about the likelihood of complications and about preparations for them, Nishikawa reveals the tactics of the Japanese command: "If the Bolsheviks accept our proposal, then the troops should not insist on the demands put forward. In case they do not agree to our demands, take appropriate measures against political groupings. However, it is difficult to imagine that it would be possible to maintain the existing position, so that nothing would arise. In this case, it is necessary that orders and orders are delivered in a timely manner, and each part would develop a plan of action accordingly, agreed with the general leadership in avoid making mistakes at the right time. "

Thus, the Japanese troops had instructions in advance to advance, and the negotiations were conducted in order to lull the vigilance of the command of the Soviet troops. On the night of April 5, when it seemed that the conflict had already been settled, the Japanese suddenly opened artillery and machine-gun fire in Vladivostok, Nikolsk-Ussuriysk, Khabarovsk, Shkotov and other cities of Primorye. They shelled Soviet garrisons, government and public buildings, destroyed and looted property. The Soviet units, taken by surprise, were unable to offer organized resistance; moreover, they had instructions to avoid armed clashes with the Japanese. Japanese detachments seized the railway station in Vladivostok, the telegraph station, the court raided, seized the fortress and destroyed the premises of the Central Bureau of Trade Unions, the Zemstvo Council, the party committee and headquarters.

The Japanese interventionists struck the main blow against the governing bodies in order to immediately eliminate the possibility of organizing countermeasures. On this score they had special instructions. First of all, members of the Military Council were captured - S. Lazo, A. Lutsky and V. Sibirtsev, whom they then handed over to the White Guard armed formation of Esaul Bochkarev, operating in the Iman region. The White Guards, at the direction of the interventionists, dealt with the leaders of the revolutionary army of Primorye. They burned their bodies in a locomotive furnace at st. Muravyov-Amurskaya Ussuriyskaya railway (now Lazo station).

In Nikolsk-Ussuriisky, Japanese troops arrested almost all the participants in the congress of workers of the Primorsky region, which met in early April. Here the 33rd regiment was especially badly damaged, which was subjected to concentrated artillery and machine-gun fire while retreating across the Suifun River. More than a thousand unarmed soldiers of the Nikolsky garrison were captured. The garrison in Shkotov also suffered significant losses, in which more than 300 people were killed and up to 100 people were wounded. In Khbarovsk, on April 3, a representative of the Japanese command announced the upcoming evacuation of Japanese troops. At the same time, an announcement appeared in a local newspaper that on April 5 at 9 o'clock in the morning Japanese units would conduct "practical training artillery shooting." In this regard, the Japanese command asked the residents not to worry.

On the morning of April 5, Japanese artillery did open fire, but not at targets, but at government agencies, the headquarters of the revolutionary troops, military barracks, public buildings and civilians. Following this, machine-gun and rifle firing began, under the cover of which the Japanese infantry surrounded the barracks. Dedicated groups of Japanese torchbearers poured fuel on the houses and set them on fire. Soon all of Khabarovsk was enveloped in a thick smoke of conflagrations. All day on April 5, gun and machine-gun fire did not stop. Most of the 35th regiment perished under the fire of the Japanese interventionists in Khabarovsk. Only the detachments of Shevchuk and Kochnev managed to break through the Japanese chains with a fight and with great losses retreated to the left bank of the Amur. Some partisan units and the remnants of the Khabarovsk garrison withdrew to the Krasnaya Rechka junction area. In Khabarovsk, the Japanese invaders killed and wounded about 2,500 soldiers and civilians.

The performance of the Japanese troops was everywhere accompanied by massacres of the civilian population. Along with the Russians, Koreans, who were treated like slaves by Japanese soldiers, suffered greatly. As a result of the action of the Japanese troops, several thousand civilians were killed, many party and Soviet workers, soldiers and commanders of the revolutionary army were shot. The Japanese imperialists wanted to wipe out the "red danger" from the face of the earth and establish their own order in the Far East by massacres and the destruction of the state, party, trade union and military organizations of Primorye. To this end, they intended to plant the Semyonov administration in Primorye.

In their actions, the Japanese militarists relied on the support of other states participating in the intervention, and above all the United States. On the eve of the Japanese troops' performance, a meeting of the American, British, French and other consuls took place. It was not for nothing that the Japanese diplomatic representative in Vladivostok, Matsudaira, said in a special interview the very next day after the April 4-5 events that "Japan acted in accordance with the agreement with all its allies." American circles, justifying the atrocities of the Japanese troops, declared that all this happened "due to the fear of an uprising that could threaten the base of the Japanese troops."

Separate detachments and units put up stubborn resistance to the Japanese troops. In Khabarovsk, a unit of the Special Detachment of the Amur Military Flotilla under the command of the communist N. Khoroshev fought heroically. In some places, such as in Spassk, fighting continued until April 12. The Japanese lost up to 500 people here. Working in Blagoveshchensk, the 8th Congress of the Workers of the Amur Region, at the very first news of the action of the Japanese troops, elected a military revolutionary committee, to which it transferred all the full civil and military power and made a decision to organize the Red Army in the Amur Region.

The Amur Revolutionary Committee decided to create a front on the left bank of the Amur to repel the Japanese interventionists. The front commander was appointed S.M. Seryshev, and the commissioner P.P. Postyshev. The detachments of the Amur partisans concentrated here and the units of the Primorsky army that had withdrawn from Khabarovsk organized a defense. They blocked the access of the Japanese invaders to the Amur region. On May 18, when Amur cleared the ice, the Japanese prepared an amphibious operation through the so-called "Furious Channel", but received a crushing rebuff. The entire Japanese landing was destroyed by artillery and machine-gun fire. Under pressure from public opinion, the Japanese command, finding no support in any of the political groups, was forced to re-admit the Provisional Government of the Primorsk Zemstvo Council to control and negotiate with it. A Russian-Japanese conciliation commission was created, which on April 29, 1920 worked out conditions of 29 points on the cessation of hostilities and "On maintaining order in the Primorsky region." According to these conditions, the Russian troops could not be simultaneously with the Japanese troops within the limits bounded by the line passing 30 km from the terminal point occupied by the Japanese troops along the Ussuri railway, on the one hand, and the line of the Russian-Chinese-Korean border from the west and south - on the other hand, as well as in the strip along the Suchansky railway line from Suchan to its end at a distance of 30 km in each direction.

