Napoleon Bonaparte and Alexander IHAPOLEON I (Napoleon) (Napoleon Bonaparte) (1769-1821), French emperor in 1804-14 and in March - June 1815. A native of Corsica. He began serving in the army in 1785 with the rank of junior lieutenant of artillery; advanced during the French Revolution (reaching the rank of brigadier general) and under the Directory (army commander). In November 1799 he carried out a coup d'état (Brumaire 18), as a result of which he became the first consul, who in the course of time effectively concentrated all power in his hands; in 1804 he was proclaimed emperor. Established a dictatorial regime. He carried out a number of reforms (the adoption of the civil code, 1804, the foundation of the French bank, 1800, etc.). Thanks to victorious wars, he significantly expanded the territory of the empire, made most of the Western states dependent on France. and Center. Europe. The defeat of Napoleon's troops in the war of 1812 against Russia marked the beginning of the collapse of the empire of Napoleon I. The entry of troops of the anti-French coalition into Paris in 1814 forced Napoleon I to abdicate. Was exiled to Fr. Elbe. He again occupied the French throne in March 1815 (see "One Hundred Days"). After the defeat at Waterloo, he abdicated a second time (June 22, 1815). He spent the last years of his life on about. St. Helena a prisoner of the English. Alexander I (Blessed), Alexander Pavlovich (December 12 (23), 1777, St. Petersburg - November 19 (December 1), 1825, Taganrog) - Emperor of the Russian Empire from March 11 (23), 1801 to 19 November (December 1), 1825), the eldest son of Emperor Paul I and Maria Feodorovna. At the beginning of his reign, he carried out moderately liberal reforms developed by the Private Committee and M.M. Speransky. In foreign policy, he maneuvered between Great Britain and France. In 1805-07 he participated in anti-French coalitions. In 1807-12 he temporarily became close to France. He waged successful wars with Turkey (1806-12) and Sweden (1808-09). Under Alexander I, the territories of Eastern Georgia (1801), Finland (1809), Bessarabia (1812), Azerbaijan (1813), and the former Duchy of Warsaw (1815) were annexed to Russia. After the Patriotic War of 1812, in 1813-14 he headed the anti-French coalition of European powers. He was one of the leaders of the Vienna Congress of 1814-15 and the organizers of the Holy Alliance. AT last years In his life, he often spoke of his intention to abdicate the throne and “retreat from the world”, which, after his unexpected death from typhoid fever in Taganrog, gave rise to the legend of “Elder Fyodor Kuzmich”. According to this legend, it was not Alexander who died and was then buried in Taganrog, but his double, while the tsar lived for a long time as an old hermit in Siberia and died in 1864.

Foreign policy and their friendship

Russia and France were bound by a common destiny, which determined many things not only in their lives. The two empires turned out to be both parallel to each other and very different. Historians talk about it in long sentences. Art clearly shows this without words. The cultural affinity established by the Age of Enlightenment proved to be more than just stronger than political enmity. It included this enmity (and its variant, the touching alliance) within itself, made it a concrete version of cultural history, more enduring and more important for posterity than political history. The monuments tell us about the same situation of love and hate that politicians felt and feel. In the West, Russia was actively involved in European affairs. In the first decade and a half of the nineteenth century the implementation of the western direction was associated with the struggle against the aggression of Napoleon. After 1815, the main task of Russia's foreign policy in Europe was to maintain the old monarchical regimes and fight against the revolutionary movement. Alexander I and Nicholas I relied on the most conservative forces and most often relied on alliances with Austria and Prussia. In 1848, Nicholas helped the Austrian emperor suppress the revolution that broke out in Hungary, and strangled the revolutionary uprisings in the Danubian principalities. early XIX in. Russia adhered to neutrality in European affairs. However, the aggressive plans of Napoleon, since 1804 the French emperor, forced Alexander I to oppose him. In 1805, a third coalition was formed against France: Russia, Austria and England. The outbreak of the war was extremely unsuccessful for the allies. In November 1805, their troops were defeated near Austerlipem. Austria withdrew from the war, the coalition collapsed. Russia, continuing to fight alone, tried to create a new alliance against France. In 1806, the 4th coalition was formed: Russia, Prussia, England and Sweden. However, the French army forced Prussia to capitulate within just a few weeks. Once again, Russia found itself alone in the face of a formidable and powerful enemy. In June 1807, she lost the battle near Friedland (the territory of East Prussia, now the Kaliningrad region of Russia). This forced Alexander I to enter into peace negotiations with Napoleon. In the summer of 1807, Russia and France signed a peace treaty in Tilsit, and then an alliance treaty. According to its terms, the Duchy of Warsaw was created from the Polish lands torn away from Prussia under the protectorate of Napoleon. This territory in the future became a springboard for an attack on Russia. The Treaty of Tilsit obliged Russia to join the continental blockade of Great Britain and break off political relations with it. The rupture of traditional trade ties with England caused significant damage to the Russian economy, undermining its finances. The nobles, whose material well-being largely depended on the sale of Russian agricultural products to England, showed particular dissatisfaction with this condition and Alexander I personally. The peace of Tilsit was unfavorable for Russia. At the same time, he gave her a temporary respite in Europe, allowing her to intensify her policy in the eastern and northwestern directions. Napoleon, sensing the serious political significance of the Bailen catastrophe. Although he pretended to be calm, emphasizing that the Baylen loss was a complete trifle compared to the resources owned by his empire, he understood perfectly well how this event should affect Austria, which began to arm with redoubled energy. Austria saw that Napoleon suddenly turned out to be not one front, but two, and that this new southern Spanish front would henceforth greatly weaken him on the Danube. To keep Austria out of the war, it was necessary to make her understand that Alexander I would invade Austrian possessions from the east, while Napoleon, his ally, would march on Vienna from the west. For this purpose, the Erfurt demonstration of friendship between the two emperors was mainly started. Alexander I experienced a difficult time after Tilsit. The alliance with Napoleon and the inevitable consequences of this alliance - a break with England - severely hurt the economic interests of both the nobility and the merchant class. Friedland and Tilsit were considered not only a misfortune, but also a disgrace. Alexander hoped, believing Napoleon's promises, that by acquiring a part of Turkey thanks to the Franco-Russian alliance, he would calm the court, guards, general noble opposition. But time passed, and no steps were taken by Napoleon in this direction; moreover, rumors began to reach St. Petersburg that Napoleon was inciting the Turks to further resistance in the war they were waging at that time against Russia. In Erfurt, both participants in the Franco-Russian alliance hoped to take a closer look at the good quality of the cards with which each of them plays his diplomatic game. Both allies deceived each other, both knew it, although not yet completely, both did not trust each other in anything, and both needed each other. Alexander considered Napoleon a man of the greatest mind; Napoleon recognized the diplomatic subtlety and cunning of Alexander. "This is a real Byzantine," the French emperor said about the Russian Tsar. Therefore, at the first meeting in Erfurt on September 27, 1808, they passionately embraced and kissed each other in public and did not stop doing this for two weeks in a row, daily and inseparably appearing at reviews, parades, melons, feasts, in the theater, on hunting, on horseback rides. Publicity was the most important thing in these hugs and kisses: for Napoleon, these kisses would have lost all their sweetness if the Austrians had not known about them, and for Alexander if the Turks had not known about them. Alexander in the year that passed between Tilsit and Erfurt, made sure that Napoleon only beckoned him with a promise to give him the "East", and take the "West" for himself; it was clear that not only would he not allow the tsar to occupy Constantinople, but that Napoleon would prefer to leave even Moldavia and Wallachia in the hands of the Turks. On the other hand, the tsar saw that Napoleon, for a whole year after Tilsit, did not bother to remove his troops even from that part of Prussia, which he returned to the Prussian king. As for Napoleon, for him the most important thing was to keep Austria from speaking out against France, while he was. Napoleon will not be able to put an end to the guerrilla war that has flared up in Spain. And for this, Alexander had to undertake to actively act against Austria if Austria decided to speak out. And Alexander did not want to give or fulfill this direct obligation. Napoleon agreed to give in advance for this Russian military assistance to Alexander Galicia and even more possessions near the Carpathians. Subsequently, the most prominent representatives of both the Slavophile and the national-patriotic schools of Russian historiography bitterly reproached Alexander for not accepting these proposals of Napoleon and for missing an opportunity that would never happen again. But Alexander submitted after feeble attempts to resist that strong current in the Russian nobility, which saw in an alliance with Napoleon, who twice defeated the Russian army (in 1805 and 1807), not only a disgrace (it would still go anywhere), but also ruin. Anonymous letters reminding Alexander of the end of Paul, his father, who also entered into friendship with Napoleon, were quite convincing. And yet, Alexander was afraid of Napoleon and did not want to break with him for anything. At the direction and invitation of Napoleon, who wanted to punish Sweden for her alliance with England, Alexander had been waging war with Sweden since February 1808, which ended with the rejection of all Finland from Sweden to the Torneo River and its annexation to Russia. Alexander knew that even by this he did not calm the irritation and anxiety of the Russian landlords, for whom the interests of their own pocket were infinitely higher than any territorial state expansions in the barren north. In any case, the acquisition of Finland was also an argument for Alexander in favor of the fact that breaking with Napoleon now is both dangerous and unprofitable. In Erfurt, Talleyrand betrayed Napoleon for the first time, entering into secret relations with Alexander, whom he advised to resist Napoleonic hegemony. Talleyrand subsequently motivated his behavior as if by concern for France, which Napoleon's insane love of power led to death. "The Russian sovereign is civilized, but the Russian people are not civilized, the French sovereign is not civilized, but the French people are civilized. It is necessary that the Russian sovereign and the French people enter into an alliance with each other," with such a flattering phrase, the old intriguer began his secret negotiations with the tsar. Talleyrands said that all his life he "sold those who bought him." At one time he sold the Directory to Napoleon, now in Erfurt he sold Napoleon to Alexander. He subsequently sold Alexander to the British. He only didn’t sell the English to anyone, because only they didn’t buy him (although he offered himself to them several times at the most reasonable price). It is inappropriate to delve into Talleyrand’s motives (who later received money from Alexander, although not in such he counted). It is important for us to note two features here: firstly, Talleyrand saw more clearly than others already in 1808 what, more or less vaguely, began to disturb, as already mentioned, many marshals and dignitaries; secondly, Alexander realized that the Napoleonic empire was not as strong and indestructible as it might seem. He began to oppose Napoleonic harassment on the issue of Russia's military action against Austria in the event of a new Franco-Austrian war. During one of these disputes, Napoleon threw his hat on the ground and began to trample it furiously with his feet. Alexander, in response to this trick, declared: “You are harsh, but I am stubborn ... We will talk, we will reason, otherwise I will leave.” The alliance remained formally in force, but from now on Napoleon could not count on it. Russia, will the meeting in Erfurt end well: will Napoleon arrest Alexander, as he did only four months ago with the Spanish Bourbons, luring them to Bayonne. "No one hoped that he would let you go, Your Majesty," one old Prussian general let slip frankly (and to Alexander's great annoyance) when Alexander was returning from Erfurt. From the outside, everything was excellent: during the entire Erfurt meeting, the vassal kings and other monarchs who made up Napoleon's retinue did not cease to be touched by the heartfelt mutual love of Napoleon and the tsar. But Napoleon himself, seeing Alexander off, was gloomy. He knew that the vassal kings did not believe in the strength of this alliance, and that Austria did not believe either. It was necessary to put an end to Spanish affairs as soon as possible. In Spain, Napoleon had 100 thousand people. He ordered another 150,000 to hastily invade Spain. The peasant uprising flared up every month. The Spanish word guerilla, "little war," misunderstood the meaning of what was happening. This war with peasants and artisans, with sheep herders and mule drivers worried the emperor much more than other large campaigns. After Prussia, who had slavishly resigned, the Spanish fierce resistance seemed especially strange and unexpected. And yet Napoleon did not even suspect what this Spanish fire would come to. This could have affected General Bonaparte in a somewhat sobering way, but the “riot of the poor ragamuffins” could not have affected Emperor Napoleon, the winner of Europe. Unsure of Alexander's help and almost convinced that Austria would oppose him. Napoleon in the late autumn of 1808 rushed to Spain. France and Russia share a remarkably complicated history of political and cultural relations. The war with Napoleon was the main event of the Russian history of the XIX century. But she had a strange result. In Russia, the cult of Napoleon intensified, and the traditional love for French culture increased immeasurably. The Empire style with its Russian version dominated everywhere. The Russian emperor ordered a large painting “Parade of the Old Guard” for his office, and a unit was created as part of the Russian guard, wearing a uniform that deliberately repeated the form of the Napoleonic soldiers. The republican ideas that inspired the Russian nobles to the Decembrist uprising were also brought from imperial France. sympathy existed, despite the objective political and social contradictions. The Empire style of art would have meant "Napoleon's style" if it had not become international and had not gone beyond the era. The ideology of the Napoleonic Empire created a kind of artificial Renaissance, which revived not the ancient spirit, but the symbols and signs of the Roman militarized world - eagles, armor, lictor bundles, sacrificial tripods - and the solemn severity inherent in Roman aesthetics. This style, created "under Napoleon", became an important contribution to the history of culture, no less important than military campaigns with their bright victories and gloomy defeats. The style survived Napoleon and took root in many countries of the world, but especially and very beautifully in another empire - in Russia. What is called Russian Empire is part of an international phenomenon. However, in Russia, the "imperial" style not only changed its form, but also found new historical origins and key symbols - the past of Russia with its helmets and chain mail, with the image-ideal of a medieval knight. The works of French and Russian applied art of the early 19th century shown nearby confirm the global character of the style created by France, which turned the Republic back into a monarchy, focusing on ideals and style ancient world. Russia imported brilliant monuments of French craftsmanship. French artists created sketches for Russian factories. The original works of Russian workshops were not inferior to imported ones and were saturated with their own ideological program. All this can be shown by Russia and its museum - the Hermitage. But he also shows objects with a stronger French accent. Thanks to a combination of circumstances, personal sympathies and dynastic marriages, many Napoleonic things that were kept in the Beauharnais family ended up in Russia: from the saber that was with Napoleon at Marengo to the service. However, behind the story about art, a topic very close to Russian history is hidden. Gilded heroes of French and Russian production stand side by side like brothers, like Alexander Pavlovich and Napoleon on a raft in Tilsit. The theme "Alexander and Napoleon" is loved not only by historians, but also by everyone who in Russia thinks about national history. A dramatic break with France after the assassination of Paul, a humiliating defeat at Austerlitz, a reconciliation that delighted everyone, skillfully used for Russia's political goals. A treacherous preventive attack, the loss of Moscow and the terrible humiliation of all-European victors, which ended with the capture of Paris by Russian troops, which was struck by the nobility of the victorious emperor. This is a beautiful saga. For the Hermitage, there is another aspect of this story. His name is Vivant Denon. A remarkable artist, one of the organizers of the scientific Egyptian expedition of Napoleon, the creator of the Louvre, the father of "Egyptomania", a freemason and mystic, who served in his youth at the Russian Court. The Egyptian papyrus donated by him and a luxurious book of his oriental engravings are kept in Russia. They say that during the period of friendship between Alexander and Napoleon, he helped to buy paintings for the Hermitage, including, supposedly, Caravaggio's The Lute Player. Alexander awarded him the Order of St. Anne in gratitude for the art objects sent to St. Petersburg. As director of the Louvre, he unsuccessfully tried to buy from the Empress Josephine part of her art collection. Josephine's daughter sold paintings and sculptures to Alexander, to the Hermitage. The Russian emperor, in turn, defended the right of France to preserve the treasures collected by Denon throughout Europe. Our cultural interactions are full of fascinating episodes, many of which are visibly and invisibly behind amazingly beautiful things united “under the sign of two eagles” - Russian and French. The Bucharest peace treaty was of great importance. It was concluded a month before Napoleon's attack on Russia and upset his hopes of helping the Turkish army. The treaty allowed the Russian command to concentrate all its forces on repelling the Napoleonic aggression. The successes of Russian weapons and the conclusion of the Bucharest Treaty led to a weakening of the political, economic and religious yoke Ottoman Empire over the Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula.

Reasons for the termination of friendship, their common interests and contradictions

After Erfurt, Alexander returned to St. Petersburg with the intention of supporting the Franco-Russian alliance and not getting out of the wake of Napoleonic policy, at least in the near future. When a scientific and detailed socio-economic and political history of Russia at the beginning of the 19th century is written, then, probably, the future researcher will pay much attention and devote a lot of pages to these curious years from Erfurt to the invasion of Napoleon in 1812. In these four years, we see a complex the struggle of hostile social forces and trends that determined the historical pattern of both the appearance of the figure of Speransky and his collapse. Apparently, the question of introducing certain reforms in the administration of the Russian Empire was put forward quite persistently by the conditions of that time. There were enough shocks that contributed to the creation of the need for reform: Austerlitz, Friedland, Tilsit. But, on the other hand, terrible defeats in two big wars , which were conducted by Russia in 1805-1807. against Napoleon, ended, no matter what was said about the shame of Tilsit, with a comparatively advantageous alliance with a world conqueror and then, in a short time, the acquisition of vast Finland. This means that the Russian tsar did not see any reasons for very deep, fundamental reforms, even for those that were outlined for Prussia after the Jena defeat. It was here that Speransky came in unusually handy to the court. A smart, dexterous and cautious raznochinets returned from Erfurt, where he traveled in Alexander's retinue, completely delighted with Napoleon. Speransky did not touch serfdom in any way, even remotely - on the contrary, he convincingly argued that it was not slavery at all. He also did not touch the Orthodox Church in any way - on the contrary, he said many compliments to her at every opportunity. Not only did he not encroach on any restriction of autocracy, but, on the contrary, he saw in tsarist absolutism the main lever of the transformations he had initiated. And these transformations were precisely intended to turn the loose semi-Eastern despotism, the patrimony of the Holstein-Gottorp family, who appropriated the boyar surname of the extinct Romanovs, into a modern European state with a properly functioning bureaucracy, with a system of formal legality, with organized control over finances and administration, educated and businesslike personnel of the bureaucracy, with the transformation of governors from satraps into prefects, in a word, he wanted to plant on Russian soil the same orders that, in his opinion, turned France into the first country in the world. In itself, this program did not contradict the thoughts, feelings, desires of Alexander, and the king supported his favorite for several years in a row. But both Alexander and Speransky paid off without a host. The well-born nobility and the middle-noble stratum led by it sensed the enemy, no matter how much he covered himself with moderation and good intentions. They understood instinctively that Speransky was striving to make the feudal-absolutist state bourgeois-absolutist and create forms that were essentially incompatible with the feudal-serf system that existed in Russia and the nobility of political and social life. They went as a united phalanx against Speransky. Not by chance, but organically, Speransky's reform work was associated in their eyes with the commitment of the leading minister to the Franco-Russian alliance, to friendship with the military dictator of France and Europe; not by chance, but organically, in the minds of the Russian nobility, the popovich was associated, who introduces exams for officials and wants to oust the nobility from the state machine in order to transfer this machine to raznochintsy, rabble-rousers and merchants, and the French conqueror, who ruins the same Russian nobility with a continental blockade and to whom the king went to the Erfurt Horde to bow with his favorite. What was the firm line of the court-noble opposition in St. Petersburg and Moscow in 1808-1812, and this opposition was directed equally sharply both against the domestic and against the foreign policy of the tsar and his minister. Already this circumstance deprived the Franco-Russian alliance of due strength. In Russian aristocratic salons, the taking of Finland from Sweden was condemned, because it was done at the request of Napoleon, and they did not even want to get Galicia, if this required helping the hated Bonaparte against Austria in 1809. They tried in every possible way to show coldness to the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, Caulaincourt, and the more affectionate and cordial the tsar was with him, the more demonstratively the aristocratic circles, both new Petersburg and especially old Moscow, showed their hostility. But from the end of 1810, Alexander ceased to oppose this victorious current . Firstly, Napoleon's Tilsit speeches about the spread of Russian influence in the East, in Turkey, turned out to be only words, and this disappointed Alexander; Secondly. Napoleon still did not withdraw his troops from Prussia and, most importantly, played some kind of game with the Poles, not abandoning the idea of ​​restoring Poland, which threatened the integrity of the Russian borders and the rejection of Lithuania; thirdly, Napoleon's protests and displeasure at the failure to comply exactly with the conditions of the continental blockade took on very insulting forms; fourthly, the arbitrary annexations with a stroke of the pen of entire states, practiced so readily by Napoleon in 1810-1811, disturbed and annoyed Alexander. The exorbitant power of Napoleon itself hung as an eternal threat over his vassals, and after Tilsit, Alexander was looked upon (and he knew it) as a simple vassal of Napoleon. They were ironic about the small handouts that Napoleon gave Alexander both in 1807, giving him the Prussian Bialystok, and in 1809, giving the king one Austrian district on the eastern (Galician) border; they said that Napoleon treats Alexander in the same way as the former Russian tsars treated their serfs, granting them so many souls as a reward for their service. between the two emperors. The marriage of Napoleon to the daughter of the Austrian emperor was interpreted as replacing the Franco-Russian alliance with the Franco-Austrian one. There are precise indications that for the first time not only thinking aloud about the war with Russia, but also seriously studying this issue, Napoleon began in January 1811. when I got acquainted with the new Russian customs tariff. This tariff greatly increased duties on the importation into Russia of wines, silk and velvet fabrics, and other luxury items, i.e., just those goods that were the main items of French imports to Russia. Napoleon protested against this tariff; he was told that the deplorable state of Russian finances compels such a measure. The rate remains. Complaints about the too easy passage of colonial goods to Russia on pseudo-neutral, but in fact English courts, became more and more frequent. Napoleon was sure that the Russians were secretly releasing English goods and that from Russia these goods were widely distributed in Germany, Austria, Poland, and thus the blockade of England was reduced to zero. Alexander also thought about the inevitability of war, looked for allies, negotiated with Bernadotte, formerly a Napoleonic marshal, now the Crown Prince of Sweden and an enemy of Napoleon. On August 15, 1811, at a solemn reception of the diplomatic corps, who arrived to congratulate Napoleon on his birthday, the emperor, stopping near the Russian ambassador, Prince Kurakin, turned to him with an angry speech that had a threatening meaning. He accused Alexander of infidelity to the union, of hostile actions. What does your sovereign hope for? he asked menacingly. Napoleon then suggested that Kurakin immediately sign an agreement that would settle all misunderstandings between Russia and the French Empire. Kurakin, timid and agitated, declared that he had no authority for such an act. No authority? - Napoleon shouted. - So demand your powers! .. I don’t want war, I don’t want to restore Poland, but you yourself want the Duchy of Warsaw and Danzig to join Russia ... Until the secret intentions of your court become open, I will not stop increasing army stationed in Germany! The emperor did not listen to excuses and explanations of Kurakin, who rejected all these accusations, but spoke and repeated his thoughts in every way. After this scene, no one in Europe doubted that the war was coming. Napoleon gradually turned the whole of vassal Germany into a vast springboard for a future invasion. At the same time, he decided to force both Prussia and Austria into a military alliance with him - two powers on the continent that were still considered independent, although in fact Prussia was in complete political slavery to Napoleon. This military alliance was to immediately precede the attack on Russia. Prussia experienced very difficult times in the years when the Napoleonic yoke weighed on it, but still, even in the first moments after Tilsit, in 1807-1808. , there was no such chronic panic as after Wagram and the Austrian marriage of Napoleon. In the early years, under the influence of Stein and the reform party in Prussia, if not completely abolished serfdom, then almost all of its legal foundations were very significantly broken. Some more reforms were carried out. But the fiery patriot Stein, who too openly admired the Spanish uprising, attracted the attention of the Napoleonic police: one of his letters was intercepted, which seemed unintentional to Napoleon, and the emperor ordered King Frederick William III to immediately expel Stein from Prussia. The king, as a sign of zeal, not only immediately carried out the order, but also confiscated the property of the disgraced statesman. The reform process in Prussia slowed down, but did not stop. Scharnhorst, the Minister of War, Gneisenau and their assistants worked as far as possible to reorganize the army. At the request of Napoleon, Prussia could not have an army of more than 42 thousand people, but by various clever measures the Prussian government managed, calling for a short time, to give military training to a large mass. Thus, slavishly fulfilling the will of Napoleon, submissive, flattering, humiliating, Prussia nevertheless quietly prepared for the distant future and did not lose hope of a way out of that desperate impossible situation in which the terrible defeat of 1806 and the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 had placed her. When Napoleon's war with Austria broke out in 1809, there was one desperate, convulsive, made at individual risk and fear attempt on the Prussian side to free themselves from oppression: Major Schill with part of the hussar regiment, which he commanded, began a partisan war. He was defeated and killed, his comrades, by order of Napoleon, were tried by a Prussian military court and shot. The king was beside himself with fear and rage against Schill, but for the time being Napoleon was content with these executions and the humiliated assurances of Friedrich-Wilhelm. After the new defeat of Austria at Wagram, after the Treaty of Schönbrunn and the marriage of Napoleon to Marie-Louise, the last hopes for the salvation of Prussia disappeared: Austria, it seemed, completely and irrevocably entered the orbit of Napoleonic politics. Who could help, what to hope for? At the beginning of the quarrel between Napoleon and Russia? But this quarrel developed very slowly, and now, after Austerlitz and Friedland, the former hopes were no longer placed on the strength of Russia. part (between the French Empire, the Westphalian kingdom of Jerome Bonaparte and Saxony, which was a vassal of Napoleon), or by expelling the Hohenzollern dynasty from there and replacing it with one of their relatives or marshals. When, on June 9, 1810, by a simple decree, Napoleon annexed Holland and then turned it into nine new departments of the French Empire, when Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, the Lauenburg duchies of Oldenburg, Salm-Salm, Arenberg and a number of others were annexed to France in the same easy way possessions, when, having occupied the entire northern coast of Germany, from Holland to Holstein, Marshal Davout, as the only consolation for those who were joining, declared in an official appeal to them: Your independence was only imaginary, then the Prussian king began to expect the last hour of his reign. His independence, after all, was also only imaginary, and he knew that back in Tilsit, Napoleon had categorically declared that he had not erased Prussia from the map of Europe only out of courtesy to the Russian Tsar. And now, in 1810-1811, Napoleon's relations with the tsar quickly deteriorated and there was no talk of any kindness. Napoleon did not hesitate at the end of 1810 for no reason, among complete peace , drive the Duke of Oldenburg out of his possessions and annex Oldenburg to his state, although the son and heir of this duke was married to Alexander's sister, Ekaterina Pavlovna. Prussia in 1810-1811 was waiting for death. It was not only King Frederick William III, who had never distinguished himself for courage, who was afraid, but those liberal-patriotic associations, like the Tugendbund, which at that time reflected the desire of a part of the young German bourgeoisie to get rid of the foreign oppressor and then create a new, free Germany, were also silenced. The Tugendbund was not the only, but only the most conspicuous of these illegal associations; he, too, fell silent and despondent in 1810, and especially in 1811 and early 1812. The situation seemed very hopeless. Minister Hardenberg, who once stood for resistance and for this, at the request of Napoleon, removed from the Prussian court, now formally repented and in writing brought to the attention of the French ambassador Saint-Marsan about a complete change in his convictions. Our salvation depends only on Napoleon, - wrote Hardenberg to General Scharnhorst. Hardenberg himself in May 1810 turned to the French ambassador with the following humiliated request: Let his imperial majesty deign to speak out about the participation that I could take in business. This will provide significant evidence of the return of the emperor's trust and favors to the king. Napoleon relented and allowed Friedrich Wilhelm to appoint Hardenberg as state chancellor. This happened on June 5, and already on June 7, 1810. the new Prussian chancellor wrote to Napoleon: Deeply convinced that Prussia can be reborn and ensure its integrity and its future happiness only by honestly following your system, sovereign ... I consider it my highest glory to earn the approval and high confidence of your imperial majesty. I remain with the deepest respect, sir, the most humble and obedient servant of Your Imperial Majesty. Baron von Hardenberg, State Chancellor of the Prussian King. On March 14, 1812, a Franco-Austrian treaty was signed in Paris, according to which Austria was obliged to send 30 thousand soldiers to help Napoleon. Napoleon guaranteed the seizure of Moldavia and Wallachia from Russia, which were then occupied by Russian troops. In addition, the Austrians were guaranteed possession of Galicia or other territorial compensation corresponding in value. Napoleon needed these two alliances, with Prussia and Austria, not so much to replenish the great army, but to divert part of the Russian forces north and south of that direct Kovno road - Vilna - Vitebsk - Smolensk - Moscow, along which his offensive was to be directed. Prussia undertook to put 20 thousand people at the disposal of Napoleon for the upcoming war, Austria - 30 thousand people. Moreover, Prussia pledged to provide Napoleon for his army (to pay off part of its unpaid debts to the French emperor, from which Prussia could not get out) 20 million kilograms of rye, 40 million kilograms of wheat, more than 40 thousand bulls, 70 million bottles of alcoholic beverages. Diplomatic preparations for the war were already completed in early spring. There is information that a bad harvest in 1811 led to famine in some parts of France at the end of winter and in the spring of 1812, that in some places in the countryside there were disturbances on this basis, and in some places they were expected, and there are indications that this delayed Napoleon's campaign for one and a half to two months. Buying and speculating in bread increased anxiety and irritation in the countryside, and this turbulent situation also slowed down Napoleon's performance. Napoleon was forced to organize special flying detachments that were supposed to hunt through the forests for deviators and forcibly bring them to military units. As a result of repressive measures, recruiting before the war of 1812, in general, gave everything that Napoleon was counting on. Military and diplomatic preparations by the end of the spring of 1812 were basically and partly completed by Napoleon. All vassal Europe was dutifully ready to oppose Russia.

Chandler D. Napoleon's military campaigns. M.: Tsentropoligraf, 1999.

Aksenova M., Ismailova S. World History - T.I, - M .: Avanta +, 1993 - P 222.

Introduction

Chapter I. Biography of Emperors

Biography of Alexander I Napoleon Bonaparte

Chapter II. The policy of the emperors and their military actions

Reforms of Alexander I

Domestic policy of Napoleon

Relations between Russia and France

Patriotic War of 1812

Napoleon commander

Alexander I commander

Chapter I. Biography of Emperors Alexander I and Napoleon Bonaparte

Biography of Alexander I

Alexander I Pavlovich (December 12 (23), 1777 - November 19 (December 1), 1825) - Emperor of All Russia (from March 11 (23), 1801), the eldest son of Emperor Paul I and Maria Feodorovna. Alexander I Pavlovich - Russian Tsar. He issued a decree on free cultivators, opened gymnasiums, county schools, founded pedagogical institutes, opened universities in Kazan and Kharkov. Established the State Council and ministries. Victoriously ended the war with Napoleon, solemnly entering Paris. He was buried in St. Petersburg in the Peter and Paul Cathedral on March 18, 1826.

On the night of March 11-12, 1801, the conspirators entered the undefended Mikhailovsky Castle and demanded the emperor's abdication. But Paul I refused and was killed. The sons of Paul were so confused that night that the St. Petersburg Governor-General, Count Palen, had to take the eldest, Alexander, by the shoulders and tell him: “Sir, it’s enough to be a child, go reign.” The new king was not yet 24 years old. He was a young man of above average height, slightly stooped, reddish blond with a smile on his perfectly shaped lips and sad eyes. Even men admired the grandson of Catherine II, and women were ready to adore the crowned handsome man. Alexander Pavlovich used to get along with the same immediacy in the Catherine's kingdom and in the Pavlovsk. He learned to admire "the rights of man and citizen" while deriving the greatest pleasure from marching and yelling at the soldiers. His teacher La Harpe praised the love of freedom, and Alexander took his lessons, but before him was the example of Catherine, freedom-loving and autocratic, and Paul, who was attracted only to the Prussian drill, and these examples inspired him with an unconscious tendency to combine in his heart what usually seems incompatible.

Alexander's family life almost immediately developed unhappily. When he was sixteen years old, Catherine married her grandson to the 14-year-old Princess Louise-Maria-August of Baden, who was named Elizabeth when she converted to Orthodoxy. He was handsome, she was charming, delicate and fragile, and there was something airy, elusive in her appearance. Shyness, self-doubt combined in her with great spiritual receptivity. She was smart, though somewhat superficial, and her mindset, and indeed her whole character, was colored by dreaminess, romanticism. From a young age she was looking for some kind of truth and at the same time, as if afraid to touch the truth, she loved her inner world that she created for herself. In a word, the future Empress Elizaveta Alekseevna was, like her husband, a rather complex and not quite stable nature. But it happened, however, that they did not approach each other at all. Elizabeth, the young Grand Duchess, thoughtful and passionate, needed love, needed tenderness and outpourings of a close heart. Her husband did not pay attention to her, returning from Gatchina, where a soldier drilled with his father, so tired that he could hardly stand on his feet, and, having slept, again hurried to the guardhouse. From a young age, Alexander Pavlovich sought oblivion in women, rest from the doubts and contradictions that tormented his soul. Maria Antonovna Naryshkina, born Princess Svyatopolk-Chetvertinskaya, was his greatest passion.

About Alexander Pavlovich - Don Juan - can be judged exhaustively from the reports of informants of the Vienna police during the time when the congress was in session, that very famous congress at which the Russian emperor, in very difficult circumstances, was destined to once again stubbornly and brilliantly defend the interests of Russia. He is the liberator of Europe, he is the first among monarchs, there is no one in the world who would be more powerful than him. Alexander Pavlovich liked to show off, but usually he was a stranger to pomp, because his very famous elegance was just the one that was impeccable because it never caught the eye. In Vienna, it became clear to him that at the moment when European diplomacy was trying to reduce his strength, it was necessary for him to dazzle with his splendor the capital of the heirs of the Caesars. After all, he is their heir: such is the will of the ancestors of his Muscovite tsars. The balls he gave, receptions, solemn ceremonies were more magnificent than the Austrian ones. To outshine everyone - such was the desire of a worthy grandson of Catherine. In Vienna, he decided to outshine everyone in love. However, his Viennese adventures are a consequence of the fact that by that time big politics had already brought him a lot of disappointment. So, Alexander Pavlovich spent his time in Vienna as if very carelessly. It would, however, be completely erroneous to believe that amorous entertainment, even in the least, prevented him from fulfilling his duties. He actually headed the Russian delegation at the congress: he was in charge foreign policy Russia, impressing with its perseverance and knowledge of the matter to all other monarchs who preferred to avoid direct participation in diplomatic strife.

The sudden death of Paul frightened Alexander for the rest of his life. The memory of this death tormented him so much throughout his life that at one time many were convinced that this death could not have happened without the participation of Alexander. Alexander found salvation from these terrible memories in religious mysticism. And while Alexander gave himself up to religion, the government was entirely left to his favorites, in particular, Arakcheev. Worst of all, this same Arakcheev was not at all an independent person, but a puppet in the hands of his many mistresses, before whom, however, the highest-ranking officials of the empire were humiliated.

Ten years have passed. In the last period of his reign, before his mysterious departure to Taganrog, Emperor Alexander Pavlovich often asked himself what he had achieved, what had he accomplished? He increased the size of his empire, the population increased by twelve million souls, he led his people across Europe from end to end and broke the power of Napoleon, but what, besides glory and new lands, did he give Russia? Sadness probably seized him when he remembered that he was going to free the peasants, and almost two and a half decades after his accession to the throne, he did not do anything decisive for this - and knew that he could no longer do it.

People's rumor gave rise to rumors after his death in Taganrog in 1825 that the monarch did not die; instead of himself, he buried someone else, and he himself went to Siberia, where he led the life of a wanderer and died at a ripe old age.