The Provisional Government of the Primorsk Zemstvo Council undertook to withdraw its units from the indicated areas. It could keep here only the people's militia of up to 4,500 people. On September 24, 1920, an additional agreement was concluded, according to which, after the Japanese troops had cleared Khabarovsk, the Russian armed forces could not enter south of the Iman River. Thus, a "neutral zone" was created, which the interventionists widely used to concentrate and form White Guard detachments in it, as well as a springboard for subsequent attacks on the Far Eastern Republic. The Japanese militarists managed to carry out their occupation plans in the spring of 1920 only in relation to the northern part of the Sakhalin Peninsula and the lower reaches of the Amur. In April - May, they landed large assault forces in Aleksandrovsk-on-Sakhalin and at the mouth of the Amur and established a military-occupation regime here, setting up their own administration.

Formation of the FER and the creation of the People's Revolutionary Army

The actions of the Japanese interventionists and their defeat of the revolutionary organizations interrupted the state and military construction begun in Primorye. The center of gravity of the struggle against the interventionists in the Far East shifted to Western Transbaikalia.

The government of the new state formation was formed on a coalition basis. Representatives from the Communists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, and also from the regional zemstvo were introduced into it. But the general political leadership, according to the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, remained with the Dalburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). IN AND. Lenin, speaking at the communist faction of the VIII Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR in December 1920, called the main reason for the creation of the FER the desire to avoid an open military clash with Japan.

The FER government was faced with the task of uniting all the regions of the Far Eastern Territory into a single state. For this, first of all, it was necessary to remove the "Chita plug" created by the Japanese invaders from the Semyonov and Kappel troops. This task had to be solved in difficult conditions. It was possible to liquidate Semyonov's military formations only through the complete defeat of their manpower, while avoiding at the same time a war with Japan, which stood behind them.

Together with the organization of the Far Eastern Republic, and even somewhat earlier, its armed forces began to be created - the People's Revolutionary Army. At first, the personnel of this army were East Siberian and Baikal partisans, as well as some Kolchak units that went over to the side of the Bolsheviks. The formation of units and formations of the People's Revolutionary Army was carried out by two centers. This work began with the Irkutsk Revolutionary Committee, which formed the 1st Irkutsk Rifle Division back in February 1920, and continued its main operational headquarters, created in Verkhneudinsk, after the arrival of the Red Army in the tenth of March. The headquarters issued an order on the subordination of all partisan detachments operating in the Baikal region, and proceeded to reorganize the detachments and the Trans-Baikal group of forces into the Trans-Baikal rifle division and the Trans-Baikal cavalry brigade.

The quick liberation of Verkhneudinsk was largely due to the fact that Semenov, despite the support of the Japanese interventionists, was unable to strengthen the White garrison defending there. The active actions of the East Trans-Baikal partisans, who posed a serious threat to Sretensk and the last communication linking the ataman "capital" with the outside world, the Chita-Manchuria railway, forced Semyonov to keep a significant part of his troops east of Chita. Here, in the regions of Sretensk and Nerchinsk, the Trans-Baikal Cossack Division (up to 3 thousand bayonets and sabers) and the Separate Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade (2 thousand sabers) were concentrated. To guard the Chita-Manchuria railway at its largest stations - Borzya, Olovyannaya and Dauria - the Asian equestrian division of Baron Ungern (1 thousand sabers) was grouped.

The first and second offensives of the People's Revolutionary Army on Chita

The formation in March 1920 of a common front of the Amur and East Baikal partisans and the expected in this connection even more decisive actions of the partisan army forced Semenov to begin the transfer to the east of an additional Consolidated Manchurian Brigade and the 2nd Kappel Corps, reorganized from the remnants of the 2nd Kolchak Army. The situation that arose in Eastern Transbaikalia in mid-March forced the Japanese and Semyonov command to form the Eastern Front in order to defeat the partisan detachments in the areas of eastern Chita. The Japanese invaders and the Semenovites believed that the solution of this, in their opinion, an easily achievable task, would provide an opportunity to ensure the rear, free up forces and untie their hands for the subsequent effective struggle against the People's Revolutionary Army.

As for the Western Trans-Baikal Front, here the Semyonov command decided to conduct an active defense for the time being, firmly securing the main directions leading to Chita, where the White Guards counted on the support of Japanese troops. In accordance with this plan, the White Guard and Japanese units, having occupied a bridgehead on the western bank of the Chita and Ingoda rivers on the line of the settlements Smolenskoye, Kenon, Tataurovo, were concentrated by the main groupings in three regions.

The White Guards west of Chita and in the city itself had up to 6,000 bayonets, about 2,600 sabers, 225 machine guns, 31 guns, and the Japanese invaders - up to 5,200 bayonets and sabers with 18 guns. By March 25, 1920, the total number of all Semyonovsky and Kappel troops was: officers - 2337, bayonets - 8383, sabers - 9041, machine guns - 496, guns - 78.

In the second half of March and the first half of April 1920, during the first offensive on Chita, the People's Revolutionary Army had the only regular formation that had completed its formation - the 1st Irkutsk Rifle Division. This division and the partisan detachments operating on the passes of the Yablonovy ridge and in the valley of the Ingoda River, and the main burden of the fight against the Semenovites and Japanese troops fell. The rest of the connections were still in the process of formation.

After the liberation of Verkhneudinsk and the cleansing of the Baikal region from the White Guards, the 1st Irkutsk Rifle Division moved eastward in railway echelons. On March 13, the 3rd brigade of this division, which followed in front, reached st. Khilok. The main forces of the division, the 1st and 2nd brigades, were approaching at that time. Petrovsky plant.