Biography of Napoleon Bonaparte

French emperor (August 15, 1769 - May 5, 1821), from the Bonaparte dynasty. A native of Corsica. He began serving in the army with the rank of junior lieutenant of artillery; advanced during the French Revolution and under the Directory. In November 1799, he carried out a coup d'état, as a result of which he became the first consul, who actually concentrated all power in his hands; in 1804 he was proclaimed emperor. He established a dictatorial regime that met the interests of the French bourgeoisie. Thanks to victorious wars, he significantly expanded the territory of the empire, but the defeat in the war of 1812 against Russia marked the beginning of the collapse of the empire. After the troops of the anti-French coalition entered Paris, he abdicated. He was exiled to the island of Elba. He again occupied the French throne, but after the defeat at Waterloo he abdicated a second time. He spent the last years of his life on the island of St. Helena as a prisoner of the British.

Napoleon adored women. For their sake, he put things aside, forgot about his grandiose plans, soldiers and marshals. He spent billions to attract women, wrote thousands of love letters to seduce them. In his youth, Napoleon's love was reduced either to flirting, which had no consequences, or to banal adventures. With the exception of the young wife of the people's representative of the Convention, Madame Turrot, who herself threw herself on his neck, the other women did not pay any attention to the small, thin, pale and badly dressed officer.

Bonaparte gave the order to disarm the Parisians. A boy came to his headquarters with a request to be allowed to keep his sword in memory of his father. Bonaparte allows, and soon the boy's mother came to visit him to thank the general for his mercy. For the first time he was face to face with a noble lady, a former viscountess, elegant and seductive. A few days later, Bonaparte paid a return visit to the Vicomtesse de Beauharnais. She lived very modestly, but Bonaparte saw in her a beautiful woman. Fifteen days after the first visit, Napoleon and Josephine became close. He passionately fell in love. Bonaparte begs her to marry him. And she made up her mind. On March 9, 1796, the wedding took place. Two days later, General Bonaparte went to the Italian army, Madame Bonaparte remained in Paris. He sent her letters from every post station. He won six victories in fifteen days, but all this time the fever tormented him, the cough exhausted the body. Going to Egypt, Bonaparte agreed with Josephine that as soon as he conquered this country, his wife would come to him. But already on the way, anxiety seized him. He began to suspect her, asked friends whom he trusted about his wife. As soon as Bonaparte's eyes were opened, as soon as the illusions dissipated, he began to think about divorce.

Meanwhile, returning to France, Napoleon, greeted with enthusiasm by the people, really had firm intentions to break with Josephine. But this woman, having soberly weighed her situation, realized that a break with Bonaparte would deprive her of everything. And for almost a day she sought a meeting with him, sobbing at his door. When her children joined her, he gave in and let her in. Bonaparte forgave Josephine completely and generously, but drew his own conclusions: his wife should never be alone with another man. He paid all her debts - more than two million, and Madame Bonaparte understood that such generosity and position in society, bestowed on her by her husband, were worth it to behave impeccably, and henceforth she behaved like that.

As the power of Bonaparte increased, the number of petitioners and ambitious intriguers became more and more, all of them cannot be counted. In the decade between 1800 and 1810, Napoleon was at the height of his fame, his mental and physical strength, and his masculine temperament. He did not seek love adventures, but he did not avoid them either. He took what was at hand. At the same time, not a single woman interfered with his work, did not distract him from important thoughts, did not violate his plans. No preparatory steps were taken on his part, no hassle, no anxiety. As Napoleon rose, his wife's prestige in the world fell. Any carelessness on her part, a flash of the emperor's anger - and she could lose everything. After one of the ugly scenes of jealousy, Bonaparte announced to her that he intended to get a divorce. Josephine spent two days in tears, and the great Napoleon yielded to the weeping woman. He told her to prepare for the coronation. With the help of the Pope, she persuaded him to marry. And now Josephine, the empress, is married by a priest, and she is crowned emperor.

Having decided to divorce Josephine, Bonaparte could not take this step for a long time. Napoleon announced a divorce, and Josephine's tears and fainting no longer helped. She achieved only that he retained for her the Elysee Palace, Malmaison, the Navarre castle, three million a year, the title, coats of arms, security, escort. After the divorce, he was constantly interested in her, but met her only in public, as if he was afraid that this most unshakable, most powerful and blind love would flare up in him again with the same strength.

Napoleon was looking for a bride of royal blood. The Austrian Emperor himself offered him his eldest daughter Marie-Louise as his wife. This marriage satisfied his vanity, it seemed to him that, having become related to the Austrian monarchy, he would become on a par with them. March 11, 1810 in Vienna, in the Cathedral of St. Stefan, the marriage ceremony took place. On March 13, Marie Louise said goodbye to her family and left for France. Bonaparte himself ordered linen, negligees, bonnets, dresses, shawls, lace, shoes, boots, incredibly expensive and beautiful jewelry for her. He himself oversaw the decoration of apartments for his royal wife. Was looking forward to it. Napoleon saw his wife only in a portrait. She had blond hair, beautiful blue eyes, and pale pink cheeks. She was densely built, she did not differ in grace, but she had undoubted health - this was important for a woman preparing to become the mother of Napoleon's heir. Marie Louise gave birth to Napoleon's heir, Eugene, but unwittingly becomes the bait with which the old European monarchical aristocracy tried to trap him. He solemnly proclaimed Marie-Louise Regent of the Empire. But the empire collapsed. Napoleon was in exile. He made a desperate attempt to regain power. On March 1, 1815, he set foot on French soil. His return was greeted with enthusiasm by the Parisians. But the thought of Marie-Louise haunted Bonaparte. In vain did he send his people to Vienna, in vain did he write letters to his wife. Marie Louise never visited him.

Napoleon's star was rapidly setting. The Allies defeated the French at the Battle of Waterloo. The Emperor abdicated for the second time. On August 7, 1815, the frigate Northumberland with Napoleon and his retinue on board left Plymouth and headed for St. Helena, where he was to spend the last years of his stormy life.

In the spring of 1821, the mysterious illness from which the emperor suffered worsened. Napoleon died on May 5, 1821.

Chapter II The policy of the emperors and their military actions

Reforms of Alexander I.

In the mid-90s, a small circle of like-minded people formed around Alexander. They were V.P. Kochubey, Prince A.A. Czartoryski, Count A.S. Stroganov, N.N. Novosiltsev is Stroganov's cousin. In this circle of "young friends" the vices of Pavlov's reign were discussed and plans for the future were made.

Control over the activities of the monarch, the creation of a mechanism that protects against despotic tendencies, met Alexander's convictions, and therefore, on April 5, 1801, a decree appeared on the creation of an Indispensable Council - a legislative advisory body under the sovereign. Council members were given the opportunity to monitor the activities of the monarch and, in essence, protest those actions or decrees of the emperor with which they did not agree. Initially, the Council consisted of 12 people, mostly heads of the most important state institutions.

Alexander saw the main goal of the changes in the creation of a constitution that would guarantee his subjects the rights of a citizen. Meanwhile, without waiting for the reform plan to be created, in May 1801. Alexander submitted to the Permanent Council a draft decree prohibiting the sale of serfs without land. According to the emperor, this decree was to be the first step towards the elimination of serfdom. It was followed by the next one - permission to purchase inhabited lands to non-nobles with the condition that the peasants living on these lands would become free. When a certain number of free peasants would appear as a result, it was planned to extend a similar procedure for selling land to the nobles. The most important consequence of Alexander's failure in trying to solve the peasant problem was the final transfer of the preparation of reforms to the circle of "young friends", and he agreed with their opinion that this work should be carried out in secret so as not to cause peasant unrest, constantly arising from the spread of rumors about changing laws. So the Unspoken Committee was created, which included Stroganov,

Kochubey, Czartorysky, Novosiltsev, and later Count A.R. Vorontsov.

As for the official Indispensable Council, the real result of the first months of its work was the project of the Most Merciful Letter Russian people Complained", which was supposed to be published on the day of the coronation of the emperor on September 15, 1801. The letter was supposed to reaffirm all the privileges of the nobility, philistinism and merchants, indicated in the Letters of Complaint of 1785, as well as the rights and guarantees of private property, personal security, freedom of speech, press and conscience common to all inhabitants of the country. A special article of the charter guaranteed the inviolability of these rights.

Another project prepared for the coronation was that of reorganizing the Senate. The Senate was to become the body of the supreme leadership of the country, combining the executive, judicial, control and legislative functions.

In September 1802, a series of decrees created a system of eight ministries: Military, Naval, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Commerce, Finance, Public Education and Justice, as well as the State Treasury as a ministry. The ministers and chief executives, as ministers, formed the Committee of Ministers, in which each of them undertook to submit for discussion their most submissive reports to the emperor. Simultaneously with the creation of the ministries, the Senate reform was also carried out. Decree on the rights of the Senate, he was defined as "the supreme seat of the empire", whose power was limited only by the power of the emperor. Ministers had to submit annual reports to the Senate, which he could protest before the sovereign.

February 20, 1803 issued a decree on free cultivators. In fact, a new social category of free cultivators was created, owning land by the right of private property.

Along with attempts to resolve the most important issues of Russian life, the government of Alexander I carried out major reforms in the sphere of public education. January 24, 1803 the king approved a new provision on the device educational institutions. The territory of Russia was divided into six educational districts, in which four categories of educational institutions were created: parish, district, provincial schools, as well as gymnasiums and universities. The first stage of the reforms of Alexander I ended in 1803, when it became clear that it was necessary to look for new ways and forms of their implementation.

1809-1812 This stage is associated with the activities of Speransky. According to his project, it was supposed:

Implement the principle of separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial;

Create a system of representative institutions - elected volost, district, provincial dumas, which would be crowned by the State Duma, the country's highest legislative body;

Transfer the functions of the highest judicial authority to the Senate;

To clarify the functions and procedures for the activities of the ministries, to strengthen their responsibility as the highest bodies of executive power;

Establish a State Council - an advisory body under the emperor, a link between the monarch and the legislative, executive, judicial bodies of the empire;

The emperor retained full executive power, he had the exclusive right to initiate legislation, could dissolve the State Duma, and appoint members of the State Council;

Divide the entire population of Russia into three estates: the nobility, the "average condition", "the working people". All estates acquired civil rights, and the first two - political rights.

The question of the abolition of serfdom was not considered, the reform was supposed to be completed by 1811. Of the measures proposed by Speransky, one was implemented - in 1810 the State Council was created.

In 1818, the tsar instructed N.N. Novosiltsev to develop a constitution for its introduction in Russia. By 1820, the Charter of the Russian Empire was ready. According to this project, Russia became a federation, introduced civil rights and freedoms and limited popular representation. A constitutional monarchy was established.

In 1818, Alexander I was submitted to the draft of the abolition of serfdom prepared on his behalf. It was developed by the closest associate of the last decade of his reign, A.A. Arakcheev.

Both projects remained secret; Alexander I did not even begin to implement them. In 1820-1821. the reactionary course, usually called Arakcheevism, triumphed. The reform plans were over. The landlords were confirmed the right to exile peasants to Siberia. The military settlements created in 1815-1819 expanded. The settlers had to combine military service with agricultural labor. The drill on the parade ground was supplemented by the petty supervision of the chiefs who monitored the plowing and sowing. Military settlements became a kind of symbol of the last period of the reign of Alexander I.

Post-war reforms of Alexander I

Having strengthened his authority as a result of the victory over the French, Alexander I made another series of reform attempts in the domestic politics of the post-war period. As early as 1809, the Grand Duchy of Finland was created, which essentially became an autonomy with its own diet, without whose consent the tsar could not change legislation and introduce new taxes, and a senate. In May 1815, Alexander announced the granting of a constitution to the Kingdom of Poland, which provided for the creation of a bicameral Sejm, a system of local self-government, and freedom of the press.

In 1817-1818, a number of people close to the emperor were engaged, on his orders, in developing projects for the phased elimination of serfdom in Russia. In 1818, Alexander I gave the task to N. N. Novosiltsev to prepare a draft constitution for Russia. The draft "State charter of the Russian Empire", which provided for the federal structure of the country, was ready by the end of 1820 and approved by the emperor, but its introduction was postponed indefinitely. The tsar complained to his inner circle that he had no assistants and could not find suitable people for governorships. Former ideals more and more seemed to Alexander I only fruitless romantic dreams and illusions, divorced from real political practice. The news of the uprising of the Semyonovsky regiment, which he perceived as a threat of a revolutionary explosion in Russia, had a sobering effect on Alexander, to prevent which it was necessary to take tough measures. However, the dreams of reform did not leave the emperor until 1822-1823.

One of the paradoxes of the domestic policy of Alexander I of the post-war period was the fact that attempts to renew the Russian state were accompanied by the establishment of a police regime, later called "Arakcheevshchina". Military settlements became its symbol, in which Alexander himself, however, saw one of the ways to free the peasants from personal dependence, but which aroused hatred in the widest circles of society. In 1817, instead of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Spiritual Affairs and Public Education was created, headed by the Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod and head of the Bible Society A.N. Golitsyn. Under his leadership, the defeat of Russian universities was actually carried out, cruel censorship reigned. In 1822, Alexander I banned the activities of Masonic lodges and other secret societies in Russia and approved the proposal of the Senate, which allowed landowners to exile their peasants to Siberia for "bad deeds". At the same time, the emperor was aware of the activities of the first Decembrist organizations, but did not take any measures against their members, believing that they shared the delusions of his youth.

Domestic policy of Napoleon

Having become a full-fledged dictator, Napoleon radically changed state structure countries. The emphasis was solely on strengthening the position of Napoleon in politics, that is, personal power, which was the guarantor of consolidating the successes that the revolution had achieved: civil rights, the liberation of peasants from serfdom, and the right to preserve the land of those who managed to buy it during the revolution from those who left the country. The Napoleonic Code, that is, the civil code named after Napoleon, adopted in 1804, was intended to preserve all these achievements.

Napoleon organized the Administrative Reform, which led to the fact that departments and district prefects appeared in France. That is, the administrative division of the French lands has changed significantly. In cities or even villages, from that time there appeared managers - mayors.

A state-owned French bank was established to store gold reserves and issue paper money. Until 1936, no major changes were made to the management system of the French Bank created by Napoleon: the manager and his deputies were appointed by the government, and decisions were made jointly with 15 board members from shareholders - this ensured a balance between public and private interests. On March 28, 1803, paper money was liquidated: the franc, equal to a five-gram silver coin and divided into 100 centimes, became the monetary unit. To centralize the tax collection system, the Directorate of Direct Taxation and the Directorate of Reduced Taxation were created. Having taken over a state with a deplorable financial condition, Napoleon introduced austerity in all areas. The normal functioning of the financial system was ensured by the creation of two opposing and at the same time cooperating ministries: finance and treasury. They were led by the prominent financiers of the time Gaudin and Mollien. The Minister of Finance was responsible for budget revenues, the Minister of the Treasury gave a detailed report on the expenditure of funds, his activities were checked by the Accounts Chamber of 100 civil servants. She controlled the expenditures of the state, but did not pass judgment on their expediency.

The administrative and legal innovations of Napoleon became the foundation for the modern state, many of them work to this day. Just at that time, the education system was updated: secondary schools appeared - lyceums, and universities - the so-called Polytechnic School and Normal School. Incidentally, these are still learning structures are the most prestigious literally throughout France. Printing also expected impressive changes. More than 90% of newspapers were closed, as Napoleon was aware of how dangerous and effective newspapers are in terms of influencing people's minds. A powerful police force and an extensive secret service were created. The church, too, was completely subject to the jurisdiction and control of the government and the emperor.

These and other measures forced Napoleon's opponents to declare him a traitor to the Revolution, although he considered himself a faithful successor to its ideas. The truth is that he managed to consolidate some revolutionary gains, but decisively dissociated himself from the principle of freedom.

Relations between Russia and France

Alexander I considered Napoleon a symbol of trampling on the legality of the world order. But the Russian emperor overestimated his capabilities, which led to the disaster near Austerlitz in November 1805, and the presence of the emperor in the army, his inept orders had the most disastrous consequences. Alexander refused to ratify the peace treaty signed in June 1806 with France, and only the defeat near Friedland in May 1807 forced the Russian emperor to agree to an agreement. At his first meeting with Napoleon in Tilsit in June 1807, Alexander I managed to prove himself an outstanding diplomat. An alliance and an agreement on the division of zones of influence was concluded between Russia and France. As the further development of events showed, the Tilsit agreement turned out to be more beneficial for Russia, allowing it to accumulate forces. Napoleon sincerely considered Russia his only possible ally in Europe. In 1808, the parties discussed plans for a joint campaign against India and the division of the Ottoman Empire. At a meeting with Alexander I in Erfurt, Napoleon recognized Russia's right to Finland captured during the Russo-Swedish War, and Russia recognized France's right to Spain. However, already at this time, relations between the allies began to heat up due to the imperial interests of both sides. Thus, Russia was not satisfied with the existence of the Duchy of Warsaw, the continental blockade harmed the Russian economy, and in the Balkans, each of the two countries had their own far-reaching plans. In 1810, Alexander I refused Napoleon, who asked for the hand of his sister, Grand Duchess Anna Pavlovna, and signed a provision on neutral trade, which effectively nullified the continental blockade. There is an assumption that Alexander I was going to deliver a preemptive strike to Napoleon, but after France concluded allied treaties with Austria and Prussia, Russia began to prepare for a defensive war. On June 12, 1812, French troops crossed Russian border. The Patriotic War of 1812 began.

Patriotic War of 1812

The invasion of the Napoleonic armies into Russia was perceived by Alexander not only as the greatest threat to Russia, but also as a personal insult, and Napoleon himself became from now on a mortal personal enemy for him. Not wanting to repeat the experience of Austerlitz and, submitting to the pressure of his entourage, Alexander left the army and returned to St. Petersburg. During the entire time that Barclay de Tolly carried out a retreat, which provoked sharp criticism from both society and the army, Alexander almost did not show his solidarity with the commander. After Smolensk was abandoned, the emperor gave in to the general demands and appointed M.I. Kutuzov. With the expulsion of the Napoleonic troops from Russia, Alexander returned to the army and was in it during the foreign campaigns of 1813-1814.