To the demand of the brigade commander to let the People's Revolutionary Army units go to Chita, the Japanese command refused, citing the need to protect the railway from the partisans, along which the trains with the Czechoslovakians were supposed to follow. This was an obvious lie, since the Irkutsk division, still from Irkutsk, moved after the last echelon of the Czechoslovakians. The division commander, who was instructed to negotiate, presented the Japanese command with a copy of the note of the Czechoslovak ambassador dated March 11, which indicated that the evacuation of the Czechoslovak troops would not encounter any difficulties. However, this did not change the position of the Japanese command.

In order not to enter into a direct armed clash with Japanese troops, and not to give Japan a pretext for war against the Far Eastern Republic, the advance on the railroad had to be stopped. It was necessary to make such a decision, the implementation of which would force the Japanese to clear the railway themselves. The latter could be achieved by concentrating one's forces in such a way as to threaten the rear of the Japanese troops, i.e. withdraw units of the 1st Irkutsk Rifle Division or to the north of the railway to the Vershino-Udinskaya, Beklemishevo area, Lake Telemba, or to the south along the Yamarovsky tract to the Tataurovo, Cheremkhovo area.

In these conditions, it was advisable to wait until the formation of reserve units was completed in order to be able to create more powerful groupings. In addition, units of the 1st Irkutsk Rifle Division, which had made a long march along the road destroyed by the retreating white units, needed rest. It was necessary to bring up the lagging artillery and carts. However, the command of the People's Revolutionary Army decided to launch an offensive immediately. The information obtained from Art. Zilovo from the commander of the East Transbaikal Front partisans D.S. Shilov. In this information it was reported that the Kappelevites and the Semenovites threw on the site Nerchinsk, Art. Kuenga, Sretensk most of their combat-ready forces. In addition, the position of the Amur partisans was complicated by the action of the Japanese interventionists in Primorye. The command of the partisan front asked to accelerate the offensive on Chita and indicated that the entire population of the Far East was ready for a decisive and merciless struggle against the Japanese invaders.

The special instruction spoke about the attitude towards the Japanese. In the event of the transition of Japanese troops to hostilities, against the People's Revolutionary Army, it was ordered to expel envoys and demand that neutrality be observed. In the event that the Japanese nevertheless began hostilities, it was proposed to suspend the further offensive of the units of the People's Revolutionary Army and, having taken comfortable positions, go over to a stubborn defense. The start of the offensive was scheduled for April 9, 1920. However, the powerful counterstrike of the Semyonov and Japanese troops that followed on April 8 led to a change in the plans of the partisan command and, ultimately, to the failure of the first offensive of the People's Revolutionary Army on Chita.

After the first unsuccessful offensive of the People's Revolutionary Army on Chita, the Japanese interventionists strove to gain a foothold in the Trans-Baikal region. They left unanswered the proposal of the Verkhneudinsk government of April 21, 1920 about an armistice. The Japanese military, not only in fact, but also formally took the Semyonov and Kappel units under their command. At the same time, Japanese aircraft made long-distance reconnaissance flights, scattering leaflets calling on the partisans to lay down their arms and threatening that otherwise "there will be no mercy, that Japanese troops are always ready." But the Japanese invaders failed to achieve their goals.

Semyonov's attempts to untie his hands on the East Transbaikal Front were also unsuccessful, although large forces were thrown there. In the tenths of April, when the fate of Chita was being decided, General Voitsekhovsky undertook a major offensive, moving his forces simultaneously from Sretensk, Nerchinsk and from st. Tin. On April 12, he managed to cover the partisan regiments, grouped in the area of ​​the village of Kopun, in a wide semicircle. Having occupied the settlements of Udychi, Nalgachi, the villages of Zhidku and Shelopugino, the Whites planned on April 13 to strike a concentric blow on the village of Kopun.

On the night of April 13, a partisan strike group of five regiments (two of them infantry and three cavalry), covered by part of the forces from the north, struck a surprise blow on Kuprekovo, Shelopugino and defeated General Sakharov's division here. The White Guards lost up to 200 people killed, a lot of wounded and 300 surrendered. The rest fled through the woods. After that, the partisans turned their regiments to the village of Zhidka and, approaching it under the cover of a snowstorm, defeated the second division of the Kappelevites here. However, the lack of ammunition did not allow the partisans to develop their success further along the Amur railway, as well as to enter the Chita-Manchuria railway. However, their active action forced Semyonov to abandon the idea of ​​freeing up at least part of the forces for the Chita front.

Despite the fact that the second offensive against Chita, undertaken by the People's Revolutionary Army at the end of April 1920, failed, the political and strategic position of the Japanese interventionists and Semenovites did not improve.

An attempt to create a buffer against the FER by establishing contact between the Provisional Government of the Primorsk Zemstvo Council and Semyonov also failed, although the Japanese command promised to evacuate their troops from Primorye for this. In the same month, the Japanese occupied Northern Sakhalin. In May 1920, the Japanese Foreign Minister Utsida, followed by the commander of Japanese troops in the Far East, General Ooi, issued a declaration "on the Siberian issue" in print, which announced the cessation of hostilities.

In June 1920, the Japanese command, taking advantage of the lull on the front west of Chita, took new hike against the East Baikal partisans in order to defeat them and deal with the Amur partisans. However, this time, too, the Japanese met such a rebuff that they were forced to abandon their venture and go to peace negotiations. As a result of the negotiations, on July 2, an armistice was concluded for the areas of the right bank of the Shilka River, and on July 10, for the left bank.

On July 5, the Japanese command signed an agreement on the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a neutral zone west of Chita between the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army and the Japanese White Guards. Somewhat earlier, on July 3, 1920, the Japanese government published a declaration in which it announced its decision to evacuate its troops from Transbaikalia. The evacuation of the Japanese invaders from Chita and Sretensk began on July 25, but was carried out with great reluctance, with various delays and dragged on practically until October 15. Semyonov wrote a letter to Japan with a request to postpone the evacuation of Japanese troops for at least another 4 months. In response, he received a dry telegram from the Ministry of War with a refusal.