The victory over Napoleon strengthened the authority of Alexander I, he became one of the most powerful rulers of Europe, who felt like a liberator of its peoples, who was entrusted with a special mission determined by God's will to prevent further wars and devastation on the continent. He also considered the tranquility of Europe a necessary condition for the realization of his reformist plans in Russia itself. To ensure these conditions, it was necessary to maintain the status quo, determined by the decisions of the Congress of Vienna, according to which the territory of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was ceded to Russia, and the monarchy was restored in France, and Alexander insisted on the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in this country, which should have served as a precedent to establish similar regimes in other countries. The Russian emperor, in particular, managed to enlist the support of his allies for his idea of ​​introducing a constitution in Poland. As a guarantor of compliance with the decisions of the Congress of Vienna, the emperor initiated the creation of the Holy Alliance on September 14, 1815. Alexander I directly participated in the activities of the congresses of the Holy Alliance in Aachen September-November 1818, Troppau and Laibach October-December 1820-January 1821, Verona October-December 1822. However, the strengthening of Russian influence in Europe provoked opposition from the allies. In 1825 the Holy Alliance essentially collapsed.

Chapter III Comparison of two emperors with each other

Napoleon commander

Napoleon was an unsurpassed commander-improviser. He carried out his main military thesis: “to achieve a decisive advantage in the most necessary place” in all battles from the beginning of his military career. Irrationality, spontaneity and exceptional abilities for a structural, holistic spatial assessment of the situation Napoleon directed to short-term operations. The exceptional force of influence on the army and the advantage of the spirit of confidence could always be opposed to the superior number of enemy troops. In battles, he used a covert and sudden strike by attacking forces in that place and at a time where and when the enemy was not waiting for him. How to catch the right moment and how to determine the right place of attack, when cannons rumble, volleys of guns pour into their discordant roar, death and war cries are heard from everywhere? The factors of genius manifest themselves precisely in this reality. In the long-term war that he had to fight in Russia, Napoleon could not realize his military talent and lost the war, in fact, without losing specific battles. On the Berezina, using lightning speed and a structural vision of the situation, Napoleon, having deceived Chichagov, left an absolutely hopeless situation. Like Alexander the Great, Napoleon instilled unshakable confidence in the victory of his troops. This confidence was passed from marshal to marshal, from hussar to hussar, from corporal to corporal, from soldier to soldier - all were embraced by a single impulse of battle. Napoleon's entire attacking army acted as a single, coordinated human mechanism for the destruction of the enemy's force. Napoleon was cruel, that cruelty of any commander, when huge human sacrifices are made to sacrifice the goal. Encouraged by the magic of the commander, they marched in close ranks under continuous fire from the enemy, buckshot and bullets mowed down entire ranks, but, despising death, they again went forward.

In a brilliant commander, the images-structures of battles and campaigns are in periodic tension, because they are aimed at further development and are just waiting for this opportune moment. This is analogous to the same processes in the mind that are characteristic of geniuses. The semantic structures imprinted in the brain experience mental stress. Gaps and deformations associated with uncertainty appear in them. But the brilliant commanders during the battle, the excitement of the whole nervous system exceptionally strong, the force of influence of this mental focus is great and the influence of the personality itself is great. This psychic energy, this flow of confidence in victory, fascinates and hypnotizes the army. Throughout his military career, a special mental filter formed in the mind of Napoleon as a commander. The action of this filter suppresses one image of the battle, along with its fears and thirst for destruction, and enhances the other. Thanks to this mental filter, the entire war experience is imprinted in the memory. Covering the battle area with a single glance, the commander was inspired by future sensations. In these future sensations with insights, outbursts of emotions and inspiration, he saw his goal.

Alexander I commander

Alexander I cannot be called a brilliant ruler or commander. He won the Patriotic War thanks to the military genius of Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov. Also, a huge contribution to the victory of Russia over Napoleon was made by: Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly, Bagration Pyotr Ivanovich, Denis Vasilyevich Davydov, Alexei Petrovich Ermolov, Mikhail Andreevich Miloradovich.

What do Alexander and Napoleon have in common?

Alexander and Napoleon are contemporaries, from 1807 to 1811 - allies, almost intermarried, and before and after that, mortal enemies who invaded each other's capitals.

The scale of Alexander's personality and domestic and foreign historians are assessed low. It seems that this whole series of assessments is underestimated, it is necessary to judge Alexander by a whole octave higher, as A.Z. did. Manfred in a book about Napoleon: "Among the monarchs of the Romanov dynasties, not counting Peter I, Alexander I was, apparently, the most intelligent and skillful politician." Napoleon himself was inclined to this opinion, who, although he said about Alexander that “in everything and always he lacks something and what he lacks changes indefinitely”, he nevertheless concluded his statements about him on the island of St. Helena: "This is undoubtedly the most capable of all reigning monarchs." It is the comparison with Napoleon that prompts historians to underestimate Alexander, a comparison that Alexander, of course, does not stand up to. Even the official biographer of the tsar, his great-nephew, Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich was forced to admit: “As the ruler of a vast state, thanks to the genius of first his ally, and then the enemy, Napoleon, he will forever occupy a special position in the history of Europe at the beginning of the 19th century, having also received from the imaginary friendship and rivalry with Napoleon is the inspiration that is a necessary attribute of a great monarch. His appearance became, as it were, an addition to the image of Napoleon. The genius of Napoleon was reflected, as on water, on him and gave him the importance that he would not have had it not for this reflection.

With all the polarity of opinions of contemporaries and descendants about the individual qualities of Napoleon, almost all of them, with rare unanimity, recognized the unique scale of his personality as a genius and colossus. All of them put Bonaparte in the first rank of the greatest military leaders of the world and, in general, the most important figures in the history of mankind, seeing in him the most characteristic example of a "genius man" (Chernyshevsky) and even being carried away by him to such exaggerations as: "unprecedented genius" (Hegel), “the best offspring of the Earth” (Byron), “a deity from head to toe” (Heine), etc. The main historical merit of Napoleon is one of his Russian biographers N.A. Solovyov defined it this way: born of "revolutionary chaos", he "ordered this chaos." Indeed, having pacified the revolution, Napoleon preserved and clothed in legal norms its most important achievements: the abolition of feudal restrictions, the freedom to develop capitalist production, and the civil equality of the population. Moreover, he spread these conquests from France throughout Europe. Invading foreign countries, ruining them with indemnities, Bonaparte destroyed the feudal junk in them - he destroyed medieval regimes, abolished noble and church privileges, freed the peasants from the fetters of serfdom, introduced his own Civil Code.

The tragedy of Napoleon lay in the fact that he imposed his advanced laws and regulations on backward peoples by force. Having conquered Europe and benefiting it with his transformations, he turned it all against him. Since 1808, when Napoleon was forced to fight with numerous opponents, and especially since 1812, when he died in Russia " Grand Army", he was historically doomed.

In conclusion, it should be noted that there are similarities between Napoleon and Alexander: accession to the throne through coups; unhappy family life; many love stories. But the difference is that Napoleon was a more talented commander than Alexander. The historical role of Alexander I would have been played in his place by any of his many allies and associates, but only he alone could play the role of Napoleon.

List of used literature

1. Aksenova M., Ismailova S. World History - T.I, - M .: Avanta +, 1993 -618 p.

2. Chandler D. Napoleon's military campaigns. M.: Tsentropoligraf, 1999.

3. Tarle E.V. Napoleon. - M.: Gosizdat, 1941. - 562 p.

4. The work of N.A. Troitsky Alexander I and Napoleon M., 1994.

5. Sakharov A.N. Alexander I // Russian autocrats (1801-1917) . M., 1993.

6. Vandal A. Napoleon and Alexander I. Rostov-on-Don, 1995. T. 1-3.

About historical personalities, equipped with illustrations, portraits. The presented material helps students to create an idea about the era, about the life of historical figures of the past. CHAPTER 11. METHODS OF STUDYING PERSONALIES IN THE LESSONS OF THE HISTORY OF RUSSIA (GRADE 8) § 1 Results of the ascertaining experiment Pedagogical research took place in three stages. Each stage had its own goals and ...

About the fear of him) exiles... If he died the death of a warrior, and not the death of a pensioner - from an incomprehensible, long-term illness, which one would so much like to explain for the sake of completeness by the machinations of enemies. Chapter 2. Napoleon as the idol of generations The entire nineteenth century is permeated with echoes of the Napoleonic myth. Napoleon is the man of the century: he shook the imagination of several generations. To him - to his glory and destiny, ...

To war. Italy at that time was under Austrian rule. Like other European monarchical states, Austria waged military operations against revolutionary France. Napoleon Bonaparte was opposed by the Austrian army, which was four times larger than the French, was well armed, supported from the sea by an English squadron under the command of the famous admiral ...

The rest of the allies sent Napoleon to St. Helena (in the southern part Atlantic Ocean). Here he died in May 1821. After the second reign of Napoleon, which went down in history under the name "Hundred Days", the Bourbons again established themselves in France. 12. Convocation of the Vienna Congress. Final act. Creation of the Holy Alliance. Soon after the victory over Napoleon, representatives of all ...

LECTURE VII

The second period of the reign of Alexander (1805–1807). – The international position of Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. - The break with Napoleon. - Czartoryski's plans and Alexander's attitude towards the Poles in 1805 - Unsuccessful outcome of the 1805 campaign - War of 1806-1807 - Defeat of Prussia. - Emergency preparations for war with Napoleon in Russia, - Winter campaign of 1807 - Depletion of Russia's military means. - Peace of Tilsit. - Alliance with Napoleon. – Acute discontent in Russia caused by the Treaty of Tilsit and its consequences. – Manifestations and nature of the opposition mood in society.

Russia and Napoleon at the beginning of the reign of Alexander I

Turning to the consideration of the second period of the reign of Alexander, marked by the first two wars with Napoleon, it should be said that those relations that led to the war of 1805 began to take shape long before that.

At the time of Paul's death, a war was coming with England, and the English fleet was already on its way to bombard Kronstadt. Immediately after the accession of Alexander, peace was concluded with England, and those controversial issues of maritime law, which for quite a long time harmed the peaceful relations of Russia and other powers with England, were also resolved. Although all the sympathies of Alexander himself in his youth were on the side of France, nevertheless he submitted, as we have seen, to the pressure that was exerted on him by those around him, in favor of an alliance with England. At the very first meetings of the secret committee, it was decided in principle not to interfere in any internal affairs of foreign states, and although a suspicious attitude was established towards France due to the ambitious plans of Bonaparte, peaceful principles prevailed in external affairs. Russia, therefore, in the first years of Alexander's reign was freed from all external confusions and wars, and this was in full accordance with Alexander's own intentions to turn all his attention to internal affairs. These peace-loving relations were not then limited to Western Europe, but also extended to the eastern outskirts, so that when Georgia, fleeing the onslaught of Persia, asked to be annexed to Russia, this issue, too, was initially resolved in the unspoken committee in the negative, and only in view of the insistence of the Indispensable Council, Alexander resolved this issue in the opposite sense, and, however, ordered that all income received from the population of Georgia annexed to Russia go to local needs and that Georgia be governed according to local customs. Unfortunately, these good intentions and instructions of the young sovereign did not prevent the unsuccessful representatives of the Russian authorities in Georgia - Knorring and Kovalensky - within a few months to excite the entire public opinion of Georgia against Russia with their outrageous abuses and violence.

Relations with Napoleon, which had developed quite favorably in the first months of Alexander's reign and were secured by a peace treaty concluded in the autumn of 1801, began to deteriorate already from the end of 1801 - partly due to the hostile attitude towards Napoleon, which was taken up by our new ambassador in Paris - the arrogant c. Morkov, partly because of the Sardinian king, whom Napoleon wanted, contrary to the treaty concluded with Russia, to be wiped off the face of the earth, and Alexander considered himself obliged to protect as an old ally of Russia. In addition, Alexander himself became more and more inclined to think that it was necessary to limit the ambitious aspirations of Bonaparte, and from 1802 he gradually became convinced that sooner or later Napoleon would have to be curbed by an armed hand. At the same time, having become more familiar with international relations and personally entering into relations with representatives of foreign powers in St. propensity for direct diplomatic negotiations. He was apparently fascinated by the very technique of diplomatic relations. One can think, however, that even then he was guided by a vague desire to subsequently liberate Europe from the growing despotism and boundless lust for power of Napoleon.

In spite of the warnings and forebodings of his co-workers, as early as the spring of 1802 Alexander decided to take an active part in the affairs of Europe and, for a start, arranged a meeting with the Prussian king in Memel. In the same year, 1802, he had to be finally convinced of the rudeness and vulgarity of Napoleon's ambition, when he, having made a new coup d'état, declared himself consul for life. “The veil has fallen,” Alexander wrote to La Harpe at the time, “he, that is, Napoleon, himself deprived himself of the best glory that a mortal can achieve and which he had to acquire, the glory of proving that he, without any personal views, worked solely for the good and the glory of his fatherland, and, being faithful to the constitution to which he himself swore, lay down in ten years the power that was in his hands. Instead, he preferred to imitate the courts, while violating the constitution of his country. From now on, this is the most famous of the tyrants that we find in history.

At the same time, the rights of the Sardinian king, whose possessions were annexed to France, were finally violated. In 1803, after the renewal of the war with England, Napoleon captured Hanover and clearly threatened to become the arbiter of the fate of Central Europe. Napoleon's personal relationship with Count Carrot so deteriorated that Napoleon demanded a change in the Russian ambassador. But Alexander did not immediately go towards this desire, and then, recalling Morkov, defiantly awarded him the highest Russian order of St. Andrew the First-Called, in which Morkov appeared to bow to Napoleon.

In Paris, the Russian emperor did not appoint an ambassador at all, but temporarily entrusted the management of the affairs of the embassy to a minor official, Ubri. The proclamation of Napoleon as emperor and the murder of the Duke of Enghien that preceded this served as the last reason for the break.

Third coalition

From all the above, it is clear that the interests of Russia in this whole story were, in essence, nothing to do with it: in this whole affair, Alexander acted not as a representative of Russian state interests proper, but as the head of one of the great European powers. Having broken with Napoleon, he actively began to draw up a coalition against him.

The management of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at this time, after the retirement of Chancellor Count A.R. Vorontsov, whom Alexander disliked, was in the hands of Prince. Adam Czartoryski. Czartoryski was very sympathetic to the idea of ​​a coalition against Napoleon, he dreamed that one of the results of the war could be the restoration of Poland. He tried to convince Alexander that one armed force against Napoleon was not enough, that it was necessary, in view of his extraordinary genius and the prestige of invincibility, to arouse special enthusiasm in the peoples of Europe in the fight against him. As an idea that could create such enthusiasm, Czartoryski put forward the principle of restoring the trampled independence of nationalities, hoping that this would also lead to the restoration of the Polish nationality. Alexander, apparently, agreed with such a formulation of the question, although, in the mouth of Czartoryski, the restoration of Polish nationality meant the rejection from Russia of such primordial Russian regions as Volhynia and Podolia, for Czartoryski dreamed of restoring Poland within the borders of 1772. With such a formulation of the question, the war against Napoleon in 1805 not only was not aroused by Russian interests, but even threatened to further complicate Russia with a new struggle for territory, a struggle that in past centuries determined all her backwardness and savagery. Pretending to share all the views of Czartoryski, Alexander took advantage, however in a very peculiar way, of the hopes of the Polish patriots. He encouraged them in every possible way, although he did not bind himself with definite promises, mainly, as one can now think, in order to force the wavering Prussian king to join the coalition against Napoleon and conclude an alliance with Russia by the threat of a Polish uprising in the regions of Prussian Poland; and as soon as he managed to force Friedrich Wilhelm to conclude a convention with him (which was later not even carried out), he abandoned all encouragement for the kindled hopes of the Poles and postponed the solution of the Polish question indefinitely. By this careless and incorrect behavior, he caused great disappointment in the Poles and pushed them into the arms of Napoleon, which the latter did not fail to take advantage of soon. In 1805, the war was thus decided, and the Russian people had to put up a sufficient armed force, since on the continent of Europe only Austrian and Russian troops actually opposed Napoleon. In order to muster this force, it took three consecutive recruitment sets, and up to 150 thousand people were recruited. recruits (10 recruits for every thousand male souls, but since recruits were then taken from persons aged 20 to 35 years, the ratio of the number of recruits to the size of this population group was already 10:225). Moreover, it was necessary to allow a new significant deficit in the budget, which was again covered by a new issue of banknotes.

In this case, Alexander acted like a true autocrat, whom no one could interfere with and who was not responsible to anyone. But it should be noted that Russian public opinion was already so armed against Napoleon that Russia's participation in the war with him almost no one - with the exception of Napoleon's direct admirers, whose number was getting smaller - did not seem inappropriate, and Czartoryski's views were known to few, the people are accustomed to endure without grumbling and much greater hardships.

As you know, the war of 1805 ended unhappily for Russia and Austria, mainly due to the inept conduct of the case by the Austrian generals, and partly due to the inexperience and arrogance of Alexander himself, who forced the Russian commander in chief Kutuzov to act contrary to his convictions, in accordance with the plan of the Austrian armchair strategist, doctrinaire Weyrothera. After the surrender of the Austrian army of Mack at Ulm and the subsequent terrible defeat of the Russian troops in the battle of Austerlitz, given to Napoleon against the will and advice of Kutuzov, the Russian army had to hastily retreat to the Russian borders, and the war ended there. Austria made a humiliating peace at Pressburg; Prussia also concluded with Napoleon at the same time a defensive and offensive treaty.

Nevertheless, Alexander began to prepare for the continuation of the war: the defeat of the Russian troops created a patriotic mood in society, which Alexander kindled by direct appeals to the people. Wanting these appeals to reach the masses of the people, he set in motion a powerful means in the form of appeals from the Holy Synod, which were read in all churches. In these proclamations, Napoleon was declared an enemy of the human race, plotting to declare himself the Messiah and inciting the Jews to destroy the Christian church, and unprecedented blasphemy was attributed to him. Anticipating the transfer of the war to the borders of Russia, Alexander at the same time, regardless of the recruitment, convened a militia, which, according to the initial orders, was supposed to be a mass of 612 thousand warriors. One can imagine what the national economy cost in such preparations for war, accompanied, especially in the western provinces, by exhausting underwater service, with the help of which food and ammunition were brought to the theater of war.

Fourth Coalition

Although Prussia, after the first treaty of alliance with Napoleon, concluded a second treaty, apparently even more lasting, Alexander still did not lose hope of raising her against Napoleon, who kept his troops on German territory, refused to remove them and at the same time did not give his consent to the formation by the Prussian king of the North German Union from the German states not included in the Confederation of the Rhine formed by Napoleon himself. Alexander tried to persuade Friedrich Wilhelm to oppose Napoleon in every possible way, and the break between France and Prussia really did finally occur, moreover, it happened earlier than Alexander expected. Friedrich Wilhelm, as a man of weak character, hesitated for a long time, and then suddenly delivered an ultimatum to Napoleon, suggesting that he immediately remove his troops and not interfere with Prussia from forming a North German alliance, otherwise threatening to break. All this happened so unexpectedly that Alexander did not have time to draw his troops to support Prussia. Napoleon, however, did not even respond to the Prussian ultimatum, but immediately began hostilities and eight days later inflicted a terrible defeat on Prussia at Jena. The main Prussian army here was destroyed and then, after the loss of the second battle of Auerstet, almost the entire Prussian territory was quickly occupied by the French. In the hands of the Prussians, only two fortresses remained in the northeastern corner of the kingdom - Danzig and Konigsberg; behind which Friedrich Wilhelm had to take refuge in the small town of Memel on the Neman near the Russian border. Poland became the theater of operations, and here Napoleon, wanting to oppose the hopes of the Polish population that were placed on Alexander, with his intentions, very cleverly took advantage of the disappointment that Alexander aroused in the Poles with his changeable behavior in 1805, and began to spread rumors that it is he, Napoleon, who intends to restore Poland as a bulwark of Europe against Russia.

The commander of the Russian army was the old field marshal Kamensky, who, having arrived in the army, suddenly went crazy and almost ruined it with his ridiculous orders; but, fortunately, he left without permission, having been in the army for only a week; upon departure, they were ordered to retreat, as best they could, to the borders of Russia. However, the generals decided not to obey him, and Bennigsen, pulling his troops to one point, gave a successful rebuff to the vanguard of the French troops near Pultusk, fifty miles from Warsaw on the other side of the Vistula. At first they thought - and Bennigsen supported this opinion - that there was a battle with Napoleon himself (in fact, the victory was won over the troops of Marshal Lannes, who were in the vanguard of the Napoleonic army). Bennigsen, bypassing his senior rank c. Bukshoevden, was appointed commander in chief. Then, in the battle of Preussish-Eylau (not far from Koenigsberg), one of the bloodiest battles, in which up to 50 thousand people fell. - including 26 thousand from our side - Bennigsen really managed to repel Napoleon himself: both troops remained in their places, and the fact that the battle with such an enemy as Napoleon was not lost greatly supported the spirit of the army. However, after 5 months of inactivity, Napoleon inflicted a decisive defeat on the Russian troops at Friedland (which cost us at least 15 thousand soldiers), after which we could no longer continue the war. There was no hope for reinforcements, except for one infantry division brought by Prince. Lobanov-Rostovsky and consisted entirely of recruits; meanwhile, we had to declare war on Turkey, and therefore part of the troops was needed to reinforce Michelson's army, which occupied Wallachia and Moldavia. As for the militia, in spite of all its enormity, it proved to be completely useless; it could offer great resistance in the event of an enemy invasion of Russia, in a guerrilla war, but untrained and poorly armed warriors were completely unsuitable for a regular war, in an army in the field; however, with the then impassability, they could not even be quickly mobilized.

It was especially difficult to replenish the huge loss in officers and generals; there were few good generals - the best were out of order - as for the officers, there was already a shortage in them before, which forced them to take the most extreme measures - to take, for example, students who were not prepared for military service, and even just nobles, as officers “undersized” if they agreed to undergo some training in the cadet corps in a few months. Thus, we could not fight alone. Meanwhile, it was necessary to act just one way: England participated in the war with subsidies, and they were released rather meagerly (in the amount of 2,200 thousand pounds sterling a year for all its continental allies). Thanks to all this, Alexander had no choice but to start peace negotiations, taking advantage of the fact that Napoleon himself willingly extended the hand of reconciliation, since he, too, was in great difficulty after the bloody battles at Preussisch-Eylau and Friedland.

Peace of Tilsit

A meeting took place between the two emperors on the Neman, in Tilsit. Here, for the first time, Alexander had to show his remarkable diplomatic talent in all its splendor, since Napoleon offered him to negotiate directly, without the participation of ministers, and Alexander willingly agreed to this. At the same time, he had to spend especially a lot of effort to keep Napoleon from the complete destruction of Prussia. Prussia was, however, brought to unprecedented humiliation: she lost half of her territory and from a great power turned for a time into a country dependent on Napoleon, which did not even have the right to maintain an army of more than 42 thousand people; her fortresses, even on the territory returned to her, were occupied by the French for a number of years (until payment of indemnity).

During the negotiations in Tilsit, Napoleon did not want to reckon with anyone except Alexander, with whom he intended for the time being to share dominion over the world. Alexander, realizing that now further struggle is impossible, decided to temporarily meet the wishes of his rival, who, in appearance, offered rather honorable terms of peace. But an indispensable condition for peace, a condition sina qua non, Napoleon set, in the event that England refused the conditions set for her - and she obviously could not agree to them - Alexander's declaration of war with her acceptance at the same time of the notorious continental system. This system invented by Napoleon consisted in the fact that all the states of Europe, allied with him or dependent on him, refused trade relations with England and pledged not to allow English merchant ships into their ports. Alexander pledged, in addition, to force Sweden and Denmark to break with England and take part in the continental system directed against her; moreover, it could be foreseen in advance that Sweden, completely defenseless from the attack of the British, could not agree to this, while its king, Gustav IV, showed a fanatical hatred of Napoleon. Thus, even then it was possible to foresee the inevitability of an attack by England and Sweden on Russia from the sea and land near St. Petersburg. Meanwhile, at that time, the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland belonged to Sweden. Therefore, Napoleon quite thoroughly, from a strategic point of view, pointed out to Alexander the need to conquer it. Thus, in Tilsit, the accession of Finland to Russia was prepared, for which we had to in 1808 and 1809. wage a difficult two-year war with Sweden.

As for Turkey, with which we were at that time in a war caused by the Turks thanks to the intrigues of the French ambassador in Constantinople, Sebastiani, Napoleon offered his mediation to end it on terms favorable to Russia, and at the same time, in verbal negotiations with Alexander, he even expressed readiness , in the event of Porta's persistence in ceding the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia, go hand in hand with Alexander, if he wishes, up to the partition of Turkey (its European possessions); but at the same time, he made it a precondition for the beginning of a truce and peace negotiations to withdraw our troops from both principalities, so that, however, the Turks could not occupy them with their troops. In fact, the war with the Turks did not stop, and although Napoleon later tried to seduce Alexander with the brilliant prospects of expelling the Turks from Europe and a joint campaign with him in India, Russia, however, had to wage a rather fruitless war with the Turks this time, without any assistance from him. before 1812

The intrigues and measures of Napoleon on the Polish question were very unfavorable for Russia: Napoleon did not agree in Tilsit to the return of the Polish regions occupied by the French to Prussia and formed the Duchy of Warsaw from them under the leadership of the Saxon king and under the protectorate of the emperor of the French. Thus, a military outpost of Napoleon himself was created on the Russian border. At the same time, Napoleon placed Alexander in a difficult position in relation to the Poles; Alexander had to stand in apparent contradiction with himself and prevent the restoration of an independent Poland. This circumstance caused the final disappointment of the Poles in their hopes for Alexander and forced them to transfer them entirely to Napoleon.

In Tilsit and after Tilsit, Alexander outwardly expressed admiration for the genius of Napoleon and his friendship with him. He was reproached by his contemporaries for having allowed himself to be deceived by the cunning Corsican, since much of what Napoleon had promised orally was not later included in the written contracts. However, Alexander was by no means infatuated with Napoleon; he skillfully played his part in Tilsit, and then in Erfurt, so that he even gave Napoleon reason to call him later northern Talma(the name of a then famous dramatic actor) and "Byzantine Greek".

It is difficult to say who was more deceived in this diplomatic tournament, since Napoleon was later repeatedly told by those close to him that he was deceived by Alexander. If we look at the matter from the point of view of the then international relations and if we take into account the real conditions of the moment, then it should, in any case, be recognized that the policy of Alexander in Tilsit and then a year later at a new meeting with Napoleon in Erfurt was very skillful. In these negotiations, Alexander appears for the first time as a subtle and insightful diplomat, and it seems that now we can assume that this was his real sphere, in which he was undoubtedly a great statesman, capable of competing with all the European celebrities of his time.

Russia and the continental blockade

These wars with Napoleon affected the situation of the population in Russia most sharply. We have already talked about the severity of wars for the population - the severity of recruiting, militia, food supplies, etc. The suspension of the legislative activities of the government caused by the war also had a huge negative effect. Finally, the plight of the finances, under the influence of military expenditures, greatly curtailed all the plans of the government in the field of public education, which had advanced so much just before. As a result of the wars of 1805-1807, to which was added a complete crop failure in Russia in 1806, the financial situation began to deteriorate from year to year. In 1806, revenues were 100 million rubles, while expenses were 122 million rubles; in 1807, income - 121, and expenses - 171 million rubles; in 1808 it was 111.5 million rubles. income and 140 million rubles. expenses only for the army, and the total amount of expenses in 1808 reached 240 million rubles. Huge deficits were again covered by new issues of paper money, the total amount of which already reached 319 million rubles in 1806, 382 million rubles in 1807, and 477 million rubles in 1808. Meanwhile, the turnover of foreign trade under the influence of the war, and then the continental system and the prohibition of the export of grain from the western provinces, which followed under the influence of a bad harvest in 1806, was extremely reduced, and the export of Russian raw materials abroad was especially reduced, which changed the balance of trade in an unfavorable direction, which caused, in turn, the outflow of specie, which greatly influenced the depreciation of paper money.

Thanks to all these circumstances, the exchange rate of our paper money, which held firm from 1802 to 1805 and even increased during these years, now began to fall sharply: in 1806 the paper ruble was equal to 78 kopecks, in 1807 - 66 kopecks. and in 1808 fell to 48 kopecks. Meanwhile, taxes were paid in banknotes, and a significant part of foreign state expenditures (for the maintenance of the army and for subsidies to the completely ruined Prussian king) had to be made in specie. The situation thus became very difficult, and after the Peace of Tilsit and the accession of Russia to the continental system, it became, as we shall see, downright unbearable. The Treaty of Tilsit made a depressing impression on all sections of Russian society and on the people. Many considered this treaty more shameful than all the lost battles. After the peace with Napoleon, Alexander lost a significant part of the popularity that he enjoyed. The people, who shortly before this had heard curses against Napoleon from the church pulpit, could not understand how the Russian tsar could be so defiantly friends with the “enemy of the human race”, who was plotting to abolish the Christian faith.

When the continental system began to be implemented, which completely undermined our export trade, led to the bankruptcy of many trading houses, ruined many landlord farms that sold raw materials abroad (especially flax and hemp in various forms), and caused the high cost of many supplies, then discontent took over. universal character. According to contemporaries, Alexander, who, in the eyes of everyone, had to play such an unpleasant and difficult role in his relations with Napoleon, began to noticeably deteriorate in character, and his previously so even and kind treatment of everyone began to be replaced by an irritable, sometimes gloomy mood of the spirit, moreover, characteristic his stubbornness began to manifest itself sometimes in very unpleasant forms. It is remarkable that already in 1805, going to war, Alexander, by secret order, restored, in essence, the secret police, establishing a special temporary committee of three persons to monitor public opinion and talk among the public. This committee, after the Peace of Tilsit, was officially converted into a permanent institution, and a secret instruction was given to it, which restored, among other things, the revision of letters and those methods of police supervision, from which Alexander was so far away in the first years of his reign. Especially unpleasant at that time, Alexander was affected by the rumors in society about his friendship with Napoleon. At the head of the opposition to Alexander's foreign policy in court spheres was the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna herself. At the same time, Alexander's position was all the more difficult because he was forced to play his role without revealing his real intentions to anyone.

Patriotic opposition to the Peace of Tilsit

Alexander's closest friends, former members of the secret committee Kochubey, Czartorysky, Novosiltsev, retired and the last two even went abroad, and Stroganov went into military service so as not to interfere in politics. Even the Marshal Alexandra gr. N. A. Tolstoy managed to express his opposition to Alexander’s friendship with Napoleon by refusing to put on, next to the ribbon of the Legion of Honor granted to him by Napoleon, the ribbon of the highest Russian order of St. Andrew the First-Called, which Alexander wanted to put on him. The opposition in the highest circles of St. Petersburg society was especially pronounced when General Savary, sent by Napoleon as a military agent, came to St. Petersburg, personally involved in the execution of the Duke of Enghien. Petersburg salons closed their doors to him, they did not receive him anywhere (except for the Winter Palace) and did not give him visits, until, finally, Alexander himself intervened in this matter and demanded from his confidants a more polite attitude towards the representative of his ally. Savary, later Napoleon's Minister of Police, decided to show his political and, one might say, downright provocative talents here too. He diligently began to collect and combine all sorts of gossip and careless phrases that sometimes broke out at Alexander in a circle of people dissatisfied with his policies, and went so far as to fabricate a legend about a major conspiracy and a coup that was being prepared, and did not hesitate to inspire all this to Alexander, trying to quarrel him with society and inflate the mutual distrust that began to form during this period between the young sovereign and his subjects.

In wider public circles, discontent manifested itself even more strongly, expressed in literature and in theaters, where patriotic tragedies like Dmitry Donskoy became the favorite plays of the public. Ozerova or "Prince Pozharsky" Kryukovsky, which caused stormy applause and even sobs from the audience in the most pathetic places. Comedies enjoyed the same success. Krylova"Fashion Shop" and "A Lesson for Daughters", directed against the French language and imitation of French fashions.

This opposition manifested itself even more strongly in Moscow, where one of the most ardent patriots of that time S. N. Glinka began to publish since 1808 a new patriotic magazine "Russian Messenger", directed directly against Napoleon. In this journal, Glinka wrote in the interval between the Tilsit and Erfurt meetings - where Alexander so vividly demonstrated his friendship with Napoleon in the face of all Europe - that the Tilsit peace is only a temporary truce and that when there is a new war, then all measures will be taken in society to repel the power-hungry Napoleon. Napoleon's envoy, Caulaincourt, considered it his duty to draw Alexander's attention to this article, and Glinka, an ardent patriot and conservative of Glinka, one of the first in Alexander's reign, provoked censorship persecution against himself. Along with him, the old Pavlovian nobleman gr. Rostopchin, who lived in Moscow "out of work", published at the same time a pamphlet under the pseudonym Bogatyrev "Thoughts aloud on the Red Porch", in which he tried to spread the same views in wide circles of the common people.

At the same time, Admiral A. S. Shishkov, Russian Old Believer, already known earlier for his attacks on Karamzin (in "Discourse on the old and new style Russian language”), now formed in St. Petersburg the patriotic literary society “Conversation”, which met in Derzhavin’s house, which, however, now, along with the Old Believers, included Karamzin and even the liberal Mordvinov.

It is remarkable that this opposition, which united fairly broad social circles and manifested itself in patriotic forms, was by no means chauvinistic in nature. It was directed entirely against Napoleon and the Treaty of Tilsit with its consequences, which were so heavily reflected in the position of Russian trade, Russian industry and the entire course of Russian social life. At that time we fought four wars, and Russian society, according to a contemporary ( Vigel, a man of quite protective views), treated with amazing indifference, sometimes even with direct hostility to the success of the goals set by the government! Two of these wars (with then weak Persia and with Austria, with which Alexander himself fought à contre coeur [reluctantly], as an ally of Napoleon), were given relatively easily, although they still required significant costs. But the other two cost us very dearly and required significant expenses both in money and in people. These were: the war with Turkey, which lasted from 1806 - with interruptions, but without the conclusion of peace - until the spring of 1812, and the war with Sweden, which began after the Treaty of Tilsit as a direct consequence of the treaty with Napoleon and ended after a number of vicissitudes and heroic , but heavy exploits for our troops in 1809 by annexing all of Finland to the Torneo River.

Alexander wanted to attract the hearts of new subjects with generosity, and even before the signing of the peace treaty, he gathered the Diet in Borgo, having previously confirmed the ancient rights and privileges of the Finnish population with a special letter. With accession to Russia, therefore, the legal situation of the population of Finland did not change for the worse, and the economic situation of the country even improved at the very beginning: the tax that Finland paid to cover Swedish debts was canceled, and internal customs were destroyed.

But Russian society nevertheless reacted rather disapprovingly to the Friedrichsham world - there were even regrets addressed to the Swedes.

Wishes were also expressed to end the war with Turkey. Mordvinov in 1810 submitted a note to Alexander, in which he justified in detail the uselessness of territorial acquisitions for Russia, whose borders were already stretched, and insisted on the need for a speedy end to the Turkish war.

Such was the mood of Russian society after the Peace of Tilsit.