Despite a negative response from Tokyo, Semyonov continued to strenuously seek the abandonment of Japanese troops in the Chita region. To this end, the Semenovites began to violate the neutral zone established by the Gongot Agreement. However, all attempts by the Semyonovites to extend the stay of Japanese troops in Eastern Transbaikalia ended in failure. The command of the People's Revolutionary Army began preparations for the next offensive on Chita. Now the balance of power was in favor of the Reds. The offensive was being prepared very carefully. All previous mistakes were taken into account.

Completion of the intervention on far east

Leaving Transbaikalia, the Japanese concentrated in Primorye. The fighting continued for another two years. The invaders provided support to the local anti-Bolshevik forces. In mid-April 1921, a meeting of representatives of the White Guard detachments (Semenov, Verzhbitsky, Ungern, Annenkov, Bakich, Savelyev, etc.), organized by the Japanese militarists, was held in Beijing. The conference was aimed at uniting the White Guard detachments under the general command of Ataman Semyonov and outlined a specific plan of action. According to this plan, Verzhbitsky and Savelyev were to act in Primorye against the Primorsky Zemstvo regional government; Glebov - to launch an offensive from Sakhalyan (from Chinese territory) to the Amur Region; Ungern - to advance on Verkhneudinsk through Manchuria and Mongolia; Kazantsev - to Minusinsk and Krasnoyarsk; Kaigorodov - to Biysk and Barnaul; Bakich - to Semipalatinsk and Omsk. All these actions of the White Guards did not find any support among the population and were quickly eliminated.

Only in Primorye, where the People's Revolutionary Army did not have the right of access under the terms of the agreement of April 29, 1920 on the "neutral zone", the action of the Semenovites and the Kappelites, relying on Japanese bayonets, was successful. On May 26, 1921, the White Guards overthrew the Primorsky Zemstvo government and established the power of representatives of the so-called "bureau of non-socialist organizations" headed by speculators - the Merkulov brothers. In preparing the coup, together with the Japanese interventionists, the American Consul McGown and the special representatives of the US government, Smith and Clark, took an active part. So the Japanese and American imperialists, with the hands of the White Guards, created the notorious "black buffer" in Primorye, as opposed to the Far Eastern republic.

The Japanese interventionists initially hoped to put ataman Semyonov in power and brought him to Vladivostok. But against this executioner and the Japanese mercenary, even the consular corps, fearing popular outrage, spoke out. The Kappelevites were also against Semyonov's coming to power. The latter, having received from the Merkulovs about half a million rubles in gold "compensation", went to Japan. After that, he left the political arena, but the gangs formed from the remnants of his troops terrorized the Trans-Baikal population for almost a decade.

The Merkulov government began to carry out terror against all revolutionary and public organizations that existed in Primorye under the zemstvo regional government. The terror was accompanied by a massive looting of Russian property. An example of such a robbery was the so-called "sale" of seven Russian destroyers to the Japanese for 40,000 yen. The answer was the expansion of the partisan struggle of the local population against the White Guards and interventionists.

Having landed on November 5, in the Vostok and America gulfs, the whites, with the support of the ship's artillery, pushed the partisans back up the Suchan River. The command of the partisan detachments withdrew their forces from Yakovlevka and Anuchino to reinforce the Suchansky detachment. Taking advantage of this, the Whites on November 10 launched an offensive from Nikolsk-Ussuriisky and Spassk to Anuchino and Yakovlevka, cutting off the retreat paths of the partisans to the north from the rear to join the People's Revolutionary Army. The partisans, covered from the sea and north-west, were forced to disperse along the hills of the Sikhote-Alin ridge. Having pushed the partisans into the mountains, the White Guards, under the cover of the Japanese garrisons, began to concentrate to the southern border of the "neutral zone" in the area of ​​Art. Shmakovka, aiming to launch an offensive on Khabarovsk.

As a result of the three-year domination of the interventionists and White Guards in the Far Eastern Territory, the Far Eastern People's Republic received a completely destroyed economy in the liberated regions. Suffice it to say that the sown area by 1921 in comparison with 1916 in Transbaikalia, the Amur region and the Amur region decreased by 20%. Coal mining, even in comparison with 1917, fell by 70 - 80%. The railways (Transbaikal and Amur) were completely destroyed. Their carrying capacity barely reached 1 - 2 pairs of trains per day. Of the 470 steam locomotives available, 55% required major overhaul and of 12 thousand freight cars, 25% were unusable.

The enormous depletion of the region's economic resources forced the FER government to go for a sharp reduction in the number of the People's Revolutionary Army, which had reached 90 thousand people by the summer of 1921, and its reorganization. The reorganization of the units of the People's Revolutionary Army by the beginning of the offensive of the "White Insurgent Army" had not yet been fully completed. In addition, the offensive of the whites coincided with a period when the old age army soldiers were demobilized, and the recruits had not yet arrived.

Therefore, at the first stage of hostilities, the People's Revolutionary Army was forced to leave Khabarovsk. This happened on December 22, 1921. However, in the battles near st. Ying White Guards were defeated and began to retreat. They were entrenched on the Volochaevsky bridgehead. Meanwhile, the government of the Far Eastern Republic took measures to increase the fighting efficiency of the People's Revolutionary Army. In January 1922, hostilities resumed. The White Guards again suffered a series of defeats. In February 1922, the Reds launched a counteroffensive. As a result of stubborn battles, they managed to occupy the Volochaev positions and Khabarovsk. The White Guards tried to gain a foothold in positions near the station. Bikin, but to no avail. As a result, they retreated to the northern border of the "neutral zone" in the area of ​​Iman. However, the Reds continued to pursue the enemy within the "neutral zone", while avoiding clashes with Japanese troops.

On April 2, the Chita brigade occupied the village. Aleksandrovskaya, Annenskaya, Konstantinovka, with the task of continuing the offensive to the south. To avoid an armed clash with the Japanese, the Military Council of the Eastern Front sent its delegate to Spassk, who was supposed to coordinate with the Japanese command the issue of letting in units of the People's Revolutionary Army to eliminate the rebels calling themselves "White rebels". During the negotiations that had begun, on April 2, Japanese troops suddenly opened fire from 52 guns concentrated in the Spassk region at the Chita brigade and launched an offensive in two columns from Spassk and Khvalynka, trying to encircle parts of the People's Revolutionary Army.

A retaliatory military action on the part of the People's Revolutionary Army would mean open war with Japan. This is exactly what the American leadership sought, encouraging the Japanese command to provocative attacks on the FER. In order not to succumb to provocation and to avoid war, the command of the Eastern Front ordered the Chita brigade to withdraw across the Iman River and take defensive positions in the area of ​​st. Gondatievka. Consolidated brigade, which by that time reached level. Anuchino was also recalled to the northern border of the "neutral zone".

The defeat of the White Guards at Volochaevka greatly shaken the position of the Japanese interventionists in Primorye. Now there was not even a formal pretext for leaving the Japanese troops there. The US government, trying to soften the impression of the failure of its own military adventure in the Far East and convinced of the unreality of its policy of continuing military intervention by the hands of Japanese militarists, began to put pressure on Japan in order to force it to withdraw its troops from Primorye.

In Japan itself, the political situation in the summer of 1922 was also unfavorable for the militant clique and supporters of intervention. The economic crisis, the enormous but ineffectual expenditure of funds on the intervention, which reached one and a half billion yen, the large losses of people - all this aroused dissatisfaction with the continued intervention not only on the part of the general population, but also on the part of the local bourgeoisie of Japan. In Japan, there has been a change in the ruling cabinet. The new cabinet, headed by Admiral Kato, a representative of the maritime community, inclined to shift the center of gravity of expansion from the shores of the Far East to the Pacific Ocean, issued a statement to end the war in the Far East. Under such conditions, the Japanese government was forced to admit the need to evacuate troops from Primorye and to resume diplomatic negotiations interrupted in Dairen.

In September 1922, a conference was opened in Changchun, which was attended by a joint delegation of the RSFSR and the Far East Republic on the one hand, and a delegation from Japan, on the other.

Representatives of the Soviet Republic and the FER presented to the Japanese how necessary condition for further negotiations, the main requirement is to immediately clear all areas of the Far East from Japanese troops. The Japanese spokesman Matsudaira declined to respond directly to this demand. And only after the Soviet delegation, seeing the failure of further negotiations, threatened to leave the conference, he announced that the evacuation of Japanese troops from Primorye was a settled issue. But, agreeing to the evacuation of their troops from Primorye, the Japanese delegation said that Japanese troops would continue to occupy Northern Sakhalin as compensation for the "Nikolaev incident." This demand was rejected by the delegation of the RSFSR. Negotiations reached an impasse and were interrupted on 19 September.

After the resumption of negotiations, the Japanese delegation continued to insist on its statement on the continuation of the occupation of the northern part of Sakhalin. Then the delegation of the Far Eastern Republic proposed to investigate the "Nikolaev events" and discuss them on the merits. Having found himself in a difficult situation, the head of the Japanese delegation could not think of anything else how to declare that "Japan cannot go into the details of the" Nikolaev events ": the fact is that the governments of the RSFSR and the Far East Republic are not recognized by Japan." In view of the apparent inconsistency of this statement, the negotiations were terminated again on September 26.

On October 12, 1922, the People's Revolutionary Army launched the Seaside Operation. It developed successfully and continued until October 25. As a result, units of the People's Revolutionary Army occupied the last large city in the Far East - Vladivostok.

The seaside operation, which was the last major operation of the People's Revolutionary Army, ended in a brilliant victory over the enemy. Only a small part of the White Guards managed to escape from Vladivostok on Japanese ships. The last and decisive blow was dealt to the interventionists by the defeat of the "zemstvo army". After that, they had no choice but to evacuate their troops from South Primorye.

In November 1922, the American cruiser Sacramento with a detachment of Americans stationed on the Russian Island was forced to leave the Vladivostok port. Seven months after the end of the Primorsky operation, on June 2, 1923, the last Japanese ship, the battleship Nissin, left the Golden Horn Bay.

Losses incurred by Japan during the intervention of 1918 - 1923 contributed to the fact that she never again dared to invade the region on a large scale.

I have long wanted to introduce you to a colorful series of pictures Vladivostok during the Second Troubles, or intervention (1918-1920). About seven dozen high-resolution pictures came to me in the fall of 2008 at one of the forums where I was looking for Transsib materials. A little later, this archive was published by the "Retro-photo" site on nnm.ru (a link to it is at the end of the post). Here I will show only a few shots, less than half, most of which are fragments of full photos. Fragments - because it is more convenient for live viewing: you can see smaller details and talk about them.
And the pictures there are different: the Entente troops on the streets of Vladivostok - for example, the allied parade at the American consulate; there are everyday pictures, and sea, and just street views, mainly on Svetlanskaya. There are also railway photos, although there were fewer of them in the series than I expected. And very remarkable personalities, such as ataman Semyonov or the Czechoslovak leader Gaida. In general, the topics are diverse. I was unable to explain or comment on some of the details - therefore, experts and experts in narrow topics, for example, experts in the fleets of the Entente powers, are invited to comment. If inaccuracies have crept into the comments, correct them, but be sure to give reasons. I think that by joint efforts we will decipher a lot :)

Allied parade on Svetlanskaya in honor of the victory in the First World War. 11/15/1918

2. To begin with, a general view of the Golden Horn Bay, on the banks of which the city has historically emerged. The Entente warships are stationed in the same place where, 60 years later, the ships of the Pacific Fleet of the USSR were stationed, for example, the aircraft-carrying cruiser "Minsk" or the BDK "Alexander Nikolaev". In the same place, near the coast, then a high-rise of the KTOF Headquarters was erected. On the left side there is a quay with a small 2-pipe vessel, and on the right side of it there is a floating crane: there, if my memory serves me right, in the late Soviet times there was a hospital ship "Irtysh". And closer to us is a commercial port. To the right of the frame, below (did not fit) - Vladivostok station. In the distance - the Lugovoy area, but whether there was already "Dalzavod" at that time, I find it difficult to say.