“A fierce enemy of peace and blessed silence,” the Synod’s proclamation begins, “Napoleon Bonaparte, who autocratically appropriated the royal crown of France and by force of arms, and more cunningly extended his power to many neighboring states, devastated their cities and villages with a sword and flames, dares, in the frenzy of her malice, to threaten Russia, which is patronized from above, with an invasion of its borders, the destruction of landscaping, which she now enjoys alone in the world under the meek scepter of our God-blessed and beloved pious sovereign Alexander the First, and the shock of the Orthodox Greek-Russian Church, in all its purity and holiness in this prosperous Empire ... "

After referring to the duties of the pastors of the church, the Synod continues:

“The whole world knows his ungodly plans and deeds, with which he trampled on the law and truth.”

“Even during the time of popular indignation that raged in France during the ungodly revolution, disastrous for mankind and brought a heavenly curse on the perpetrators of it, he broke away from the Christian faith, triumphed at the gatherings of the people, the idolatrous festivals established by false-minded apostates, and in the host of his impious accomplices paid worship, befitting to the only Almighty deity, to idols, human creatures and harlots, who served as an idol image for them.

“In Egypt, he joined the persecutors of the Church of Christ, preached the alcoran Mohammed, declared himself the defender of the confession of the superstitious followers of this false prophet of Muslims, and solemnly showed his contempt for the pastors of the holy church of Christ.”

“Finally, to her greatest disgrace, he convened Jewish synagogues in France, commanded that the rabbis be clearly honored and established a new great Jewish sanhydrin, this most ungodly cathedral, which once dared to condemn our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ to the crucifixion - and now is thinking of uniting the Jews, scattered all over the face of the earth by the wrath of God, and direct them to overthrow the church of Christ and (oh, terrible insolence, surpassing the measure of all atrocities!) - to proclaim a false messiah in the person of Napoleon ... "

At the end of the proclamation, after various formidable curses and threats borrowed from Deuteronomy, the same thing is repeated once more:

“... Rejecting the thoughts of God's justice, he (i.e. Napoleon) dreams in his rampage, with the help of haters of the Christian name and capable of his wickedness, the Jews, to steal (which every person can even think terribly!) the sacred name of the Messiah: show him that he is a creature, burned with conscience and deserving of contempt...” A similar appeal was sent by the Catholic Metropolitan of Mogilev Sestrentsevich to the Catholic priests of the Western Territory (Schilder, name cit., II, p. 354 - in appendices to the text). At the same time, the local authorities of the Western Territory received an order to watch the Jews and warn them against relations with the Parisian all-Jewish institutions formed by Napoleon, and the Jews were instilled that the Parisian assembly (Sanhedrin) was striving to change their faith (Circus, February 20, 1807, see Heb. Encicl., vol. XI, p. 516). It is remarkable that the Jews in the Western Territory in 1812, contrary to all fears, remained loyal to Russia everywhere. (Compare “Acts, documents and materials for political and everyday history of 1812”, ed. K. Voensky, in "Collection, Russian. ist. gen., volumes CXXVIII and CXXXIII. SPb., 1910 and 1911, and his own art. "Napoleon and the Jews of Borisov in 1812", in Voen. collection, for 1906, No. 9.)

Ref. Bogdanovich, name op. II, p. 177. The commanders of the divisions received an order directly from the field marshal: “when retreating to the Russian borders, go by the shortest route to Vilna and report to the elder” (!). Gr. Buksgevden, to whom he handed over the command, Kamensky ordered to throw battery artillery on the road if it impedes the movement of troops, and to take care only of saving people. (Ibid.) All this before meeting the enemy.

Bogdanovich reports that due to the lack of guns only fifth part militia could have them; the rest of the warriors were supposed to be armed with peaks (Ist. Reigning them. Alexander I, vol. II, p. 165). After the battle of Pultusk, Alexander ordered the size of the militia to be reduced to 252,000 men. (Shiman."Alexander I", p. 17 Russian. translation and Bogdanovich, ibidem, vol. III, p. 1). Albert Vandal("Napoleon and Alexander I", vol. I, p. 49 of the Russian translation) is quoted from Rustam's memoirs, published in Revue retrospective, nos. 8–9. the following fact: when the Russian army fled after the Friedland defeat, having lost the ability to resist, the French, having reached the Neman near Tilsit, saw a strange sight: “a horde of barbarians with Asian faces, Kalmyks and Siberians (?) without guns, firing clouds of arrows, circled around plain and frightened us in vain. It was a reserve army, which Russia announced to the public and brought by Prince. Lobanov.

Ref. Napoleon's letter to Alexander dated February 2, 1808. Its text is given at vandal(vol. 1, p. 249, Russian translation) and Solovyov (“Imp. Alexander I”, p. 165), and both historians attach completely different significance to this letter.

Napoleon's Admirer Vandal this is how he expresses himself about this subject: “Not intending to put the victim of the triple partition in the position of a stable state, he wants to create in Europe - I will not say the Polish nation, but Polish army, because he recognizes in the projected state only a large military force standing guard over France ”(! - on the banks of the Vistula), called. cit., vol. I, p. 90 of the Russian translation.

Ref. a report to Napoleon Duroc, who managed, probably with the help of bribery, to get from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Napoleon to the Russian ambassador, Prince. Kurakin in 1809. The text of this curious document is given in extracts from Bogdanovich, vol. III, p. 85 et seq.

Colonial goods, which until then had been received from England, rose in price so much that, for example, a pood of sugar in 1808 cost 100 rubles in St. Petersburg.

"The text of these decrees and instructions see Schilder, vol. II, pp. 362–367 – in appendices. There, by the way, there is a very curious list of the subjects of competence of these secret committees, and it is clear how this competence expanded from September 5, 1805 to January 13, 1807.

Ref. at vandal, name op. pp. 111 ff., Russian translation, a whole juicy chapter entitled "Diplomatic intelligence". It is curious that other foreign diplomats in St. Petersburg (for example, Bar. Steding) and Canning in London (as can be seen from his conversation with the Russian ambassador Alopeus) report the same disturbing (but undoubtedly unfounded) rumors about conspiracies supposedly being prepared in St. Petersburg and coups. It is very possible that these were traces of Savary's intrigues and inventions. Ref. Shiman, name op. page 18 Russian translation.

In 1807, the St. Petersburg newspaper The Genius of Times also spoke of Napoleon with great harshness. After 1808, when the government began to prohibit such reviews, in the same "Genius of the Times" N. I. Grech already wrote laudatory articles about Napoleon, which did not prevent him later (in 1812) from scolding him again without mercy in Son of the Fatherland. But the public in 1808-1811. she already treated such “official” praises and censures with contempt.

In 1809, after Erfurt, Alexander, convinced of the impossibility of keeping the Austrians from a dangerous war with Napoleon, in which he himself formally undertook to help Napoleon, in a fit of frankness, told the Austrian ambassador, Prince. Schwarzenberg: “... My position is so strange that although you and I are on opposite lines, I cannot but wish you success! ..” (Soloviev, p. 190). The Russian public in 1809 directly rejoiced at every success of our "enemies" of the Austrians and every failure of our "ally" Napoleon (Vigel, Notes).

Vigel. Notes, cf. at Schilder, vol. II, p. 242.

The Age of the Two Emperors

Napoleon and Alexander I

Material on the topic "Patriotic War of 1812".
8th grade.

The course of world history in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. largely determined by the events that took place on the European continent. This important time period of a quarter of a century is called differently: the era Napoleonic Wars or the Napoleonic era; the era of coalitions; the era of the Patriotic War of 1812; congress era. Without any doubt, due to the significance of the events and due to the spread of new social ideas, this was a turning point in the history of mankind, since it was during this period of global conflicts between the great European states that the fate of the future world order was determined. It was decided both on the battlefields and in the course of behind-the-scenes diplomatic negotiations.

A number of outstanding personalities appeared on the forefront of political history - role models in the spirit of romanticism. Then a real cult of "heroes" reigned: in the minds of contemporaries and descendants, this epic struggle of European titans was strongly associated with the names of people who led and determined the course of world events. At the center of the historical drama of the early 19th century were two people whose names personified this turbulent era - the French emperor and commander Napoleon Bonaparte and the Russian monarch Alexander I, who received the title of "Blessed" after the end of seemingly endless bloody wars. It was they who turned out to be the pillars of European and world politics at the beginning of the 19th century.

Both Napoleon and Alexander I stood at the head of the great powers, dictating and determining the rhythm of epoch-making events. The fate of the peoples of the world largely depended on the personal will and actions of these two rulers, although both of them, like no other, knew how to subordinate their personal ambitions to political expediency and state interests. Each of them at one time played the role of "Agamemnon of Europe" - "the king of kings." In 1805-1807. they were irreconcilable rivals and competitors in European political life, striving to prove their imperial superiority in the international arena by force of arms; from 1807 to 1811 - allies and "brothers" (according to the then accepted among the monarchs to address each other), who almost became related to each other; and later - sworn enemies, who alternately made "visits" to the capitals of the enemy states at the head of their armed subjects.
Contemporaries and descendants, with all the polarity of opinions, highly appreciated the scale of their personalities. In fairness, it should be noted that the bar for Napoleon's assessments in the public mind has always been higher: "the greatest military leader in world history", "administrative and state genius." With respect to Alexander I, skepticism and doubts are noticeable. The emphasis was usually placed on the mystery and inconsistency of his nature, and for characterization, the statement of P.A. Vyazemsky, which sounded relevant at all times, was cited: “The Sphinx, not unraveled to the grave, is now arguing about it again.” But in the historical context of their era, they were antipodes. Each of the emperors represented two opposite principles, which was largely due to both the difference in origin and upbringing, and the different way of coming to power. The personalities of Napoleon and Alexander I can also be viewed from this point of view: as a projection of certain social circumstances. You can, of course, find a number of similar moments that united both.

During their youth, the spirit of change was in the air. As individuals, both were formed under the influence of the ideas of the European Enlightenment, which influenced their worldview, but later, under the pressure of life circumstances, the views of both changed. If we consider the way of thinking of the young Napoleon, then, undoubtedly, one can notice that he began as an extreme radical. Then he traveled a path very characteristic of post-revolutionary France - from an ardent and staunch Jacobin he turned into the emperor of all the French, concerned only with the preservation and strengthening of his unlimited power, since it was not consecrated by the old feudal traditions and was hostilely perceived by his opponents. Alexander I, who received in his youth from his educators the theoretical baggage of advanced and even republican ideas, without any doubt, was considered a liberal in his younger years, but towards the end of his life, after a collision with reality, his liberalism began to decline. Most of his biographers believed that in the last period of his reign, he was in the camp of reaction.
As contemporaries noted, both emperors, each in their own way, possessed the magnetic power of influencing those around them: Napoleon, in addition to the ability to instantly subdue any, the most desperate and brave military leader, could ignite and rouse the masses of soldiers into battle with his appearance during the battle. Even the famous opponent of the French emperor, the English commander A.U. Wellington remarked that "his presence on the battlefield created a superiority of 40,000 men." Alexander I also had a rare gift (he inherited from his grandmother, Catherine II) of seducing people from his environment (“a real deceiver”), especially women. According to the historian M.A. Korf, he was "extremely able to conquer his own minds and penetrate the souls of others." Without any doubt, both had outstanding acting abilities, and the Russian Tsar in this art, apparently, was head and shoulders above his partner in politics: what was his famous ability to shed a tear at the right moment. No wonder Napoleon, realizing that the game on the political stage with him was played by the highest master, once called Alexander I "northern Talma". In general, both skillfully used the arsenal of means (innate or acquired) that was extremely necessary for any crowned ruler and had the advantages and disadvantages inherent in most statesmen.

In addition to common and bringing together moments, there were striking differences even in outwardly seemingly similar circumstances. For example, both almost simultaneously received the supreme power in their hands, in fact, as a result of state conspiracies. But in France and in Russia, the causes and course of events differed sharply from each other. In these conspiracies, the roles that fell to the lot of General Napoleon Bonaparte and the heir to the Russian throne, Grand Duke Alexander Pavlovich, as well as the degree of their participation in what was happening, turned out to be different.
Napoleon, the child and heir of the French Revolution, owed everything to her: both temporary hardships and a phenomenally successful career. He came to power thanks to public fatigue from the horrors of revolutionary terror and military upheavals, disappointment in the proclaimed ideals. All French society longed for order and tranquility. The young general successfully used the current favorable situation and, acting decisively, as a result of a well-thought-out and bloodless coup d'état, took power into his own hands in 1799.
In Russia, in 1801, events developed according to a different scenario. Alexander I ascended the throne and put on the imperial crown as a result of the extreme dissatisfaction of the Russian officer corps and bureaucracy with the despotic rule of his father, Emperor Paul I, who was quick to both anger and forgiveness. The role of the heir in this classically executed palace coup was passive, he only gave his consent to a handful of conspirators for actions that were supposed to force his father to abdicate. But the tragedy that occurred - the assassination of Paul I - then, according to many contemporaries, led to constant torment of conscience in the Russian "crowned Hamlet" (A.I. Herzen) until the end of his reign.
If Alexander I was constantly weighed down by the burden of moral responsibility, then Napoleon hardly thought about the moral nature of power. He very quickly, alternately announcing plebiscites, went from First Consul to Emperor and believed that his power was legitimate, since it was based on the results of the will of the French nation. But feudal Europe, in the person of its monarchs, was in no hurry to accept the newly-made emperor into its ranks. Most of them were forced to recognize the imperial title of Napoleon only thanks to the force of arms and the brilliant military victories of the French army.
The Russian emperor remained "a republican only in words and an autocrat in deeds." Napoleon, "born of the chaos of the revolution, ordered this chaos." He, unlike Alexander I, who inherited the power structure that had been established for centuries, created his own empire himself. Using the basic postulates of the ideology of the Enlightenment and destroying the remnants of feudalism, Napoleon constructed an effective state system of government in France and clothed the developing bourgeois relations in clear legal norms. The famous Civil Code of Napoleon became not only a famous monument of legal thought, but is still the current code of laws in many countries of the world. But the Russian emperor, who formally had unlimited (autocratic) power, was a hostage to feudal traditions and could not act without regard to Russian nobility, realizing their real dependence on this estate. It was precisely because of these circumstances that he was often forced to yield to the conservative majority, whose representatives occupied dominant positions among the highest bureaucracy.
Napoleon Bonaparte made his way through life on his own. Even as a young officer, who was teased by the fair sex as a “puss in boots” for his small stature, the native of Corsica knew exactly what he wanted; he always strove to be the first and asserted his superiority in every way. Constant self-affirmation became his life credo. Thanks to the successful military career and acquired fame, he reached the highest level of power in France and intended to go further and further - to dominance over Europe. The Russian monarch did not have such aspiration and target setting. Behind young Alexander I was only the school of sophisticated court maneuvering he had completed in his youth between the salon of his grandmother, the power-hungry Catherine II, and the Gatchina barracks of his father, the always suspicious Paul I. and father. According to V.O. Klyuchevsky, he had to live for a long time "on two minds, keep two front faces." To a large extent, it was precisely for this reason that traits such as diversity appeared early in his character and were further developed - the ability to find the right demeanor in the most unexpected circumstances and put on a “mask” appropriate for the case, flexibility in doing business, which often manifested itself in the exaltation of people not only personally unpleasant to him, but, from his point of view, absolutely unworthy of respect, and a number of other qualities that are extremely important for survival in an atmosphere of constant intrigues of the Russian imperial court. Therefore, in Alexander I, liberal rules were very simply combined with such hereditary vices of the Holstein-Gottorps (received from Peter III and Paul I) as paradomania and martinetism, while noble dreams of the liberation of the peasants, constitutional projects on "reasonable autocracy", plans for broad transformations were calmly coexisted with the serf way of life and military settlements arranged according to personal imperial instructions. According to the definition of the same V.O. Klyuchevsky, the tsar always wavered "between constitutional ideals and absolutist habits."

Dissimilar in life and in politics, Napoleon and Alexander had their own scope of unique abilities. There is no need to convince anyone that in his time on the battlefields, Napoleon had no equal. He went down in history, first of all, as one of the world's greatest generals. Undoubtedly, he possessed the most versatile qualities of a leader and was an example of a military leader endowed with incredible abilities. His talents were fully manifested in that historical period when the art of war was at a crossroads. And, without any doubt, the Napoleonic campaigns had a tremendous impact on the further development of military theory and military art. They still amaze those who study them. Unlike Napoleon, the talents of Alexander I as a statesman did not receive universal recognition. Only recently have researchers begun to give credit to what one of the most educated and intelligent Russian emperors did. Summing up all his personal qualities, it should be noted that he was a born diplomat and had an extraordinary foreign policy thinking. True, from his youth, Alexander I dreamed of military glory, he loved to engage in the army, but he valued only the external (front) side of military affairs. And very soon he had a sobering up. In 1805, he was the first of the Russian monarchs after Peter I went to the theater of operations - and witnessed the defeat of the Russian troops at Austerlitz, and at the same time Napoleon's military triumph. Having fully drunk the bitterness of military failures, he concluded for himself that the first commander in Europe on the battlefields would always be his successful opponent. Therefore, Alexander Pavlovich chose another field of activity for the confrontation with the French commander, and from that moment he directed all his forces to the area of ​​​​high politics. As a diplomat, he demonstrated a broad vision of the prospects of international politics, ways of managing it, showed himself to be a subtle master of political calculation, in which many contemporaries gave him credit. “This is a true Byzantine,” Napoleon said about him, “subtle, feigned, cunning.”
Europe at the beginning of the 19th century was a military camp, and Napoleonic France was a constant troublemaker. For the French commander, who wore the imperial mantle, the first goal was always power, and war became the most reliable and more than once tested means of strengthening and expanding the boundaries of his despotic influence. Once Napoleon himself dropped a prophetic phrase: "My power will end on the day when they will no longer be afraid of me." It is no coincidence that many contemporaries called the French emperor the military despot of Europe. In essence, he tried to put into practice the model of continental integration by force of bayonets.
Since the war, with the growth of the power of the aggressively unceremonious French empire, turned into a pan-European phenomenon, Russia (and, consequently, Alexander I) could not stay away from the raging military fire for a long time. But what could then be opposed to the Napoleonic dictatorial manners and the resounding victories of the perfectly well-oiled military machine of France? To counter Napoleonic expansion, feudal Europe, in the old fashioned way, tried to use only military means and consistently created one coalition after another. The core of these coalitions was most often Russia as the most powerful land power in Europe, while England, which paid part of the Allied military expenses, assumed the functions of the main banker. But in the camp of the allies traditionally there were contradictions, friction and dissatisfaction with each other. Napoleon, in the fight against coalitions of European states, always took this factor into account and successfully used his repeatedly tested and effective strategy. Achieving military victories, he consistently removed one enemy after another from the allies, and in this way he managed to successfully destroy several coalitions.
After the three military campaigns of 1805-1807, which were generally unsuccessful for the Russian army, when almost all of continental Europe was under French control, Alexander I took a bold and unexpected step. During the famous personal Tilsit meeting with Napoleon in 1807, he not only signed peace with France, but also concluded a military-political alliance.
The course towards rapprochement with France caused a negative reaction in Russian society, but then few people understood the true reasons and the real background of the events. Many contemporaries condemned the Russian emperor, weighing only the benefits received by Napoleon on the scales. But Alexander I calculated the possible options well further development events: the main thing was that Russia received a five-year respite to prepare for a new and inevitable military clash with France.
Alexander I himself always (even as an ally) considered Napoleon as his personal enemy, and also as an enemy of the entire Russian state. The Russian Tsar became one of the first European monarchs who understood the need to use political means to fight post-revolutionary France. He began to adopt the methods by which the French achieved impressive victories. Appreciating the brilliance of glory and realizing the importance of public opinion, Alexander I saw in propaganda not only the most important element of politics, but also a sharp weapon to fight his opponent. In 1812, the Russian press and journalism (in Russian and foreign languages), with the blessing of the emperor, began to actively use liberal phraseology and anti-French liberation rhetoric in opposition to Napoleonic propaganda. The desecrated patriotism of the European peoples was skillfully fed, and nationalism, which was gaining strength during this period, was stimulated in various ways. In 1813, the spearhead of propaganda efforts turned out to be directed at Germany, and in 1814 - at France, whose territory became the scene of hostilities. The national-patriotic upsurge of the German people was largely caused by the offensive nature of Russian journalism. In 1814, Alexander I put forward a very important thesis and then widely disseminated among the French population that the Allies were fighting not against France and its people, but personally against Napoleon and his conquest ambitions. In general, in the "war of feathers" and in the struggle for public opinion in Europe, the advantage turned out to be on the side of Alexander I. To a large extent, thanks to this circumstance, he achieved the final political defeat of his crowned rival.
The Russian emperor also won in the pre-war "battle of wits" that unfolded before 1812. Beginning in 1810, the two gigantic empires, realizing the inevitability of war, began to actively prepare for it. Napoleon, as usual, concentrated powerful human and material resources and hoped for a fleeting campaign. The French commander planned, by multiplying "mass by speed" (his expression), to achieve a quick victory in a general battle in the border provinces. After Russia was brought to its knees, he hoped to sign with her "on the drum" a peace favorable to the French empire. This strategic concept turned out to be fundamentally vicious and erroneous. The initial miscalculation led to other mistakes, which ultimately led the great commander to the grandiose catastrophe of the Russian campaign.
Even in the pre-war period, Alexander I managed to carry out partial reforms of the state administration system according to French models and, most importantly, to prepare the army for a decisive military battle. In addition, together with the Minister of War M.B. Barclay de Tolly, the Russian emperor, thanks to the brilliantly acting military intelligence, was able to develop a three-year strategic plan for the war with Napoleon. The first period (1812) is the prolongation of the war in time and luring the enemy into the depths of Russian territory, and then (1813-1814) the transfer of hostilities to Western Europe, in the hope of an uprising in Germany against the Napoleonic yoke. The Russian strategic plan was based on ideas that were completely opposite to Napoleonic plans and turned out to be disastrous for the French ruler. Subsequent events, which developed according to the strategic scenario conceived in St. Petersburg by Alexander I, only proved the correctness of the Russian emperor's predictions.
Often in the historical literature it was argued that, unlike Napoleon, who made global miscalculations in the Russian campaign, the Russian monarch in 1812 played a passive role and only from a distance observed the events that were fateful for all of Europe. It is hardly possible to agree with such an opinion. Yes, Alexander I, of course, experienced the unpleasant fact for him personally of his departure from the army at the beginning of the war. He was convinced of the expediency of such a step by those close to him, although it was another and very painful blow to the emperor's pride. But in 1812, the Russian tsar, in spite of everything, was the autocratic leader of the state, and all the most important strategic and military-political decisions depended on his will. For example, he took a very firm and unshakable position: not to enter into any peace negotiations with Napoleon as long as at least one enemy soldier remained on Russian territory. He repeatedly stated this decision both before the start of the war and during it, which was recorded by many contemporaries. It was Alexander I who initiated the creation of the militia, he also appointed M.I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov to the post of commander-in-chief, no matter what they write about, although he had his own, generally negative, judgment about his personal qualities. He also drew up a plan for the conduct of hostilities for the second period of the war of 1812, which guided all Russian troops in the expulsion of the enemy from Russian borders. In general, the Patriotic War and the subsequent course of military events in Europe completely refute the prevailing opinions about the weakness, indecision, compliance of Alexander I and his susceptibility to foreign influence. In an extreme situation of an unprecedented enemy invasion of his country, the Russian emperor showed firmness and uncompromisingness in upholding clearly defined goals and in bringing the matter to a victorious end.
Alexander I played an outstanding role during the foreign campaigns of the Russian army in 1813-1814. Despite the proposals made in the Russian camp at the end of the campaign of 1812 not to conduct active operations abroad and to make peace with Napoleon, the Russian tsar insisted on continuing offensive operations in Europe. He also became the inspirer, ideologist, organizer and, in fact, the military-political leader of the new anti-Napoleonic coalition. During periods of temporary setbacks, he made titanic efforts to prevent collapse and keep all allies in the ranks of the alliance that had formed. But Alexander I not only settled the friction, he developed a unified military and foreign policy strategy of the allies and proposed the right tactical solutions. In 1813, at critical moments, such as during the Battle of Leipzig, he actively intervened in events: despite the objections of the Austrians, he insisted on the need for decisive action by the strength of his authority. In 1814, contrary to the opinion and opposition of the same Austrians, Alexander I initiated the movement of the allied forces to Paris, which led to the final fall of Napoleon and his abdication. Most contemporaries also noted the special generosity and loyalty shown by the Russian monarch, in contrast to other allies, in relation to the defeated France.
1814 became the "finest hour" of Russia's international politics, the highest point of Alexander I's glory, after which a new diplomatic career opened up for him. The final denouement in the fate of Napoleon has not yet arrived. The following year, he attempted one last return to the European political scene. The famous "hundred days" added to him a few minutes of fame in his lifetime and a little popularity after his death. But the ensuing exile to the island of St. Helena meant not only public oblivion and the slow extinction of the disgraced emperor. For such an active nature as Napoleon, she marked political death. Although his figure until the time of his death was perceived by opponents who had not forgotten anything as the main symbol of evil (“monster” and “enemy of mankind”), politically he ceased to be dangerous. Only the name remained significant - Napoleon. It symbolized the revolutionary and post-revolutionary era, the period of cardinal changes and resounding victories. The bearer of this name himself, who was in forced inaction as a state prisoner of all European monarchs, had only one thing left to do - write memoirs, on the basis of which the "Napoleonic legend" was subsequently born.
For Alexander I, after leaving the stage of his main opponent, the time came for stormy international activity, when his moral authority increased immensely and in the "concert" of the winners he rightfully got the first violin. Concerned about the fate of post-war Europe, the Russian emperor demonstrated unconventional thinking and innovative approaches to international politics. Being one of the main creators of the Vienna system, which fixed the redistribution of borders and a new alignment of forces in Europe, he personally developed and proposed a scheme for peaceful existence and collective security, which provided for the preservation of the existing balance of power, the inviolability of the form of government and established borders. It was based on a wide range of ideas, primarily on the moral precepts of Christianity, which gave many people a reason to call Alexander I an "idealist politician" and a "romantic emperor." These principles were laid down in the Act of the Holy Alliance of 1815, drawn up in the gospel style. Behind the vague and religious-mystical postulates of the Act, the original version of which was written by the hand of the Russian monarch, a new interpretation of the “European idea” was read.

At one time, Napoleon also tried to unite under his scepter all the peoples of the continent into a single whole on a confederate basis. But he wanted to realize his plan through military violence, while simultaneously imposing his famous Civil Code on the entire European territory, which, in his opinion, would allow uniting peoples and "forming a single and united nation." In opposition to the Napoleonic idea of ​​forced unification of Europe under the auspices of French cultural, legal and economic hegemony, Alexander I proposed a voluntary union of monarchs for the sake of peace, collective security and stability. In addition to the aforementioned Act (which provided for the "indissoluble brotherhood" of monarchs), which was signed by almost all European sovereigns (except for the Pope and English king George III), in addition to it, the Paris Treaty of 1815 was drawn up by the four heads of the European powers. It formalized the so-called quadruple alliance (Russia, England, Austria Prussia), which actually solved the main European problems. The mechanism for the functioning of the Holy Union was also envisaged. It was based on constant mutual contacts, for which international congresses were convened as needed. Diplomacy thus acquired a new dimension: in addition to the traditionally bilateral diplomacy, it also became a conference one. The congresses convened then essentially became the forerunners of the modern European Parliament - a club, or assembly, of all monarchs. In the conditions of feudal Europe it was impossible to offer anything else. But as a precedent, this was of great importance for the future European world order. We can especially note one confidential proposal made by Alexander I to the English government in 1816 - on the simultaneous proportional disarmament of European states. An amazing initiative for the most powerful and most authoritative power at that moment! But England did not support this proposal, and the bold initiative remained unclaimed. The world returned to the realization of this prematurely formulated idea much later.
Historians of various trends and views at one time, being under the influence of certain worldview and ideological clichés, wrote a lot about the reactionary nature and protective orientation of the activities of the Holy Alliance (“the conspiracy of monarchs against the peoples”), about the struggle against the revolutionary movement, in which Russia (“ gendarme of Europe") played an important role. Others filled their characteristics with an exclusively negative meaning, often replacing and narrowing the scope of the term "Vienna system" to the concept of "Holy Alliance". Some authors emphasized that the foreign policy of Alexander I of this period did not meet national interests and tied Russia's hands in the international arena by observing the principles of the Holy Alliance (the impossibility of fundamentally resolving the "Eastern question"), and being busy with European affairs distracted the tsar from solving internal problems. In addition, a noticeable increase in the influence and prestige of Russia caused counteraction from the major Western powers. Many scientists were not entirely right when, pointing to the motives that guided the Russian emperor, they characterized them as illusory, while clearly exaggerating the foreign policy altruism of Alexander I.
Without any doubt, any researcher cannot but notice in the actions of the Russian emperor in the last decade of his reign elements of mysticism, his faith in his messianic destiny. At the same time, modern historians also wrote about the purely practical nature of the royal mystic, because the Vienna system, created largely thanks to his efforts, did not fail for half a century and turned out to be extremely stable. Despite the existing contradictions between the great powers, it was aimed at peace, not war, and the European consensus was achieved through collective efforts through the negotiation process and compromises.
Of course, at the beginning of the 19th century, the ideas of European integration by peaceful means were clearly ahead of their time, since they were not stimulated by the economic interest of states and peoples in such an association. The motivating reason was only the frank fear of the European monarchs of a repetition of the bloody events of the Napoleonic wars and any revolutionary upheavals. But even the first, perhaps not entirely successful attempt led to the fact that Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century. did not know major wars. Of course, the question immediately arises about the price of progress, to which humanity has not yet given an unequivocal answer: what is better - stable and peaceful development or an era of rapid change? Graduality and evolution - or upheavals and rapid revolutionary changes?
How many people - so many opinions. Development does not always proceed in straight lines, and it is impossible to issue a correct recipe for infallible decisions. Historical experience will help to develop the correct answer. In this regard, the epoch of two great emperors, two historical antipodes provides a lot of food for thought. Both for the first time in practice tried to implement one global idea. But they approached its implementation in different ways and offered completely opposite methods - military and diplomatic. And both, each in their own way, ended up failing.

Summing up life path two historical figures representing one generation of great politicians at the turn of the 18th-19th centuries, it is necessary to recognize their outstanding role, first of all, in the national history of their states. Both France and Russia during their reign reached the peak of their military glory. It is unlikely that someday French regiments will march in the Kremlin, and Russian soldiers will bivouac on the Champs Elysees. In the historical consciousness of the descendants, these events associated with the names of emperors left a noticeable mark.
The role of both is also great in the formation state institutions and management structures: in France and in Russia, they have survived in a modified form to this day. It was under Napoleon and Alexander I that the main paths and main trends in the development of the French and Russian peoples were determined. In France at that time, bourgeois relations were firmly established, which even the restoration of the Bourbons could not prevent. In Russia, however, the timid constitutional dreams and the first transformations of Alexander I laid the foundation for the gradual movement of Russian society towards the abolition of serfdom and bourgeois reforms. The legacy of the two emperors in world diplomacy is great - each offered his own way of solving the most complex international problems.
More than 500 thousand works have been written about this era and its main figures - Napoleon and Alexander I, about the military, political, economic, social, moral aspects of their deeds. Probably, no historical period has attracted such close attention of scientific minds. But despite the seeming study, the phenomenon of this era itself remains unrevealed to the end. Previously unknown sources continue to be introduced into scientific circulation, new and original points of view appear, the vision of world history at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries is constantly changing. The state activity of Napoleon and Alexander I, their behavior both as allies and as opponents in the military confrontation of multidirectional forces - this invaluable historical experience is inexhaustible. His study and comprehension, no doubt, will be continued by the new forces of historians.

Victor BEZOTOSNY,
Candidate of Historical Sciences

Two great men, two emperors - Russian Alexander I and the French Napoleon Bonaparte - throughout their lives experienced respect and sympathy for each other, which could well develop into true friendship. If the union of France and Russia, concluded at the signing of the Treaty of Tilsit, had lasted as long as possible, this could radically change the fate of all of Europe, and possibly the world.

But it turns out that even the personal human relations of the heads of state do not guarantee peace to their subjects.

"Alexander! We loved each other ..." - Napoleon will write a letter with these words to the Russian emperor shortly before his death, already being a prisoner of St. Helena. Correspondence between them did not stop throughout their lives. Surprisingly, fate, it would seem, did everything to ensure that these two became true friends. "Alexander considered Napoleon a genius statesman longed to get to know him and even wanted to be like him.

If the alliance between France and Russia, secured by the Tilsit peace treaty in 1807, had not disintegrated after a few years, Europe would have been different. Two leaders - Russia and France - would determine the entire policy of this region. This means that not only would there not have been the Patriotic War of 1812, but also the subsequent Franco-Prussian War, the Crimean Wars, the unification of the Prussian lands would not have taken place in that form, and therefore, it is quite possible that the terrible First and Second World Wars would not have happened.

Napoleon and Alexander. Two emperors, one is the son of the revolution, the other is the prince of the blood. They survived five wars with each other. We were allies for five years. There were almost two bitter enemies who had not become related. Their destinies are so closely connected that no one now dares to guess what one would become without the other. And even before his death, Napoleon's thoughts were turned to Alexander... But first things first.

In those days when 8-year-old Napoleon was chasing wild goats over the rocks of Corsica, the heir to the Russian throne was born in St. Petersburg. The upbringing of the child was taken up by the grandmother, the great Empress Catherine II. Educated, communicating with Diderot and Voltaire, she prepared Alexander for the reign according to her own understanding. By the age of 13, the boy was fluent in 4 languages, studied history, geography, laws and other sciences.

The Swiss Frederic Laharpe was invited as an educator of the future emperor. An adherent of the ideas of enlightenment and a liberal, he instilled his principles in the young Alexander. Having absorbed these ideals, Alexander became not a typical autocrat, which was reflected in his relationship with Napoleon.

Alexander's attitude towards Napoleon was not at all contemptuous, as towards an upstart. On the contrary, at some period of time he treated him enthusiastically, as a great man. And when it came to personal meetings, then, paradoxically, it was Alexander who defended the principle of equality of people before the law, the principle of individual freedom. Napoleon was just proving that you need to rule with a firm hand, that you need absolute power. This, they say, is better than reckoning with the opinion of the people.

Alexander I, however, was forced to reckon. Let not with the people, but with the Russian nobility. He, the legitimate heir to the throne, came to power as a result of a conspiracy during which his father, Emperor Paul I, was killed. And until the end of his life, the stigma of the father and regicide (it is not yet known which is more terrible) dominated Alexander, making him dependent on his retinue.

This was especially evident in foreign policy. It must be said that shortly before the death of Paul I, Russia and France became very close. Pavel, with all his originality, was an open person, not alien to grand gestures. On this, Napoleon was able to play well. For example, Napoleon gratuitously released Russian prisoners captured in various - Italian, Dutch, Swiss - campaigns in 1799. Moreover, the French re-equipped the Russian prisoners, returned their weapons, banners, that is, they returned them to their homeland with great honor. Paul liked it. He appreciated such chivalrous deeds. And against the backdrop of dissatisfaction with the perfidious and selfish policies of England and Austria, Paul I turned the vector of his policy 180 degrees. There was a rapprochement between France and Russia. Even a joint project began to be implemented - a trip to India.

Is it any wonder that the news of the death of Paul I shocked Napoleon. The circumstances of the death of the Russian Tsar did not add sympathy to Alexander in the eyes of Napoleon. Moreover, the Cossacks who went to India were recalled, and the English tilt was again outlined in Russia's foreign policy. This was facilitated by the ambassadors who represented Russia in Paris in the early years of Alexander's reign. Opposed to Napoleon, sympathizing with the royalists, they sent to Moscow biased information about the state of affairs in France.