3. The photographer turns the camera to the right. The narrow throat of the curved Golden Horn opposite the train station. The railway station itself (and still exists) is clearly visible on the right side of the frame. The end of the Trans-Siberian Railway runs along it, and on the site of the current seaport there is some kind of capital building, which looks like a warehouse or a depot. However, judging by the frame, now there is a little poured land there: the sea is already farther from the railway line. Vessels maneuver in the water area, some of them are military. In the background is a peninsula, almost uninhabited; v Soviet time there will grow a large fishing area Cape Churkin.

4. Unloading an American supply vessel. It is moored not to the pier, but to the pontoon, which serves as a "pad". A railway line runs along the edge of the quay, on which there is a tandem railway crane. Those. in 1918, which is interesting, such equipment was already on the CER.

5. The Entente warship, the Japanese "Hizen", docked at the pier. A very remarkable ship is the former Russian squadron battleship Retvizan, which took part in the Russo-Japanese war, and after the war was raised by the Japanese in the harbor of Port Arthur and restored by them, but under the Japanese flag. [addition glorfindeil]

6. A whole brood of cars on Svetlanskaya Street, at the porch of the largest Russian store "Churin and Co". As you can see, by 1918 there were already a lot of cars in Vladik.

7. Section of Svetlanskaya Street. On the firewall of one of the buildings is a monumental advertisement - "Nestlé. Swiss M [possibly milk]".

8. Perhaps Svetlanskaya too, judging by the tram line, but I'm not entirely sure - by 1918 there was already a second line, to Pervaya Rechka. [khathi addition is Chinese, or Oceanic Avenue]

9. st. Svetlanskaya, the tram line to Lugovaya also got into the frame. The tram in Vladik was built under a concession by the Belgians, the first cars went on the line in 1912. The structure of the paving stone is clearly visible.

10. A Chinese peddler (coolies) on the street. But what is there in his baskets - I find it difficult to say. Perhaps dried fish, but maybe dried carrots :)

11. Gorgeous everyday scene: baths on the Amur Bay. Closer to us - the women's department with its own water area; you can see naked young ladies sunbathing behind the fence. And in the far part of the frame - the "diving" and the general part. Judging by the photo, there is already a mixed population - both men and women.

12. Funeral procession on Svetlanskaya.

13. The passage of a column of Entente troops (Canadians) along Svetlanskaya, December 15, 1918. In the distance, the same building with Nestlé on the firewall. It is interesting that the column is marching along the pavement, while the citizens are calmly walking along the sidewalk about their business, not gazing and staring at foreign soldiers, but cabbies and carriages along the roadway. Apparently, this was a habit for them by that time. But the street is quite crowded.

14. American soldiers on Svetlanskaya (19.8.1918).

15. Sons of the Empire of Japan walk along the pavement, they cannot be confused with anyone (19.8.1918).

16. American soldiers with Russian officers - the commanders of the troops of the Russian Eastern Region. In the center is the man who will also appear on frames 17, 18, 19. This is Major General William Sidney Graves, commander of the 8th Infantry Division, which was the backbone of the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia. [Addition glorfindeil]
However, the most remarkable person in this frame is a mustachioed officer with George 4th degree, seated on the left.

17. Let's take a closer look at him: in this shot he is smiling and looking away. This is none other than the legendary white chieftain Grigory Semyonov, a cross between Buryats and Old Believers, who terrified the Trans-Baikal, Chita, Harbin, Primorsk Revolutionary Committee members, Bolsheviks, and partisans. Judging by the fact that he is in Vladivostok at this parade, this is most likely 1920. Here he seems to be a kind of mature, middle-aged warrior - but in fact he is here about 29-30 years old. True, his military biography by this time was extremely rich - a topographic team in Mongolia with participation in the coup in Urga, participation in the First World War - Poland, the Caucasus, Persian Kurdistan, Manchurian, Harbin, Chita raids, etc.
Then, after the defeat and expulsion of the invaders and whites from the Far East, the Japanese will give Semyonov a villa in Dairen [ex. Far] and a pension from the government. Apparently, he helped the Japanese a lot in their affairs. However, in August 1945, during an operation against the Kwantung Army, the ataman fell into the hands of Soviet troops, was arrested and brought to trial. One of the versions says that the chieftain came to the arrest himself, having arrived at the railway platform with all the awards and George, in full dress. However, it is possible that this is just a beautiful legend.

Ataman Semyonov was personally known by my maternal great-grandfather E.M. Kisel. By the beginning of the Second Troubles (1917) he was the commander of the Verkhneudinsk branch of the railway guard of the Siberian railway. with the rank of staff captain (in translation into the current language - the head of the transport police department of a section of the railway 600 km long, from Tankhoi to Khilok). Has come February revolution- and it is understandable that the bad reactionary gendarmes were driven from St. Petersburg from everywhere by "temporary pets", thereby creating the preconditions for the future revelry of the daring atamanism and general chaos from Chelyabinsk to Vladivostok. In general, the Buryat-Mongolian fellow Semyonov was sent just there, to Verkhneudinsk [ now Ulan-Ude], on the formation of the ethnic part. Moreover, what is absolutely amazing, Semenov arrived with a double mandate - both from the Provisional Government and from the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies (!!!). That was the kind of chaos and uncertainty. Emelyan's great-grandfather then handed over the affairs to some unknown person, having gone nowhere, and Semyonov abruptly went up the hill (in 2 years he would become a "lieutenant general"). He became famous in Transbaikalia for his exceptional audacity, ingenuity, illegibility in achieving goals and cruelty - from Olovyannaya and Sretensk to Petrovsky Zavod and Kizhinga, I met the graves of the Reds tortured by the Semyonovites (and showed some of them - for example, in a post about the village of Holbon). In principle, the falling away from Kolchak of Transbaikalia is largely the result of Semyonov's activities. He was too inflexible and embittered the population. On the other hand, of course, he cannot be denied personal courage and audacity.