The fact is that from 1800 to 1804 there was a period of rapid prosperity in France. Revitalization of industry, construction of roads. Perhaps this time in France in terms of development is comparable only to the era of Louis XIV. And the Russian ambassadors sent reports to St. Petersburg about how bad things were in France, how dissatisfied they were with Bonaparte's policy. Of course, this could not but affect Alexander. In addition, there were many French emigrant nobles in Russian high society who had a very negative attitude towards Napoleon as the heir to the revolution.

Russia met the beginning of the century with the settlement of its relations with the European powers. Friendly relations with England were restored, diplomatic relations with the Austrian Empire were resumed. Alexander I declared that he refuses to interfere in the internal affairs of foreign states and recognizes in them the political system that is supported " common consent"the peoples of these countries. With France, the former friendly relations were maintained, but Alexander every month was imbued with more and more distrust of the First Consul of France. This distrust was based not only on politics, the ever-increasing expansion of France on the European continent, about which much has been written by our historians , but also Alexander's attitude to the internal political problems of "France, which was not paid attention to.

Being an admirer of the ideas of the French Revolution, the republic, the constitutional system and ardently condemning the dictatorship and terror of the Jacobins, the young Russian monarch closely followed the development of events in France. Already in 1801, reflecting on Napoleon's desire to raise his power in France, on his international claims, which were actively promoted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Talleyrand, Alexander remarked: "What swindlers!" And in 1802, when Napoleon declared himself consul for life, Alexander wrote to La Harpe: “I have completely changed, just like you, my dear, my opinion about the First Consul. things are getting worse and worse. He began by depriving himself of the greatest glory that can befall a man. The only thing left for him was to prove that he acted without any personal gain, only for the happiness and glory of his homeland, and to remain true to the constitution to which he himself swore to transfer his power in ten years. Instead, he chose to ape-like the customs of the royal courts, thereby violating the constitution of his country. Now he is one of the greatest tyrants that has ever produced story" . As you can see, Alexander cares about the constitutional order of France. Moreover, it is not at all necessary to consider this demagogy, since Alexander professed precisely these views in recent years, and the letter was of a purely personal, closed nature. In addition, Alexander quite correctly caught the sovereign claims of the "little corporal."

Since 1803, the expansion of France has been increasing. Bonaparte organizes the Boulogne camp to prepare troops for the invasion of the British Isles, occupies Hanover and the Kingdom of Naples. The Russian ambassador in Paris begins to demonstrate his opposition to this policy of Napoleon, which infuriates the First Consul. The execution by Napoleon of the Duke of Epghien, the offspring of the Bourbons and a relative of the St. Petersburg court, caused a shock in the Russian capital. The Russian government protested. In particular, it said that Napoleon violated the neutrality of another state (the duke was captured in Baden) and human rights. After the proclamation of Napoleon as emperor, Russia went on an active rapprochement with Prussia, and then with England. Business went to the European war. So, by the force of circumstances, rather by the force of his humanistic aspirations, the rejection of Napoleon's cynical violation of the laws of his own country, as well as the principles of legitimism, the system established in Europe, Alexander was forced to abandon his position of non-interference in European affairs, although the confrontation with France at this stage was not caused the interests of Russia. But already at that time, the desire to make Russia happy through the reforms that were beginning began to coexist more and more in Alexander's soul with the desire to "save" Europe from the French tyrant. And this desire should not be underestimated or replaced by the concept of "saving the reactionary regimes of Europe", etc., since it lay in the general mainstream of Alexander I's worldview at that time.

For Russia, a military confrontation with France was objectively undesirable, since already at that time there was a natural desire of the parties through political combinations to achieve the desired results for themselves. Russia sought to develop the successes of the Russian-Turkish wars and claimed the straits and Poland, the annexation of Moldavia and Wallachia, and Finland was also in the sphere of Russia's interests. Napoleon sought to secure a free hand in the fight against England and sought to extend his power to southern and central Europe. There were possible compromises along the way, but war was also possible. The subsequent development of events showed the regularity of both. And yet it should be said about the two main trends that dictated the behavior of Alexander. The first is, of course, the policy of Russia as a great European power capable of dividing Europe with Bonaparte, and the growing autocratic ambitions of the Russian emperor. The second is his liberal complexes, which spilled over from domestic politics into the international arena. It was at this time that Alexander determined the idea, later expressed in the organization of the Holy Union, about the possibility of organizing the European world on the basis of humanism, cooperation, justice, respect for the rights of nations, and observance of human rights. The lessons of La Harpe were not in vain. So, sending Novosiltsev to England in 1804 for negotiations, he gave him instructions in which he outlined the idea of ​​concluding a general peace treaty between the peoples and creating a league of peoples. Here is what he wrote in this document: “Of course, this is not about the realization of the dream of eternal peace, but still it would be possible to get closer to the benefits that are expected from such a world, if in the treaty, when determining the conditions for a general war, it was possible establish on clear and precise principles the requirements of international law Why not include in such a treaty a positive definition of the rights of nationalities, provide the benefits of neutrality and establish obligations never to start a war without first exhausting all the means provided by arbitration mediation, which makes it possible to ascertain mutual misunderstandings and try to eliminate them? Under such conditions, it would be possible to begin to implement this general pacification and create an alliance, the provisions of which would form, so to speak, a new code of international law. A remarkable document, although very premature for that time. Nevertheless, Alexander was perhaps the first statesman in Europe to put forward the idea of ​​legal regulation of international relations, which long anticipated real steps in this direction already in the second half of the 20th century.

And yet all these arguments at that time remained a chimera. The reality turned out to be prosaic. England sought an alliance with Russia to crush Napoleon. There was a new anti-French coalition consisting of England, Russia, Austria, Prussia. At the same time, Russian claims to Turkey and Poland were satisfied. Russian troops moved to Europe. The goal of a great absolutist power outweighed the good fantasies of a liberal young man. But these fantasies remained in his mind, and they will arise again as soon as the right circumstances arise for this.

Already at this time, that perseverance in the fight against Napoleon was manifested, which, despite temporary compromises, Alexander demonstrated in all subsequent years. He refused to meet with the French emperor and the world to resolve controversial issues, demanded that Napoleon withdraw from Austria and Italy, return France to the borders of 1789, which was already an outright utopia. And it was not only the geopolitical issues that separated France and Russia, and Alexander’s unchanged assessments of Napoleon’s personality, but also the fact that the French emperor inflicted a number of personal insults on Alexander: he shot the Duke of Enghien, refused the tsar’s request to award the General with the Order of the Legion of Honor Bennigsen, which the tsar regarded as an allusion to the participation of the general in the murder of Paul; In the same plane, one should regard the publication in the capital's newspaper "Paris Monitor" with the knowledge of Napoleon of an article in which, in response to the accusation in connection with the execution of the duke, it was said about the role of England in the murder of Paul and that the killers escaped retribution. Alexander took this as a personal attack, and the proud sovereign did not forget such things.

On December 2, 1805, the combined Russian-Austrian army, contrary to the warnings of M.I. Kutuzov, met with Napoleon near Austerlitz. The defeat of the allies was complete. Crashed into dust and illusions of Alexander. He led the troops, determined their disposition, was sure of victory ... When the troops fled and the catastrophe became obvious, he burst into tears. Alexander barely escaped captivity that day, having lost contact with the headquarters, with the troops. He took refuge in the hut of a Moravian peasant, then galloped for several hours among the fleeing army, was tired, dirty, did not change his sweaty linen for two days, and lost his luggage. The Cossacks got him wine, and he warmed up a little, fell asleep in a shed on straw. But he was not broken, but only realized that it was necessary to fight with such a rival as Napoleon fully armed with physical and spiritual forces and all the forces of the empire. From now on, for him - extremely proud, claiming to be the benefactor of Russia and Europe, Napoleon became a mortal enemy, and from 1805 he purposefully and stubbornly went to destroy him. But on the way to this there were still new defeats in the fields of Prussia, Tilsit, Erfurt, 1812, the fire of Moscow, the European campaign of the Russian army, new defeats from Napoleon.

Contemporaries noted that after Austerlitz, Alexander changed in many ways. L.N. Engelgard, who closely observed the king at that time, wrote: “The battle of Austerlitz made a great influence on the character of Alexander, and it can be called an era in his reign. Before that, he was meek, trusting, affectionate, and then he became suspicious, strict to immensity, unapproachable and no longer tolerated anyone telling him the truth. From that time on, Arakcheev became a more prominent figure under him, and the activities of the Private Committee gradually faded. And although the tsar's reform efforts continue - still slowly and cautiously - but the time of former hobbies and revelations is already passing: life, the system takes its toll. In fact, the very first encounter with Napoleon taught Alexander a cruel life lesson, which he learned very thoroughly.

This manifested itself already during the negotiations in Tilsit, where the emperors talked face to face in a house on a raft in the middle of the Niemen.

The Peace of Tilsit dramatically reoriented Russian foreign policy. Russia joined the continental blockade against England, was forced to abandon the support of Prussia, which was dismembered by Napoleon, but received a free hand in relation to Turkey and Sweden, which meant that Russia could henceforth take appropriate steps to annex the Danubian principalities - Moldavia and Wallachia, and also Finland. For Russia, such a concession on the part of France was of a fundamental nature. However, in the Polish question, in Alexander's desire to create a united Poland under his crown, Napoleon was adamant: the Duchy of Warsaw remained under the patronage of France. In essence, the monarchs made one of the next divisions of Europe. Alexander showed his charm and friendliness to Napoleon and seems to have deceived him. Napoleon wrote to his wife Josephine from Tilsit: "I just had a meeting with Emperor Alexander, I was extremely pleased with him! This is a young, extremely kind and handsome emperor; he is much smarter than people think." Napoleon, in a conversation with his adjutant Caulaincourt, considered the tsar handsome, intelligent, kind, a man who puts "all the feelings of a good heart in the place where reason should be ..." This was Bonaparte's big mistake and, perhaps, the beginning of his future Defeat. Meanwhile, Alexander wrote to his sister Ekaterina Pavlovna that Bonaparte had one vulnerable feature - his vanity, and that he was ready to sacrifice his pride for the sake of saving Russia. Somewhat later, in a conversation with the Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm III and his wife, the charming Queen Louise, Alexander said: “Be patient, we will return ours. He will break his neck. Despite all my demonstrations and outward actions, in my soul I am your friend and I hope to prove it to you in practice ... At least I will buy time. To them he also advised: "Flatter his vanity." Today, comparing all the facts, all the data about the Tilsit meeting of the two emperors, one cannot help but come to the conclusion that it was really a duel of two prominent personalities , two major politicians. And in this duel, Alexander not only did not lose to the French genius, but also surpassed a hundred. Defeated in the war, having lost the color of its army in the Battle of Friedland, forced to go to peace, Russia, through the efforts of Alexander I, managed to protect its borders from the invasion of a victorious enemy, maintain its prestige, not stand on a par with the defeated, occupied, humiliated Prussia and pushed aside in the supporting roles of Austria, over which the sword of Damocles hung a new blow from Napoleon. Alexander succeeded in these difficult conditions, bearing in mind not only the defeat of his army at Friedland, but also the stubbornness of the Russian army at Preusia-Eylau in February 1807, which shocked Napoleon, to stand on a par with the winner solely due to his diplomatic and political talent. But even after making a number of serious concessions, primarily in the economic field (participation in the continental blockade of England), he achieved certain advantages on the continent, received guarantees in far-reaching prospects. I think that N.K. Schilder was right when, analyzing the confrontation between Napoleon and Alexander in Tilsit, he wrote: "He (Alexander), among the circumstances that arose after June 2 (14) (the day of the battle at Friedland), did everything to save Russia from the inevitable disasters that awaited her and to strengthen her future greatness.The sovereign showed in this matter remarkable stamina, endurance and political insight; if this remarkable feat in his life was not appreciated by his contemporaries, then at least posterity should restore truth and pay due tribute of gratitude to the memory of their crowned leader. These words are all the more significant because immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty of Tilsit, Alexander I experienced the strongest pressure from certain circles of Russian society. It was at this time that the indomitable empress dowager stood at the center of opposition to her son. The Treaty of Tilsit became for her that wonderful occasion that she used to pour out all her unquenched thirst for power, public leadership, from which both Catherine and Pavel, and now Alexander, turned her away for a long time. In addition, she hated Napoleon, who severely treated her native German lands, humiliated Prussia and her royal family. Maria Fedorovna in her salon openly condemned Alexander's new policy, not understanding its forced nature, fueled oppositional moods in society, not being able to calculate the emperor's long-term goals. The wife of Alexander I, Elizaveta Alekseevna, wrote indignantly about this to her mother in Baden in August 1807: to the head of the opposition; all the dissatisfied, whose number is very large, rally around her, glorify her to the skies, and she has never attracted so many people to Pavlovsk as this year. At the same time, opposition circles launched an attack on Speransky, which, in the end, ended in his exile. They also talked about the need to remove Alexander from the throne and replace him with one of the more determined opponents of Napoleon. They even called Ekaterina Pavlovna, but behind all this political fuss, the handwriting of Maria Feodorovna and people close to her was guessed. Thus, in these post-Tilsit days, Alexander I had to fight not only with Napoleonic diplomacy, not only to neutralize the discontent of England and reassure his friends - the Prussian king and queen, but also to resist strong internal opposition, threatening a coup.

Already in these years, Alexander feels an increasingly strong personal loneliness. Always closed, cautious, equally even with everyone, he could be himself only with very close friends - Volkonsky, Golitsyn, the valet. Perhaps this circle of his trusted persons is exhausted. There is not a single woman in it. Even his wife, who was certainly personally devoted to him, did not get here. However, she was intimately connected with other men, and Alexander could not help but know this. He himself, in the end, became a victim of his amorousness and moral promiscuity: there was no woman really close to him around him, to whom he could entrust his innermost thoughts, receive encouragement and consolation.

In 1804, at a ball, he met the dazzling beauty Maria Antonovna Naryshkina, a Polish woman, born Princess Svyatopolk-Chetvertinskaya. Accustomed to quick victories, Alexander this time met with indifferent politeness. Female beauty and self-confidence this time turned out to be stronger than the charm of higher power. Only a few months later, Alexander managed to achieve the favor of a charming polka. She condescended to him as to a sovereign, but remained indifferent to his personal merits. It was a great, long and unhappy love of Alexander. This relationship continued for fifteen years. Naryshkina bore him two daughters and a son, insisted that Alexander divorce Empress Elizaveta Alekseevna and marry her. Alexander, despite all his enthusiasm for Maria Antonovna, persisted and referred to political motives. But by that time he had already soberly assessed his relationship with the beautiful Polish woman, realizing that she was a stranger to him. Already during his first long absence to Tilsit, and later to Erfurt for negotiations with Napoleon, M.A. Naryshkina began to cheat on him with the guards officers. Later, he discovered her connection with his adjutant, Count Ozharovsky. He said a few bitter words to Ozharovsky, but kept it to himself. As for Naryshkina, the emperor pretended that he knew nothing about her adventures; but there was no longer any inner confidence in her. By the way, in the same years, Napoleon was carried away by another beautiful Polish woman and also Maria, Countess Walewska, and also did not acquire lasting and calm happiness with her.

In Tilsit's day this loneliness of Alexander was especially palpable. He had a mother, but she remained his enemy; he had a wife, she was his friend, but he did not have ties of intimacy with her; he had a mistress, but she was not his friend and confidant. And only one person, it seems, sometimes replaced him with a mother, and a friend, and a wife, and, apparently, a mistress - it was his sister Ekaterina Pavlovna, with whom Alexander had close and very personal relations since his youth. His letters to her different years life fully reveals their special feelings. And it is no coincidence that when, after the negotiations in Erfurt, Napoleon asked for her hand, Alexander became furious, and this was one of those secret reasons that determined the cooling of relations between the two European rulers. But before that it was still far away. Ahead was still Erfurt, where Alexander had to continue his difficult game with a brilliant commander and an outstanding politician.

On the way to Erfurt - the second meeting with Napoleon and the next negotiations with him - Alexander I continued this line: restraint, calmness, goodwill, playing on the vanity of the French emperor and the desire to obtain certain foreign policy benefits for Russia. Trade continued over Poland, the straits, Constantinople, the Danubian principalities, Finland, the German states, and so on. At the same time, Alexander sent secret letters to England, calming the British cabinet, expressing his firm desire to fight Bonaparte. Distrust, secrecy, duplicity - this is how Alexander appeared in his relationship with Napoleon in 1807-1808. At the same time, Kolenku was transmitting to Paris the words of Alexander that Napoleon had conquered him in Tilsit.

The meeting in Erfurt brought Russia incomparable success: Napoleon agreed to Russia's annexation of Finland, Moldavia and Wallachia, but opposed the capture of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. At the same time, he forced Russia to take his side in the event of a war between France and Austria. The Russian emperor, saving his unlucky ally, the Prussian king, obtained from France a reduction in indemnity from Prussia. He also insisted on the withdrawal of French troops from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

And here Alexander continued the double game. Talleyrand wrote later in his memoirs: "Napoleon's favors, gifts and impulses were completely in vain. Before leaving Erfurt, Alexander personally wrote a letter to the Emperor of Austria in order to dispel his fears about the meeting."

The negotiations in Erfurt, despite outward cordiality, were very tense. At one point, Napoleon threw his hat on the ground, to which Alexander objected: "You are quick-tempered. I am stubborn. You will not get anything from me with anger. Let's talk, reason, otherwise I will leave."

In Erfurt, Alexander achieved another undoubted success: he enlisted the support of the French Foreign Minister Talleyrand in these negotiations for the future. During a secret audience with Alexander I, Talleyrand said significant words to him, which indicated that the minister was betraying his master: “Sir, why did you come here? You have to save Europe, and you will achieve this, only in no way inferior to Napoleon. The French people are civilized, their sovereign is not civilized. The Russian sovereign is civilized, but his people are not. Therefore, the Russian sovereign must be an ally of the French people."