And here's another interesting moment, from the family chronicle. I did not find Yemelyan's great-grandfather himself - he died 10 years before my birth, in February 1955. But I managed to ask his older daughters, grandmother's sisters, in the late 1990s. So, one of them remembered that in September 1945 he read in Zabaikalsky Rabochy a message that Ataman Semyonov had been caught, arrested and would be tried. He got very excited, stood up with a newspaper in his hands and instructively said to his daughters: "See, yes? There is justice in the world, there is! He lived to see the court! Now he will get it for everything!" Later I asked, how did he react to the news of the execution of Semyonov in 1946 (this was reported in the newspapers)? But they did not remember it, it was not postponed.

18. And this is the same American US. Graves (center), but with other officers. The officer on the left (with a cigarette in his hand) is also very colorful - this is the Czechoslovak leader Radol Gaid, a native of Austria-Hungary, who entered the service of Kolchak, and then raised a mutiny against him. He is also very young - in the photo he is 28 years old.

19. In this photo, it seems, only the Americans, led by Graves (see photo 16). Behind - typical symbols of buildings belonging to the railway department.

20. A fragment of a large photo, which shows the soldiers of all powers who arrived in Vladivostok on a "peacekeeping mission".

21. American field cuisine and hearty al fresco dining. Moreover, they dine right in the snow :-)

22. On the Aleutian are the British, in front - a military band. There is a British flag on the building on the left.

23. Parade of the Entente troops 11/15/1918. The British are coming.

24. And these are the sons of the Japanese Empire again (and the flag cannot be confused).

25. Route the White Guard units, under the Russian tricolor.

26. This shot most likely refers not to 1919-20, but to 1918: a very crowded demonstration with the slogans of the RSFSR and the rudiments of the old spelling. A still from 1922, the time when the "buffer" of the DVR expired. The street is near the station, in my opinion, Aleutskaya. Struck by the poster with the anchor ( Unity is strength), which is hugged by two hands, on both sides. What is this, no one knows? :)

27. At the railway station there is an armored train under steam, driven by an old steam locomotive (most likely, series A or H). Photo of 11/19/1919 [Armored train - "Kalmykovets" ataman Kalmykov, addition eurgen12]

28. And this is a 2-3-0 steam locomotive of the G series, or, as the then railroad workers called it, "the iron Manchurian". A charismatic steam locomotive - Kharkiv-built in 1902-1903, this was built only for two roads - Vladikavkaz and Sino-Eastern. It had a drawback - it was too heavy with an axle load, and therefore could only walk on trunk lines with a powerful ballast base and heavy rails. But for that time he developed a tremendous speed: a modification for the Chinese Eastern Railway - up to 115 km / h! And therefore, he drove mostly high-speed trains, in particular the courier "number one" (Irkutsk - Harbin - Vladivostok). Here he is also standing under some kind of mixed train. The arrow (on the left in the frame) is also interesting. Vladivostok station is visible in the distance.

29. Americans against the background of Russian cars (service markings - Pervaya Rechka depot). Left - Colonel Lantry of the US Railroad Engineers Corps.

30. The tail platform of the armored train (see photo 27). Depot marking Pervaya Rechka. To the right of the main line of the Transsib, the branch deviates to the naval berths (see photo 2).

31. Some Napoleons are walking along Svetlanskaya. Sorry, I didn't recognize the nation exactly, but maybe it's the French :)

A. Archive with full versions of photos -

From the end of 1917, active negotiations were held between the United States, Britain, France and Japan to organize the intervention. It was decided that the overthrow of the Soviet regime in the Far East and Siberia would be carried out mainly by Japanese troops. However, unlike the Western European powers, the United States was not going to completely give these lands rich in natural resources to the Japanese. Washington politicians worried about Tokyo's attempts to negotiate in advance its rights to obtain fishing, mining and forestry concessions in Siberia, which meant the establishment of Japan's sole economic and political control there. In order to prevent this, it was decided to send American troops to the Russian Far East.

The reason for the start of the invasion was the murder by unknown persons in Vladivostok on the night of April 5, 1918, of two employees of the Japanese trade office "Ishido". It was like a planned provocation, which was the signal for the start of a planned operation. Without waiting for the circumstances of the incident to be clarified, on the same day, under the cover of the artillery of warships that entered the inner harbor of the port of warships in Vladivostok, two companies of Japanese infantry landed, the next day the scale of the operation was expanded - the forces of an airborne detachment of 250 people captured Vladivostok, which was covering the well-fortified Russky Island from the sea.

To move deeper into Siberia, the Japanese and Americans provoked the so-called "rebellion of the Czechoslovakians." The Czechs and Slovaks, who were previously part of the Austro-Hungarian army, were sent home through Vladivostok by the decision of the Soviet government. By the end of May, 63 echelons with united Czechoslovak Corps 40 thousand repatriates spread throughout Siberia from Penza to Primorye. The Soviet authorities were worried that the corps followed through unprotected Russian territory with weapons. In order to rule out any incidents and clashes along the way, an order was given to surrender the weapons. Resisting this, the corps command called on its soldiers and officers to disobey, which then resulted in an open mutiny.

Tokyo and Washington immediately decided to take advantage of the situation. On July 6, 1918, the White House authorized the dispatch of troops to Siberia "to provide assistance to the Czechoslovakians." To begin with, it was decided to send Japanese and American troops numbering 7,000 bayonets to the territory of Russia. However, the Japanese, for whom the main thing was to quickly occupy as many strategically important regions of the Far East and Siberia as possible, were not going to impose any restrictions on the number of their interventionist troops. Already on August 2, under the cover of destroyers, having landed troops at the mouth of the Amur, they captured the city of Nikolaev-on-Amur, and on August 12 they transferred an infantry division of about 16 thousand people to Vladivostok. Along with the Japanese, the city was also occupied by smaller military contingents of the British, French and Americans.

According to official American data, 72,000 Japanese and over 9,000 American soldiers were sent to the Russian Far East. It should be borne in mind that the number of Japanese interventionist troops has changed. So, in the literature there are indications that during different periods of occupation in the Far East and Siberia, up to 100 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers operated.

Having a multiple advantage in the number of troops, the invaders, nevertheless, could not control the captured vast expanses of the eastern part of Russia on their own. This forced them to use their henchmen from among the atamans who had taken refuge in the territory of China - Semyonov, Kalmykov, Gamow, who headed the white-bandit formations. With their help, in the territories occupied by Japanese troops, all laws and institutions of Soviet power were abolished, the old, pre-revolutionary order was restored. The pre-revolutionary rights of officers, ranks and titles of tsarist officials, the Cossack estate were restored. The nationalized enterprises were returned to their former owners. The peasants were allowed to use only those land borders that were before March 1917.

Throughout the Far East and Siberia, bloody massacres unfolded against representatives and sympathizers of the Soviet government. In order to intimidate the local population, entire villages were burned and mass demonstration shootings were organized, and punitive operations were carried out. There is a lot of evidence of the atrocities and inhuman treatment of the local population by the occupiers.

As a result of active hostilities created after the revolution, the Red Army and Siberian partisan formations by the end of 1919, Kolchak's army was defeated. Having lost hope for the restoration of the previous regime in Russia, the governments of the United States and the Entente countries decided to withdraw their troops from Siberia. However, the Japanese government, unwilling to join this decision, continued the occupation Russian territory.

Since the expulsion of the Japanese invaders from Russian territory was recognized by the Soviet authorities as "now impossible", the Soviet government decided to create a "buffer" state in the Far East for a temporary peaceful settlement in the eastern regions of the country. On April 6, 1920, the Constituent Congress of Transbaikalia workers in Verkhneudinsk proclaimed the formation of an independent Far Eastern Republic (FER), which included the territory from Lake Baikal to the Pacific Ocean. At the same time, the Soviet government offered Japan to end hostilities in the Far East.

Suffering losses in clashes with parts of the FER army and partisans, the Japanese agreed to negotiations. On July 14, 1920, an armistice agreement was signed between the FER government and the command of the expeditionary forces in the Far East, after which the Japanese troops were withdrawn from Transbaikalia. Having lost the support of the Japanese, the gangs of Ataman Semyonov fled to Manchuria. After its liberation, Chita became the capital of the Far Eastern Republic. Although the Japanese continued to occupy Primorye and did not want to abandon their plans to subjugate the Siberian territories that were part of the FER, the situation was not in their favor.

The continuation of the armed struggle of the Red Army and partisans against the interventionists, the facts of decomposition and desertion of soldiers and officers of the Japanese Expeditionary Army forced Tokyo to enter the negotiation process. The negotiation of the terms of a peaceful settlement was conducted between the FER and the Japanese government from August 1921 to April 1922 in the Chinese city of Dairen. The FER delegation proposed to sign an agreement stipulating Japan's obligations to evacuate all troops from the Far East. However, the Japanese side, rejecting this proposal, put forward its own project obliging the FER: to destroy all fortifications on the border with Korea and in the region of the Vladivostok fortress; eliminate the navy in the Pacific ..

To strengthen their position in the negotiations, the Japanese organized an offensive of the White Guard units from Primorye to Khabarovsk. Taking advantage of the superiority in forces, the army of the White Guards, numbering 20 thousand bayonets, captured Khabarovsk and, coordinating its actions with the Japanese command, prepared for a throw into the Amur region. However, these plans were thwarted. At the beginning of 1922, the FER army defeated the White Guards at Volochaevka, and Khabarovsk was liberated on February 14. The ensuing attempts by the Japanese and White Guards to go over to the offensive again were thwarted.

The negative attitude towards the continuation of the intervention both at home and abroad, in particular in the United States, prompted the Japanese government to enter into negotiations. The beginning of the negotiations was facilitated by the statement of the Japanese government that it was ready to withdraw its troops from Primorye by November 1, 1922. Contrary to the promise to evacuate troops, the Japanese government began to openly prepare for the seizure of Primorye. The intention was announced, by uniting Primorye and Manchuria, to create a "buffer" on their territory under the protectorate of Japan. It became clear that the Japanese invaders would not leave the Russian Far East of their own free will.

On September 1, 1922, the White Guard units again tried to go on the offensive from Primorye to the north. However, parts of the FER army and partisan detachments repulsed their attacks, and then, having launched a counteroffensive in October, captured the White stronghold in the Spassk region. On October 15, Nikolsk-Ussuriisky was liberated, and the troops of the Far Eastern Republic came close to Vladivostok. Here they were blocked by Japanese troops. On October 21, the governments of the RSFSR and the Far Eastern Republic sent a note to the government of Japan, in which they declared a resolute protest against "the delay in evacuation and the prevention of Russian troops in Vladivostok." Finding themselves surrounded by the units of the regular army and partisan detachments pulled together to Vladivostok, the Japanese command was forced to sign an agreement on the evacuation of its troops no later than October 25, 1922.

On November 13, 1922, the People's Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic proclaimed and proclaimed the power of the Soviets in the entire Far East, and on November 16, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee proclaimed the Far Eastern Republic a constituent part of the RSFSR.

From the book "Kuril Ping-Pong. 100 Years of the Struggle for the Islands" author Koshkin A.A.